

Experimenting with Social Norms

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*Fairness and Punishment
in Cross-Cultural Perspective*

Edited by Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich

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CONTENTS

	<i>Illustrations</i>	vii
	<i>Contributors</i>	xix
Part I	Theory, Method, and Comparative Analysis	
Chapter 1	Introduction, Project History, and Guide to the Volume <i>Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich</i>	3
Chapter 2	Theoretical Foundations: The Coevolution of Social Norms, Intrinsic Motivation, Markets, and the Institutions of Complex Societies <i>Joseph Henrich and Jean Ensminger</i>	19
Chapter 3	Cross-Cultural Methods, Sites, and Variables <i>Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, and Joseph Henrich</i>	45
Chapter 4	Major Empirical Results: Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment <i>Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, and Richard McElreath</i>	89
Chapter 5	Double-Blind Dictator Games in Africa and the United States: Differential Experimenter Effects <i>Carolyn K. Lesorogol and Jean Ensminger</i>	149
<i>Chapters 6–18 are available for download at https://www.russellsage.org/publications/experimenting-social-norms.</i>		
Part II	Society Case Studies	
Chapter 6	Better to Receive Than to Give: Hadza Behavior in Three Experimental Economic Games <i>Frank W. Marlowe</i>	161
Chapter 7	Cruel to Be Kind: Effects of Sanctions and Third-Party Enforcers on Generosity in Papua New Guinea <i>David P. Tracer, Ivo Mueller, and Jennifer Morse</i>	177
Chapter 8	The Tsimane' Rarely Punish: An Experimental Investigation of Dictators, Ultimatums, and Punishment <i>Michael D. Gurven</i>	197
Chapter 9	Fairness Without Punishment: Behavioral Experiments in the Yasawa Islands, Fiji <i>Joseph Henrich and Natalie Henrich</i>	225
Chapter 10	Economic Game Behavior Among the Shuar <i>H. Clark Barrett and Kevin J. Haley</i>	259

Chapter 11	Economic Experimental Game Results from the Sursurunga of New Ireland, Papua New Guinea <i>Alexander H. Bolyanatz</i>	275
Chapter 12	Maragoli and Gusii Farmers in Kenya: Strong Collective Action and High Prosocial Punishment <i>Edwins Laban Gwako</i>	309
Chapter 13	Sharing, Subsistence, and Social Norms in Northern Siberia <i>John P. Ziker</i>	337
Chapter 14	Gifts or Entitlements: The Influence of Property Rights and Institutions for Third-Party Sanctioning on Behavior in Three Experimental Economic Games <i>Carolyn K. Lesorogol</i>	357
Chapter 15	Cooperation and Punishment in an Economically Diverse Community in Highland Tanzania <i>Richard McElreath</i>	377
Chapter 16	Social Preferences Among the People of Sanquianga in Colombia <i>Juan-Camilo Cardenas</i>	391
Chapter 17	The Effects of Birthplace and Current Context on Other-Regarding Preferences in Accra <i>Abigail Barr</i>	421
Chapter 18	Prosociality in Rural America: Evidence from Dictator, Ultimatum, Public Goods, and Trust Games <i>Jean Ensminger and Kathleen Cook</i>	445
	<i>Index</i>	465

ILLUSTRATIONS

Table 3.1	Samples Sites and Mean Market Integration	49
Table 3.2	Ethnographic Summary of Societies in the Study	52
Table 3.3	Mean Demographics, by Society	61
Table 4.1	Mean Summary Statistics on Offers and Rejections, by Society	102
Table 4.2	Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game: Linear Regressions for All Offers	107
Table 4.3	Linear Regressions for Dictator Game Offers	110
Table 4.4	Linear Regressions for Ultimatum Game Offers	113
Table 4.5	Linear Regressions for Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	115
Table 4.6	Linear Regressions for Offers in the Ultimatum Game and the Third-Party Punishment Game With and Without the Mean Minimum Acceptable Offer as a Predictor	116
Table 4.7	Linear Regressions on the Difference Between Mean Dictator Game and Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	119
Table 4.8	Linear Regressions for the Difference in Ultimatum Game and Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	119
Table 4.9	Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in the Third-Party Punishment Game, Using Community Size	123
Table 4.10	Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in the Third-Party Punishment Game, Using LNCS	125
Table 4.11	Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in the Ultimatum Game, Using Community Size	127
Table 4.12	Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in the Ultimatum Game, Using LNCS	128
Table 5.1	Statistical Tests of Null Hypothesis Comparing Offers for the Double-Blind Dictator Game and the Dictator Game for Each Site	154
Table 6.1	Results in the 2002 Round Compared to the 1998 Rounds	165
Table 6.2	Linear Regressions of Hadza Dictator Game Offers	167
Table 6.3	Linear Regressions of Hadza Ultimatum Game Offers	167
Table 6.4	Linear Regressions of Hadza Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	169
Table 6.5	Linear Regressions of Hadza Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	171
Table 6.6	Linear Regressions of Hadza Third-Party Punishment Game Minimum Nonpunished Offers	171

Table 7.1	Linear Regressions of Au Dictator Game Offers	190
Table 7.2	Linear Regressions of Au Ultimatum Game Offers	191
Table 7.3	Linear Regressions of Au Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	192
Table 7.4	Linear Regressions of Au Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	193
Table 7.5	Linear Regressions of Au Lowest Game Offers Not Punished in Third-Party Punishment Game	194
Table 8.1	Statistical Comparison of Game Samples Drawn from the Tsimane', Hadza, and Germans	205
Table 8.2	Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Dictator Game Offers	206
Table 8.3	Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Ultimatum Game Offers	209
Table 8.4	Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	211
Table 8.5	Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	215
Table 8.6	Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Third-Party Punishment Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	216
Table 9.1	Comparison of Yasawan Offer Distributions	229
Table 9.2	Linear Regressions of Yasawan Dictator Game Offers	236
Table 9.3	Linear Regressions of Yasawan Ultimatum Game Offers	237
Table 9.4	Linear Regressions of Yasawan Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	238
Table 9.5	Linear Regressions of Yasawan Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	239
Table 9.6	Linear Regressions of Yasawan Third-Party Punishment Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	240
Table 9.7	Genetic Relatedness on Behavioral Measures	241
Table 9.8	Market Integration Variables	242
Table 9.9	Correlation Coefficients for Market Integration	243
Table 9.10	Experimenter Effects on Behavioral Measures	244
Table 9.11	Number of Examples Used to Explain the Games	245
Table 9.12	Number of Responses to the Question: "How Much Should Player 1 Send to Player 2?"	246
Table 9.13	Number of Responses to the Question: "In the Third-Party Punishment Game, if Player 1 Sent \$0 to Player 2 and Kept \$20, How Would Players 2 and 3 Feel?"	246
Table 9.14	Number of Responses to the Question: "In the Ultimatum Game, How Would You Feel if You Received an Offer of \$0 from Player 1?"	246
Table 9.15	Number of Responses to the Question: "What Does This Game Remind You Of?"	247
Table 9.16	Cooperative Activities in Teci and Dalomo	252

Table 10.1	Linear Regressions of Shuar Dictator Game Offers	267
Table 10.2	Linear Regressions of Shuar Ultimatum Game Offers	269
Table 10.3	Linear Regressions of Shuar Ultimatum Game Minimal Acceptable Offers	269
Table 10.4	Linear Regressions of Shuar Third-Party Punishment Game Offers	270
Table 10.5	Linear Regressions of Shuar Lowest Unpunished Offers in the Third-Party Punishment Game	270
Table 11.1	Reduction in Wage Labor in New Ireland Province, 1990 to 2000	276
Table 11.2	Household Economic Activity in Northern and Southern New Ireland Province, 2010	277
Table 11.3	Dictator Game Player 1 Offers	285
Table 11.4	Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers and Six Demographic Variables	286
Table 11.5	Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers and Household Wealth	287
Table 11.6	Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers and Land	288
Table 11.7	Ultimatum Game Player 2 MAOs	289
Table 11.8	Ultimatum Game Player 2 Minimum Acceptable Offers	290
Table 11.9	Player 1 in Dictator Game Compared to Player 1 in Third-Party Punishment Game	291
Table 11.10	Third-Party Punishment Game Player 1 Offers	292
Table 11.11	Third-Party Punishment Game Player 3 Highest Offer Punished	293
Table 11.12	Sursurunga Postgame Responses to the Question: "Did This Game Remind You of Any Aspect of Customary Life?" by Range of Offer	294
Table 11.13	Aggregated Results of Table 11.12	294
Table 11.14	Sursurunga Player 2 Rejections of Fifty-Fifty Offers in the Ultimatum Game	301
Table 12.1	Demographic Differences Between Maragoli and Gusii Players	320
Table 12.2	Linear Regressions of Dictator Game Offers for the Maragoli and the Gusii	331
Table 12.3	Linear Regressions of Ultimatum Game Offers for the Maragoli and the Gusii	332
Table 12.4	Linear Regressions of Combined Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Offers for the Maragoli and the Gusii	333
Table 12.5	Linear Regressions of Third-Party Punishment Game Offers for the Maragoli and the Gusii	333
Table 12.6	Linear Regressions of Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Ultimatum Game for the Maragoli and the Gusii	335
Table 12.7	Linear Regressions of Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Third-Party Punishment Game for the Maragoli and the Gusii	335

Table 13.1	Linear Regressions of Ust'-Avam Dictator Game Offers	349
Table 13.2	Linear Regressions of Ust'-Avam Ultimatum Game Offers	350
Table 13.3	Linear Regressions of Ust'-Avam Minimum Acceptable Offers	351
Table 14.1	Mann-Whitney Test on Dictator Game Offers in Mbaringon, 2001 and 2003	365
Table 14.2	Mann-Whitney Test on Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Offers in Mbaringon	365
Table 14.3	Correlations of Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Offers in Mbaringon, 2003	367
Table 14.4	Linear Regressions of Mbaringon Offers, Dictator Game 2003	370
Table 14.5	Linear Regressions of Mbaringon Ultimatum Game Offers, 2003	370
Table 14.6	Linear Regressions of Mbaringon Third-Party Punishment Game Offers, 2003	371
Table 14.7	Linear Regressions of Mbaringon Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Ultimatum Game, 2003	371
Table 14.8	Linear Regressions of Mbaringon Lowest Unpunished Offers in the Third-Party Punishment Game, 2003	372
Table 15.1	Regressions of Six Standard Variables Against Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game Offers, UG Minimum Acceptable Offers, and TPG Minimum Unpunished Offers	386
Table 15.2	Regressions of Six Standard and Five Ethnicity Variables Against Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game Offers, UG Minimum Acceptable Offers, and TPG Minimum Unpunished Offers	387
Table 15.3	Pairwise Correlations Between Five Measures of Market Integration	388
Table 15.4	Regressions Using Market Integration Variables Against Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game Offers, UG Minimum Acceptable Offers, and TPG Minimum Unpunished Offers	389
Table 16.1	Urban and Rural Populations of the Main Municipalities in the Coastal Region of Nariño	395
Table 16.2	Demographic Variables for the Sanquianga Sample	395
Table 16.3	Correlation Coefficients for Market Integration Variables	397
Table 16.4	Sanquianga Sample Size, by Experiment	399
Table 16.5	Frequency of Rejection in the Ultimatum Game and Punishment in the Third-Party Punishment Game and Expected Income for Both Games	404
Table 16.6	Schedules of Acceptances by Thirty Player 2s in the Ultimatum Game	406
Table 16.7	Dictator Game Offers Explained by Demographic Variables	410

Table 16.8	Strategy Method Ultimatum Game Offers Explained by Demographic Variables	411
Table 16.9	Minimum Acceptable Offers by Player 2s in the Strategy Method Ultimatum Game	411
Table 16.10	Third-Party Punishment Game Offers Explained by Demographic Variable	412
Table 16.11	Frequency of Offers by Player 1s in the Sealed-Envelope Dictator Game	413
Table 17.1	Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Ghanaian Manufacturing Employees	424
Table 17.2	Means of Behavioral Variables for Urban-Born and Rural-Born Employees	431
Table 17.3	Explanatory Power of Ethnic, Religion, and Employer Dummies (<i>p</i> -Values)	433
Table 17.4	Explaining Variations in Offers in the Dictator Game	435
Table 17.5	Explaining Variations in Offers in the Ultimatum Game	436
Table 17.6	Explaining Variations in Offers in the Third-Party Punishment Game	437
Table 17.7	Explaining Variations in the Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Ultimatum Game	439
Table 17.8	Explaining Variations in the Maximum Acceptable Offers in the Ultimatum Game	440
Table 17.9	Explaining Variations in the Minimum Unpunished Offers in the Third-Party Punishment Game	441
Table 18.1	Hamilton Demographics, by Game	450
Table 18.2	Linear Regressions of Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Ultimatum Game	458
Table 18.3	Linear Regressions of Offers in the Public Goods Game	459
Table 18.4	Linear Regressions of Offers in the Trust Game (Player 1)	461
Table 18.5	Linear Regressions of Returns in the Trust Game (Player 2)	462
Figure 3.1	The Global Distribution of Our Populations	50
Figure 4.1	The Dictator Game: Distribution of Offers	92
Figure 4.2	The Ultimatum Game: Distribution of Rejections (top) and Offers (bottom)	94
Figure 4.3	The Third-Party Punishment Game: Distribution of Punishment (top) and Offers (bottom)	100
Figure 4.4	Mean Dictator Game Offers for Each Population, Plotted Against Mean Value of Market Integration	109
Figure 4.5	Mean Dictator Game Offers for Each Population Plotted Against Both Their Mean Offers in the Third-Party Punishment Game and in the Ultimatum Game	117

Figure 4.6	Community Size Predicting Third-Party Punishment Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	124
Figure 4.7	LNCS Predicting Third-Party Punishment Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	124
Figure 4.8	Community Size Predicting Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	129
Figure 4.9	LNCS Predicting Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable Offers	129
Figure 5.1	Dictator Game and Double-Blind Dictator Game Offers in Each Site	153
Figure 6.1	Demographic Characteristics of the Hadza	164
Figure 6.2	Hadza Offers in the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game	165
Figure 6.3	Hadza Dictator Game Offers by Head of Household Status	166
Figure 6.4	Hadza Ultimatum Game Offers by Head of Household Status	168
Figure 6.5	Hadza Third-Party Punishment Game Offers by Head of Household Status	170
Figure 6.6	Expected Income for the Ultimatum Game and the Third-Party Punishment Game, Based on Rejection and Punishment	170
Figure 6.7	2002 Dictator Game Offers Combined with 1998 Dictator Game Offers	172
Figure 6.8	2002 Ultimatum Game Offers Combined with 1998 Ultimatum Game Offers	173
Figure 7.1	Comparison of Gender Distribution of the Samples at Weis and Wulukum	183
Figure 7.2	Comparison of Household Size of the Samples at Weis and Wulukum	184
Figure 7.3	Comparison of Educational Attainment of the Samples at Weis and Wulukum	184
Figure 7.4	Comparison of Frequency of Attendance at Christian Religious Services at Weis and Wulukum	185
Figure 7.5	Comparison of Proficiency in the National Language (English) at Weis and Wulukum	186
Figure 7.6	Comparison of Annual Income of Individuals at Weis and Wulukum	186
Figure 7.7	Comparison of Wealth of Households at Weis and Wulukum	187
Figure 7.8	Offer Amounts in the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Third-Party Punishment Games	188
Figure 7.9	Frequency of Rejection in the Ultimatum Game and Punishment in the Third-Party Punishment Game and Corresponding Expected Incomes, by Offer Percentage	189

Figure 8.1	Predictor Variables for Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Offers by the Tsimane'	203
Figure 8.2	Offer Distributions for the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game	204
Figure 8.3	Dictator Game Behavior for Repeat Players in 2000 and 2002	207
Figure 8.4	Rejection, Punishment, and Expected Income in the Ultimatum Game and the Third-Party Punishment Game	210
Figure 8.5	Predictor Variables for Third-Party Punishment Game Offers by the Tsimane'	214
Figure 9.1	Yasawan Offer Distribution for the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game	229
Figure 9.2	Comparison of Yasawan and Emory Student Offer Distributions	231
Figure 9.3	Comparison of the Distributions of Player 2 Rejections in the Ultimatum Game Across All Possible Offers for Yasawans and Emory Students	232
Figure 9.4	Comparison of Yasawan Rejections Made Across Possible Offers by Player 2s in the Ultimatum Game and Player 3s in the Third-Party Punishment Game	233
Figure 9.5	Comparison of Third-Party Punishment Game Offers Among Yasawans and Emory Students	234
Figure 9.6	Age, Education, Individual Income, and Household Wealth of Yasawans, per Household Member	235
Figure 9.7	Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Offers Showing Correlations Among Yasawans and Emory Students	238
Figure 9.8	Yasawan Market Integration Variables: MI2, MI3, MI4, and MI5	242
Figure 9.9	Yasawan and Emory Ultimatum Game Offers, Overlaid with Expected Income Curves Derived from Distribution of Rejections	248
Figure 10.1	Demographic Characteristics of the Shuar Sample for All Three Games (Pooled)	262
Figure 10.2	Player 1 Offer Amounts in the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game	266
Figure 10.3	Frequency of Rejections or Punishment in the Ultimatum Game and the Third-Party Punishment Game	268
Figure 11.1	Sursurunga Sample: Age	279
Figure 11.2	Sursurunga Sample: Sex	280
Figure 11.3	Sursurunga Sample: Education	280
Figure 11.4	Sursurunga Sample: Annual Income	281

Figure 11.5	Sursurunga Sample: Household Wealth	281
Figure 11.6	Sursurunga Sample: Household Size	282
Figure 11.7	Sursurunga Sample: Dictator Game Player 1 Offers	284
Figure 11.8	Sursurunga Sample: Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers	295
Figure 11.9	Sursurunga Sample: Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Player 1 Offers	296
Figure 11.10	Sursurunga Sample: Ultimatum Game Player 2 Rejected Offers	297
Figure 11.11	Sursurunga Sample: Ultimatum Game Player 2 Minimum Acceptable Offers	297
Figure 11.12	Sursurunga Sample: Third-Party Punishment Game Player 1 Offers	297
Figure 11.13	Sursurunga Sample: Third-Party Punishment Game Player 1 Offers Punished by Player 3	298
Figure 11.14	Third-Party Punishment Game Results from Highland New Guinea	299
Figure 11.15	Sursurunga Sample: Player 1 Offers Across All Three Games	299
Figure 11.16	The Relationships of the Four Sursurunga Subjects Who Rejected All Offers Except 100 Percent in the Dictator Game	302
Figure 12.1	Maragoli and Gusii Players' Age Distribution	320
Figure 12.2	Maragoli and Gusii Players' Sex Distribution	321
Figure 12.3	Maragoli and Gusii Players' Education	321
Figure 12.4	Maragoli and Gusii Players' Number of Children	322
Figure 12.5	Maragoli and Gusii Players' Annual Income	322
Figure 12.6	Maragoli and Gusii Players' Wealth	323
Figure 12.7	Maragoli and Gusii Players' Wage Labor	323
Figure 12.8	Maragoli Dictator Game Offers (N = 25)	325
Figure 12.9	Gusii Dictator Game Offers (N = 25)	325
Figure 12.10	Maragoli Ultimatum Game Offers (N = 25)	326
Figure 12.11	Gusii Ultimatum Game Offers (N = 25)	326
Figure 12.12	Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Offers by Individual Maragoli Players	327
Figure 12.13	Maragoli Offers in the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game	328
Figure 12.14	Gusii Offers in the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game	328
Figure 12.15	Maragoli Expected Income in the Ultimatum Game and the Third-Party Punishment Game	330
Figure 12.16	Gusii Expected Income in the Ultimatum Game and the Third-Party Punishment Game	330

Figure 13.1	Location of Ust'-Avam, Taimyr Autonomous Region, Russian Federation	338
Figure 13.2	Distribution of Offers in the Dictator Game and the Ultimatum Game in Ust'-Avam, 2003	346
Figure 13.3	Distribution of Rejections in the Ultimatum Game and Expected Income for Player 1 in Ust'-Avam, 2003	347
Figure 14.1	Sex of Mbaringon Participants in Games	360
Figure 14.2	Age of Mbaringon Participants in Games	361
Figure 14.3	Years of Schooling in Mbaringon Sample	361
Figure 14.4	National Language Proficiency in Mbaringon Sample	362
Figure 14.5	Household Size in Mbaringon Sample	362
Figure 14.6	Individual Total Annual Income in Mbaringon Sample	363
Figure 14.7	Total Household Wealth in Mbaringon Sample	363
Figure 14.8	Mbaringon Offers in the Dictator Game	364
Figure 14.9	Mbaringon Ultimatum Game Offers (N = 31)	366
Figure 14.10	Scatter Plot of Mbaringon Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game Offers	366
Figure 14.11	Mbaringon Rejections and Expected Income in the Ultimatum Game and the Third-Party Punishment Game	367
Figure 14.12	Mbaringon Offers in the Third-Party Punishment Game (N = 30)	368
Figure 15.1	Game Participants in Isanga, Divided by Ethnic Affiliation	381
Figure 15.2	Isanga Offer Amounts in the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Third-Party Punishment Games	383
Figure 15.3	Frequency of Rejection (UG) and Punishment (TPG) in Isanga Sample and Expected Income for Player 1s	383
Figure 15.4	Distributions of Five Basic Independent Variables Used in the Regressions	384
Figure 15.5	Distributions of Independent Variables, Ethnic Group Frequency, and the Five Market Integration Variables	385
Figure 16.1	Location of Sanquianga Field Site on the Pacific Coast of Colombia	394
Figure 16.2	Distributions in Sanquianga for the Five Market Integration Indices (N = 186)	396
Figure 16.3	Distribution of Wealth in Productive Assets Valued at Local Prices in the Sanquianga Sample	398
Figure 16.4	Distribution of Income from Wage Labor, Trading, Profits, and Remittances in the Sample of Sanquianga	398
Figure 16.5	Frequency of Offers by Player 1s in the Dictator Game, the Strategy Method Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game	402

Figure 16.6	Frequency of Rejection in the Ultimatum Game and Punishment in the Third-Party Punishment Game and Expected Income for Both Games	404
Figure 16.7	Frequency of Minimum Acceptable Offers for Player 2s in the Ultimatum Game	408
Figure 16.8	Distribution of Offers in the Initial Dictator Game and in the Sealed-Envelope Dictator Game	414
Figure 16.9	Distribution of Third-Party Punishment Game Offers by Player 1s in Amarales and Bazán	417
Figure 17.1	Distribution of Age, Sex, Education, Income, Siblings, Children, Time in Current Workforce, and Place of Birth for Full Accra Sample	426
Figure 17.2	Offers in the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Third-Party Punishment Games	429
Figure 17.3	Expected Income in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games	430
Figure 17.4	Offers Made by Urban-Born Employees and by Rural-Born Migrant Employees	432
Figure 17.5	Rejection and Fining Functions for Urban-Born and Rural-Born Employees	432
Figure 18.1	Hamilton Age Distribution	451
Figure 18.2	Hamilton Sex Distribution	451
Figure 18.3	Hamilton Education Distribution	452
Figure 18.4	Hamilton Individual Income Distribution	452
Figure 18.5	Hamilton Household Wealth Distribution	453
Figure 18.6	Hamilton Household Size Distribution	453
Figure 18.7	Dictator Game Offers (N = 15)	454
Figure 18.8	Strategy Method Ultimatum Game Offers (N = 26)	456
Figure 18.9	Strategy Method Ultimatum Game Rejections (Player 2)	457
Figure 18.10	Public Goods Game	458
Figure 18.11	Trust Game Offers (Player 1; N = 26)	460
Figure 18.12	Trust Game Returns (Player 2; N = 24)	461
Photo 3.1	The Phase 2 Research Team and Advisers at the California Institute of Technology	46
Photo 3.2	The Third-Party Punishment Game	64

Photo 3.3	The Ultimatum Game Among the Tsimane'	66
Photo 3.4	Preparing for Game Instruction	67
Photo 3.5	The Third-Party Punishment Game Among the Au	69
Photo 13.1	Reading a Game Protocol	344
Photo 13.2	Game Participants and Research Assistant Listening to the DG Protocol After Filling Out Player Data Sheets	353
Photo 16.1	Mangrove Forest in the Pacific South, Nariño	393
Photo 16.2	Researcher with a Dictator Game Participant	400
Photo 16.3	Sanquianga Participants Waiting for Their Turn in the Games and a Monitor Filling Out Survey Forms with a Participant	401

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Part I

*Theory, Method, and
Comparative Analysis*