FEAR, ANXIETY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
The Russell Sage Foundation

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Introduction

Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity: Immigration and Belonging in North America and Western Europe

NANCY FONER AND PATRICK SIMON

After more than fifty years of large-scale immigration, western European and North American societies have been dramatically transformed by the huge inflows that have altered the composition of their populations in profound ways and created remarkable—new—ethnic, racial, and religious diversity. A crucial issue concerns whether the newcomers, and especially their second-generation children, are included in, or excluded from, the prevailing national identity and come to feel that they belong. Now that a second, and indeed third, generation has come or is coming of age it is more pressing than ever to understand whether others recognize them—and they see themselves—as truly belonging to the societies that have been their home since birth.

This issue is of special importance given developments on both sides of the Atlantic. In much of western Europe, the rise in concerns about national identity in the last two decades is notable. In the Netherlands, a nationalistic backlash followed the 2004 sensational murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the streets of Amsterdam by a Dutch-born Muslim fundamentalist of Moroccan origin, and the last decade has seen intense public debates there on Islam and the integration of the second generation. In Britain, the deadly July 7 London bombings in 2005 (fifty-two people were killed) by three second-generation Pakistanis and a Jamaican convert to Islam strengthened worries about “home-grown Muslim terrorists.” In general, anxiety continues in Britain about the consequences of fragmentation and segregation along ethnic community lines. France has also witnessed debates about the integration of immigrants and the second generation, with growing concern about
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ethnic and racial discrimination and threats to national identity since the riots of 2005 and, most recently in January 2015, the terror attacks in Paris by second-generation French Muslims, killing a dozen people in and around the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, a police woman in the street, and four in a kosher supermarket. Germany may not have experienced similar murders, bombings, or riots but it too has seen heated public discussions about national identity and the failure of immigrant integration and, in 2014 and early 2015, rallies against the influence of Islam organized under the banner of a new political movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West). Scandinavian countries—which have long promoted tolerance for immigrants and practiced a mild multiculturalism, Sweden being considered a forerunner in this respect in Europe—have seen the rise of anti-immigrant mobilizations in recent decades and a concern that immigrants are threatening the cultural cohesiveness of their societies and the welfare state.1

Debates throughout Europe have been problematized by scholars as, among other things, related to a backlash against multiculturalism, a “restrictive turn,” the “return of assimilation,” and the use of cultural and social differences to heighten the salience of symbolic boundaries between us and them.2 The debates have been accompanied by the adoption of new civic tests for naturalization in many European countries that represent an ideal version of the nation and require skills and knowledge that even most long-established residents do not possess.3

The widely held anxieties over immigrant integration and national identity are reflected in, and have been intensified by, often-quoted statements by leading public figures such as German chancellor Angela Merkel in 2010 on the failure of the MultiKulti creed in Germany, British prime minister David Cameron in 2011 on how state multiculturalism has led to different cultures with separate lives apart from the mainstream, and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2011 on the need to shore up French republican values and their importance to what it means to be French. In many European countries, fears and worries about the “lack of integration” of immigrants and the second generation have focused heavily on concerns about Muslims, who are viewed as challenging, indeed undermining, basic norms and values associated with modern western democracies.4 Populist parties have capitalized on and reinforced nativist views, putting these views at the center of political debate in European societies.5 Indeed, the 2014 election for the European parliament saw an unprecedented upsurge in the voting strength of populist and anti-immigrant parties. In Britain, Denmark, and France, these parties, which made clear a willingness to stop immigration and to institute various preferences for long-established natives, attracted a remarkably high share of voters, France’s National Front (FN, Front National) getting
25 percent and the Danish People’s Party (DF, Dansk Folkeparti) and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) each getting 27 percent in their countries.

Across the Atlantic, public debates are less focused on national identity issues and fears of cultural fragmentation. Becoming American and becoming Canadian are seen as less problematic. Although levels of anxiety about national identity are not the same as in western Europe, nativist fears have bubbled to the surface. In Canada, especially Quebec, passionate debates on the “reasonable accommodation” of religious practices and rituals have arisen, with Muslim practices particularly at issue. In the United States, concerns have been voiced about Islam and Muslim immigrants’ fitting into the nation since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. It is Latinos, however, especially the millions of undocumented, who have been the focus of alarm and often seen as a threat to the American nation.

The essays in this book explore these fears and anxieties about national identity and issues of belonging through case studies of several western European countries—the Netherlands (chapter 5), Britain (chapter 6), and Germany (chapter 7)—and, on the other side of the Atlantic, the United States (chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4) and Canada (chapter 2). All of these countries have had to deal with incorporating millions of immigrants whose ethnic, racial, and national backgrounds differ from those of many long-established residents, and who display a variety of languages, religions, cultures, and lifestyles. Immigrants and the second generation make up about a fifth or more of the population in each of the five countries, Canada at the high end (38 percent) and Britain at the low end (18 percent), and Germany (19 percent), the Netherlands (21 percent), and the United States (25 percent) in between. In actual numbers, the United States stands out with around 77 million first- and second-generation immigrants, more than twice the total Canadian population and more than four times the Dutch. As the chapters show, the five countries represent a variety of different institutional approaches and policies to immigration and diversity. Moreover, fears and anxieties among long-established natives about whether immigrants and their descendants can be truly part of the nation have developed in each of the countries in particular ways.

Although the chapters touch on reasons some native elites have adopted nativist stances, the main concerns throughout the book are different. A major focus is the sense of inclusion into, or exclusion from, national membership that those of immigrant origin experience, whether they are called immigrants and the second generation or ethnic, racial, or religious minorities. In addition, two related questions are key: What forces account for the openness or barriers to national belonging and acceptance for these minorities in the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic? What are the anxieties about the incorporation of individuals of immigrant
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origin that stand out in the United States—and how do they differ from those that are prominent in western Europe?

In this introductory chapter, we do several things, with an eye on Europe–North America comparisons. We begin by considering why fears and anxieties about immigrant origin populations and their incorporation have taken different forms in western Europe and North America, exploring why the religious divide is more central in Europe and legal status and race especially pronounced in the United States. Drawing on the analyses in the volume’s chapters, we then look at whether—and to what degree—immigrants and especially their children are seen as being insiders and part of the nation in different countries. We analyze why, despite especially profound inequalities and barriers based on race and legal status in the United States, the United States and Canada are more inclusive in extending a national identity to those of immigrant origin than western European societies. We conclude by briefly looking ahead to the future and to the prospect of changes on both sides of the Atlantic.

Fears about Immigrants and Barriers to Inclusion

On one level, many pervasive fears and anxieties about whether those of immigrant origin can, or should, be full members of the nation can be considered a matter of basic nativism. Nativism is what the historian John Higham referred to as an intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign connections or, as Gary Gerstle puts it in chapter 1, that they are not like us, the native-born keepers of the nation’s traditions.6 A nativist reaction, among at least some of the longer-settled majority population and involving discourses about the impossibility of assimilation, is a phenomenon in most societies experiencing an inflow of massive numbers of immigrants whose ethnic and racial backgrounds, and cultural and religious allegiances, are perceived as unlike those of established residents. Views about “unmeltable” differences are fueled by the attachments of newcomers to traditions and identities often seen as at odds with national cohesion.7

As the chapters in this book indicate, worries about the loss of cultural hegemony in the face of massive immigration, and the dangers that immigration and new diversity pose to core national cultural beliefs and practices, underpin concerns about those of immigrant origin held by some politicians, public intellectuals, and opinion leaders as well as by many in the general public in both Europe and North America. The British Labour and Conservative Party politicians that Nasar Meer, Varun Uberoi, and Tariq Modood discuss in chapter 6 were sincerely wrestling, often in complex and contradictory ways, with the tortured public debate about how to reconcile British values and traditions with those in the large Bangladeshi
and Pakistani Muslim communities. Other chapters in this volume suggest that politicians (most commonly, but not exclusively, on the Right) may, at times, benefit from—and in the process further stoke—concerns about threats to mainstream culture in their quest to bolster support and gain votes. The Netherlands is a pertinent example. Although the country is well known for its progressive social policies, anti-immigrant, populist politicians have gained seats in the Dutch national parliament by defending traditional national identities against the perceived onslaught of newcomers, especially Muslims.

Fears and anxiety about immigrants have other roots, as well. On the European Left, as Irene Bloemraad notes in chapter 2, some public figures have worried that continued immigration will undermine the welfare state by undercutting the social cohesion and sense of common identity needed for redistribution policies. Marieke Slootman and Jan Willem Duyvendak point in chapter 5 to another dynamic operating in the Netherlands. Many Dutch politicians feel that the more tolerant policies adopted in previous decades failed to produce the successful integration of immigrants and their children and believe (or hope) that a less tolerant approach will be more effective—an approach supported by many of their native Dutch constituents. In Europe and in North America, competition for resources may also be at play: many long-established natives worry that newcomers and their children will reduce their own access to jobs, housing, and other valued benefits and opportunities. In the United States, many white Americans see the growing population of racial minorities—which has been fueled by immigration—as threatening white political and economic advantages and dominance.

Religion

A central, comparative, transatlantic question is why particular fears about immigrants—and whether, and how, they can be incorporated into the nation—are more or less prominent in public discourse in Europe as compared to North America, especially the United States. This brings us to a consideration of particular barriers to integration, beginning with religion. Why is religion a more central divide and barrier to the inclusion of immigrant minorities in western Europe, whereas inequalities based on legal status and race are more serious bases for exclusion in the United States? The answer is linked to the composition of immigrant flows and, perhaps even more important, historically rooted social, political, and economic institutions in the different receiving societies.

The domain of immigrant religion—in particular, Islam—has become of pivotal importance as a source of exclusion in western Europe, as the chapters on Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands indicate. On one side are worries about Islam in the international political sphere and terrorist
networks and the links to local integration. These are evident in recent concerns about the radicalization of young European Muslims and the involvement of some in wars in Iraq and Syria in the name of the jihad. Religion in western Europe is also—and very significantly—at the heart of fears about whether many immigrants and their children can truly belong. A central issue among vocal critics of Islam, and a concern among a substantial portion of the population, is that Islam is threatening the liberal values of European states, such as free speech and equal rights for women and homosexuals. As John Bowen and his colleagues note,

> Across a wide political spectrum, public figures denounce Islam for its retrograde values. Some claim that Islam is incompatible with the values of Europe and European states, that Muslims are irreducibly foreign because they will not or cannot abandon pre-Enlightenment values. Framing Islam as a set of values intrinsically incompatible with Europe implies that Muslims must choose between abandoning their religion and remaining outside the boundaries of the true European citizenry. . . . Western European states have [in response] tried to define national identities as reservoirs of values for citizenship: Dutch values, French laïcité . . . Britishness. . . . By doing so they have transformed what had been values of liberal citizenship into values of cultural distinctiveness.⁹

> Statements like that of Geert Wilders, the popular leader of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, may be extreme and condemned by many but have become part of Dutch public discourse. Wilders, whose party was at the top of the polls in 2013, has called Islam a backward religion. “If we do not stop Islamification now,” he has said, “Eurabia and Netherabia will just be a matter of time. . . . We are heading for the end of European civilization . . . as we know it.”¹⁰ In Germany, a best-selling book by Thilo Sarrazin, who served on the board of Germany’s central bank, blames Muslims for lowering the nation’s intelligence level and argues that immigration and high birth rates will eventually turn Germany into a Muslim country. Throughout Europe, conflicts have developed over Muslim practices, including ritual animal slaughter, mosque building, the call to prayer, and, most visible of all, wearing the headscarf and niqab (full-face veil).¹¹ In the Netherlands, as Slootman and Duyvendak note in chapter 5, these Muslim practices, as well as pronouncements by ultra-orthodox imams and Islam-inspired political extremists, are popular subjects in the media, where they are often portrayed as threatening to destroy, damage, and undermine Dutch culture.

In chapter 7, Thomas Faist and Christian Ulbricht speak of symbolic exclusion in which certain cultural beliefs and practices associated with migrants are devalued—and those associated with long-established Germans are valorized. They cite the prime minister of one German
state, who argued that Christendom and Islam are fundamentally incom-
patible as long as no liberalized European Islam exists. Migrants of Muslim
origin are commonly disparaged for their supposed sociocultural back-
wardness and failure to integrate into German society. In Germany as
elsewhere, the legacy, and memory, of the terrorist attacks of September
11 have strengthened fears that Muslims are not loyal citizens but
manipulated from abroad. Faist and Ulbricht also provide a fascinating
analysis of the strategic use of the concept of a German Leitkultur (guid-
ing culture) by conservative Christian Democrats—a concept associated
with certain civil liberties and human rights and implicitly contrasted
with the “other culture” of Islam. Reference to this concept is a way
political figures can appeal to many in the German majority popula-
tion and distinguish the Christian Democratic Party from liberal politi-
cal parties. At the same time, by not naming Islam, Faist and Ulbricht
argue, the concept of a German Leitkultur implicitly refers to ethnic
markers without declaring so openly and thus seeks to avoid alienating
spokespeople for Muslim organizations (and no doubt at least some
Muslim voters).

Anti-Muslim sentiments are of course present in the United States, which,
among other things, has witnessed hate crimes and bias incidents against
Muslims in the wake of September 11, state surveillance of Muslims, and a
number of controversies over the building of mosques. Yet Islam has not
aroused the same bitter reaction as it has in western Europe, nor is it as fre-
quent a subject of public debate about whether immigrants are fitting in.
Immigration debates in the United States, as Jocelyne Cesari writes, have
not been Islamicized, or systematically connected with anti-Islamic rheto-
ic, as they have in much of western Europe. Muslims in the United States
are more often framed as an enemy from outside the country threatening
national security, than as an enemy from within undermining national cul-
tural values, as in western Europe.

Nancy Foner and Richard Alba argue that religion is less of a barrier to
inclusion in the United States than in many western European countries
for three main reasons. One is that the great majority of immigrants in the
United States, like most of the native born, are Christian, and Muslims are a
tiny proportion of the immigrant population, an estimated 4 percent. In west-
ern Europe, Muslims have become the largest religious minority as a result of
postwar inflows, and are a much larger proportion of the immigrant-origin
population. Moreover, Muslim immigrants in the United States are relatively
successful in socioeconomic terms relative to their counterparts in Europe,
where Islam is associated with large immigrant groups whose successful
incorporation is viewed as problematic, such as Turks in Germany, North
Africans and sub-Saharan Africans in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands,
and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain.
In addition, Americans indicate higher levels of religious commitment and involvement than western Europeans. To be religious in the United States is the norm and in sync with mainstream expectations, whereas secularism has gained ground among remarkably large segments of western European societies where the religious are generally a decided minority. The higher degree of secularization in Europe means that forms of social and cultural activity based on religious principles are frequently seen as illegitimate, especially when it comes to Islam. Indeed, in the wake of the 2015 killings in Paris in the offices of a satirical magazine, French Premier Manuel Valls emphasized that “there needs to be a firm message about the values of the Republic and of secularism.” In the United States, demands made on the basis of religion are a common feature of American life, put forward by a broad range of religious groups, including most vocally and most often by fundamentalist and evangelical (mostly native-born white) Christians. In the Netherlands, Slootman and Duyvendak argue in chapter 5, the development of a progressive yet intolerant, monoculturalism on issues such as homosexuality and gender roles—in contrast to the strict sexual morals that the Dutch only recently left behind—has exacerbated the divide with Muslim populations and accentuated the sense among the majority population that they must reinvigorate and protect Dutch culture. Whereas in the United States, they write, opinions among the majority population are divided on issues of gender, family, and sexuality, in the Netherlands almost the entire political spectrum of the Dutch majority population supports progressive values on these matters.

Finally, state institutions and constitutional principles in the United States—and the eventual incorporation of Catholics and Jews into the system of American pluralism in the mid-twentieth century—provide a foundation for the easier acceptance and integration of non-Christian religions. As secular as Europeans are, their societies have deeply institutionalized religious identities that are rooted in history—and majority denominations have been accorded special privileges whose impact lingers on. In Britain and the Netherlands, the state provides financial support for religious schools. Although these arrangements are seemingly fair to all religions, they favor the most established ones. As of 2010, for example, the government funded more than 6,500 Church of England and Catholic schools in Britain, but as of 2011 only twelve Islamic schools in a nation of nearly three million Muslims. In the Netherlands, most children go to state-supported religious schools, nearly all Protestant and Catholic, but the country’s nearly one million Muslims in 2008 had only about forty-four of their own publicly funded schools educating about ten thousand pupils. In Germany, Catholics and Protestants as well as Jews—but not Islam, the third largest faith—are recognized as public corporations and entitled to federally collected church taxes and the right
to run state-subsidized religious social services and hospitals. Because Islam is not organized the same way as the historically recognized religions in Germany, it is outside the state-supported mainstream. In short, in western Europe, Muslim immigrants confront, on the one hand, majority populations that are mainly secular and therefore suspicious of claims based on religion and its requirements and, on the other, societal institutions and national identities that remain anchored to an important extent in Christianity and do not make equal room for Islam.

Canada, it might be noted, seems in between western Europe and the United States, religion there posing fewer problems for integration than in continental Europe. At the same time, issues over the “reasonable accommodation” of religious minorities, such as wearing the Islamic veil in public settings, have engendered heated controversies in Francophone Quebec, owing, among other things, to the growing erosion of religiosity and increase in secularization since the 1960s, the historically strong French connection, and—as a Francophone island in an Anglophone sea—the fear that the arrival of outsiders will dilute or erode Quebecois cultural identity. The debate around the project to establish a Quebec Charter of Values (Charte de la laïcité), which was officially launched as Bill 60 in September 2013, reveals the continued contentious role of religion in Quebec. In the name of “religious neutrality and reserve,” the then-governing party, Parti Quebecois (PC), proposed to bar government employees from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols,” including Muslim headscarves and veils (as well as yarmulkes, turbans, and oversized Christian crosses) on the job (although also planning to keep the large crucifix in Quebec’s National Assembly and allowing Christmas trees in government offices). In the end, the bill was canceled after the PC was defeated in the April 2014 election.

Controversy over Islam, it should be added, has also erupted in Anglophone Canada. For example, Muslims sought to include sharia in Ontario family tribunals in line with the province’s recognition of Catholic and Jewish faith-based tribunals to settle family law matters. The provincial government decided in 2005 to reject the inclusion of sharia law, at the same time revoking parallel privileges previously available to Jews and Catholics. Less equitably, in 2007, when about a third of students in Ontario’s publicly funded schools attended Catholic institutions, voters in the province strongly rejected a proposal to extend funding beyond Catholic schools.

Legal Status

If religion is less of a barrier to inclusion in the United States than western Europe, legal status is a much greater divide. To be sure, citizenship rules in the United States and Canada are more liberal than those in western
European countries, which lack the same kind of unqualified and unconditional birthright citizenship. Still, citizenship regimes in much of continental Europe have been moving in many ways in a North American direction to make it easier for long-settled immigrants and their children to acquire citizenship. By now, the majority of western European countries provide some form of jus soli citizenship to the second generation, though it occurs “not only automatically at birth [as in the United States], but also under conditions of residency or through voluntary acquisition, both of which are presumed to entail socialization.”

When it comes to legal barriers, the big issue is undocumented status and here the U.S. case is striking. Although irregular or undocumented immigration is an issue of ongoing public debate and concern in western Europe, the size of the unauthorized migrant population there, and its share of the foreign-born total, pale beside the figures for the United States. Indeed, according to a Migration Policy Institute report, Europe’s unauthorized migrant population was on the decline between 2002 and 2008. In 2008, estimates of the number of irregular or unauthorized immigrants in the twenty-seven European Union member states ranged from 1.9 to 3.8 million: an estimated 196,000 to 457,000 in Germany, around 417,000 to 863,000 in Britain, and between 178,000 and 400,000 in France. In Canada, in the absence of credible tallies, scholars have cited media reports of between 200,000 and 400,000. The United States, by contrast, was home to an astounding 11.7 million undocumented immigrants in 2012—up from an estimated 3.5 million in 1990—and they constituted more than a quarter of the total foreign-born population of around 40 million.

Given the enormity of the numbers, it is perhaps not surprising that fears and anxieties about immigration in the United States focus on this group—or that the fears center on Latinos, who are about four-fifths of the undocumented, and even more specifically on Mexicans, who are more than half. In chapter 4, Mary C. Waters and Philip Kasinitz detail the plight of the undocumented, who live in fear of detention and deportation and in the shadows of the law, in what they call a system of legal and political exclusion in which legal mechanisms and lack of political rights play an increased role. The level of formal deportations in recent years has been astounding, reaching over four hundred thousand in 2012. Many of the undocumented who have been detained in prisons or detention facilities have had no criminal record and have been held for such minor offenses as traffic-related violations. The general fear of the law means that the undocumented are often afraid to contact school authorities, seek medical care, or ask the police for help. Not only do they tend to be confined to low-paid jobs with unpleasant, sometimes dangerous, conditions, but they are also often afraid to report employers who refuse to pay them or cheat them. They cannot live in public housing and are ineligible for most federally funded social welfare and health benefits. These experiences of social
exclusion have been shown to have consequences beyond the parental generation, with negative effects on the trajectories of U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants, despite their birthright citizenship.29

Public debates about immigration in the United States—and anti-immigrant sentiment—are, by and large, about undocumented immigration. Press coverage of immigration is overwhelmingly about the undocumented. In chapter 4 of this volume, Waters and Kasinitz note that from 1980 to 2007, about four-fifths of Associated Press stories on immigration topics fit into the framework of illegality. In the same period, 86 percent of *New York Times* stories on immigration dealt with illegality in various forms. Many Americans worry that “illegal” immigrants are overrunning the country and think that a much larger proportion of the foreign born are undocumented than is the case. Many politicians, especially Republicans in regions that have only recently experienced an upswing in immigration and in districts with few minority voters, have played on and exacerbated these fears in their rhetoric and political appeals. Waters and Kasinitz observe that undocumented immigration, and the beliefs that both undocumented and legal immigrants receive government benefits they did not work for, have fueled the growth of right-wing movements such as the Tea Party.

Whereas in public etiquette, racial and ethnic slurs are condemned when public officials utter them, it is acceptable in public discourse, and carries little stigma, to disparage and castigate the undocumented, as opposed to the “good” immigrants who are in the United States legally and whose achievements are often celebrated. Focusing on “illegals” in immigration debates, in fact, is one way that long-established Americans can support the notion that immigration is good and made America great yet at the same time distance themselves, and their ancestors, from contemporary arrivals. My people, the argument goes, came legally in the past—they were the model immigrants; today, too many immigrants are illegal and should not be here at all.30 Politicians arguing for tougher immigration enforcement and border control, Waters and Kasinitz write, “often pause to praise the work ethic of legal immigrants and say good things about the role of cultural diversity in American life. . . . In the American imagination the illegal immigrant, usually assumed to be Mexican, has come to be seen as an undeserving criminal, in contrast to legal immigrants, who are often depicted as virtuous, hardworking, and rule followers.”

Race

Despite the remarkable changes in the United States since the civil rights era, race remains a potent fault line given the historical legacy of slavery, segregation, and ghettoization in the nation. Of course, racial divisions
are relevant in western Europe as well. Even if the term *race* is frowned upon there for its associations with the Nazi past and for legitimizing inequalities, racial differences—based on the belief that visible physical differences or putative ancestry define groups or categories of people as inferior or superior in ways that are innate or unchangeable—have important consequences.\(^{31}\) This is especially so in countries where postcolonial immigration has led to the creation of a significant population of racialized groups: North and sub-Saharan Africans, Caribbeans, and South Asians. In France and the Netherlands, for example, Afro-Caribbeans and sub-Saharan Africans perceive discrimination against them as based in good part on color.\(^{32}\) Color-based discrimination has been a central concern in Britain since the huge inflow of Afro-Caribbeans in the 1950s and 1960s and a fundamental element in policies and public discourse, in which a race-relations framework has been prominent. In Canadian society, color-coded race is also key. Indeed, immigrants from Asia, Arab countries, Africa, and the Caribbean and their descendants are officially referred to as *visible minorities*, a term defined by the Canadian government as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.”\(^ {33}\)

The United States stands out for the incredibly high degree of separation of blacks and whites and the taken-for-granted emphasis on color-coded race in the media and popular discourse. Racial categories and inequalities not only shape the opportunities and constraints immigrants and their children encounter—but also the way that they see themselves and are viewed by others. Blacks, whether immigrant or native-born, continue to be highly residentially segregated from whites in American society—a situation that has no parallel among immigrant groups in western Europe.\(^ {34}\) Rates of black-white intermarriage are also much lower in the United States than they are in Britain, France, and the Netherlands.\(^ {35}\) Not surprisingly, high proportions of blacks and Latinos in the United States say they experience discrimination.\(^ {36}\)

It is not just those categorized as black in the United States who are seen through the prism of color-coded racism. Asians and Latinos are generally viewed as nonwhite or people of color, and Latinos with visible African ancestry—such as many Dominicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans—may sometimes be seen as black. A major question is how to conceptualize the position of Latinos. Some scholars argue that Latinos are a racialized minority, with Mexicans—who make up nearly a third of U.S. immigrants and are conspicuous for their low rates of education, high rates of poverty, and large proportion of undocumented—of special concern. That Mexicans are often stigmatized as inferior, illegal, and foreign has led some social scientists to label them a racialized ethnic group.\(^ {37}\) In another formulation, Mexican Americans are seen to experience a racialized form of nativism in which their foreignness is central and their right
to be in the country is questioned; third- and later-generation Mexican Americans are discriminated against, in this view, because they are associated with and often mistaken for new immigrants.38 Pigmentation may be involved, too. Skin color has been shown to matter among Mexicans and other Latinos for socioeconomic standing and residential integration.39

In chapter 4, Waters and Kasinitz contend that while today’s system of legal and political exclusion confronting undocumented immigrants “is often highly racialized in its outcomes,” just focusing on race obscures what they call a twenty-first-century pattern of legal exclusion, oppressing undocumented immigrants in the United States in ways that are different from those of racial exclusion. Indeed, in the post–civil rights era, race can be a resource for nonwhite legal immigrants and citizens in providing opportunities through such policies as affirmative action and diversity measures in employment that were designed to promote the incorporation and empowerment of African Americans and long-established Latino populations. To complicate matters further, whether Hispanics are stigmatized on the basis of a racial frame or legal frame by the media and politicians depends, among other things, on patterns of discrimination in different regions of the country.40

Undocumented immigration and race are linked in yet one other way. Although concerns about the undocumented are a major element in public and political debates, it could be argued that in post–civil rights America they are a legitimate way to express many Americans’ worries that immigration will lead to the end of white hegemony. After decades of massive immigration, the U.S. population in 2013 was 17 percent Latino, 13 percent black, 5 percent Asian, and 2 percent mixed race, and, given high fertility among Latina mothers and the prospect of continued Latino immigration, the transition to a minority-majority population is well under way.41 What many Americans, including a good many political figures, stress in public utterances is that “illegal” immigrants are breaking the law and have no right to live in the United States when, in fact, behind these concerns are widespread anxieties about the changing ethnoracial character of the country and fears about the loss of white economic and political dominance. Indeed, Deborah J. Schildkraut reports in chapter 3 that in the face of the declining non-Hispanic white share of the nation’s population (now at an all-time low of 63 percent), white Americans’ sense of white racial identity is more likely to lead to more restrictive immigration preferences and support for Republican candidates.

Belonging and National Identity

A central part of our enterprise is understanding how, and to what degree, the different countries in western Europe and North America extend a national identity to immigrants and their children. Or, as Irene
Bloemraad puts it in chapter 2, what is the openness of national identities to diversity?

We put particular emphasis on the second generation. Immigrants, after all, who were born in, raised, and spent much of their lives in another country often continue to have strong attachments to that place. Because they often speak another language and retain beliefs and practices associated with their homeland, they are, unsurprisingly, often not seen as “one of us.” The situation for the second, and indeed third, generation is different, given that they are “home grown” and share many social experiences with native peers of longer-term ancestry in their society. But do they feel at home and, even more, are they accepted as full members of the national community?

The answer for the United States is, to a large extent, yes—despite what we have just said about the deep barriers of race and legal status there. It has a lot to do with the general acceptance of hyphenated identities in the wider society so that the second generation, as well as their parents, are not forced to make the choice between a national and ethnic identity. Ethnic affiliation is not perceived as a serious potential threat to national cohesion. Ethnicity, in other words, is reconcilable with acquiring a new American identity.

In both the United States and Canada, it is acceptable for immigrants to hold onto earlier identities and cultures—as long as these are additions to a fundamentally American or Canadian core. As Roger Waldinger writes, new Americans can retain what they wish of the old country but they need to “master the native code.” In general, ties to the country of origin are not perceived as a threat to national identity in Canada or the United States. The taken-for-granted expectation is that newcomers will, and should, conform to and adopt mainstream norms and values. There is a confidence in Americanization or “Canadianization” as an inevitable process.

Hyphenated identities are the American way—and are not something that set the second generation apart. Hyphenated identities are used, at least some of the time, by those whose immigrant origins go generations back, such as Irish Americans and Italian Americans, as well as by the contemporary second generation, Mexican Americans and Chinese Americans among them. To borrow from Nathan Glazer, one might say that we are all—or virtually all—hyphenated Americans. In Canada, especially English-speaking Canada, being ethnic and Canadian is also normal and accepted. Canadian pluralism is often seen as rooted in the trinity of the “founding peoples”—Aboriginals, French, and British—and a large proportion of the long-established native white population identifies as Francophone or Anglophone Canadian.

This does not mean that those of immigrant origin are always warmly welcomed into the national fold. Far from it. As we have already discussed,
in the United States, Latinos, especially the undocumented, are often seen as a threat to the American nation. Post-9/11 prejudice against Muslims has contributed to increased hostility toward Islam. Moreover, owing to racial prejudice, many black and Latino immigrants and their children are not seen to be part of the American mainstream, and Asians often complain that no matter their American birth, they may still be viewed as “forever foreign.” The publication in 2004 of Samuel Huntington’s well-known book *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity*—in which he forecast that the continued inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatened to turn the United States into a country of two peoples, two cultures, and two languages—reflected and reinforced doubts about the capacity of American national identity to remain unaltered in the face of the dramatic growth of the Latino population. Schildkraut refers in chapter 3 to the outrage among basketball fans when a Mexican American boy dressed in a mariachi suit sang the national anthem at the 2013 National Basketball association finals.

This said, as Schildkraut also makes clear, worries that immigration is leading to a “fractured national identity” and lack of identification with the United States are greatly overblown. More than half of the Latinos and blacks, and nearly half of the Asians in the large-scale 2004 national survey she draws on chose American as their primary identity—something true of more than 75 percent of the entire second generation and a whopping 92 percent of the third. Even 40 percent of the first generation described themselves as American. The only people in the survey who did not think of themselves primarily as American were those who spoke a language other than English at home and who were not citizens, for whom a national-origin identification was primary. Interestingly, Schildkraut also finds that identifying as American did not make people better Americans in the sense of trusting government and having obligations to the national community. What was critical in shaping trust in American political institutions and obligations to the nation was perceptions of discrimination against them or their ethnoracial group—not whether people saw themselves as American.

Other studies show a strong sense of American identification among the second generation in the United States, though often coupled with ethnic identity. Survey data on identity, to be sure, are often problematic and unable to give a sense of the complex nature of identities as they tend to shift and change from one context to another. Still, the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) study found that 85 percent of the Mexican and 99 percent of the Chinese second generation said the United States felt more like home than their parents’ country of origin. Recent studies by the Pew Research Center indicate that though most adult Asian and Latino children of immigrants identified in ethnic (for example, Mexican) or panethnic (such as Hispanic or
Latino) terms, about 60 percent said they considered themselves to be a “typical American.” Adopting a panethnic identity as Hispanic or Asian as one of their identities, it should be said, gives the second generation a sense of belonging to an American minority group—a kind of societal membership that as yet has no parallel in Europe. The same, it should be said, goes for the children of black immigrants who tend to be viewed, and see themselves, as black Americans. Second-generation Asians and Latinos, like their black counterparts, may be racialized Americans, but Americans nonetheless.

In western Europe, hyphenated identities are less accepted, indeed in some countries without much support at all; in most countries, a conception of nationhood as involving exclusive belonging is prominent. Commonly held notions of an imagined homogeneous native or mainstream people—based on shared race, ethnicity, culture, or religion—also make it difficult for newcomers to feel that they truly belong.

Even if, as is often the case in western Europe, immigrants and their children combine a sense of belonging to their country of origin and country of residence, they are frequently suspected of lacking loyalty to the land where they now live. This is especially true for Muslims, whose attachments to their home societies and values are commonly seen as undermining the nation. This is in contrast to the United States, where ties to the country of origin generally are not perceived as a threat to national unity.

Legal immigrants and their children in the United States can more easily think of themselves as, say, Mexican American than those of Turkish origin can be Turkish-German. Germany, according to a study of second-generation belonging, does not support hyphenated identities. The notion of German Turks (Deutschturken) is just beginning to gain some presence in public discourse: “anyone with non-German . . . family roots has an ambiguous task defining themselves as German. . . . The wider society and much of the political discourse intimate that it is not possible to be German and also Turkish.” Faist and Ulbricht speak in chapter 7 of the symbolic exclusion of those of Turkish origin in Germany, estimated at around three million people, who are often viewed as foreigners—not considered part of “us” and perceived as having primary allegiance to Turkish culture and to Turkey itself.

The same reluctance to consider the expression of multiple or hyphenated identities characterizes the situation in France, as Patrick Simon shows. The conception of French nationhood is “actively unfavorable” to plural belongings—even though a recent survey in metropolitan France indicates that most members of the second generation combine a sense of belonging to France and to their parents’ origin country. Any public claim to dual identity is perceived negatively because such an identity is considered to inevitably weaken the sense of being French.
A significant minority of the second generation, moreover, especially in Muslim groups, say they do not feel French—but instead Algerian, for example, or African. However, the second generation’s feeling and intensity of French belonging is less an issue than how others recognize the identity. Many descendants of North African, Turkish, and southeast Asian immigrants—seen as visible minorities in France—say they are not viewed as French, or as Simon puts it, they feel their Frenchness is denied on the basis of their origins.  

The Dutch case represents a variant on this theme. In the 1970s, as Slootman and Duyvendak point out in chapter 5, government policy emphasized that guest workers from Turkey and Morocco should maintain their cultural identities—not to celebrate cultural differences but to facilitate the migrants’ eventual return to their home countries. Many did not, however, go “home”—and their Dutch-born children are a significant number; the roughly 750,000 first- and second-generation Moroccans and Turks are now about 4 percent of the Dutch population. Since the 1990s, as Slootman and Duyvendak observe, an intolerant monoculturalism has developed that highlights progressive values, with Dutch policy insisting that migrants must assimilate into Dutch culture and norms, including those on gender and sexuality. To many Dutch political figures, identification with another country or culture is seen as a lack of loyalty, and threat to emotional attachment, to the Netherlands, which leaves Muslim immigrants and their children, in particular, suspected of disloyalty.

In line with these trends, use of the term *autochtoon*, those who originate from the soil and were there first, to refer to the Dutch with Dutch parents, and of the term *allochtoon* to non-Western migrants and their children and even their grandchildren, has been constant and persistent. Being born in the Netherlands and a citizen, in other words, are not enough to be truly Dutch. As in France, few children of immigrants in the Netherlands have a strong emotional bond with Turkey or Morocco—most have a much stronger bond with the country where they now live. Yet some feel excluded from a Dutch identity precisely because they are continually labeled by others as allochtoon, Muslim, and foreign. This “thick” notion of what it means to be Dutch, Duyvendak has argued in another context, makes it difficult for the second generation to be recognized as “one of us.” The sense of exclusion from the national community often leads to a reactive ethnicity. As one Moroccan Dutch young adult said, “Because you see me as Moroccan, I start behaving like one, or at least feel like one.” Interestingly, many in the second generation in the Netherlands identify more strongly with their city of residence than the nation as a whole given that many Dutch cities, including the two largest—Amsterdam and Rotterdam—are more open to ethnic and cultural diversity. Researchers have also found a strong city identity among the
second generation in the United States. Second-generation New Yorkers have a strong identification as New Yorkers because they see this as an “inclusive identity that encompassed both natives and immigrants and differentiated them from a generic American identity that might be conceived as white and Midwestern and thus exclusionary.”

Britain is closer to the United States and Canada in emphasizing civic integration while also recognizing the cultural or ethnic identity of migrants and their children. It is characterized by what could be called a British brand of multiculturalism, which includes a range of policies and discourses that, according to Meer, Uberoi, and Modood in chapter 6, reject the idea of uncompromising cultural assimilation and recognize immigrant-origin groups as ethnic and racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to overcome distinctive barriers. Yet as their chapter also brings out, Britain’s 2.7 million Muslims pose an intriguing, and disturbing, paradox. On the one hand, polling and survey data show that Muslims express a strong sense of belonging in Britain. In a 2007 citizenship survey, nearly 90 percent of British-born South Asians indicated a sense of belonging to Britain. Similarly, in a 2010 national election survey, more than 75 percent of second-generation South Asians said they felt equally or more British than Asian. In another poll, 83 percent of Muslims of any generation said they were proud to be British citizens, versus 79 percent of the general public; 77 percent of Muslims and 50 percent of the wider population strongly identified with Britain; and about the same percentage, some 86 percent, of Muslims and Christians said they felt they belonged to Britain.

On the other hand, and despite Muslims’ strong identification with Britain and pride in being British, public discourse about Muslims’ identity often takes a different, one might say fear-and-anxiety, tack. Worries about Muslims’ loyalty to Britain are widespread. As Meer and his coauthors argue in chapter 6, a number of leading journalists and politicians have stoked these anxieties by portraying Muslims in their writings and public statements as having difficulty feeling British. Whether this simply reflects personal beliefs or, in the case of politicians, is a conscious political strategy is unclear. Whatever the reason for these public statements and writing about Muslims, they contribute to and reinforce a sense among many in Britain that Muslims, or at least many Muslims, are outsiders and do not belong. Thus, in one poll, 52 percent of Britons said that Muslims create problems, 47 percent saw Muslims as a threat, and 45 percent believed that too many Muslims are in Britain. A 2008 study, based on group interviews with English-born whites, revealed that they saw themselves, and people like them, as the rightful symbolic owners of the nation and as under threat from a seemingly powerful “other” that has arrived “here” in the past forty years—and whom they often identified as Muslims.
Explaining Transatlantic Differences in Framing National Identities

How can we account for the fact that the United States and Canada frame national identities in a manner that is more inclusive of immigrants and their children than western European countries do? In asking the question this way, we are coming at this from an admittedly North American perspective, focusing on features of the two societies that differentiate them from those in western Europe and help explain the contrast. One line of thought stresses that Canada and the United States are settler societies, founded, peopled, and built by continuous inflows of immigrants, unlike the countries of western Europe. As a result, it has been argued, immigration, especially from other continents, has not been a core part of European identity the way it is in North American countries. However, as Irene Bloemraad makes clear in chapter 2, this explanation is “simple and deterministic.”

Not that we can reject the argument out of hand. Given the history of Canada and the United States as immigration societies since their founding, the practice in each country has been to encourage immigrants to see themselves as linked to the new society as rapidly as possible, as American or Canadian. By contrast, European countries in the course of their development as nation-states constructed identities founded on histories that go back centuries, even millennia, making it more difficult for newcomers to link their origins to these historical roots. Then, too, citizenship policies have played a role. As noted, the United States and Canada have long given automatic and unqualified birthright citizenship to those born there, which no doubt reinforces a feeling of belonging among the second generation. Germany did not accord birthright citizenship until 2000, as Faist and Ulbricht point out in chapter 7 of this volume, and until 2014 required the German-born children of non-EU immigrants to choose between German citizenship and that of their homeland when they became young adults. Britain, France, and the Netherlands have stronger traditions of or longer experience with birthright citizenship, but it is not unconditional for the native-born children of migrants. They attribute citizenship to those born on their soil but only if certain conditions are met; in France and the Netherlands, children born there to immigrant parents are granted citizenship at the age of majority.

Yet even with their long-standing and liberal citizenship regimes—and their position as immigration societies from their founding—the United States and Canada have not always been open to ethnic diversity or accepting of ethnic identities. As Bloemraad notes in chapter 2, far from being bastions of diversity in the past, both Canada and the United States kept out most nonwhite immigrants, restricted their naturalization, and denied
people of color full rights. In early twentieth-century America, when millions of eastern and southern European immigrants were entering the country, the emphasis was on “100 percent Americanism.” To some in the United States at the time, hyphenated Americanism even “amounted to un-Americanism.” As former president Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed in a 1915 speech, “There is no such thing as a hyphenated American who is a good American. The only man who is a good American is the man who is an American and nothing else.” To become a real Canadian in pre–World War II English-speaking Canada, it has been said, meant becoming British.

Gary Gerstle details in chapter 1 the complex and contradictory ways that immigrants in the past were excluded from American nationality, highlighting—among other things—the depths and durability of anti-Catholic hostility for much of American history. Although America in the past, he notes, “proclaimed itself an open society, it also saw itself as a Protestant nation with a mission to save the world from Catholicism and other false faiths. In addition, although it proclaimed that all men are created equal, it aspired, for much of its history, to be a white republic.” If the Irish bore the brunt of intense anti-Catholicism in the nineteenth century, Chinese and other Asian immigrants were barred from citizenship, Jewish and Italian immigrants were seen as racial inferiors, and black immigrants (and their native-born counterparts) were subject to Jim Crow laws in the American South for nearly a century after the Civil War.

What is key is the combination of factors that led to the greater inclusion of ethnic diversity in American nationality, or an “American” identity, that exists today and to the growing celebration of the United States as a land of multiple peoples and cultures. The incorporation of once-despised late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European immigrants and their children played a big role. Gerstle emphasizes the struggles by European immigrants and the second generation in the labor movement “marching under the banner of Americanism,” their involvement in Democratic Party politics in the 1920s and 1930s, and the multiethnic platoons fighting together during World War II. Also critical in the greater acceptance of ethnic identities, as others have shown, was the social and economic mobility of the children of eastern, central, and southern European immigrants in the mid-twentieth century—in a context in which the massive influx from their homelands had virtually ceased.

In the postwar period, the notion of the United States as a Judeo-Christian nation had become ubiquitous. Ellis Island identities began to replace Plymouth Rock ones, as the national narrative was refashioned to imagine and indeed commemorate the United States as a nation of immigrants and the ethnic identities that grew out of immigration. The civil rights movement—initiated, as Bloemraad emphasizes, by the native-born minority population before the onset of large-scale nonwhite
immigration—and legislation that ensued also contributed to the creation of a more inclusive national identity, beyond that, in Gerstle’s words, embodied in the term *Judeo-Christian*, which in the 1940s mainly referred to white Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. The effect of the civil rights legislative successes of the 1960s in changing the dominant discourse of national civic life and acknowledging the experiences of racial and ethnic minorities was electrifying.67 The Black Is Beautiful movement was followed by immigrant ethnic groups adopting a similar stance with regard to their own cultures, in this way, as Gerstle writes in chapter 1, “broadening and intensifying the effort to locate America’s vitality in its ethnic and racial diversity.” Despite setbacks and recent legal challenges to initiatives such as the Voting Rights Act and affirmative action, the civil right successes expanded educational, occupational, and political opportunities for ethnoracial minorities and also changed the cultural idiom of American national identity.68 They also had a major effect on public discourse, ushering in a new climate and understanding about what is acceptable to say about race and ethnic differences in public. Ethnic and racial slurs by candidates for high office and public officials are now condemned—and diversity routinely applauded. Indeed, in presidential speeches, from those of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to the country’s first black president, Barack Obama, cultural diversity has been lauded as a central feature of the nation.

In chapter 2, Bloemraad provides a counterpoint to the U.S. experience in her discussion of Canada, indicating how there too the large native-born minority—Francophone Canadians who in the 1960s mobilized in support of Quebec separatism—were critical in the transformation of Canadian identity. The national government first instituted an official policy of French-English bilingualism in 1969, and then, in 1971, an official policy of multiculturalism. Originally envisioned narrowly, mainly centered on recognizing European immigrants, Canada’s multicultural policy has promoted incorporation within a context of pluralism, with multiculturalism becoming “an identity touchstone for the majority population . . . an idiom for national identity” and not, incidentally, a way to distinguish Canada from the U.S. economic and political behemoth to the south. Bloemraad notes, drawing on a 2010 opinion survey, that more Canadians said that multiculturalism was very important to Canadian national identity than the number who said hockey.

**Conclusion**

The chapters in this volume make clear that immigration has given rise to a host of fears and anxieties that are frequently voiced in public discourse, ranging from concerns in western Europe that Muslim immigrants and their children are undermining basic liberal values to common statements
in the United States that the millions of undocumented immigrants have no right to be in the country at all. At the same time, when it comes to legal immigrants and their children, the United States (as well as Canada) find it easier to extend a national identity to them than western, particularly continental, European countries do. National identities in North America, to put it another way, appear to be more open to diversity.

That this has not always been the case and that both the United States and Canada were less welcoming in the past are powerful reminders of the elasticity and changeability of social patterns, norms, and beliefs. It may sometimes seem that the widespread anxieties about undocumented Mexican immigration in the United States, so salient today, will never disappear, yet if—or, many would say, when—federal legislation creates a pathway to legalization and, especially citizenship, for the undocumented, these anxieties are bound to lessen and subside. As of this writing, some movement on this issue has been made, with President Obama issuing executive orders in 2012 and 2014 to reduce the legal vulnerability of a substantial fraction of the undocumented through temporary deportation deferrals and work permits. Although a definite step forward, it is unclear how many will end up taking advantage of the programs—and the most recent executive initiatives are currently under challenge in the courts. At best, they will be a temporary and modest fix for a portion of the undocumented, not a permanent change in status that will allow them to live as legal residents do. On the sending society end, lowered fertility and economic improvements in Mexico are forecast to dramatically reduce the number of new undocumented arrivals from Mexico—although as Gerstle cautions in chapter 1, a stream of undocumented mass migration from elsewhere may grow, perhaps from Central America.69

As for racial barriers, these are not inevitably permanent, either. Much has been written about the possibility of the blurring of America’s color lines, with one scenario suggesting the emergence of a black-nonblack racial order, predicting that many Asians and Latinos will be welcomed into a new American majority.70 Their high rates of intermarriage, and much greater flexibility of the children of white-Asian and white-Latino, as opposed to white-black, unions to choose among various ethnoracial options, point in this direction.71

If the United States and Canada in the past developed more expansive national identities to include immigrants and their offspring—and became more accepting of ethnic allegiances—so, too, this is liable to happen in the future in countries across the Atlantic, and for many of the same reasons. These factors include the prospect of economic mobility for many members of the second and third generations, increased social mixing, friendships, and intermarriage with longer-established Europeans, and greater participation of immigrants and their descendants in mainstream political and economic life over time.
Already, a 2014 Transatlantic Trends poll found that majorities in the Netherlands (66 percent), Germany (63 percent), Britain (63 percent), and the United States (69 percent) said that the second generation were integrating well into their society. Sheer demographic changes in the years ahead will also be at work as the number of individuals from immigrant and minority backgrounds coming of age increases while the number of native majority youth declines and aging baby boomers retire and leave the workforce. Nor should we forget the role of political struggles of minority groups in Europe for more rights and recognition, something that was significant in the greater inclusion of once-disparaged eastern and southern European immigrants and their descendants in the United States in the past. In the Netherlands, to mention one possibility, second- and third-generation Moroccans and Turks may mount collective efforts to eliminate the stigmatizing term allochtoon from official use. In Germany, pressures from Muslim groups, as well as the desire to preserve the corporate structure benefiting historically established religions, may well lead to devising ways to recognize Islam as a corporate body equal to Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths.

Less happily, many in the second generation of Muslim background in western Europe seem poised to experience unemployment or underemployment and stalled social mobility, giving ammunition to “skeptics who will continue to argue that Muslims will never fit in or successfully adjust to European society.” In addition, the sense of exclusion felt by many second-generation Muslims has created a pool of potential recruits for radical Islamist groups. Although these radicalized Muslims are only a very small proportion of the second generation, their presence in Europe—along with the possibility of their involvement in further terrorist incidents—has the potential to heighten anxieties about and hostilities toward Muslims in general. Indeed, as of this writing, tensions surrounding Islam have intensified in France in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks, with, among other things, French Muslims and their leaders facing unprecedented pressure to publicly endorse French republican secular values.

At the same time in western Europe, new sources of large-scale migration from eastern Europe have become more prominent. In 2012, for example, more than half a million residents of Britain had Polish nationality, more than a hundred thousand in the Netherlands. Among the fascinating issues are whether these migrants see themselves as temporary visitors and how they are now viewed as well as how others will come to view them in the future in terms of national identity and belonging.

As we look to the decades ahead, we cannot of course know how the future will unfold. Much is unpredictable, including unforeseen economic conditions and political events. What we can say, however, is that national differences, whatever shape they take, will not disappear. Although similar
dynamics in Europe and North America will lead to growing economic integration, political incorporation, and interethnic mixing among the second generation, we are hardly likely to see complete convergence among European and North American countries and the elimination of distinctive national features. Owing to their different national histories, institutional features, and composition of their immigrant inflows, these countries will continue to be characterized by contrasts in the way—and extent to which—immigrants and their descendants are incorporated into the national fold. The chapters that follow offer insights and raise questions about these dynamics at the beginning of the twentieth-first century, and thus, we believe, provide a step forward in understanding the nexus between immigration, belonging, and national identity on both sides of the Atlantic.

Notes

3. See, for example, Joppke 2010; Michalowski 2011.
4. Levey and Modood 2008; see Bowen et al. 2014.
7. See Schildkraut, chapter 3, this volume.
8. See Brochmann and Hagelund 2012.
14. See, for example, Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; Duyvendak 2011.
18. See also Joppke 2013.
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42. Waldinger 2007.
43. Foner 2012.
45. Tuan 1998; see also Lee and Bean 2010.
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51. Ibid., 215.
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54. See also de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014.
56. See Schneider et al. 2012b.
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PART I

NORTH AMERICA
Chapter 1

The Contradictory Character of American Nationality: A Historical Perspective

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Any examination of American nationality must contend with its contradictory character. On the one hand, this nationality harbors a civic creed promising all Americans equal rights regardless of race, religion, sex, or national origin. On the other hand, American nationality has also contained religious and racial ideologies that have defined the United States in exclusionary ways. Thus, although America proclaimed itself an open society, it also saw itself as a Protestant nation with a mission to save the world from Catholicism and other false faiths. In addition, although it proclaimed that all men are created equal, it aspired, for much of its history, to be a white republic. Writing a history of American nationality requires, then, that one identify its inclusionary and exclusionary characteristics, what the balance between inclusion and exclusion has been during different periods of American history, and how and why that balance has changed over time. That is what I try to do in this chapter, which explores the three nationalist traditions—the civic, the religious, the racial—that have shaped American life. Laws governing immigration and citizenship—rules determining who has been allowed to enter America and to become a full member of American society and who has not—play an important part in this analysis, for they reveal a great deal about the kind of society America has aspired to be. The essay begins with an examination of America’s revolutionary founding in the second half of the eighteenth century and concludes with an analysis of the likely relevance—or irrelevance—of America’s three nationalist traditions to our own time.
Civic Nationalism

America’s civic nationalist principles can be found in two famous eighteenth-century phrases: “all men are created equal” and “we the people.” These phrases expressed beliefs in the fundamental equality of all human beings, in every individual’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and in a democratic government that derives its legitimacy from the people’s consent. These beliefs make up a democratic universalism that can take root anywhere. But because they were enshrined in the American nation’s two founding documents, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, they have marked something distinctive about the American people and their polity. In the 1940s, Gunnar Myrdal bundled these civic rights and principles together into a political faith that he called the American Creed. I prefer the more generic term civic nationalism that Michael Ignatieff and other students of the contemporary nation have used to denote these beliefs.1

American civic nationalism embodied the republican notion of popular sovereignty. The people would rule; they would determine the course taken by the governments, local, state, and federal, that had some role in their lives. America’s civic nationalist tradition also promised a society free of discrimination—ethnic, religious, racial, or sexual. It portrayed America as a place where all individuals could pursue opportunity, economic and cultural, and secure their liberty and property. It called on America to open itself to foreigners willing to work hard, obey the law, and pledge allegiance to its democratic institutions. These potential immigrants were to be drawn not just from the ranks of the educated or privileged, but, in the words of Emma Lazarus, from the world’s “huddled masses yearning to breathe free.”2 America’s civic nationalist tradition promised to set these downtrodden free, to allow them to pursue their economic dreams, and to practice faith, pursue politics, and fashion identities of their own choosing.

Choice—choosing one’s national identity rather than having it imposed by a ruler or by heredity—was crucial to this civic nationalism. Prior to the American Revolution, rules of membership in nations had been dominated by Westphalian and mercantilist doctrines. Under these doctrines, states claimed complete and permanent sovereignty over their subjects, reserving the right to control their movement within state territory and their freedom to move beyond it. Because the strength of a state or monarchy was measured in numbers—the more people a sovereign could claim as subjects, the mightier the realm—European rulers were reluctant to permit their subjects to emigrate, unless the latter were paupers, criminals, or some other class of undesirables. Subjects who did move to another state were still expected to give allegiance to their original state or monarch.
The British colonists in North America had begun to challenge this European state system in the mid-eighteenth century, in part for pragmatic reasons: the North American appetite for settlers from Europe had become insatiable. But the colonists made this materialist demand for labor into a political principle. Even before the 1770s, they had begun to develop rules for membership that were based on residence, consent, and voluntary loyalty rather than on birth, descent, and perpetual subjecthood. And when these colonists brought an independent United States into being, they committed themselves to two principles—freedom of movement into and out of the United States, and ease of membership in the American polity—that were radical for the eighteenth-century world. The second principle, embodied in the country’s first naturalization law in 1790, gave every free European immigrant of “good character”—regardless of nationality, language, religion, or gender—the opportunity to become a citizen of the United States after residing in the United States only two years. This ease of affiliation made this naturalization statute the most inclusive measure of its kind in the eighteenth-century world—a judgment that holds even if we take into account, as we must, the racial restriction for which this law has recently become so well known (a matter I soon address). Even as subsequent Congresses made naturalization tougher to achieve, by mandating waiting periods stretching to five years and, at some points, longer, America continued to distinguish itself by the ease with which European immigrants could choose U.S. citizenship for themselves. Both the ease of joining the American polity and the ease of leaving it were part of the revolutionary settlement. So, too, was a willingness to accept into the polity religious groups who, in Europe, were excluded from membership. Thus the United States extended full citizenship to Catholics a half-century before Great Britain and to Jews before the French revolutionaries had done so. The freedom of movement guaranteed by the new nation in combination with the generous terms of civic membership made the United States a magnet for Europeans and established America’s reputation early on for being a nation of immigrants.3

The Reconstruction Congresses that sat during and after the Civil War (1861–1869) further strengthened America’s civic nationalist tradition not only by outlawing slavery but also by passing a broad antidiscrimination amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) declared that “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Over the next 150 years, these due process and equal protection clauses became the foremost weapons the federal government had to battle discrimination against African Americans and other racial minorities, women, religious groups, and gays. They worked to reinforce America’s civic nationalist tradition.4
A lesser known part of this amendment’s section 1 did similar work: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” this sentence read, “are citizens of the United States.” These deceptively ordinary words actually constituted a ringing endorsement of the principle of equality first articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Anyone born on U.S. soil automatically, at birth, became a citizen. That individual’s race, ethnicity, religion, and sex were irrelevant; so, too, was the nationality of that person’s parents. This clause was an attempt to offer African Americans an ironclad citizenship guarantee. It was meant to, and in fact did, deny future courts the ability to do what the Taney Court had done in Dred Scott: to strip native-born people of African descent of their citizenship.⁵

The supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment also made clear that this clause’s protections were to be extended to groups other than African Americans whose color or culture had rendered them suspect populations in the United States. Chief among these groups in the 1860s were the Chinese, who, since the San Francisco Gold Rush, had begun coming to California in large numbers. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, a Fourteenth Amendment architect, declared on the floor of Congress in 1866 that, under the proposed amendment’s terms, “the child of an Asiatic is just as much a citizen as the child of a European.” Trumbull gave the same answer when queried about the Gypsies of Pennsylvania. No one in Congress seemed to know whether Gypsies actually then resided in the Keystone state, or whether this group existed only in the imagination of Fourteenth Amendment opponents, conjured up as a category of perpetually footloose, strange, and dangerous foreigners that no known society had ever successfully incorporated into its polity. Certainly Gypsy children born on U.S. soil should never be admitted to American citizenship, declared a Fourteenth Amendment opponent, Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania. To which Trumbull briefly but powerfully replied, of course they should.⁶

Trumbull and his allies intended to construe birthright citizenship broadly. The words of section 1 accurately express their intent. Because of this intent, the Supreme Court, in the 1890s, affirmed the birthright citizenship of the American-born children of Chinese and other East and South Asian immigrants who, by law, had been barred from becoming U.S. citizens themselves.⁷ As part of the Civil War settlement, the United States had given itself the strongest system of birthright citizenship then extant anywhere in the world. It needs to be seen for what it was: a profound affirmation of America’s civic nationalist tradition.

Religious Nationalism

At its origins, and for much of its history, the United States wanted to be a Protestant country. That meant not only that Protestants of all varieties would be able to worship free of interference from the state (or some
state-endorsed religious establishment). It meant as well that the country should do everything in its power to create a society in which Catholicism, and more specifically, papal influence, would have little or no purchase. This fear of Rome is difficult for twenty-first-century Americans to understand because it is no longer a motive force in their politics or immigration policy. But, for most of American history, the Catholic Church’s theology, liturgy, and rituals, its life-and-death struggle with European Protestants, its international size and power, and the control it was thought to exercise over rank-and-file Catholics alarmed American Protestants. Catholicism was depicted not only as the enemy of God but as the enemy of republicanism. To Protestant Americans, the Catholic Church stood for monarchy, aristocracy, and other reactionary forces that America was seeking to escape. Where the pope ruled, Protestants charged, the people most certainly did not. And, thus, Catholic influence had to be resisted, contained, and even eradicated.

The intensity of anti-Catholicism did not surface in the constitutional debates of 1787; to the contrary, the framers put the country on the path to religious toleration by refusing to denigrate any religion by name or establish any faith as the country’s official religion. The debates over ratification yielded a remarkable First Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1791, that prohibited Congress from passing any “law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The naturalization law of 1790 had already signaled America’s openness to religious diversity by putting no prohibition on the ability of immigrant Catholics, Jews, or members of another non-Protestant faith to become citizens of the United States. In law, America’s civic nationalism was strong and its religious nationalism weak.

But as evangelical Protestantism revived in early nineteenth-century America, anti-Catholicism recharged as well. Those who bore the brunt of American Protestant fury were the Irish, who, when they arrived in the 1830s and 1840s, constituted the first mass immigration of Catholics to America. Fleeing an Ireland devastated by colonial rule and famine, these Irish immigrants were largely destitute; they had few skills, little access to good jobs, and not much familiarity with urban living. Many native Protestants viewed them as an urban underclass, cut off from American values and traditions, their assimilation to their new land blocked by what these Protestants took to be an unholy devotion to the Catholic Church. America’s first mass nativist movement, the Know-Nothings, arose in the 1840s and 1850s in reaction to the “Irish peril.” The Know-Nothings stirred up anti-Irish sentiment and sparked vigilante attacks by Protestant gangs on Irish neighborhoods, Catholic schools, and even, in some cases, Catholic churches. In their more “respectable” moments, the Know-Nothings organized politically to end Irish immigration, to remove the children of Irish Catholic immigrants from parochial schools so that they could be educated
in proper Protestant environments, and to bar immigrants from holding public office and, in some cases, from voting.\(^\text{10}\)

The politics of sectionalism and the outbreak of the Civil War sent Know-Nothing nativism into eclipse and provided opportunities for Irish immigrants to demonstrate their loyalty to the Union, to rise in the social order, and to gain more respectability for their Catholic ways. Still, religiously motivated discrimination against Irish Catholics persisted for another hundred years and expanded to other groups of Catholics—Italians, Poles, French Canadians, Mexicans, and others who were arriving in the United States. In 1928, the Republicans defeated the Democratic, Irish Catholic nominee for president, Al Smith, by arousing anxiety about the threat that a Catholic president would pose to the United States. Even in 1960, another Democratic hopeful and Irish Catholic, John F. Kennedy, had to appear before a group of Protestant ministers in Houston to prove to their satisfaction that his election would not make the Vatican the ruler of Washington.\(^\text{11}\)

The durability and depths of anti-Catholic hostility help make sense of the comprehensive infrastructure that American Catholics built to take care of their needs. Parochial schools, universities, welfare agencies, fraternal organizations, and sports leagues were all part of this firmament. Catholics’ dedication to building a separate world reflected both the fact of their exclusion from many established institutions and their fear that the mainstream institutions that did admit them (such as public schools) would bring unbearable pressure upon them to sacrifice their faith.\(^\text{12}\)

One can find similar kinds of anti-Catholic sentiments fueling America’s territorial expansion in the nineteenth century. Americans conceived of their Manifest Destiny as a providential mission to spread their Protestant-republican nation to the farthest reaches of the North American continent. In the process, America would not only eliminate or corral pagan Indians but would also weaken Catholic presence and power in North America. These sorts of Protestant convictions provided an important justification for the war against Mexico in the 1840s (and for seizing half of Mexico’s land) and later for the war against Spain in Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898. Protestant Americans depicted Catholicism as a sinister force. On the one hand, it spread papal autocracy and crushed democracy. On the other, it rendered those who lived in Catholic lands weak and indolent, incapable either of distinguishing themselves in war, by demonstrating courage or valor, or in peace, through the habits of hard work, frugality, and inventiveness that Protestants had mobilized to turn the United States into an industrial juggernaut.\(^\text{13}\)

Hard work, freedom, and republicanism were depicted as part of America’s core Protestant character; these characteristics had made the United States exceptional. America’s continued welfare demanded that these qualities be cultivated and that Protestants maintain their position
as the nation’s core group. As the number of Catholic, Christian Orthodox, and Jewish immigrants swelled in the late nineteenth century, more and more Protestants banded together under the banner of religious nationalism, demanding that Anglo-Saxon ascendancy—in the presidency, Congress, judiciary, military, foreign service, universities, corporations, and in the immigration stream itself—be preserved.14

Racial Nationalism

Racial nationalism arose to justify the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century enslavement of African Americans. This racial nationalism conceived of the United States as a home for white people, which, in the eighteenth century, meant those of European origin and descent. Many of those who fashioned America’s universalist and democratic political creed were also the architects of its racial nationalism—a paradox that has been one of the most unsettling in U.S. history.15 Slaveowners played key roles in the 1776 revolution against Britain and in drafting the 1789 Constitution, which both endorsed slavery and apportioned congressional delegates to ensure that slaveowners would exercise disproportionate power in national affairs. The 1790 naturalization law described earlier as affirming American civic nationalism also created a racial test for citizenship—an immigrant had to be free and white to qualify for inclusion in the American nation—that would remain in force until 1952, more than 160 years. For three-quarters of its history, in other words, the United States, by law, aspired to be a white republic.16

The North’s victory over the slaveholding South in the Civil War (1861–1865) offered the United States an opportunity to uproot its racial nationalist tradition and to reorganize the republic solely around its civic creed. Indeed, the abolition of slavery, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the wide-ranging efforts to empower freedmen and freedwomen in the years between 1863 and 1877 constituted what some have called a second American revolution, one committed, without racial qualification, to America’s civic nationalist creed. But this revolution only partially succeeded. Many groups in American society, North and South, were still committed to racial nationalism and were determined to revive it, even during the headiest days of Radical Reconstruction. Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky gave expression to racial nationalist beliefs in Congress’s 1866 debate over birthright citizenship: “The fundamental, original, and universal principle upon which our system of government rests,” declared Davis, “is that it was founded by and for white men; and that to preserve and administer it now and forever is the right and mission of the white man. When a negro or Chinaman is attempted to be obstructed into it, the sufficient cause to repel him is that he is a negro or Chinaman.” Davis’s ally, Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, added,
“It is necessary, as part of the story of the nature of things, that society will be more or less exclusive. It is utterly and totally impossible to mingle all the various families of men, from the lowest Hottentot to the highest Caucasian, within the same society.”

Davis, Cowan, and their supporters in Congress did not succeed in blunting the drive for the Fourteenth Amendment, or for its birthright citizenship clause, but they would find other ways to resuscitate racial nationalism. Thus, after 1877, propertied southern whites fashioned a system of peonage that held rural blacks in economic semiservitude and an ideology of Jim Crow that ensured African American segregation and subordination in politics and culture. White southerners stripped blacks of basic citizenship rights—to vote, hold elective offices, and sit on juries—and denied them access to any space, public or private, defined as white: schools, parks, restaurants, stores, theaters, churches, railroad cars, and bathrooms. Through this system of apartheid, white southerners revived America’s tradition of racial nationalism for a new century and mocked black claims to be equal or full participants in the American nation.

After 1877, racial nationalism also increasingly shaped American immigration law. Before the 1880s, America’s immigration policy was one of the fullest expressions of its civic nationalist creed. During this period, America welcomed virtually anyone, regardless of national origin, who wished to make the United States his or her home. In the forty years from the 1880s to the 1920s, however, Congress and the executive branch replaced America’s open-borders policy with a closed border, one grounded largely in racial exclusions. Congress banned the immigration of Chinese laborers in 1882, and President Theodore Roosevelt prohibited, as part of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, the immigration of Japanese laborers in 1907. Although both actions were responses to regional anxieties, notably white westerners’ worries that “yellow hordes” were taking over the Pacific Coast, they became national policies, endorsed and sustained by the federal government. Frankly racist justifications underlay such discriminatory practices: Chinese and Japanese were so different from Americans of European origin and were so primitive, restrictionists argued, they could never be civilized or acculturated. Their biological constitution was such, their opponents alleged, that they needed no rest and little food. They thus would outperform American workers on a sliver of an American workingman’s wages and would drive the latter to ruin. These Asians were also alleged to care little about democracy and citizenship, and to be oblivious to the value of family life or moral probity. They were thought to be sexual predators and the carriers of debilitating drug habits. They would contribute nothing to the American nation and had already harmed it by their presence. Fortunately, in the eyes of America’s Asian immigrant opponents, no immigrant from East
Character of American Nationality  41

(and South) Asia could become a citizen, thanks to the 1790 law limiting naturalization to those who were free and white. The American nation had no place for these groups.19

In the 1920s, Congress extended its ban on immigration from East Asia to most of the world. And, for the first time, it struck at Europe and, in particular, at groups from southern and eastern Europe who were also thought to be racially inferior and thus damaging to America’s Anglo-Saxon or Nordic stock. Congress had temporarily limited the immigration of “undesirable” Europeans in 1921. In 1924, it made those limitations permanent. Here is how legislators in the House of Representatives described eastern and southern Europeans in 1924: “There is little or no similarity,” declared Congressman Fred S. Purnell of Indiana, “between the clear-thinking, self-governing stocks that sired the American people and this stream of irresponsible and broken wreckage that is pouring into the lifeblood of America the social and political diseases of the Old World.” Purnell quoted approvingly the words of a Dr. Ward, who claimed that Americans had deceived themselves into believing that “we could change inferior beings into superior ones.” Americans could not escape the laws of heredity, Ward argued. “We cannot make a heavy horse into a trotter by keeping him in a racing stable. We cannot make a well-bred dog out of a mongrel by teaching him tricks.” The acts that Ward dismissed as tricks included the learning by immigrants of the Gettysburg Address and the Declaration of Independence.20

Congressman J. Will Taylor of Tennessee, meanwhile, approvingly read to his colleagues a Boston Herald editorial warning that America was entering the same period of eugenical decline that had doomed Rome: “Rome had [a mistaken] faith in the melting pot, as we have. It scorned the iron uncertainties of heredity, as we do. It lost its instinct for race preservation, as we have lost ours. It forgot that men must be selected and bred as sacredly as cows and pigs and sheep, as we have not learned.” The editorial concluded, “Rome rapidly senilized and died,” and so would America unless Congress took note of eugenical principles and passed the 1924 restriction legislation. The law passed both houses of Congress by overwhelming margins, drawing votes from congressman and senators from every region of the country, East and West, North and South, urban and rural. It remained on the books until 1965, giving a decidedly racial cast to the American nation.21

State and local laws complemented federal laws in promoting racial nationalism. Anti-miscegenation statutes reached a climax in the 1920s, more than twenty states having such laws. Several western states, in the 1910s and 1920s, passed alien land laws prohibiting any immigrant ineligible for citizenship from owning real estate. These land measures were directed mostly at Japanese immigrant farmers, who had become successful at growing fresh fruits and vegetables and supplying them to
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and other urban markets. But they also struck at Chinese, Indian, and other East and South Asians (including Filipinos after 1934) who, by terms of the 1790 naturalization law, were also ineligible for citizenship. Finally, groups of white homeowners invented restrictive covenants to racialize space and property. Covenants typically identified racial and sometimes religious groups who were prohibited from purchasing homes in designated white areas.22

A racially structured system of immigration restriction, alien land laws, Jim Crow, anti-miscegenation statutes, and racially restrictive covenants—these measures reveal how deeply racial nationalism shaped society during the 1920s, a moment of American history usually celebrated for its urbanity and modernism. The enveloping power of this ideology was such that even those who were American citizens could not escape its harmful effects. Thus Mexican American citizens would be among those deported in the repatriation campaigns of the 1930s; and two-thirds of the 120,000 Japanese who would be interned in World War II were Nisei, the American-born children of Japanese immigrants. Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process counted for little in these roundups; America’s civic nationalism bowed to the imperatives of racial nationalism.23

I do not want to suggest that no one resisted racial nationalism at this time. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, sizeable and varied groups of Americans drawn from the ranks of liberal reformers, radicals, and ethnic and racial minorities labored to invigorate the civic basis of American nationhood and to insist that equality and inclusion ought to remain the governing principles of their polity. Many Americans were drawn to Israel Zangwill’s vision of America as a melting pot in which the races of many lands would be forged into a single people. A much smaller group, but including individuals whose writings and politics would gain influence in subsequent decades—the philosophers Horace Kallen and Alain Locke, the literary critic Randolph Bourne, the anthropologist Franz Boas, the educator Rachel Davis-DuBois, and the Indian reformer John Collier—pushed their thinking beyond inclusive programs of assimilation and began to argue that pluralism would strengthen the egalitarian and democratic foundation of the American nation.24

Moreover, as nativist attacks on non-Protestant immigrants intensified, so did the resistance of the targeted groups, manifest, for example, in the rapidly growing number of eastern and southern Europeans who became citizens and who then mobilized politically, hoping to put into office politicians more sympathetic to their concerns. At stake was not just the ability to control public policy but also the ideological power to define the values for which America stood. A careful observer of the 1928 election would have noticed that a broad counter-mobilization against Protestant ascendancy and racial exclusivity was already in the works:
voting returns revealed that Al Smith, although losing the election to Herbert Hoover, had carried the twelve largest cities. But if the future belonged to the offspring of those immigrants who had mobilized in the 1920s, and to a revivified civic nationalist tradition, the period from the 1880s to the 1920s was one in which racial and religious exclusion had triumphed. The racial and religious boundaries had narrowed in the early twentieth century. The country’s urbanization and modernization, at this time, went hand in hand with the deepening of America’s racial and religious nationalism.

Exclusion and Inclusion, 1870s–1990s

The forces working to narrow the American nation from the 1870s to the 1920s were global in scope. Strengthening nationhood had become politically imperative throughout the world. Strong nations were thought to require robust industrial economies and populations that were vigorous, productive, and disciplined. They were expected to project their power onto the world stage by assembling strong armies and navies, and to flex their muscles through commerce, territorial expansion, and, if necessary, war. Even under the best of circumstances, nation-building was not easy work. Many nations, in the 1880s and 1890s, also seemed beset by deteriorating conditions: economic turmoil and depression, unemployment, class conflict, and regional and cultural resistance to projects of national consolidation. In these circumstances, and amid the developing conviction that nation-building was a zero-sum game—one nation’s advance requiring another nation’s retreat—nationalists everywhere sought assurance that their nations were destined to succeed. Many found this assurance in racialized discourses that spoke with conviction about the special qualities that inhered in their people. These discourses variously celebrated the superiority of Anglo-Saxons, English-speaking peoples, Aryans, Nordics, Caucasians, whites, and the West. Many scholars lent their sanction to these discussions, making racial classification into a complex pseudoscience, and urging politicians in various nations to pursue policies that would maximize their nation’s stock of racial superiors and either minimize, segregate, or expel populations of racial inferiors. Immigration and naturalization restrictions, natalist programs for the so-called racially advantaged, sterilization for the so-called racially disadvantaged, bans on racial intermarriage, and segregation were all part of this policy brew, giving multiple expressions to this racial nationalist moment in world affairs. The prestige of racial science was such that its practitioners were able to take differences rooted in religion—the conflict between Protestants and Catholics and between Christians and Jews in America, for example—and render them racial. Thus, in 1924, congressmen stigmatized eastern and southern European Catholics, Jews, and Christian
Orthodox not for their religious heterodoxy but for their racial inferiority. Racial science had alchemized religious divides into racial chasms.27

This era of racial nationalism reached its peak with the rise of Hitler and with the aggressive (and nearly successful) campaign to spread German power throughout Europe and, in the process, to rid the continent of its “racial inferiors,” most notably Jews. Hitler’s actions drew the world into a terrible world war. The unlikely alliance that massed against Germany ultimately dealt Hitler and his plans for an Aryan racial order a devastating defeat. Shock spread as the scale of Hitler’s destruction of European Jewry became known. That this barbarism had occurred in Germany, whose culture was thought to sit at the pinnacle of Western civilization, provoked a frank reckoning with the racial science that had enabled Hitler’s rise. Meanwhile, Japan’s dramatic strikes in 1941 and 1942 against every European and American imperial outpost in East and Southeast Asia punctured the myth of Western superiority. The colonial system that Europe had built across hundreds of years and legitimated with a variety of racial ideologies would never again be the same. In both Europe and Asia, World War II had dealt a serious blow to those who wanted to order the globe according to principles of racial superiority and inferiority.28

These were the circumstances in which civic nationalism in the United States regained its stature, its core beliefs conscripted with increasing force to fuel campaigns to topple both Protestant ascendency and white supremacy. Gunnar Myrdal articulated his version of American civic nationalism, the American Creed, in 1944 when he published his landmark An American Dilemma. That same year, Thurgood Marshall, then an attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, articulated his understanding of the need to revive American civic nationalism in a world torn apart by racism. “Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our traditions and ideals,” Marshall declared. “They are at variance with the principles for which we are now waging war. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that for centuries the Old World has been torn by racial and religious conflicts and has suffered the worst kind of anguish because of inequality of treatment for different groups.”29

The revival of civic nationalism in America had actually begun in the 1920s and 1930s among southern and eastern Europeans and their descendants, who were resisting the hardening of racial nationalism. Their movement widened in the 1930s in response to capitalist crisis. The labor movement that arose in those years was full of immigrants and their descendants—Irish, German, Italian, Jewish, Polish, Greek, Arab, French Canadian, Mexican, and others—united by their poverty and marginality and by their conviction that, as Americans, they deserved better. Marching under the banner of Americanism, working-class ethnics infused
the first principles of the American republic—freedom, democracy, and opportunity—with insurgent and working-class meaning. Freedom now meant the right of a worker to speak his or her mind at work or to cast a ballot for a Democrat at the polling station without fear of reprisal from management. Democracy meant ending the regime of autocracy at the workplace and replacing it with one in which workers had a voice in the conditions of their labor. Opportunity only had meaning, trade unionists argued, if poor workers and their families had access to government-guaranteed forms of assistance, such as Social Security and unemployment insurance, that would cushion the effects of job loss, illness and death in the family, and old age.

Ethnic workers made themselves heard not just in unions but also in politics. Continuing the mobilization that had begun with the Al Smith campaign in the 1920s, immigrant Americans and their offspring cast their votes for another Democrat, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. They helped carry him to victory in four elections. They also provided critical support for Roosevelt’s comprehensive reform program, the New Deal, that aimed to resuscitate the economy, establish a welfare state, and narrow the gap in opportunities and wealth that separated the rich and poor. In so doing, ethnic workers, and the communities in which they lived, helped shift the balance of power in the United States from conservatism to liberalism, and from a politics that glorified the free market to one that celebrated the role of government in regulating a capitalist system that seemed unable to right itself. Rhetorically, this shift was couched in civic nationalist terms. As ethnic workers glimpsed an opportunity to refashion America, they began to believe that America, finally, was opening itself to them. Their attachment to America deepened as a consequence.

America’s opening to its ethnics manifested itself, too, in the growing celebration of the United States as a land of multiple peoples and cultures. New Dealers for the most part did not self-consciously promote religious pluralism or multiculturalism, nor did they describe their supporters as a “rainbow coalition” of ethnic and racial groups. Indeed, in important ways, the New Deal reinvigorated older cultural and racial prejudices. The groups pouring into the Democratic Party were a diverse lot, however, and their very presence began to disrupt accepted ways of defining and representing the American nation.

This became abundantly clear in World War II, when the dominant and most honored image of the nation became that of the multiethnic platoon, with its Protestant, Irish, Polish, Italian, and Jewish soldiers fighting side by side to preserve American democracy and freedom. At the same time, the phrase Judeo-Christian began to displace Anglo-Saxon and Protestant as a way to describe American civilization. No one did more to popularize this phrase than a Presbyterian minister, Everett R. Clinchy,
who began to use it as a weapon against the totalitarian challenge that he believed America confronted. “Political party machines, led by Nazi Hitler, Communist Stalin, and Fascist Mussolini alike,” Clinchy declared in 1938, “deny the sovereignty of God above all else, pour contempt on the spiritual values of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and refuse to recognize those natural rights of freedom of conscience, freedom of church, press, of pulpit, and of religious organization work. . . . Never before in history have Protestants, Catholics and Jews been as aware of each other’s suffering and as willing to mobilize spiritual forces as American citizens.” The Judeo-Christian tradition, he concluded, was the foundation of the “American Way of life.”

Following Clinchy’s lead, an ecumenical group of clergymen distributed in 1942 a “Declaration of Fundamental Religious Beliefs Held in Common by Catholics, Protestants, and Jews.” That same year, the National Conference of Christians and Jews successfully made Brotherhood Week, timed to coincide with Washington’s birthday, into a nationwide event. Roosevelt himself chaired the event in 1943, declaring that Brotherhood Week “reminds us of the basic religious faith from which democracy has grown—that all men are children of one Father and brothers in the human family. . . . It is good to pledge renewed devotion to the fundamentals on which this country has been built.” In 1944, Major General Frederick E. Uhl announced that “the way was open for Judaism, Protestantism and Catholicism to stand shoulder to shoulder before our swiftly expanding armed forces.” By the end of the war, invocations to religious brotherhood and to the Judeo-Christian tradition as the American way had become ubiquitous. Religious nationalism, in the form of the Protestant ascendency, had been knocked from its perch.

The growing popularity of the term Judeo-Christian civilization cannot be understood simply in terms of a Protestant elite magnanimously deciding to relinquish its privileged place. Rather, it must be understood also in terms of the struggles of Catholic and Jewish immigrants and their children to declare civic nationalism, a creed that drew no distinctions on the basis of Protestant, Catholic, or Jew, to be the most honored of America’s traditions. In this case, civic nationalism allowed Americanizing immigrants to become advocates for building a different America, all the while claiming that they were being true to America’s promise. Civic nationalism generated among immigrants and their children both insistent demands for change and powerful cultural and political affiliations to their new home. It gave them reason to believe in the idea of America and to engage deeply in its democracy. Over time, it would accelerate their political and cultural integration.

The events of the 1930s and 1940s also challenged the color line and the legitimacy of America’s racial nationalist tradition. Indeed, the challenges to that tradition, beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the late
1960s, would be among the most serious and lasting challenges to white supremacy in American history. In 1948, President Harry Truman desegregated the armed forces. In 1952, Congress repealed the 1790 naturalization law limiting citizenship to “free, white persons.” In 1954, the Supreme Court reversed its “separate but equal” 1896 decision, now declaring that segregation was unconstitutional by the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1963, in his famous “I Have a Dream” speech, Martin Luther King Jr. made clear the civic nationalist stakes of the unfolding challenge to white supremacy. “When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence,” King observed, “they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” That America had defaulted on this note was obvious for all to see, King argued. But, he hastened to add, “we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. So we have come to cash this check—a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice.”

In 1964 and 1965, Congress, in response to the mass protest movement that King and others had unleashed, passed the most sweeping civil rights and voting rights legislation since Reconstruction. That same Congress also passed the Immigration Act of 1965, ending the racially based system of immigration restriction in place since the 1920s. After 1965, it became almost impossible for the U.S. government to deny foreigners entry into America and access to citizenship on the basis of race. The result, over the next forty years, was an immigration wave unprecedented in its global origins and racial diversity. Finally, in 1967, the Supreme Court declared that a Virginia law forbidding marriage between a black and a white was unconstitutional, bringing the entire edifice of state anti-miscegenation statutes crashing to the ground. In America, individuals in every state of the union would now be free to marry across the color line.

The civil rights upheaval also challenged prevailing notions of cultural integration and incorporation. Through the Black Is Beautiful movement, African Americans signaled that their political incorporation would not cost them their cultural pride or distinctiveness. Immigrant groups, both old and new, quickly adopted a similar stance in regard to their own ethnic cultures, thereby broadening and intensifying the effort to locate America’s vitality in its ethnic and racial diversity. The breadth and strength of this movement, which took the name multiculturalism, would have been unimaginable to immigrant and native Americans a hundred years earlier. And the diversity now upheld as an American ideal went beyond that embodied in the phrase Judeo-Christian, which, in the context of the 1940s, referred principally to white Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.
The rise of multiculturalism unleashed conflict about its legitimacy. Many on the Left embraced it only on the condition that it serve as a substitute to American nationalism; minorities were encouraged to find authenticity, community, and goodness in their particular cultures, grounded in race, gender, and sexuality, and to reject mainstream American culture, including the civic nationalist tradition, as compromised by racism, imperialism, and sexism. Those on the Right attacked multiculturalism for what they perceived to be its anti-Americanism and cultural relativism, both of which, they alleged, threatened to destroy the core ideals of the country’s eighteenth-century political and cultural inheritance. Yet, by the 1990s, after two decades of culture wars, multiculturalism was no longer the property of the Left or the Right, but of a broad middle, which saw in multiculturalism a superior creed for defining the meaning of America for the twenty-first century. In the eyes of this middle and its tribunes, including Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, America ought to celebrate its cultural diversity while calling on its various groups to embrace the principles of civic nationalism as their own. Multiculturalism, from this point of view, offered a formula for making a celebration of diversity central to a program of national belonging.39

American nationalism had moved a great distance across the second half of the twentieth century. That the country elected its first African American president in 2008, and that this president presided over a Supreme Court that did not even include a token Protestant in its ranks, reveals how much the traditions of racial and religious nationalism had weakened. But it would be a mistake to conclude that they are gone. The racial nationalist tradition, in particular, has roots so deep that the possibility of regeneration always remains. Additionally, in the anti-Muslim sentiment that has become so pronounced in recent years, one can discern too the possibility of a religious nationalist revival.

America in the Twenty-First Century

Nativism has shaped America’s early twenty-first century, as is evident in the increasing attacks on the immigrant presence in American society. Especially since 2005, many Americans have claimed that they (the immigrants) are not like us, the native-born keepers of American traditions. They stand accused of subverting what we have built.40 This anxiety has taken two forms in particular. First is that America is in the process of becoming a majority-minority nation, leaving the white majority permanently displaced. Second is that America cannot survive the presence of Muslim immigrants in its midst because the latter are the carriers of a religion of terror, domination, and oppression. Widespread denunciations of sharia are a good example of this anti-Islam orientation. These two manifestations of national fear found a common focus
in the person of Barack Obama, the first minority president and the first alleged to have a close affinity with Islam (Barack Hussein Obama). Indeed, through much of his first term, many Republicans believed that Obama was secretly a Muslim and had been indoctrinated into the faith during the years he spent as a boy in Indonesia. Obama is also only the third second-generation immigrant since 1900 to become president of the United States, and the first in American history to have an African father. The convergence of popular anxieties about race and religion on Obama helps explain why his legitimacy as president was challenged in the first two years of his presidency more than almost any other previous resident of the Oval Office.

In the anxiety about America’s becoming a majority-minority nation, one can discern a hoary racial nationalist principle at work: namely, that America was meant to be a white or European nation. As America’s non-European demographic future continues, ineluctably, to unfold, declarations that the European or white character of America must be preserved are likely to multiply. Alternatively, the racial nationalist tradition might reinvent itself by declaring that the critical division in America is not between whites and nonwhites but between blacks and nonblacks. In this second scenario, Asians and Latinos would be welcomed into a new American majority that construes its racial privilege in terms of being not black. America’s color line underwent something of a similar shift when the descendants of eastern and southern European immigrants transitioned, in the 1930s and 1940s, from being racially suspect to being racially fit and, in the process, walled themselves off from other racially suspect groups they had left behind. America may yet find a new way of defining and legitimating racial privilege for the twenty-first century. Events in 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, New York City, and elsewhere revealed how quick municipal police departments have been in recent years to use indiscriminate force against black men but far more circumspect in their response to the alleged misdeeds of nonblacks. The disproportionately large numbers of young black men locked up in the nation’s jails similarly reveal racial discrimination within the judicial system. Racial nationalism lurks in these patterns, still capable of legitimating programs that consign African Americans to a subordinate place within the American nation.

Efforts to revive religious nationalism as a defining feature of America can be glimpsed, meanwhile, in popular anxiety about Islam. This new religious nationalism no longer defines itself as Protestant (though some would like to restore a Protestant ascendancy) but as Western, and it claims to stand for the core principles of European humanism and American civic nationalism: freedom, individual rights, the dignity of every human being, and the toleration of dissent. Islam, by contrast, is alleged to be a faith that denies its adherents freedom while celebrating war on nonbelievers. In this version of religious nationalism, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are
called on to stand together to defend America and its Judeo-Christian tradition from Muslim assault.

The American fear of Islam today is reminiscent of America’s fear of Catholicism 150 years ago. That America overcame its fear of what it referred to as the Catholic menace—though it took more than a hundred years—offers hope that it can do so with regard to Islam as well. It is therefore possible that by 2050 we will be talking about America as an Abrahamic-Christian civilization, that phrase joining Muslims with Jews and Christians as joint stakeholders in the American nation. America, at present, is a long way from that formulation of American national identity, but no further than it once was from the Judeo-Christian one.

Future configurations of American national identity will be shaped not just by cultural struggles but by economic circumstances as well. Economic distress, and the crashing of the American dream of economic opportunity across the twenty-first century’s first decade, have darkened the country’s mood toward immigrants. Richard Alba has made his hopeful scenario for blurring America’s color lines—and, we might add, for dealing America’s tradition of racial nationalism a final defeat—contingent on an economy robust enough to generate ample economic opportunity for nonwhites and whites alike. He is right to do so. America’s tradition of civic nationalism has always promised that good things would come to those willing to work hard and inventively. That promise must be honored if civic nationalism is to regain its vigor and advance its integrative work.

Civic nationalism faces an even more difficult problem in regard to the eleven million undocumented immigrants living in the United States, a large majority of them Mexican. As a discourse centered on the rights of citizens, civic nationalism can deliver its promise only to those who are already citizens or who can reasonably hope to acquire that status. Across the twentieth century, immigrant rights’ advocates succeeded at times in extending constitutional rights and protections to aliens who were legally resident in the United States. Extending the same rights and protections to those who were here illegally has faced far stiffer opposition. As a result, being illegal in America has exposed the holders of this status to extreme forms of legal, economic, and social vulnerability.

The problem of the undocumented in America is not new. On the contrary, it has been present for more than half of American history, since Congress passed Chinese Exclusion in 1882. The Chinese experience with illegality is, on the one hand, a sobering lesson in the social costs that this status imposes on individuals and the communities in which they live. On the other hand, it offers an example of the United States gradually forging a pathway toward inclusion and integration. The scale of the Mexican undocumented problem is vast, of course, relative to the Chinese case. That, in itself, poses a stiff challenge. Then,
this question looms: even if the number of Mexican illegals is reduced substantially, will that reduction simply trigger a replacement stream of undocumented migration originating, perhaps, in Central America or the Caribbean? The numbers of undocumented immigrants, including many unaccompanied minors, streaming into the United States from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador rose significantly in 2014 and 2015. Have developed nations in this global age come to depend on the undocumented as a source of cheap and hyper-exploitable labor? Has globalization thrown some underdeveloped countries into such chaos that portions of their populations are increasingly willing to risk everything for a chance of a decent life somewhere else? It is not hard to imagine conditions in the world today overwhelming even those nations with the greatest openness to foreigners and with the strongest traditions of inclusion.

Yet it is also possible to imagine a combination of policies and events that might lessen the intractability of the undocumented problem in the United States in connection to that group—Mexicans—that has given America its most severe test. The continued growth in Latino political power in the United States has increased the pressure on the government to legalize at least a portion of the undocumented population. Polls in recent years have shown that a majority of Americans, Latinos and not, believe that substantial portions of the undocumented population should be put on the road to citizenship. Underlying these sentiments is the conviction that America’s civic nationalist tradition—and its commitment to inclusion and opportunity—is strong enough to handle this massive task of integration. Conservative Republicans, who constitute a minority of the country but a majority in the House of Representatives, have blocked every piece of legislation meant to put any kind of path to citizenship in place. President Obama, frustrated by Congress’s repeated failure in this regard, issued executive orders in 2012 and in 2014 offering temporary legal status to as many as five million undocumented immigrants—those who were brought here as young children and those who are parents to children born on American soil (and thus who are citizens of the United States). Although these executive orders have been controversial, they may one day be regarded as having been the first difficult steps toward integrating a vast undocumented population into American life.

Obama’s plan may be helped by a development invisible to most Americans: a radical decrease in the fertility of women in Mexico, from nearly seven children per woman in the 1970 to a fraction more than two today. As far fewer children grow to maturity in Mexico, the pressure on them to emigrate in search of work will likely be less than it was on every Mexican generation of the twentieth century. Mexican women, in other words, have taken actions that may be as consequential for Mexican communities in the United States as the geopolitical imperatives arising from
World War II and the Cold War once were for Chinese settlements in the United States. Moreover, if Mexico continues on its current path of economic development, which has worked to narrow the wealth gap between it and the United States, the pressure to migrate will be further reduced.

In short, the combination of radically decreased migration pressures in Mexico and temporary legalization measures in the United States may shrink the undocumented population significantly. Should Americans perceive that the magnitude of the problem has decreased, their confidence that their government can address the part of the problem that remains is likely to grow. Demographic change already under way within the undocumented population may also strengthen popular confidence in the efficacy of a politics of integration. With each year, more and more of the undocumented become anchored to America through children—already numbering about four million—born on U.S. soil and who have only known life north of the Rio Grande. Historically, Americanization has usually accelerated once members of the second generation are old and numerous enough to wrest influence in immigrant communities away from their parents. There are reasons to think that this transition is already under way within significant stretches of the Mexican undocumented population in the United States.

One can imagine, of course, multiple reasons why the hopeful scenario I have set forth here may not unfold; but suppose it does? Then, America’s civic nationalist tradition will have found a way to regain its relevance for a new century.

Notes

3. Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (1790); Zolberg 2006; Kettner 1978; Schuck and Smith 1985, chapters 1 and 2.
6. U.S. Congress 1866, 498; Epps 2010. Only some groups of Indians were to be excluded from birthright citizenship, and for reasons of jurisdiction rather than race or culture. The U.S. government had, through treaties, granted these groups rights of self-government, which meant that they were not fully subject to the jurisdiction of American laws.
9. U.S. Const. amend. I; Naturalization Act of 1790. Various states, such as Massachusetts and South Carolina, did have laws establishing Protestantism as the official religion and barring non-Protestants from holding state office (Neem 2008).
17. U.S. Congress 1866, 575, 2861.
35. Hollinger 2011.
42. Alexander 2010.
43. Alba 2009.
44. Schuck 1984.
46. U.S. Customs and Border Protection estimates that as many as fifty thousand unaccompanied and undocumented minors from Honduras, El Salvador,
and Guatemala entered the United States in 2014 and that those numbers may reach one hundred fifty thousand in 2015 (Oleaga 2014).

47. Gutiérrez 2010.

References


Chapter 2

Reimagining the Nation in a World of Migration: Legitimacy, Political Claims-Making, and Membership in Comparative Perspective

IRENE BLOEMRAAD

Canada and the United States have made significant strides in redefining a national identity that today celebrates ethno-racial diversity. A century ago, both countries aggressively kept out Asian migrants and projected a white, Christian notion of an “imagined community.” But in 2009, almost two-thirds of American and Canadian survey respondents agreed that immigration enriches their country’s culture with new customs and ideas.1 In Canada, when a 2010 opinion survey asked residents what was “very important” to Canadian national identity, 56 percent underscored the centrality of multiculturalism, more than the 47 percent who supported hockey. Immigrants, though cognizant of discrimination, perceive significant acceptance of cultural pluralism in Canada and the United States.2 Indeed, with the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency, some even talk about a post-ethnic or post-racial social order.3 In Canada, two recent governors general—the Queen’s representative in Canada and nominal head of state—have been women with immigrant and racial minority backgrounds: Adrienne Clarkson, born in Hong Kong, and Michâelle Jean, born in Haiti. Whether in the United States or Canada, the political “face of the nation” has become the polar opposite of the national image celebrated a century before.

We do not know whether Europeans would rate multiculturalism as more important to national identity than soccer, but contemporary political debate makes one skeptical. In their introduction to this volume, Nancy Foner and Patrick Simon provide survey data documenting the
much greater European skepticism over national identities grounded in pluralism, and greater feelings of exclusion among those of immigrant descent. Elites echo such concerns. Across Europe, political leaders and intellectuals have worried that immigration and diversity undermine national unity. Political leaders of large European countries, from David Cameron in the United Kingdom to Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy in France, have criticized multiculturalism and the celebration of diversity as divisive. In smaller European countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden—countries well known for tolerance and progressive social policies—anti-immigrant politicians such as Geert Wilders and the Sverigedemokraterna Party have gained seats in national parliament by defending traditional, homogeneous national identities against the perceived cultural onslaught of newcomers, especially Muslims. Although concerns about immigrant-generated diversity are particularly strong on the Right, scholars and politicians on the European Left also worry about what some have called the “progressive dilemma,” namely, the concern that continued immigration will undermine the welfare state because diversity undercuts the social cohesion and sense of common identity needed for policies of redistribution. Across these various indicators, North Americans appear to value ethno-cultural and racial diversity as part of national identity more than Europeans do.

How do we explain transatlantic differences in contemporary national identity and imagining? Various observers point to North America’s long history of immigration. The successful integration of millions of European colonists and migrants into a nation of “Americans” or “Canadians” during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sets up a national narrative, it is argued, that provides fertile ground for an inclusive national identity. “In the settler societies of North America and Oceania,” James Hampshire observes, “immigration is central to narratives of national identity . . . [so] representing immigrants as a cultural threat is a more difficult discursive project.” Moreover, because Canada and the United States are “younger” societies than those in Europe, history’s reach is shorter; the sense of common peoplehood spanning centuries is not as foundational to North American self-conceptions as to European ones. The result, according to this historical narrative, is that Canada and the United States are better positioned and better able to frame national identities to include immigrants and their children.

I challenge such a simple and deterministic reading of history. From the vantage point of the late 1940s, it was far from evident that Canada or the United States would be contemporary bastions of multiculturalism or that diversity would be celebrated as part of national identity. Laws and practice kept most nonwhite immigrants from migrating to North America, restricted their naturalization, and denied people of color full rights, even if they held citizenship. Members of U.S. Congress refused to
change immigration laws in large part over worries about racial mixing, while in 1947 the prime minister of Canada vowed to limit “Oriental” migration so as not to alter the “fundamental character” of the Canadian population.

In Europe, in contrast, the horrors of ethno-racial nationalism were so shocking that it would have been hard to imagine politicians at the time making calls for minorities’ assimilation into the dominant native-born groups that had worked toward genocide or were complicit in such projects. Consider also the symbolism and governance demands of the multiethnic, multiracial, and multireligious empires various European nations still held. An observer traversing the Atlantic Ocean at the close of World War II would have been hard-pressed to predict the direction of national identity transformations across the two continents, or to predict that the next half century would inexorably and inevitably lead to the more diverse and inclusive national identity discourse found in North America today.

I suggest that national reimagining has gone further in North America than Europe due to three key causal processes. My focus is on the post–World War II period, picking up the narrative ably laid out by Gary Gerstle in chapter 1 of this volume. First, I argue, national identity change in Canada and the United States was initiated by native-born minority populations before the onset of large-scale nonwhite migration. The timing and legitimacy of this mobilization set the stage for more inclusive national identity discourses on which immigrants could build. Second, a relatively generous citizenship policy—through birth or naturalization—and a political system open to, but which could contain, ethnic politics were critical. The changes started by native-born minorities were reinforced by the political engagement of immigrants, immigrant-origin minorities, and their supporters. Finally, civil rights and diversity gains were institutionalized through law, bureaucracy, policy, and educational systems and had real effects on national culture.

None of this occurred because of any consensus on national identity. Today, various political observers and some academics express alarm about immigration because they fear diversity will undermine social cohesion, which in turn is posited as necessary to support the welfare state, engender social trust, strengthen patriotism, and reduce alienation, including alienation that breeds violence. The positive value placed on social cohesion, however, privileges consensus over conflict and undermines the legitimacy of contestation. The causal processes I identify in North America show that the broadening of national identities arose out of political battles, in a context where immigrants and their descendants could be part of the debate. In this sense, contemporary calls for social cohesion in Europe and elsewhere misread the history of national identity change. The North American experience shows that the (re-)creation of
national imagined communities is often conflictual: when groups make claims about legitimacy and standing in a society, others often resist such claims. Working out such conflicts becomes a new thread in the national story.

**Legitimate National Identity Shocks: Actors and Timing**

The process of national identity change is facilitated when the early shock against traditional membership norms is grounded in historic majority-minority conflicts. When this occurs, the reimagining of national identity is, initially, tangential to immigration. This is important because accommodating native-born minorities’ grievances legitimizes new identity frameworks on which immigrants can graft their membership. Although burdened with second-class citizenship, after World War II native-born minority groups in North America could appeal to the ideal of equal citizenship and the reality of their long participation in the economic, social, and cultural life of the nation to militate for inclusion. The actors and timing of identity change was different in Europe. In many European countries, the process of reimagining national identity was directly tied to migration. In some cases, this occurred as Europe’s colonial powers confronted the arrival of former colonial peoples to the continent, such as in the early post–World War II period for Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, then later for Spain and Portugal. For other countries, such as Germany, discussion of national identity was largely forbidden in the immediate postwar period given the atrocities perpetuated in the name of racial purity. But as labor migration became permanent immigration, national identity questions arose in the face of a changing demographic reality. When the initial push to make national identities more inclusive is somewhat divorced from immigration, it is arguably harder to undermine the legitimacy of immigrants’ diversity claims later.

Of course, change in U.S. and Canadian national identities following World War II was preceded by substantial experience with large-scale immigration. Both the United States and Canada were founded on the premise of European settlement in a new world of vast land mass and natural resources. Millions of migrants streamed into the continent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a process that also involved the containment and destruction of Aboriginal populations. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States and Canada were more nations of immigrants than most European countries. In the United States, 7 percent of the population in 1950 was foreign born; in Canada, the proportion in 1951 was 15 percent. For many, this history explains contemporary North America’s more open national identity.
We must not forget, however, that religious, ethnic, and racial hierarchies were central to the early story of North American immigration. There was no broad-based diversity discourse at the time. Indeed, the similarities in the ethnic-racial orders on either side of the 49th parallel were striking. The most desirable immigrants, in the view of the public and government, were western and northern Europeans (preferably Protestant), followed by other white Christians, Jews, and at the bottom, non-European peoples. In 1882, the United States began the first of a series of Chinese exclusion acts that sought to bar almost all Chinese immigration; in 1885, Canada instituted a head tax, directed only at Chinese, with the same purpose. In the first decade of the twentieth century, both countries entered into agreements with Japan to eliminate Japanese migration. At the subnational level, states such as California and the province of British Columbia reinforced Asian migrants’ legal and social inequality by passing laws restricting Asians’ access to land, licenses, juries, and the ballot box.

These attitudes remained largely intact after World War II. In 1947, Canadian prime minister Mackenzie King famously reaffirmed the government’s commitment to a white, British-centered immigration policy. Speaking to the House of Commons, he declared, “The people of Canada do not wish . . . to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. . . . Any considerable Oriental immigration would give rise to social and economic problems.” Conservative Republicans and southern Democrats in the U.S. Congress articulated similar sentiment and logic, as Gerstle illustrates in chapter 1 of this volume. They defended the national origin quotas, which heavily favored migrants from north and west Europe. This arrangement, they argued, would facilitate social and cultural assimilation, an outcome impossible to achieve if new immigrants came from different origins.

As Rogers Smith argues, “ascriptive” Americanism was not just a historical aberration in a trajectory toward republican and liberal equality. Rather, ascriptive exclusion, by which large swaths of U.S. society were denied full citizenship, was a constituent element of American nationhood (see also chapter 1, this volume). The same was true in Canada, which used both law and practice to keep non-Europeans out of the country. As late as 1966, Canada’s Department of Manpower and Immigration reported that of 194,743 new migrants admitted, only 10 percent had non-European ethnic backgrounds, including 5,870 “Negros” (largely from the West Indies), 5,178 Chinese, and 4,094 East Asians. It would be wrong to read contemporary, inclusive national identities in Canada and the United States as a natural progression of each country’s immigrant past.

Against this backdrop, the 1960s saw enormous change. In the area of immigration, the Canadian government began to remove race or nationality criteria from entrance decisions starting in 1962, and in 1965 the U.S.
Immigration and National Identity Act ended the system of national-origin quotas. These changes occurred in tandem with momentous challenges to each nation’s self-image. In the United States, the challenge came from the civil rights movement, demanding equality for African Americans and other native-born minorities; in Canada, the country faced national dissolution with the rising threat of Quebec separation.

Importantly, changes in immigration law were largely tangential to the reimagining of national identity brought about by native-born minorities’ activism. In 1970, less than 5 percent of the U.S. population was foreign born; immigration reform was not a central issue for the civil rights movement. Indeed, few anticipated the demographic transformations that the new immigration law would bring, given its focus on family reunification as the main pathway into the United States. One of the bill’s sponsors, Emanuel Celler, testified, “Since the peoples of Africa and Asia have very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate from those countries.” President Lyndon Johnson concurred, calling the new law “not a revolutionary bill. . . . It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives.” Although the domestic fight against racial exclusion animated some progressives’ support for changes to U.S. immigration law, as important and likely more so were foreign policy considerations and the buildup of incremental policy changes over prior decades.

In Canada, changes to immigration law flowed from economic considerations and concern about Canada’s moral and political standing in the international community. Such changes were largely divorced from the central national identity challenge of the day: growing Quebecois nationalism and grievances over French Canadians’ status and socio-economic position in the country. Many Francophone separatists saw common cause with the situation of black Americans and those in the third world, equating the place of Francophones within English Canada to internal colonialism. A key response of the federal government was the establishment, in 1963, of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to report on and make recommendations for the development of the Canadian confederation. Although the commission’s terms included a nod to “the contribution made by other ethnic groups,” its primary mandate was to further the equal partnership between “the two founding races,” the British and the French. The use of the word race to refer to the two groups, which represented the understanding of national identity at the time, is striking.

The political turmoil of the 1960s and early 1970s occurred within an arc of gradually loosening ties to Great Britain—as seen in the adoption of a Canadian passport and citizenship in 1947—and a desire to distinguish the country from the United States. Immigration reform was tangential to these debates and, in any case, the vast majority of immigrants living in Canada were of European origin. In 1966, for example, two-thirds of new
immigrants came from just five countries: the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States, Germany, or Portugal. As Elke Winter argues persuasively, the transformation of Canadian identity included multiple groups and concerns; it was not just a story of a native-born us worried about a foreign other. Conflict over Canadian identity centered on Quebec separatism, the place of Canada in the British Commonwealth, and differentiation from the United States. Later, it would also implicate conflict over Aboriginal self-determination. The lack of attention to immigration at these key moments was, arguably, vital for later including immigrant diversity in the reimagined nation.

From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, we can see that the 1960s and 1970s were a watershed in both the United States and Canada, a decisive moment when claims to inclusion (or independence) made by long-standing minorities forced the two nations to articulate a national identity that embraced diversity far more than previously. In the United States, ideas of assimilation or Americanization lost their luster. This was in part because of the continuing cultural pride of later-generation European descendants, but even more because of the civil rights movement. Black power and black pride movements, and complimentary efforts by Chicano, Asian American, and Native American activists, brought attention to claims for equality, inclusion, and the valorization of cultural heritage.

In Canada, lobbying by European-origin Canadians led to the abandonment of biculturalism—but the retention of bilingualism—following the commission’s report. In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced to the House of Commons a new federal government policy of multiculturalism, committing the government to facilitate integration by removing barriers to participation but also supporting groups’ efforts to maintain their cultural heritage. Trudeau apparently took little interest in the policy after his speech, and some commentators see the embrace of multiculturalism as a federal ploy to undermine Francophone claims to special status. It is clear that, at the time, multiculturalism was envisioned narrowly, primarily centered on recognizing European immigrants and mostly about folkloric aspects of diversity.

Why were civil rights and Francophone nationalism so central to later immigrants’ ability to be part of the national community? Two elements stand out: the actors involved and the timing. Because the key actors were native-born minorities with long-standing roots in the two countries, it was much harder for elites and majority citizens to dismiss claims of inequality and calls for inclusion. Whereas foreigners can be seen as invited guests who should not ask for too much (or, alternatively, unwanted guests), the claims of African Americans and Francophones were less easily dismissed. The two countries’ respective national narratives—including a civil war fought in the United States to end slavery, and the
notion of two founding peoples in Canada—provided legitimacy to calls for equality and inclusion that carried normative weight for elites and many ordinary people.

The relative unimportance of immigration during this period was, I hypothesize, also an asset for later expansion of the national community. Immigration in the 1960s and 1970s was, in the Canadian context, still dominated by Europeans, and in the United States, little new migration occurred from the mid-1920s into the 1960s. This provided a period during which institutional changes such as civil rights law, multicultural programs, and curricular changes could begin without strong linkages to fears over mass migration or the arrival of people of very different religious, cultural, and racial backgrounds than before.

Claims-Making: The Importance of Political Inclusion and Contestation

“Home-grown” identity shocks are not, however, a sufficient explanation for postwar changes in American and Canadian national identities. European countries dealing with postwar reconstruction and, in some cases the dissolution of colonial empires, also had to articulate modified national identities, a process further influenced by the international eclipse of Europe within a Cold War context and the stirrings of what would become the European Union.

We thus need to ask what the mechanisms are by which such shocks become transformed into an identity inclusive of immigrant diversity. For this to happen, early transformations must be reinforced—even appropriated—by immigrants, their descendants, and advocates for new minorities. Here the political incorporation of immigrants and their children is critical, including open naturalization policy, relatively high levels of citizenship acquisition, birthright citizenship, and active participation in electoral and protest politics. The conditions for political inclusion and contestation for immigrants and their children have, until quite recently, been more open in Canada and the United States than in Europe. This is important because when assimilationist or anti-immigrant voices speak out, such voices can gain traction absent a vigorous and vocal opposition that carries political clout. For this reason, the political engagement of immigrants and their descendants is a critical mechanism for broadening membership, not just in a legal sense but also in reimagining the symbolic and cultural national community.

Immigrants’ acquisition of citizenship has long been a normative expectation in Canada and the United States even as, historically, naturalization was envisioned only for those of European origin. U.S. law and courts restricted naturalization to white (and later black) immigrants,
leaving all those not deemed white as racially ineligible for citizenship; these provisions were only eliminated definitively in 1952. The low barriers to citizenship, established for European migrants, nevertheless remained in place after World War II. As a result, postwar legal permanent immigrants to the United States and to Canada face a relatively accessible citizenship process: a short residency period of three to five years, demonstration of English (or in Canada, French) language ability, and evidence of some civic knowledge, including familiarity with government institutions. In the early 1970s, more than three in five immigrants living in Canada and the United States were citizens of their adopted nation.21

Both Canada and the United States also accord automatic birthright citizenship to those born on their territory, facilitating the political inclusion of the children of immigrants. Birthright citizenship is given regardless of parents’ status, whether parents are temporary labor migrants or international students or have no legal residence at all. In comparison, even those European countries with strong civic traditions of nationhood do not offer such unconditional citizenship.22 The European second generation does not consequently become an automatic part of the national electorate as it does in North America, despite more local voting rights for noncitizens in Europe than in North America.

This open political incorporation is critical to understanding North American national identity changes. The early ethnic politics of European-origin Americans began an expansion of American nationhood, as with the election of the first Catholic president, John F. Kennedy. Early on, the activism of certain European ethnic groups also helped generate pressure for legislative change to U.S. immigration law, which had inclusive repercussions for post-1965 migrants.23 Such gains were cemented as new migrants—including Cuban émigrés in Florida, West Indian immigrants in New York City, and Vietnamese refugees in southern California—began to make inroads into politics. This is not to say that all immigrants and migrant communities embrace diversity or advocate for expansive immigration—some do not—but their presence and activism makes it qualitatively harder to adopt a simplistic anti-immigrant narrative. This can be seen in the American context when conservative politicians and interest groups worried about immigration distinguish between unwanted illegal migrants, on the one hand, and hardworking immigrants who play by the rules, on the other. In making these distinctions, they allow, even if only grudgingly, that some immigrants are part of the national community. Politicians or pundits who adopt a narrower view of national identity must specify their objections to immigration and diversity more carefully in the face of politically active immigrant communities and the continuing activism of native-born minority groups.
The Canadian case is particularly instructive in this regard, in part because the political incorporation of immigrants occurs more quickly in Canada than in the United States. As noted, the declaration of multiculturalism in 1971 had as much to do with dampening French Canadian nationalism as with celebrating non-British and non-French minorities. Nevertheless, the recognition of other cultural communities came in part from the political activism of ethnic minorities of European origin. Ukrainian Canadian Paul Yuzyk, named to the Senate in 1963, challenged an account of the nation as a partnership between French and English in his maiden speech to the Senate, titled “Canada: A Multicultural Nation.” By the 1980s, new waves of migration, notably from Asia, pushed national reimagining further. In 1985, migration from Asia constituted close to one-half of all new arrivals (46 percent), and from Europe and the United States less than one-third (30 percent) of total admissions. The government shifted multiculturalism policy away from folklore and cultural heritage to greater attention to racial exclusion. The report *Equality Now!* published in 1984, heralded this shift, which further expanded in the 1980s and 1990s. In Toronto, the presence of large numbers of foreign-born Canadian citizens affected the political calculus of the federal Liberal Party, which hoped that an appeal to multiculturalism would garner votes with ethnic minority voters.

High immigration combined with high levels of citizenship generate pressure for political leaders to articulate inclusive notions of national identity. They also create feedback loops that consolidate changes by making it difficult for anti-immigrant politicians to gain a foothold in politics. The remarkable transformation of the Canadian political right is a case in point. At its founding in 1987, the Reform Party, a western populist party, was antagonistic to multiculturalism and suspicious of immigration; it was the closest cousin to the antiforeigner populism found in many European countries. Although not as virulent as European far-right parties, in its 1988 Blue Book, the Reform Party outlined a platform using language akin to Mackenzie King’s from four decades earlier. With the caveat, “Immigration should not be based on race or creed, as it was in the past,” the Blue Book nevertheless proclaimed that immigration policy should not “be explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada, as it increasingly seems to be.” The Reform Party’s 1991 Blue Book dropped the language of Canada’s ethnic makeup, but committed the party to opposing “the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism” by abolishing the program and ministry dedicated to multiculturalism.

This populist party succeeded in first displacing, then taking over, the traditional right-of-center party in Canada, leading to the creation of a new, unified Conservative Party in 2003. As party leaders sought
to contest national elections coast to coast within a winner-take-all electoral system, the party’s tenor toward diversity and its outreach efforts to immigrant-origin voters changed markedly. This was due in no small part to the electoral power of immigrant-origin Canadians. In 2006, an astounding 85 percent of foreign-born individuals who had lived in Canada at least three years (the minimum residency requirement for citizenship) reported Canadian citizenship. Although not all of them vote, enough do that politicians must be attentive to this electorate.

When the refashioned Conservative Party won a majority in the 2011 federal elections—headed by former Reform Party member Prime Minister Stephen Harper—it succeeded in part because it sought out immigrant-origin voters, including those classified as visible minorities in Canada. In contrast to the Reform Party’s early platform, the government did not eliminate the country’s multiculturalism policy or rescind the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. It also continued to admit significant numbers of new immigrants from around the world. A possible implication for Europe is that as immigrants and their descendants make up a growing share of the electorate, they might open up national identity discourses.

The Canadian and American electoral and party systems also help moderate the political expression of antidiversity and anti-immigrant sentiment. In many European parliamentary systems, a radical party can gain some seats in the national legislature—and consequently political voice—by garnering a relatively low proportion of total votes. In Sweden, the Sverigedemokraterna Party needed only 4 percent of the vote to gain parliamentary representation in 2010. In North America, political parties seeking national office must engage in a big-tent strategy, trying to reconcile diverse opinions on immigration within the party. The effects of the electoral and party systems can be seen in the United States when Republican candidates who take harder stances on immigration during primary elections to select the party’s nominee subsequently moderate their position and tone in the general election. In 2012, presidential candidate Mitt Romney initially took a hard-line stance on immigration as he tried to secure the Republican nomination, and then encountered significant difficulties with Latino voters in the general election. As the Latino electorate grows, a moderation of discourse, akin to what happened for the Canadian Reform Party, might occur.

When immigrants and their descendants enjoy a relatively high level of political incorporation, and politicians decide to solicit the support of immigrant-origin voters, those on the right (and left) must temper anti-immigrant or antiminority rhetoric, and they are more likely to articulate an inclusive national identity, one that includes people from a variety of ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds.
Institutionalizing Change and Changing Cultures

National identity shocks and political activism must be partnered with institution-building and cultural change among the general population. Political activism is not enough without legislative, bureaucratic, and policy changes that institutionalize more inclusive notions of national identity. Civil rights legislation, the enshrinement of equality guarantees, and antidiscrimination efforts are critical. They not only offer real protections for minorities, but also become taken for granted over time, changing attitudes and political culture in gradual but consequential ways. Attitudinal change is further spurred by curricular initiatives and the efforts of teachers to promote multiculturalism among the younger generation.

To borrow from the field of international relations, such institutionalization provides immigrants and their descendants with both hard and soft power in their country of residence. In foreign relations, hard power is harnessed when countries resort to military force and economic sanctions (or aid) to coerce or cajole particular results. Applied domestically, minorities can use courts and legal protections to force changes on people and organizations that would exclude them from the national community. Public policies such as affirmative action or integration programs provide material resources to further minorities’ individual and group ends. Concurrently, diversity instruction in classrooms and the changing discourse on equality that is reflected in and reinforced by legal protections provide softer power, the ability to achieve ends through persuasion and attraction rather than coercion. Diversity discourses become symbolic resources that immigrant-origin groups can use to make claims and challenge exclusion. In this way, legislative and bureaucratic changes not only modify hierarchies of power and inequality, but also alter cultural notions of the nation and who fits in.

This process is readily apparent in the United States, which arguably began the post–World War II institutionalization process earlier than Canada. The civil rights movement in America brought about a minority rights revolution that has facilitated immigrants’ claims-making and national inclusion. The 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawed racial segregation in schools, workplaces, and public accommodations. These protections were extended in ensuing years through amendments and further legislation. Federal and state governments also initiated policies to open up schools, small business opportunities, and jobs through affirmative action, such as preferential admissions, contracting, and hiring of minorities. As Congress and state legislatures developed new legal protections, bureaucracies, and implementation policies, the ideals of equity and
pluralism were legitimized. As Philip Kasinitz argues, the original goal of righting historical injustices toward native-born African Americans was recast as a way to promote diversity and minority representation in schools and the workforce, benefiting racial minorities of immigrant origin.33

Civil rights legislation also put into motion special policies for linguistic minorities, regardless of national origin, which were particularly relevant to immigrant communities.34 The president and U.S. Congress used Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to mandate that administrative agencies hire bilingual personnel and translate forms, notices, and applications for limited-English proficient (LEP) individuals in certain contexts. Similarly, Section 203 of the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, another piece of civil rights legislation, mandates language access at the ballot box. As of 2002, 466 local jurisdictions in thirty-one states were legally required to provide voting information and ballots in non-English languages.35 Traditional immigrant gateway cities such as San Francisco and New York City have also adopted their own, more expansive, language access policies.

Another product of the 1960s, the federal Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (BEA) provided—until it expired in 2002—a federal remedy for discrimination against public-school students who did not speak English, and it made federal funding available for programs taught in languages other than English. During its thirty-four years, the BEA generated constant controversy, especially over whether it should help maintain minority languages and cultures or provide only remedial or transitional English instruction.36 But even amid controversy, it brought attention to diversity in the classroom.

Some might argue that at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the institutionalization process has suffered a series of setbacks. In the area of U.S. educational policy, in 2001 the federal English Language Acquisition Act (ELAA), enacted as Title III of the No Child Left Behind Act, replaced BEA, but contained no reference to bilingual education. Concurrently, voters in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts passed ballot measures to ban bilingual education in state public schools in 1998, 2000, and 2002, respectively.

Nevertheless, policy and legislative changes begun in the civil rights era decisively moved the discourse of integration in the United States beyond a singular focus on Americanization. As Kasinitz contends, “Today, many forms of diversity are not just tolerated, they are celebrated, particularly by institutions of higher education, in ways that would have been hard to imagine in earlier times.”37 Even without bilingual education, many U.S. schools regularly incorporate activities such as Hispanic Heritage Month into the curriculum or spotlight the contribution of specific groups in history, government, and English classes. This has, in the terms of Richard Alba and Victor Nee, broadened what constitutes the American mainstream.38
The federal government has also helped extend the notion of civil rights to include immigrants by using its power to regulate interstate commerce, to guarantee equal protection under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and through appeals to plenary power when state or local laws are perceived as usurping federal power over immigration. These protections have even covered those without legal residence in some cases. In 1982, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Plyler v. Doe decision struck down a Texas law targeting undocumented children by declared that children without legal status have a constitutional right to attend primary and secondary school. This right, and other legislation providing some legal standing for undocumented residents, set the stage for increased mobilization for DREAM Act legislation that would grant residency to those brought to the country without authorization at a young age.39

Of course, processes of institutionalization are not unidirectional. Recent events in the United States spotlight a host of legislative initiatives that target immigrants, in particular state initiatives directed at those without legal status. Legislation—such as S.B. 1070 in Arizona and what the American Civil Liberties Union has called copycat measures in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah—contributes to a growing climate of fear for undocumented migrants. Even legal noncitizens have seen rights and benefits rolled back. The federal 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, also known as the Welfare Reform Act, denied social welfare benefits to many legal permanent residents, for the first time drawing a bright boundary between citizens and immigrants with permanent residency with regard to accessing social benefits. Other legislation passed in 1996 extended the grounds for deportation and greatly restricted judicial discretion, including for legal noncitizen immigrants, beginning a sharp increase in deportations through to 2014.

Nevertheless, civil rights legislation and efforts at institutionalizing antidiscrimination and diversity initiatives have broadened the contours of American national identity. The significance of judicial review, in particular, needs to be underscored. The ability to use judicial review and the legitimacy of law and courts as an avenue to fight for civil rights—now extended to immigrant rights—has not only permitted courts to overturn legislation deemed in conflict with the constitution, but also helped legitimate the political demands of minorities and attract supporters. Immigrant advocates in the United States use the language of civil rights, antidiscrimination, and inclusion to make claims and to articulate immigrants’ future place in the nation in a way quite different from Europe. On the European continent, passage of antidiscrimination legislation and the establishment of agencies to oversee discrimination claims are more likely to be seen as an imposition from the European Union, as in the case of the 2000 EU Race Directive, requiring that member states outlaw
discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin by July 2003. In the United States, legal and institutional changes, generated through domestic action and contestation, have been critical to changing the cultural idiom of American national identity. It is possible that with time and migrants’ use of European courts to advance antidiscrimination claims, acceptance of broader contours of the national community will also increase among the general European population.

In this regard, the Canadian case might be instructive. In Canada, one seldom hears the term civil rights to encompass the demands for equality by minority groups, though the two countries enshrine many of the same protections. Instead, Canadians speak of equality guarantees, Charter protections, antidiscrimination initiatives, and human rights. The difference in the language lies partly in the relative newness of a written set of rights guarantees. For most of its existence, Canada did not have a document that corresponds to the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, and Canadian courts therefore had few opportunities to override challenges to parliamentary legislation. However, in 1982 the Charter of Rights and Freedoms established, for the first time, the fundamental nature of certain rights and freedoms, giving individuals a means to challenge government in court. The Charter gave constitutional strength to the prohibition against discrimination, affirmed equality guarantees, protected equity hiring (a Canadian form of affirmative action), and even instructed judges to keep the multicultural heritage of Canada in mind when rendering decisions. The enshrinement of the Charter was a milestone, precipitating the Canadian version of a rights revolution. In the Migrant Integration Policy Index, an international comparative metric of policies affecting migrants, Canada and the United States stand out as having the strongest antidiscrimination infrastructure of the thirty-seven countries surveyed. The United Kingdom is not far behind—perhaps relevant to understanding why Muslims are very likely to report feeling British, even if political and media elite question this (see chapter 6, this volume)—whereas the institutionalization of antidiscrimination measures lags in Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Norway, all countries in the midst of heated identity debates.

Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms has consequently become a legal resource that minorities can use to combat unequal treatment, and it has become a foundation stone of contemporary notions of Canadian identity. According to the 2010 poll mentioned earlier, 78 percent of Canadian residents consider the Charter very important to Canadian identity less than twenty years after its signing. The level of support for the Charter was second only to health care and more important than the Canadian flag in defining the Canadian nation. The Charter thus functions as both a resource to facilitate minorities’ inclusion and a source of national pride for all Canadians.
Multiculturalism policy in Canada has also served such a dual purpose. For immigrants, multicultural policy, combined with immigrant settlement programs, has promoted political incorporation within a context of pluralism. This process of incorporation works both at an instrumental level—public policies provide financial and technical support to immigrants and community-based organizations—and at a symbolical level of membership. As a “hard resource,” projected spending for Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s integration programs, including transfers to provincial counterparts, stood at slightly over $1 billion in the 2010–2011 fiscal year. Symbolic repercussions are also important. Not only does public funding communicate that multiculturalism ideology is important for the national identity, but the way funding is administered also sends a message. A substantial portion of monies for diversity and integration initiatives gets channeled to community-based organizations. By contracting with civil society groups, governments send a message that they want to work in partnership with immigrant communities and that they trust them to use public funds in line with national goals. Such funding also feeds back into political mobilization and voice, given that public support helps build an organizational structure and leadership base that immigrants can use to advocate on their behalf.

Thus, rather than a zero-sum trade-off, the Canadian argument has been that multicultural recognition and accommodation of difference facilitates integration and national unity. Comparative survey data show that immigrants in Canada are more likely to report that their ethnicity is important to their sense of identity than their counterparts in the United States are, but they are also more likely to report an attachment to the nation. Ethnic and Canadian attachments are complementary, not in conflict.

Critically, multiculturalism also serves as an identity touchstone for the majority population. Only 12 percent of Canadian residents believe that multiculturalism is unimportant to Canadian national identity. A recent analysis finds that, in Canada, those who express the greatest patriotism are also those more likely to support immigration and multiculturalism. This is a surprising relationship from the vantage point of other countries, where patriotism is often correlated with anti-immigrant or antidiversity attitudes.

Of course, multiculturalism is not a panacea, and there are definite limits in the public’s mind. Controversies have focused on the use of sharia during arbitration in the Ontario judicial system, the right of Sikhs to wear turbans in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the accommodation of religious minorities in Quebec. The success of multiculturalism as an ideology and idiom for national identity must be understood as part and parcel of a complex web of minority relations: a non-British, non-American Canadian national identity was (and is) negotiated within
an underlying threat of Quebec separation and vocal claims-making by Canada’s Aboriginal population.50

**Caveats and Concluding Thoughts**

Other factors come into play in understanding the relationship between immigrant-generated diversity and national identity transformations. Immigration policies likely play a role. The Canadian point system is often held up as facilitating positive integration because economic migrants are selected based on their education, language skills, training, work experience, and age; a smaller group is chosen for their ability to invest in business and job creation. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 59 percent of new permanent immigrants arriving in Canada were economic migrants, 26 percent entered through family sponsorship, and 11 percent were refugees.51 The native-born public might be more generous in reimagining the country’s national identity to include immigrants when those arriving are viewed as making a net positive contribution to the economy.

Similarly, although the American immigration system differs substantially from the Canadian one—two-thirds of legal new permanent residents gain status because of family connections, the rest entering as economic migrants or refugees—the labor market participation and employment rates of immigrants usually stand higher than that of the native born. Just before the financial crisis of 2008, 65 percent of the U.S. native-born population worked and 4.9 percent were unemployed, versus 68 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively, of the foreign born.52 Furthermore, although opinion polls regularly document Americans’ negative views of illegal immigrants, when asked about work ethic, similar proportions of Americans—nine out of ten—judge that migrants are hard workers regardless of whether respondents are asked about legal or illegal migrants.53 Given that immigrants’ employment, occupation, and income in Europe often lag behind the native-born population, this likely adds fuel to negative portrayals of newcomers in Europe and might help explain somewhat more open national identities in North America.54

Americans’ relatively high support for cultural pluralism coexists with deep ambivalence about immigration, but concerns largely center on illegal migration rather than anxiety about ethno-racial or religious diversity, per se. More than half of Americans (55 percent) think that the majority of immigrants are in the United States illegally.55 The reality, though significant, is only half that: an estimated 11.7 million residents, or 28 percent of all migrants, do not have residency papers.56 In comparison, figures for Canada, which are highly speculative, place the number of undocumented between two hundred thousand and four hundred thousand individuals, which would constitute 3 to 6 percent of the
foreign-born population. As a percentage of the country’s total population, the Canadian figures are higher than estimates for the irregular migrant population in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and similar to Belgium, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Surprisingly, Europeans nevertheless worry more about clandestine migration: in Europe, 67 percent of respondents expressed worries over illegal migration in 2009, versus 61 percent in the United States and 50 percent in Canada. Even if undocumented, North Americans appear to have somewhat more faith in integration outcomes, whereas Europeans’ fears of diversity and immigration arguably feed into concern over clandestine migrants.

In this respect, the immigrant past and mythologies of the United States and Canada, particularly North Americans’ long-standing belief in permanent migration and settlement, might play a role somewhat distinct from European experiences. Whereas 58 percent of American respondents expressed concern about illegal migration in 2011, only 18 percent expressed similar worries about legal migration, proportions that have held steady since 2008. Absent a belief in permanent migration, one can well imagine that the native-born population has little incentive to see foreigners as future members of the society, or for migrants to feel a sense of inclusion and investment in that society if migration is viewed as temporary.

Understanding national identities matters for understanding immigration politics and likely immigrant integration. As James Hampshire observes, “To the extent that liberal states are nation-states, drawing upon deep reservoirs of feeling and emotion to underpin their authority, identity-based opposition toward immigration poses real challenges to government.” These challenges are doubly felt in that national identities not only affect broad public opinion on immigration, but also shape the views and policies of elites.

Too often, however, national identities are viewed as static and invariant over time, resulting in pessimistic prognoses of immigration policies and integration. This chapter instead started from the premise that studying the intersection of national identity narratives and immigration requires models of how national identities change. Observers often imply that European anxieties about integration are greater and the challenges of immigrant incorporation are more arduous and complex than in North America simply because Canada and the United States are nations of immigrants.

Yet narratives of diversity and migration can be found in the stories, songs, and histories of many European nations. This can range from romantic images of the colonial period—think of the Portuguese self-image as a nation of seafarers—to stories of safe haven—think of the movement and integration of Jews within the Low Countries following expulsion from the Iberian peninsula. Conversely, nothing in the North American story
of migration in the nineteenth or early twentieth century would have given any reason to be optimistic about the contemporary treatment of Asian, black, or non-Christian immigrants. A history of migration does not necessarily beget a more inclusive national identity. Instead, I have argued that Canada and the United States benefited from the timing of internal struggles around national identity, struggles that implicated native-born minorities and occurred just before new, large-scale migration. These dynamics of national identity change grew to include immigrants because of processes of political incorporation. National identities expanded because of the agency of migrants and their allies, as well as the institutionalization of antidiscrimination laws and diversity policies, which provided resources to contest anti-immigrant discourses and served as a touchstone for cultural change.

I do not argue that these struggles for an inclusive national identity are settled or unproblematic; indeed, a central claim is that conflict is part and parcel of reimagining national identities. None of the changes in the 1960s and 1970s came easily to the United States or Canada. Political and civic battles were fought in legislatures, in the courts, through the ballot box, and on the streets. This occurred when native-born minorities militated for inclusion and when immigrants mobilized. Expansion of the boundaries of national membership often occurs through contestation. Yet the role of contestation is often lost in contemporary political or academic calls for social cohesion or worries about how diversity undermines social trust and social capital. The extension of social rights to male workers in Britain, celebrated in T. H. Marshall’s famous account of citizenship, occurred because of the militant activism of unions and political actors favorable to labor. Sometimes distrust and conflict are necessary to expand national membership. The desire to shut down conflict, which in the early twenty-first century is often articulated as the need for immigrants to modify their behaviors and attitudes to better fit into the majority, becomes a project of double silencing. Not only must immigrants suppress their diversity, but they also cannot complain about it.

Notes

5. Hampshire 2013, 34.
6. On the United States, Gibson and Jung 2006; on Canada, Leacy 1983. In addition, in 1950, 10 percent of the U.S. population was enumerated as black, almost all of whom were native-born minorities (Gibson and Jung 2002).
22. Vink and de Groot 2010.
30. The government is, however, increasingly making appeals to traditional conservative symbols of Canadian identity, including the military and the monarchy. It is possible that the Conservatives might downplay multiculturalism in the future, but this has not yet happened.
34. Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012.
38. Alba and Nee 2003.
43. Environics Institute 2011, 17. The importance of the health-care system to Canadian identity and integration might seem strange to outsiders, but needs
to be understood in terms of Canada’s relationship to the United States. Because a part of Canadian nation-building is about making distinctions from Americans, Canadians celebrate their universal health-care system with respect to the U.S. system, which historically left millions of Americans uninsured. This is another point around which a majority of native-born Canadians and new Canadians can rally and thus serves as a source of inclusion.

44. Bloemraad 2006.
47. Wright and Bloemraad 2012.
49. Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012.
52. Author’s calculations from a three-year average (2007–2009) of the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (2010).
56. Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013.
59. Ibid. 2012, 8, 7.
60. Hampshire 2013, 24.

References


Debates about immigration reform in the United States center on a variety of topics, including the economic impact of illegal immigration, the role of state governments in apprehending undocumented immigrants, and whether to allow naturalization for children brought to the country illegally by their parents. Another prominent concern in recent years has been that immigrants, documented and undocumented alike, may not be developing a sense of American identity. On the one hand, immigrants and their supporters at rallies for undocumented rights often have been praised for showing native-born Americans what active citizenship—a bedrock American value—is all about, and such civic engagement has been shown to strengthen immigrants’ attachments to the United States. On the other hand, immigrants have been chastised for not “becoming American,” as when a group of musicians were criticized in press accounts and by President George W. Bush for releasing a Spanish interpretation of the American national anthem in 2006. One newspaper columnist wrote that the anthem signaled “an invitation to separatism and a fractured national identity now finding voice among Mexican illegal immigrants and their advocates.” An editorial noted that “the mere fact that [the anthem] is in Spanish is a protest against assimilation.” Similar outrage among basketball fans occurred in 2013 when a Mexican American boy dressed in a mariachi suit sang the national anthem during the finals of the National Basketball Association. Critics have also pointed to the presence of Mexican flags at immigration rallies
to underscore fears that immigrants are not sufficiently attached to the United States.

Among the worries is that lack of American identification—with its alleged lack of commitment and loyalty—will hurt the nation as a whole. As Gary Gerstle explains in chapter 1 of this volume, the very openness of the American political community has long made the notion of identity choice a central concern when contemplating national stability and prosperity. Examining the validity of such concerns is especially pressing at this juncture as ongoing immigration and a growing second generation produce an ever more diverse population. Indeed, the number of children born to nonwhite parents in the United States outpaced the number born to white parents for the first time in mid-2012. As other chapters in this volume also illustrate, outward cultural expressions among immigrants and their children raise fears that newcomers have psychological attachments to identities that are at odds with national cohesion and the values that sustain democratic stability. These fears are now common across western Europe as well as in the United States. Marieke Sloopman and Jan Willem Duyvendak refer in chapter 5 of this volume to this sentiment as emotive citizenship, the belief that for immigrants and the second generation to be seen as compatriots, they need to prove their loyalty through their cultural habits and national identification, that legal citizenship is not enough.

This chapter looks beyond popular rhetoric to explore whether—and how much—we need to be concerned about the identity attachments of ethno-racial minorities in the United States among both immigrants and their descendants. It focuses on a series of questions that probe the impact of panethnic and national-origin identities on broader American attachments and obligations. Does prioritizing a panethnic identity—such as Latino or Asian—or a national-origin identity—such as Mexican or Korean—over an American identity promote alienation from the American political community? Do attachments to panethnic identities lead to reduced trust and a diminished sense of obligation to the United States? Does a person of Latino descent who primarily identifies as Latino, or as Mexican, feel more alienated from law enforcement or the federal government than a person of Latino descent who primarily identifies as American? Does that same person feel less of a sense of obligation to the United States and to the American people? Or do other factors, such as how people feel their group is treated in the United States, affect trust and obligation more?

Drawing on the results of a large-scale telephone survey of randomly selected participants conducted in 2004, I show that fears of widespread rejection of American identity are overblown and that adopting a non-American identity is often inconsequential. Insights from group consciousness theory and social identity theory can provide explanations for
the mechanisms driving the interplay among identities, perceptions of discrimination, and political attitudes. The impact of identity attachments on trust in American political institutions and on obligations to the national community depends on how people feel they or their group is treated. As it turns out, identity attachments themselves have little or no impact on trust and obligation. Instead, perceptions of group-level and individual-level discrimination have a greater negative effect. Absent perceptions of discrimination, a person’s primary identity attachment is often of little consequence. When perceptions of discrimination are present, a non-American identification can be beneficial with regard to trust, and detrimental with regard to obligation. These findings thus raise important questions about when—and whether—a sense of psychological attachment to an American identity is desirable.

Trust, Obligation, and Identity

Trust in political institutions is generally defined as a belief that leaders will do or are doing right by the community and its interests and the extent to which people think the government’s performance is living up to their expectations. Trust affects compliance with political and legal processes, particularly when people dislike the outcomes of those processes. It affects whether people support policies aimed at reducing inequality. It also, some argue, plays a role in sustaining a willingness to take risks on behalf of the community and to accept compromise as a means of resolving conflict.

Trust in law enforcement, as well as in the federal government, is an important factor in understanding connections with the American political system among members of ethnic and racial minority groups. In addition to general issues of racial profiling by the police, efforts have also been made in many states and cities to enlist local law enforcement agencies to locate and apprehend undocumented immigrants. In recent years, several states have gone even further, enacting stringent policies that require local police officers to verify the immigration status of people they suspect might be in the country illegally. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld such provisions.

Obligation refers to the duties of citizenship, what we owe to compatriots and political institutions in exchange for the privileges and rights conferred by membership in the political community. It is generally agreed that compliance with the law is where obligations start, though many Americans also feel they have a duty to devote time and resources to the common good. Some scholars argue that fulfilling such obligations is necessary in order for a self-governing society to be able to provide rights and privileges in the first place. William Galston, for instance, argues that a sense of obligation is essential in a society that provides people with
so many individual-level benefits, such as freedom, prosperity, and sta-
bility. It is imperative, he writes, “to do one’s fair share to uphold the
institutions that help secure these advantages.” Likewise, Christopher
Wellman maintains, “the state cannot exist and perform its functions
without the collective sacrifice of its citizens.” In practical terms, people
with a greater sense of civic duty are more likely to participate in politics
and thus embody the ideal of the active citizen.

Concerns about whether immigrants and the second generation develop
a sense of obligation have led observers to look to identity attachment as a
culprit, and not just conservative or nativist commentators. Many political
scientists, philosophers, and psychologists wonder about the role that a
sense of national identity plays in the vitality of democracies. On the one
hand, having a strong attachment to one’s country can lead to hostility
toward outsiders, feelings of superiority, diminished support for redistribu-
tion, and uncritical support of one’s government. At the same time, posses-
sing strong national attachments can also lead to greater willingness to
make sacrifices for the public good, obey laws and pay taxes, and engage
in more civic-minded behavior. Moreover, psychologists have shown that
cooperation and group harmony increase when people recognize that they
share an attachment to a particular group.

In this vein, Rogers Smith writes that “if citizens feel that their most pro-
found commitments go to a racial, ethnic, religious, regional, national, or
voluntary subgroup, then the broader society’s leaders may find that their
government lacks adequate popular support to perform some functions
effectively” and that it is “politically necessary” to “constitute a people
that feels itself to be a people.” Liberal democratic societies such as the
United States must convince members of the “distinctive worth” of their
membership, he argues, because only when people have such a feeling
can the very liberal principles that make the society of value be nurtured.

Other theorists, known as liberal nationalists, contend that a shared
national identity is important for several reasons. It prevents alienation
from political institutions; promotes political stability; leads to trust in
one’s fellow citizens, making people willing to rely on compromise to set-
tle disagreements; and generates a concern for the common good, which
in turn leads to support for redistributive policies. Communitarians,
including Michael Sandel, also write of the importance of loyalty to the
political community in the maintenance of stable and vibrant democra-
cies. Even Charles Taylor, a critic of the notion that a common culture is
necessary in liberal societies, admits that “democratic states need some-
thing like a common identity.” In short, many scholars maintain that
for a diverse democracy like the United States to be governable, stable,
and able to provide the opportunities of liberalism to all of its people, its
members must view themselves as full members of the national commu-
ity and think that being American is an important part of who they are.
But what, if anything, does empirical social science tell us about these matters? As it turns out, not much. To date, scholars have largely neglected analyses that examine the role of race, ethnicity, and identity in shaping trust and obligation. Studies of trust among Americans have tangentially mentioned that blacks are sometimes less trusting than whites or simply include racial dummy variables as controls, but fail to comment further. As for opinions about the obligations of citizenship, they have received hardly any attention in empirical social science scholarship, let alone in studies of identity and diversity. When they have, the focus has generally been on whether people feel they have a duty to vote or to pay taxes, but not on other obligations, such as volunteerism or serving in the military.

**When National Identity Might Matter**

It is helpful to consider the mechanisms involved in determining whether a sense of national identity affects political outcomes such as trust and obligation. Two theoretical approaches—group consciousness and social identity theory—shed light on this process. The two theories, which provide the main frameworks in empirical studies of the political consequences of group identities, look beyond how group membership shapes political attitudes to concentrate on the conditions under which psychological processes associated with group membership become influential. In both theories, the perception of threat plays a key role in activating the power of identities.

Group consciousness theory posits that objective group membership must be paired with a psychological attachment to or identification with the group and a sense that the group membership is politicized before the identity itself will have political outcomes. Politicization can involve the perception of threat in the form of discrimination against one's group and against oneself individually. It can involve perceptions of deprivation relative to other groups in society along with the view that the political system—and not individual attributes—is to blame for such deprivation. It can involve feelings of linked fate, or a sense that the group is worth fighting for.

When politicized, an identification with one’s ethnic group can generate political activity and minimize the otherwise alienating effects of perceptions of discrimination. It does so by providing a psychological resource—or psychological capital—that facilitates engagement with the political system. People with politicized identities feel that a change in the system—not in themselves—is necessary for improved status. Importantly, they believe such change is possible, but only if they engage with the system. In contrast, people who perceive mistreatment yet do not feel close to the aggrieved group lack this mobilizing resource and withdraw.
Social identity theory also highlights the important role that perceptions of threat play in determining whether group identities affect subsequent attitudes and behavior. This theory posits that the need to maintain a positive group image is so powerful that group identification can promote ingroup bias or outgroup derogation. Moreover, the perception of threat heightens the need to see one’s group positively and exacerbates these tendencies. Research has demonstrated that “the mere perception of belonging to a social category is sufficient for group behavior,” as measured by “intergroup discrimination in social perception and behavior or intragroup altruism.” Studies document ingroup bias regarding helping behavior and that such bias is enhanced by perceptions of group threat. As Nyla Branscombe and her colleagues explain, “when outgroup-based threats to the ingroup’s value in the form of discrimination and devaluation are severe enough . . . we would expect that most ingroup members would behave in [a] defensive fashion; closing ranks following explicit group-based exclusion allows devalued group members to protect their well being.” Thus, whereas group consciousness theory predicts little power for group identification without a politicizing agent, social identity theory contends that psychological identification with a group is sometimes enough to lead people to close ranks around the ingroup. Both theories are in agreement, however, in noting that attachments to group identities are especially powerful when politicized by a perception of threat.

The question is whether the power of such politicized identities will lead to more or less engagement with the broader national political community. Here, the two theories generally provide complementary expectations. Much like the group consciousness literature, social identity scholarship has investigated the conditions under which people in disadvantaged groups become more likely to engage in actions aimed at improving their status. Such scholarship argues that collective action is more likely when people identify with the disadvantaged group, when they perceive that the group is disadvantaged, when group boundaries are seen as impermeable (as is typically the case with race and ethnicity), when alternatives to the status quo can be imagined, and when the group’s lower status is perceived as illegitimate. These conditions set the stage for psychological capital to emerge and enable people to become empowered, confident in their abilities, and motivated by a feeling of common cause shared with other group members. Thus, both theories lead us to expect a greater sense of trust in the political system among those with politicized identities than among those who perceive discrimination but do not identify strongly with the aggrieved group. After all, the very ability to imagine an alternative to the status quo implies that one believes that the political system is in fact responsive to pressure from collective action. The psychological capital that politicized identities provide sustains such beliefs. At a minimum, at least, we might expect
that politicized identities can inoculate people against the loss of trust in the political system that might otherwise result from the belief that one’s group is disadvantaged.

When it comes to a sense of obligation to that system and the people who make up the national community, however, engagement is likely to decline among those with politicized identities, at least according to social identity theory. Social identity scholarship demonstrates that an attachment to a particular identity paired with the perception that the identity is threatened leads to withdrawal from prosocial interactions with the outgroup. As Branscombe and her colleagues note, attachment plus the perception of threat can lead people to close ranks around their ingroup. The implication is, therefore, that people will be less willing to make the sacrifices that obligations to a national community require when both an attachment to a subgroup and the perception of threat to that group are present.

Social identity theory also suggests that identification with the group might be enough to influence one’s relationship to politics, whereas group consciousness theory explicitly rejects this possibility. Thus, this aspect of social identity theory would lead us to expect that ethnic minorities will be less likely to have obligations to the national community if they do not think of themselves as part of the American ingroup, just as immigration critics contend. Both theories agree that a psychological attachment to the group is necessary for the identity in question to become politically consequential, but whether it is sufficient is a matter of debate.

What, then, are the implications—and expectations—of group consciousness and social identity theory for the present inquiry? With regard to trust in institutions, American identifiers who perceive discrimination against their panethnic or national-origin group or against themselves personally should have lower levels of trust in political institutions than non-American identifiers who perceive discrimination, due to the psychological capital generated by politicized identities. With regard to obligations to the national community, non-American identifiers who perceive discrimination are expected to withdraw from prosocial behaviors that benefit the superordinate group. In both cases, perceptions of discrimination activate the ability of identity attachments to become politically consequential. On their own, such attachments should have no or comparatively less predictive power.

Little research to date has examined whether the influence of politicized identities goes beyond voting or protest and carries over to trust in government, trust in law enforcement, or one’s sense of obligation to the national community. Some extant research finds that both group-level and individual-level perceptions of discrimination can matter. At the same time, identity attachment, the concept animating both immigration critics and scholars of democratic theory, is often innocuous. To date, however, most studies in this area have looked only at group identification or
Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity

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mistreatment. They have not tested whether the interactive dynamic proposed by group consciousness theory and social identity theory plays out with respect to trust and obligation. Moreover, most group consciousness research has focused primarily on African Americans. Applying its insights to other groups, such as Latinos and Asians, might be more complex given the different histories of these groups and the extensive diversity the pan-ethnic labels embrace. Most studies also lack the means to distinguish between types of non-American identifications, generally contrasting an American identification with only a panethnic or a national-origin identification. Whether panethnic and national-origin identifications play the same role in shaping political outcomes is largely unstudied, despite reasons to expect a panethnic identity to be more politically potent than enduring ties to one’s country of origin.

In the analyses that follow, I address these limitations through use of the 21st Century Americanism Survey (21-CAS), a national random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone survey of adults, supplemented with oversamples of blacks, Latinos, and Asians. Conducted in 2004, the survey had 2,800 respondents: 1,633 white, non-Hispanic; 300 black; 441 Latino; 299 Asian. It included questions designed to measure the attachments people have to American, panethnic, and national-origin identities, perceptions of discrimination these groups face, attitudes about trust in institutions, and attitudes about obligations to the American people.

Measuring Identities and Perceptions of Discrimination

One of the most noteworthy findings of the survey is the little credence to the concern that ethnic minorities in the United States fail to think of themselves as American.

Identity Attachment

The structure of the survey provided a way for respondents to indicate whether they ever thought of themselves in terms of their national origin, their panethnic group, and as American. It also asked them to indicate which of those identities best described how they thought of themselves most of the time. Answers to that question serve as my measure of a respondent’s primary identity attachment.

Overall, 78 percent of the sample chose American as their primary identity, 14 percent chose their panethnic group, and 8 percent chose their national-origin group. Of the 22 percent who did not choose American as their primary identity, 73 percent still sometimes described themselves as American. Table 3.1 shows bivariate breakdowns on identity attachment according to respondent characteristics relevant to this inquiry, and it offers few surprises. Whites, American citizens, people whose families
had been American for generations, and people who mainly spoke English at home were overwhelmingly likely to identify primarily as American. The level of American identification among the second generation is especially noteworthy given the comparatively lower levels of national identification among the second generation found in other countries.45 In no case did a panethnic identification achieve plurality. Moreover, a majority of Latinos and a plurality of Asians and first-generation respondents adopted American as their primary identity. The only groups that were unlikely to see themselves primarily as American were those who spoke a language other than English at home and who were not citizens. In both cases, a national-origin identification was most common.

**Perceptions of Discrimination**

Central to this inquiry is an examination of whether perceptions of discrimination determine possible political consequences for having a panethnic, national-origin, or American identity. Thus, three types of discrimination perceptions were measured in the 21-CAS: against one’s panethnic group, against one’s national-origin group, and against oneself individually on the basis of race or ethnicity. The findings reveal wide variation among ethnic groups in the extent to which they perceived all three types of discrimination, nonwhites—especially blacks—perceiving more discrimination than whites. The results also indicate that among all

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Panethnic</th>
<th>National Origin</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>N (Raw)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>1,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. citizen</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>2,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not U.S. citizen</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third generation</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth generation or more</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>1,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks primarily English at home</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>2,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks another language at home</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note:* N = unweighted.

*Question posed: “Which one best describes how you think of yourself most of the time?”*
groups, perceptions of group-level discrimination are more common than perceptions of individual discrimination.

The group-level measures in the 21-CAS asked about the degree to which respondents felt that discrimination against their group existed in schools, in the workplace, and in American society in general. Respondents’ answers to the questions were combined to form one scale measuring the perception of panethnic discrimination (α = 0.84), and one measuring national-origin discrimination (α = 0.91). The individual-level measures asked whether respondents had personally experienced discrimination because of their racial or ethnic background in the workplace, in restaurants or stores, and in American society generally.46 Answers were combined to form a scale of individual-level discrimination (α = 0.64). All three scales were then recalibrated to run from 0 (no discrimination) to 1 (all scenarios in question are a major problem or have been personally experienced).47

Perceiving that one’s group is mistreated is often more common than perceiving that one is personally a victim of discrimination, a phenomenon known as the personal-group discrepancy.48 This discrepancy is evident in the 21-CAS: the mean level of panethnic discrimination is 0.37 (standard deviation [SD] = 0.33); the mean level of national-origin discrimination is 0.25 (SD = 0.33); and the mean level of personal discrimination is 0.15 (SD = 0.27). Table 3.2 shows bivariate breakdowns, and again, few surprises. The personal-group discrepancy appears among all groups, and in every case, a sense of panethnic discrimination is more common than national-origin discrimination. Across all three types of discrimination,
nonwhites perceived more discrimination than whites, and noncitizens perceived more than citizens. Discrimination seemed to level off after the first generation, and people who spoke a language other than English at home perceived more discrimination than those who spoke only English.

Overall perceptions of discrimination against one’s panethnic or national-origin group are prevalent among nonwhites and immigrants. Establishment reactions to ethnically tinged claims of Americanness among immigrants and minorities, like those described earlier, along with restrictionist changes in immigration policy over the past several years, sustain these perceptions.49

In sum, panethnic identities are the least common, though that is the group people think is mistreated the most. Acculturation seems to increase the likelihood of adopting an American identity and decrease the likelihood of perceiving mistreatment. Together, these patterns suggest that fears that newer Americans—and their nonwhite descendants—fail to think of themselves primarily as American are overblown. Still, some cause for concern may be merited. Perceptions of panethnic discrimination are most common—even among the acculturated—yet few respondents identify primarily with their panethnic group. This combination reduces the likelihood that people who perceive discrimination are finding solace with the aggrieved group.

### Predicting Trust and Obligation

Measures of identity attachment and perceptions of discrimination in place, we can test whether each of these factors, alone or in combination, are politically consequential. Examining trust in government and law enforcement, I find that identity attachment on its own is not where the main story lies. Trust in the federal government is affected more by politicized identities than by identity attachment absent perceptions of discrimination. Among Latino and Asian respondents, American identifiers who perceived discrimination against their panethnic group trusted the government less than non-American identifiers who perceived discrimination, just as the theoretical approaches outlined earlier lead us to expect. Likewise, among black respondents, American identifiers who perceived individual-level discrimination trusted the government less than non-American identifiers who perceived such discrimination. Trust in law enforcement, on the other hand, was lower for minority respondents who perceived individual-level discrimination regardless of whether they identified primarily as American.

Trust in government and law enforcement was gauged in the 21-CAS by asking respondents, “How much of the time do you think you can trust [the government in Washington/law enforcement] to do what is right . . . just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or never?”50 Most respondents said they trust government only some of the time (57 percent) and that they trust law enforcement most of the time (53 percent). Separate statistical models were run to predict each form of trust for
whites, for blacks, and for Latinos and Asians. Latinos and Asians were analyzed together for several reasons. First, together these groups are well over a majority of contemporary immigrants. Second, Latino and Asian respondents yielded similar patterns underlying identity attachment. Moreover, studies have shown that there are minimal differences among Asians of different national origins with respect to trust, that Latinos of different backgrounds have similar political views, and that Latinos and Asians “bear similar underlying structures of ethnicity.” Third, analyzing these groups together yields more precise estimates because of the increased sample size. Except where noted, running the models for Asians and Latinos separately gives similar results.

Each model has five sets of independent variables that are used in all subsequent analyses. The first consists of standard demographic and attitudinal measures: education, age, partisanship, and generalized trust (where 1 = most people can be trusted and 0 = you cannot be too careful). The second captures acculturation: generation (first, second, third, or more), and whether the respondent primarily speaks English in the home. The third consists of identity attachment (American, panethnic, or national-origin), American being the omitted category. The fourth consists of perceptions of discrimination against one’s panethnic group, against one’s national-origin group, and against oneself personally. The fifth consists of interactions between each type of identity choice and each type of discrimination. These interaction terms reflect the concept of a politicized identity. They go beyond mere objective membership in a group by capturing both identification and beliefs about social standing, a combination that is essential for group consciousness to emerge. Only with these interaction terms can we compare people who are and are not attached to the ethnic group (or to being American) under different degrees of politicization. It moves the debate beyond whether attachment affects political engagement by shifting our attention to the conditions under which such effects might be more or less likely to emerge.

For the model with black respondents, only the identity and discrimination measures relating to panethnicity were included, and for blacks and whites, speaking only English was dropped for its failure to achieve significance in earlier tests. In all cases, the model for whites is considered the baseline because most of what we know about trust and obligation comes from studying whites. The role of identity and discrimination in shaping the opinions of whites is of less interest in the present analysis.

**Trust in Government**

The results for trust in government are in table 3.3. Due to the interaction terms, the coefficients on identity choices should be read as the effect of that identity choice on trust when perceptions of discrimination are absent. Likewise, the coefficients on the different types of discrimination should be read as the effect of each type of discrimination on trust
for American identifiers only. The coefficients on the interaction terms indicate whether the effect of identity attachment is different when the various perceptions of discrimination are present, and whether the effect of discrimination is different for non-American identifiers than it is for American identifiers.56

Table 3.3 shows that trust in government for whites works much like most existing research on trust would predict: Republicans and people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Asian and Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.28** 0.13</td>
<td>-0.14 0.25</td>
<td>-0.33* 0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.23 0.17</td>
<td>0.45 0.38</td>
<td>0.02 0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>1.13** 0.10</td>
<td>-0.19 0.33</td>
<td>0.74** 0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized (interpersonal) trust</td>
<td>0.23** 0.08</td>
<td>0.46** 0.18</td>
<td>0.04 0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (first to fourth-plus)</td>
<td>0.04 0.14</td>
<td>0.21 0.34</td>
<td>-0.53** 0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks primarily English at home</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>-0.21* 0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>0.44** 0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National origin self-identification</td>
<td>-0.23 0.22</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>-0.08 0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic self-identification</td>
<td>0.25 0.18</td>
<td>0.02 0.44</td>
<td>-0.58* 0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National origin discrimination</td>
<td>0.31 0.21</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>0.19 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic discrimination</td>
<td>-0.17 0.16</td>
<td>-0.43 0.48</td>
<td>-0.59** 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level discrimination</td>
<td>-0.05 0.27</td>
<td>-0.69** 0.34</td>
<td>-0.12 0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National origin × national origin discrimination</td>
<td>-0.89 1.02</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>-0.11 0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National origin × individual discrimination</td>
<td>1.50 1.05</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>0.07 0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic × panethnic discrimination</td>
<td>-0.60 0.42</td>
<td>-0.88 0.63</td>
<td>1.19** 0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic × individual discrimination</td>
<td>-0.90 0.84</td>
<td>1.03** 0.50</td>
<td>-0.36 0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutpoint 1</td>
<td>-1.14 0.21</td>
<td>-1.41 0.45</td>
<td>-1.89 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutpoint 2</td>
<td>0.93 0.20</td>
<td>0.66 0.44</td>
<td>0.01 0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutpoint 3</td>
<td>2.32 0.21</td>
<td>1.69 0.47</td>
<td>1.32 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>165.35</td>
<td>32.46</td>
<td>75.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schildkraut and Grosse 2010.
Notes: Ordered probit; all nondummy variables coded 0 to 1; unweighted data.
**p < .05; *p < .1
with more generalized trust government more (the Republican Party controlled the executive and legislative branches when the 21-CAS was conducted), and people with more education trust less. For whites, all measures of identity choice and perceptions of discrimination are insignificant, as are the interaction terms. For blacks, generalized trust promotes trust in government and individual-level discrimination diminishes trust in government. Identifying primarily as black has no impact absent perceptions of discrimination, but it mitigates the damaging effects of individual-level discrimination. In other words, discrimination hurts trust in government only for blacks who identify primarily as American (see interaction term for panethnic identity and perception of individual-level discrimination).

Latinos trust government slightly more than Asians, and acculturation reduces trust, as indicated by the negative coefficients on generational status and language use. But as with blacks, discrimination and identity also play a complicated role. Here, panethnic discrimination diminishes trust rather than personal discrimination. But as before, this effect only applies to people who identify primarily as American. Identifying as Latino or as Asian neutralizes the damaging effect of discrimination.

To get a better sense of the magnitude of the relationship between panethnic discrimination and identity attachment among Latinos, I determined the predicted probability of trusting government most of the time and never as identity attachment and perceptions of discrimination vary. Figure 3.1 shows the probability that a Latino respondent trusts the government most of the time as his identification changes from American to Latino and as his perception of discrimination against Latinos changes from “not a problem” to “a major problem.” Figure 3.2 shows the probability that a Latino respondent never trusts the government under the same conditions. These figures show that among American identifiers, perceptions of panethnic discrimination decrease the likelihood of trusting government most of the time by over ten percentage points and increase the likelihood of never trusting government, while panethnic identifiers exhibit psychological capital. Trust among American identifiers decreases in the face of panethnic discrimination, but trust among panethnic identifiers is enhanced. Predicted outcomes for Asians tell the same story.

Clearly, the role that identity attachment plays in shaping trust is more complicated than it is typically cast. For blacks, Latinos, and Asians, having an American identification is beneficial if perceptions of discrimination are absent. But such perceptions are not absent. Twenty-two percent of black respondents both score at or above the midpoint on the individual-level discrimination scale and identify primarily as American. Twenty-five percent of Latino and Asian respondents score at or above the midpoint on the panethnic discrimination scale and identify primarily as American.
Figure 3.1  Probabilities of Latinos Trusting Government “Most of the Time”

Source: Schildkraut and Grosse 2010.

Figure 3.2  Probabilities of Latinos Never Trusting Government

Source: Schildkraut and Grosse 2010.
A nontrivial portion of the population would have its level of trust in government raised if it were to identify primarily with the panethnic group instead of as American.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{Trust in Law Enforcement}

To analyze trust in law enforcement, I used the same statistical test as for trust in government. The results of the full model are not shown here because the complicated relationship between identity attachment, discrimination, and trust does not apply when our target shifts from government to law enforcement. Instead, perceptions of individual-level discrimination diminish trust for blacks, Latinos, and Asians, and identity attachment does not alter this effect. The probability that a Latino respondent who identifies as American will trust law enforcement “just about always” drops from 0.21 to 0.08 when the perception of individual-level discrimination changes from 0 to 1. For Asians, it drops from 0.12 to 0.04. Changing primary identity attachment from American to Latino or Asian or to a national-origin group does not affect these results.\textsuperscript{62} That perceptions of personal discrimination are so powerful in shaping attitudes toward law enforcement is perhaps not surprising, given that efforts to command social control through the police and federal agents loom so large in the daily experiences of immigrants and other minorities, as Mary C. Waters and Philip Kasinitz describe in chapter 4 of this volume.

In sum, perceptions of both personal discrimination and panethnic discrimination are powerful. When it comes to trust in government, the expectations of group consciousness theory and social identity theory are borne out: identifying with the aggrieved group can inoculate people against alienation. But the impact of discrimination on trust in law enforcement is too powerful; identifying with the aggrieved group offers no protection for blacks, Latinos, or Asians.

\textbf{Obligation}

When the analysis shifts to predicting attitudes about obligations to the national community, the theoretical expectations detailed earlier are again on display. Identity attachment is not a central factor shaping whether people felt as if they had particular obligations to their fellow Americans. Only after perceptions of discrimination were present did identities sometimes become consequential, and did so in a way that made people less willing to contribute to the broader society. In particular, among Latinos and Asians, non-American identifiers who perceived group-level discrimination were less likely to feel that they had an obligation to donate to charity or to volunteer in their communities than American identifiers who perceived such discrimination.
Obligation is measured in the 21-CAS by offering respondents a list of possible obligations and asking them to indicate if they think each one is an obligation they owe to other Americans. Accepted responses were yes, no, and it depends. The obligations under investigation are giving money to charities, volunteering in one’s community, and serving in the military. Overall, Americans felt that they had all three obligations: charity = 57 percent, volunteer = 72 percent, and military service = 45 percent (a plurality). As noted earlier, research on group consciousness has not examined these kinds of prosocial behaviors; it has focused on collective action in pursuit of group-specific gains. Social identity scholarship, on the other hand, suggests that panethnic or national-origin identifications, when paired with perceptions of discrimination, would make one’s sense of obligation to the broader community less likely. Attachment plus the perception of threat should lead people to close ranks around the aggrieved group.

The same models used to predict trust were employed here, but with three changes. First, generalized trust is removed. Second, gender is added because of scholarship suggesting that women are more sympathetic to the disadvantaged than men and possess an ethic of caring, and because men are more likely to serve in the military. Third, a variable called civic republican Americanism is added. This measure captures the belief that “true Americans” should do volunteer work in their community, should be informed about local and national politics, and should be involved in local and national politics. People who think American identity is uniquely defined by these types of active citizenship are probably more likely to feel that they personally have obligations to the United States and to the American people. The results appear in table 3.4. For ease of presentation, standard errors are not reported.

The strongest and most consistent relationship across all models is the power that civic republican Americanism plays in shaping whether people feel that they personally have obligations to other Americans. With regard to the main causal variables of this study, identity attachment, absent perceptions of discrimination, only matters twice: whites who identify as white are less likely to say they should volunteer in their communities, and blacks who identify as black are less likely to say they should serve in the military. Perceptions of discrimination for American identifiers are relatively inconsequential. Blacks are more likely to say they should volunteer in their communities when they feel they personally have been mistreated due to their race, and they are less likely to say they should serve in the military when they feel that blacks have been mistreated. Identifying primarily as black instead of as American does nothing to mitigate—or exacerbate—these relationships.

Perceptions of discrimination on their own do not affect whether Latinos or Asians feel they personally have obligations to donate, volunteer, or
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Donate</th>
<th></th>
<th>Volunteer</th>
<th></th>
<th>Serve</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Asian/ Latino</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Asian/ Latino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.43</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.67**</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>−0.18**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
<td>−0.21**</td>
<td>−0.32*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (first to four-plus)</td>
<td>−0.26*</td>
<td>−0.30</td>
<td>0.38**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>−0.22</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks primarily English at home</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−0.34**</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic republican Americanism</td>
<td>1.75**</td>
<td>1.54**</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
<td>2.51**</td>
<td>2.29**</td>
<td>1.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−0.17</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National origin self-identification</td>
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<td>−</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.24</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panethnic self-identification</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>−0.55**</td>
<td>−0.60</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
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<td>National origin discrimination</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panethnic discrimination</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National origin</td>
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<td>-0.11</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.80**</td>
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<td>× national origin</td>
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<td>discrimination</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National origin ×</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic ×</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.86*</td>
<td>1.05**</td>
<td>1.24*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>panethnic discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panethnic ×</td>
<td>2.10**</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutpoint 1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutpoint 2</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>116.40</td>
<td>15.01</td>
<td>35.23</td>
<td>157.69</td>
<td>29.83</td>
<td>46.75</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schildkraut and Grosse 2010.

Notes: Ordered probit; all nondummy variables coded 0 to 1; unweighted data.

**p < .05; *p < .1
serve, but such perceptions do become consequential when paired with a Latino or Asian identity. Also, contrary to the positive impact that politicized identities have on trust, the joint presence of discrimination and attachment to a non-American identity here reduces one’s sense of connection to the American ingroup. For donating to charity, the relevant level of analysis is panethnicity. For volunteering in the community, it is the national-origin group.

Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probability of thinking that one has an obligation to donate to charity as one’s identity choice (American versus panethnic) and perception of panethnic discrimination vary for Latinos and Asians. It shows that for American identifiers, one’s likelihood of feeling an obligation to donate to charity does not vary with the level of perceived panethnic discrimination. It also shows that those who identify as Latino and Asian have a higher likelihood of saying they have an obligation to donate than American identifiers when perceptions of panethnic discrimination are absent. Importantly, once such perceptions are present, the sense of obligation among these panethnic identifiers drops considerably. A Latino respondent who identifies as Latino but does not perceive discrimination has a 62 percent chance of saying

Source: Schildkraut and Grosse 2010.
she has an obligation to donate to charity. When the same respondent thinks Latinos are mistreated, that probability drops to 31 percent—a precipitous drop of 31 percentage points. The effect of politicized identities on the obligation to volunteer in one’s community is similar (results not shown here).

In sum, a politicized non-American identity turns Latinos and Asians away from the American community. Twelve percent of Latino and Asian respondents identified primarily as Latino and Asian and scored at or above the midpoint on the panethnic discrimination scale, and 23 percent of Latino and Asian respondents identified primarily with their national-origin group and scored at or above the midpoint on the national-origin discrimination scale. In short, the phenomenon discussed here affects nontrivial proportions of American minorities.

Identity, Engagement, and Withdrawal in Contemporary American Politics

The results of the study are quite clear: American identities are alive and well in the United States. As one might expect, the immigrant generation held on to its national-origin attachments, but even among immigrants, about two-fifths said they identified primarily as American. Moreover, national-origin attachments shrink considerably with each generation and with English acquisition. When national-origin attachment fades, an American identity becomes common rather than a panethnic identity.

It is also clear from the study that identity attachments on their own (absent perceptions of discrimination) are rarely a problem when it comes to trust in government and law enforcement and obligation to the national community. Becoming American, in the sense of identifying as American, does not appear to make better Americans, and concerns that lack of an American identity reduces trust and obligation are largely unfounded. There are two caveats. A panethnic identity can lead Latinos and Asians (who do not perceive discrimination) to be less trusting of government and make blacks less likely to say they have an obligation to serve in the military. Otherwise, whether a person sees herself primarily as American or as a member of a panethnic or national-origin group appears to be inconsequential, although only if she does not perceive discrimination.

Perceptions of discrimination, however, cause a fair amount of alienation. Adopting a non-American identity can lessen the effects of discrimination with respect to trust in government, and this is more often the case with panethnic identities than with national-origin identities. But holding a panethnic or national-origin identity can also activate the alienating power of discrimination with respect to a sense of obligation to the American people. Such perceptions also reduce trust in law enforcement,
regardless of primary identity attachment. Politicized identities can provide a critical psychological resource that mitigates the damaging effects of discrimination, yet they can also lead people to close ranks around the mistreated group and be less willing to make sacrifices for the broader community.

The ideal advanced by immigration critics as well as by some democratic theorists and social psychologists—having all people in the United States identify primarily as American—is ideal only if people do not feel that they or their group is mistreated. Once perceptions of discrimination are added to the mix, the normative question of whether we should want people to see themselves primarily as American becomes considerably more complicated. As Lisa García Bedolla warns, feeling stigmatized while lacking a positive attachment to the aggrieved group leads to disengagement, and “for members of stigmatized groups, establishing a positive attachment to their social group may be a necessary first step toward their attachment to the political community as a whole.” My research suggests she is right with respect to trust, but not necessarily with respect to obligation. In both cases, however, the findings underscore the need to focus attention on perceptions of mistreatment more than on identity attachments, or rather, along with identity attachments. Without appreciating the conditional nature of how identities shape engagement with American society or how perceptions of threat activate the ability of identities to have political consequences, we run the risk of concentrating our attention on the wrong things. If we seek pathways to achieve a society in which people share attachments to a superordinate national identity and trust political institutions and feel they have obligations to the political community, we will never find them if we fail to look beyond simply whether people do or do not see themselves as American.

The 21-CAS was conducted in 2004. In the past few years, the national climate has arguably become even more hostile to immigrants and their descendants. The number of deportations has risen, and proposals for comprehensive immigration reform have stalled in Congress, as have proposals aimed at legalizing the status of children brought to the country illegally by their parents. Meanwhile, several states have passed laws aimed at driving immigrants out and that serve to create fears of racial profiling among native-born minorities. In 2012, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that allows key elements of such laws to stand. Although majorities of Americans favor political reforms that provide an opportunity for undocumented immigrants to acquire legal status, as many as 20 percent of the American public have favored deporting all illegal immigrants in recent years. In the wake of these trends, perceptions of discrimination among Latinos have risen steadily. In 2002, 47 percent of Latinos said that discrimination against Latinos was a major problem; by 2010, that figure rose to 61 percent.
The views of whites on these matters are in flux as well. Over the past two decades, non-Hispanic white Americans have become more likely to feel that being white is important to them, more likely to have their sense of white racial identity lead to more restrictive immigration preferences, and more likely to have their views on immigration affect their partisan preferences, with more hostility leading to more support for Republican candidates and identification with the Republican Party. Research in psychology shows that whites who are primed to think about demographic projections become more conservative on a range of issues, perceive that their status as the prototypical American is threatened, and become more opposed to diversity. One study also found that many American whites now consider antiwhite bias to be a bigger problem than antiblack bias. Feeling that one’s status is threatened in response to demographic change is of course not new in the United States, but it merits continued examination in light of its profound effects on both the majority and the minority.

Three factors—demographic changes, the reactions of the native born to such changes, and the reactions of newcomers to the reactions of the native born—suggest that the phenomena presented in this chapter have likely become even more acute. After the 2012 presidential election, the dominant media narrative emphasized the extent to which ethnic background affected vote choice: nonwhites overwhelmingly supported the Democrat and whites favored the Republican. Issues related to ethnicity and identity have become aligned with partisan differences and are intricately tied to electoral politics. This inescapable political narrative, coupled with victories on the political right (in congressional elections and at thwarting immigration reform) and episodes in our popular culture (such as the negative reaction when a Mexican American boy sang the national anthem) reinforce the tensions that immigration stokes and that drive the findings uncovered in this chapter. Immigrants and the second generation are responsive to this environment, as are the native born. Together, these reactions can create a vicious circle of distrust, perceptions of threat, alienation, and disengagement. In short, our current trajectory has the potential to promote collective action and electoral participation among minorities, but also to exacerbate group-based distinctions and diminish attitudes and actions related to collective obligations.

Notes
1. On active citizenship, Meyerson 2006; on civic engagement, Silber Mohamed 2013.
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5. Tavernise 2012.
6. See also chapters 6 and 7, this volume.
8. Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 2006.
11. See chapter 4, this volume. See also National Conference of State Legislatures 2014.
18. For a review of liberal nationalist arguments, see Mason 1999.
30. This is not to say that social identity theory maintains that outgroup deroga-
tion automatically follows from group attachment and threat; some deroga-
tion is more accurately characterized as a product of ingroup promotion
rather than outgroup hostility (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1999; Oakes
2001; Turner and Reynolds 2001).
32. Dovidio and Morris 1975; Hornstein 1976; Hayden, Jackson, and Guydish
1984; Flippen et al. 1996.
33. Branscombe et al. 1999, 47.
34. Tajfel and Turner 1986; Ellemers and Barreto 2001; Wright 2001; Spears 2011.
35. See also Gaertner and Dovidio 2000.
37. In contrast to social identity research, research on group consciousness
has typically examined collective action outcomes and not prosocial
behavior, leaving us with little in the way of expectations regarding how
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a politicized identity might affect one’s sense of obligation to the national community.


39. For related research, see Tyler and Huo 2002; Michelson 2003; Putnam 2003; Weaver 2004; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Weitzer and Tuch 2004; Schildkraut 2005b; Pearson and Citrin 2006; Theiss-Morse 2009.


42. Schildkraut and Grosse 2010. The survey was conducted by the Social and Economic Sciences and Research Center (SESRC) at Washington State University and was funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. Any U.S. resident over eighteen years old and living in a household with a telephone was eligible for selection in the sample. Counties with higher percentages of black, Latino, and Asian residents were targeted more heavily with RDD for the oversamples. The cooperation rate, the ratio of interviews to interviews plus refusals, was 31.2 percent. Although a higher rate would be preferable to a lower rate, studies challenge whether the cost of extensive refusal conversions are worth the effort (Curtin, Presser, and Singer 2000; Keeter et al. 2000). A Spanish version of the survey was available and used by 137 respondents. The average interview length was twenty-six minutes. Comparisons between the 21-CAS and the 2000 Census show nearly identical breakdowns regarding age, nativity, and race. The survey population is more female, more educated, and has more households earning over $100,000 than the U.S. population, but the median household income compares favorably. Such differences are typical (see, for example, Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004).

43. The remaining respondents identified as mixed, Native American, or answered the race question in a way that could not be incorporated into this breakdown (for example, “human”).

44. Unless otherwise noted, all figures refer to weighted results, using population weights provided by the SESRC.

45. For a discussion of the differing forces that potentially shape identity integration on either side of the Atlantic, see chapters 5 and 2, this volume.

46. Exact question wording can be found in Schildkraut 2011.

47. Exploratory factor analysis confirmed these three distinct dimensions among the discrimination items.


49. See chapter 4, this volume.

50. “Just about always” was coded as 1, “never” as 0.

51. Schildkraut 2011.


55. In all analyses, all nondummy variables are recalibrated to run from 0 to 1.
57. For existing scholarship on trust in government, see Brehm and Rahn 1997; Keele 2005; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Citrin and Luks 2001; and Hetherington 2005.
58. Predicted outcomes are calculated using CLARIFY, holding all other variables constant at their means for Latinos, with speaks English at home held constant at 1 (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). I predicted “most of the time” instead of “just about always” because so few respondents of any kind said that they trust the government just about always under any condition.
59. It is important to note that a panethnic identification for Latinos and Asians does reduce trust in government when perceptions of discrimination are absent (see table 3.3), indicating that concerns of immigration critics cannot be dismissed completely.
60. See Schildkraut 2011.
61. In separate analyses (not shown), I used the 2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey to predict trust in local government. In that test, the interaction between an Asian identification and discrimination was positive and significant, confirming that panethnic identification can neutralize the negative impact of discrimination on trust for Asian Americans.
62. For full results, see Schildkraut 2011.
63. “Yes” was coded as 1, “no” as 0, and “it depends” as 0.5.
64. “It depends” was a volunteered response: donating to charity (9.6 percent), volunteering (6.4 percent), and serving in the military (11.6 percent).
65. For other research on attitudes about obligations, see Eckstein 2001; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002.
67. This scale runs from 0 to 1, with $\alpha = 0.6$ and mean $= 0.78$.
68. Standard errors are available from the author on request.
69. Though unexpected, it is possible that panethnic mistreatment promotes the belief among blacks that one owes it to other Americans to volunteer in the community due to the prevalence of residential segregation in the United States. When black respondents hear “the community,” they may think of a largely black community.
70. García Bedolla 2005, 190.
71. See Gallup 2014.
74. Craig and Richeson 2014; Danbold and Huo 2014.
75. Norton and Sommers 2011.
76. See chapter 1, this volume.
References


Chapter 4

The War on Crime and the War on Immigrants: Racial and Legal Exclusion in the Twenty-First-Century United States

MARY C. WATERS AND PHILIP KASINITZ

Half a century after the landmark 1964 U.S. Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Immigration Act, scholars are debating the nature of race relations, the axes of racial exclusion, and the scope of the racial changes in U.S. society. Contradictions abound. An African American sits in the White House yet a stunning 60 percent of young black men lacking a high school degree will sit in jail at some point in their lives. Many, probably most, of the children of immigrants, including immigrants of color, are now clearly experiencing modest but substantial upward mobility relative to their parents, a few groups dramatic ones.¹ Yet others, often their siblings, are “waking up to a nightmare” as they realize that their unauthorized legal status excludes them from employment and educational opportunities.² Changing American demography and the retirement of the baby boomers provides new opportunities for “non-zero sum mobility,” as Richard Alba has noted.³ Yet, as in Europe, although some members of previously excluded groups seem poised to take advantage of this situation, others clearly are not.⁴ Despite the much ballyhooed influx of unaccompanied minors from Central America, the combination of the 2008 recession, its aftermath, and tightening border enforcement has reduced the numbers of undocumented immigrants crossing the border. Yet the rise in enforcement and control at the border has also discouraged migrants from leaving the country. The decline in return migration, combined with a decline in the opportunities for unauthorized migrants to change their status inside the United States, has ironically led to a growth in the undocumented population.⁵
As Latinos have surpassed blacks as the largest minority group in the United States, there are reasons to both celebrate and bemoan the state of civic and social inclusion of both groups. Two questions are paramount: are Latinos a racialized and excluded minority, or are they following a path similar to European immigrants a century ago? Are African Americans slowly being incorporated into mainstream American society now that de jure discrimination has been outlawed for fifty years, or are they trapped by a new Jim Crow system in which poverty and a “school to prison pipeline” has replaced the plantation?

Michelle Alexander takes the latter view. She begins her highly influential book, The New Jim Crow, with the story of a black man named Jarvious Cotton who cannot vote because of felon disenfranchisement. She notes that his father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather also could not vote. She concludes that “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” The arguments and rationalizations that justify the denial of basic citizenship rights to African Americans may have changed, she argues, but the results have not. The disproportionate numbers of young black men in prison or marked for life because of a felony conviction lead Alexander to conclude that virulent systemic racial exclusion continues in the United States.

A quick look at the numbers makes it clear why this argument is so compelling. Approximately 5.8 million people in the United States cannot vote because they are currently in prison or permanently barred from voting because of a felony disenfranchisement. Another approximately 11 million are permanently barred from most civil rights and most forms of civic participation as unauthorized, undocumented, or illegal immigrants. Taken together, this population of political “un-persons” far surpasses the number of African Americans who lived in southern states at the dawn of the civil rights movement in the 1950s. Shocking as these numbers are, they tell only part of the story. Alice Goffman shows, for example, how the specter of incarceration limits the economic and social participation of young men not yet in prison, as well as their family members. Devah Pager shows how social stigma and legal exclusion continue to limit the life chances of once-convicted men and women long after they have served their time—a fact which also limits the opportunities for their children. Frank Bean and his collaborators demonstrate how undocumented status of parents negatively effects the educational achievement of even their U.S.-citizen children. And when large numbers of politically excluded persons, due to either unauthorized status or felony disenfranchisement are concentrated in the same places, the resulting decrease of political power and the “rotten borough” effect reduce the social and political efficacy of entire communities. Thus, though not generally discussed or studied together, unauthorized immigration and mass incarceration have simultaneously created groups of mostly black
and brown people who live in the United States but are barred from the
democratic process and most forms of civic participation. As such, these
trends are a challenge to our understandings of citizenship, race relations,
and democracy.

Given these facts, it would be easy to conclude, with Alexander and
many others, that little has actually changed in American race relations.
Indeed, there is no shortage of critics who argue that the growth of the
African American middle class, the upward mobility of so many immi-
grants and their children, and even the election of an African American
president provide only an illusion of change or at best a slight rework-
ing of racial boundaries while the fundamental racism of American society
reasserts itself in new forms. Yet we feel that this old-wine-in-new-bottles
argument, while correctly pointing to a profound crisis in American
society, is mistaken in using outmoded analytic tools to understand the
current crisis of societal membership. As such, it tends to understate the
degree to which the American racial order has been transformed in recent
years and is at a loss to explain how apparently contradictory trends in
American race relations have gone on simultaneously.11

In this chapter, we address questions of citizenship, race, anti-immigrant
or nativist sentiments, and evolving patterns of inclusion and exclusion.
Our argument is that a twentieth-century racial lens on the patterns of
inclusion, discrimination, identity, and stratification may be obscuring a
twenty-first-century pattern of legal exclusion. By racial lens, we mean the
primary variables used by social scientists to categorize the population,
the frame or narrative they use to understand patterns of inclusion and
exclusion, and the variables they use in proposing solutions to societal
problems going forward. A legal lens would showcase how legal exclusion
underlies many of the new patterns of social stratification that rely less on
biological and cultural roots of defining difference, but rather stress indi-
vidual and moral culpability for exclusion and discrimination. We will
argue that a vast system of law, prisons, and criminal justice enforcement
has arisen to create new forms of domination and control.

We are, we should be clear, not suggesting that legal citizenship has
become the only, or even the primary, factor in American ethno-racial
stratification. Nor are we suggesting that race has ceased to be an impor-
tant factor in determining the life chances of Americans. Indeed, today’s
system of legal and political exclusion is often highly racialized in its out-
comes and, of course, racial and legal exclusion often overlap in practice.
Yet neither one is a simple mask for the other. Accordingly, we argue that
legal mechanisms and the lack of citizenship rights are now playing an
increased role in patterns of exclusion and are of increased importance,
relative to race and relative to the role that formal citizenship played
in times past. Although these legal mechanisms often overlap with
racial discrimination, they are not simply reducible to it (as Alexander
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and some critical race theorists imply). The new legal-political exclusion is not straightforwardly racial in the same way that Jim Crow or the Chinese Exclusion Act—to take two obvious examples—were. By introducing a legal lens into the discussion, we hope to illuminate how American racial practices are shifting and to at least partially explain why limits on societal membership, social citizenship, and civic participation for many Latinos and African Americans are not inconsistent with very real social inclusion and upward mobility for others. We further argue that today’s political-legal exclusion is not necessarily best resisted using the language and tools that worked in the civil rights movement. A changing system of domination requires new lenses to understand its operation and new tools of resistance to bring about social change. Clinging to the rhetoric of previous eras may at times be obscuring the reality of twenty-first-century boundaries. It is in that spirit that we offer this analysis.

Historical Patterns of Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion

When immigrants enter a new society, the history and institutions of that society shape the opportunities and obstacles they will encounter. Most comparisons of the integration of immigrants in Europe and the United States begin with an acknowledgment of that fact. The long history of immigration to the United States is often held up as a resource that provides a model or pathway for current immigrants to follow, one that is lacking in European countries. On the other hand, America’s dark history of slavery and racism is seen as a roadblock or barrier to incorporation for today’s nonwhite immigrants and their children. These two patterns have been described as the positive and negative sides of American exceptionalism relative to Europe. In general, in the U.S. immigration and race have been seen as fundamentally separate, if interrelated, issues. In contemporary Europe, where most racial division is seen as the result of relatively recent immigration, they are often seen as the same issue.

Comparisons between patterns of inclusion and exclusion in western Europe and the United States describe these institutional structures. Richard Alba has described them as setting up different kinds of boundaries that divide groups in society. He argues that for European-origin immigrant groups the United States allowed “boundary blurring” and eventually “boundary shifting.” The second and third generation of these groups did not have to pass over a boundary to become fully accepted Americans—the boundary itself shifted to allow them full membership. This blurred boundary led to the full integration of the descendants of European immigrants.
Alba contrasts this situation of the incorporation of immigrants and their children in the United States with the bright boundary based on citizenship and religion that has characterized the situation of immigrants and their descendants in France and Germany. Where the United States has historically maintained a bright boundary between blacks and whites, one that has been difficult if not impossible to cross over, western European countries have had a bright boundary between natives and foreigners—especially, Alba argues, Muslim immigrants. Religion, which has been a bridge for immigrants to the United States to connect with natives, has been a barrier in Europe.

The more or less successful integration of tens of millions of European immigrants established an institutional framework of welcome for immigrants that the United States proudly celebrates. This includes the development of an American identity that allows for civic inclusion of newcomers and persisting ethnic affiliations. This did not happen immediately or as unproblematically as some today think. But it did happen. The invisible hand of social mobility and Americanization blurred boundaries between immigrants and natives. As a consequence, legal immigrants to the United States, though often the object of discrimination, generally face fewer barriers to acceptance and full integration than their counterparts in western Europe. The persistence of some largely symbolic manifestations of ethnic identity is rarely seen as a threat to American national unity. In contrast to Europeans, few Americans care what sports team immigrants and their descendants root for, and the creation of ethnically themed shopping districts is more likely to be celebrated than seen as a sign of dangerous cultural fragmentation.

Historically, America has obviously not been so successful when it comes to matters of race. The end of slavery with the Civil War ushered in a hundred years of both de jure and extralegal segregation, including systematic violence in enforcing whites’ racial domination. The civil rights movement was successful in eliminating de jure segregation, but de facto discrimination continued in many areas of American life. Unlike in Europe, racial segregation in housing and education remains high, and stereotypes of nonwhites as inferior to whites persist. This has led many to wonder whether the United States will be as successful in incorporating the predominantly nonwhite immigrants who have come since 1965 as it was the European immigrants of earlier periods. The central role of race as a determinant of status in the United States has led scholars to question whether American success in assimilating the children of European immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be repeated with Asian, Latino, and black immigrants in the twenty-first. Some scholars argue that contemporary Latino immigrants face a particularly bright boundary—a process of racialization that will prevent their full incorporation into the United States. Others point to evidence of increased Latino social mobility.
Finally, the civil-rights-era racial frame itself provides new opportunities for recent immigrants of color to take advantage of institutions and policies created in response to African Americans and long-established (and long-racialized) Latino populations. Affirmative action in educational institutions and the workplace, as well as the general effect of civil rights advances and the celebration of diversity in at least some sectors of American society, has opened opportunities for immigrants and their children, opportunities they are often better positioned to take advantage of than the African Americans and long-settled Latinos for whom the policies were originally intended.25

Changing Situation of Black Americans

Although the degree to which race has hampered the assimilation of new immigrants has been debated by scholars of immigration, scholars who study African Americans have also been noting changes in the racial and legal axes of inclusion and exclusion of blacks. Since the mid-1960s, change in this arena has been considerable. The civil rights movement demanded civil rights for African Americans who, as citizens were entitled to protection from discrimination and civic participation—the right to vote in particular. This successful movement was predicated on what Gunnar Myrdal described as the American Dilemma—that the Constitution had promised equal rights for all citizens but we had denied those rights to blacks.26 This contradiction challenged the fundamental belief of most Americans in their country as being founded on liberty and legal equality. As a result of the civil rights movement, racial statistics once gathered to facilitate segregation were now gathered to monitor and fight racial discrimination in voting, housing, and employment—a marked contrast to the use of statistics in many European contexts, particularly France.27

These legal and social changes led to many undeniably positive changes in the life chances of African Americans. Both education and wealth have increased, as well as residential integration (although housing segregation remains extremely high by European standards) and intermarriage. Perhaps more remarkable has been the growing presence and visibility of blacks in elite positions culminating in the election in 2008 of the first black president. The rise of an educated black middle class has also been appreciable: in 1967, 4 percent of the black population over age twenty-five had a four-year college degree; by 2012, 20 percent did.28

Racial attitudes have also been changing. Whites still hold negative stereotypes about blacks, but these are “gradational or qualified, rather than categorical.”29 They also have shifted away from presumed biological or “natural” differences and focus more on presumptions rooted in group culture. Thus whites are much more willing to see differences among black Americans, and are more accepting of middle- and upper-class African
Americans, but are also more likely to express fear and resentment of poor, less educated African Americans, particularly those seen as criminal and outside the mainstream. Indeed, a decline in biologically based racism may be associated with a greater willingness to blame individual, less advantaged African Americans for their negative life outcomes.

This shift in attitudes coincided with the rise of mass incarceration. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, state and federal correctional authorities in 2010 had jurisdiction over 1,612,395 prisoners on December 31, and over the course of the year some 7.1 million adults were under some form of correctional supervision. This quantity is the result of a rise of more than 500 percent in twenty-five years. The rate of incarceration began to climb in the mid-1970s but took a dramatic upturn with the increase of harsh sentences for nonviolent drug offenders in the 1980s and early 1990s. Bruce Western outlines how this largely nonpartisan shift in criminal justice policy led to an unprecedented increase in incarceration, particularly among low-skilled, low-income minority men. By 2000, 702 of every hundred thousand U.S. residents were behind bars, a rate six to twelve times higher than that of western European countries.

Scholars have characterized the rise of mass incarceration as one of the most important developments in the United States in the last few decades. Legal scholar Jonathan Simon describes the United States as governing through crime control—leading to the rise of the “carceral state,” replacing the welfare state as the way to deal with poor stigmatized groups. This increase in incarceration occurred as crime rates were falling and was preceded over by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Indeed, in recent years it has been increasingly challenged by some on the Right on the grounds that it is simply too expensive and represents a wasteful expansion of government. In part because of this ideological shift, the growth of the prison population has recently slowed and in many states began to reverse after 2010. Yet the United States continues to imprison far more of its population than any other nation, and reducing those numbers, even after most criminologists have concluded that much incarceration has little value in terms of crime control, has proven extremely politically difficult. Whether the recent trend is the beginning of the end of the era of mass incarceration or simply a slowing in the rate of the growth remains to be seen.

Changing Situation of Latinos

In the 1960s, the United States also changed its immigration laws, opening up immigration to the entire world, but at the same time limiting immigration from the Western Hemisphere for the first time. This led to two major demographic changes that had large implications for American race relations. Immigration changed the complexion of the society with a very large increase in Latinos and Asians. A black-white dichotomy in
American race relations changed into a complex multigroup situation. The foreign born were 4.7 percent of the population in 1970, and by 2010 were 13 percent. Latinos grew from 4.7 percent to 16.3 percent, surpassing African Americans as the largest nonwhite group. In addition, restrictions on the number of people from the Western Hemisphere created a large undocumented population. Over time, the pressures for immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries, along with the long-established ties with American society, led to increased numbers of people crossing the southern U.S. border without authorization—the growth of the undocumented, or illegal, immigrants.

Beginning in the 1990s, the militarization of the border led to a sharp rise in the number of undocumented Mexicans and other Latin Americans—not because it stopped people from coming into the United States, but because it prevented immigrants from returning to Mexico. The circular migration that had been occurring ended. These government policies led to the explosive growth of undocumented immigrants in new destinations in the south and Midwest, changing what was once a limited regional issue into a permanent national phenomenon. An important shift in how the United States dealt with immigrants—documented and undocumented—came in 1996. Congress passed three laws that year that had far-reaching impacts on the prospects for integration of all immigrants. Both the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) not only laid the legal groundwork for mass deportations of undocumented immigrants, but also greatly increased the ways in which legal immigrants who are not yet citizens must be deported if they are convicted of a felony. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), also known as Welfare Reform, broadened the restrictions on public benefits for undocumented immigrants and established restrictions on the eligibility of legal immigrants for means-tested public assistance.

The 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was part of IIRIRA, contained the controversial section 287(g), which authorized state and local police to screen people for immigration status, to detain them until the federal government takes custody, and to generate the necessary charges to ultimately remove them from the country. In effect, this shifted to local police the authority to stop and detain people for immigration violations, a power that until then only federal authorities had held. The IIRIRA broadened the definition of aggravated felony that justifies deportation of immigrants, both documented and undocumented, and expanded the categories of noncitizens eligible for deportation. The ominously named 1996 AEDPA removed judicial review for most categories of immigrants subject to deportation. The Patriot Act of 2001 further increased the power of the federal government by allowing it
to apprehend, detain, and deport legal immigrants deemed a threat to national security.

These laws are a sharp reversal of previous trends. From the Hart-Celler reforms of 1965 to the 1990s, the practical differences between legal permanent residence and citizenship had been shrinking to the point where political participation was the last remaining bright boundary between the two. In the early 1990s, this direction reversed. Legal permanent residents began steadily losing social rights. At the same time, administrative and legislative changes systematically foreclosed many of the routes that unauthorized immigrants had used to regularize their status.

The net effect of these changes has been a growth in the intersection of the U.S. criminal justice system with the immigration enforcement system, a massive rise in the numbers of documented and undocumented immigrants deported each year, and a rapid growth of the numbers of undocumented immigrants in mandatory detention throughout the country. These laws gave power to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and then to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to arrest, detain, and deport undocumented people and sharply limited their rights to appeal these decisions. In addition, the law defined as criminal what had been up to that point an administrative violation—entry without inspection. This new legal regime created what Daniel Kanstroom describes as a system of “post entry social control” and Rachel Buff describes as “deportation terror.” This has led to a whole new meaning of the concept of “crime and immigration.” According to the Department of Homeland Security, 189,000 people were removed in 2001, some 395,000 by 2009, and another 438,421 by 2013. The criminalization of the undocumented has led to new methods of identifying undocumented people, of new systems of detention throughout the country, and to mass deportations unseen before in U.S. history.

New laws have led to a blurring of the federal, state, and local jurisdictions. In 2003, the INS was replaced by ICE. The INS had been under control of the Justice Department. The new bureau was put under the control of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. ICE saw its mission as apprehending, detaining, and deporting “criminal and fugitive” noncitizens. It launched three programs to identify whether undocumented people had broken the law and were in state or local custody. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) places ICE officials at state prisons to conduct immigrant screening. The Priority Enforcement Program has set up a joint database between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ICE into which local police can enter the fingerprints of people they arrest. This program has taken over many of the functions of the controversial 287(g) program, which had delegated the federal power of immigration enforcement to state and local personnel. By connecting the databases of the FBI and ICE, any time state and
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local law enforcement check the background of persons they encounter, they are in effect screening them for immigration law violations. State and local authorities then detain them until they can be transferred to federal authorities. The evolution of a program designed to catch “dangerous criminals”—defined by a 2007 ICE fact sheet to be people involved in “violent crimes, human smuggling, gang/organized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics smuggling and money laundering”—into one based on finding every undocumented person happened at first in those jurisdictions where immigration was a politically sensitive and visible issue. This is especially true in the Southeast, where immigration has been increasing rapidly in areas that had little previous exposure to it. The program reinforced the false but increasingly common public perception that illegal immigrants were disproportionately engaged in criminal activity. Politically, many local officials used that fear of crime and the 287(g) program to create a climate of fear and intimidation.

When people are detained for immigration violations, either through detection by ICE officials or after an arrest on another charge and a screening for immigration status, they are held before it is decided whether they should be deported. It is important to note that criminal aliens convicted of a crime serve their sentence before they come into ICE custody. Yet people who have not committed any serious crimes are often held for long periods in the immigrant detention system. The detention system consists of agreements, intergovernmental service agreements (IGSAs), between ICE and state and local prisons to house people in a system of privately run contract detention facilities (CDFs) and ICE-run detention centers, or service processing centers (SPCs). A recent study using ICE data obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request found that 58 percent of the thirty-two thousand detainees in custody as of January 29, 2009, did not have any criminal record.44 Four hundred people who had no criminal record had been held for more than a year. “The most serious convictions for 20 percent of criminal aliens in ICE custody were for traffic-related (13 percent) and immigration-related (6 percent) offenses.”45 The most common criminal conviction of those in detention was driving under the influence of alcohol. Nevertheless, these detainees were primarily held in facilities designed for people who have committed serious crimes—70 percent were in state and local prisons, 17 percent in CDFs, 10 percent in SPCs, 2 percent in federal prisons, and 3 percent in soft detention centers such as medical centers.

The average number of immigrant detainees on a given day increased from 6,785 in 1994 to 33,330 in 2011.46 Indeed, immigration violations were the most commonly reported lead charges brought by federal prosecutors during the first half of fiscal year 2011. In 2011, ICE detained 429,247 people, a 105 percent increase from 2001. ICE has six ICE-owned
SPCs (six of the seven are managed by for-profit companies), seven prisons owned and run by CDFs, and 240 local and county jails that have signed agreements with ICE to house detainees. This increase of deportations is made all the more remarkable by the fact that much of it took place under the Obama administration—an administration at least nominally committed to comprehensive immigration reform and to protecting some classes of immigrants from deportation.

Intersection of the War on Crime and the War on Immigrants

Ryan King and his colleagues examine the determinants of deportation over a long period of U.S. history, from 1908 to 2005. They find a strong positive association between unemployment and deportation in the period before 1986 but find that after that time the number of deportations tracks along with the rise in incarceration in general in the United States. They conclude that deportation is a part of the “culture of control” that has emerged in the United States as a way of dealing with the poor and marginalized. The growth in incarceration and the growth in immigration intersected and the numbers of immigrants behind bars rose. By 2009, a reported 94,498 immigrants were held in federal and state prisons. Peter Schuck estimates that immigrants are more than 25 percent of federal prisoners and 4 percent of state prisoners.

In fact, the intensive policing that has affected poor communities across the country is related to the rise in deportations, immigration detention, and Latino imprisonment. Because the federal immigration authorities have integrated their data systems with local and state police, they do not need to go looking for unauthorized immigrants; the local authorities let them know when an undocumented person comes in contact with the criminal justice system. Increasingly, misdemeanor offenses such as public drunkenness, driving without a license, and traffic violations can lead to an undocumented person’s being discovered and detained in a state or local jail or in an ICE facility and often deported. The rationale for more intensive policing is generally public safety, not immigration control. Yet more aggressive policing and more arrests for minor offenses inevitably make it more likely that police action will ensnare immigration violators.

Racial versus Legal Frames

How should we understand the experiences of the eleven million undocumented immigrants, most of whom are Latino? Clearly, how they are being portrayed to the American public has racial overtones that pick up on long-standing stereotypes and racial definitions of Mexican
Many thoughtful scholars assert that we are seeing a racialization and dehumanization of all Latinos in the United States. Deborah Boehm, for example, argues that mass deportation is best understood as being rooted in a racial logic:

U.S. citizens of color, while not legally “deportable,” are subject to the racial logic of “deportability” and the racism that guides surveillance and deportation (e.g., Chávez 2008; De Genova 2005; Rosas 2007). The shifting and racialized character of deportability and deportation underscores the complexities of studying “undocumented migration” and points to the significance of ethnographic research in the analysis of both migration and return.

A racial understanding of the plight of the undocumented most surely contributes to understanding the phenomena. But we would argue that a new form of nativism, one with a strong legal component, is also operating. The distinction between racism and nativism is too little used to understand undocumented Latinos in the United States. Racism can be defined as the belief that “socially significant differences between human groups or communities that differ in visible physical characteristics or putative ancestry are innate and unchangeable” and when “such a sense of deep unalterable difference . . . [is] accompanied by the notion that ‘we’ are superior to ‘them’ and need to be protected from the real or imagined threats to our privileged group position that might arise if ‘they’ were to gain in resources and rights.” Nativism has traditionally been seen as “an intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (that is, un-American) connections.” In American history, blacks have been subject to virulent racism, and European immigrants to virulent nativism. Asians and Hispanics were subject to both, though the degree to which their exclusion and suffering was due to one or the other is a subject of scholarly debate. Today, however, growing anti-immigrant sentiment is largely focused on one subgroup of immigrants: the roughly one-quarter of the foreign-born population whose presence in the country is seen as illegal. Political leaders now routinely castigate illegals while celebrating the achievements of those immigrants who entered the country legally, play by the rules, and who are seen as consistent with American traditions of immigrant incorporation. Of course, many Americans presume that a much larger portion of immigrants are illegal than is actually the case, and this presumption clearly has a racial overtone. Yet the fact that many feel uncomfortable expressing an openly racist sentiment and feel the need to hang their anti-immigrant rhetoric on a legal distinction is important. It stands in sharp contrast to America in the recent past, as well as to contemporary anti-immigrant rhetoric in Europe.

Moreover, legal status matters. The foreign born in the United States now number about forty million. About a third have naturalized and
become citizens. Yet more than a quarter are undocumented and can never become citizens unless there is a fundamental change in our immigration laws. Most of the rest are legal permanent residents. De jure inequality between unauthorized immigrants and others has grown a great deal, and de jure inequality between citizens and legal immigrants has also grown, as has social inequality more generally.

A great deal of evidence points to rising nativism directed particularly toward the undocumented. Little stigma is attached to demonizing undocumented persons. Roberto Suro reports that “an analysis of 1,848 Associated Press stories on immigration topics from 1980 to 2007 showed that 79 percent fit into the framework on illegality. Of 2,614 stories on immigration in the New York Times over the same period, 86 percent dealt with illegality in various forms.” Undocumented immigration and the belief that immigrants, both legal and illegal, receive government benefits they did not work for has fueled the growth of right-wing movements such as the Tea Party. The false belief that immigrants are more likely to be criminal than natives and that undocumented immigrants are by definition criminals is a strong source of anti-immigrant ideology in America. In addition to unfairly stigmatizing the vast majority of law-abiding immigrants, this stereotype of immigrant criminality has led to harsh laws targeting immigrants, to large numbers of people being held in detention in prisons, and to the largest number of deportations in our country’s history.

The importance of the notion of illegality needs to be stressed here. In contrast to nativist movements of the past, today’s anti-immigrant activists rarely point to the total number of all immigrants as a problem, nor do they often call for a reduction in the number of legal immigrants, though those numbers remain substantial compared with many countries. Even the notion that immigrants take jobs from Americans has become less common in recent years, the post-2008 recession notwithstanding. And, in contrast to Europe, the fear of cultural balkanization and divided loyalties, while certainly present in the U.S. nativist rhetoric, is rarely the central argument. Indeed, politicians arguing for tougher immigration enforcement and border security often pause to praise the work ethic of legal immigrants and say good things about the role of cultural diversity in American life. Although in reality the social distinction between authorized and unauthorized immigrants is often minimal (in many cases, they are part of the same families), in the American imagination the illegal immigrant, usually assumed to be Mexican, has come to be seen as an undeserving criminal, in contrast to legal immigrants, who are often depicted as virtuous, hardworking, and rule followers. Indeed, much of the political power of the Dreamers—the activist undocumented-student advocates of the DREAM Act—stems from their ability to put a sympathetic human face on the stigmatized, illegal category. Yet even here there is a risk. Much of the Dreamers’ appeal lies in the fact that, because they
immigrated as children, their illegal status is not their fault, implying that others may indeed be at fault.

One researcher has examined the empirical effects of how animus toward Hispanics is framed in different states. Hana Brown shows that negative views about Hispanic immigrants in both the media and among politicians could take two different forms. She calls these the *legality frame* and the *racial frame*. She finds that anti-Hispanic stereotypes in Arizona in the period between 1970 and 2010 were deployed using a racial frame, whereas anti–Hispanic immigrant activists in California used a legality frame. She states that “the legality frame draws moral boundaries based on legal status, lauding the contributions of legal immigrants while chastising their illegal counterparts. The racial frame explicitly racializes moral worth, blaming Hispanics or Mexicans for the suffering of deserving White American citizens.”

Brown traces the effects of these frames on policy outcomes in the two states. As a result of the 1996 welfare reform law (PRWORA), the federal government made legal noncitizens ineligible for welfare benefits. California responded by creating a state-supported program for documented noncitizen welfare recipients. Meanwhile, Arizona refused to extend benefits to legal noncitizens. The fight in California over Proposition 187 established a legality frame that was mobilized by anti-poverty activists seeking support for noncitizen legal immigrants who needed support. In Arizona, a racialized attack on all Hispanics more clearly drew racial boundaries that not only cut off welfare support for legal noncitizens but also paved the way for one of the harshest anti-immigrant laws in the country. This measure was passed in 2010, though part of it was struck down by the Supreme Court for racial profiling.

Of course, the reaction to undocumented Latino immigrants is partially based on race as well as on presumed legal status. Latinos occupy a somewhat indeterminate space in American racial hierarchies—as both a racial and an ethnic group—and patterns of discrimination and acceptance differ in different parts of the country given different historical circumstances and group histories and identities. Accordingly, their acceptance or exclusion can vary over time and space. It is not clear whether a racial or a legal frame leads to greater possibilities for challenging exclusion. The legal frame in California may have helped legal Latino immigrants, but the undocumented may be better protected in a state such as Arizona, where racial allies are created by racial exclusion.

**Citizenship and the Difference It Makes**

In America, as in all countries, the institutional infrastructure of the nation reflects its history. The United States has developed a number of institutions designed to deal with its major fault line of race. It has laws
prohibiting racial discrimination and programs to create racial and ethnic diversity in higher education and the workplace. It collects statistics on race to monitor progress toward a racially fair and just society. Because historically immigration has been seen as relatively unproblematic, the United States does not have laws written specifically to prohibit discrimination against foreigners. It also does not have ministries devoted to immigrant integration. In the United States, unlike Europe, the assimilation of legal immigrants is left to civil society and especially the labor market, where legal immigrants have largely unfettered access, albeit often to the worst jobs. Because the United States believes that it is “good at” dealing with immigrants, it has not set up a governmentally sanctioned system of institutions devoted to promoting integration, except in the important case of refugees.

Theoretical and legal scholarship on citizenship has also had two parallel tracks: an immigration and a race perspective. Linda Bosniak describes what she sees as a division of labor in legal and political theory scholarship on citizenship—with experts on immigration focusing on access to formal citizenship, and most other scholars assuming formal citizenship and focusing on substantive citizenship:

The universality of citizenship as both norm and fact thus informs most contemporary citizenship theory; it is presumed by liberal citizenship theorists and their critics.... Universality is treated as so axiomatic, in fact, that the issue is rarely addressed, except by historical contrast. The ideal is widely treated as given, leaving theorists free to argue instead over precisely how citizenship should be understood in substantive terms.60

Jennifer Gordon and Robin Lenhardt also argue that the immigration and race perspectives in citizenship have been talking past each other—the race perspective focuses on the failures of the United States to deliver the equality promised by citizenship to African Americans and other minorities.61 They point out that critical race scholars recognize that “while legal rights are important for racial minorities, the formal status of citizen has done relatively little to ensure belonging for racial minorities.”62 Bosniak notes that focusing on inequality and racial exclusion in the United States leads to the argument that “formal rights [are] relatively empty of substance, since most citizens are not in a position to avail themselves of these rights in a meaningful way.”63

For most of American history, legal citizenship has been less important than race, ethnicity, and sometimes other factors in determining social inclusion and societal membership. It is true that historically, legal U.S. citizenship has been relatively easy to obtain. In nineteenth-century America, naturalization was a relatively simple matter, and birthright citizenship for all those born in U.S. territory, except slaves and American
Indians living in tribal groups, has been recognized since the beginning of the republic. Birthright citizenship was extended to former slaves and their offspring under the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866. In 1896, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court clarified the fact that under the Fourteenth Amendment, birthright citizenship also applied to the children of immigrants, including those whose noncitizen parents were themselves barred from naturalization (primarily the Chinese) or were in the country illegally. Ironically, native American tribal members were the one group not accorded birthright citizenship until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, though most persons of native American descent were already recognized as U.S. citizens by that time.

Yet although members of racialized minority groups have long been technically accorded U.S. citizenship, the designation has not served as a meaningful guarantee of civil or social rights in practice. In reality, the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the voting rights of African Americans and, in some cases, Mexican Americans, who were effectively disenfranchised in many parts of the country until the civil rights laws of the 1960s. Legal citizenship was also no guarantee of equal treatment before the law, equal access to public services, the right of assembly and protest, or many of the other basic rights we usually think of as components of substantive citizenship. Two-thirds of the Japanese Americans interned after the attack on Pearl Harbor were U.S. citizens—in this case, clearly race mattered far more than legal status. Interestingly, although some German and Italian citizens living in the United States at the time were also interned as enemy aliens, most were not. In any event, U.S. citizens of German and Italian descent faced remarkably little persecution compared with what Japanese Americans experienced. Both during the Great Depression and under Operation Wetback in the 1950s, U.S. citizens were among the thousands of Mexican Americans caught up in dragnets of mass deportations. Here again, race trumped legal status.

Yet this may be less true in a post–civil rights context. As Anny Bakalian and Mehdi Bozorgmehr note, Japanese internment contrasts markedly to the situation of Arab and other Muslim Americans after the 9/11 attacks. Although Arabs, Muslims, and even those who were confused with Arabs and Muslims, such as Sikhs, were victims of prejudice and violence in the wake of 9/11, the brunt of the backlash was borne by noncitizens. Undocumented immigrants and resident aliens were victims of arbitrary arrest and internment, held incommunicado and deported. Yet while the government moved swiftly and sometimes brutally against unauthorized immigrants, it was generally cautious when it came to the rights of citizens, regardless of race or nation of origin. Further, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr note, the post-9/11 period actually led to an increase in the activity of Arab American civil rights organizations, usually founded by long-time American citizens and modeled on (and sometimes working
in cooperation with) African American, Latino, and Jewish civil rights groups.68

Living in the Shadow of the Law

The sheer numbers of the people in prison is a new development, but scholars have also stressed the growth of a different relationship to poor minority communities through this involvement of the criminal justice system. As so-called criminals, the less-educated, mostly minority populations (including African Americans and undocumented Latinos) can be seen as individually responsible for their conditions and as threatening to the rest of civil society.

For immigrants, in addition to being held for unspecified periods in prisons and other detention facilities, people who are detained suffer other abuses and indignities. A Human Rights Watch report estimated that more than one million family members had been separated through detention and deportation. Sometimes family members vanish when they are taken in workplace raids, and it is difficult for people to find their loved ones. Nina Bernstein, the immigration reporter for the New York Times, describes the terror and uncertainty the raids produce: “It can be risky, for example, simply to live in an immigrant neighborhood in a house or apartment where a previous tenant may have had an old deportation order. Immigration agents may show up at the door with a photograph of someone who hasn’t lived there for years, roust people from bed to demand papers and take away in handcuffs anyone who cannot produce the right documents. In the aftermath of such raids, relatives, employers, even lawyers have to struggle to find out where those detained are being held.”69

In addition to living with the constant fear of deportation and the ripple effects of deportation of loved ones and neighbors, undocumented immigrants, including many who have lived in the country for decades, are living in the shadows, ineligible for many services and freedoms that most Americans take for granted. Although their children can attend school from kindergarten through twelfth grade—one human right that U.S. courts have made it clear that all immigrants have regardless of legal status—the undocumented are often afraid of contact with school authorities because it can lead to their discovery. They suffer domestic violence and are afraid to ask police for help. They are often afraid to seek medical care, have no documents to fly on domestic airlines, cannot legally drive, and have no identification to open bank accounts or cash checks. They cannot live in public housing, reclaim taxes they have paid under false documents, and are often at the mercy of employers to pay them and treat them fairly, since few undocumented people would report an employer who cheated them for fear of being discovered.
A parallel world of constrained mobility, fear of the law, and denial of benefits for the poor characterizes the world of poor African Americans caught up in the criminal justice system (a majority of African Americans with less than a high school education). A six-year ethnographic study of men in these circumstances led Alice Goffman to conclude that “the dealings these young men have with the police, the courts and the probation and parole board grant them an illegal or semilegal status and instill an overriding fear of capture. Suspicious even of those closest to them, young men cultivate unpredictability or altogether avoid institutions, places, and relations on which they formerly relied.”

Goffman describes how young men in this situation, like undocumented immigrants, avoid contact with government bureaucracy, do not call on the police when they are in danger, and alter their day-to-day lives to reduce the possibility of being caught by the criminal justice system—avoiding hospitals, courts, and the police. Goffman concludes that these men are “living as semilegal or illegal people, coping with the daily threat of capture and confinement.”

In addition, those who have been convicted of a felony, Alexander reminds us, often lose basic citizenship rights in terms of voting, employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury service.

Ethnographic and statistical studies of the lives of the undocumented and the men “on the run” from the police are increasingly demonstrating the strong ripple effects of this life of fear on relatives and neighbors. Sara Wakefield and Christopher Wildeman find that approximately 25 percent of African American children born since 1990 will have a parent in prison at some point in their childhood. Prison inmates are parents to 2.5 million children, and research finds they suffer mental health and behavioral problems along with economic instability. Indeed, research shows that imprisonment of parents has far-reaching effects on children into adolescence and adulthood, leading to the perpetuation of intergenerational disadvantage.

Yet while the criminalization of poor African Americans affects far more than those actually incarcerated, it does not affect all members of the racialized group in the way segregation did. The existence of a large black middle class, the shifting and perhaps softening of once hard racial boundaries, to say nothing of the election of an African American president (can one imagine a Turkish-descent Muslim chancellor of Germany in the near future?), all point to clear progress and lead us to question the utility of seeing the present situation as simply the new Jim Crow or the most recent manifestation of age-old racial hierarchies. At the same time, the emphasis on individual blame and personal responsibility implied by the legal criminalization lens may prove even more insidious than traditional racism when it comes to isolating and denying basic rights to the poor in contemporary America. Undocumented immigrants are also the parents to some four million U.S.-citizen children. Studies show that these
children also suffer from their parents’ lack of legal status. In addition to the forced separations of more than a million family members, evidence has accumulated that legal status of parents has a negative effect on developmental and educational outcomes among citizen children, net of all other individual characteristics. The children of the undocumented are also more likely to suffer food insecurity and less access to health care.

**Conclusion**

How should the new modes of social exclusion be confronted? A racial lens on undocumented Americans may lead to a false hope for a solution—the civil rights movement. It is true that references to the racial past, such as Alexander’s “new Jim Crow,” are rhetorically effective. The Dreamers use the symbolism of the civil rights movement and increasingly the gay rights movement (that is, “coming out”) particularly effectively, in part because the very Americanness of these claims, clearly a product of their post–civil rights American educations, reinforces the notions that they are in fact Americans in all but the legal sense. Yet this frame also has clear limitations. It obscures the ways in which race can be a resource rather than an impediment for legal immigrants and citizens of Latino origin. This is because legal resources and remedies are available for racial discrimination but not for immigrant discrimination. The court challenges to the most virulent immigration laws passed in Alabama and in Arizona challenged them on the basis of racial profiling. Immigrant profiling is perfectly acceptable and legal. A racial lens obscures the shifting line of oppression in our society from racial phenotype to legal exclusion. Indeed, in some situations—such as economic progress of the second generation—the relative success of children of immigrants obscures how badly the native minority population is doing.

In other contexts, seeing immigrants in purely racial terms misses the social significance of the political exclusion of the large undocumented population. This group of people is significant, permanently domiciled in the United States, and part of the society economically, socially, and culturally, yet not politically. This political exclusion ill serves a democratic society. In addition, although the United States remains comparatively open to the naturalization of legal immigrants, it has been more reluctant than many European countries to open arenas for noncitizen political participation, such as voting rights in local elections. Because the United States has seen immigrant integration as relatively unproblematic, no specific laws are on the books to guarantee immigrants equal rights, and no government agency offers aid in immigrant integration. Because undocumented immigrants are part of the labor force and part of the society but most definitely not eligible for civic participation, they cannot, by definition, lay claims to civil rights.
Racialization and references to the caste-like situations of the recent immigrants, however rhetorically effective, can also be misleading. When critical race scholars speak of the racialization of unauthorized immigrants, they are arguing, in effect, that these immigrants are coming to occupy a social position similar to that of African Americans: virtual blacks. In many ways, that is true—there is no shortage of ethnic and racial discrimination toward Latinos. However, it is also true that legal exclusion has its own unique characteristics and consequences. Indeed, given the criminalization and disenfranchisement of millions of poor African Americans, we would argue that many (but not all) poor African Americans are now being redefined as virtual illegal immigrants.

Race and caste are also, by definition, seen to be immutable. However much social scientists point out their socially and historically constructed nature, in popular usage they masquerade as permanent, historically fixed categories that can be changed only very slowly, if at all. But the current situations of the criminalized black poor and the unauthorized immigrant population of the United States are fairly recent creations. They happened quite suddenly. Forty years ago, illegal immigrants were barely an issue in the United States, and the level of incarceration was comparable to many European countries. The current situation is more akin to what Robert Smith has called “a cruel natural experiment” in which the life chances of unauthorized migrants are markedly different from fellow migrants (often their siblings) who are only a few years older but qualified for naturalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act amnesty, or who are only a few years younger, but were birthright citizens of the United States. The socially excluded status of these “un-persons” is the direct result of politics and policy. It can thus be changed by politics and policy.

Unfortunately, we may be headed in the opposite direction. In 2013, moderate Republican legislators unwilling to accept even the extraordinary long and tortuous path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants proposed in reform legislation passed by the U.S. Senate began to circulate proposals to regularize the status of unauthorized immigrants to a new type of permanent legal resident without the possibility of citizenship. This new status, which would allow immigrant labor full participation in the economy but give immigrant people no role in the polity, was seen as a perfect compromise between business interests and conservative Republicans anxious not to create millions of new Latino voters. Yet it also seemed to be gaining the grudging support of many immigrants and their advocates because it would stop mass deportations, allow people to come “out of the shadows” and undoubtedly improve the daily lives of millions of immigrants. Democrats, desperate to say they had accomplished something on immigration reform, might also have reluctantly gone along with such a proposal. In the end, the idea was sidetracked by
the electoral calendar: Republican leaders did not want a conflict between the party’s establishment and Tea Party wings in the months leading up to the 2014 congressional election. But we suspect it will remerge when political circumstances warrant.

As Douglas Massey notes, “The transition to a minority-majority U.S. population is now well under way, and is inevitable in demographic terms. Although the U.S. population is currently 16 percent Latino, 14 percent black, 5 percent Asian, and 3 percent mixed race, among births, 25 percent are to Latino mothers, 15 percent are to African Americans, and 7 percent are to Asians, making up almost half the total.”81 Middle-class African Americans and Latinos are everywhere in American society. Yet large numbers of African Americans and Latinos also live in deep poverty, experience intense fear, and are much more likely than whites to end up in prison, detention, or deportation. One can understand this as a racial phenomenon and call for racial justice and fairness and seek racial solidarity among Latinos and blacks to fight for the rights all of their members.

One can also understand this as the result of long-standing racial injustices and historical colonial power that led to unequal economic and social conditions that are now being managed, at least in part, through legal means. This is an ostensibly race-neutral policy that has strongly unequal racial outcomes. Black and brown people are locked up, disenfranchised, barred from public housing and public assistance, and in many cases prevented from democratic participation and voting. Yet appeals for racial justice for these people may not go far because they are in this predicament because of immigration or criminal violations and thus are responsible for their own fates. Worse still, they are not able to advocate for themselves because they have been defined out of the polity—in effect, they cannot influence the society they live in. Civil rights do not exist for them and there is no American dilemma to be overcome—because by legal definition they are not part of the civil society.

The criminalization of poor African Americans and unauthorized immigrants allows for the oppression and exclusion of large communities of color in a way that is not at odds with America’s self-image of a color-blind society in the post–civil rights era. This legal regime also accommodates racial progress for many black- and brown-skinned Americans, increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the top institutions of American society, but condemning a significant number of African Americans and Latinos to a lifetime under the thumb of a police state. Scholars who share our dismay at this situation are hoping that calling attention to the racialized nature of the phenomena might lead to societal change. We suggest that this is not necessarily the best path to right these wrongs. It may be that we need a new social movement rooted in the human rights of all people. Unlike in Europe, which has a strongly established human rights
discourse, this stance is a new and often unpopular position in American society. Yet until we can recognize the humanity of those who have been convicted of crimes and those who entered and live in our society without authorization, we will continue to have a democracy in name only.

Notes

2. Gonzalez and Chavez 2012.
4. See Alba and Foner 2014.
10. Waters, Kasinitz, and Asad 2014.
16. We use the words *seen as* quite deliberately here. Many European societies do, in fact, have long histories of incorporating immigrants as well as histories of struggle over the incorporation or exclusion of racial and religious minorities. Yet, for a variety of reasons, issues of immigrant incorporation in the United States are usually discussed in the context of past immigrant incorporation, whereas in Europe observers are far more likely to frame contemporary issues of ethnic diversity as unprecedented or at least disconnected from the ethnic diversity of the past. See Duyvendak 2014; Lucassen 2014.
19. See also Bail 2008.
22. Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Massey and Sánchez 2010.
23. Telles and Ortiz 2008; Massey and Sánchez 2010.
Interestingly, in New York City, the sharpest declines in crime of any U.S. city during the 1990s and 2000s were accompanied by relatively low rates of incarceration. During the mayoral administrations of Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg, New York pursued a policy of extremely aggressive “stop and frisk” policing and made very large numbers of arrests of mostly African American and Latino youth for minor offenses. However, while many young men were stopped, searched, arrested and detained, relatively few were incarcerated for long periods of time. This aggressive “stop and frisk” policing, often seen as specifically directed at minority youth, was the subject of several civil rights–based court challenges and became a major issue in the 2013 mayoral election.
References


PART II

WESTERN EUROPE
Chapter 5

Feeling Dutch: The Culturalization and Emotionalization of Citizenship and Second-Generation Belonging in the Netherlands

MARIEKE SLOOTMAN AND JAN WILLEM DUYVENDAK

Western European countries are heatedly debating how much and what kind of cultural diversity is to be accepted in the public domain. Many have witnessed the rise of right-wing populist parties that see immigrants as a threat to social cohesion and national identity. The debate has a nostalgic character, based on a reifying, ahistorical notion of culture. Culture in this perspective is portrayed as a closed, timeless, and conflict-free whole, carried by citizens who all basically share beliefs, norms, and traditions. Different cultures are regarded as essentially different and irreconcilable, and this ignites debates on actual or potential harmful influences of Muslim minorities—who are a large share of the immigrant population in western Europe.

This closed, static conception of culture is prominent in Dutch debates and is embraced by many natives, who increasingly tend to fear Islam. The building of mosques, the call to prayer, the use of religious symbols such as the headscarf, gender inequality, anti-integration pronouncements by ultra-orthodox imams, and Islam-inspired political extremism are all popular subjects in the media that are often portrayed as threatening to destroy, damage, and undermine Dutch culture. In the Netherlands, the Islamophobic political party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) took second place in the 2002 elections. After 2002, various populist parties gained electoral support, Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) being the latest and the most successful.
We argue that a culturalization and emotionalization of citizenship has taken place, by which we mean that citizenship is less about political and social rights and duties (let alone a juridical status, as it is often understood in the U.S. context), and more about norms and values of a culturally defined community.

A Multicultural Paradise?

What happened in the Netherlands, a country often described as an oasis of multicultural tolerance, that it became intolerant and what we call monoculturalist? We argue that the current culturalist and emotive citizenship policies are far less of a break with the past than is often suggested. In reality, what had been rather tolerant but monoculturalist policies developed into intolerant monoculturalism.

In our perspective, the Netherlands has been wrongly portrayed as tolerant and deeply multiculturalist. For instance, in When Ways of Life Collide, Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn write that “in the Netherlands, as much as can be done on behalf of multiculturalism has been done. . . . It promoted the most ambitious program of multiculturalism in Western Europe. . . . The politics of the Netherlands since the assassination of Fortuyn has been the politics of multiculturalism in extremis.”4 A critical debate revolves around what are seen as the pernicious effects of multiculturalism for so-called failures of the cultural and economic integration of immigrants.5 Radical multiculturalism is often seen as causing enormous social tensions in the Netherlands: “The whole thrust of multiculturalism is to accentuate, even exaggerate, differences between majority and minority and insist on their importance. . . . Sharing a common identity builds support for inclusion; bringing differences of ethnic and religious identity to the fore evokes the very exclusionary reactions it is meant to avoid.”6 According to Christian Joppke, the supposed approach of allowing designated minority groups to “emancipate” themselves within their own parallel institutions has fuelled segregation and separation from the mainstream society.7

But are or were the Dutch indeed radical multiculturalists, supporting multicultural policies? As shown elsewhere, the assumption that the Dutch were radical multiculturalists is a misrepresentation of what really happened and is now happening in the Netherlands.8 Policies that focused on the sociocultural position of immigrants were much more complex than the accounts of Sniderman and Hagendoorn suggest. The policy regarding cultural identities in the 1970s can be misunderstood as multiculturalist, because of the central tenet that “guest workers,” such as those from Turkey and Morocco, should maintain their identity. The reason for this policy, however, was not to celebrate cultural differences and accommodate pluralism in the Netherlands, but to facilitate immigrants’
eventual return to their country of origin. In the early 1980s, the ideal of group empowerment emerged, but only as a vehicle for improving immigrants’ socioeconomic status. Moreover, this policy emphasis faded into the background by the late 1980s as the objective of full individual—rather than group—socioeconomic integration and participation gradually took center stage. The fact is that the central government’s policy toward sociocultural integration showed little consistency. It evolved from focusing on achieving group emancipation to an approach that accentuated individual integration, but it never was really multicultural.

The use of group-specific provisions by immigrants was made possible by the heritage of the general Dutch institutional pillarized system, in which each religious and ideological segment of Dutch society in the first half of the twentieth century had its own schools, political parties, broadcasting organizations, newspapers, and hospitals. Pillarization gradually disappeared after the 1960s. Although the legacy of pillarization provided a basis for creating immigrant religious and cultural institutions, it had nothing whatsoever to do with multicultural integration policies. Instead of favoring the development of a new (Islamic) religious pillar, most politicians were decidedly reluctant to support such a development. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, as one of the most secularized countries in the world, the Netherlands has shown little inclination to accommodate new religious institutions. In fact, from the 1970s onward, local governments tried to prohibit immigrants from claiming their rights as Dutch citizens to set up Muslim schools.

To put it somewhat differently, the recognition of the right to self-organization among minorities in the Dutch institutional structure is quite different from the recognition of cultural rights of equal citizens with different cultural backgrounds, as is the case, for example, in Canada, with its official multicultural policies. It is confusing to call both policies multiculturalism. For the sake of clarity, it is better to call the policies and attitudes that prevailed in the Netherlands during the 1970s and 1980s tolerant monoculturalism: the native Dutch became a rather homogeneous and progressive, and self-congratulatory, monoculture in these years, but ethnic minorities were not forced to culturally assimilate into the Dutch mainstream.

We argue that since the 1990s, there has been a transition from a tolerant to an intolerant monoculturalism, in which the “culturalization of citizenship” has played a central role. As we will show, citizenship came to stand less for the formal rights and duties of members of a political community and more for the customs and tastes of a homogeneous cultural community. In the process, the Dutch progressive culture increasingly came to be seen as a product of a timeless consensus that needed protection from external influence, and as a quintessentially Dutch achievement to which immigrants must prove their loyalty.
Dutch Cultural Consensus

The majority population of the Netherlands has rapidly become more culturally homogeneous since the 1960s. Whereas in many countries, including the United States, opinions among the majority population are divided on issues of gender, family, and sexuality, almost the entire political spectrum of the Dutch majority population supports progressive values on these matters. After a period of intense cultural polarization during what is called the long sixties, the Dutch majority developed remarkably uniform, progressive ideals. More than anywhere else in Europe, members of the Dutch majority population believe that homosexuality is nothing out of the ordinary. Eighty percent of the Dutch believe that “gays in Europe should be allowed to marry,” and close to 70 percent of the Dutch population—once more, the highest percentage of all European countries—believe that “gay couples in Europe should be allowed to adopt children.” More than 70 percent of the Dutch disagree with conservative propositions that “women have to have children to be happy,” “that a child should respect its parents,” or that “we would be better off were we to return to a traditional way of life.” Finally, the Netherlands shows less of a value gap on these questions between more and less highly educated people. Indeed, the Netherlands is now among the three least culturally polarized European countries. In this respect, the Netherlands is similar to Denmark, which also has a clearly “enlightened” moral majority.

Politicians of various backgrounds use this progressive, liberal consensus to demand the acculturation of those who are assumed to fall outside of it. The cultural consensus among the Dutch goes hand in hand with a consensual dismissal of different sets of values. As Ian Buruma observes, “Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch progressives. It is easy to be tolerant of those who are much like us. . . . It is much harder to extend the same principle to the strangers in our midst, who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs.”

The growing consensus around progressive values has resulted in a bigger perceived value gap between the native majority and (Muslim) immigrants than is found in countries with less liberal majority cultures. As Peter van der Veer puts it, “For the Dutch, Muslims stand for theft of enjoyment. Their strict sexual morals remind the Dutch too much of what they have so recently left behind. . . . In a society where consumption and especially the public performance of sexual identity have become so important, the strict clothing habits of observant Muslims are an eyesore.”

In this context, the majority population of the Netherlands has come to define cultural differences as a growing problem.
The Culturalization and Emotionalization of Citizenship

This liberal consensus has fueled the culturalization of citizenship: a process in which norms and values and symbols and traditions (including religion) have come to play a pivotal role in defining what can be expected of a Dutch citizen. “The native culture” is seen as under threat, leading to the normative project of defining and protecting Dutch “traditional” cultural heritage (for instance, in the form of a national historical canon to be taught at all secondary schools and to newcomers in citizenship courses). “Culture” is often presented as the root cause of social problems among ethnic minority groups, particularly among Moroccans, whose so-called deviant culture is blamed for both causing nuisance in public spaces and high criminality rates.

Government policy has increasingly insisted that immigrants and their children totally adjust to “Dutch” culture, to “Dutch” norms and values, in order to avert the impending danger of insufficient social cohesion.\(^\text{19}\) A recent policy letter from the minister of integration explains this need to adapt to the Dutch national culture—not just to the nation’s laws but to unwritten notions as well:

> The fundamentals that shape social life in the Netherlands are historically formed and are points of reference, which many Dutch share and which are not to be lost. This is not only about the attainments and the principal values that form the foundation of the Dutch nation state, but also about points of reference that have evolved historically and culturally, like the Dutch language, certain monuments or architectural characteristics or the unwritten ways and codes of behaviour that have developed during the course of history.\(^\text{20}\)

Underlying this statement is a \textit{nativist} conception of citizenship, in which the original inhabitants own the place, the home, and the nation, because they were there first.\(^\text{21}\) This nativist conception is reflected in the constant and persistent use of \textit{autochthonous} to refer to natives, and \textit{allochthonous} in reference to non-Western immigrants (and their children and even their grandchildren). These are originally geological terms, meaning originating (or not originating) from the soil where it is found.\(^\text{22}\) To ask for adaptation by newcomers is thus justified by historical, indeed one might even say by primordial, ties to the Netherlands:

Integration is about integration into the Dutch society—a society formed by the labour, efforts, expectations and convictions of generations which preceded us, on whose fundamentals society will further develop. . . . Given all social changes and cultural developments, which undeniably occur, society
Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity

is founded on the fundamental continuity of values, opinions, institutions and habits, which form the guiding culture in Dutch society. . . . The Dutch society in all its diversity is the society in which those who settle in the Netherlands must learn to live, to which they must adapt, and which they have to become part of.23

In addition to the culturalization of citizenship, most of the elements that have ignited the debates over integration and cultural diversity in the Netherlands—and other western European countries—can be traced to the emotionalization of what it means to be a citizen. In debates over dual citizenship, spokespersons of various political parties emphasize that citizenship is more than a formality, as statements from two members of the Dutch parliament indicate. “To have Dutch nationality is more than having a Dutch passport. It is an expression of feeling at home in Dutch society, in her democratic legal order, her values, norms and mentality. You must, in other words, fully focus on Dutch society.”24 “People must feel connected to our society if they want to be naturalized, they have to feel at home in it. It is necessary to feel Dutch.”25

The process of culturalization underscores the emotional aspects of citizenship. Criteria for citizenship have evolved from formal and legal dimensions into also requiring deep sentiments. Citizens are subjected to new “feeling rules.”26 Belonging and feeling Dutch have become prime, perhaps even the prime, requirements for citizenship. Because feelings as such cannot easily be observed, certain actions become their symbolic stand-ins.27 For example, having dual nationality has come to represent lack of loyalty to Dutch culture in the eyes of a majority of Dutch politicians.28 Belonging to and identification with a nation are regarded as zero-sum attributes and singular in nature—the view is that a person can only identify with one country at a time—which is why loyalties to other countries and cultures are regarded as a threat to emotional attachment to the Netherlands.

Emotive citizenship stresses the need for loyalty to the nation-state and demands proof of such feelings from immigrants and their children. It includes the warning that immigrants who do not manage to feel at home should go “home,” that is, disappear altogether from their “country of arrival”—even when they were born and raised in the Netherlands.29 Jan Marijnissen, at the time the chairman of the left-wing Socialist Party, put it this way: “The Muslim community must understand that there is a collective responsibility to combat excesses such as political Islam. Educators, teachers and imams must choose for our Constitution and bring up children in its spirit. If one is not prepared to conform to our values and obey our laws, the pressing advice is: seek a country where you feel at home.”30

So, if immigrants want to stay in the Netherlands, they have to adapt to so-called Dutch norms, values, and emotions. As the anthropologist
Peter Geschiere notes, “The idea seems to be, indeed, that Dutch identity must ‘cannibalize’ other identities in order to turn immigrants into reliable citizens.”31

The assumed incompatibility between us and them not only fuels suspicions that immigrants do not really feel at home in the Netherlands; the corollary is the claim that the native Dutch feel less at home as well: they increasingly cannot imagine sharing their “home” with people who have such “alien” norms and values.32 Hence, on the basis of a certain conception of home—everybody shares and values the same norms, values, practices, habits—Muslim immigrants in particular are suspected of disloyalty, which only increases the unease of the native Dutch and Dutch political figures with Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and their offspring.

The Second Generation and Feelings of Belonging

Given the changes we have documented, including the emphasis on the loyalties of Muslim immigrants and their children, a crucial question is the extent to which members of the second generation, born and raised in the Netherlands, actually feel they belong in the society. To what extent do they meet the culturalist and emotive criteria we have discussed? Do the attitudes and sentiments of members of the second generation (especially the children of Muslim immigrants) reflect the assumptions of the dominant integration discourse about them, that they do not feel Dutch? The remainder of this chapter, therefore, empirically explores feelings of belonging among second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch.

Our focus is on those of Turkish and Moroccan descent, as these ethnic groups—being predominantly Muslim—are not only central to current integration debates, but are also the largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. First- and second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch make up roughly 4 percent of the 16.5 million Dutch population (393,000 and 363,000, respectively), with about half in the second generation.33 The percentages are much higher in the large cities. For example, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, first- and second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch make up over 14 percent of the population,34 and in some neighborhoods over 40 percent.35 The two other largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands are those from former Dutch colonies with Surinamese and Antillean background, respectively 347,000 and 144,000 persons, including the second generation. These four minority groups are the main targets of Dutch integration policies.

The first-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants arrived in the Netherlands as guest workers in the late 1960s and 1970s to work in lower-skilled jobs.36 Many came from rural areas and had extremely little
formal education. Later, their families followed them to the Netherlands. Everybody, including themselves, assumed that they would return to Morocco and Turkey. Hence, for long, they were oriented to their homelands, and Dutch policy was aimed at facilitating their return. Eventually, many stayed in the Netherlands.

Although most of the first generation remained in the lower socioeconomic strata, the educational position of the second generation is characterized by a large contrast between those who are advancing and those who lag behind. Since the 1990s, the share of second-generation youth with a Turkish and Moroccan background starting in higher education increased from 20 percent to more than 40 percent. Despite the steady increase, the average education level among the second generation is still much lower than among ethnic Dutch. The ethnic Dutch more often enroll in higher education (nearly 60 percent), finish quicker, and drop out less. Members of the second generation may have been born and raised in the Netherlands, yet at the same time they have been at the center of integration debates in which they are constantly and officially labeled as allochthonous (allochtonen). For lack of a suitable or practical alternative, when we refer to autochthonous citizens, we use—albeit reluctantly—the term native. By natives, we mean Dutch whose parents were born in the Netherlands, which unjustly excludes members of the second generation, who were also born in the Netherlands. We want to emphasize that this chapter is not about what kinds of identification, cultural norms, and behavior are desirable or should be adopted. We do not intend to reflect our personal opinions on the desirability or undesirability of immigrants and their children accepting particular norms or particular emotions. Rather, our goal is to evaluate empirically the criteria applied to immigrants and their offspring, as set by the culturalist, nativist integration discourse.

This discussion is based on data from four studies on young adult children of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands, most of them in the second, Dutch-born, generation. The studies are relatively recent and represent a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The first study is based on the data set of the international TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation) project. The Dutch component of this study consisted of a structured survey, conducted face to face in 2006 and 2007 with 1,500 Dutch young adults between eighteen and thirty-five years old in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, all born and raised in the Netherlands. The respondents were spread over three ethnic groups: second-generation Moroccan Dutch, second-generation Turkish Dutch (at least one parent was born in Morocco or Turkey), and a native control group (both parents were born in the Netherlands). The second study, by Han Entzinger and Edith Dourleijn, focuses on first- and second-generation young adult Turkish and Moroccan Dutch in Rotterdam. It is based on a structured survey conducted in 1999 with 962 respondents.
(eighteen to thirty years old) and repeated in 2006 with 647 respondents. The third study, conducted in 2007 and 2008, explores the identification and belonging of young adults (eighteen to thirty years old) in Amsterdam in four ethnic groups (Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, and Dutch), all born in the Netherlands. Inge van der Welle combined a structured survey of 1,132 respondents with semistructured in-depth interviews with fifty respondents. The fourth study is a qualitative study of the meaning that members of the second generation attach to integration. In 2008 and 2009, Jurriaan Omlo conducted semistructured interviews with twenty-seven respondents of Moroccan descent, ranging from nineteen to thirty years old and living in Amsterdam and The Hague. All were born in the Netherlands or arrived there at a very young age, and had middle to higher education levels.

### Relatively Weak Identification as Dutch

What do these studies tell us about the children of immigrants’ attachment to being Dutch? Do they, as nativists assume, express a relatively weak attachment to being Dutch—and if they do, why?

In line with the emotive integration discourse, the data do, in fact, show that second-generation respondents have weaker feelings of belonging than native respondents. When we look at the TIES data, we see that in answering the question “To what extent do you feel Dutch?” the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch feel Dutch to a much lesser extent than the native Dutch (see table 5.1).

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Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the TIES project.

Notes: 1 = not at all or very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = neither strong nor weak; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong.

Question posed: “To what extent do you feel Dutch?”
fully consistent. For example, whereas 55 percent of the Moroccan Dutch respondents in Van der Welle’s survey were “proud of the Netherlands,” 69 percent felt “connected with the Netherlands,” and 80 percent felt “at home in the Netherlands.” So, even though questions about feeling Dutch are generally used to ask about identification in a broad sense, they often only skim the surface and are not able to reveal the complex and fluid nature of identities and sense of belonging. Moreover, there is the issue of whether members of the second generation feel a sense of belonging to particular places or cities in the Netherlands—and whether this explains why most say they feel at home in the Netherlands but in some cases say they do not feel Dutch.

We still need to confront the issue of why the second-generation respondents in the TIES and Van der Welle studies expressed a lower emotional bond with the Netherlands than the native Dutch. One of the main suggestions in the Dutch integration discourse is that immigrants and their children feel less Dutch than natives because of a strong loyalty to their parents’ country of origin. Loyalty to the country of ancestry, in other words, is thought to be competing with loyalty to Dutch society. However, the studies indicate that few children of immigrants in the Netherlands have a very strong emotional bond with Turkey or Morocco. The bond with the Netherlands appears to be much stronger. This is particularly the case for the Moroccan Dutch. Moreover, feeling at home in the parents’ country of origin does not necessarily detract from feeling at home in the Netherlands. It is not, one can say, a zero-sum game. Among the second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Amsterdam youth in Van der Welle’s survey, 80 percent said they felt at home in the Netherlands and around two-thirds felt at home in Turkey and Morocco. Feeling at home in Morocco or Turkey may mean that they see Morocco or Turkey as holiday destinations. Indeed, visits to Morocco may actually make them feel more Dutch than before. As one Moroccan Dutch young adult said, “It [Morocco] actually is a country for holidays, not more. When you get there, you are Dutch. So you cannot say: Morocco, I like to go there because I feel at home there. Unfortunately.”

Another assumption of the nativist, culturalist, emotive discourse is that the second generation’s weaker sense of feeling Dutch (compared with the native Dutch) is because the Dutch progressive norms are foreign to them. The studies do not show this. Han Entzinger and Edith Dourleijn’s study reveals that despite a diminishing sociocultural gap between second-generation youth and native youth, identification as Dutch among the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch was roughly unaltered over the years. Entzinger and Dourleijn show that in terms of norms regarding
partner choice and “traditional” values such as respect for parents, obedience, courtesy, and conservatism, the second generation has become more progressive over time. Data in the integration report prepared for the Dutch government in 2009 also show that children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants had more progressive values in 2006 than in 1998, for example with regard to individualization, female emancipation, and secularization.\(^{52}\) In addition, their Dutch language skills had improved, they more often spoke the Dutch language, and the Moroccan Dutch showed increased interaction with the native Dutch. In short, being more like the Dutch is not the same as identifying or feeling more like them.

What emerges from many of the studies is the suggestion that the changed integration discourse has played a large role in hampering the second generation’s identification as Dutch.\(^{53}\) As Van der Welle notes, “Some of the young adults of foreign descent feel excluded from the ‘Dutch identity,’ because they are continuously labeled by others as allochtoon, as Muslim, as foreigner. For them it is difficult to claim this ‘feeling Dutch.’”\(^{54}\) Even though most respondents in her study emphasized that they were, without doubt, Dutch because they were born and raised in the Netherlands and spoke the language, feeling Dutch was a different matter. Indeed, Omlo observes among Moroccan Dutch respondents in his study that feeling Dutch was strongly related to identity ascription by others. All his respondents felt at home (somewhere) in the Netherlands and considered themselves Dutch, as they were born and raised there, and integrated in terms of language use, social participation, and cultural preferences.\(^ {55} \) But many stressed that they were not seen as Dutch by most people in the larger society. They experienced a disjunction between their self-identification as (at least partly) Dutch and external ascription as (solely) Moroccan by others. In the nativist discourse, in which these two ethnic-national dimensions are generally seen as mutually exclusive, external ascription as Moroccan implies not being Dutch. This all-or-nothing approach in the mainstream society has a strong impact on many in the second generation. It leads to frustration and may actually lead many to not present themselves as Dutch. Omlo’s and Van der Welle’s interviews clearly illustrate how, for many Moroccan Dutch, self-identification is, at least partly, the result of how others identify them:

They often ask me: do you feel more Dutch or more Moroccan? I always return the question and say: When you see me on the street, do you see a Moroccan or a Dutchman? Then the answer is most often: I see a Moroccan. I say: Because you see me as Moroccan, I start behaving like one, or at least feel like one.\(^ {56} \)

I never say I am Dutch. Simply because no one sees me as Dutch, because I wear a headscarf. I think that, when I take off my headscarf and my black hair is visible, still people won’t say: “Oh, you are Dutch”. So thinking about the way people see me, I don’t feel Dutch. . . . I feel accepted as I
am, but society does not see me as Dutch. I am not—I will be addressed as
allochtoon the rest of my life. I can’t stand this, I have to admit. I do have the
Dutch nationality, and don’t I speak Dutch well? Am I not born here, raised,
what do you want in addition?57

When I am abroad I say I am Dutch, because I am born here. . . . But when I
say I am Dutch in the Netherlands, they say: “How is that possible? You have
dark hair, a darker complexion.” They look at you like you are crazy. In the
Netherlands this is tricky. Then I say I am from Almelo, or that I am Moroccan.58

I very much regret that people emphasize that this is not true. . . . We are
more Dutch than Moroccan. You count in Dutch, you dream in Dutch, then
you simply are Dutch.59

Thus, even though many second-generation Moroccans do not have
strong connections with their parents’ country of origin, are relatively
integrated in many ways, and feel at home, at least somewhere in the
Netherlands, they do not feel that others recognize them as fully Dutch
and, as a result, feel they have no alternative but to identify with their
ethnicity. This is at least partly caused by the emotive and nativist inte-
gration discourse, which permeates everyday interactions and plays an
exclusionary role.

Local City Identification as
Mediating Identity

We have focused on feeling Dutch, but what about a sense of belonging
to local communities and cities in the Netherlands?

Among the second generation, the local city identification appears to
be stronger than identification as Dutch, as figure 5.1 shows.60 In contrast
to feelings of belonging to the nation, the TIES survey found little differ-
ence between the second-generation and native respondents in feelings
of belonging to Amsterdam or Rotterdam.61 Being born and raised in the
city of residence more strongly influences identification with the city than
having immigrant parents.62 It seems that the public discourse about inte-
gration has not had a strong impact on the second generation’s identifi-
cation with the city where they live. Interestingly, in many large Dutch
cities, including Amsterdam and Rotterdam, a larger share of the second
generation is actually native to (that is, born in) the city than native Dutch
residents.63

As the qualitative studies bring out, for most second-generation young
adults the city of residence is the main arena where they live their lives and
have their social encounters. This partly explains their identification with
the city and why they feel at home there.64 That family members often live
in the same city and that members of the second generation have been
raised there create a strong emotional bond to the city.65 Also, second-
generation young adults recognize themselves more in the population
composition of the city, characterized by diversity, than in the population composition of the Netherlands as a whole. Because they often have not traveled much outside the city and relatively few have lived for any significant time anywhere else in the Netherlands, the second generation’s identification with the national level is mostly shaped by the media and political discourse, which are perceived as predominantly exclusionary and polarizing.

In contrast to the Dutch identity, which has been formulated in public discourse in an exclusionary way in culturalist and nativist terms, the city identity is more open to ethnic and cultural diversity. Both Van der Welle’s and Omlo’s respondents explained that identifying as an Amsterdammer does not lead to feelings of exclusion, or conflicts with a sense of being partly Turkish or Moroccan. They stressed the diverse and tolerant character of Amsterdam, which makes it possible for people from different ethnic backgrounds to be seen as—and to feel like—an Amsterdammer. Marianne van Bochove, Katja Rušinović, and Godfried Engbersen come to a similar conclusion: “According to many respondents, people do not see them as ‘Dutch’, because they do not look Dutch. However, they have the feeling that no one can deny them their urban identity.” Here are some typical comments from Van der Welle’s and Omlo’s interviews:

Everybody can say: “I am Amsterdammer.” You don’t need to explain that you are an Amsterdammer. Whereas, when you say you are Dutch, you are questioned about your Moroccan descent.
But when you would ask me “Are you Amsterdammer,” I would say “Yes, definitely. Because Amsterdam has many cultures.” And Amsterdammer does stand for cultural diversity. And I am born here, that matters as well.\textsuperscript{71}

The label *Amsterdammer* does not imply an all-or-nothing choice between identities but allows a combination of different dimensions, including non-Dutch ethnic dimension.

Thus, although the bond and identification with the city can vary among cities, for the second generation in general, identification with the city is stronger than identification with the Dutch nation, partly because the local identity is seen as more inclusive and open to diversity.\textsuperscript{72} Apparently, the integration discourse, which defines in culturalist and nativist terms who belongs to Dutch society and who does not, primarily influences feelings of belonging on the national level and does not extend to the local level. For many in the second generation, the local city identity has become a “mediating” identity, which expresses belonging and can be combined more easily with other dimensions of their identity, such as being Turkish or Moroccan, than an identity as Dutch.

**Conclusion: Perverse, but Limited, Effects of the Integration Discourse**

We have shown that, in line with nativist assumptions, the second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch express weaker emotional attachments to the Netherlands than the native Dutch. This comparatively weak identification as Dutch, we have argued, is actually caused to a large extent by the very same culturalist and emotive integration discourse that warns against it.

The culturalist and emotive integration discourse—pressing for incorporation of migrants—thus has some counterproductive effects. In spite of the “feeling rules” that demand an expression of emotional attachment to Dutch society and culture, for many second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, the exclusionary discourse hampers their full identification as Dutch—even though many feel at home at least somewhere in the Netherlands and are adapting to “Dutch” culture. In-depth interviews show that for many members of the second generation, their identification with Dutch society is closely related to how others see them. The fact that they are labeled by others as Moroccans or Turkish and, therefore, as not-Dutch affects their self-identification. It makes them—even though they see themselves undeniably as Dutch—identify (often solely) as Moroccan or Turkish, which can be seen as a partly reactive identity. This is a strong feature of their self-identification, even if they are integrated in terms of a wide range of social and cultural patterns and lack strong connections with their parents’ country of origin. Thus, whereas the new integration
discourse demands that people feel part of the Dutch “home” and fully identify as Dutch, this has tended to have the opposite effect: it makes immigrants, and most importantly their Dutch-born children, identify less strongly as Dutch.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the negative effects of the integration discourse. Although, taken as a whole, members of the second generation do not feel as strongly Dutch as natives, this does not mean that they do not identify with the Dutch society at all. Many do feel Dutch very strongly. Furthermore, the second generation tends to have a strong identification with the city where they live. Indeed, second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch identify more strongly with their city than with the Netherlands as a whole. This is partly a result of functional and emotional bonds formed by living one’s life in the local environment of the city, but it is more than that. City identities in the Netherlands appear to be more open and inclusive than the national identity, and can be relatively easily combined with other identities such as being Turkish or Moroccan.

Another caveat is significant. Even though the integration discourse partly hampers the second generation’s identification as Dutch, it seems to have had only a limited impact on acculturation (regarded as integration by Dutch policymakers), as the sociocultural gap between the second generation and natives has decreased over the years. To be sure, we do not know how processes of acculturation would have developed without the culturalization of citizenship, but we can at least conclude that this change in discourse did not prevent a growing level of adaptation among the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch to the Dutch progressive, liberal consensus.

Nevertheless, as long as the closing of the sociocultural gap between the Turkish and Moroccan second generation and native Dutch is not acknowledged by mainstream society and by the Dutch media and politicians in particular, and does not become a visible part of public discourse, the dominant impression will persist that the distance between immigrants and their children and native Dutch society is static and unbridgeable. As we have seen, this has a paradoxical effect. Politicians speak of the goal of integration as they elaborate an emotive integration discourse but, in reality, this discourse has played a role in hindering the second generation’s full emotional attachment to a Dutch identity.

Why then, if this culturalist and emotive thinking turns out to have perverse effects and contributes to a widening instead of a closing of the sociocultural gap, do politicians and others persist in such thinking? The reason why some employ this culturalist and emotive discourse is precisely for its exclusivist effects. They have an essentialist notion of what is Dutch and argue that this needs to be protected from outsiders who are perceived as culturally different. Actually, they particularly rely on this presentation of newcomers, nonnatives, as inherently different, in order to define what is Dutch and what binds the Dutch. This mechanism
of defining an ethnic other in order to increase national belonging and cohesion among those who see themselves as the “real” natives, is also described by others.73 However, only a small minority of (populist) politicians seem to hold this position. We think that there is another reason for the persistence of the culturalist discourse—a rather simple one: many people are not aware of its perverse effect. As the turn from a relatively tolerant to an intolerant discourse has been strongly inspired by the presumption that it was particularly this tolerant attitude that hindered “successful” integration, they assume the opposite will work. The previous approach, labeled multiculturalism, is blamed for the presumed failings in integration, hence the resort to a more direct and less tolerant approach, with the best intentions. This is also what the mainstream now has come to demand of politicians: a less soft approach, which is supposed or at least hoped to be more effective.

Notes

6. Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2006, 15, 135
11. See also Hurenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2011a, 2011b, 2012.
22. See also Geschiere 2009.
25. Maxime Verhagen (CDA) in ibid., 3635.
33. CBS 2012.
35. In Amsterdam, in six of the ninety-six neighborhoods, 40 to 57 percent of the residents were first- or second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch. Onderzoek, Informatie en Statistiek. Available at: http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/779/ (accessed October 1, 2012).
37. Scholten 2011.
41. De Zwart 2012. In 2012, the Advisory Council for Social Developments (RMO) recommended abolishing the term allochthonous in governmental categorization and registration because there should no longer be a legitimization for this way of categorizing members of second generation. This advice was not followed. Tracking the integration of the second generations was regarded by the minister of social affairs and employment as crucial information to develop the right integration policies (Dutch Parliament 2013).
42. For more details on the study’s methodology, see the TIES website (http://www.tiesproject.eu) and Crul and Heering 2008.
43. Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008.
44. Van der Welle 2011.
45. Omlo 2011.
46. Question and possible answers in the Dutch TIES survey were as follows: To what extent do you feel Dutch? (In hoeverre voelt u zich Nederlander?). Answers: 0: not at all; 1: very weak; 2: weak; 3: not weak, not strong; 4: strong; 5: very strong (0: helemaal niet; 1: heel zwak; 2: zwak; 3: niet zwak, niet sterk; 4: sterk; 5: heel sterk).
References


WRR. 2007. *Identificatie met Nederland.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
These are difficult times to be British,” Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright maintain. Their assessment centers on how “the state which underpinned British identity is no longer the confident structure of earlier times.” They are not alone in coming to this view, and at least two implications follow from their observation. One is that the political unity of the administrative and bureaucratic components of the state is related to cultural features of British nationhood, including the ways in which people express feeling and being British. This is perhaps a familiar assessment of the configuration of all nation-states, though it could also imply that the state has been one—though not necessarily the most important—touchstone in the historical cultivation of British as a national identity.

A number of contemporary political developments that put into question the prevailing coherence of the British state—for example, devolution, European integration, globalization—might add to the kinds of issues informing Gamble and Wright’s view, and are perhaps most starkly illustrated by the promised 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. Of course, Britain has since its inception been a multinational state. It was constructed in a series of treaties and parliamentary acts between its constituent nations: England and Wales joining in 1536, Scotland in 1603 and 1707, Ireland in 1801 (formalizing a long-standing occupation), and Northern Ireland in 1921, 1922, and 1949. Britain thus has always contained a certain intrinsic tension that has had the potential to be productive as well as undermining. It should therefore come as no surprise to learn that “the empirical view of Britishness is open to objection,” for Britain’s “nested” nations have always retained and cultivated—rather than erased—distinguishing languages, churches, systems of law, jurisdiction over education and local governance, and
other features of civil society. To some extent, it is precisely these issues that are now reflected in forms of regional citizenship, and rearticulated in current debates on these nations’ territorial governance in a manner that goes beyond issues of constitutional devolution per se. Questions of national identity in Britain—such as who is British and what Britishness consists of—are therefore complicated by the fact that English and British have long been “(con)fused—[with] the coterminosity of flag, anthem, symbols compounding the confusion.” Although as yet “English nationalism is the dog that did not bark,” the same is not true for England’s Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish neighbors.

In each case, nationalist and regionalist parties have recently assumed power at the regional level, either outright or in a minority or coalition government.

The second implication in Gamble and Wright’s statement about the decline of British identity is at first less obvious but no less important. It concerns how current debates about Britishness are not restricted to national minorities but have also come to focus on ethnic minorities, namely migrant and post-immigrant minorities, frequently thought of as visible minorities. For example, one salient articulation of contemporary British national identity in governmental policy and discourse, frequently discussed in the press, is concerned with the promotion of common civic values, as well as English language competencies among ethnic minorities through a wider knowledge of—and self-identification with—British cultural, historical, and institutional heritages, as well as approved kinds of political engagement and activity. A sort of British civic national identity, as the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB) described, remains embedded in particular cultural values and traditions that involve not only an allegiance to the state, but also intuitive, emotional, symbolic allegiances to a historic nation, even while the idea of the nation is contested and reimagined.

Two Minorities or One Majority

Although this chapter is principally concerned with the place of Muslims in British nationhood, some elaboration of the ongoing debates about British nationhood is required to properly understand the place of Muslims within these debates. To be sure, Muslims have not created the wider debate. On the contrary, they have found themselves positioned between two impulses. One is a centrifugal multinationalism—such as Welsh devolution, Northern Ireland power sharing, or the prospect of Scottish independence—and the other centripetal—such as the civic integration of newer ethnic minorities. These need not pull in opposite directions, insofar as “Britain’s past and present immigrant minorities easily fit into this [common] framework.” By common framework,
we might think about a consensus that multiple identities are valuable and not in themselves a problem for identifying with Britain. As Bhikhu Parekh argues, “Just as it [Britain] has learned to respect the diversity of its four nations, it should respect the diversity of its immigrants.” This prospect has important conditions that can hinder or facilitate a meaningful settlement in which minorities feel that they belong and their status as British is not constantly challenged or questioned. Parekh continues:

The way a country treats its members plays a particularly important role. They are more likely to identify with the country if they are accepted as its full and legitimate members and treated with respect, enjoy equality with the rest, are free to express their other cherished identities, and have the opportunity to lead a minimally decent life. Conversely, they are unlikely to feel at home in the country and see it as theirs if their very presence is resented, if they are subjected to discriminatory treatment, mocked and ridiculed with impunity, or if they are required to sacrifice their other identities as a precondition of their membership or as proof of their commitment to the country.

Applying this observation to the question of where Muslims fit into contemporary debates about nationhood in Britain brings out that national identities usually reflect the culture of the majority. One normative option is to remake the nation (and national identities) in plural forms, something that needs to register what Michael Billig describes as the “banal” features of ordinary nationhood that may not commonly be understood to be inscribed with majority ethnic, cultural or racial features. It was this very assessment of British national identity that, at the turn into the twenty-first century, informed the CMEB, a nongovernmental inquiry created by an influential equality think-tank and charity, the Runnymede Trust. This inquiry characterized British national identity as potentially “based on generalisations [that] involve a selective and simplified account of a complex history” in which “many complicated strands are reduced to a simple tale of essential and enduring national unity.” Because they do not easily fit into a majoritarian account of national identity or cannot be reduced to or assimilated into a prescribed public culture, minority differences thus may be negatively conceived.

Britain has faced particular challenges in addressing issues of disadvantage tied to cultural difference experienced by a variety of ethnic and religious minorities. The most substantive response, developed cumulatively during the final quarter of the twentieth century and made up of a range of policies and discourses, is commonly known as multiculturalism. The multicultural response has sought to promote equality of access to opportunities and accommodate aspects of minority difference while promoting the social and moral benefits of ethnic minority-related
diversity in an inclusive sense of civic belonging. This has been neither a linear nor stable development, has frequently been subject to (often productive) criticism from a variety of camps, and has especially been under stress since the publication of the CMEB report. More than a decade since then, a period that has included civil disturbances, wars abroad, and terrorism at home, as well as the distinctively multicultural London 2012 Olympics, the core idea that Britain rejects the idea of integration—being based on a drive for unity through uncompromising cultural assimilation—remains as true as ever.

This is not to say that competing discourses and policies do not have significant traction, but the resilience and dynamism of Roy Jenkins’s famous 1966 definition of integration in Britain—as “not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”—is clearly evident to those who choose to look. That is not to deny this has been qualified. Hence the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 explicitly introduced a test, implemented in 2005, for those seeking British citizenship. Thus applicants should show “a sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic” and “a sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom.” Immigrants seeking to settle in the United Kingdom (applying for “indefinite leave to remain”) also have to pass the test, which latter stipulation has been effective since April 2007. If applicants do not have sufficient knowledge of English, they are encouraged to attend English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and citizenship classes. Despite important variations, emphasis and explicitness on national identities is thus renewed in countries that have not always prioritized it—such as Britain, Denmark, and increasingly Germany. This phenomenon is not simply a methodological artifact whose true meaning is obscured by methodological nationalism.

In contrast, postmigrant groups have been recognized as ethnic and racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to overcome distinctive barriers in their exercise of citizenship. This recognition includes how, under the remit of several race relations acts (RRAs), the state has sought to integrate minorities into the labor market and other key arenas of British society by promoting equal access. It is nearly forty years since the introduction of a third RRA in 1976 cemented a state sponsorship of race equality by consolidating earlier, weaker legislative instruments, those in 1965 and 1968. Alongside its broad remit spanning public and private institutions, recognizing indirect discrimination, and imposing a statutory public duty to promote good race relations, the 1976 RRA created the Commission for Racial Equality (later amalgamated into the Equality and Human Rights Commission) to assist individual complainants and monitor implementation of the act. Does this amount to multiculturalism? We argue that it does, though lacking any official
multicultural act or charter, in having rejected the idea of integration more than forty years ago.

“Framing” Muslims

According to the most recent census of England and Wales, around 2.7 million people (or 4.8 percent of the population) define themselves as Muslim—making Muslims the second largest religious group after Christians (33.2 million, or 59.3 percent). As the Office for National Statistics summarizes, the areas with the highest proportion of Muslims are in London, especially Tower Hamlets and Newham, respectively 34.5 percent and 32.0 percent, and Redbridge and Waltham Forest, both higher than 20 percent. Beyond London, areas more than 20 percent Muslim include Blackburn with Darwen in the northwest (27 percent), as well as Bradford in Yorkshire and the Humber, Luton in the east of England, Slough in the southeast, and Birmingham in the West Midlands. The precise cross-tabulations of ethnic composition are yet to be released, but it is anticipated that they will not show a radical departure from the configuration of ethnic proportions set out in the last census. In 2001, those of Pakistani origin made up 42.5 percent of the Muslim population; Bangladeshis, 16.8 percent; Indians, 8.5 percent; and most interestingly “other white,” 7.5 percent. This “other white” category includes those of Turkish, Arabic, and North African origin who did not define themselves as nonwhite; East European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo; and white Muslims from across Europe. Finally, 6.2 percent of the Muslim population identified as black African, 5.8 percent as other Asian, and 4.1 percent as British. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still understandable that Muslims in Britain are associated primarily with South Asia, especially given that they make up roughly 68 percent of the British Muslim population.

Although a small proportion of the total population of England and Wales, Muslims are the minority group whose national loyalty and integration has been of greatest concern. This may partly be due to anxieties following the attacks of 9/11 in New York and 7/7 in London, though fear throughout the West of Muslims and questions about their loyalty predate the war on terror. Muslim identities have thus become a staple feature of contemporary political discussion in Britain. It is the content of these familiar discussions, however, which some have argued “operates as the other half of a distorted dialogue,” that is of concern. Despite fears of British Muslims’ loyalty, available evidence suggests that most Muslims do identify with Britain and feel British. Using the 2005 Home Office Citizenship Survey, Anthony Heath and Jane Roberts show that 43 percent of Muslim respondents identify very strongly with Britain and
42 percent fairly strongly. These figures are corroborated by earlier survey data, and later surveys even suggest that British Muslims identify more strongly with Britain than the British public at large. Polling data from Max Wind-Cowie and Trevor Gregory support this further:

Our polling shows that 88 percent of Anglicans and Jews agreed that they were “proud to be a British citizen” alongside 84 percent of non-conformists and 83 percent of Muslims—compared with 79 percent for the population as a whole. . . . This optimism in British Muslims is significant as—combined with their high score for pride in British—it runs counter to a prevailing narrative about Muslim dissatisfaction with and in the UK. While it is true that there are significant challenges to integration for some in the British Muslim community—and justified concern at the levels of radicalism and extremism in some British Muslim communities—overall British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic and optimistic about Britain than are the white British community.

Despite this evidence, leading politicians often conceive of and portray Muslims as having difficulty feeling British and seeing their British identities as meaningful parts of their individual identities. Likewise, many leading journalists portray some Muslims as having difficulty “being British” and behaving as British people are “supposed” to behave. These portrayals have significant consequences. Politicians, the publicly funded education system, the media, and the arts help shape the broader public subjective sense of national identity issues. Similarly, journalists who write for national newspapers convey information about, as well as an image of, the nation that readers often internalize, thus influencing the way they think about their own and others’ identification with the nation. If senior politicians and journalists suggest that some Muslims have difficulty feeling and being British, it is unsurprising if Muslims are seen as outsiders by large sections of the public in Britain. The discourse about Muslims by important public figures, in short, contributes to and reinforces a sense among many in Britain that Muslims, or at least a good many Muslims, do not belong.

Feeling British

How do senior Labour and Conservative party politicians conceptualize and portray the ability of Muslims to feel British? We can begin to get a glimpse of their views through interviews conducted in 2007 and 2008 with six members of the Labour government—Labour was in power between 1997 and 2010—and four members of the shadow Conservative cabinet, as well as published reports of their speeches and comments. All the politicians interviewed had some responsibility for the policy area of community cohesion, which since its introduction in 2001 as a
government focus, has been intimately tied to issues relating to Muslims and Britishness.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, this policy area was initially created to help prevent disturbances like those in 2001 in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford, in which young Muslims participated, often provoked by the far-right British National Party. It also developed in response to reports on the disturbances that recommended a national debate on “the common elements of nationhood.”\textsuperscript{35} The reports seemed to suggest that Muslims who participated in the riots had difficulty seeing themselves as British, a view supported by the then home secretary, David Blunkett, who praised the reports for facing “head on” how “people in the Asian community help the second and third generation feel British.”\textsuperscript{36}

Certain junior ministers, such as Angela Eagle, responsible for community cohesion policies were sanguine about the ability of Muslims to feel British. Hence Eagle, when interviewed, said that “having a British identity isn’t inconsistent with being a British Pakistani.”\textsuperscript{37} Mike O’Brien, a minister of state for pension reform in 2007 and 2008 and for race equality from 1999 to 2001, said that “a lot of Muslims actually do” feel British and that they are unlikely to have difficulty doing so because “a person can feel dual identity, you can be British and you can feel Pakistani . . . that’s not a problem.”\textsuperscript{38} Fiona Mactaggart, MP, suggested that even Muslims who say they do not feel British may not really be rejecting their British identities: “If the British government has done something you think is wrong, like going to war with Iraq, then you can say I’m no longer British . . . that’s a way of rejecting their values . . . But I’m not sure how profound it is.”\textsuperscript{39} These Labour Party ministers contested the view that Muslims had difficulty feeling British, unlike their senior colleague and cabinet minister David Blunkett. To be sure, Blunkett claimed, “you can be first generation Pakistani and British.” But when asked which immigrant groups might have difficulty feeling British, he indicated that among some Pakistanis, “I think there’s a lip service to Britishness and the issue is if we get under the surface, do people really mean it, do they feel it?” He added, “You see, Pakistani covers a lot of different backgrounds, Pashtun and all the rest of it, and so it’s difficult and they don’t always agree with each other. So I always have to find out who the community leaders are [laughs]. . . . I think they would, I think all those groups would pay a lip service to being British.”\textsuperscript{40}

Unsure about whether many Pakistanis pay lip service to Britishness, Blunkett stated, “I don’t have any authentic statistics on it, I don’t have anything that is not just pure anecdote.”\textsuperscript{41} Indeed, Blunkett was the home secretary who set up the Home Office Citizenship Survey mentioned earlier, in which more than four-fifths of Muslim respondents claimed that they very strongly or fairly strongly belonged to Britain.\textsuperscript{42} In establishing the survey, Blunkett reflected the turn toward “evidence-based policy” and the prevailing “mood” in government in support of “management
Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity

by numbers.”43 It is thus difficult to understand why, despite requesting data relating to Muslims and despite a mood in government that favored using it, Blunkett relied on anecdotal information. One possible reason is his view that survey data on Muslim attitudes to feeling British reflect the “lip service” Blunkett believes some are willing to pay to Britishness.44

Blunkett also linked views about feeling British to social class. Some Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, he indicated, have difficulty feeling British because they are “at the very bottom of the economic ladder.” He saw a relationship between feeling British, integration, and being economically successful:

The Hindu community have managed not to be the focal point of bitterness and hatred . . . because there’s a very much larger middle class, and wherever you have a larger middle class . . . then integration, social cohesion go hand in hand. . . . And therefore the answer to your question is those areas of inward migration, where people have been struggling at the very bottom end of the economic ladder, that obviously means Bangladeshi and to some extent Pakistani communities, although that is changing.45

In a lecture delivered in 2003, Blunkett spoke of a growing number of young Muslims who believe they have to choose between identifying as Muslim or British. Other leading politicians have made similar claims. As Blunkett said, “There will always be those . . . encouraging their followers to define their faith and their identity in opposition to outsiders rather than in positive terms. . . . It is a worrying trend that young second generation British Muslims are more likely than their parents to feel they have to choose between feeling part of the UK and feeling part of their faith.”46 In a Fabian pamphlet written when Ruth Kelly was secretary of state for local government and communities and Liam Byrne was minister of state for immigration, Byrne and Kelly expressed similar concerns about Muslims’ identity: “There is a particular issue with a minority of second and third generation Muslims’ ability to feel British.”47

Like the views of many politicians, Blunkett’s were often inconsistent and contradictory. He noted in a 2001 newspaper interview that after September 11 he thought that

there was a real problem in trying to hook the Islamic community and do something about them feeling part of the country. . . . We needed to throw up a protective screen and we needed at the same time to hold out a hand to say, you know, you are part of us. . . . It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy, if you say to people . . . we think you are very different, we think that there is a problem here and . . . and we’re extremely concerned that you do something about it, then that re-enforces a feeling. Whereas if you embrace people, we’ve all done this in our own lives, if you embrace somebody who is giving you a hard time, then it’s much more difficult.48
One strategy for Blunkett was to embrace Muslims and help them “to feel part of our community.” At the same time, however, as we have indicated, he emphasized that many Muslims lack a strong British identity, and, in the interview in 2001, noted how some Muslims should avoid marrying people from their countries of origin and need to adhere to British norms. By Blunkett’s own admission, his approach was not only inconsistent with his and his government’s data sets and approach to using such data, but also with his ideas of how to make Muslims feel at home in Britain at a time when they felt threatened by the “atmosphere that . . . had been created by the attack in America.”

Similar contradictions are found among leading Conservative Party politicians. On the one hand are indications that they accept that Muslim values are now part of British society, as when William Hague, then Conservative Party leader, in the week after the 2001 disturbances in Oldham, pointed to “the way in which Muslim values are being built into the edifice of Modern Britain.” Sayeeda Warsi, as opposition spokeswoman on community cohesion, and after a trip to Sudan to aid the release of a British school teacher, made clear that being a Muslim does not conflict with British values: “I hope our mission to Sudan demonstrated to people in Britain, and in other Western countries, that you can be Muslim and hold firm to your country’s values and interests.”

Former community cohesion spokesman Paul Goodman distinguished, in an interview, between older Muslim immigrants and the younger generations: “The very oldest tranche of the people . . . I don’t get the sense that when they arrived they wanted to engage with the mainstream culture.” But in successive generations, he believed, are those “who plunge themselves into the mainstream.”

Other leading Conservatives conceived of and portrayed Muslims rather differently. When we asked the then shadow security minister Pauline Neville Jones, who in 2007 published a report on community cohesion, whether any particular “types of people” might have difficulty feeling British, she answered, “That’s a very good question, and a kind of important question, actually. What I’m about to say is not based on either work we’ve done or, or stuff I’ve read.” She went on to say that there could be “quite a lot of people who don’t feel particularly British” and that thus the focus should not be exclusively on Muslims. However, when asked whether some Muslims might have difficulty feeling British, she responded, “yep.” Elsewhere she has been quoted as saying that the challenge “is not how you try to indigenise Islam . . . which is important, but how you give British Muslims in this country the feeling that actually they are Brits, like any other British [sic].” Former community cohesion spokesman and later attorney general, Dominic Grieve, shared such views. He seemed unaware of studies concerning British identity while
saying, in our interview, that non-Muslims might have difficulty feeling British, and suggesting that Muslims might have trouble both being and feeling British and hold views that are out of sync with British norms and traditions:

If looked at bluntly, I keep on meeting very pleasant people, not just Muslims, sometimes from other religious groups but I have to say principally Muslims, who seem to me to have views, and I have listened carefully to what they’ve got to say, which are certainly incompatible with development in our national and historical tradition.

It is true there are only a tiny number of people who want to blow themselves up on the underground killing people for the sake of their view of what the world should be like. But equally it seems to me that whilst there are large numbers of Muslims living in Britain who have very little difficulty reconciling their religious views with the advantages of living in a pluralist democratic society, there are actually quite a large number of them who, whilst they might be quite grateful for the fact that they are living in a pluralist society rather than being persecuted somewhere else, actually want to live in a society that is very different.58

Thus, although “large numbers” of peaceful Muslims are glad to live in Britain and benefit from doing so, he says, they allegedly wish Britain to be a very different society and this prevents them from identifying with it. Interestingly, Neville Jones offered a more critical view of British society that might explain why Muslims are loathe to identify with it. She referred to “aspects of modern western British secular society [that] are particularly unattractive. The violence, the lawlessness, the drunkenness, the, um, the vulgarity, these are all things that no sane person would actually want to join.”59

Being British

Leading journalists also have made problematic links between Muslims and Britishness, but in a different way from the politicians we have discussed. The newspaper coverage following former home and foreign secretary Jack Straw’s controversial comments in 2006 about Muslim women who choose to wear the niqab (a full-face veil) is a case in point.60 In his weekly column in the Lancashire Telegraph, Straw explained the reasons why he asked Muslim women wearing the niqab to remove the veil when meeting him in his Blackburn constituency office.61 The removal of the face veil, he argued, enabled him to engage more effectively in a face-to-face dialogue. He was better able to “see what the other person means and not just hear what they say.” He described face veils as a “visible statement of separation and difference” that made “better, positive relations between the two communities more difficult.”62 He continued:
It was not the first time I had conducted an interview with someone in a full veil, but this particular encounter, though very polite and respectful on both sides, got me thinking. In part, this was because of the apparent incongruity between the signals which indicate common bonds—the entirely English accent, the couple’s education (wholly in the UK)—and the fact of the veil. Above all, it was because I felt uncomfortable about talking to someone “face-to-face” who I could not see.63

Much later, and as the 2010 general election neared, Straw apologized for the problems that his views caused Muslims, but in his memoirs he subtly changed positions again by noting how glad he was that he raised the issue.64 The notion that Muslims wearing the veil are antithetical to British traditions is implied in Straw’s claims that his views reflect in part “the concern of other white people.”65

Straw’s comments seemed to have encouraged and given legitimacy to journalists to portray some Muslims as unable to be British.66 Characteristic of much of the newspaper coverage, and from all impressions, the national popular reaction saw the issue of the niqab—which was universally agreed to be worn by only a tiny percentage of Muslim women—presented as a matter of national identity and minority-majority relations rather than a rather marginal issue of personal religious choice. Consider the most widely read middle-market national newspaper, the Daily Mail, a publication widely recognized for focusing its coverage on controversial matters of ethnic minority difference. The Daily Mail’s editorials frequently framed their discussion by juxtaposing British national identity with Muslim separatism (facilitated by multiculturalism). The following extract from such an editorial provides a good illustration of how Muslims and national identity were often cast as mutually exclusive in that newspaper:

This Government has actively promoted multiculturalism, encouraged Muslim “ghettoes” and set its face against greater integration. Anyone who dared to question this new apartheid was routinely denounced as a “racist.” Britishness? Who cares? For New Labour yes, including Mr Straw, it became an article of faith for the ethnic minorities to celebrate their own languages, culture and traditions, at the expense of shared values. There could hardly be a more effective recipe for division. Is it really surprising . . . if they [Muslims] see Mr Straw’s views on the veil as a juddering reversal of all that has gone before?67

Several important ideas intermingle in this passage, but clearly Britishness is portrayed as the opposite to a government-sponsored multiculturalism that encourages people to celebrate their differences. The latter has allegedly created a type of apartheid, especially among Muslims who were permitted, if not encouraged, to celebrate their
distinctive features under multiculturalism. Seen as a corollary of multi-
culturalism, Muslim difference is juxtaposed with, and seen as antitheti-
cal to, Britishness, which stands for shared values and integration. Like 
multiculturalism, then, Muslim difference is conceived as a competitor to 
Britishness, the latter also seen to be missing among Muslims—although 
a sense of Britishness is viewed as having the ability to rectify the prob-
lems that multiculturalism has allegedly fostered, including “Muslim 
ghettoes.”

Prominent columnists in the *Daily Mail* expressed similar views. For 
example, Alison Pearson articulated how she and other women feel a sense 
of ownership of Britain that is disturbed by women wearing the niqab:

> It’s not a nice sensation—to feel judged for wearing your own clothes in 
your own country. The truth is that females who cover their faces and bod-
ies make us uneasy. The veil is often downright intimidating. . . . I just don’t 
like seeing them on British streets. Nor do I want to see another newspaper 
provide, as it did this week, a cut-out-and-keep fashion guide to the dif-
ferent types of veil: “Here we see Mumtaz, or rather we don’t see Mumtaz 
because the poor kid is wearing a nosebag over her face, modelling the lat-
est female-inhibiting shrouds from the House of Taliban.”

More is at work here than national identity. There are clear intersec-
tions with gender and the discourse on female submission that under-
girds the contested nature of what veiling signifies. For Pearson, the 
“country” belongs to women who are willing not to cover their faces and 
who have a “liberal” conception of modest dress. Those who wear veils 
are in some sense aliens, even if they are also British citizens. Their stan-
dards of prescribed modesty are not simply regarded as extreme but as 
un-British, making other women uneasy and self-conscious in “their own 
country.” The “British streets,” as Pearson puts it, are no place for those 
wearing a garment from the “House of Taliban.”

Perhaps surprisingly, some journalists at the *Daily Telegraph*, a 
conservative-leaning newspaper, adopted a far more nuanced position 
with regards to the niqab. Charles Moore, columnist in and former editor 
of the newspaper, did not endorse the idea of the veil as a symbol of 
oppression. Indeed, he noted how discussions about it among Muslims in 
Britain can at times signify autonomy. Moore not only noted “a struggle 
for control of Islam in this country, and for its political exploitation,” but 
that wearing the niqab can simply be a form of rebellion among teenage 
girls against oppression they experience from their parents: “There is an 
attempt to ‘arabise’ Muslims from the Indian sub-continent, persuading 
them to wear clothes that are alien to their culture to show their religious 
zeal. . . . For a few Muslim girls in this country, wearing the veil is a form of 
oppression imposed by their families; for more, it is a form of teenage rebellion, of
showing more commitment than their parents—a religious version of wearing a hoodie."

Moore wrote that “many non-Muslims find these veils a little unsettling . . . not because they are an exotic import to these shores . . . but because they conceal the face.” Nonetheless, Moore noted that setting up British national traditions and wearing “the veil” as opposed to each other is “a hostile statement about the society in which the wearer lives,” and wrongly portrays Muslims who wear the niqab as being hostile to Britain and unwilling to behave like other British people.

But what about more difference-friendly newspapers like the Independent? The Independent has a reputation for balanced discussion and is less likely to cast British national identity and examples of Muslim difference as mutually exclusive. Indeed, one editorial, titled “Mr Straw has raised a valid issue, but reached the wrong conclusion,” maintained that “it [the niqab] is not the wearing of the headscarf. . . . Unlike in France, where the wearing of headscarves at school became a highly contentious political issue, the attitude to headscarves in Britain has been wisely liberal, which has kept the subject largely out of the political domain.” Another editorial went as far as to contrast what it characterized as negative contemporary press coverage of Muslims with that experienced by other groups in earlier periods: “The shaming aspect is that we are repeating our mistakes, in standing by while certain ethnic or religious minorities—in this case, Muslims—are demonised. Britain may be seen abroad as having managed the transition to a multicultural society more successfully than some, but as a nation we have not overcome the tendency to suspect, even fear, ‘the other.’”

Still, the Independent’s editorials and main stories are particularly striking when contrasted with the ways its leading columnists use national identity to condemn those who wear the niqab and sometimes also the hijab. This includes, most notably, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, one of only two or three Muslim columnists in the national press, who has portrayed wearers of the niqab not only as deliberately rejecting British, or at the least, Western society, but also as acting and dressing as aliens and abusing their freedoms by trying to make Britain more like Saudi Arabia: “When does this country decide that it does not want citizens using their freedoms to build a satellite Saudi Arabia here? . . . It [the niqab] rejects human commonalities and even the membership of society itself. . . . It is hard to be a Muslim today. And it becomes harder still when some choose deliberately to act and dress as aliens.”

The view that being Muslim and British can, at times, conflict is also nicely illustrated by the Sunday Telegraph columnist Patience Wheatcroft, who characterized the niqab as “a barrier that limits the creation of relationships. It unites those who nestle behind such garments and makes it harder for them to integrate. . . . It may be that there are many Muslims
who choose to wear the veil but also want to play a full role in British society. They should realise that they are making that more difficult because of the uniform they choose to wear.”

In sum, journalists working at newspapers that are traditionally thought to span the political spectrum are portraying some Muslims as having difficulty being British.

Conclusions

We have shown that some politicians are expounding the view that Muslims do not feel British, even though since the 1990s the relevant surveys suggest just the opposite; clearly a number of leading politicians conceive of and are promoting an inaccurate view about British Muslims. Also significant are the rationales for the politicians’ stated views. Blunkett’s reasons were economic. Although we certainly do not want to deny that poverty may cultivate a sense of exclusion, poverty is also experienced by certain white communities, but they are not typically thought to have difficulty feeling British. For several other leading politicians quoted here, some Muslims have difficulty feeling British because they want Britain to be a more Islamic land and they have difficulty leaving their own communities. These are empirical claims that have yet to be investigated, but given the high percentage of Muslims who feel British, these claims, even if true, can apply to only a very small percentage of Muslims.

An understanding of what it means to be British is also being projected by senior journalists, and it does not include all Muslims. Focus on the tiny number of Muslims wearing the niqab has been considerable, the Jack Straw incident acting as a lightening rod for hostility against Muslims. The incident was seized on as an opportunity to lambaste not just conservative Islam, especially in its gender relations aspect, but multiculturalism as well. A marginal issue of dress obsessed the nation and its media for more than a week in 2006. The outpouring of emotional repulsion was massive against the niqab as un-British in a way that threatened the acceptance of other Muslims not wearing the niqab but visibly devout in various ways.

This flood of negative feeling about the niqab in particular and Islam more generally, bursting through usual restraints about public discourse, illustrates an important feature of nationhood. For such exclusionary, affective power, no less than imaginative inclusivity, is a central feature of national belonging. Indeed, we noted earlier that the CMEB outlined how such exclusive understandings of the nation can be inaccurate, reflecting a selective reading of British history and a privileging of the majority that is difficult to justify. More inclusive understandings of what it means to be British that do not interpret Muslim difference as a barrier are available. Indeed two of the authors of this chapter have separately suggested
the need to accept them. Doing so would entail a willingness among journalists to accept a more inclusive form of Britishness, which would provide a “space for Muslims” within the nation. Certainly when the CMEB suggested recasting the national story, the media’s reaction was hostile. But, significantly, and despite questions about both attachment to and ability to be a part of Britain, the vast majority of Muslims still feel British. Although we are right to be alert to the dangers of self-fulfilling prophecies, what is clear is that even if others cannot envisage a conception of the nation that includes Muslims, many Muslims can.

Notes

2. Scholars typically begin a chronology of the contemporary British question by making reference to Tom Nairn’s 1977 book The Break-Up of Britain. Nairn of course was a Marxist critic who offered more of a challenge to the idea of the union than an analysis of its condition. For our purposes, the debate really commences in the early 1990s and is neatly summarized by the late Bernard Crick’s observation, from the middle of that decade, of how “for the first time anyone can remember in a people who have taken themselves so much for granted, have been widely envied for their psychological security, an anxious debate has broken out about national identity” (1995, 168). The difference between Great Britain and the United Kingdom can be confusing. Politically, Great Britain brings together the three home nations of England, Scotland, and Wales, as well as a number of islands off those coasts, including the Isle of Wight, Anglesey, the Isles of Scilly, the Hebrides, and the island groups of Orkney and Shetland. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, includes all of these as well as Northern Ireland. Territories that have further autonomy from both Great Britain and the United Kingdom include the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, which have distinct legislative and taxation systems. The derivation of the term Great Britain predates the British Empire, and is a consequence of distinguishing the British mainland from Lesser Britain, which approximates to modern Brittany in France.
4. Although a multinational British state (and indeed identity, albeit unevenly) came about through time, a formal category of British citizenship, as distinct from the imperial category civis Britannicus sum, did not emerge until the mid-twentieth century postwar decolonization. This multinational settlement, however, has always been asymmetrical to the extent it has not been evenly federal but instead unevenly devolved.
5. Moreover, other times have seen severe tensions threatening a unified Britain, for example, the period of winding down of empire in the postwar period, in which a series of wide-ranging questions on the future of the Union were raised (Aughey 2009).
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 34.
19. CMEB 2000, 2.9 16.
23. Ibid., 8.
24. Ibid.
27. Morely and Hussain 2011, 5.
30. Wind-Cowie and Gregory 2011, 39, 42.
33. These sections draw on previously published materials from Meer, Dwyer, and Modood 2010; Uberoi and Modood 2010; and Uberoi and Modood 2012.
34. Dwyer and Uberoi 2009; McGhee 2003, 377; Bright 2007, 11. Varun Uberoi conducted nine of these interviews and Tariq Modood one of them. Each interview was semistructured, lasted approximately an hour and, as the main text indicates, was with a Labour or Conservative politician who since 2001 had responsibility in government or opposition for community cohesion.
37. Angela Eagle, interview by the authors, October 15, 2007.
38. Mike O’Brien, interview by the authors, October 30, 2007.
39. Fiona Mactaggart, interview by the authors, October 16, 2007.
40. David Blunkett, interview by the authors, March 11, 2008.
41. Ibid.
42. Heath and Roberts 2008, 14.
44. David Blunkett, interview, March 11, 2008.
46. Blunkett 2003, 3 (emphasis added).
53. Sayeeda Warsi, interview by the authors.
54. Paul Goodman, interview by the authors.
55. Pauline Neville Jones, interview by the authors, October 17, 2007.
56. Ibid.
58. Dominic Grieve, interview by the authors, September 18, 2007 (emphasis added).
59. Neville Jones, interview by the authors, 2007.
60. The discussion of newspaper coverage draws on a systematic content analysis of the national press reaction to Straw’s comments, although here it purposefully limits the time-frame to a ten-day period in which the issue dominated the news agenda, from October 5 to October 15, 2006. A search of the LexisNexis database of national newspaper archives using the keywords Straw and Veil identified 497 items. These, using Atlas Ti, were coded in two stages: first, as newspaper editorials or leaders, news items or features, letters, and columnist opinion or comment; and, second, according to a coding schedule devised to tap keywords such as Britishness, cohesion, multiculturalism, and so on, before qualitatively tracing how the newspaper items invoked or made reference to accounts of national identity and citizenship. For a full methodological discussion, see Meer, Dwye, and Modood 2010, 91–92.
61. Straw 2006.
62. Throughout the article and subsequent interviews, Straw continually distinguished between the niqab and other types of Muslim coverings such as the hijab.
63. Straw 2006.
64. Straw 2012, 480, 484.
65. Ibid., 480.
68. Pearson 2006.
70. Moore 2006.
71. Ibid. (emphasis added).
72. Ibid.
74. Independent 2006a.
75. See Lewis 2006; Orr 2006; Smith 2006.
77. Wheatcroft 2006.
80. CMEB 2000.

References


Chapter 7

Constituting National Identity Through Transnationality: Categorizations of Inequalities in German Integration Debates

THOMAS FAIST AND CHRISTIAN ULBRICTH

Immigration and the social integration of migrants have raised the issue of group boundaries around national identity. Historically, states have used immigration policy as a tool in fostering a particular national identity, and integration policies and debates have served to answer the question of who we are. In contemporary public debates in Germany, as in other immigration countries in Europe and North America, the issue of national identity looms large, especially in drawing attention to the social integration of immigrants whose dispositions, principles, worldviews, and competences are allegedly at times incompatible with liberal-democratic values and norms. Public debates abound in Germany over such issues as the compatibility of Islam with democracy and with gender equality, the relationship between migrants’ cross-border ties and national loyalty in dual citizenship, and transnational political claims-making of migrants. These debates have been inextricably related to and discussed in terms of nonintegration, failed integration, or disintegration. This negative coding often refers to transnationality, that is, to cross-border transactions in the broadest sense. Typically, for example, for more than two decades, many politicians and writers have identified the three Ts—Turkish television received via satellite and cable, low telephone costs for international calls, and cheap cross-border travel via air flights—as contributing to disintegration and segregation. Implicitly, the claim seems to be that though the national is associated with integration, the transnational more often connotes disintegration. This distinction stems from the assumption, asserted in some academic and public debates, that society can be thought of as a whole or as a unit
in a nation-state. This assumption in turn has been criticized for espousing methodological nationalism, the conflation of the societal life and the national state.4

Transnational here refers to migrants’ cross-border ties, often to the countries of origin. In this analysis, however, we do not deal with transnationality as a continuum of social practices that researchers observe. Instead, we focus on transnationality as speakers portray it in public debates, involving not only politicians and representatives of interest groups, but also spokespersons for migrant groups. In this analysis, transnationality, as a marker of difference (heterogeneity), refers to two dimensions. In essence, we pursue the question of how national identity is constituted in public debates by referring to what could be called transnational. And what are the implications of emphasizing national identity and membership for issues of resources, status, privilege, and power?

The integration of immigrants in Germany and elsewhere in Europe has turned into a question of incorporating or rejecting creeds and principles. The associated processes have been ambiguous, as we observe changing boundaries but also new boundaries and the hardening of old boundaries. Here, the term boundary refers to specific patterns of relations and representation between groups located on one or the other side. Thus boundaries denote social relations, representations, perceptions, and evaluations.5 One manifestation of shifting boundaries is that entire groups are now perceived to belong to the whole of national society, or at least to be on their way. In contemporary Europe, this can be seen in efforts to incorporate organized Islam institutionally.6 In Germany, this dynamic mainly refers to those of Turkish origin, now about four million people, who have been seen as a problematic group in terms of various socioeconomic measures as well as their religion (Islam). Existing corporatist institutions regulating church-state relations in Germany have started only very recently to adapt to the realities of a very large and by now relatively long-settled Muslim population.

Corporatist institutions are those that mediate between state and private institutions and fulfill public functions, such as unions and employer associations, which in Germany are autonomous in determining wages and working conditions without state interference. In a similar way, the Christian churches and the Jewish community have the status of a “corporation of public law,” which enables them, for example, to serve on public mass media programming and control boards, give religious instruction in public schools, and have church taxes collected by the state.

Bodies such as the national Islam Conference have been established in which Muslim organizations have begun to function as agents who speak for their groups in the public addressing of religious issues, akin to employer associations and labor unions in labor-related issues.7 Human rights norms—namely, the human right to religious practice—have also
been used to rationalize steps toward organizational incorporation of Islam in Germany. An explicit transnational phenomenon involving shifting boundaries between a nonmigrant majority and a migrant minority is dual citizenship. Even though Germany officially rejects dual citizenship as a rule, a high percentage of new citizens there, indeed about 30 percent to almost 50 percent, are not asked to renounce their former citizenship on naturalizing. This situation is influenced not only by human rights considerations for those who would otherwise be stateless but also by gender equity concerns. Yet, exclusionary tendencies also harden boundaries, as evident in what in Europe has been called civic integrationism, which rejects multicultural accommodation. Other examples are bans on religious attire or outright exclusion, either at the border—through more stringent admissions policies such as those on family reunification—or from the fabric of civic life—through rigorous naturalization tests. The issue of terrorism has also kept the significance of cross-border ties alive in public debates.

At stake is what we call national identity, as presented and portrayed in public debates in media such as newspapers or television. It is in public debates that parts of these efforts at the social (re)constitution of national identity become visible. Discussions on brain drain and the integration of immigrants are poignant examples. In these debates, the modernization of the national economy and modernity of national society have been juxtaposed to religious tradition, fundamentalism, and backwardness. First is what is considered “good” transnationality in public debates, such as the mobility of highly qualified. One pattern of interpretation is the mobility of highly skilled professionals who increase national economic competitiveness. A successful “global hunt for talent” is thus part of modernizing the national economy and of national pride. Second is “bad” transnationality, such as the import of brides and bridegrooms from Turkey, which is held to lead to disintegration of Turkish immigrants. In this case, the cultural modernity of German society is juxtaposed to traditional and backward behavior of immigrants. National identity is tightly interwoven with a self-understanding of Germany as a modern and liberal European society.

A tension is unmistakable: on the one hand, transnational or cross-border ties have come to be seen as part of national identity; on the other, they are also a basis for exclusion. To better understand this tension, this analysis focuses on public discourse, examining public debates on the juxtaposition of national identity and migrants’ transnational ties in Germany since the 1990s. In using the phrase “constituting national identity”—that is, focusing on how the distinction between national integration and transnational disintegration is produced and reproduced in public debates—we emphasize that national identity is not a quasi-natural
phenomenon but instead one that needs to be socially reconstituted on a continual basis if it is to buttress and reinforce the solidarity that underpins national policies and politics.\(^{11}\)

Three questions are central. First, what is the role of migrants’ transnational ties in constructing national identity and integration debates in Germany—or, to put it another way, how do perceptions of and debates on transnational ties and attachments and national identity relate to each other? Second, what are the mechanisms in how transnationality is used to define views of the nation and national identity? Third, in what ways is cultural categorization instrumentalized politically, that is, as a frame which is connected to a wide range of social, economic, and political problems? The empirical examples we provide are meant to illustrate how transnationality as a marker of difference—referred to as heterogeneity—contributes both to national identity and to inequalities among migrants and between migrants and nonmigrants.\(^{12}\)

A brief discussion of heterogeneities and inequalities is helpful before considering the role of transnationality in defining national identity and integration. Transnationality is a marker of difference or heterogeneity that some (not all) migrants have. Transnationality is a continuum of cross-border transactions, ranging from low to high in various areas, such as sending financial remittances, exchanging goods, visiting relatives and friends, and engaging in the politics of another country and in other social practices.\(^{13}\) However, here we do not refer to this meaning but are instead interested in how participants in public debates use the term. We analyze how transnationality is used in making cultural and economic categorizations of groups. First, transnationality involves a cultural categorization and is assigned or attributed to persons, groups, or organizations. Cultural categorizations are significant given that the social integration of immigrants is deemed a simple matter of insertion into a modern society, whereas references to transnational ties and connections signal challenges to social integration or even disintegration. Second, transnationality can be involved in making economic categorizations, for example, as either good or bad for the national economy. In academic and public debates alike, transnationality is regarded as a desirable element of upward mobility for people with higher incomes and for the educated classes.\(^{14}\) Tellingly, in this context it is frequently called cosmopolitanism. However, those with lower social status are often considered to have barely any transnational ties, or—as in the case of migrants—transnationality is associated with undesirable downward mobility and coupled with the risk of social segregation and lack of integration.\(^{15}\) In this second meaning, transnationality is frequently thought to be associated with illiberal worldviews and traditional lifestyles.

Heterogeneities such as transnationality are not in themselves natural or self-evident categories that inevitably translate into inequalities. For
example, from a Marxist point of view, differences in resource endowments in labor markets and capitalist production translate, given inevitable exploitation of surplus, into class inequalities. Or take gender as heterogeneity. Gender assumes crucial importance in ranking and sorting workers, and—indirectly—in the division of labor in child care. In the production of inequalities based on gender as heterogeneity, various categorizations are at work, such as the attribution of allegedly innate abilities (motherly love) to women. Conceiving of transnationality as a heterogeneity allows us to link the concept to studies of inequality focused on the processes and, more concretely, the mechanisms that lead from perceived differences between groups to inequalities.

Tracing the production and maintenance of inequalities based on heterogeneities such as transnationality is at the core of this analysis. Changing views of migrants’ transnational ties in Germany can be clearly discerned in the shift from the early years of recruitment to the settlement of some migrants. In the early 1960s, when guest workers from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and later also Tunisia and ex-Yugoslavia started to arrive in Germany, the expectation was that they would return to their countries of origin. The majority (around eight million) did so over the years, but a significant number (about four million) remained in Germany. Of these, migrants from Turkey were the largest group. In the early period, transnational ties, embodied in the sense that migrants would eventually leave whence they had come, were seen as positive and thus an inherent part of the migration process. This view changed completely in later years, and public debates began to focus on immigrant integration. Transnational ties, for example, came to be seen as problematic signs of nonintegration in Germany. Interestingly, the issue did not arise in the context of several million so-called resettlers (ethnic Germans) from central and eastern Europe in the 1990s. In this case, most of the immigrants did not maintain cross-border ties because most arrived as complete families. However, circular and seasonal mobility between Poland and Germany has been substantial. Indeed, Polish migrants now constitute the second-largest immigrant group in Germany.

More recently, data from the General Survey in the Social Sciences (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften, ALLBUS) suggest that between 1996 and 2006 significant changes took place in boundaries between migrant groups (immigrants) and the majority group (German-Germans). In these ten years, the majority group has changed its perception of certain migrant groups—originally from Italy, Spain, and Greece—and now considers them as belonging to the majority. The national we now includes other citizens from European Union countries. However, no change, or even an increase in perceived dissimilarity, occurred with regard to other categories, including Muslims. Moreover, the percentage of the population agreeing that those born in the country
should be given the right to naturalize has increased. Legal reform has accompanied these changing perceptions. The new citizenship law in 2000 provided that children born to immigrant parents, one of whom has stayed in Germany for at least eight years, automatically receive German citizenship as well as that of their parents.

This analysis draws on an analysis of anthologies on public debates, parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag, and secondary literature. We concentrate on two realms of German integration debates. First are issues involving cultural categorizations, as in the debates on dual citizenship, and on social and religious life, with a particular focus on migration from Turkey. Second are economic categorizations in the debates on importing highly skilled professionals and on the brain drain of German scientists and professionals abroad.

Transnationality and Cultural Categorizations

What emerges from the analysis is that German debates on integration and the national we mutually reinforce each other: the way the national we is imagined is supported by tenets on integration, and reference to migrants’ transnational ties distinguishes integration from nonintegration. Some aspects of what is seen as transnational have been incorporated into conceptions of the nation, especially if these aspects conform to liberal principles, in contrast to fundamentalist religious beliefs (in this case, Muslim). Yet insofar as transnational ties stand for connections to foreign cultures and practices seen as problematic, they can function and be used as a distinguishing marker to categorize the other. This implies two elements. One is that German national identity is, from a point of view often communicated in public arenas, not clearly defined beyond very general ideas such as competence in the national languages and loyalty to the constitution. Also, in contrast to national identity, transnational ties and allegiances are often referred to in specific terms, such as cross-border, fundamentalist terrorism based on Islam. In this way, they can serve political purposes. Only certain immigrant groups, however, are categorized negatively in terms of transnational ties—and, as indicated, changes have taken place over time in that some groups once disparaged for their transnational allegiances are now perceived as part of the national we. Guest workers from Italy were considered the other in the 1960s, to be replaced gradually by migrants from Turkey and later Muslims. German citizens abroad (especially the highly educated, such as scientists) and highly skilled labor recruited to work in Germany are discussed not in terms of integration but in the frame of economic competitiveness.
In some areas of the public debates, the national is more clearly defined only because it is juxtaposed to the transnational. Whether it is or is not, however, transnational ties and attachments usually have been portrayed in these debates as a concrete danger or at the very least a problem associated with broader controversial political issues, such as the possible admission of Turkey to the European Union. Comments that emphasize the incompatibility of German and Turkish culture emphasize that the culture brought into Germany is the problem. One example is those of the social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler that “everywhere in Europe, Muslim minorities can not be assimilated and seclude themselves in their subculture. The Federal Republic has no problem of foreigners, but only a Turkish problem.”\textsuperscript{19} The former Bundesbank board member and Social Democratic Party member Thilo Sarrazin is one of the latest exponents of the view that the incompatibility of Turkish and German culture—and continued links that migrants maintain to Turkey—prevent integration: “I curse satellite receivers, without those we would be much further along with integration. . . . Learning German is up to 80% the task of the migrants. . . . But if I read Turkish newspapers only, watch Turkish TV only and meet Turkish friends only, I do not want to integrate.”\textsuperscript{20}

In a fashion typical of much of the immigrant integration debate, Sarrazin moves back and forth between speaking of Islam in a broad sense as inimical to German culture and migrants’ cross-border communication. The transnational ties of some categories of migrants are seen as leading to ethnic and religious segregation.

The ways in which transnational ties and, often at the same time, multiculturalism have been defined in German public debates are similar in that both are often said to lead to disastrous outcomes.\textsuperscript{21} A statement from a former minister of the interior of Bavaria is a typical conservative view on multiculturalism as a threat to national integration:

We must hand down a clear rejection of multicultural ideologies. With the concept “multicultural,” a link is usually made to the notion that different foreign cultures have equal rights alongside German culture and that . . . they will be recognized as a piece of our national culture. This approach amounts to the formation of an official “state of many peoples,” which neglects the concerns of the German majority populations in an unacceptable way. The consequences would ultimately be to relinquish the nation as a community of laws and common destiny, a loss of identity and the feeling of belonging together, . . . and the development of segregated “parallel societies.”\textsuperscript{22}

Ever since the 1990s, references to multiculturalism, much like those to cross-border transactions of former guest workers, have served as a foil for dystopian visions in public debates. In short, multiculturalism, like transnational ties, is often seen as undermining the demand for integration (Integrationsaufforderung).
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks of 9/11 and during the controversy over dual citizenship in the late 1990s, transnationality has become central to the definition of national integration. The events of September 11 led to reinforced demands for integration in Germany. As the political scientist Bassam Tibi noted in the weekly *Die Zeit*, “The terror attacks of September 11 proved in a concrete way that security issues are closely connected to immigration, given that the attacks were organized in the German Islamic Diaspora. . . . Nowadays, only the integration of Muslim migrants offers an effective way to counter religious extremism.”

Although 9/11 may not have been the primary cause of the demand for intensified efforts at integration of Turkish migrants, it certainly strengthened notions of the national *we* against the Muslim and transnational *other*. It is an interesting example of the way in which transnational phenomena, such as terrorism, add to the way the nation is itself is conceived. One such as terrorism can be used to legitimate nationalist exclusion. Coupled with the suspicion harbored against Muslims as loyal citizens has been the fear that they are manipulated from abroad, as exemplified in a statement by the executive officer of the Society for Endangered People, an international organization advocating the human rights of Kurds: “Turkish voters with dual citizenship are not ‘neutral’ voters who hold the future of the new homeland dear to their hearts. As long as they allow themselves to be manipulated so completely by the press in Turkey, they will remain ‘foreigners’, who are just exploiting the right to vote.”

The issue of dual citizenship aroused even greater emotional debate over integration of immigrants in the late 1990s. Ironically, although the Social Democratic-Green coalition, which came into power in 1998 and stayed until 2005, called for abolishing the requirement to renounce former citizenship when acquiring German citizenship, the reform finally enacted in 2000, which provided for birthright citizenship to the German-born children of immigrants, did not allow for dual citizenship for those with origins outside the European Union. Until 2014, Germany required the German-born children of non-EU immigrants to choose between German citizenship and that of their homeland when they became young adults. In 2000, a rather far-reaching (by European standards) jus soli found its way into the new citizenship law. Further, as-of-right naturalization can be obtained after only eight years rather than fifteen, as previously the case.

Dual citizenship has been discussed since the early 1990s in Germany only with respect to integration. Explicit transnational considerations did not enter into the debate even though a growing percentage of the population is born abroad or has parents who immigrated. Instead, politicians from all parties have viewed dual citizenship predominantly as a way of removing the emotional and social barriers to—and thus hurdles
for—naturalization. The goal has been migrant social integration into the national state. The difference in political positions is whether dual citizenship should be tolerated as a way to realize this goal or rejected. A statement by a member of the Bundestag succinctly summarizes the position of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), which have argued to reject dual citizenship: “Of course, one could entertain links into various countries for various reasons. However, viewed from a citizenship perspective, there should be membership and belonging to one and one country only.”

The debates on national identity that have been part of discussions on social integration have lacked a clear definition of what a German is. This point comes out in a debate that sought to clarify the demands placed on immigrants in Germany and emphasized a German Leitkultur, or guiding culture. The CDU politician Friedrich Merz instigated the debate in 2000 in the newspaper Die Welt. Other than references to the importance of allegiance to the German constitution and the law, there was no clear actual definition of the German guiding culture. Though rich in insinuations about Germany’s cultural heritage, Merz’s statements were rather vague: “The country must be tolerant and open; immigrants who want to live with us on a long-term basis must, for their part, be ready respect the rules of coexistence in Germany.” In speaking of a liberal German guiding culture, he referred to “the constitutional tradition of our Basic Law [that] is essential to our country’s culture of civil liberties” and that “German culture was shaped decisively after World War Two by the European idea . . . with a Europe of peace and freedom, based on democracy and a social market economy.” This idea of a guiding culture is also associated with upholding certain civil liberties and human rights: “Integral to our system of freedom is the position of woman in our society, which was achieved only after decades of struggle.”

The debate on Leitkultur can be seen as mainly of strategic use in party politics, implicitly comparing German culture with that of Islam, and thus seeking to appeal to many in the long-established German majority, but not naming Islam as a way to avoid alienating spokespersons for Muslim organizations, and thus many potential Muslim voters, and adhering to the new norms of mainstream German and indeed western European politics. Although the idea of German guiding culture is diffuse, its function is to claim the assimilatory capacity of German society and to maintain and reinforce national identity. In the world of German party politics, the rhetoric of the guiding culture of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) had the strategic goal of criticizing the ruling coalition of the more liberal Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party, which ruled from 1998 to 2005. The coalition government of the administration of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder propagated the reform of citizenship law and the green card initiative—a scheme to attract highly skilled
workers—to establish a distinct political profile that clearly dissociated the SPD–Green Party coalition from the former Christian Democrats–Liberal coalition of Helmut Kohl. Both the idea of a guiding culture and the campaign against tolerance toward dual citizenship articulated the vision of national identity based on a common culture—no longer on German ethnic origins. Legal and policy changes in recent years, such as the citizenship reform in 2000, indicate a gradual yet grudging acceptance of the fact that Germany has become a country of immigration. Although the reform of citizenship law (and the introduction of birthright citizenship) indicates that an ethnic concept has given way to a republican concept of nationhood, conservative political elites have used the idea of a guiding culture to implicitly refer to common ethnic markers without declaring this openly.

Transnationality and Economic Categorizations

Another way that transnationality has been classified in Germany, for both migrants and nonmigrants, is in terms of whether it is good or bad, or desirable or nondesirable—what we call nominal categorizations. Nominal categorizations refer to particular subsets of immigrants or nonimmigrants whose cross-border social practices and demands are deemed to be either incompatible with or desirable for liberal politics. Here, the connection between transnationality, national identity, and social inequality seems to be characterized by a dualism. On the one hand, for people with relatively high incomes and degrees from tertiary educational institutions, geographic mobility, and transnational networks are often regarded in public and academic debates as a social asset, an element of upward social mobility. On the other hand, those of lower social status are considered to have hardly any transnational ties; or, if they do, transnationality among them is linked with downward mobility and lack of integration. Migrant groups with few material resources, and little cultural and social bridging capital beyond immigrant enclaves, are thought to derive no benefit from cross-border ties. Instead, transnational practices are seen as reflecting and reinforcing ethnic segregation.

When it comes to debates about the so-called highly qualified from abroad who Germany wants to attract, and highly qualified German citizens who work abroad as professionals and scientists, the absence of talk about integration is striking. Instead, the core of debate is whether they have positive or negative effects for Germany’s economic competitiveness, that is, whether they represent a brain gain or brain drain. Categorizations in terms of economic utility seem to be reserved for highly skilled immigrants and German citizens who are emigrants, whereas low-status immigrants
have been categorized in terms of culture. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder launched a green card initiative in 2001 to attract highly qualified personnel to Germany’s labor markets, reasoning that

if we do not want to lose the competition for the best minds, we need an objective and informed debate on a labor market-oriented immigration. . . . Given the demographic trends, we should try early on to gain in the long run a sufficient number of skilled workers for our economy. There is a fierce international competition for these professionals. With the Green Card initiative, we have given a powerful impulse to the issue of immigration. . . . With this contribution to rapid alleviation of skill shortages in the IT sector, we shall provide additional jobs for the people in this country. Because statistically, each Green Card Expert has created on average two and a half additional jobs.30

Germany as a competition state is concerned not only about gaining brains from abroad but also about the emigration of its own highly qualified citizen-workers.31 Whereas the term brain drain in the 1970s denoted the exodus of highly skilled labor from so-called developing to economically developed countries, it has now entered the discussions of OECD (Organisation for Economics Co-operation and Development) countries with regard to its geographically mobile citizens. Discussion was sparked in 2006, when emigration from Germany reached the highest level since 1954, that is, more people left Germany than entered.32 The number of German citizens moving abroad was in the middle range relative to other OECD countries. Nonetheless, in public debates Germany turned from being a reluctant country of immigration directly into being a country of emigration, evidenced by mass media, such as TV soap operas titled Umzug in ein neues Leben (Moving into a New Life) or Goodbye Deutschland: die Auswanderer (Goodbye Germany: The Emigrants). On October 26, 2006, The Economist even forecast that Germans abroad will be tomorrow’s new guest workers. The accompanying public debates singled out particular professions, especially scientists. In these commentaries, Germany’s Nobel prize winners had only one option to escape Germany’s restrictive and stifling regulation of scientific work—move to the United States. This scenario tied in neatly with the concern about the flight of the creative class and Germany’s losing its best and brightest.33

Considerations of inequality have entered into debates regarding the German-born children of former Turkish guest workers who have moved to Turkey—a case at the intersection of labor migration and the mobility of the so-called highly qualified. Some relatively highly skilled children of Turkish migrants have taken up work in economic powerhouses in Turkish cities such as İstanbul and İzmir. Somewhat provocatively, such movements have been called second-generation return.34 Public
discussion of this phenomenon tends to refer to discrimination encountered by the second generation in Germany and to failed integration, finding fault with the majority population, that has led the young people to move to Turkey. Some academic researchers, in particular, have blamed discriminatory practices in Germany but have not looked at another and much more plausible explanation, namely, increasing opportunities for young professionals in Turkey.\textsuperscript{35}

**Mechanisms Underlying Categorizations**

To draw boundaries between national integration and the potential disintegrating effects of transnational ties, the underlying social mechanisms first need to be more closely examined. An analysis shows how inequalities are generated, reinforced, and reproduced by transnationality, constantly interacting with other heterogeneities, such as religion, ethnicity, gender, and legal status. The response of those categorized as transnational is also important.

The three most prevalent discursive mechanisms are symbolic exclusion, culturalist ranking, and generalization (homogenization), all of which play a role in creating or buttressing inequalities and hierarchies.

Symbolic exclusion works primarily through devaluing certain cultural beliefs and practices associated with migrants—and valorizing those associated with long-established Germans. It pertains, for example, to the question of whether Islam is a part of German culture. Former federal president Christian Wulff initiated a debate in 2010 when he claimed that “but Islam nowadays also belongs to Germany” (aber der Islam gehört inzwischen auch zu Deutschland). Critics immediately conceded the point but emphasized that Germany is steeped in the Christian-Jewish tradition. The prime minister of Hesse, Volker Bouffier, argued that Christendom and Islam are fundamentally incompatible as long as no liberalized, European Islam exists. Another example is the debate on dual citizenship mentioned earlier.

The overwhelming majority of voices in public debates since the 1990s have not considered transnational ties of actual and future citizens as an integral part of citizenship, which should in their view be a purely national (that is, German) matter. In other words, cross-border transactions in themselves are not relevant for citizenship. Any individual’s country of origin needs to be tolerated if the threshold for citizenship acquisition is to be lowered.

Public debates also rank cultures as integral to the process of distinguishing various categories of transnational migrants and mobile individuals. As mentioned, transnationality is considered desirable for the highly skilled, moving into or out of Germany, aliens or citizens, but for
labor migrants in Germany from abroad, transnationality is a first step toward exclusion and segregation. With respect to the former, transnationality is discussed solely as a prerequisite for increasing economic competitiveness of the national economy.\textsuperscript{36} The devaluation of labor migrants, especially those of Muslim origin, is legitimized by their alleged sociocultural backwardness and the danger of segregation and failure to integrate. In this perspective, transnationality simply is another word for what is viewed as an undesirable parallel society. Symbolic exclusion, we thus suggest, is a typical example of cultural categorizations of transnationality.

The mechanisms of symbolic exclusion and cultural ranking intersect with a third—generalization. Generalization is evident, for example, in the debate over the proposed guidelines for naturalization in Baden-Württemberg, in which a new civics test was put forward though finally not adopted, which became known as the Muslim test.\textsuperscript{37} In this proposal, the Muslim category appeared as a relatively coherent community. In some debates, this generalization is connected with devaluation and exclusion. What is interesting is that governmental efforts usually have not been intended to devalue Muslim applicants for German citizenship, but rather to differentiate between the wheat and the chaff, distinguishing between secular Muslims and problematic cases. One justification for the proposed stricter citizenship tests was that extremists should not be naturalized. Government spokespersons thus connected national integration policy and the fight against terrorism and political-religious extremism semantically. The war against terrorism did not only seek to identify those who committed terrorist acts, but also, through integration policy, to prevent those ready to engage in violence from becoming citizens. To make such distinctions, civics knowledge and mastery of the national language were viewed as desirable. More general concerns focused on values, norms, and practices associated with Muslim groups. In the proposed naturalization test in Baden-Württemberg, for example, parents would have been asked how they would react if their daughter wanted to dress like other (German) girls and women, or if a son or brother was insulted; if a man married several women; and if they would use force to marry off their daughter. The panoply of questions covered practically all publicly debated issues such as gender relations, the headscarf, homosexuality, honor killings, forced marriage, terrorism, and freedom of religion. The answers were meant to give a comprehensive picture of the applicant’s inner disposition. Eventually, the German federal government decided on a much milder standard test that refrained from examining the internal disposition and ethos of applicants, as the Baden-Württemberg proposal suggested should be done. This was a sign that civic integrationism in Germany might indeed not be so aggressive but could conform to liberal standards. Nonetheless, the public debate around the test showed that generalizations—in this case,
stereotypes about Islam—so constantly used in the media were an important way to categorize certain migrant-origin groups.

Various strategies have been used by those claiming to speak for the symbolically excluded and those whose symbolic resources are devalued. One such strategy is symbolic inclusion. A speech given by Turkish prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan in the Köln Arena in 2008 is a particularly potent example.38 Significantly, Erdoğan did not mention the term integration, commonly used in Germany, but pronounced “assimilation as a crime against humanity.”39 Although he encouraged Turks in Germany to participate actively in German life and to not consider themselves victims of discrimination, he praised the achievements of his government in Turkey and encouraged Turks in Germany to continue to feel that they belonged and remain attached to Turkey—a strategy aptly called long-distance nationalism.40 Similar views have been evident in many speeches and statements by Turkish politicians of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government over the past decade, as in a recent statement by Turkish minister of economics Zafer Çağlayan: “You should never assimilate and you should never forget your language and religion. Yet you should naturalize and become citizens in the countries in which you live. You should enter the economic and political streams, ask critical questions and exercise the right to vote. If you do so, you will be a formidable power which cannot be ignored.”41

Another strategy of politicians speaking for the excluded is reactive reframing, which is evident in statements by several umbrella associations of Turkish immigrants, mostly in response to debates aggressively emphasizing the need for social integration. Whereas the associations frequently referred to transnational ties until the mid-1990s, since then, they have dealt with transnational issues in ambiguous ways and tended to put more emphasis on integration, partly in response to civic integrationist pressures.42 For example, the Turkish Community Berlin (Türkische Gemeinde Berlin, or TGB), which before the mid-1990s was more concerned with, and took positions on, political events and developments in Turkey since the mid-1990s, has been focused on integration in Germany and avoids issues concerning politics in Turkey. An analysis of reports in four major nationwide newspapers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, and Die Tageszeitung) between 1995 and 2004 indicates the five major topics noted in articles on Turkish migrant associations (number of articles in parentheses): citizenship (N = 241), Islam (N = 203), integration (N = 200), exclusion and racism (N = 129), accession of Turkey to the European Union (N = 72), and other (N = 66).43 Despite the shift in focus, which could be described as a reactive reframing, the leaders and members of most Turkish migrant associations generally see national and transnational issues and orientations as deeply intertwined. Although such associations were minor players in German
debates on dual citizenship, they sought a greater role and argued that political and social inclusion through naturalization depended on greater tolerance of dual citizenship.44

The Symbolic Politics of Doing National Identity and Integration

What about the political context in which terms used in debates about national identity, integration, and transnational ties operate? How does the cultural categorization enter into political debates, and what are the consequences for inequalities?

Public debates involve struggles over interpretations of symbolic boundaries. The ways that integration and disintegration and, relatedly, national and transnational allegiances and identities have been classified, defined, and described do not simply describe social reality but also help create perceptions of that reality. If these categorizations are used in policymaking, they are directly linked to political structures and decision-making.45

Integration and—implicitly—transnationality are meta-issues that abound in symbolic politics in Germany.46 All kinds of issues, such as unemployment and cutbacks in the welfare state or terrorism, have at various periods been tagged onto migration and integration. Their symbolic use in politics has helped establish migration as a meta-issue. In the 1980s, migration allegedly accounted for the deleterious effects of economic crisis and policy failures.47 In the 1990s and 2000s, transnationality in the sense of continued attachments across borders, such as importing marriage partners from Turkey to Germany, came to be seen as an impediment to social integration. Overall, migration, integration, and transnational ties have come to be associated with social inequalities and various social problems.

The opportunities to use symbolic politics and migration in relation to national identity have increased over the past few years, and not only in Germany. Economic austerity has severely affected the capacity of nation-states to mediate between the rights of citizens on the one hand and the requirements of capital accumulation on the other. Governments in all the wealthy nations face stronger resistance to tax increases, particularly in highly indebted countries where infusions of public money will be needed for many years to pay for goods that have long been consumed. Although and perhaps because it has become increasingly difficult to pretend that the tensions between capitalism and democracy can be handled within the boundaries of national political communities, symbolic politics sometimes is a convenient escape. For transnational ties and attachments to be effective symbolically—a crucial requisite for politicization—they need
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to appear as a concrete danger to social integration of the nation, albeit a
diffuse one. Thus politicians use issues such as transnational allegiances
to demonstrate that they can deal with cross-border matters and global-
ization. The symbolic politics of national identity and integration are also
a way to renew national identity. Leitkultur is a prime example. Given
symbolic exclusion of immigrants, the native population can be imagined
and addressed as a group, which then can be conceived as the subject
of political decisions. As classical studies of nationalism have shown,
“national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locat-
ing . . . divided and disoriented individuals who have had to content
with the vast changes and uncertainties of the modern world.” 48 Over
the past three decades, conservative politicians in Germany have used
this approach more often than liberal and democratic socialist ones. The
latter have usually insisted that national citizenship is a basis for claiming
rights. Conservative politicians, on the other hand, have emphasized that
citizenship should be granted only after newcomers have successfully
integrated into the national community.

The particular issues related to transnational connections vary from
country to country. In Germany and the Netherlands, for example, dual
citizenship was at the center of symbolic politics in the 1990s—and dual
citizens were portrayed by the critics of multiple citizenship as reaping
undue advantages, such as the right to vote twice. More recently, cross-
border ties of terrorists have figured prominently in public debates.

Interestingly, the same types of arguments used to distinguish national-
liberal-modern from transnational-illiberal-traditional are used by those
symbolically excluded to claim inclusion. For example, in Germany and
elsewhere in western Europe, representatives of Muslim organizations
have appealed to the discourse on human rights to demand the freedom
to practice their religion and for institutional integration on the same
footing as established religious communities.

Conclusion: The Limits of Using Transnationality

The analysis of German integration debates reveals how binaries of
national-transnational and the nominal categorizations of transnational-
ity are particular expressions of the relations between national identity
and the other. The representation of German national identity is supported
by tenets on integration, and the reference to the transnational helps dis-
tinguish integration from nonintegration or disintegration. Mechanisms
such as symbolic exclusion, culturalist ranking, and generalization do not
apply to all immigrant groups or at all times, however. Some groups over
time may come to be perceived as part of us, an effort directed at equal-
ization. Moreover, Germans abroad (the highly skilled, such as scientists)
and highly skilled labor who are highly sought after to contribute to the German labor market are discussed in terms not of integration but instead of economic competitiveness.

Our argument is that it is useful to conceive of transnationality as a heterogeneity in public debates on inequalities and national identities. The social mechanisms by which this is achieved, for example, symbolic exclusion and culturalist ranking, function as distancing mechanisms which serve to produce and maintain hierarchies. At the same time, efforts at inclusion by those of migrant-origin affected by discursive exclusion constitute countermechanisms. Yet the dominant debates on national identity and integration in Germany have not incorporated the voices of the excluded. Such discursive inequalities are reinforced by how the categories are used in political debates and campaigns. The use of migration, integration, and transnational ties in symbolic politics helps shape how those of migrant origin are seen—and indeed how they see themselves.

What role transnational ties will continue to play in how national identities and allegiances are presented in public debates in Germany remains to be seen. The juxtaposition of national versus transnational may become problematic as a cultural categorization to the extent that value generalization, a concept Talcott Parsons puts forward, is advancing. According to Parsons, the more a society becomes differentiated, the more its values become abstract in order to legitimate its different functions, segments, and subcultures. The higher degrees of differentiation within modern societies result in problems of systems and social integration, which usually are addressed by including new entities, structures, and mechanisms within the normative frame of society. As we have indicated, public debates in Germany over the past twenty years have been replete with multiple references to appeals to a liberal (political, social, economic) order, with the frequent invocation of human rights being just one example. Parsons goes so far as to argue that “when the network of socially structured situations becomes more complex, the value pattern itself must be couched at a higher level of generality in order to ensure social stability.”

We are not sure whether Parson’s observation holds empirically true. Nonetheless, the political instrumentalization of transnational ties will likely keep changing. After all, much of what used to be discursively conceived of or portrayed as transnational or common to all Western countries—including liberal convictions and an adherence to human rights or republican understandings of nationality—is (now) increasingly part of national self-understanding. In addition, if national politicians rely on and enforce liberal norms to construct a liberal national identity, it is highly likely that they can demand loyalty from the inside populace and support from the outside as well. Liberal norms act as a powerful resource for a legitimate justification of political action in Western democracies.
Moreover, other factors are also at work, as a second and third generation is coming of age and entering the broad economic and political arenas in Germany. As economic transnational ties of the children of immigrants take forms different from those of their parents—examples included circular occupational mobility between Germany and the parents’ country of origin—so will the frames used to debate such issues change. Also, cultural practices are less tied to the countries of origin in religion, at least on an organizational level. In the process, Germany has entered a process of redefining herself to include certain types of Islam and to tolerate cross-border loyalties. In a diverse multicultural society, the other can no longer just be the migrant or foreigner. The boundaries of national identity are thus being reformed, lines increasingly drawn between bad and good foreigners and good and bad forms of transnationality.

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Notes

2. Adherence to liberal norms is in no way the only exclusionary criterion. Yet in a country like Germany, statements that openly define categories in terms of race are rare because of the racist past of the Nazi regime.
3. For example, Scholl-Latour 1999, 268.
12. Blau 1977. Two research projects in the Collaborative Research Center “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities” (CRC 882) deal with transnationality understood as a continuum of cross-border ties. Both projects mainly deal with social structural analysis and not, like this chapter, with the analysis of public discourse. The project “Transnationality and the Unequal Distribution of Social Protection” analyzes the nominal categorizations in Turkish-German, Polish-German and Kazakh-German social spaces. The project “Pilot Study: Longitudinal Panel” uses mixed methods, quantitative and qualitative, to design a longitudinal study of German-Turkish households to investigate

17. The public debates are based mainly on Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007.
18. A third main debate, citizenship discourse on social rights, social security in particular, cannot be dealt with here for reasons of space; see Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004, chapter 3, showing these three topical issues as the main arenas of public debate in major German newspapers from 1996 until 1999.
21. In academic discourse, the two are very different: multiculturalism is mainly concerned with social integration within the national state, without explicit consideration of cross-border transactions, whereas transnationalization as an analytical perspective takes into account the latter, leaving open the unit to which integration refers—immigration or emigration national states, migrant groups, localities, and so on.
25. Peter Huber, then minister of interior of Thuringia, in Deutscher Bundestags 2010, 2232B.
26. Merz, cited in Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 313. Similar statements are common in public debates. In the words of the Bavarian minister of the interior at the time (1999), “real integration demands, first of all, major accomplishments from individuals. The acquisition of the German language is a first crucial step. In addition, foreign fellow citizens must devote themselves to our state and its societal and constitutional order and value systems with no ifs, ands, or buts. Respecting our political, social, and cultural conditions is essential” (Günter Beckstein, cited in Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 303).
27. See also Siebt, cited in Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 314.
28. For an empirical analysis of this claim in the German context, see Ette and Sauer 2010.
32. A typical statement in parliament (Bundestag) raising the issue of brain drain: “We need the best brains. Yet the problem is: These brains are thinking too often in other places in this world. It is simply a fact that the country of poets and thinkers is losing its thinkers. The data although incomplete, show this:
In 2005 about 150,000 Germans emigrated, about 100,000 have returned. There is already a big gap. The significance can be played down, as you did, Mr. Schäuble. However, we have to take this problem seriously” (Thea Dückert cited in Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 12383, author’s translation).

34. See King and Christou 2010.
36. Sometimes, the interpretation then immediately moves from arguments emphasizing “brain drain” to desirable mobility in and out of Germany: “The mobility of highly skilled workers can only be appreciated, for Germany, in the case of foreign specialists and scholars alike. It is in our own interest that our scientists and professionals go abroad to educate themselves, to collect personal experiences and to return with this knowledge back home. In the same way, we are interested to attract internationally renowned scientists and professionals to work in our country” (Annette Hübinger cited in Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 12391).
37. The interview guidelines introduced in Baden-Württemberg were part of a series of measures introduced in Europe. In 2005, Austria introduced a test examining civics knowledge as part of the naturalization process, the Netherlands followed suit in 2006. In Germany, heated debates emerged when the Länder Baden-Württemberg and Hesse came up with proposals for new and stricter guidelines for naturalization interviews.
42. On references to ties, Rauer 2010; on emphasizing integration, Faist and Amelina 2008.
43. Rauer 2010, 77.
44. One of the crucial questions for further analysis is whether exclusionary mechanisms ultimately result in self-identification as a sort of self-otherization among the immigrant groups concerned (Hall 1996). This possibility would imply that not only the receiving group but also the newcomers conceive of themselves as the other. Another possibility is that those affected negotiate their way around dominant beliefs.
45. Compare Foucault 2004, 187. The public debates and the negative portrayals of some types of transnationality, that is, the transnational connections of some types of migrants expressing or resulting in disintegration, are frequently far removed from the practices of transnationality in everyday life, in manifold localities, as observed in empirical research (see, for example,
Faist and Özveren 2004). Research thus suggests a much more nuanced and balanced picture of transnationality as a heterogeneity. Although a number of studies, particularly in the American context, have shown that transnational resources can contribute to improving the social position of the lower-income groups (see Levitt and Jaworsky 2007), such findings refer mostly to this position in the country of settlement, and implications for the place of origin require more systematic study. In a transnational inequality perspective, the dynamics of multiple places of reference within a transnational space must be taken into account. By the same token, multiple affiliations can also give rise to new restrictions and conflicts, for example between those who remain spatially immobile and take care of supporting children and elderly family members on the one hand and those migrating abroad on the other hand.

49. Because we use Parson’s position on value generalization only as a heuristic, we take the term society as being unproblematic for this analysis. Also, we do not argue that value generalization is inherently evolutionary in terms of an ever progressing march toward ever more abstract norms. Reversals are possible.
51. Parsons 1971, 27.

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