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Introduction

Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity: Immigration and Belonging in North America and Western Europe

NANCY FONER AND PATRICK SIMON

After more than fifty years of large-scale immigration, western European and North American societies have been dramatically transformed by the huge inflows that have altered the composition of their populations in profound ways and created remarkable—new—ethnic, racial, and religious diversity. A crucial issue concerns whether the newcomers, and especially their second-generation children, are included in, or excluded from, the prevailing national identity and come to feel that they belong. Now that a second, and indeed third, generation has come or is coming of age it is more pressing than ever to understand whether others recognize them—and they see themselves—as truly belonging to the societies that have been their home since birth.

This issue is of special importance given developments on both sides of the Atlantic. In much of western Europe, the rise in concerns about national identity in the last two decades is notable. In the Netherlands, a nationalistic backlash followed the 2004 sensational murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh in the streets of Amsterdam by a Dutch-born Muslim fundamentalist of Moroccan origin, and the last decade has seen intense public debates there on Islam and the integration of the second generation. In Britain, the deadly July 7 London bombings in 2005 (fifty-two people were killed) by three second-generation Pakistanis and a Jamaican convert to Islam strengthened worries about “home-grown Muslim terrorists.” In general, anxiety continues in Britain about the consequences of fragmentation and segregation along ethnic community lines. France has also witnessed debates about the integration of immigrants and the second generation, with growing concern about
ethnic and racial discrimination and threats to national identity since the riots of 2005 and, most recently in January 2015, the terror attacks in Paris by second-generation French Muslims, killing a dozen people in and around the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, a policewoman in the street, and four in a kosher supermarket. Germany may not have experienced similar murders, bombings, or riots but it too has seen heated public discussions about national identity and the failure of immigrant integration and, in 2014 and early 2015, rallies against the influence of Islam organized under the banner of a new political movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West). Scandinavian countries—which have long promoted tolerance for immigrants and practiced a mild multiculturalism, Sweden being considered a forerunner in this respect in Europe—have seen the rise of anti-immigrant mobilizations in recent decades and a concern that immigrants are threatening the cultural cohesiveness of their societies and the welfare state.1

Debates throughout Europe have been problematized by scholars as, among other things, related to a backlash against multiculturalism, a “restrictive turn,” the “return of assimilation,” and the use of cultural and social differences to heighten the salience of symbolic boundaries between us and them.2 The debates have been accompanied by the adoption of new civic tests for naturalization in many European countries that represent an ideal version of the nation and require skills and knowledge that even most long-established residents do not possess.3

The widely held anxieties over immigrant integration and national identity are reflected in, and have been intensified by, often-quoted statements by leading public figures such as German chancellor Angela Merkel in 2010 on the failure of the MultiKulti creed in Germany, British prime minister David Cameron in 2011 on how state multiculturalism has led to different cultures with separate lives apart from the mainstream, and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2011 on the need to shore up French republican values and their importance to what it means to be French. In many European countries, fears and worries about the “lack of integration” of immigrants and the second generation have focused heavily on concerns about Muslims, who are viewed as challenging, indeed undermining, basic norms and values associated with modern western democracies.4 Populist parties have capitalized on and reinforced nativist views, putting these views at the center of political debate in European societies.5 Indeed, the 2014 election for the European parliament saw an unprecedented upsurge in the voting strength of populist and anti-immigrant parties. In Britain, Denmark, and France, these parties, which made clear a willingness to stop immigration and to institute various preferences for long-established natives, attracted a remarkably high share of voters, France’s National Front (FN, Front National) getting
25 percent and the Danish People’s Party (DF, Dansk Folkeparti) and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) each getting 27 percent in their countries.

Across the Atlantic, public debates are less focused on national identity issues and fears of cultural fragmentation. Becoming American and becoming Canadian are seen as less problematic. Although levels of anxiety about national identity are not the same as in western Europe, nativist fears have bubbled to the surface. In Canada, especially Quebec, passionate debates on the “reasonable accommodation” of religious practices and rituals have arisen, with Muslim practices particularly at issue. In the United States, concerns have been voiced about Islam and Muslim immigrants’ fitting into the nation since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. It is Latinos, however, especially the millions of undocumented, who have been the focus of alarm and often seen as a threat to the American nation.

The essays in this book explore these fears and anxieties about national identity and issues of belonging through case studies of several western European countries—the Netherlands (chapter 5), Britain (chapter 6), and Germany (chapter 7)—and, on the other side of the Atlantic, the United States (chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4) and Canada (chapter 2). All of these countries have had to deal with incorporating millions of immigrants whose ethnic, racial, and national backgrounds differ from those of many long-established residents, and who display a variety of languages, religions, cultures, and lifestyles. Immigrants and the second generation make up about a fifth or more of the population in each of the five countries, Canada at the high end (38 percent) and Britain at the low end (18 percent), and Germany (19 percent), the Netherlands (21 percent), and the United States (25 percent) in between. In actual numbers, the United States stands out with around 77 million first- and second-generation immigrants, more than twice the total Canadian population and more than four times the Dutch. As the chapters show, the five countries represent a variety of different institutional approaches and policies to immigration and diversity. Moreover, fears and anxieties among long-established natives about whether immigrants and their descendants can be truly part of the nation have developed in each of the countries in particular ways.

Although the chapters touch on reasons some native elites have adopted nativist stances, the main concerns throughout the book are different. A major focus is the sense of inclusion into, or exclusion from, national membership that those of immigrant origin experience, whether they are called immigrants and the second generation or ethnic, racial, or religious minorities. In addition, two related questions are key: What forces account for the openness or barriers to national belonging and acceptance for these minorities in the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic? What are the anxieties about the incorporation of individuals of immigrant
origin that stand out in the United States—and how do they differ from those that are prominent in western Europe?

In this introductory chapter, we do several things, with an eye on Europe–North America comparisons. We begin by considering why fears and anxieties about immigrant origin populations and their incorporation have taken different forms in western Europe and North America, exploring why the religious divide is more central in Europe and legal status and race especially pronounced in the United States. Drawing on the analyses in the volume’s chapters, we then look at whether—and to what degree—immigrants and especially their children are seen as being insiders and part of the nation in different countries. We analyze why, despite especially profound inequalities and barriers based on race and legal status in the United States, the United States and Canada are more inclusive in extending a national identity to those of immigrant origin than western European societies. We conclude by briefly looking ahead to the future and to the prospect of changes on both sides of the Atlantic.

Fears about Immigrants and Barriers to Inclusion

On one level, many pervasive fears and anxieties about whether those of immigrant origin can, or should, be full members of the nation can be considered a matter of basic nativism. Nativism is what the historian John Higham referred to as an intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign connections or, as Gary Gerstle puts it in chapter 1, that they are not like us, the native-born keepers of the nation’s traditions. A nativist reaction, among at least some of the longer-settled majority population and involving discourses about the impossibility of assimilation, is a phenomenon in most societies experiencing an inflow of massive numbers of immigrants whose ethnic and racial backgrounds, and cultural and religious allegiances, are perceived as unlike those of established residents. Views about “unmeltable” differences are fueled by the attachments of newcomers to traditions and identities often seen as at odds with national cohesion.

As the chapters in this book indicate, worries about the loss of cultural hegemony in the face of massive immigration, and the dangers that immigration and new diversity pose to core national cultural beliefs and practices, underpin concerns about those of immigrant origin held by some politicians, public intellectuals, and opinion leaders as well as by many in the general public in both Europe and North America. The British Labour and Conservative Party politicians that Nasar Meer, Varun Uberoi, and Tariq Modood discuss in chapter 6 were sincerely wrestling, often in complex and contradictory ways, with the tortured public debate about how to reconcile British values and traditions with those in the large Bangladeshi
and Pakistani Muslim communities. Other chapters in this volume suggest that politicians (most commonly, but not exclusively, on the Right) may, at times, benefit from—and in the process further stoke—concerns about threats to mainstream culture in their quest to bolster support and gain votes. The Netherlands is a pertinent example. Although the country is well known for its progressive social policies, anti-immigrant, populist politicians have gained seats in the Dutch national parliament by defending traditional national identities against the perceived onslaught of newcomers, especially Muslims.

Fears and anxiety about immigrants have other roots, as well. On the European Left, as Irene Bloemraad notes in chapter 2, some public figures have worried that continued immigration will undermine the welfare state by undercutting the social cohesion and sense of common identity needed for redistribution policies. Marieke Slootman and Jan Willem Duyvendak point in chapter 5 to another dynamic operating in the Netherlands. Many Dutch politicians feel that the more tolerant policies adopted in previous decades failed to produce the successful integration of immigrants and their children and believe (or hope) that a less tolerant approach will be more effective—an approach supported by many of their native Dutch constituents. In Europe and in North America, competition for resources may also be at play: many long-established natives worry that newcomers and their children will reduce their own access to jobs, housing, and other valued benefits and opportunities. In the United States, many white Americans see the growing population of racial minorities—which has been fueled by immigration—as threatening white political and economic advantages and dominance.

Religion

A central, comparative, transatlantic question is why particular fears about immigrants—and whether, and how, they can be incorporated into the nation—are more or less prominent in public discourse in Europe as compared to North America, especially the United States. This brings us to a consideration of particular barriers to integration, beginning with religion. Why is religion a more central divide and barrier to the inclusion of immigrant minorities in western Europe, whereas inequalities based on legal status and race are more serious bases for exclusion in the United States? The answer is linked to the composition of immigrant flows and, perhaps even more important, historically rooted social, political, and economic institutions in the different receiving societies.

The domain of immigrant religion—in particular, Islam—has become of pivotal importance as a source of exclusion in western Europe, as the chapters on Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands indicate. On one side are worries about Islam in the international political sphere and terrorist
networks and the links to local integration. These are evident in recent concerns about the radicalization of young European Muslims and the involvement of some in wars in Iraq and Syria in the name of the jihad. Religion in western Europe is also—and very significantly—at the heart of fears about whether many immigrants and their children can truly belong. A central issue among vocal critics of Islam, and a concern among a substantial portion of the population, is that Islam is threatening the liberal values of European states, such as free speech and equal rights for women and homosexuals. As John Bowen and his colleagues note,

Across a wide political spectrum, public figures denounce Islam for its retrograde values. Some claim that Islam is incompatible with the values of Europe and European states, that Muslims are irreducibly foreign because they will not or cannot abandon pre-Enlightenment values. Framing Islam as a set of values intrinsically incompatible with Europe implies that Muslims must choose between abandoning their religion and remaining outside the boundaries of the true European citizenry. . . . Western European states have [in response] tried to define national identities as reservoirs of values for citizenship: Dutch values, French laïcité . . . Britishness. . . . By doing so they have transformed what had been values of liberal citizenship into values of cultural distinctiveness.9

Statements like that of Geert Wilders, the popular leader of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, may be extreme and condemned by many but have become part of Dutch public discourse. Wilders, whose party was at the top of the polls in 2013, has called Islam a backward religion. “If we do not stop Islamification now,” he has said, “Eurabia and Netherabia will just be a matter of time. . . . We are heading for the end of European civilization . . . as we know it.”10 In Germany, a best-selling book by Thilo Sarrazin, who served on the board of Germany’s central bank, blames Muslims for lowering the nation’s intelligence level and argues that immigration and high birth rates will eventually turn Germany into a Muslim country. Throughout Europe, conflicts have developed over Muslim practices, including ritual animal slaughter, mosque building, the call to prayer, and, most visible of all, wearing the headscarf and niqab (full-face veil).11 In the Netherlands, as Slootman and Duyvendak note in chapter 5, these Muslim practices, as well as pronouncements by ultra-orthodox imams and Islam-inspired political extremists, are popular subjects in the media, where they are often portrayed as threatening to destroy, damage, and undermine Dutch culture. In chapter 7, Thomas Faist and Christian Ulbricht speak of symbolic exclusion in which certain cultural beliefs and practices associated with migrants are devalued—and those associated with long-established Germans are valorized. They cite the prime minister of one German
state, who argued that Christendom and Islam are fundamentally incompatible as long as no liberalized European Islam exists. Migrants of Muslim origin are commonly disparaged for their supposed sociocultural backwardness and failure to integrate into German society. In Germany as elsewhere, the legacy, and memory, of the terrorist attacks of September 11 have strengthened fears that Muslims are not loyal citizens but manipulated from abroad. Faist and Ulbricht also provide a fascinating analysis of the strategic use of the concept of a German Leitkultur (guiding culture) by conservative Christian Democrats—a concept associated with certain civil liberties and human rights and implicitly contrasted with the “other culture” of Islam. Reference to this concept is a way political figures can appeal to many in the German majority population and distinguish the Christian Democratic Party from liberal political parties. At the same time, by not naming Islam, Faist and Ulbricht argue, the concept of a German Leitkultur implicitly refers to ethnic markers without declaring so openly and thus seeks to avoid alienating spokespersons for Muslim organizations (and no doubt at least some Muslim voters).

Anti-Muslim sentiments are of course present in the United States, which, among other things, has witnessed hate crimes and bias incidents against Muslims in the wake of September 11, state surveillance of Muslims, and a number of controversies over the building of mosques. Yet Islam has not aroused the same bitter reaction as it has in western Europe, nor is it as frequent a subject of public debate about whether immigrants are fitting in. Immigration debates in the United States, as Jocelyne Cesari writes, have not been Islamicized, or systematically connected with anti-Islamic rhetoric, as they have in much of western Europe. Muslims in the United States are more often framed as an enemy from outside the country threatening national security, than as an enemy from within undermining national cultural values, as in western Europe.

Nancy Foner and Richard Alba argue that religion is less of a barrier to inclusion in the United States than in many western European countries for three main reasons. One is that the great majority of immigrants in the United States, like most of the native born, are Christian, and Muslims are a tiny proportion of the immigrant population, an estimated 4 percent. In western Europe, Muslims have become the largest religious minority as a result of postwar inflows, and are a much larger proportion of the immigrant-origin population. Moreover, Muslim immigrants in the United States are relatively successful in socioeconomic terms relative to their counterparts in Europe, where Islam is associated with large immigrant groups whose successful incorporation is viewed as problematic, such as Turks in Germany, North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands, and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain.
In addition, Americans indicate higher levels of religious commitment and involvement than western Europeans. To be religious in the United States is the norm and in sync with mainstream expectations, whereas secularism has gained ground among remarkably large segments of western European societies where the religious are generally a decided minority. The higher degree of secularization in Europe means that forms of social and cultural activity based on religious principles are frequently seen as illegitimate, especially when it comes to Islam. Indeed, in the wake of the 2015 killings in Paris in the offices of a satirical magazine, French Premier Manuel Valls emphasized that “there needs to be a firm message about the values of the Republic and of secularism.” In the United States, demands made on the basis of religion are a common feature of American life, put forward by a broad range of religious groups, including most vocally and most often by fundamentalist and evangelical (mostly native-born white) Christians. In the Netherlands, Slootman and Duyvendak argue in chapter 5, the development of a progressive yet intolerant, monoculturalism on issues such as homosexuality and gender roles—in contrast to the strict sexual morals that the Dutch only recently left behind—has exacerbated the divide with Muslim populations and accentuated the sense among the majority population that they must reinvigorate and protect Dutch culture. Whereas in the United States, they write, opinions among the majority population are divided on issues of gender, family, and sexuality, in the Netherlands almost the entire political spectrum of the Dutch majority population supports progressive values on these matters.

Finally, state institutions and constitutional principles in the United States—and the eventual incorporation of Catholics and Jews into the system of American pluralism in the mid-twentieth century—provide a foundation for the easier acceptance and integration of non-Christian religions. As secular as Europeans are, their societies have deeply institutionalized religious identities that are rooted in history—and majority denominations have been accorded special privileges whose impact lingers on. In Britain and the Netherlands, the state provides financial support for religious schools. Although these arrangements are seemingly fair to all religions, they favor the most established ones. As of 2010, for example, the government funded more than 6,500 Church of England and Catholic schools in Britain, but as of 2011 only twelve Islamic schools in a nation of nearly three million Muslims. In the Netherlands, most children go to state-supported religious schools, nearly all Protestant and Catholic, but the country’s nearly one million Muslims in 2008 had only about forty-four of their own publicly funded schools educating about ten thousand pupils. In Germany, Catholics and Protestants as well as Jews—but not Islam, the third largest faith—are recognized as public corporations and entitled to federally collected church taxes and the right
to run state-subsidized religious social services and hospitals. Because Islam is not organized the same way as the historically recognized religions in Germany, it is outside the state-supported mainstream. In short, in western Europe, Muslim immigrants confront, on the one hand, majority populations that are mainly secular and therefore suspicious of claims based on religion and its requirements and, on the other, societal institutions and national identities that remain anchored to an important extent in Christianity and do not make equal room for Islam.

Canada, it might be noted, seems in between western Europe and the United States, religion there posing fewer problems for integration than in continental Europe. At the same time, issues over the “reasonable accommodation” of religious minorities, such as wearing the Islamic veil in public settings, have engendered heated controversies in Francophone Quebec, owing, among other things, to the growing erosion of religiosity and increase in secularization since the 1960s, the historically strong French connection, and—as a Francophone island in an Anglophone sea—the fear that the arrival of outsiders will dilute or erode Quebecois cultural identity. The debate around the project to establish a Quebec Charter of Values (Charte de la laïcité), which was officially launched as Bill 60 in September 2013, reveals the continued contentious role of religion in Quebec. In the name of “religious neutrality and reserve,” the then-governing party, Parti Quebecois (PC), proposed to bar government employees from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols,” including Muslim headscarves and veils (as well as yarmulkes, turbans, and oversized Christian crosses) on the job (although also planning to keep the large crucifix in Quebec’s National Assembly and allowing Christmas trees in government offices). In the end, the bill was canceled after the PC was defeated in the April 2014 election.

Controversy over Islam, it should be added, has also erupted in Anglophone Canada. For example, Muslims sought to include sharia in Ontario family tribunals in line with the province’s recognition of Catholic and Jewish faith-based tribunals to settle family law matters. The provincial government decided in 2005 to reject the inclusion of sharia law, at the same time revoking parallel privileges previously available to Jews and Catholics. Less equitably, in 2007, when about a third of students in Ontario’s publicly funded schools attended Catholic institutions, voters in the province strongly rejected a proposal to extend funding beyond Catholic schools.

**Legal Status**

If religion is less of a barrier to inclusion in the United States than western Europe, legal status is a much greater divide. To be sure, citizenship rules in the United States and Canada are more liberal than those in western
European countries, which lack the same kind of unqualified and unconditional birthright citizenship. Still, citizenship regimes in much of continental Europe have been moving in many ways in a North American direction to make it easier for long-settled immigrants and their children to acquire citizenship. By now, the majority of western European countries provide some form of jus soli citizenship to the second generation, though it occurs “not only automatically at birth [as in the United States], but also under conditions of residency or through voluntary acquisition, both of which are presumed to entail socialization.”

When it comes to legal barriers, the big issue is undocumented status and here the U.S. case is striking. Although irregular or undocumented immigration is an issue of ongoing public debate and concern in western Europe, the size of the unauthorized migrant population there, and its share of the foreign-born total, pale beside the figures for the United States. Indeed, according to a Migration Policy Institute report, Europe’s unauthorized migrant population was on the decline between 2002 and 2008. In 2008, estimates of the number of irregular or unauthorized immigrants in the twenty-seven European Union member states ranged from 1.9 to 3.8 million: an estimated 196,000 to 457,000 in Germany, around 417,000 to 863,000 in Britain, and between 178,000 and 400,000 in France. In Canada, in the absence of credible tallies, scholars have cited media reports of between 200,000 and 400,000. The United States, by contrast, was home to an astounding 11.7 million undocumented immigrants in 2012—up from an estimated 3.5 million in 1990—and they constituted more than a quarter of the total foreign-born population of around 40 million.

Given the enormity of the numbers, it is perhaps not surprising that fears and anxieties about immigration in the United States focus on this group—or that the fears center on Latinos, who are about four-fifths of the undocumented, and even more specifically on Mexicans, who are more than half. In chapter 4, Mary C. Waters and Philip Kasinitz detail the plight of the undocumented, who live in fear of detention and deportation and in the shadows of the law, in what they call a system of legal and political exclusion in which legal mechanisms and lack of political rights play an increased role. The level of formal deportations in recent years has been astounding, reaching over four hundred thousand in 2012. Many of the undocumented who have been detained in prisons or detention facilities have had no criminal record and have been held for such minor offenses as traffic-related violations. The general fear of the law means that the undocumented are often afraid to contact school authorities, seek medical care, or ask the police for help. Not only do they tend to be confined to low-paid jobs with unpleasant, sometimes dangerous, conditions, but they are also often afraid to report employers who refuse to pay them or cheat them. They cannot live in public housing and are ineligible for most federally funded social welfare and health benefits. These experiences of social
exclusion have been shown to have consequences beyond the parental
generation, with negative effects on the trajectories of U.S.-born children
of undocumented immigrants, despite their birthright citizenship.29

Public debates about immigration in the United States—and anti-
immigrant sentiment—are, by and large, about undocumented immi-
gration. Press coverage of immigration is overwhelmingly about the
undocumented. In chapter 4 of this volume, Waters and Kasinitz note
that from 1980 to 2007, about four-fifths of Associated Press stories
on immigration topics fit into the framework of illegality. In the same
period, 86 percent of New York Times stories on immigration dealt
with illegality in various forms. Many Americans worry that “illegal”
immigrants are overrunning the country and think that a much larger
proportion of the foreign born are undocumented than is the case.
Many politicians, especially Republicans in regions that have only
recently experienced an upswing in immigration and in districts
with few minority voters, have played on and exacerbated these fears
in their rhetoric and political appeals. Waters and Kasinitz observe that
undocumented immigration, and the beliefs that both undocumented
and legal immigrants receive government benefits they did not work
for, have fueled the growth of right-wing movements such as the
Tea Party.

Whereas in public etiquette, racial and ethnic slurs are condemned
when public officials utter them, it is acceptable in public discourse, and
carries little stigma, to disparage and castigate the undocumented, as
opposed to the “good” immigrants who are in the United States legally
and whose achievements are often celebrated. Focusing on “illegals” in
immigration debates, in fact, is one way that long-established Americans
can support the notion that immigration is good and made America great
yet at the same time distance themselves, and their ancestors, from con-
temporary arrivals. My people, the argument goes, came legally in the
past—they were the model immigrants; today, too many immigrants
are illegal and should not be here at all.30 Politicians arguing for tougher
immigration enforcement and border control, Waters and Kasinitz write,
“often pause to praise the work ethic of legal immigrants and say good
things about the role of cultural diversity in American life. . . . In the
American imagination the illegal immigrant, usually assumed to be
Mexican, has come to be seen as an undeserving criminal, in contrast to
legal immigrants, who are often depicted as virtuous, hardworking, and
rule followers.”

Race

Despite the remarkable changes in the United States since the civil rights
era, race remains a potent fault line given the historical legacy of slavery,
segregation, and ghettoization in the nation. Of course, racial divisions
are relevant in western Europe as well. Even if the term *race* is frowned upon there for its associations with the Nazi past and for legitimizing inequalities, racial differences—based on the belief that visible physical differences or putative ancestry define groups or categories of people as inferior or superior in ways that are innate or unchangeable—have important consequences.\(^{31}\) This is especially so in countries where postcolonial immigration has led to the creation of a significant population of racialized groups: North and sub-Saharan Africans, Caribbeans, and South Asians. In France and the Netherlands, for example, Afro-Caribbeans and sub-Saharan Africans perceive discrimination against them as based in good part on color.\(^{32}\) Color-based discrimination has been a central concern in Britain since the huge inflow of Afro-Caribbeans in the 1950s and 1960s and a fundamental element in policies and public discourse, in which a race-relations framework has been prominent. In Canadian society, color-coded race is also key. Indeed, immigrants from Asia, Arab countries, Africa, and the Caribbean and their descendants are officially referred to as *visible minorities*, a term defined by the Canadian government as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.”\(^{33}\)

The United States stands out for the incredibly high degree of separation of blacks and whites and the taken-for-granted emphasis on color-coded race in the media and popular discourse. Racial categories and inequalities not only shape the opportunities and constraints immigrants and their children encounter—but also the way that they see themselves and are viewed by others. Blacks, whether immigrant or native-born, continue to be highly residentially segregated from whites in American society—a situation that has no parallel among immigrant groups in western Europe.\(^{34}\) Rates of black-white intermarriage are also much lower in the United States than they are in Britain, France, and the Netherlands.\(^{35}\) Not surprisingly, high proportions of blacks and Latinos in the United States say they experience discrimination.\(^{36}\)

It is not just those categorized as black in the United States who are seen through the prism of color-coded racism. Asians and Latinos are generally viewed as nonwhite or people of color, and Latinos with visible African ancestry—such as many Dominicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans—may sometimes be seen as black. A major question is how to conceptualize the position of Latinos. Some scholars argue that Latinos are a racialized minority, with Mexicans—who make up nearly a third of U.S. immigrants and are conspicuous for their low rates of education, high rates of poverty, and large proportion of undocumented—of special concern. That Mexicans are often stigmatized as inferior, illegal, and foreign has led some social scientists to label them a racialized ethnic group.\(^{37}\) In another formulation, Mexican Americans are seen to experience a racialized form of nativism in which their foreignness is central and their right...
to be in the country is questioned; third- and later-generation Mexican Americans are discriminated against, in this view, because they are associated with and often mistaken for new immigrants. Pigmentation may be involved, too. Skin color has been shown to matter among Mexicans and other Latinos for socioeconomic standing and residential integration.

In chapter 4, Waters and Kasinitz contend that while today’s system of legal and political exclusion confronting undocumented immigrants “is often highly racialized in its outcomes,” just focusing on race obscures what they call a twenty-first-century pattern of legal exclusion, oppressing undocumented immigrants in the United States in ways that are different from those of racial exclusion. Indeed, in the post–civil rights era, race can be a resource for nonwhite legal immigrants and citizens in providing opportunities through such policies as affirmative action and diversity measures in employment that were designed to promote the incorporation and empowerment of African Americans and long-established Latino populations. To complicate matters further, whether Hispanics are stigmatized on the basis of a racial frame or legal frame by the media and politicians depends, among other things, on patterns of discrimination in different regions of the country.

Undocumented immigration and race are linked in yet one other way. Although concerns about the undocumented are a major element in public and political debates, it could be argued that in post–civil rights America they are a legitimate way to express many Americans’ worries that immigration will lead to the end of white hegemony. After decades of massive immigration, the U.S. population in 2013 was 17 percent Latino, 13 percent black, 5 percent Asian, and 2 percent mixed race, and, given high fertility among Latina mothers and the prospect of continued Latino immigration, the transition to a minority-majority population is well under way. What many Americans, including a good many political figures, stress in public utterances is that “illegal” immigrants are breaking the law and have no right to live in the United States when, in fact, behind these concerns are widespread anxieties about the changing ethnoracial character of the country and fears about the loss of white economic and political dominance. Indeed, Deborah J. Schildkraut reports in chapter 3 that in the face of the declining non-Hispanic white share of the nation’s population (now at an all-time low of 63 percent), white Americans’ sense of white racial identity is more likely to lead to more restrictive immigration preferences and support for Republican candidates.

Belonging and National Identity

A central part of our enterprise is understanding how, and to what degree, the different countries in western Europe and North America extend a national identity to immigrants and their children. Or, as Irene
Bloemraad puts it in chapter 2, what is the openness of national identities to diversity?

We put particular emphasis on the second generation. Immigrants, after all, who were born in, raised, and spent much of their lives in another country often continue to have strong attachments to that place. Because they often speak another language and retain beliefs and practices associated with their homeland, they are, unsurprisingly, often not seen as “one of us.” The situation for the second, and indeed third, generation is different, given that they are “home grown” and share many social experiences with native peers of longer-term ancestry in their society. But do they feel at home and, even more, are they accepted as full members of the national community?

The answer for the United States is, to a large extent, yes—despite what we have just said about the deep barriers of race and legal status there. It has a lot to do with the general acceptance of hyphenated identities in the wider society so that the second generation, as well as their parents, are not forced to make the choice between a national and ethnic identity. Ethnic affiliation is not perceived as a serious potential threat to national cohesion. Ethnicity, in other words, is reconcilable with acquiring a new American identity.

In both the United States and Canada, it is acceptable for immigrants to hold onto earlier identities and cultures—as long as these are additions to a fundamentally American or Canadian core. As Roger Waldinger writes, new Americans can retain what they wish of the old country but they need to “master the native code.”42 In general, ties to the country of origin are not perceived as a threat to national identity in Canada or the United States. The taken-for-granted expectation is that newcomers will, and should, conform to and adopt mainstream norms and values. There is a confidence in Americanization or “Canadianization” as an inevitable process.

Hyphenated identities are the American way—and are not something that set the second generation apart. Hyphenated identities are used, at least some of the time, by those whose immigrant origins go generations back, such as Irish Americans and Italian Americans, as well as by the contemporary second generation, Mexican Americans and Chinese Americans among them.43 To borrow from Nathan Glazer, one might say that we are all—or virtually all—hyphenated Americans.44 In Canada, especially English-speaking Canada, being ethnic and Canadian is also normal and accepted. Canadian pluralism is often seen as rooted in the trinity of the “founding peoples”—Aboriginals, French, and British—and a large proportion of the long-established native white population identifies as Francophone or Anglophone Canadian.

This does not mean that those of immigrant origin are always warmly welcomed into the national fold. Far from it. As we have already discussed,
in the United States, Latinos, especially the undocumented, are often seen as a threat to the American nation. Post-9/11 prejudice against Muslims has contributed to increased hostility toward Islam. Moreover, owing to racial prejudice, many black and Latino immigrants and their children are not seen to be part of the American mainstream, and Asians often complain that no matter their American birth, they may still be viewed as “forever foreign.” The publication in 2004 of Samuel Huntington’s well-known book *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity*—in which he forecast that the continued inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatened to turn the United States into a country of two peoples, two cultures, and two languages—reflected and reinforced doubts about the capacity of American national identity to remain unaltered in the face of the dramatic growth of the Latino population. Schildkraut refers in chapter 3 to the outrage among basketball fans when a Mexican American boy dressed in a mariachi suit sang the national anthem at the 2013 National Basketball Association finals.

This said, as Schildkraut also makes clear, worries that immigration is leading to a “fractured national identity” and lack of identification with the United States are greatly overblown. More than half of the Latinos and blacks, and nearly half of the Asians in the large-scale 2004 national survey she draws on chose American as their primary identity—something true of more than 75 percent of the entire second generation and a whopping 92 percent of the third. Even 40 percent of the first generation described themselves as American. The only people in the survey who did not think of themselves primarily as American were those who spoke a language other than English at home and who were not citizens, for whom a national-origin identification was primary. Interestingly, Schildkraut also finds that identifying as American did not make people better Americans in the sense of trusting government and having obligations to the national community. What was critical in shaping trust in American political institutions and obligations to the nation was perceptions of discrimination against them or their ethnoracial group—not whether people saw themselves as American.

Other studies show a strong sense of American identification among the second generation in the United States, though often coupled with ethnic identity. Survey data on identity, to be sure, are often problematic and unable to give a sense of the complex nature of identities as they tend to shift and change from one context to another. Still, the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) study found that 85 percent of the Mexican and 99 percent of the Chinese second generation said the United States felt more like home than their parents’ country of origin. Recent studies by the Pew Research Center indicate that though most adult Asian and Latino children of immigrants identified in ethnic (for example, Mexican) or panethnic (such as Hispanic or
Latino) terms, about 60 percent said they considered themselves to be a “typical American.” Adopting a panethnic identity as Hispanic or Asian as one of their identities, it should be said, gives the second generation a sense of belonging to an American minority group—a kind of societal membership that as yet has no parallel in Europe. The same, it should be said, goes for the children of black immigrants who tend to be viewed, and see themselves, as black Americans. Second-generation Asians and Latinos, like their black counterparts, may be racialized Americans, but Americans nonetheless.

In western Europe, hyphenated identities are less accepted, indeed in some countries without much support at all; in most countries, a conception of nationhood as involving exclusive belonging is prominent. Commonly held notions of an imagined homogeneous native or mainstream people—based on shared race, ethnicity, culture, or religion—also make it difficult for newcomers to feel that they truly belong.

This is especially true for Muslims, whose attachments to their home societies and values are commonly seen as undermining the nation. This is in contrast to the United States, where ties to the country of origin generally are not perceived as a threat to national unity.

Legal immigrants and their children in the United States can more easily think of themselves as, say, Mexican American than those of Turkish origin can be Turkish-German. Germany, according to a study of second-generation belonging, does not support hyphenated identities. The notion of German Turks (Deutschturken) is just beginning to gain some presence in public discourse: “anyone with non-German . . . family roots has an ambiguous task defining themselves as German. . . . The wider society and much of the political discourse intimate that it is not possible to be German and also Turkish.” Faist and Ulbricht speak in chapter 7 of the symbolic exclusion of those of Turkish origin in Germany, estimated at around three million people, who are often viewed as foreigners—not considered part of “us” and perceived as having primary allegiance to Turkish culture and to Turkey itself.

The same reluctance to consider the expression of multiple or hyphenated identities characterizes the situation in France, as Patrick Simon shows. The conception of French nationhood is “actively unfavorable” to plural belongings—even though a recent survey in metropolitan France indicates that most members of the second generation combine a sense of belonging to France and to their parents’ origin country. Any public claim to dual identity is perceived negatively because such an identity is considered to inevitably weaken the sense of being French.
A significant minority of the second generation, moreover, especially in Muslim groups, say they do not feel French—but instead Algerian, for example, or African. However, the second generation’s feeling and intensity of French belonging is less an issue than how others recognize the identity. Many descendants of North African, Turkish, and southeast Asian immigrants—seen as visible minorities in France—say they are not viewed as French, or as Simon puts it, they feel their Frenchness is denied on the basis of their origins.53

The Dutch case represents a variant on this theme. In the 1970s, as Slootman and Duyvendak point out in chapter 5, government policy emphasized that guest workers from Turkey and Morocco should maintain their cultural identities—not to celebrate cultural differences but to facilitate the migrants’ eventual return to their home countries. Many did not, however, go “home”—and their Dutch-born children are a significant number; the roughly 750,000 first- and second-generation Moroccans and Turks are now about 4 percent of the Dutch population. Since the 1990s, as Slootman and Duyvendak observe, an intolerant monoculturalism has developed that highlights progressive values, with Dutch policy insisting that migrants must assimilate into Dutch culture and norms, including those on gender and sexuality. To many Dutch political figures, identification with another country or culture is seen as a lack of loyalty, and threat to emotional attachment, to the Netherlands, which leaves Muslim immigrants and their children, in particular, suspected of disloyalty.

In line with these trends, use of the term autochtoon, those who originate from the soil and were there first, to refer to the Dutch with Dutch parents, and of the term allochtoon to non-Western migrants and their children and even their grandchildren, has been constant and persistent. Being born in the Netherlands and a citizen, in other words, are not enough to be truly Dutch. As in France, few children of immigrants in the Netherlands have a strong emotional bond with Turkey or Morocco—most have a much stronger bond with the country where they now live.54 Yet some feel excluded from a Dutch identity precisely because they are continually labeled by others as allochtoon, Muslim, and foreign. This “thick” notion of what it means to be Dutch, Duyvendak has argued in another context, makes it difficult for the second generation to be recognized as “one of us.”55 The sense of exclusion from the national community often leads to a reactive ethnicity. As one Moroccan Dutch young adult said, “Because you see me as Moroccan, I start behaving like one, or at least feel like one.” Interestingly, many in the second generation in the Netherlands identify more strongly with their city of residence than the nation as a whole given that many Dutch cities, including the two largest—Amsterdam and Rotterdam—are more open to ethnic and cultural diversity.56 Researchers have also found a strong city identity among the
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second generation in the United States. Second-generation New Yorkers have a strong identification as New Yorkers because they see this as an “inclusive identity that encompassed both natives and immigrants and differentiated them from a generic American identity that might be conceived as white and Midwestern and thus exclusionary.”

Britain is closer to the United States and Canada in emphasizing civic integration while also recognizing the cultural or ethnic identity of migrants and their children. It is characterized by what could be called a British brand of multiculturalism, which includes a range of policies and discourses that, according to Meer, Uberoi, and Modood in chapter 6, reject the idea of uncompromising cultural assimilation and recognize immigrant-origin groups as ethnic and racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to overcome distinctive barriers. Yet as their chapter also brings out, Britain’s 2.7 million Muslims pose an intriguing, and disturbing, paradox. On the one hand, polling and survey data show that Muslims express a strong sense of belonging in Britain. In a 2007 citizenship survey, nearly 90 percent of British-born South Asians indicated a sense of belonging to Britain. Similarly, in a 2010 national election survey, more than 75 percent of second-generation South Asians said they felt equally or more British than Asian. In another poll, 83 percent of Muslims of any generation said they were proud to be British citizens, versus 79 percent of the general public; 77 percent of Muslims and 50 percent of the wider population strongly identified with Britain; and about the same percentage, some 86 percent, of Muslims and Christians said they felt they belonged to Britain.

On the other hand, and despite Muslims’ strong identification with Britain and pride in being British, public discourse about Muslims’ identity often takes a different, one might say fear-and-anxiety, tack. Worries about Muslims’ loyalty to Britain are widespread. As Meer and his coauthors argue in chapter 6, a number of leading journalists and politicians have stoked these anxieties by portraying Muslims in their writings and public statements as having difficulty feeling British. Whether this simply reflects personal beliefs or, in the case of politicians, is a conscious political strategy is unclear. Whatever the reason for these public statements and writing about Muslims, they contribute to and reinforce a sense among many in Britain that Muslims, or at least many Muslims, are outsiders and do not belong. Thus, in one poll, 52 percent of Britons said that Muslims create problems, 47 percent saw Muslims as a threat, and 45 percent believed that too many Muslims are in Britain. A 2008 study, based on group interviews with English-born whites, revealed that they saw themselves, and people like them, as the rightful symbolic owners of the nation and as under threat from a seemingly powerful “other” that has arrived “here” in the past forty years—and whom they often identified as Muslims.
Explaining Transatlantic Differences in Framing National Identities

How can we account for the fact that the United States and Canada frame national identities in a manner that is more inclusive of immigrants and their children than western European countries do? In asking the question this way, we are coming at this from an admittedly North American perspective, focusing on features of the two societies that differentiate them from those in western Europe and help explain the contrast. One line of thought stresses that Canada and the United States are settler societies, founded, peopled, and built by continuous inflows of immigrants, unlike the countries of western Europe. As a result, it has been argued, immigration, especially from other continents, has not been a core part of European identity the way it is in North American countries. However, as Irene Bloemraad makes clear in chapter 2, this explanation is “simple and deterministic.”

Not that we can reject the argument out of hand. Given the history of Canada and the United States as immigration societies since their founding, the practice in each country has been to encourage immigrants to see themselves as linked to the new society as rapidly as possible, as American or Canadian. By contrast, European countries in the course of their development as nation-states constructed identities founded on histories that go back centuries, even millennia, making it more difficult for newcomers to link their origins to these historical roots. Then, too, citizenship policies have played a role. As noted, the United States and Canada have long given automatic and unqualified birthright citizenship to those born there, which no doubt reinforces a feeling of belonging among the second generation. Germany did not accord birthright citizenship until 2000, as Faist and Ulbricht point out in chapter 7 of this volume, and until 2014 required the German-born children of non-EU immigrants to choose between German citizenship and that of their homeland when they became young adults. Britain, France, and the Netherlands have stronger traditions of or longer experience with birthright citizenship, but it is not unconditional for the native-born children of migrants. They attribute citizenship to those born on their soil but only if certain conditions are met; in France and the Netherlands, children born there to immigrant parents are granted citizenship at the age of majority.

Yet even with their long-standing and liberal citizenship regimes—and their position as immigration societies from their founding—the United States and Canada have not always been open to ethnic diversity or accepting of ethnic identities. As Bloemraad notes in chapter 2, far from being bastions of diversity in the past, both Canada and the United States kept out most nonwhite immigrants, restricted their naturalization, and denied
people of color full rights. In early twentieth-century America, when millions of eastern and southern European immigrants were entering the country, the emphasis was on “100 percent Americanism.” To some in the United States at the time, hyphenated Americanism even “amounted to un-Americanism.” As former president Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed in a 1915 speech, “There is no such thing as a hyphenated American who is a good American. The only man who is a good American is the man who is an American and nothing else.” To become a real Canadian in pre–World War II English-speaking Canada, it has been said, meant becoming British.

Gary Gerstle details in chapter 1 the complex and contradictory ways that immigrants in the past were excluded from American nationality, highlighting—among other things—the depths and durability of anti-Catholic hostility for much of American history. Although America in the past, he notes, “proclaimed itself an open society, it also saw itself as a Protestant nation with a mission to save the world from Catholicism and other false faiths. In addition, although it proclaimed that all men are created equal, it aspired, for much of its history, to be a white republic.” If the Irish bore the brunt of intense anti-Catholicism in the nineteenth century, Chinese and other Asian immigrants were barred from citizenship, Jewish and Italian immigrants were seen as racial inferiors, and black immigrants (and their native-born counterparts) were subject to Jim Crow laws in the American South for nearly a century after the Civil War.

What is key is the combination of factors that led to the greater inclusion of ethnic diversity in American nationality, or an “American” identity, that exists today and to the growing celebration of the United States as a land of multiple peoples and cultures. The incorporation of once-despised late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European immigrants and their children played a big role. Gerstle emphasizes the struggles by European immigrants and the second generation in the labor movement “marching under the banner of Americanism,” their involvement in Democratic Party politics in the 1920s and 1930s, and the multiethnic platoons fighting together during World War II. Also critical in the greater acceptance of ethnic identities, as others have shown, was the social and economic mobility of the children of eastern, central, and southern European immigrants in the mid-twentieth century—in a context in which the massive influx from their homelands had virtually ceased.

In the postwar period, the notion of the United States as a Judeo-Christian nation had become ubiquitous. Ellis Island identities began to replace Plymouth Rock ones, as the national narrative was refashioned to imagine and indeed commemorate the United States as a nation of immigrants and the ethnic identities that grew out of immigration.

The civil rights movement—initiated, as Bloemraad emphasizes, by the native-born minority population before the onset of large-scale nonwhite
immigration—and legislation that ensued also contributed to the creation of a more inclusive national identity, beyond that, in Gerstle’s words, embodied in the term *Judeo-Christian*, which in the 1940s mainly referred to white Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. The effect of the civil rights legislative successes of the 1960s in changing the dominant discourse of national civic life and acknowledging the experiences of racial and ethnic minorities was electrifying.67 The Black Is Beautiful movement was followed by immigrant ethnic groups adopting a similar stance with regard to their own cultures, in this way, as Gerstle writes in chapter 1, “broadening and intensifying the effort to locate America’s vitality in its ethnic and racial diversity.” Despite setbacks and recent legal challenges to initiatives such as the Voting Rights Act and affirmative action, the civil right successes expanded educational, occupational, and political opportunities for ethnoracial minorities and also changed the cultural idiom of American national identity.68 They also had a major effect on public discourse, ushering in a new climate and understanding about what is acceptable to say about race and ethnic differences in public. Ethnic and racial slurs by candidates for high office and public officials are now condemned—and diversity routinely applauded. Indeed, in presidential speeches, from those of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to the country’s first black president, Barack Obama, cultural diversity has been lauded as a central feature of the nation.

In chapter 2, Bloemraad provides a counterpoint to the U.S. experience in her discussion of Canada, indicating how there too the large native-born minority—Francophone Canadians who in the 1960s mobilized in support of Quebec separatism—were critical in the transformation of Canadian identity. The national government first instituted an official policy of French-English bilingualism in 1969, and then, in 1971, an official policy of multiculturalism. Originally envisioned narrowly, mainly centered on recognizing European immigrants, Canada’s multicultural policy has promoted incorporation within a context of pluralism, with multiculturalism becoming “an identity touchstone for the majority population . . . an idiom for national identity” and not, incidentally, a way to distinguish Canada from the U.S. economic and political behemoth to the south. Bloemraad notes, drawing on a 2010 opinion survey, that more Canadians said that multiculturalism was very important to Canadian national identity than the number who said hockey.

**Conclusion**

The chapters in this volume make clear that immigration has given rise to a host of fears and anxieties that are frequently voiced in public discourse, ranging from concerns in western Europe that Muslim immigrants and their children are undermining basic liberal values to common statements
in the United States that the millions of undocumented immigrants have no right to be in the country at all. At the same time, when it comes to legal immigrants and their children, the United States (as well as Canada) find it easier to extend a national identity to them than western, particularly continental, European countries do. National identities in North America, to put it another way, appear to be more open to diversity.

That this has not always been the case and that both the United States and Canada were less welcoming in the past are powerful reminders of the elasticity and changeability of social patterns, norms, and beliefs. It may sometimes seem that the widespread anxieties about undocumented Mexican immigration in the United States, so salient today, will never disappear, yet if—or, many would say, when—federal legislation creates a pathway to legalization and, especially citizenship, for the undocumented, these anxieties are bound to lessen and subside. As of this writing, some movement on this issue has been made, with President Obama issuing executive orders in 2012 and 2014 to reduce the legal vulnerability of a substantial fraction of the undocumented through temporary deportation deferrals and work permits. Although a definite step forward, it is unclear how many will end up taking advantage of the programs—and the most recent executive initiatives are currently under challenge in the courts. At best, they will be a temporary and modest fix for a portion of the undocumented, not a permanent change in status that will allow them to live as legal residents do. On the sending society end, lowered fertility and economic improvements in Mexico are forecast to dramatically reduce the number of new undocumented arrivals from Mexico—although as Gerstle cautions in chapter 1, a stream of undocumented mass migration from elsewhere may grow, perhaps from Central America.69

As for racial barriers, these are not inevitably permanent, either. Much has been written about the possibility of the blurring of America’s color lines, with one scenario suggesting the emergence of a black-nonblack racial order, predicting that many Asians and Latinos will be welcomed into a new American majority.70 Their high rates of intermarriage, and much greater flexibility of the children of white-Asian and white-Latino, as opposed to white-black, unions to choose among various ethnoracial options, point in this direction.71

If the United States and Canada in the past developed more expansive national identities to include immigrants and their offspring—and became more accepting of ethnic allegiances—so, too, this is liable to happen in the future in countries across the Atlantic, and for many of the same reasons. These factors include the prospect of economic mobility for many members of the second and third generations, increased social mixing, friendships, and intermarriage with longer-established Europeans, and greater participation of immigrants and their descendants in mainstream political and economic life over time.
Already, a 2014 Transatlantic Trends poll found that majorities in the Netherlands (66 percent), Germany (63 percent), Britain (63 percent), and the United States (69 percent) said that the second generation were integrating well into their society. Sheer demographic changes in the years ahead will also be at work as the number of individuals from immigrant and minority backgrounds coming of age increases while the number of native majority youth declines and aging baby boomers retire and leave the work force. Nor should we forget the role of political struggles of minority groups in Europe for more rights and recognition, something that was significant in the greater inclusion of once-disparaged eastern and southern European immigrants and their descendants in the United States in the past. In the Netherlands, to mention one possibility, second- and third-generation Moroccans and Turks may mount collective efforts to eliminate the stigmatizing term *allochtoon* from official use. In Germany, pressures from Muslim groups, as well as the desire to preserve the corporate structure benefiting historically established religions, may well lead to devising ways to recognize Islam as a corporate body equal to Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths.

Less happily, many in the second generation of Muslim background in western Europe seem poised to experience unemployment or underemployment and stalled social mobility, giving ammunition to “skeptics who will continue to argue that Muslims will never fit in or successfully adjust to European society.” In addition, the sense of exclusion felt by many second-generation Muslims has created a pool of potential recruits for radical Islamist groups. Although these radicalized Muslims are only a very small proportion of the second generation, their presence in Europe—along with the possibility of their involvement in further terrorist incidents—has the potential to heighten anxieties about and hostilities toward Muslims in general. Indeed, as of this writing, tensions surrounding Islam have intensified in France in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks, with, among other things, French Muslims and their leaders facing unprecedented pressure to publicly endorse French republican secular values.

At the same time in western Europe, new sources of large-scale migration from eastern Europe have become more prominent. In 2012, for example, more than half a million residents of Britain had Polish nationality, more than a hundred thousand in the Netherlands. Among the fascinating issues are whether these migrants see themselves as temporary visitors and how they are now viewed as well as how others will come to view them in the future in terms of national identity and belonging.

As we look to the decades ahead, we cannot of course know how the future will unfold. Much is unpredictable, including unforeseen economic conditions and political events. What we can say, however, is that national differences, whatever shape they take, will not disappear. Although similar
dynamics in Europe and North America will lead to growing economic integration, political incorporation, and interethnic mixing among the second generation, we are hardly likely to see complete convergence among European and North American countries and the elimination of distinctive national features. Owing to their different national histories, institutional features, and composition of their immigrant inflows, these countries will continue to be characterized by contrasts in the way—and extent to which—immigrants and their descendants are incorporated into the national fold. The chapters that follow offer insights and raise questions about these dynamics at the beginning of the twentieth-first century, and thus, we believe, provide a step forward in understanding the nexus between immigration, belonging, and national identity on both sides of the Atlantic.

Notes

3. See, for example, Joppke 2010; Michalowski 2011.
4. Levey and Modood 2008; see Bowen et al. 2014.
7. See Schildkraut, chapter 3, this volume.
8. See Brochmann and Hagelund 2012.
14. See, for example, Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; Duyvendak 2011.
18. See also Joppke 2013.
20. See, for example, Bramadat 2005; Breton 2012; Lepinard 2014; Ray 2003; Reitz et al. 2009.
27. Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013.
30. Foner 2000, 35.
32. See, for example, Beauchemin et al. 2010; Bosma 2013.
34. Alba and Foner 2015; Musterd and van Kempen 2009.
35. Alba and Foner 2015.
36. Schildkraut, chapter 3, this volume.
40. Brown 2013.
41. Massey 2013.
42. Waldinger 2007.
43. Foner 2012.
45. Tuan 1998; see also Lee and Bean 2010.
47. Taylor et al. 2013.
49. Bowen et al. 2014.
51. Ibid., 215.
52. Simon 2012.
53. Ibid.
54. See also de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014.
56. See Schneider et al. 2012b.
60. Ibid.
61. Skrey 2010, 279.
64. Quoted in Foner 2012.
69. On Mexico, see, for example, Alba 2013; Myers 2012.
70. See, for example, Alba 2009; Foner 2000.
References


