
© The Russell Sage Foundation.

To download additional chapters in this book. Please go to:
Chapter 7

Constituting National Identity Through Transnationality: Categorizations of Inequalities in German Integration Debates

THOMAS FAIST AND CHRISTIAN ULBRICHT

Immigration and the social integration of migrants have raised the issue of group boundaries around national identity. Historically, states have used immigration policy as a tool in fostering a particular national identity, and integration policies and debates have served to answer the question of who we are.¹ In contemporary public debates in Germany, as in other immigration countries in Europe and North America, the issue of national identity looms large, especially in drawing attention to the social integration of immigrants whose dispositions, principles, worldviews, and competences are allegedly at times incompatible with liberal-democratic values and norms.² Public debates abound in Germany over such issues as the compatibility of Islam with democracy and with gender equality, the relationship between migrants’ cross-border ties and national loyalty in dual citizenship, and transnational political claims-making of migrants. These debates have been inextricably related to and discussed in terms of nonintegration, failed integration, or disintegration. This negative coding often refers to transnationality, that is, to cross-border transactions in the broadest sense. Typically, for example, for more than two decades, many politicians and writers have identified the three Ts—Turkish television received via satellite and cable, low telephone costs for international calls, and cheap cross-border travel via air flights—as contributing to disintegration and segregation.³ Implicitly, the claim seems to be that though the national is associated with integration, the transnational more often connotes disintegration. This distinction stems from the assumption, asserted in some academic and public debates, that society can be thought of as a whole or as a unit
in a nation-state. This assumption in turn has been criticized for espousing methodological nationalism, the conflation of the societal life and the national state.\textsuperscript{4}

Transnational here refers to migrants’ cross-border ties, often to the countries of origin. In this analysis, however, we do not deal with transnationality as a continuum of social practices that researchers observe. Instead, we focus on transnationality as speakers portray it in public debates, involving not only politicians and representatives of interest groups, but also spokespersons for migrant groups. In this analysis, transnationality, as a marker of difference (heterogeneity), refers to two dimensions. In essence, we pursue the question of how national identity is constituted in public debates by referring to what could be called transnational. And what are the implications of emphasizing national identity and membership for issues of resources, status, privilege, and power?

The integration of immigrants in Germany and elsewhere in Europe has turned into a question of incorporating or rejecting creeds and principles. The associated processes have been ambiguous, as we observe changing boundaries but also new boundaries and the hardening of old boundaries. Here, the term \textit{boundary} refers to specific patterns of relations and representation between groups located on one or the other side. Thus boundaries denote social relations, representations, perceptions, and evaluations.\textsuperscript{5} One manifestation of shifting boundaries is that entire groups are now perceived to belong to the whole of national society, or at least to be on their way. In contemporary Europe, this can be seen in efforts to incorporate organized Islam institutionally.\textsuperscript{6} In Germany, this dynamic mainly refers to those of Turkish origin, now about four million people, who have been seen as a problematic group in terms of various socioeconomic measures as well as their religion (Islam). Existing corporatist institutions regulating church-state relations in Germany have started only very recently to adapt to the realities of a very large and by now relatively long-settled Muslim population.

Corporatist institutions are those that mediate between state and private institutions and fulfill public functions, such as unions and employer associations, which in Germany are autonomous in determining wages and working conditions without state interference. In a similar way, the Christian churches and the Jewish community have the status of a “corporation of public law,” which enables them, for example, to serve on public mass media programming and control boards, give religious instruction in public schools, and have church taxes collected by the state. Bodies such as the national Islam Conference have been established in which Muslim organizations have begun to function as agents who speak for their groups in the public addressing of religious issues, akin to employer associations and labor unions in labor-related issues.\textsuperscript{7} Human rights norms—namely, the human right to religious practice—have also
been used to rationalize steps toward organizational incorporation of Islam in Germany.\textsuperscript{8}

An explicit transnational phenomenon involving shifting boundaries between a nonmigrant majority and a migrant minority is dual citizenship. Even though Germany officially rejects dual citizenship as a rule, a high percentage of new citizens there, indeed about 30 percent to almost 50 percent, are not asked to renounce their former citizenship on naturalizing. This situation is influenced not only by human rights considerations for those who would otherwise be stateless but also by gender equity concerns.\textsuperscript{9} Yet, exclusionary tendencies also harden boundaries, as evident in what in Europe has been called civic integrationism, which rejects multicultural accommodation. Other examples are bans on religious attire or outright exclusion, either at the border—through more stringent admissions policies such as those on family reunification—or from the fabric of civic life—through rigorous naturalization tests. The issue of terrorism has also kept the significance of cross-border ties alive in public debates.

At stake is what we call national identity, as presented and portrayed in public debates in media such as newspapers or television. It is in public debates that parts of these efforts at the social (re)constitution of national identity become visible. Discussions on brain drain and the integration of immigrants are poignant examples. In these debates, the modernization of the national economy and modernity of national society have been juxtaposed to religious tradition, fundamentalism, and backwardness. First is what is considered “good” transnationality in public debates, such as the mobility of highly qualified. One pattern of interpretation is the mobility of highly skilled professionals who increase national economic competitiveness. A successful “global hunt for talent” is thus part of modernizing the national economy and of national pride.\textsuperscript{10} Second is “bad” transnationality, such as the import of brides and bridegrooms from Turkey, which is held to lead to disintegration of Turkish immigrants. In this case, the cultural modernity of German society is juxtaposed to traditional and backward behavior of immigrants. National identity is tightly interwoven with a self-understanding of Germany as a modern and liberal European society.

A tension is unmistakable: on the one hand, transnational or cross-border ties have come to be seen as part of national identity; on the other, they are also a basis for exclusion. To better understand this tension, this analysis focuses on public discourse, examining public debates on the juxtaposition of national identity and migrants’ transnational ties in Germany since the 1990s. In using the phrase “constituting national identity”—that is, focusing on how the distinction between national integration and transnational disintegration is produced and reproduced in public debates—we emphasize that national identity is not a quasi-natural
phenomenon but instead one that needs to be socially reconstituted on a continual basis if it is to buttress and reinforce the solidarity that underpins national policies and politics.¹¹

Three questions are central. First, what is the role of migrants’ transnational ties in constructing national identity and integration debates in Germany—or, to put it another way, how do perceptions of and debates on transnational ties and attachments and national identity relate to each other? Second, what are the mechanisms in how transnationality is used to define views of the nation and national identity? Third, in what ways is cultural categorization instrumentalized politically, that is, as a frame which is connected to a wide range of social, economic, and political problems? The empirical examples we provide are meant to illustrate how transnationality as a marker of difference—referred to as heterogeneity—contributes both to national identity and to inequalities among migrants and between migrants and nonmigrants.¹²

A brief discussion of heterogeneities and inequalities is helpful before considering the role of transnationality in defining national identity and integration. Transnationality is a marker of difference or heterogeneity that some (not all) migrants have. Transnationality is a continuum of cross-border transactions, ranging from low to high in various areas, such as sending financial remittances, exchanging goods, visiting relatives and friends, and engaging in the politics of another country and in other social practices.¹³ However, here we do not refer to this meaning but are instead interested in how participants in public debates use the term. We analyze how transnationality is used in making cultural and economic categorizations of groups. First, transnationality involves a cultural categorization and is assigned or attributed to persons, groups, or organizations. Cultural categorizations are significant given that the social integration of immigrants is deemed a simple matter of insertion into a modern society, whereas references to transnational ties and connections signal challenges to social integration or even disintegration. Second, transnationality can be involved in making economic categorizations, for example, as either good or bad for the national economy. In academic and public debates alike, transnationality is regarded as a desirable element of upward mobility for people with higher incomes and for the educated classes.¹⁴ Tellingly, in this context it is frequently called cosmopolitanism. However, those with lower social status are often considered to have barely any transnational ties, or—as in the case of migrants—transnationality is associated with undesirable downward mobility and coupled with the risk of social segregation and lack of integration.¹⁵ In this second meaning, transnationality is frequently thought to be associated with illiberal worldviews and traditional lifestyles.

Heterogeneities such as transnationality are not in themselves natural or self-evident categories that inevitably translate into inequalities. For
example, from a Marxist point of view, differences in resource endowments in labor markets and capitalist production translate, given inevitable exploitation of surplus, into class inequalities. Or take gender as heterogeneity. Gender assumes crucial importance in ranking and sorting workers, and—indirectly—in the division of labor in child care. In the production of inequalities based on gender as heterogeneity, various categorizations are at work, such as the attribution of allegedly innate abilities (motherly love) to women. Conceiving of transnationality as a heterogeneity allows us to link the concept to studies of inequality focused on the processes and, more concretely, the mechanisms that lead from perceived differences between groups to inequalities.

Tracing the production and maintenance of inequalities based on heterogeneities such as transnationality is at the core of this analysis. Changing views of migrants’ transnational ties in Germany can be clearly discerned in the shift from the early years of recruitment to the settlement of some migrants. In the early 1960s, when guest workers from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and later also Tunisia and ex-Yugoslavia started to arrive in Germany, the expectation was that they would return to their countries of origin. The majority (around eight million) did so over the years, but a significant number (about four million) remained in Germany. Of these, migrants from Turkey were the largest group. In the early period, transnational ties, embodied in the sense that migrants would eventually leave whence they had come, were seen as positive and thus an inherent part of the migration process. This view changed completely in later years, and public debates began to focus on immigrant integration. Transnational ties, for example, came to be seen as problematic signs of nonintegration in Germany. Interestingly, the issue did not arise in the context of several million so-called resettlers (ethnic Germans) from central and eastern Europe in the 1990s. In this case, most of the immigrants did not maintain cross-border ties because most arrived as complete families. However, circular and seasonal mobility between Poland and Germany has been substantial. Indeed, Polish migrants now constitute the second-largest immigrant group in Germany.

More recently, data from the General Survey in the Social Sciences (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften, ALLBUS) suggest that between 1996 and 2006 significant changes took place in boundaries between migrant groups (immigrants) and the majority group (German-Germans). In these ten years, the majority group has changed its perception of certain migrant groups—originally from Italy, Spain, and Greece—and now considers them as belonging to the majority. The national we now includes other citizens from European Union countries. However, no change, or even an increase in perceived dissimilarity, occurred with regard to other categories, including Muslims. Moreover, the percentage of the population agreeing that those born in the country
should be given the right to naturalize has increased.\textsuperscript{16} Legal reform has accompanied these changing perceptions. The new citizenship law in 2000 provided that children born to immigrant parents, one of whom has stayed in Germany for at least eight years, automatically receive German citizenship as well as that of their parents.

This analysis draws on an analysis of anthologies on public debates, parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag, and secondary literature.\textsuperscript{17} We concentrate on two realms of German integration debates. First are issues involving cultural categorizations, as in the debates on dual citizenship, and on social and religious life, with a particular focus on migration from Turkey.\textsuperscript{18} Second are economic categorizations in the debates on importing highly skilled professionals and on the brain drain of German scientists and professionals abroad.

**Transnationality and Cultural Categorizations**

What emerges from the analysis is that German debates on integration and the national \textit{we} mutually reinforce each other: the way the national \textit{we} is imagined is supported by tenets on integration, and reference to migrants’ transnational ties distinguishes integration from nonintegration. Some aspects of what is seen as transnational have been incorporated into conceptions of the nation, especially if these aspects conform to liberal principles, in contrast to fundamentalist religious beliefs (in this case, Muslim). Yet insofar as transnational ties stand for connections to foreign cultures and practices seen as problematic, they can function and be used as a distinguishing marker to categorize the \textit{other}. This implies two elements. One is that German national identity is, from a point of view often communicated in public arenas, not clearly defined beyond very general ideas such as competence in the national languages and loyalty to the constitution. Also, in contrast to national identity, transnational ties and allegiances are often referred to in specific terms, such as cross-border, fundamentalist terrorism based on Islam. In this way, they can serve political purposes. Only certain immigrant groups, however, are categorized negatively in terms of transnational ties—and, as indicated, changes have taken place over time in that some groups once disparaged for their transnational allegiances are now perceived as part of the national \textit{we}. Guest workers from Italy were considered the \textit{other} in the 1960s, to be replaced gradually by migrants from Turkey and later Muslims. German citizens abroad (especially the highly educated, such as scientists) and highly skilled labor recruited to work in Germany are discussed not in terms of integration but in the frame of economic competitiveness.
In some areas of the public debates, the national is more clearly defined only because it is juxtaposed to the transnational. Whether it is or is not, however, transnational ties and attachments usually have been portrayed in these debates as a concrete danger or at the very least a problem associated with broader controversial political issues, such as the possible admission of Turkey to the European Union. Comments that emphasize the incompatibility of German and Turkish culture emphasize that the culture brought into Germany is the problem. One example is those of the social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler that “everywhere in Europe, Muslim minorities can not be assimilated and seclude themselves in their subculture. The Federal Republic has no problem of foreigners, but only a Turkish problem.”\(^{19}\) The former Bundesbank board member and Social Democratic Party member Thilo Sarrazin is one of the latest exponents of the view that the incompatibility of Turkish and German culture—and continued links that migrants maintain to Turkey—prevent integration: “I curse satellite receivers, without those we would be much further along with integration. . . . Learning German is up to 80% the task of the migrants. . . . But if I read Turkish newspapers only, watch Turkish TV only and meet Turkish friends only, I do not want to integrate.”\(^{20}\)

In a fashion typical of much of the immigrant integration debate, Sarrazin moves back and forth between speaking of Islam in a broad sense as inimical to German culture and migrants’ cross-border communication. The transnational ties of some categories of migrants are seen as leading to ethnic and religious segregation.

The ways in which transnational ties and, often at the same time, multiculturalism have been defined in German public debates are similar in that both are often said to lead to disastrous outcomes.\(^{21}\) A statement from a former minister of the interior of Bavaria is a typical conservative view on multiculturalism as a threat to national integration:

> We must hand down a clear rejection of multicultural ideologies. With the concept “multicultural,” a link is usually made to the notion that different foreign cultures have equal rights alongside German culture and that . . . they will be recognized as a piece of our national culture. This approach amounts to the formation of an official “state of many peoples,” which neglects the concerns of the German majority populations in an unacceptable way. The consequences would ultimately be to relinquish the nation as a community of laws and common destiny, a loss of identity and the feeling of belonging together, . . . and the development of segregated “parallel societies.”\(^{22}\)

Ever since the 1990s, references to multiculturalism, much like those to cross-border transactions of former guest workers, have served as a foil for dystopian visions in public debates. In short, multiculturalism, like transnational ties, is often seen as undermining the demand for integration (Integrationsaufforderung).
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks of 9/11 and during the controversy over dual citizenship in the late 1990s, transnationality has become central to the definition of national integration. The events of September 11 led to reinforced demands for integration in Germany. As the political scientist Bassam Tibi noted in the weekly *Die Zeit*, “The terror attacks of September 11 proved in a concrete way that security issues are closely connected to immigration, given that the attacks were organized in the German Islamic Diaspora. . . . Nowadays, only the integration of Muslim migrants offers an effective way to counter religious extremism.”

Although 9/11 may not have been the primary cause of the demand for intensified efforts at integration of Turkish migrants, it certainly strengthened notions of the national *we* against the Muslim and transnational other. It is an interesting example of the way in which transnational phenomena, such as terrorism, add to the way the nation is itself is conceived. One such as terrorism can be used to legitimate nationalist exclusion. Coupled with the suspicion harbored against Muslims as loyal citizens has been the fear that they are manipulated from abroad, as exemplified in a statement by the executive officer of the Society for Endangered People, an international organization advocating the human rights of Kurds: “Turkish voters with dual citizenship are not ‘neutral’ voters who hold the future of the new homeland dear to their hearts. As long as they allow themselves to be manipulated so completely by the press in Turkey, they will remain ‘foreigners’, who are just exploiting the right to vote.”

The issue of dual citizenship aroused even greater emotional debate over integration of immigrants in the late 1990s. Ironically, although the Social Democratic-Green coalition, which came into power in 1998 and stayed until 2005, called for abolishing the requirement to renounce former citizenship when acquiring German citizenship, the reform finally enacted in 2000, which provided for birthright citizenship to the German-born children of immigrants, did not allow for dual citizenship for those with origins outside the European Union. Until 2014, Germany required the German-born children of non-EU immigrants to choose between German citizenship and that of their homeland when they became young adults. In 2000, a rather far-reaching (by European standards) jus soli found its way into the new citizenship law. Further, as-of-right naturalization can be obtained after only eight years rather than fifteen, as previously the case.

Dual citizenship has been discussed since the early 1990s in Germany only with respect to integration. Explicit transnational considerations did not enter into the debate even though a growing percentage of the population is born abroad or has parents who immigrated. Instead, politicians from all parties have viewed dual citizenship predominantly as a way of removing the emotional and social barriers to—and thus hurdles
for—naturalization. The goal has been migrant social integration into the national state. The difference in political positions is whether dual citizenship should be tolerated as a way to realize this goal or rejected. A statement by a member of the Bundestag succinctly summarizes the position of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), which have argued to reject dual citizenship: “Of course, one could entertain links into various countries for various reasons. However, viewed from a citizenship perspective, there should be membership and belonging to one and one country only.”

The debates on national identity that have been part of discussions on social integration have lacked a clear definition of what a German is. This point comes out in a debate that sought to clarify the demands placed on immigrants in Germany and emphasized a German Leitkultur, or guiding culture. The CDU politician Friedrich Merz instigated the debate in 2000 in the newspaper Die Welt. Other than references to the importance of allegiance to the German constitution and the law, there was no clear actual definition of the German guiding culture. Though rich in insinuations about Germany’s cultural heritage, Merz’s statements were rather vague: “The country must be tolerant and open; immigrants who want to live with us on a long-term basis must, for their part, be ready respect the rules of coexistence in Germany.” In speaking of a liberal German guiding culture, he referred to “the constitutional tradition of our Basic Law [that] is essential to our country’s culture of civil liberties” and that “German culture was shaped decisively after World War Two by the European idea . . . with a Europe of peace and freedom, based on democracy and a social market economy.” This idea of a guiding culture is also associated with upholding certain civil liberties and human rights: “Integral to our system of freedom is the position of woman in our society, which was achieved only after decades of struggle.”

The debate on Leitkultur can be seen as mainly of strategic use in party politics, implicitly comparing German culture with that of Islam, and thus seeking to appeal to many in the long-established German majority, but not naming Islam as a way to avoid alienating spokespersons for Muslim organizations, and thus many potential Muslim voters, and adhering to the new norms of mainstream German and indeed western European politics. Although the idea of German guiding culture is diffuse, its function is to claim the assimilatory capacity of German society and to maintain and reinforce national identity. In the world of German party politics, the rhetoric of the guiding culture of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) had the strategic goal of criticizing the ruling coalition of the more liberal Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party, which ruled from 1998 to 2005. The coalition government of the administration of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder propagated the reform of citizenship law and the green card initiative—a scheme to attract highly skilled
workers—to establish a distinct political profile that clearly dissociated the SPD–Green Party coalition from the former Christian Democrats–Liberal coalition of Helmut Kohl. Both the idea of a guiding culture and the campaign against tolerance toward dual citizenship articulated the vision of national identity based on a common culture—no longer on German ethnic origins. Legal and policy changes in recent years, such as the citizenship reform in 2000, indicate a gradual yet grudging acceptance of the fact that Germany has become a country of immigration. Although the reform of citizenship law (and the introduction of birthright citizenship) indicates that an ethnic concept has given way to a republican concept of nationhood, conservative political elites have used the idea of a guiding culture to implicitly refer to common ethnic markers without declaring this openly.

Transnationality and Economic Categorizations

Another way that transnationality has been classified in Germany, for both migrants and nonmigrants, is in terms of whether it is good or bad, or desirable or nondesirable—what we call nominal categorizations. Nominal categorizations refer to particular subsets of immigrants or nonimmigrants whose cross-border social practices and demands are deemed to be either incompatible with or desirable for liberal politics. Here, the connection between transnationality, national identity, and social inequality seems to be characterized by a dualism. On the one hand, for people with relatively high incomes and degrees from tertiary educational institutions, geographic mobility, and transnational networks are often regarded in public and academic debates as a social asset, an element of upward social mobility. On the other hand, those of lower social status are considered to have hardly any transnational ties; or, if they do, transnationality among them is linked with downward mobility and lack of integration. Migrant groups with few material resources, and little cultural and social bridging capital beyond immigrant enclaves, are thought to derive no benefit from cross-border ties. Instead, transnational practices are seen as reflecting and reinforcing ethnic segregation.

When it comes to debates about the so-called highly qualified from abroad who Germany wants to attract, and highly qualified German citizens who work abroad as professionals and scientists, the absence of talk about integration is striking. Instead, the core of debate is whether they have positive or negative effects for Germany’s economic competitiveness, that is, whether they represent a brain gain or brain drain. Categorizations in terms of economic utility seem to be reserved for highly skilled immigrants and German citizens who are emigrants, whereas low-status immigrants
have been categorized in terms of culture. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder launched a green card initiative in 2001 to attract highly qualified personnel to Germany’s labor markets, reasoning that

if we do not want to lose the competition for the best minds, we need an objective and informed debate on a labor market-oriented immigration. . . . Given the demographic trends, we should try early on to gain in the long run a sufficient number of skilled workers for our economy. There is a fierce international competition for these professionals. With the Green Card initiative, we have given a powerful impulse to the issue of immigration. . . . With this contribution to rapid alleviation of skill shortages in the IT sector, we shall provide additional jobs for the people in this country. Because statistically, each Green Card Expert has created on average two and a half additional jobs.30

Germany as a competition state is concerned not only about gaining brains from abroad but also about the emigration of its own highly qualified citizen-workers.31 Whereas the term brain drain in the 1970s denoted the exodus of highly skilled labor from so-called developing to economically developed countries, it has now entered the discussions of OECD (Organisation for Economics Co-operation and Development) countries with regard to its geographically mobile citizens. Discussion was sparked in 2006, when emigration from Germany reached the highest level since 1954, that is, more people left Germany than entered.32 The number of German citizens moving abroad was in the middle range relative to other OECD countries. Nonetheless, in public debates Germany turned from being a reluctant country of immigration directly into being a country of emigration, evidenced by mass media, such as TV soap operas titled Umzug in ein neues Leben (Moving into a New Life) or Goodbye Deutschland: die Auswanderer (Goodbye Germany: The Emigrants). On October 26, 2006, The Economist even forecast that Germans abroad will be tomorrow’s new guest workers. The accompanying public debates singled out particular professions, especially scientists. In these commentaries, Germany’s Nobel prize winners had only one option to escape Germany’s restrictive and stifling regulation of scientific work—move to the United States. This scenario tied in neatly with the concern about the flight of the creative class and Germany’s losing its best and brightest.33

Considerations of inequality have entered into debates regarding the German-born children of former Turkish guest workers who have moved to Turkey—a case at the intersection of labor migration and the mobility of the so-called highly qualified. Some relatively highly skilled children of Turkish migrants have taken up work in economic powerhouses in Turkish cities such as İstanbul and İzmir. Somewhat provocatively, such movements have been called second-generation return.34 Public
discussion of this phenomenon tends to refer to discrimination encountered by the second generation in Germany and to failed integration, finding fault with the majority population, that has led the young people to move to Turkey. Some academic researchers, in particular, have blamed discriminatory practices in Germany but have not looked at another and much more plausible explanation, namely, increasing opportunities for young professionals in Turkey.35

Mechanisms Underlying Categorizations

To draw boundaries between national integration and the potential disintegrating effects of transnational ties, the underlying social mechanisms first need to be more closely examined. An analysis shows how inequalities are generated, reinforced, and reproduced by transnationality, constantly interacting with other heterogeneities, such as religion, ethnicity, gender, and legal status. The response of those categorized as transnational is also important.

The three most prevalent discursive mechanisms are symbolic exclusion, culturalist ranking, and generalization (homogenization), all of which play a role in creating or buttressing inequalities and hierarchies.

Symbolic exclusion works primarily through devaluing certain cultural beliefs and practices associated with migrants—and valorizing those associated with long-established Germans. It pertains, for example, to the question of whether Islam is a part of German culture. Former federal president Christian Wulff initiated a debate in 2010 when he claimed that “but Islam nowadays also belongs to Germany” (aber der Islam gehört inzwischen auch zu Deutschland). Critics immediately conceded the point but emphasized that Germany is steeped in the Christian-Jewish tradition. The prime minister of Hesse, Volker Bouffier, argued that Christendom and Islam are fundamentally incompatible as long as no liberalized, European Islam exists. Another example is the debate on dual citizenship mentioned earlier.

The overwhelming majority of voices in public debates since the 1990s have not considered transnational ties of actual and future citizens as an integral part of citizenship, which should in their view be a purely national (that is, German) matter. In other words, cross-border transactions in themselves are not relevant for citizenship. Any individual’s country of origin needs to be tolerated if the threshold for citizenship acquisition is to be lowered.

Public debates also rank cultures as integral to the process of distinguishing various categories of transnational migrants and mobile individuals. As mentioned, transnationality is considered desirable for the highly skilled, moving into or out of Germany, aliens or citizens, but for
labor migrants in Germany from abroad, transnationality is a first step toward exclusion and segregation. With respect to the former, transnationality is discussed solely as a prerequisite for increasing economic competitiveness of the national economy. The devaluation of labor migrants, especially those of Muslim origin, is legitimized by their alleged sociocultural backwardness and the danger of segregation and failure to integrate. In this perspective, transnationality simply is another word for what is viewed as an undesirable parallel society. Symbolic exclusion, we thus suggest, is a typical example of cultural categorizations of transnationality.

The mechanisms of symbolic exclusion and cultural ranking intersect with a third—generalization. Generalization is evident, for example, in the debate over the proposed guidelines for naturalization in Baden-Württemberg, in which a new civics test was put forward though finally not adopted, which became known as the Muslim test. In this proposal, the Muslim category appeared as a relatively coherent community. In some debates, this generalization is connected with devaluation and exclusion. What is interesting is that governmental efforts usually have not been intended to devalue Muslim applicants for German citizenship, but rather to differentiate between the wheat and the chaff, distinguishing between secular Muslims and problematic cases. One justification for the proposed stricter citizenship tests was that extremists should not be naturalized. Government spokespeople thus connected national integration policy and the fight against terrorism and political-religious extremism semantically. The war against terrorism did not only seek to identify those who committed terrorist acts, but also, through integration policy, to prevent those ready to engage in violence from becoming citizens. To make such distinctions, civics knowledge and mastery of the national language were viewed as desirable. More general concerns focused on values, norms, and practices associated with Muslim groups. In the proposed naturalization test in Baden-Württemberg, for example, parents would have been asked how they would react if their daughter wanted to dress like other (German) girls and women, or if a son or brother was insulted; if a man married several women; and if they would use force to marry off their daughter. The panoply of questions covered practically all publicly debated issues such as gender relations, the headscarf, homosexuality, honor killings, forced marriage, terrorism, and freedom of religion. The answers were meant to give a comprehensive picture of the applicant’s inner disposition. Eventually, the German federal government decided on a much milder standard test that refrained from examining the internal disposition and ethos of applicants, as the Baden-Württemberg proposal suggested should be done. This was a sign that civic integrationism in Germany might indeed not be so aggressive but could conform to liberal standards. Nonetheless, the public debate around the test showed that generalizations—in this case,
stereotypes about Islam—so constantly used in the media were an important way to categorize certain migrant-origin groups.

Various strategies have been used by those claiming to speak for the symbolically excluded and those whose symbolic resources are devalued. One such strategy is symbolic inclusion. A speech given by Turkish prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan in the Köln Arena in 2008 is a particularly potent example.38 Significantly, Erdoğan did not mention the term integration, commonly used in Germany, but pronounced “assimilation as a crime against humanity.”39 Although he encouraged Turks in Germany to participate actively in German life and not consider themselves victims of discrimination, he praised the achievements of his government in Turkey and encouraged Turks in Germany to continue to feel that they belonged and remain attached to Turkey—a strategy aptly called long-distance nationalism.40 Similar views have been evident in many speeches and statements by Turkish politicians of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government over the past decade, as in a recent statement by Turkish minister of economics Zafer Çağlayan: “You should never assimilate and you should never forget your language and religion. Yet you should naturalize and become citizens in the countries in which you live. You should enter the economic and political streams, ask critical questions and exercise the right to vote. If you do so, you will be a formidable power which cannot be ignored.”41

Another strategy of politicians speaking for the excluded is reactive reframing, which is evident in statements by several umbrella associations of Turkish immigrants, mostly in response to debates aggressively emphasizing the need for social integration. Whereas the associations frequently referred to transnational ties until the mid-1990s, since then, they have dealt with transnational issues in ambiguous ways and tended to put more emphasis on integration, partly in response to civic integrationist pressures.42 For example, the Turkish Community Berlin (Türkische Gemeinde Berlin, or TGB), which before the mid-1990s was more concerned with, and took positions on, political events and developments in Turkey since the mid-1990s, has been focused on integration in Germany and avoids issues concerning politics in Turkey. An analysis of reports in four major nationwide newspapers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, and Die Tageszeitung) between 1995 and 2004 indicates the five major topics noted in articles on Turkish migrant associations (number of articles in parentheses): citizenship (N = 241), Islam (N = 203), integration (N = 200), exclusion and racism (N = 129), accession of Turkey to the European Union (N = 72), and other (N = 66).43 Despite the shift in focus, which could be described as a reactive reframing, the leaders and members of most Turkish migrant associations generally see national and transnational issues and orientations as deeply intertwined. Although such associations were minor players in German
debates on dual citizenship, they sought a greater role and argued that political and social inclusion through naturalization depended on greater tolerance of dual citizenship.44

The Symbolic Politics of Doing National Identity and Integration

What about the political context in which terms used in debates about national identity, integration, and transnational ties operate? How does the cultural categorization enter into political debates, and what are the consequences for inequalities?

Public debates involve struggles over interpretations of symbolic boundaries. The ways that integration and disintegration and, relatedly, national and transnational allegiances and identities have been classified, defined, and described do not simply describe social reality but also help create perceptions of that reality. If these categorizations are used in policymaking, they are directly linked to political structures and decision-making.45

Integration and—implicitly—transnationality are meta-issues that abound in symbolic politics in Germany.46 All kinds of issues, such as unemployment and cutbacks in the welfare state or terrorism, have at various periods been tagged onto migration and integration. Their symbolic use in politics has helped establish migration as a meta-issue. In the 1980s, migration allegedly accounted for the deleterious effects of economic crisis and policy failures.47 In the 1990s and 2000s, transnationality in the sense of continued attachments across borders, such as importing marriage partners from Turkey to Germany, came to be seen as an impediment to social integration. Overall, migration, integration, and transnational ties have come to be associated with social inequalities and various social problems.

The opportunities to use symbolic politics and migration in relation to national identity have increased over the past few years, and not only in Germany. Economic austerity has severely affected the capacity of nation-states to mediate between the rights of citizens on the one hand and the requirements of capital accumulation on the other. Governments in all the wealthy nations face stronger resistance to tax increases, particularly in highly indebted countries where infusions of public money will be needed for many years to pay for goods that have long been consumed. Although and perhaps because it has become increasingly difficult to pretend that the tensions between capitalism and democracy can be handled within the boundaries of national political communities, symbolic politics sometimes is a convenient escape. For transnational ties and attachments to be effective symbolically—a crucial requisite for politicization—they need
to appear as a concrete danger to social integration of the nation, albeit a diffuse one. Thus politicians use issues such as transnational allegiances to demonstrate that they can deal with cross-border matters and globalization. The symbolic politics of national identity and integration are also a way to renew national identity. Leitkultur is a prime example. Given symbolic exclusion of immigrants, the native population can be imagined and addressed as a group, which then can be conceived as the subject of political decisions. As classical studies of nationalism have shown, “national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating . . . divided and disoriented individuals who have had to content with the vast changes and uncertainties of the modern world.”48 Over the past three decades, conservative politicians in Germany have used this approach more often than liberal and democratic socialist ones. The latter have usually insisted that national citizenship is a basis for claiming rights. Conservative politicians, on the other hand, have emphasized that citizenship should be granted only after newcomers have successfully integrated into the national community.

The particular issues related to transnational connections vary from country to country. In Germany and the Netherlands, for example, dual citizenship was at the center of symbolic politics in the 1990s—and dual citizens were portrayed by the critics of multiple citizenship as reaping undue advantages, such as the right to vote twice. More recently, cross-border ties of terrorists have figured prominently in public debates.

Interestingly, the same types of arguments used to distinguish national-liberal-modern from transnational-illiberal-traditional are used by those symbolically excluded to claim inclusion. For example, in Germany and elsewhere in western Europe, representatives of Muslim organizations have appealed to the discourse on human rights to demand the freedom to practice their religion and for institutional integration on the same footing as established religious communities.

**Conclusion: The Limits of Using Transnationality**

The analysis of German integration debates reveals how binaries of national-transnational and the nominal categorizations of transnationality are particular expressions of the relations between national identity and the *other*. The representation of German national identity is supported by tenets on integration, and the reference to the transnational helps distinguish integration from nonintegration or disintegration. Mechanisms such as symbolic exclusion, culturalist ranking, and generalization do not apply to all immigrant groups or at all times, however. Some groups over time may come to be perceived as part of *us*, an effort directed at equalization. Moreover, Germans abroad (the highly skilled, such as scientists)
and highly skilled labor who are highly sought after to contribute to the German labor market are discussed in terms not of integration but instead of economic competitiveness.

Our argument is that it is useful to conceive of transnationality as a heterogeneity in public debates on inequalities and national identities. The social mechanisms by which this is achieved, for example, symbolic exclusion and culturalist ranking, function as distancing mechanisms which serve to produce and maintain hierarchies. At the same time, efforts at inclusion by those of migrant-origin affected by discursive exclusion constitute countermechanisms. Yet the dominant debates on national identity and integration in Germany have not incorporated the voices of the excluded. Such discursive inequalities are reinforced by how the categories are used in political debates and campaigns. The use of migration, integration, and transnational ties in symbolic politics helps shape how those of migrant origin are seen—and indeed how they see themselves.

What role transnational ties will continue to play in how national identities and allegiances are presented in public debates in Germany remains to be seen. The juxtaposition of national versus transnational may become problematic as a cultural categorization to the extent that value generalization, a concept Talcott Parsons puts forward, is advancing. According to Parsons, the more a society becomes differentiated, the more its values become abstract in order to legitimate its different functions, segments, and subcultures. The higher degrees of differentiation within modern societies result in problems of systems and social integration, which usually are addressed by including new entities, structures, and mechanisms within the normative frame of society.49 As we have indicated, public debates in Germany over the past twenty years have been replete with multiple references to appeals to a liberal (political, social, economic) order, with the frequent invocation of human rights being just one example.50 Parsons goes so far as to argue that “when the network of socially structured situations becomes more complex, the value pattern itself must be couched at a higher level of generality in order to ensure social stability.”51

We are not sure whether Parson’s observation holds empirically true. Nonetheless, the political instrumentalization of transnational ties will likely keep changing. After all, much of what used to be discursively conceived of or portrayed as transnational or common to all Western countries—including liberal convictions and an adherence to human rights or republican understandings of nationality—is (now) increasingly part of national self-understanding. In addition, if national politicians rely on and enforce liberal norms to construct a liberal national identity, it is highly likely that they can demand loyalty from the inside populace and support from the outside as well. Liberal norms act as a powerful resource for a legitimate justification of political action in Western democracies.
Moreover, other factors are also at work, as a second and third generation is coming of age and entering the broad economic and political arenas in Germany. As economic transnational ties of the children of immigrants take forms different from those of their parents—examples included circular occupational mobility between Germany and the parents’ country of origin—so will the frames used to debate such issues change. Also, cultural practices are less tied to the countries of origin in religion, at least on an organizational level. In the process, Germany has entered a process of redefining herself to include certain types of Islam and to tolerate cross-border loyalties. In a diverse multicultural society, the other can no longer just be the migrant or foreigner. The boundaries of national identity are thus being reformed, lines increasingly drawn between bad and good foreigners and good and bad forms of transnationality.

We would like to thank Hye-Young Haubner and Eveline Reisenauer for constructive criticism and valuable suggestions. We are especially grateful to Nancy Foner for her constructive criticism and guidance.

Notes

2. Adherence to liberal norms is in no way the only exclusionary criterion. Yet in a country like Germany, statements that openly define categories in terms of race are rare because of the racist past of the Nazi regime.
3. For example, Scholl-Latour 1999, 268.
12. Blau 1977. Two research projects in the Collaborative Research Center “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities” (CRC 882) deal with transnationality understood as a continuum of cross-border ties. Both projects mainly deal with social structural analysis and not, like this chapter, with the analysis of public discourse. The project “Transnationality and the Unequal Distribution of Social Protection” analyzes the nominal categorizations in Turkish-German, Polish-German and Kazakh-German social spaces. The project “Pilot Study: Longitudinal Panel” uses mixed methods, quantitative and qualitative, to design a longitudinal study of German-Turkish households to investigate

17. The public debates are based mainly on Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007.
18. A third main debate, citizenship discourse on social rights, social security in particular, cannot be dealt with here for reasons of space; see Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004, chapter 3, showing these three topical issues as the main arenas of public debate in major German newspapers from 1996 until 1999.
21. In academic discourse, the two are very different: multiculturalism is mainly concerned with social integration within the national state, without explicit consideration of cross-border transactions, whereas transnationalization as an analytical perspective takes into account the latter, leaving open the unit to which integration refers—immigration or emigration national states, migrant groups, localities, and so on.
25. Peter Huber, then minister of interior of Thuringia, in Deutscher Bundestags 2010, 2232B.
26. Merz, cited in Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 313. Similar statements are common in public debates. In the words of the Bavarian minister of the interior at the time (1999), “real integration demands, first of all, major accomplishments from individuals. The acquisition of the German language is a first crucial step. In addition, foreign fellow citizens must devote themselves to our state and its societal and constitutional order and value systems with no ifs, ands, or buts. Respecting our political, social, and cultural conditions is essential” (Günter Beckstein, cited in Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 303).
27. See also Seibt, cited in Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 314.
28. For an empirical analysis of this claim in the German context, see Ette and Sauer 2010.
32. A typical statement in parliament (Bundestag) raising the issue of brain drain: “We need the best brains. Yet the problem is: These brains are thinking too often in other places in this world. It is simply a fact that the country of poets and thinkers is losing its thinkers. The data although incomplete, show this:
In 2005 about 150,000 Germans emigrated, about 100,000 have returned. There is already a big gap. The significance can be played down, as you did, Mr. Schäuble. However, we have to take this problem seriously” (Thea Dückert cited in Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 12383, author’s translation).

34. See King and Christou 2010.
36. Sometimes, the interpretation then immediately moves from arguments emphasizing “brain drain” to desirable mobility in and out of Germany: “The mobility of highly skilled workers can only be appreciated, for Germany, in the case of foreign specialists and scholars alike. It is in our own interest that our scientists and professionals go abroad to educate themselves, to collect personal experiences and to return with this knowledge back home. In the same way, we are interested to attract internationally renowned scientists and professionals to work in our country” (Annette Hübinger cited in Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 12391).
37. The interview guidelines introduced in Baden-Württemberg were part of a series of measures introduced in Europe. In 2005, Austria introduced a test examining civics knowledge as part of the naturalization process, the Netherlands followed suit in 2006. In Germany, heated debates emerged when the Länder Baden-Württemberg and Hesse came up with proposals for new and stricter guidelines for naturalization interviews.
41. “Bulunmuş olduğunuz ülkelerde, asimile olmayacınız, dilinize ve dininizi asla unutmayacımız, o ülke vatandaşına geçerek, o ülkenin tüm siyaset ve ticaret kanallarına geçerek, o ülkelerde hesap soran ve oy veren konumda olacaksınız. Bunlaryaptığınız zaman hiç bir güç, bu gücün karşısında duramayacak” (Hüriyet, November 19, 2011, 4).
42. On references to ties, Rauer 2010; on emphasizing integration, Faist and Amelina 2008.
43. Rauer 2010, 77.
44. One of the crucial questions for further analysis is whether exclusionary mechanisms ultimately result in self-identification as a sort of self-otherization among the immigrant groups concerned (Hall 1996). This possibility would imply that not only the receiving group but also the newcomers conceive of themselves as the other. Another possibility is that those affected negotiate their way around dominant beliefs.
45. Compare Foucault 2004, 187. The public debates and the negative portrayals of some types of transnationality, that is, the transnational connections of some types of migrants expressing or resulting in disintegration, are frequently far removed from the practices of transnationality in everyday life, in manifold localities, as observed in empirical research (see, for example,
Faist and Özveren 2004). Research thus suggests a much more nuanced and balanced picture of transnationality as a heterogeneity. Although a number of studies, particularly in the American context, have shown that transnational resources can contribute to improving the social position of the lower-income groups (see Levitt and Jaworsky 2007), such findings refer mostly to this position in the country of settlement, and implications for the place of origin require more systematic study. In a transnational inequality perspective, the dynamics of multiple places of reference within a transnational space must be taken into account. By the same token, multiple affiliations can also give rise to new restrictions and conflicts, for example between those who remain spatially immobile and take care of supporting children and elderly family members on the one hand and those migrating abroad on the other hand.

49. Because we use Parson’s position on value generalization only as a heuristic, we take the term society as being unproblematic for this analysis. Also, we do not argue that value generalization is inherently evolutionary in terms of an ever progressing march toward ever more abstract norms. Reversals are possible.
51. Parsons 1971, 27.

References


