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Chapter 5

Feeling Dutch: The Culturalization and Emotionalization of Citizenship and Second-Generation Belonging in the Netherlands

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Western European countries are heatedly debating how much and what kind of cultural diversity is to be accepted in the public domain. Many have witnessed the rise of right-wing populist parties that see immigrants as a threat to social cohesion and national identity. The debate has a nostalgic character, based on a reifying, ahistorical notion of culture. Culture in this perspective is portrayed as a closed, timeless, and conflict-free whole, carried by citizens who all basically share beliefs, norms, and traditions. Different cultures are regarded as essentially different and irreconcilable, and this ignites debates on actual or potential harmful influences of Muslim minorities—who are a large share of the immigrant population in western Europe.

This closed, static conception of culture is prominent in Dutch debates and is embraced by many natives, who increasingly tend to fear Islam. The building of mosques, the call to prayer, the use of religious symbols such as the headscarf, gender inequality, anti-integration pronouncements by ultra-orthodox imams, and Islam-inspired political extremism are all popular subjects in the media that are often portrayed as threatening to destroy, damage, and undermine Dutch culture. In the Netherlands, the Islamophobic political party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) took second place in the 2002 elections. After 2002, various populist parties gained electoral support, Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) being the latest and the most successful.
We argue that a culturalization and emotionalization of citizenship has taken place, by which we mean that citizenship is less about political and social rights and duties (let alone a juridical status, as it is often understood in the U.S. context), and more about norms and values of a culturally defined community.

A Multicultural Paradise?

What happened in the Netherlands, a country often described as an oasis of multicultural tolerance, that it became intolerant and what we call monoculturalist? We argue that the current culturalist and emotive citizenship policies are far less of a break with the past than is often suggested. In reality, what had been rather tolerant but monoculturalist policies developed into intolerant monoculturalism.

In our perspective, the Netherlands has been wrongly portrayed as tolerant and deeply multiculturalist. For instance, in *When Ways of Life Collide*, Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn write that “in the Netherlands, as much as can be done on behalf of multiculturalism has been done. . . . It promoted the most ambitious program of multiculturalism in Western Europe. . . . The politics of the Netherlands since the assassination of Fortuyn has been the politics of multiculturalism in extremis.”4 A critical debate revolves around what are seen as the pernicious effects of multiculturalism for so-called failures of the cultural and economic integration of immigrants.5 Radical multiculturalism is often seen as causing enormous social tensions in the Netherlands: “The whole thrust of multiculturalism is to accentuate, even exaggerate, differences between majority and minority and insist on their importance. . . . Sharing a common identity builds support for inclusion; bringing differences of ethnic and religious identity to the fore evokes the very exclusionary reactions it is meant to avoid.”6 According to Christian Joppke, the supposed approach of allowing designated minority groups to “emancipate” themselves within their own parallel institutions has fuelled segregation and separation from the mainstream society.7

But are or were the Dutch indeed radical multiculturalists, supporting multicultural policies? As shown elsewhere, the assumption that the Dutch were radical multiculturalists is a misrepresentation of what really happened and is now happening in the Netherlands.8 Policies that focused on the sociocultural position of immigrants were much more complex than the accounts of Sniderman and Hagendoorn suggest. The policy regarding cultural identities in the 1970s can be misunderstood as multiculturalist, because of the central tenet that “guest workers,” such as those from Turkey and Morocco, should maintain their identity. The reason for this policy, however, was not to celebrate cultural differences and accommodate pluralism in the Netherlands, but to facilitate immigrants’
eventual return to their country of origin. In the early 1980s, the ideal of group empowerment emerged, but only as a vehicle for improving immigrants’ socioeconomic status. Moreover, this policy emphasis faded into the background by the late 1980s as the objective of full individual—rather than group—socioeconomic integration and participation gradually took center stage. The fact is that the central government’s policy toward sociocultural integration showed little consistency. It evolved from focusing on achieving group emancipation to an approach that accentuated individual integration, but it never was really multiculturalist.

The use of group-specific provisions by immigrants was made possible by the heritage of the general Dutch institutional pillarized system, in which each religious and ideological segment of Dutch society in the first half of the twentieth century had its own schools, political parties, broadcasting organizations, newspapers, and hospitals. Pillarization gradually disappeared after the 1960s. Although the legacy of pillarization provided a basis for creating immigrant religious and cultural institutions, it had nothing whatsoever to do with multicultural integration policies.9 Instead of favoring the development of a new (Islamic) religious pillar, most politicians were decidedly reluctant to support such a development. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, as one of the most secularized countries in the world, the Netherlands has shown little inclination to accommodate new religious institutions. In fact, from the 1970s onward, local governments tried to prohibit immigrants from claiming their rights as Dutch citizens to set up Muslim schools.10

To put it somewhat differently, the recognition of the right to self-organization among minorities in the Dutch institutional structure is quite different from the recognition of cultural rights of equal citizens with different cultural backgrounds, as is the case, for example, in Canada, with its official multicultural policies. It is confusing to call both policies multiculturalism. For the sake of clarity, it is better to call the policies and attitudes that prevailed in the Netherlands during the 1970s and 1980s tolerant monoculturalism: the native Dutch became a rather homogeneous and progressive, and self-congratulatory, monoculture in these years, but ethnic minorities were not forced to culturally assimilate into the Dutch mainstream.

We argue that since the 1990s, there has been a transition from a tolerant to an intolerant monoculturalism, in which the “culturalization of citizenship” has played a central role.11 As we will show, citizenship came to stand less for the formal rights and duties of members of a political community and more for the customs and tastes of a homogeneous cultural community. In the process, the Dutch progressive culture increasingly came to be seen as a product of a timeless consensus that needed protection from external influence, and as a quintessentially Dutch achievement to which immigrants must prove their loyalty.
Dutch Cultural Consensus

The majority population of the Netherlands has rapidly become more culturally homogeneous since the 1960s. Whereas in many countries, including the United States, opinions among the majority population are divided on issues of gender, family, and sexuality, almost the entire political spectrum of the Dutch majority population supports progressive values on these matters. After a period of intense cultural polarization during what is called the long sixties, the Dutch majority developed remarkably uniform, progressive ideals. More than anywhere else in Europe, members of the Dutch majority population believe that homosexuality is nothing out of the ordinary. Eighty percent of the Dutch believe that “gays in Europe should be allowed to marry,” and close to 70 percent of the Dutch population—once more, the highest percentage of all European countries—believe that “gay couples in Europe should be allowed to adopt children.” More than 70 percent of the Dutch disagree with conservative propositions that “women have to have children to be happy,” “that a child should respect its parents,” or that “we would be better off were we to return to a traditional way of life.” Finally, the Netherlands shows less of a value gap on these questions between more and less highly educated people. Indeed, the Netherlands is now among the three least culturally polarized European countries. In this respect, the Netherlands is similar to Denmark, which also has a clearly “enlightened” moral majority.

Politicians of various backgrounds use this progressive, liberal consensus to demand the acculturation of those who are assumed to fall outside of it. The cultural consensus among the Dutch goes hand in hand with a consensual dismissal of different sets of values. As Ian Buruma observes, “Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch progressives. It is easy to be tolerant of those who are much like us. . . . It is much harder to extend the same principle to the strangers in our midst, who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs.”

The growing consensus around progressive values has resulted in a bigger perceived value gap between the native majority and (Muslim) immigrants than is found in countries with less liberal majority cultures. As Peter van der Veer puts it, “For the Dutch, Muslims stand for theft of enjoyment. Their strict sexual morals remind the Dutch too much of what they have so recently left behind. . . . In a society where consumption and especially the public performance of sexual identity have become so important, the strict clothing habits of observant Muslims are an eyesore.”

In this context, the majority population of the Netherlands has come to define cultural differences as a growing problem.
The Culturalization and Emotionalization of Citizenship

This liberal consensus has fueled the culturalization of citizenship: a process in which norms and values and symbols and traditions (including religion) have come to play a pivotal role in defining what can be expected of a Dutch citizen. “The native culture” is seen as under threat, leading to the normative project of defining and protecting Dutch “traditional” cultural heritage (for instance, in the form of a national historical canon to be taught at all secondary schools and to newcomers in citizenship courses).

“Culture” is often presented as the root cause of social problems among ethnic minority groups, particularly among Moroccans, whose so-called deviant culture is blamed for both causing nuisance in public spaces and high criminality rates.

Government policy has increasingly insisted that immigrants and their children totally adjust to “Dutch” culture, to “Dutch” norms and values, in order to avert the impending danger of insufficient social cohesion.19 A recent policy letter from the minister of integration explains this need to adapt to the Dutch national culture—not just to the nation’s laws but to unwritten notions as well:

The fundamentals that shape social life in the Netherlands are historically formed and are points of reference, which many Dutch share and which are not to be lost. This is not only about the attainments and the principal values that form the foundation of the Dutch nation state, but also about points of reference that have evolved historically and culturally, like the Dutch language, certain monuments or architectural characteristics or the unwritten ways and codes of behaviour that have developed during the course of history.20

Underlying this statement is a nativist conception of citizenship, in which the original inhabitants own the place, the home, and the nation, because they were there first.21 This nativist conception is reflected in the constant and persistent use of autochthonous to refer to natives, and allochthonous in reference to non-Western immigrants (and their children and even their grandchildren). These are originally geological terms, meaning originating (or not originating) from the soil where it is found.22 To ask for adaptation by newcomers is thus justified by historical, indeed one might even say by primordial, ties to the Netherlands:

Integration is about integration into the Dutch society—a society formed by the labour, efforts, expectations and convictions of generations which preceded us, on whose fundamentals society will further develop. . . . Given all social changes and cultural developments, which undeniably occur, society
is founded on the fundamental continuity of values, opinions, institutions and habits, which form the guiding culture in Dutch society. . . . The Dutch society in all its diversity is the society in which those who settle in the Netherlands must learn to live, to which they must adapt, and which they have to become part of.23

In addition to the culturalization of citizenship, most of the elements that have ignited the debates over integration and cultural diversity in the Netherlands—and other western European countries—can be traced to the emotionalization of what it means to be a citizen. In debates over dual citizenship, spokespersons of various political parties emphasize that citizenship is more than a formality, as statements from two members of the Dutch parliament indicate. “To have Dutch nationality is more than having a Dutch passport. It is an expression of feeling at home in Dutch society, in her democratic legal order, her values, norms and mentality. You must, in other words, fully focus on Dutch society.”24 “People must feel connected to our society if they want to be naturalized, they have to feel at home in it. It is necessary to feel Dutch.”25

The process of culturalization underscores the emotional aspects of citizenship. Criteria for citizenship have evolved from formal and legal dimensions into also requiring deep sentiments. Citizens are subjected to new “feeling rules.”26 Belonging and feeling Dutch have become prime, perhaps even the prime, requirements for citizenship. Because feelings as such cannot easily be observed, certain actions become their symbolic stand-ins.27 For example, having dual nationality has come to represent lack of loyalty to Dutch culture in the eyes of a majority of Dutch politicians.28 Belonging to and identification with a nation are regarded as zero-sum attributes and singular in nature—the view is that a person can only identify with one country at a time—which is why loyalties to other countries and cultures are regarded as a threat to emotional attachment to the Netherlands.

Emotive citizenship stresses the need for loyalty to the nation-state and demands proof of such feelings from immigrants and their children. It includes the warning that immigrants who do not manage to feel at home should go “home,” that is, disappear altogether from their “country of arrival”—even when they were born and raised in the Netherlands.29 Jan Marijnissen, at the time the chairman of the left-wing Socialist Party, put it this way: “The Muslim community must understand that there is a collective responsibility to combat excesses such as political Islam. Educators, teachers and imams must choose for our Constitution and bring up children in its spirit. If one is not prepared to conform to our values and obey our laws, the pressing advice is: seek a country where you feel at home.”30

So, if immigrants want to stay in the Netherlands, they have to adapt to so-called Dutch norms, values, and emotions. As the anthropologist
Peter Geschiere notes, “The idea seems to be, indeed, that Dutch identity must ‘cannibalize’ other identities in order to turn immigrants into reliable citizens.”

The assumed incompatibility between us and them not only fuels suspicions that immigrants do not really feel at home in the Netherlands; the corollary is the claim that the native Dutch feel less at home as well: they increasingly cannot imagine sharing their “home” with people who have such “alien” norms and values. Hence, on the basis of a certain conception of home—everybody shares and values the same norms, values, practices, habits—Muslim immigrants in particular are suspected of disloyalty, which only increases the unease of the native Dutch and Dutch political figures with Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and their offspring.

The Second Generation and Feelings of Belonging

Given the changes we have documented, including the emphasis on the loyalties of Muslim immigrants and their children, a crucial question is the extent to which members of the second generation, born and raised in the Netherlands, actually feel they belong in the society. To what extent do they meet the culturalist and emotive criteria we have discussed? Do the attitudes and sentiments of members of the second generation (especially the children of Muslim immigrants) reflect the assumptions of the dominant integration discourse about them, that they do not feel Dutch? The remainder of this chapter, therefore, empirically explores feelings of belonging among second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch.

Our focus is on those of Turkish and Moroccan descent, as these ethnic groups—being predominantly Muslim—are not only central to current integration debates, but are also the largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. First- and second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch make up roughly 4 percent of the 16.5 million Dutch population (393,000 and 363,000, respectively), with about half in the second generation. The percentages are much higher in the large cities. For example, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, first- and second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch make up over 14 percent of the population, and in some neighborhoods over 40 percent. The two other largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands are those from former Dutch colonies with Surinamese and Antillean background, respectively 347,000 and 144,000 persons, including the second generation. These four minority groups are the main targets of Dutch integration policies.

The first-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants arrived in the Netherlands as guest workers in the late 1960s and 1970s to work in lower-skilled jobs. Many came from rural areas and had extremely little
formal education. Later, their families followed them to the Netherlands. Everybody, including themselves, assumed that they would return to Morocco and Turkey. Hence, for long, they were oriented to their home-lands, and Dutch policy was aimed at facilitating their return. Eventually, many stayed in the Netherlands.

Although most of the first generation remained in the lower socio-economic strata, the educational position of the second generation is characterized by a large contrast between those who are advancing and those who lag behind. Since the 1990s, the share of second-generation youth with a Turkish and Moroccan background starting in higher education increased from 20 percent to more than 40 percent. Despite the steady increase, the average education level among the second generation is still much lower than among ethnic Dutch. The ethnic Dutch more often enroll in higher education (nearly 60 percent), finish quicker, and drop out less. Members of the second generation may have been born and raised in the Netherlands, yet at the same time they have been at the center of integration debates in which they are constantly and officially labeled as allochthonous. For lack of a suitable or practical alternative, when we refer to autochthonous citizens, we use—albeit reluctantly—the term native. By natives, we mean Dutch whose parents were born in the Netherlands, which unjustly excludes members of the second generation, who were also born in the Netherlands. We want to emphasize that this chapter is not about what kinds of identification, cultural norms, and behavior are desirable or should be adopted. We do not intend to reflect our personal opinions on the desirability or undesirability of immigrants and their children accepting particular norms or particular emotions. Rather, our goal is to evaluate empirically the criteria applied to immigrants and their offspring, as set by the culturalist, nativist integration discourse.

This discussion is based on data from four studies on young adult children of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands, most of them in the second, Dutch-born, generation. The studies are relatively recent and represent a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The first study is based on the data set of the international TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation) project. The Dutch component of this study consisted of a structured survey, conducted face to face in 2006 and 2007 with 1,500 Dutch young adults between eighteen and thirty-five years old in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, all born and raised in the Netherlands. The respondents were spread over three ethnic groups: second-generation Moroccan Dutch, second-generation Turkish Dutch (at least one parent was born in Morocco or Turkey), and a native control group (both parents were born in the Netherlands). The second study, by Han Entzinger and Edith Dourleijn, focuses on first- and second-generation young adult Turkish and Moroccan Dutch in Rotterdam. It is based on a structured survey conducted in 1999 with 962 respondents.
The third study, conducted in 2007 and 2008, explores the identification and belonging of young adults (eighteen to thirty years old) in Amsterdam in four ethnic groups (Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, and Dutch), all born in the Netherlands. Inge van der Welle combined a structured survey of 1,132 respondents with semistructured in-depth interviews with fifty respondents. The fourth study is a qualitative study of the meaning that members of the second generation attach to integration. In 2008 and 2009, Jurriaan Omlo conducted semistructured interviews with twenty-seven respondents of Moroccan descent, ranging from nineteen to thirty years old and living in Amsterdam and The Hague. All were born in the Netherlands or arrived there at a very young age, and had middle to higher education levels.

Relatively Weak Identification as Dutch

What do these studies tell us about the children of immigrants’ attachment to being Dutch? Do they, as nativists assume, express a relatively weak attachment to being Dutch—and if they do, why?

In line with the emotive integration discourse, the data do, in fact, show that second-generation respondents have weaker feelings of belonging than native respondents. When we look at the TIES data, we see that in answering the question “To what extent do you feel Dutch?” the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch feel Dutch to a much lesser extent than the native Dutch (see table 5.1).

But what does it mean to feel Dutch? Does it reflect a uniform set of emotional attachments to the Netherlands? As a structured questionnaire was used in the TIES study, we do not know what these answers really mean to different people. Van der Welle shows that there is no one singular kind of identification as Dutch. In her survey, answers to different questions tapping into a sense of belonging or feeling Dutch were not

### Table 5.1  Extent of Feeling Dutch

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<th>3</th>
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<td>41</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1304</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the TIES project.
Notes: 1 = not at all or very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = neither strong nor weak; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong.
Question posed: “To what extent do you feel Dutch?”
fully consistent. For example, whereas 55 percent of the Moroccan Dutch respondents in Van der Welle’s survey were “proud of the Netherlands,” 69 percent felt “connected with the Netherlands,” and 80 percent felt “at home in the Netherlands.” So, even though questions about feeling Dutch are generally used to ask about identification in a broad sense, they often only skim the surface and are not able to reveal the complex and fluid nature of identities and sense of belonging. Moreover, there is the issue of whether members of the second generation feel a sense of belonging to particular places or cities in the Netherlands—and whether this explains why most say they feel at home in the Netherlands but in some cases say they do not feel Dutch.

We still need to confront the issue of why the second-generation respondents in the TIES and Van der Welle studies expressed a lower emotional bond with the Netherlands than the native Dutch. One of the main suggestions in the Dutch integration discourse is that immigrants and their children feel less Dutch than natives because of a strong loyalty to their parents’ country of origin. Loyalty to the country of ancestry, in other words, is thought to be competing with loyalty to Dutch society. However, the studies indicate that few children of immigrants in the Netherlands have a very strong emotional bond with Turkey or Morocco. The bond with the Netherlands appears to be much stronger. This is particularly the case for the Moroccan Dutch. Moreover, feeling at home in the parents’ country of origin does not necessarily detract from feeling at home in the Netherlands. It is not, one can say, a zero-sum game. Among the second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Amsterdam youth in Van der Welle’s survey, 80 percent said they felt at home in the Netherlands and around two-thirds felt at home in Turkey and Morocco. Feeling at home in Morocco or Turkey may mean that they see Morocco or Turkey as holiday destinations. Indeed, visits to Morocco may actually make them feel more Dutch than before. As one Moroccan Dutch young adult said, “It [Morocco] actually is a country for holidays, not more. When you get there, you are Dutch. So you cannot say: Morocco, I like to go there because I feel at home there. Unfortunately.” Another explained, “I feel at home in Morocco, but more in terms of holiday. I think a visit of four weeks maximum is enough. We used to go for six weeks, and then after five weeks we went like: ‘Oh . . . I miss this and I want to go back.’ I couldn’t live there.”

Another assumption of the nativist, culturalist, emotive discourse is that the second generation’s weaker sense of feeling Dutch (compared with the native Dutch) is because the Dutch progressive norms are foreign to them. The studies do not show this. Han Entzinger and Edith Dourleijn’s study reveals that despite a diminishing sociocultural gap between second-generation youth and native youth, identification as Dutch among the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch was roughly unaltered over the years. Entzinger and Dourleijn show that in terms of norms regarding
partner choice and “traditional” values such as respect for parents, obedience, courtesy, and conservatism, the second generation has become more progressive over time. Data in the integration report prepared for the Dutch government in 2009 also show that children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants had more progressive values in 2006 than in 1998, for example with regard to individualization, female emancipation, and secularization. In addition, their Dutch language skills had improved, they more often spoke the Dutch language, and the Moroccan Dutch showed increased interaction with the native Dutch. In short, being more like the Dutch is not the same as identifying or feeling more like them.

What emerges from many of the studies is the suggestion that the changed integration discourse has played a large role in hampering the second generation’s identification as Dutch. As Van der Welle notes, “Some of the young adults of foreign descent feel excluded from the ‘Dutch identity,’ because they are continuously labeled by others as allochtoon, as Muslim, as foreigner. For them it is difficult to claim this ‘feeling Dutch.’” Even though most respondents in her study emphasized that they were, without doubt, Dutch because they were born and raised in the Netherlands and spoke the language, feeling Dutch was a different matter. Indeed, Omlo observes among Moroccan Dutch respondents in his study that feeling Dutch was strongly related to identity ascription by others. All his respondents felt at home (somewhere) in the Netherlands and considered themselves Dutch, as they were born and raised there, and integrated in terms of language use, social participation, and cultural preferences. But many stressed that they were not seen as Dutch by most people in the larger society. They experienced a disjunction between their self-identification as (at least partly) Dutch and external ascription as (solely) Moroccan by others. In the nativist discourse, in which these two ethnic-national dimensions are generally seen as mutually exclusive, external ascription as Moroccan implies not being Dutch. This all-or-nothing approach in the mainstream society has a strong impact on many in the second generation. It leads to frustration and may actually lead many to not present themselves as Dutch. Omlo’s and Van der Welle’s interviews clearly illustrate how, for many Moroccan Dutch, self-identification is, at least partly, the result of how others identify them:

They often ask me: do you feel more Dutch or more Moroccan? I always return the question and say: When you see me on the street, do you see a Moroccan or a Dutchman? Then the answer is most often: I see a Moroccan. I say: Because you see me as Moroccan, I start behaving like one, or at least feel like one.

I never say I am Dutch. Simply because no one sees me as Dutch, because I wear a headscarf. I think that, when I take off my headscarf and my black hair is visible, still people won’t say: “Oh, you are Dutch”. So thinking about the way people see me, I don’t feel Dutch. . . . I feel accepted as I
am, but society does not see me as Dutch. I am not—I will be addressed as *allochtoon* the rest of my life. I can’t stand this, I have to admit. I do have the Dutch nationality, and don’t I speak Dutch well? Am I not born here, raised, what do you want in addition?\textsuperscript{57}

When I am abroad I say I am Dutch, because I am born here. . . . But when I say I am Dutch in the Netherlands, they say: “How is that possible? You have dark hair, a darker complexion.” They look at you like you are crazy. In the Netherlands this is tricky. Then I say I am from Almelo, or that I am Moroccan.\textsuperscript{58}

I very much regret that people emphasize that this is not true. . . . We are more Dutch than Moroccan. You count in Dutch, you dream in Dutch, then you simply are Dutch.\textsuperscript{59}

Thus, even though many second-generation Moroccans do not have strong connections with their parents’ country of origin, are relatively integrated in many ways, and feel at home, at least somewhere in the Netherlands, they do not feel that others recognize them as fully Dutch and, as a result, feel they have no alternative but to identify with their ethnicity. This is at least partly caused by the emotive and nativist integration discourse, which permeates everyday interactions and plays an exclusionary role.

**Local City Identification as Mediating Identity**

We have focused on feeling Dutch, but what about a sense of belonging to local communities and cities in the Netherlands?

Among the second generation, the local city identification appears to be stronger than identification as Dutch, as figure 5.1 shows.\textsuperscript{60} In contrast to feelings of belonging to the nation, the TIES survey found little difference between the second-generation and native respondents in feelings of belonging to Amsterdam or Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{61} Being born and raised in the city of residence more strongly influences identification with the city than having immigrant parents.\textsuperscript{62} It seems that the public discourse about integration has not had a strong impact on the second generation’s identification with the city where they live. Interestingly, in many large Dutch cities, including Amsterdam and Rotterdam, a larger share of the second generation is actually native to (that is, born in) the city than native Dutch residents.\textsuperscript{63}

As the qualitative studies bring out, for most second-generation young adults the city of residence is the main arena where they live their lives and have their social encounters. This partly explains their identification with the city and why they feel at home there.\textsuperscript{64} That family members often live in the same city and that members of the second generation have been raised there create a strong emotional bond to the city.\textsuperscript{65} Also, second-generation young adults recognize themselves more in the population
composition of the city, characterized by diversity, than in the population composition of the Netherlands as a whole. Because they often have not traveled much outside the city and relatively few have lived for any significant time anywhere else in the Netherlands, the second generation’s identification with the national level is mostly shaped by the media and political discourse, which are perceived as predominantly exclusionary and polarizing.

In contrast to the Dutch identity, which has been formulated in public discourse in an exclusionary way in culturalist and nativist terms, the city identity is more open to ethnic and cultural diversity. Both Van der Welle’s and Omlo’s respondents explained that identifying as an Amsterdammer does not lead to feelings of exclusion, or conflicts with a sense of being partly Turkish or Moroccan. They stressed the diverse and tolerant character of Amsterdam, which makes it possible for people from different ethnic backgrounds to be seen as—and to feel like—an Amsterdammer. Marianne van Bochove, Katja Rušinović, and Godfried Engbersen come to a similar conclusion: “According to many respondents, people do not see them as ‘Dutch’, because they do not look Dutch. However, they have the feeling that no one can deny them their urban identity.” Here are some typical comments from Van der Welle’s and Omlo’s interviews:

Everybody can say: “I am Amsterdammer.” You don’t need to explain that you are an Amsterdammer. Whereas, when you say you are Dutch, you are questioned about your Moroccan descent.
But when you would ask me “Are you Amsterdammer,” I would say “Yes, definitely. Because Amsterdam has many cultures.” And Amsterdammer does stand for cultural diversity. And I am born here, that matters as well.71

The label Amsterdammer does not imply an all-or-nothing choice between identities but allows a combination of different dimensions, including non-Dutch ethnic dimension.

Thus, although the bond and identification with the city can vary among cities, for the second generation in general, identification with the city is stronger than identification with the Dutch nation, partly because the local identity is seen as more inclusive and open to diversity.72 Apparently, the integration discourse, which defines in culturalist and nativist terms who belongs to Dutch society and who does not, primarily influences feelings of belonging on the national level and does not extend to the local level. For many in the second generation, the local city identity has become a “mediating” identity, which expresses belonging and can be combined more easily with other dimensions of their identity, such as being Turkish or Moroccan, than an identity as Dutch.

**Conclusion: Perverse, but Limited, Effects of the Integration Discourse**

We have shown that, in line with nativist assumptions, the second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch express weaker emotional attachments to the Netherlands than the native Dutch. This comparatively weak identification as Dutch, we have argued, is actually caused to a large extent by the very same culturalist and emotive integration discourse that warns against it.

The culturalist and emotive integration discourse—pressing for incorporation of migrants—thus has some counterproductive effects. In spite of the “feeling rules” that demand an expression of emotional attachment to Dutch society and culture, for many second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, the exclusionary discourse hampers their full identification as Dutch—even though many feel at home at least somewhere in the Netherlands and are adapting to “Dutch” culture. In-depth interviews show that for many members of the second generation, their identification with Dutch society is closely related to how others see them. The fact that they are labeled by others as Moroccans or Turkish and, therefore, as not-Dutch affects their self-identification. It makes them—even though they see themselves undeniably as Dutch—identify (often solely) as Moroccan or Turkish, which can be seen as a partly reactive identity. This is a strong feature of their self-identification, even if they are integrated in terms of a wide range of social and cultural patterns and lack strong connections with their parents’ country of origin. Thus, whereas the new integration
discourse demands that people feel part of the Dutch “home” and fully identify as Dutch, this has tended to have the opposite effect: it makes immigrants, and most importantly their Dutch-born children, identify less strongly as Dutch.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the negative effects of the integration discourse. Although, taken as a whole, members of the second generation do not feel as strongly Dutch as natives, this does not mean that they do not identify with the Dutch society at all. Many do feel Dutch very strongly. Furthermore, the second generation tends to have a strong identification with the city where they live. Indeed, second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch identify more strongly with their city than with the Netherlands as a whole. This is partly a result of functional and emotional bonds formed by living one’s life in the local environment of the city, but it is more than that. City identities in the Netherlands appear to be more open and inclusive than the national identity, and can be relatively easily combined with other identities such as being Turkish or Moroccan.

Another caveat is significant. Even though the integration discourse partly hampers the second generation’s identification as Dutch, it seems to have had only a limited impact on acculturation (regarded as integration by Dutch policymakers), as the sociocultural gap between the second generation and natives has decreased over the years. To be sure, we do not know how processes of acculturation would have developed without the culturalization of citizenship, but we can at least conclude that this change in discourse did not prevent a growing level of adaptation among the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch to the Dutch progressive, liberal consensus.

Nevertheless, as long as the closing of the sociocultural gap between the Turkish and Moroccan second generation and native Dutch is not acknowledged by mainstream society and by the Dutch media and politicians in particular, and does not become a visible part of public discourse, the dominant impression will persist that the distance between immigrants and their children and native Dutch society is static and unbridgeable. As we have seen, this has a paradoxical effect. Politicians speak of the goal of integration as they elaborate an emotive integration discourse but, in reality, this discourse has played a role in hindering the second generation’s full emotional attachment to a Dutch identity.

Why then, if this culturalist and emotive thinking turns out to have perverse effects and contributes to a widening instead of a closing of the sociocultural gap, do politicians and others persist in such thinking? The reason why some employ this culturalist and emotive discourse is precisely for its exclusivist effects. They have an essentialist notion of what is Dutch and argue that this needs to be protected from outsiders who are perceived as culturally different. Actually, they particularly rely on this presentation of newcomers, nonnatives, as inherently different, in order to define what is Dutch and what binds the Dutch. This mechanism
of defining an ethnic other in order to increase national belonging and cohesion among those who see themselves as the “real” natives, is also described by others. However, only a small minority of (populist) politicians seem to hold this position. We think that there is another reason for the persistence of the culturalist discourse—a rather simple one: many people are not aware of its perverse effect. As the turn from a relatively tolerant to an intolerant discourse has been strongly inspired by the presumption that it was particularly this tolerant attitude that hindered “successful” integration, they assume the opposite will work. The previous approach, labeled multiculturalism, is blamed for the presumed failings in integration, hence the resort to a more direct and less tolerant approach, with the best intentions. This is also what the mainstream now has come to demand of politicians: a less soft approach, which is supposed or at least hoped to be more effective.

Notes

6. Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2006, 15, 135
11. See also Hurenkamp, Tonkens, and Duyvendak 2011a, 2011b, 2012.
22. See also Geschiere 2009.
25. Maxime Verhagen (CDA) in ibid., 3635.
33. CBS 2012.
35. In Amsterdam, in six of the ninety-six neighborhoods, 40 to 57 percent of the residents were first- or second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Dutch. Onderzoek, Informatie en Statistiek. Available at: http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/779/ (accessed October 1, 2012).
37. Scholten 2011.
41. De Zwart 2012. In 2012, the Advisory Council for Social Developments (RMO) recommended abolishing the term *allochthonous* in governmental categorization and registration because there should no longer be a legitimization for this way of categorizing members of second generation. This advice was not followed. Tracking the integration of the second generations was regarded by the minister of social affairs and employment as crucial information to develop the right integration policies (Dutch Parliament 2013).
42. For more details on the study’s methodology, see the TIES website (http://www.tiesproject.eu) and Crul and Heering 2008.
43. Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008.
44. Van der Welle 2011.
45. Omlo 2011.
46. Question and possible answers in the Dutch TIES survey were as follows: To what extent do you feel Dutch? (*In hoeverre voelt u zich Nederlander?*). Answers: 0: not at all; 1: very weak; 2: weak; 3: not weak, not strong; 4: strong; 5: very strong (0: helemaal niet; 1: heel zwak; 2: zwak; 3: niet zwak, niet sterk; 4: sterk; 5: heel sterk).
References


WRR. 2007. *Identificatie met Nederland.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.