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Unauthorized Mexican Migration and the Socioeconomic Integration of Mexican Americans

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Nearly fifty years ago, the United States adopted policies that allowed new kinds of immigrants to come to the country (Martin 2011; Reimers 2005). Immigration soon began to increase steadily. Now, one in eight U.S. residents is foreign-born, up from one in twenty in 1970 (Gryn and Larsen 2010). These more recent immigrants also differ from earlier generations. Nine of every ten come from outside Europe, the reverse of immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Grieco et al. 2012). They represent a variety of nationalities: more than twenty countries now contribute at least 1 percent to the total number of new legal permanent residents (Monger and Yankay 2012). Even so, Mexicans predominate heavily among both legal and, especially, unauthorized immigrant flows (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). As a result, the United States has become more non-European and ethnoracially diverse (Lee and Bean 2010). With Mexican immigrant settlements spreading in the past twenty years from the Southwest to the rest of the country (Massey and Capoferro 2008), the country also has become more Mexican, both demographically (Massey and Pren 2012b) and culturally (Arellano 2012; Jiménez 2009).

This chapter seeks to assess the implications of Mexican migration for the integration of Mexican Americans. Such migration could be undesirable if it were harming native-born Americans or leading to the formation of a new ethnoracial underclass whose costs outweighed its economic contributions to the country. But we know from labor market research that Mexican immigrants do not compete to any substantial degree with less-skilled natives. Moreover, even though little research has assessed the sociocultural consequences of this recent Mexican migration for the country (Kasinitz 2012), most studies suggest that these effects are actually often positive. For example, Jennifer Lee and Frank Bean (2010) recently observed that U.S. metropolitan areas with more Latino migrants and greater ethnoracial diversity show evidence of more ethnoracial boundary dissolution than other areas.

However, a key question remains: how well (or badly) are Mexican migrants—and especially their children and grandchildren—faring in the United States? The same labor market research that does not find adverse effects of Mexican migrants on the jobs or wages of natives does overwhelmingly reveal an impact within the population of immigrants, namely, that the newly arrived less-skilled Mexican immigrants depress the employment and wages of those Mexicans who arrived earlier. Moreover, federal and state legislation has undercut the rights and legal protections afforded to unauthorized Mexican workers and their families and sometimes curtailed those of legal permanent residents as well (Gentsch and Massey 2011; Kanstroom 2011; Reimers 2005).
This shift accentuates migrants’ social and economic marginality, which makes life precarious for them and their offspring (Bean et al. 2011; Massey and Gentsch 2014; Yoshikawa 2011). Both competition among migrants themselves and harsh treatment from the host society may handicap Mexican immigrant integration.

At the same time, the nation has gradually been employing ever more unauthorized Mexicans to fill less-skilled jobs (Bean, Brown, Bachmeier, Gubernskaya, and Smith 2012). Rising immigrant marginality, together with the growing U.S. reliance on less-skilled Mexican workers, risks the development of a new underclass, especially at a time when overall opportunities for socioeconomic mobility are stalling (Massey 2007). If upward mobility among the descendants of Mexican immigrants is to continue, it is imperative to understand why increasing numbers of unauthorized Mexican migrants have come to the country in the first place and how their migration status relates to the most crucial factor affecting mobility among Mexican Americans—namely, the educational attainment of the second and third generations.

Mexicans enter the United States in multiple ways. As the analyses here will show, the degree of success that they and their children attain depends on the nature and duration of their entry status. The most “regular” are legal migrants who have acquired legal permanent residency (LPR) status, even after arriving in some other capacity. Some of these migrants enter legally on temporary visas (tourists, students, and temporary agricultural workers) but may overstay them. The number of people from Mexico, as well as other countries, with such visas has risen sharply over the past half-century. Those who come via unauthorized land crossings at the southwestern border—often called “illegal,” “undocumented,” or “unauthorized” migrants (Bean and Lowell 2007)—have garnered the most media and scholarly attention (Chávez 2012; Dreby 2010; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Land-border crossers, overstays, and temporary legal workers all suffer from marginal status. Almost all are unauthorized. Even though some enter legally, they may end up “unauthorized.” We thus use the term “unauthorized” to refer to all of them. The socioeconomic positions and legal rights of these persons are much more limited and tenuous than those of LPRs and, especially, naturalized citizens (Gibney 2009; Kanstroom 2012; Massey and Pren 2012b).

Although past research suggests that the education and earnings of unauthorized Mexican migrants do not measure up to those of legal migrants (Bean, Browning, and Frisbie 1984; Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010; Sorensen and Bean 1994), we know little about how much unauthorized status affects the success of their children and grandchildren, be it through deportations of family members, barriers to social benefits, discrimination, or poverty. Recent research suggests, however, that unauthorized parents pass along disadvantages to their offspring (Bean et al. 2011; Gonzales and Chávez 2012; Yoshikawa 2011; Yoshikawa and Kholoptseva 2013). The reason so many unauthorized Mexican parents are here is that the country’s current immigration policies encourage a sizable less-skilled, marginal migrant workforce (Hanson 2010). The children of these immigrants experience handicaps not only because of their parents’ marginal status but also because little is done to facilitate their integration.

Over the past few decades, the United States has experienced widening economic inequality, with the wealthiest tier of Americans reaping the largest gains from economic growth (Stiglitz 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). The bottom earnings tier increasingly consists of less-skilled Mexican migrants, many of whom compete with one another. Yet almost all of them are here because of the availability of work. We present evidence that the growth of marginal Mexican migration over the past forty years derives mostly from a decline in the number of less-skilled native-born persons available to do such work, not primarily from push factors in Mexico or from policy changes in the United States, although both of these play a role. We also estimate
How much unauthorized Mexican migration status affects educational attainment among the migrants’ descendants. For policymakers and legislators, our results point to the need for changes in immigration and immigrant integration policies. If the country is to meet its workforce needs without exacerbating inequality and spurring the creation of an entrenched subclass, public policies need to do a better job of fostering both the legal entry of these less-skilled immigrants and the integration of their children.

We organize our examination into two main sections. First, we chart the trends in Mexican and non-Mexican migration since 1970, explaining how and why marginal migration has expanded so much. We focus both on the policies behind the migration and on the U.S. demographic and educational changes that have reduced the pool of less-skilled native workers, creating a void filled largely by marginal Mexican immigrants. Second, we compare the education and income of Mexican migrants who arrive under different migration statuses, documenting the gaps between unauthorized and legal migrants. Given these first-generation disadvantages, we also assess the implications of Mexican unauthorized (marginal) status for the educational integration of their children and grandchildren. Finally, we synthesize the findings and discuss their policy implications.

**The Growth of Marginal Mexican Migration and Its Relevance for Mexican American Integration**

**Trends in Marginal Mexican Migration**

Over the past four decades, the total annual number of new entrants to the United States has risen ninefold. This increase encompasses non-immigrants of all types (students, tourists, businesspeople, exchange visitors, and temporary workers), legal immigrants (including refugees), and unauthorized immigrants from every corner of the world. To a considerable extent, this expansion reflects broader international trends involving flows of people and money as most national economies join the global marketplace. For example, since 1970 the share of the U.S. economy deriving from international trade has increased from 12 to 31 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce 2012). Greatly improved communication and transportation technologies throughout the globe have expanded the potential and actual supply of new migrants (Castles and Miller 2009; Hutton and Giddens 2000; Moretti 2012). Within this overarching trend, Mexicans have predominated, with disproportionate increases of both Mexican-born non-immigrants and unauthorized immigrants (land border crossers and visa overstayers).

The absolute number of legal immigrants who are Mexican, while not as dramatic, also remains high (see figure 11.1, top panel), even though the annual number of Mexican legal permanent residents has declined. In 2000 the number of Mexicans entering legally was about four times as great as the number from the second-largest sending country (the Philippines). In 2010 Mexican immigration decreased, but it was still about twice as high as that year’s second-leading country (China). Today the number of Mexican LPRs continues to dominate the numbers from any other single national-origin country. Also, the size of the Mexican unauthorized immigrant net inflow to the United States dwarfs to an even greater degree the number coming from any other single source country, a pattern that has persisted for several decades (figure 11.1, bottom panel). In short, nearly three in every five unauthorized immigrants here today come from Mexico, a fraction about the same as in earlier decades (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). Moreover, the increasing flow of Mexican non-immigrants during this period has
FIGURE 11.1  Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) and Unauthorized Migration from Mexico and from Countries of Next-Largest Migration, 1981–2010

Legal Permanent Residents in the United States, by Year

Unauthorized Migrants in the United States, by Year

boosted this influx to levels higher than those from any other country (see figure 11.2), increasing the likelihood that the number of Mexican visa overstayers has risen both absolutely and relatively (Bachmeier et al. 2011). Altogether, of total foreign-born inflows over the past decade (LPRs, unauthorized entrants, and non-immigrants), the Mexican portion has risen from about 13 percent in 2000 to almost 28 percent in 2010.6

Over the past twenty years, the number of temporary legal Mexican workers has also climbed. These workers are not readily discernible in statistics on total legal non-immigrant admissions, which consist overwhelmingly of students and tourists. But when we break down the history of non-immigrant admissions by type (see figure 11.3), we note that they began to increase noticeably in the mid-1990s, coinciding with the high-tech economic boom. Tens of thousands of high-skilled temporary technology workers on H-1B visas began to arrive from India and China, as did larger numbers of less-skilled Mexican seasonal agricultural workers on H-2A visas and non-agricultural workers on H-2B visas. These latter categories of temporary Mexican immigrants reached levels in 2011 that were about ten times their 1970 levels. In sum, recent marginal migrant flows to the United States (those involving either unauthorized or temporary entrants and temporary workers) are sharply distinctive in two ways—in their consistent rise, and in their overwhelmingly Mexican character. No other country contributes so much to the presence of such migrants in the United States as does Mexico.

Although legal and unauthorized immigrants come from many countries, why have marginal Mexican flows predominated? What accounts for the persistent growth in their numbers, even in the face of strong hostility to unauthorized Mexicans from a vocal minority of natives? The answers help to pinpoint the reasons why the United States needs immigration policies that both ensure the size of its less-skilled workforce and foster the integration of the offspring of Mexican immigrants. If migrants have come only because of “push” factors in Mexico, the main immigration policy challenge for the United States would be reducing migration. If, on the other hand, the immigrants also come because of strong “pull” factors here, including a dearth of natives available to do low-skilled work, then migrants would be contributing substantially to the country’s workforce, and a compelling case exists for doing more to integrate them and their families into American society.

Even though labor market impact research shows that Mexican immigrants for the most part do not take the jobs of less-skilled natives or drive down native wages, a substantial segment of the public seems to think they do. Growth in marginal Mexican migration to the United States is often viewed in crisis terms—as the result of uncontrollable natural forces or disasters. The media describe a “floodtide,” “rising tide,” or “torrent” of migrants (Chávez 2001). The language...
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betrays a presumptive narrative that migration is driven by conditions in Mexico—for example, population pressure, low wages, and unemployment. In fact, the number of migrants has gradually risen along with gradual declines in the number of less-skilled natives. The imagery of a “flood” of migrants overlooks the fact that the United States is taking advantage of Mexican labor—just as it has long tended to do, ever since the expansion of railroads into the American Southwest during the 1880s (Cardoso 1980).

The steady rise in Mexican migration since the late 1970s can be traced in part to the 1965 U.S. immigration reforms that abolished national-origin quotas. This set the stage for unauthorized Mexican immigration, although the legislation did not aim to increase Mexican migration in any way (Bean and Stevens 2003; Martin 2011; Massey and Pren 2012a). Indeed, the opposite was true. To understand the unanticipated consequences of the 1965 reforms, it is instructive to recall the context of immigration in the decades prior to that. In 1924 the country passed quotas based on the size of immigrant-group populations within the country. (At that time, Germans were the largest immigrant group.) In the late 1940s and early 1950s, when policymakers sought to implement anti-Communist Cold War foreign policies involving countries favorable to the United States (such as establishing air force and naval bases, negotiating trade agreements, and admitting persons fleeing Communist countries), the 1924 quotas blocked citizens from those countries from entering the United States. Passage of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act reaffirmed those quotas. Despite numerous attempts, Congress would not reform the immigration system until the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, starting in 1963.

With the power of the presidency enhanced in the aftermath of John Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson, a master of the legislative process (Martin 2011; Reimers 1983; Tichenor 2002), broke the logjam. In his 1964 State of the Union Address, Johnson outlined proposals for pathbreaking civil rights legislation, noting, “We must also lift by legislation the bars of discrimination against those who seek entry into our country” (Tichenor 2002, 213). The following year, the Immigration Reform Act passed both houses of Congress with strong bipartisan support. The 1965 Hart-Celler Act abolished national-origin quotas and established a privileged policy of family reunification. As part of a compromise, the law retained many of the other restrictions from McCarran-Walter, as well as added new ones (Martin 2011). Essentially, the agreement broke a stalemate between conservatives and liberals within both parties: restrictionists acceded to front-door modifications (that is, changes in the criteria for legal immigration) in exchange for ostensibly tightened side-door migration (that is, a ceiling on Western Hemisphere entrants) (Zolberg 2006).^7

The Hart-Celler Act, combined with the end of the long-standing bracero program—the 1942 contract labor agreement with Mexico that permitted tens of thousands of agricultural and other manual workers to enter the United States annually (Calavita 1992)—spurred unauthorized Mexican migration. Hart-Celler imposed annual caps on entrants, initially 170,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 for the Western Hemisphere, as well as a per-country limit of 20,000 visas for the Eastern Hemisphere. Although the Johnson administration did not support the Western Hemisphere cap, members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees argued for it both on grounds of fairness (a cap only for one hemisphere seemed unfair) and out of fear of unregulated spillover from rapid nonwhite population growth in Latin America (Zolberg 2006).^8 The legislation made few provisions for low-skilled labor, even though the United States had ended the bracero program in the previous year. For many Mexicans, especially circulatory labor-migrants, the most viable option after the bracero program ended in 1964 was to enter the country illegally, since they could no longer come as contract laborers. As a result, unauthorized migration grew substantially (Massey and Pren 2012b; Zolberg 2006).
The long-term effects of the Hart-Celler Act on legal Mexican migration began immediately. The law’s family reunification procedures allowed for gradual growth in Latin American legal migration that was mostly Mexican (Keely 1971; Ueda 1998). Legal Mexican migrants had averaged only about 30,000 per year during the 1950s, but after 1965 legal permanent residents could more easily bring in immediate family members, which led to gradual increases in LPRs from Mexico, especially when employers used Hart-Celler provisions to sponsor workers previously covered as braceros. These “sponsored” workers were allowed to become LPRs and bring immediate family members. Unauthorized migration also increased because the new ceiling on legal visas was too low to accommodate all the Mexican entrants seeking to reunite with their families and for whom U.S. work was available. Moreover, the end of the bracero program had eliminated legal temporary entry for agricultural workers, although the demand for them, now growing because of the expansion of California irrigation and agriculture, was stronger than ever. Not surprisingly, during the 1970s the bulk of the unauthorized population, almost all Mexican, settled in California.

**Economic and Demographic Factors Contributing to Growth in Unauthorized Migration**

Although the 1965 reforms and the end of the bracero program created an impetus for Mexican migration, they do not fully explain why the number of unauthorized entrants steadily rose. Admittedly, the law allowed more immigration through its family reunification provisions (Martin 2011), and the growing social networks of migrants facilitated further migration, in the logic of “cumulative causation” (Massey 1999). But since less-skilled Mexican immigrants, for the most part, do not compete much with less-skilled natives, several American economic and demographic trends that have shrunk the native less-skilled population merit discussion. These trends have created a workforce void filled by Mexican migrants. Specifically: (1) U.S. economic growth has often disproportionately exceeded population growth, generating “excess” jobs; (2) gains in education have reduced the number of less-skilled natives; (3) fertility rates among the native-born have declined, also lowering the relative number of younger natives; and (4) Baby Boomers have been “aging out” of younger cohorts (such as twenty-five- to forty-four-year-olds). Over time, the result has been that fewer less-skilled, younger native workers have been available.9

**Imbalances in Economic and Population Growth**

Even allowing for both unauthorized and legal immigration, annual U.S. population growth since 1980 has rarely edged past 1 percent. Since 2000, population growth has noticeably fallen below this level. Economic growth over the overall period, however, has been substantially higher. Until the recent recession, the annual percentage change in gross domestic product (GDP) has averaged more than 3 percent annually (U.S. Census Bureau 2010; U.S. Department of Commerce 2010). Even including periods of recession, each decade since 1970 has averaged job growth at or well above the levels needed to absorb population growth. For example, during the 1970s economic growth generated more than 1.9 million new jobs per year, or about 50 percent more than the number required to absorb both the Baby Boomers, then coming of age, and the new immigrants. During the 1980s job growth was almost as high, about 1.8 million new jobs per year, and during the 1990s it was considerably higher, averaging more than 2.1 million jobs per year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). During the 2000s, until 2008, the economy would have needed to add 1.3 million new jobs each year to keep up with population expansion, a level more than half a million per year below actual job creation (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012; Bean, Brown, Bachmeier, Gubern-
skaya, and Smith 2012; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2012). In short, during most years, job expansion has outstripped the levels needed to keep up with population growth, even though population growth includes both legal and unauthorized immigrants.

**Educational Upgrading** Changes in education have depleted the supply of less-skilled natives. The upgrading that began early in the twentieth century with the “high school completion” movement (Goldin and Katz 2008) continued after World War II with the expansion of public higher education. Notwithstanding debates about why the rate of increase in college attendance slowed in the 1990s and 2000s only to rise recently, the fraction of the population with exposure to postsecondary schooling has steeply risen for most of the last six decades. Adults age twenty-five and over with more than a high school education now make up nearly 60 percent of the population, up from 5.3 percent in 1950 (Minnesota Population Center 2011; Current Population Survey 2010).

The number of native-born Americans with a high school diploma or less has fallen in both relative and absolute terms. In 1950 more than 88 percent of U.S. adults ages eighteen and older (some 90 million persons) had never finished high school. By 2010 only 14.7 percent (35 million) had not. In short, by 2010 there were 61 percent fewer persons in the country than in 1950 without a high school diploma or its equivalent (Ruggles et al. 2010). Strikingly, this figure is for the entire adult population, which includes the substantial number of poorly educated immigrants who have come here over the past three decades.10

**Declining Native Fertility and Cohort Change** Another important trend has been the sharp drop in fertility rates once the Baby Boom (those born between 1946 and 1964) ended in the mid-1960s. As measured by the total fertility rate (TFR), or the average number of children a woman would be expected to have if her childbearing followed the fertility pattern shown during that year, by the mid-1970s fertility rates had dropped by about half, reaching levels below 1.8, considerably below population replacement. Afterward, they inched up, hovering for years around 2.0 to 2.1 children per woman (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2010), before falling again during the recent recession. This fertility decline induced cohort change among Baby Boomers. From about 1970 until 1990, the number of natives ages twenty-five to forty-four (with high school diplomas or less) grew appreciably, despite educational upgrading (see figure 11.4). The expansion of the economy, as noted previously, more than absorbed the increase. But by 1990, when the earliest Baby Boomers started to reach age forty-five, the numbers of Baby Boomers ages twenty-five to forty-four started to shrink, as declining fertility after the Baby Boom led to much smaller cohorts. This tendency became more pronounced through the 1990s and 2000s as the cohorts born after the Baby Boom continued to shrink (figure 11.4). In short, there were ever fewer young people to take the less-skilled work that the expanding economy was generating.

For a quarter-century now, the “extra” increment of persons entering the labor market from Baby Boomers’ coming of age has been subsiding, and now the oldest Boomers have begun to retire. Today most Boomers are ages forty-five to sixty-four, and the labor market is experiencing the opposite dynamic from the 1970s and 1980s. As the Baby Boomers age, the number of younger natives entering the labor market has plummeted because the birth rate in the native-born population had dropped to 1.7 births per woman by 2010, a level about 20 percent below replacement level (Bean, Brown, Bachmeier, Gubernskaya, and Smith 2012), and because, as noted, the very large younger Baby Boom cohorts of natives (ages twenty-five to forty-four) had aged.11 Consequently, the younger cohorts (those ages twenty-five to forty-four in 2010) have become much smaller, consisting of drastically fewer potential less-skilled workers. In short,
FIGURE 11.4  Trends in the Nativity Components of the Less-Skilled Workforce Ages Twenty-Five to Forty-Four, by Gender, 1970–2010

Source: Adapted from Bean et al. (2011); decennial U.S. census public use microdata for 1970–2000 and 2010 ACS from Ruggles et al. (2010).
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Demographic change has already depressed the number of younger less-skilled natives who might be candidates to fill less-skilled jobs. Of course, the impending retirement of Baby Boomers may further help immigrants in the future, opening up jobs and creating opportunities for upward mobility (Alba 2009). Furthermore, when retiring Boomers sell their homes, vacancies will arise that may foster spatial assimilation (Myers 2007). These are looming changes, however; the change discussed here has already occurred.

An important question is whether the decline in the pool of young native workers has coincided with a drop in less-skilled work. Certainly, if we consider only manufacturing, the answer would be yes. From 1970 until today, the share of manufacturing jobs in the economy dropped from more than one in four to approximately one in eight. The drop-off in the share of manufacturing jobs held by persons with a high school diploma or less has been similarly precipitous, also falling from approximately one in four in 1970 to approximately one in eight today (Bean, Brown, Bachmeier, Gubernskaya, and Smith 2012). Interestingly, over this same time the overall number of manufacturing jobs remained approximately 21 million. But because of population and job growth, a relatively smaller share of less-skilled persons today work in manufacturing employment than in the past. Also, many of today’s manufacturing jobs require at least some college education (Creticos and Sohnen 2013). Thus, the relative demand for less-skilled workers in manufacturing has declined.

During this same period, however, the share of the less-skilled workforce in service jobs has grown considerably (Freeman 2007). From 1980 until today, the number of jobs held by less-skilled, younger males (of any nativity or ethnic-racial background)—the group one might expect to compete most directly with young, male Mexican labor migrants—has held steady at roughly 3.7 million to 3.8 million, or approximately 45 percent of the less-skilled, younger male workforce. Thus, despite a decline in the workforce share of less-skilled manufacturing workers, the share of less-skilled workers in general is as large today as it was forty years ago because of growth in the share of less-skilled service workers (Bean, Brown, Bachmeier, Gubernskaya, and Smith 2012).

Shortfalls in Native Workers Relative to Growth in Immigration How large is the relative decline in the number of less-skilled natives and how does it compare to the arrival of numbers of comparable immigrants? We start by focusing on males ages twenty-five to forty-four with less than a high school education. This group might compete the most with less-skilled immigrants, including less-skilled Mexican migrants. In 1970 few such immigrant males were in the workforce; however, by 2010 they numbered about 2.7 million (figure 11.4), and many of them had arrived after 1990. The comparable native workforce, however, lost about 4 million workers. Thus, the native male workforce of this age range and skill level shrank considerably more than the immigrant workforce expanded. Note that we are talking about all less-skilled immigrants. The differences would be even more dramatic if we focused on only Mexican immigrants. A similar pattern characterizes the cohort change for females.

Figure 11.5 shows further evidence on the gains or losses by nativity in the total sizes of this age group (twenty-five to forty-four) for males. Among those with less than a high school education, a drop occurred in the number of native persons who might be candidates to hold less-skilled jobs every decade, especially from 1970 to 1980 and from 2000 to 2010. The cumulative decline across decades adds up to more than 4 million males. By contrast, the increase in the number of comparable foreign-born males is far less, about 2 million. Among those with only a high school diploma, this deficit did not emerge until 1990, primarily because of the large number of Baby Boomers coming of age. But once that demographic tidal wave subsided, the number
of natives holding only a high school diploma also declined. Again, the shrinkages substantially exceeded the growth in the number of comparable foreign-born males.

Although these figures illustrate workforce shifts for younger males (ages twenty-five to forty-four), similar trends exist for other age groups and for females, although not quite so large. In any case, the pattern is clear—cohort change from the aging of the Baby Boomers, educational upgrading, and lower fertility in the native-born population have led to large declines in the pool of natives with a high school education or less, the native-born group most likely to fill less-skilled jobs. In an economy that was expanding, especially during the 1990s, this has left a workforce void, and immigrants, mostly from Mexico, have filled that void. This helps to explain both the persistence of unauthorized Mexican migration and its growth over this period. Mexican immigrant workers have filled the jobs that there are not enough native-born workers to do.
Increasingly, most of these immigrant workers are unauthorized because they have few ways to enter the country legally.

**MIGRATION STATUS, LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES, AND SECOND- AND THIRD-GENERATION EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT**

As unauthorized Mexican workers become more integral to the country’s less-skilled workforce, understanding the degree to which they resemble other Americans in regard to schooling, work, and income takes on greater importance. To address the impact of their legal and citizenship status, we compare the labor market positions of unauthorized Mexican migrants to those of Mexican LPRs and naturalized citizens, as well as to those of all U.S.-born workers. Research based on interviews with circular migrants who have returned to Mexico indicates inferior outcomes for unauthorized migrants compared to legal immigrants (Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Donato et al. 2008; Massey and Gentsch 2014). Small-scale surveys and qualitative studies done in the United States also suggest that marginal migrants, particularly the unauthorized, face hardship and insecurity in the labor market that affect their children’s cognitive and socioemotional development (Abrego and Gonzales 2010; Brabeck and Xu 2010; Ortega et al. 2009; Potochnick and Perreira 2010; Yoshikawa 2011). Unfortunately, there is little current empirical evidence of educational and labor market disadvantages for unauthorized Mexican migrants at the national level, owing to a dearth of survey data that include indicators of immigrants’ legal status. One exception that uses an imputation of status (the basis for which is not fully described) comes from Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohn (2009); another, based on data collected prior to the harsher climate of the past few years, is Hall et al. (2010).

**Education and Labor Market Outcomes Among Mexican Immigrants**

Here we present results using data from the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to assess education and labor market outcomes in the immigrant generation (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). All foreign-born respondents from the 2008 SIPP were asked whether they were U.S. citizens, and if so, how they obtained citizenship (including through naturalization, military service, and the like). The foreign-born were subsequently asked whether they were legal permanent residents upon arriving in the United States; subsequently, those non-LPR, noncitizen arrivals were asked whether their status had been adjusted to LPR status since immigrating to the United States. Though the survey allows non-LPR arrivals to specify their arrival status (for example, refugee or temporary worker), the specific non-LPR codes are suppressed in the publicly released data we use here. Thus, we are able only to distinguish between naturalized citizens, LPRs, and “others.” While the “other” category consists of both unauthorized and legal temporary migrants, Passel and Cohn (2010) estimate that nearly 90 percent of all foreign-born residents who are neither U.S. citizens nor LPRs are unauthorized. Therefore, the labor market outcomes observed for non-LPRs are overwhelmingly driven by unauthorized migrants.

The public use 2008 SIPP data also suppress country of birth codes; consequently, we cannot distinguish Mexican from Central American immigrants. Thus, our examination includes all immigrants from Mexico and Central America (largely Salvadorans and Guatemalans) but excludes those from other regions of the world. (“Caribbean” and “South American” are separate from “Central America” in the codes and are not included in our sample.) In the following analyses, “marginal migrants,” “LPRs,” and “naturalized citizens” refer to immigrants born in
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Mexico and Central America, while “U.S.-born” refers to the total U.S.-born population. Because the vast majority of those in the Mexican/Central American category are from Mexico—about 80 percent, according to 2010 ACS data (Minnesota Population Center 2011)—we use the term “Mexican” for this category.

A comparison of marginal Mexican migrants to LPRs and naturalized immigrants permits an assessment of theoretical perspectives on immigrant integration. We consider three perspectives: classic assimilation (see, for example, Alba and Nee 2003); racialization, including segmented assimilation (as in Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Telles and Ortiz 2008); and marginal membership integration, including “delayed” integration (as in Bean, Brown, Bachmeier, Fokkema, and Lessard-Phillips 2012; Brown 2007; Brown and Bean 2007; Waldinger 2011). Broadly speaking, these theoretical perspectives emphasize different dynamics driving the extent to which immigrants (and their children and grandchildren) improve their life situations after coming here, especially their labor market positions. The perspectives also imply different patterns of mobility across migration statuses as immigrants move toward parity with native majority groups, especially whites.

What are the mobility differences suggested by these perspectives? Roughly, in comparing unauthorized migrants with legal permanent residents and naturalized citizens, the classic assimilation perspective would predict that a gradient involving more mobility and a smaller gap with natives will emerge, whatever the characteristic being examined; that is, the unauthorized will fare the worst, followed by LPRs and then naturalized citizens. In short, the longer the exposure to the host society, the greater the assimilation. The racialization perspective, because it emphasizes the discrimination confronted by the members of a given ethnoracial group, would predict that, regardless of legal status, Mexican immigrants will show only partial mobility, all else equal. The marginal membership perspective, which posits that the lack of social and political membership is the most important barrier to other kinds of integration, would predict little mobility and large remaining gaps only for those migrants who are the most marginal in membership. In other words, the marginal migrants (those who are unauthorized) will show minimal mobility and sizable gaps with natives, while the legal permanent residents, or citizens, will exhibit the greatest mobility and small remaining gaps with natives. In particular, this perspective would predict a sharp discontinuity across the migration statuses.

Demographic Characteristics

We limit our examination to adults between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four. Table 11.1 compares unauthorized Mexican (non-LPR) migrants to LPRs, naturalized immigrants, and all U.S.-born adults with respect to several demographic characteristics, as well as education, that help to determine labor market outcomes. Because unauthorized migrants are primarily labor migrants (Massey et al. 1987; Portes and Bach 1985), they are disproportionately male, younger, and less likely to be married compared to other types of immigrants and U.S.-born citizens. Also, unauthorized Mexican migrants are much less educated than Mexican LPRs and naturalized citizens, other immigrants, and the U.S.-born population. In the SIPP data, three-fifths of adult unauthorized migrants had completed eight or fewer years of schooling, and 84 percent lacked a high school diploma or its equivalent. LPRs fared only slightly better. By comparison, naturalized citizens and all U.S.-born adults did considerably better: 59 and 32 percent, respectively, had not completed high school. Similarly, unauthorized migrants were less likely to speak or understand English.

As for the employment and occupational concentration by gender (table 11.2), 57 percent of working-age unauthorized migrant women were in the labor force, compared with about the same percentage of similar LPRs but 74 percent of naturalized citizens and 77 percent of the U.S.-born. Conversely, 36 percent of all working-age unauthorized migrant women were en-
gaged primarily in child-rearing, a much higher figure than those for the naturalized and the U.S.-born. Overall, male labor force participation rates were considerably higher, with a gender gap that was most pronounced among unauthorized migrants. The rate of labor force participation among male unauthorized migrants was 98 percent, the highest among all categories of male migrants.

The unemployment rates (table 11.2) point to disparities across nativity and legal/citizenship groups. For women, the unemployment rates for unauthorized migrants, LPRs, naturalized immigrants, and all U.S.-born citizens were 7.5 percent, 5.7 percent, 6.1 percent, and 2.9 percent, respectively. The corresponding rates among men were 7.6 percent (unauthorized migrants), 6.2 percent (LPRs), 4.2 percent (naturalized), and 4.1 percent (U.S.-born). Although these rates are undoubtedly inflated because wave 2 of the SIPP was conducted during the Great Recession, the cross-group comparisons nevertheless suggest that unauthorized migrants shouldered a disproportionate share of insecurity in the labor market. Even among the employed, unauthorized migrants were disproportionately concentrated in low-paying jobs that often lacked benefits and avenues for upward mobility (Kalleberg 2011). Compared with LPRs and citizens, unauthorized migrant women were heavily concentrated in building cleaning jobs and grounds maintenance, food services (primarily cooking), and production (primarily textile and apparel workers) (table 11.2). Among men, nearly 32 percent of unauthorized migrant workers were employed in construction jobs compared to 31 percent, 23 percent, and 10 percent of LPRs, naturalized immigrants, and U.S.-born citizens, respectively. And like their female counterparts, unauthorized Mexican migrant men were also heavily represented in building cleaning, grounds maintenance, and food services occupations.

Indicators of Labor Market Integration Since these occupations consist of shift work, often paid by the hour, without paid leave, the income of workers depends mostly on the number of hours worked (Bernhardt et al. 2009; Holzer et al. 2011). Since working is the fundamental

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 11.1</th>
<th>Demographic Characteristics and Human Capital Among Working-Age Adults in the United States Ages Twenty-Five to Sixty-Four, by Nativity and Immigrant Legal/Citizenship Status, 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mexican/Central American Immigrants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (percentage)</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (percentage)</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor children (percentage)</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (mean years)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero to eight years (percentage)</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine to eleven years (percentage)</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school or some college (percentage)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA or higher (percentage)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited English (percentage)</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rationale driving labor migration, one might expect unauthorized migrants to report higher average numbers of work-hours than other types of workers, especially men, given their very high rate of participation in the labor force. However, the opposite is true. We plot the average number of hours worked per week for immigrant and U.S.-born workers separately by gender (figure 11.6). For each of the types of workers compared, the unadjusted mean is simply the gender-specific group average. The adjusted mean is the average number of hours worked when holding constant the demographic and human capital factors reported in table 11.1 and the occupations from table 11.2. On average, both female (34.3 hours) and male (37.2) unauthorized migrants worked fewer than forty hours per week, and male unauthorized migrants averaged significantly fewer hours than male LPRs and U.S. citizens. Although the mean number of hours worked by unauthorized male migrants increases when adjusting for background factors, the gap in work intensity between unauthorized migrants and other types of workers remains significant.

Not only were unauthorized migrants working fewer hours, they also earned less in hourly wages (figure 11.7). The wages of unauthorized migrant men and women were, respectively,
about 67 percent and 66 percent lower than those of U.S.-born workers. Differences in demographic factors, human capital, and occupation accounted for a substantial proportion of the wage gap between unauthorized migrants and U.S.-born workers, though even after adjusting for these differences, the earnings of unauthorized migrants remained about 12 percent lower. The earnings of LPRs were also lower than those of U.S.-born workers (by 31 percent for women and 35 percent for men), but this gap is almost entirely explained by background factors for women and reduced to about an 8 percent disadvantage for LPR men. The adjusted wages of naturalized males and females actually slightly exceeded those of natives.

These statistics highlight the hardships faced by unauthorized Mexican migrants, as well as those faced by Mexican legal permanent residents. This is not surprising since a sizable proportion of LPRs from Mexico (about 35 percent, according to Guillermina Jasso and her colleagues [2008], based on data from the New Immigrant Survey) began as unauthorized migrants before converting to LPR status. For Mexicans, however, the considerable disadvantages associated with being a noncitizen barely existed among those who were naturalized, once demographic
factors are controlled. For the naturalized, after accounting for education, occupation, age, and region, hourly wages were actually slightly higher among both men and women than they were for all native-born persons. Even looking at educational differences between the naturalized and the native-born, no differences remain when only gender, age, and region of the country are controlled.

In short, among naturalized Mexicans, after controlling for basic demographic background factors, differences in either wages or education disappear. This pattern seems more consistent with the membership model of immigrant integration than with either the classic assimilation or racialization models. After controlling for such factors, the former would expect a pattern of gradually decreasing gaps in education and wages across the migration status categories, and the latter would expect remaining differences for all of the migration status categories compared to

FIGURE 11.7  Hourly Earnings of Mexican/Central American Immigrants, by Legal Status, Relative to Earnings of U.S.-Born Workers, 2008

Note: Adjusted bars control for group differences in age, educational attainment, occupation, and state of residence.
all native-born persons. Unauthorized migration status (and often even legal permanent resident status) thus appears to be associated with the greatest degree of disadvantage among the Mexican migrants, and, crucially, their offspring suffer the strongest educational disadvantage.

Parental Migration Status and Children’s Education

Although numerous case studies portray the heartrending difficulties that unauthorized migrants and their children face in navigating school and work (Dreby 2012; Gonzales 2011; Gonzales and Chávez 2012; Suárez-Orozco et al. 2011), little research has addressed the question of how unauthorized status might actually harm the children and grandchildren of immigrants, especially their schooling. Here we examine evidence that parental pathways to legalization do matter.

As noted, Mexican immigrants are by far the largest U.S. immigrant group. Because so many come without papers, Mexican-origin children account for a large majority of the children in the United States with an unauthorized immigrant parent. According to current estimates, 70 percent of the 5.5 million children of unauthorized immigrants in the United States have a Mexican-born parent (Passel and Cohn 2011). These estimates imply that in 2010 more than half of the 7.3 million children of Mexican immigrants residing in the country had an unauthorized parent (King et al. 2010; Passel and Cohn 2011). Moreover, most children of unauthorized parents, about 80 percent as of 2009, are born in the United States and thus are U.S. citizens (Passel and Cohn 2009). Even though U.S.-born children of immigrants presumably enjoy access to the same education and jobs as any other citizen, their parents’ migration-status histories reflect their first membership experiences in their families of socialization with the host society (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). Such experiences may have lasting effects on second- and third-generation children. Although targeted policies like the DREAM Act may address the situations of children who are themselves unauthorized, policies directed at the unauthorized population as a whole can affect both immigrants and their native-born children.

Mexican immigrants are distinctive in terms of the variety of pathways they take to legal status and citizenship. More than other groups, Mexican migrants to the United States have traditionally circulated back and forth between the two countries (Cornelius 1992; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Portes and Bach 1985). Circular migrants often change their orientations, gradually becoming permanent migrants (Roberts 1995) over many years (Menjívar 2006; Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Ascencio 1999). As migrants move from being “sojourners” to “setters” (Chávez 1988), their frame of reference shifts from the society of origin to the society of destination. Thus, when poor, unskilled laborers (especially males) who initially migrate for temporary employment find permanent work, they often seek ways to legalize. The family reunification provisions of U.S. immigration laws encourage the development of complex family-based strategies for achieving legalization (Curiel 2004; Glick 2010; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).

How might such legal-status trajectories relate to educational attainment among their children? Numerous additional studies have documented the deleterious effects of being unauthorized, especially in the labor market (Donato et al. 2008; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Hall et al. 2010; Massey and Gentsch 2014). Recent studies have also found negative psychological consequences for the children of unauthorized immigrants, including stress and other anxieties that inhibit learning and cognitive development (Yoshikawa and Kholoptseva 2013). Such factors may also limit children’s educational attainment, the crucial precursor of mobility in the United States (Hout 2012). Differences in levels of schooling substantially explain nativity differences in employment and earnings between many immigrant groups and whites (Duncan, Hotz, and
Parental Migration-Status Trajectories  Because of high rates of unauthorized status in the first generation, many Mexican immigrants and their children exist on the margins of society, and their incorporation may take longer than that of other immigrant groups (Bean and Stevens 2003; Brown 2007). Theoretically, this marginality may derive from either the mother or the father or both being unauthorized. We examine here the results of research on how combinations of parents’ legal status trajectories matter for children’s education (Bean et al. 2011). These are defined by each parent’s status in terms of nativity, entry, legalization, and citizenship at two points in time—at entry and at the later time of data collection. Parental trajectories across these points vary considerably within and across couples, both because immigrant parents may not have arrived together in the United States and because the costs of legalization and naturalization force the family to choose which parent should legalize first.

As previously noted, scarcely any national-level or even other data sets provide information on both unauthorized Mexican migration status for immigrants and their adult children. But one recent study in metropolitan Los Angeles, the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey (Bean, Leach, Brown, Bachmeier, and Hipp 2011; Rumbaut et al. 2004), included a large sample of second-generation Mexican respondents ages twenty to forty. Although the study is not national in scope, it offers enormously valuable information for a random sample of second-generation young adults in the city with the largest number of Mexican immigrants in the United States. The term “second-generation” typically refers to persons born in the United States with at least one immigrant parent, but the IIMMLA sample also includes immigrants who arrived in the United States as children before fifteen years of age. In using this information, we note that very few of these respondents were themselves unauthorized, and their status does not affect the research results we show. The IIMMLA data include information about the migration status of each parent when that person first entered the United States, as well as about the parents’ legal and citizenship status at the time of the interview. The answers enable the comparison of migration statuses for each parent at the time of entry and at the time of the interview. In some cases, the respondent either had never known one of his or her parents or did not know a parent’s initial migration status. Others had parents who had never lived in the United States. Still others had parents who had come as unauthorized entrants and then had become legal permanent residents. Some of these eventually naturalized.

The percentages of parents in the various trajectories used are shown in table 11.3. Mexican parents are highly likely to have been unauthorized when they came to the country: 34.2 percent of Mexican mothers and 32.8 percent of Mexican fathers in the sample were unauthorized at entry. Because a high proportion of Mexican immigrant parents at any moment may still be making the transition from temporary to permanent immigrant, and because U.S. immigration policy is so complicated that it encourages multiple legal entry strategies (Council on Foreign Relations 2009), Mexicans more than other country-of-origin group show multiple, parental mixed-status combinations of entry and legalization/citizenship statuses. Here we examine how these various parental mixed-status categories relate to children’s educational attainment. We do this by gauging the extent to which children’s schooling varies by parents’ combination of migration status categories, controlling for parents’ antecedent factors and the respondent’s other characteristics (for details, see Bean et al. 2011).

Patterns of Parental Trajectory Combinations  The members of the Mexican-immigrant generation and their children show characteristics typical of their form of migration. For ex-
ample, nearly three decades after they migrated to the United States, the Mexican parents still have mostly not finished high school, averaging only a little more than eight and a half years of schooling (see table 11.4). The Mexican American young adult respondents, by contrast, are much better educated than their parents, having completed thirteen years of schooling on average. Many of these Mexican Americans did not speak English at home while growing up (although most also learned English), and nearly three-fourths lived with both parents. Also, a noticeable proportion of their parents had returned to Mexico after migrating for at least six months, a pattern consistent with sojourner migration (Chávez 1988; Massey et al. 1987).

The parents of the second generation are characterized by seven migration-status trajectory combinations. These show considerable diversity in mother-father migration-status patterns. For example, two of the combinations involve either all of the fathers (but not all of the mothers) being citizens (either having been born in the United States or having naturalized), or all of the mothers (but not all of the fathers) being citizens. We label these “Father-Citizens” and “Mother-Citizens,” respectively. Falling into these groups were 24.1 percent and 13.9 percent of the Mexican parental combinations, respectively (figure 11.8). Also, two additional combinations involve both parents becoming legal permanent residents with many (slightly less than half) having naturalized, although not quickly. In one of these groups, almost all of the parents had entered legally, and in the other almost none of them had. We term these the “Legal Permanent Residents” (LPRs) (17.0 percent) and the “Unauthorized Entrants Who Legalized” (17.1 percent). Two somewhat idiosyncratic classes also emerge, again with mother-father differentiation, each showing substantial unauthorized entry and subsequent universal attainment of LPR status with some naturalization. But in each of these classes, only one parent had achieved legal status—either the father or the mother. These groups are “Fathers Unauthorized–Mothers Legalized” (4.5 percent) and “Mothers Unauthorized–Fathers Legalized” (14.1 percent). The remaining group (9.3 percent of the sample) consists of parents who had either entered or remained unauthorized, or parents whose status was unknown (“Mother Unauthorized and Father Unauthorized”).

### How Trajectory Combinations Affect Children’s Education

To ascertain how the parental combinations affected the education of their children, we first assess how parents’ back-

---

**TABLE 11.3 Mexican-Origin Immigrant Mothers and Fathers with Various Nativity/Migration and Legalization/Citizenship Trajectories, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trajectory</th>
<th>Mothers</th>
<th>Fathers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never migrated to the United States</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized to naturalized</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized to LPR</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized (or unknown) to naturalized</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized (or unknown) to LPR</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized (or unknown) to unauthorized</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-born</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA), adapted from Bean et al. (2011).*

*Note: N = 935. These trajectories include some mothers or fathers who after entry spent some time as an unauthorized migrant but whose entry status was unknown by the respondent. They became LPRs and in most instances naturalized. Most likely, these persons entered initially as students or tourists, overstayed their visas, subsequently were able to adjust to LPR status, and finally naturalized.*
Diversity and Disparities

Grounds were related to their combination by estimating a statistical model that regresses the trajectory combination on variables characterizing the mother’s and father’s backgrounds. These background indicators include each parent’s education and occupation in Mexico; the region of origin in Mexico; whether the parent had returned to Mexico; and whether the parents had lived together for most of the respondent’s childhood. The results reveal patterns consistent with the mixed trajectories of the combinations. For example, when parents (especially fathers) were better educated, had never worked in Mexico as laborers, had both lived with the child while the child was growing up, and had not returned to Mexico, they were more likely to be in the Mother-Citizens or Father-Citizens combinations.

We next assess how the parental combinations relate to the schooling of the adult children of the immigrants by regressing the second-generation respondent’s education (measured as years of schooling) on the seven parental mixed-trajectory combinations, with those whose parents both remained unauthorized deleted as the reference group. The regression coefficients from these models reflect the education premium to the adult children of immigrants associated with their parents’ holding a certain combination of legal statuses. We first estimate a model without any covariates or controls. In this unadjusted case, children who had at least one legal-immigrant parent showed a significant educational advantage relative to children whose parents remained unauthorized or whose status was unknown. This premium runs to more than two and a half years of schooling for those in the Father-Citizens group (first column, table 11.5). Results are then statistically adjusted for differences in background factors (shown in the second column of table 11.5). After such controls, five of the six groups still exhibit at least a full year or more.

### TABLE 11.4 Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents’ and Parents’ Characteristics, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>27.80</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education completed</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoke Spanish at home while growing up</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled in school at interview</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived with both parents while growing up</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mothers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held laborer occupation in home country</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in white-collar occupation in home country</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated from west central region of Mexico</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to home country for six months or more after migration to the United States</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IIMMLA, adapted from Bean et al. (2011).
of education than those whose parents remained unauthorized. Most important, however, the differences are not fully explainable by the adjustments. Although a considerable portion of the schooling premium (averaging roughly 50 percent across the groups) can be accounted for by other kinds of influence, these background differences, about one-half to two-thirds of the average education difference, still stands.

One combination stands out for the schooling advantage it conveys to offspring: the Mother-Citizens group. Upon close inspection, however, we note that this group is distinctive. Two-thirds of the mothers in the group were native-born. The other one-third entered the country as LPRs, and all quickly naturalized; none entered illegally. While 40 percent of these mothers married unauthorized males—a figure that suggests both the ubiquity of unauthorized Mexican male labor migration and the fact that when such migrants marry natives they gain eligibility for “green card” status—it is not surprising that adult children with parents like these show the highest levels of education. With so many native-born mothers, this group starts from such a high mobility level that it provides an upper-bound benchmark of how parents’ advantages become transmitted to their children. But because so many of the mothers are not immigrants, and because we are interested in what happens to the children of immigrants, we limit our attention to the members of the other parental groups.

Looking at the schooling premium results in table 11.5 (top part of the table), we note that the predominant difference across the trajectory combinations hinges on whether the mother has legal status or not. All of the respondents whose parents were in groups with legal mothers
showed considerably more schooling than those whose parents were in the groups with unauthorized mothers. The gross schooling difference for the offspring of these two sets of mothers is considerably more than two years (table 11.5, bottom part of the table with categories collapsed). When background statistical adjustments are introduced, the differences shrink to about one and a half years, but do not disappear. The educational advantage resulting from a mother’s legalization thus does not appear to derive substantially from other kinds of differences between these two kinds of mothers. However, there remains the possibility that the association between the mother’s legalization and the children’s education is spurious and correlated with something not observed in the research, such as parents’ levels of initiative in seeking legalization.

To assess this, we apply an instrumental variables approach to gauge the extent to which such factors might be accounting for the premium (see Bean et al. 2011). Recall that respondents whose parents were in the group in which mothers attained legal permanent residence status showed an unadjusted schooling advantage of about two years compared to those whose mothers were unauthorized. The estimate of this difference, after adjusting for multiple background factors, is about one and a half years of schooling. Applying the instrumental variables strategy reduces the premium further, to about one and a quarter (1.24) years (table 11.5, bottom part of the table). But a substantial difference of nearly one and a quarter years of schooling persists. In short, the influence on education of unobserved factors captured by the instrumental variables approach does not appear to eliminate the educational advantage associated with a mother having achieved legal status.

Implications for Third-Generation Schooling The unauthorized status of parents may also handicap third-generation (or grandchild) educational attainment. To what extent do the human

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**TABLE 11.5** Regression Models Showing Relationships Between Parents’ Mixed-Status Categories and Respondents’ Years of Schooling, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unadjusted</th>
<th>Adjusted a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All categories b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father-Citizens</td>
<td>2.60***</td>
<td>1.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother-Citizens</td>
<td>2.47***</td>
<td>1.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Entry and LPR</td>
<td>2.19***</td>
<td>1.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized Entry and LPR</td>
<td>2.31***</td>
<td>1.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Unauthorized–Mother Legalized</td>
<td>2.03***</td>
<td>1.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Unauthorized–Father Legalized</td>
<td>0.87 **</td>
<td>-0.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-value</td>
<td>17.78***</td>
<td>18.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Categories containing legal or citizen mothers | 2.04*** | 1.24*** |

Source: IIMMLA, adapted from Bean et al. (2011).

aFor “all categories,” the educational premiums shown are adjusted for parents’ and respondents’ background characteristics and for observed selectivity (the chances that certain kinds of parents are more likely to end up in one trajectory combination compared with others). With the categories collapsed, the education premium is also adjusted for these as well as for unobserved selectivity using an instrumental variables approach.

bMother Unauthorized–Father Unauthorized omitted.

cUnauthorized mothers omitted.

*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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capital and labor market disadvantages of unauthorized migrants carry over into later generations? Specifically, how much does the legacy of grandparental unauthorized status linger into the third generation? Bean and his colleagues (2013) have estimated how much of the schooling difference between third-generation Mexican-origin young adults in Los Angeles and native whites is attributable to grandparental unauthorized status. For males and females examined separately, the answer is about 35 to 40 percent. Thus, for a schooling gap of 1.1 years between these third-generation males (and here “third-generation” means the third-only generation, not the third-plus, that is, third or later generations) and non-Hispanic white males, about 0.4 of a year is explained by the legacy effects of grandparental unauthorized status. Stated differently, were it not for many third-generation Mexican Americans having unauthorized grandparents (specifically unauthorized-entry grandmothers who stayed unauthorized), a smaller schooling difference (about 0.7 of a year) between third-only-generation Mexican Americans and third-only-generation non-Hispanic whites would be expected instead of the substantially larger difference (1.1 years) observed in the IIMMLA data. In short, clear pathways to legalization can be expected to appreciably boost Mexican American educational attainment even as late as the third generation.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This chapter has documented the origins, extent, and consequences of unauthorized migration status for the offspring of Mexican immigrants in the United States. In particular, we have assessed the implications of unauthorized status for educational attainment, among both the migrants themselves and their children (including those born in the United States) and grandchildren. How significant are these educational disadvantages for Mexican American integration more broadly? The answer depends in part on the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the country and on how many children they have. Clearly, the greater the number of such migrants and the more children they have, the more widespread the integration challenge. From about 1970 through the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986 and up to the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, unauthorized migration from Mexico steadily increased, especially during the boom years of the 1990s and early 2000s. The most recent estimates from 2011 suggest that there are about 6.5 million unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States. Their children, some born in Mexico but most born in this country, number about 3.85 million (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). In terms of sheer numbers, the scope of the challenge to integration is considerable. Moreover, these numbers may undercount the Mexican unauthorized population somewhat owing to the “coverage error” associated with the Mexican-born in official government surveys (Van Hook et al. 2014).14

Mexican immigrants’ unauthorized entry status and subsequent lack of opportunities to legalize carry significant negative implications for the success of their children and grandchildren. Our analyses show that in contexts without clear-cut and easily navigable bases through which less-skilled labor migrants can obtain legal entry and residence, Mexican immigrants must traverse myriad, complex, and often incomplete trajectories to full societal membership (Leach et al. 2011), but often never attain legal residency, let alone citizenship. This forces the immigrants and their children to live in the shadows, thus affecting educational outcomes in the second and third generations. At present, unauthorized migrants have few pathways to legalization and a long wait, up to five years, when a pathway becomes available.15 Without immigration reform, a greater proportion of the unauthorized population will remain unauthorized longer than their predecessors who came during the 1960s and 1970s. If the United States does not provide pathways to legalization, or if it institutes difficult or punitive pathways (such as long
wait times, large fines for having been unauthorized, sizable fees for legalizing, or prohibitively high thresholds that generally discourage applications), then the size of the group will grow, given the availability of U.S. work owing to the relatively small number of natives to do less-skilled work. In this event, the educational disadvantages and inequalities plaguing Mexican immigrants compared to others will persist.

In addition, children will continue to suffer from their parents’ and grandparents’ unauthorized status. The unauthorized status of mothers alone appears to reduce children’s schooling by about one and a quarter years, all else equal. The children of legal Mexican immigrants averaged thirteen years of education, so a reduction of one and a quarter years marks the difference between attending some college and not finishing high school. Without a high school diploma, Americans earn about half a million dollars less over their lifetimes and die about seven years earlier than those with some college (Julian and Kominski 2011; Meara, Richards, and Cutler 2008). The disadvantage to the third generation would presumably be proportionately less, but nonetheless nontrivial.

All of this raises the question of what causes these disadvantages. In particular, to what extent do they derive from discrimination? Bean and his colleagues (2013) argue that current research results imply that poverty explains much of the handicap, but they also note that the possibility cannot be ruled out that ethnoracial discrimination accounts for at least some of the educational differences between higher-generation Mexican Americans and non-Hispanic whites. However, their findings suggest that a different kind of discrimination drives an important part of Mexican American educational disadvantage, namely, discrimination based on immigration status. “Unauthorized” parental status, which reverberates even upon the U.S.-born second and third generations, explains much of the gap in attainment between third-generation Mexican Americans and whites. Without opportunities for legalization, this gap will continue. In short, it may be the lack of initial societal membership and its legacy effects as much as native prejudice against later-generation Mexican Americans that handicaps their educational attainment.

Our findings indicate the crucial role that opportunities for legalization play in the success and failure of Mexican Americans. The disadvantages of remaining unauthorized are evident: legal status alone exerts its own positive force on second- and third-generation educational attainment. The conclusion: pathways to legalization will help overcome the risk of an expanding underclass of Mexican Americans. Since most children of unauthorized immigrants are born in the United States, our analysis also suggests that legislation providing the possibility of entry into full societal membership helps not only the immigrants themselves but also their children and their children’s children. Evidence shows that those unauthorized entrants who do attain legal status overcome many of the disadvantages confronting them, as do their children. Because parents’ socioeconomic status has sizable effects on children’s education (Fischer and Hout 2006), the positive influence of such membership in the immigrant generation is likely to carry over to later generations as well.

NOTES

1. This research was supported by the US2010 Census Research Project at the Russell Sage Foundation and by grants for data collection and analysis from the Russell Sage Foundation, including one for the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study. The research approach and findings in the chapter have been presented at seminars at the Public Policy Institute of California, the University of Illinois, the University of California at San Diego, the University of California at Davis, the University of California at Santa Barbara, the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of California at Riverside, the Univer-
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1. A related question is whether the amount of less-skilled work needing to be done has similarly decreased. In
3. For reviews, see Borjas and Katz (2007), Card and Lewis (2007), Hamermesh and Bean (1998), Holzer (2011),
4. It is important to note that the task of marshaling evidence about such migrants is made difficult by the fact that
5. In 1970 the total number of all such entrants (LPRs, temporary non-immigrants [I-94s], and net unauthorized
6. Authors’ calculations are from data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010,
7. While the broad preference categories under the McCarran-Walter Act had privileged highly skilled immigrants,
9. The argument has also been advanced that the unauthorized Mexican population in the United States grew after
10. A related question is whether the amount of less-skilled work needing to be done has similarly decreased. In
manufacturing, the answer would be yes. Since 1970, the share of manufacturing jobs in the economy has halved, dropping from more than one in four to about one in eight. The drop-off in the share of manufacturing jobs held by persons with a high school diploma or less has been similarly precipitous, also falling from approximately one in four in 1970 to approximately one in eight today. Interestingly, during this same time the overall number of manufacturing jobs remained approximately 21 million. But because of overall job growth, a relatively smaller share of less-skilled persons work in manufacturing now. Also, many of today’s manufacturing jobs require at least some college education. Thus, the relative demand for less-skilled workers in manufacturing has declined. However, during this same period the share of the less-skilled workforce in service jobs has grown considerably (Freeman 2007). As a result, from 1980 until today, the number of nonmanufacturing jobs held by less-skilled, younger males has held steady at roughly 3.7 million to 3.8 million, or approximately 45 percent of the less-skilled, male workforce ages twenty-five to forty-four. However, because service-sector work often lacks the same opportunities and pay structure as manufacturing, native low-skilled men have increasingly left the labor force altogether. Nonparticipation in the labor force by men too young to retire more than tripled between the 1960s and 1994, and that increase was concentrated among men with low skills (Murphy and Topel 1997).

11. Roughly, a decline of this magnitude implies that every 1,000 native women of childbearing age would need to have about 400 more births per year to reproduce the native population. Over a ten-year period, this would result in about 6 million more births. In other words, after ten years of current levels of childbearing, the native-born population would contain almost 6 million fewer persons (allowing for some deaths and emigration) than it would if a replacement TFR of 2.1 had been attained over the period. Thus, over the past thirty years, the size of new cohorts born to native-born mothers in the United States has been slowly shrinking. A hint of this is evident in the drop in the interdecade native growth rate, which was 21.2 percent during the 1950s but only 7.8 percent from 2000 to 2010 (authors’ calculations from U.S. census data). Even more dramatic, the size of the younger native-born population (ages twenty-five to thirty-four) has been shrinking since 1980. This means that the number of natives available to meet societal workforce needs are now in both relative and absolute decline, on account of diminished fertility alone.

12. Certain SIPP panels include a series of questions allowing users to separate marginal types of “other” immigrants, LPRs, and foreign-born citizens. A SIPP panel is interviewed roughly every four months for about three years. The survey consists of a core set of questions asked of each wave, as well as topical module questions that vary from wave to wave. We use data from the second wave, carried out between January and April 2009, which includes topical module questions about immigration and citizenship status.

13. Persons born abroad to U.S. citizen parents are U.S. citizens by birth and are thus not included in the immigrant population.

14. Recent research suggests coverage error for the Mexican-born population in the United States. Data from census and other government surveys have probably been somewhat higher than previously thought, particularly during periods of prosperity and increasing unauthorized flows. Because coverage error is a crucial element in the predominant estimation technique used to gauge unauthorized Mexican migration, the residual method, it is significant for unauthorized estimates. Jennifer Van Hook and her colleagues (2013) examined birth, death, and net migration data (for both Mexico and the United States for three time intervals) to estimate the coverage of the Mexican-born population. They use multiple methods and multiple time points to gain perspective on the problem. The results provide evidence of undercoverage of the Mexican-born population, in the range of five to ten percentage points greater than previously used estimates. This, of course, implies that the undercoverage of the unauthorized segment of the Mexican-born population, because it is harder to capture, is probably somewhat higher still. For present purposes, the statistics previously cited about the magnitude of unauthorized migrant stocks and flows should be viewed as lower-bound indications of the degree of unauthorized Mexican migration to the United States over the past couple of decades.

Also, visa overstays and other kinds of overstays among Mexicans seem highly likely to have risen in recent decades. Research by James Bachmeier and his colleagues (2011) documents the substantial increases in both the number of non-immigrants from Mexico (the population in which overstays emerge) and the number of border crossing cards (cards authorizing Mexicans to cross the border to work in border areas). In recent years, Mexicans have used tourist or other visas or border crossing cards to enter the United States for longer-term stays (Hernández-León 2008). This implies that rates of visa and other overstays have probably risen in recent years. Unfortunately, data on overstays and overstay rates are next to nonexistent, with the best research on the subject...
dating back more than twenty years (Warren 1990). Bachmeier and his colleagues (2011), however, demonstrate that even if overstay rates had declined, the number of Mexican overstays has probably risen anyway because the size of the population from which overstays come (here we include those with border crossing cards) has increased so drastically. Because overstays are not only unauthorized residents but also persons who have violated the terms of a legal entry document, they may be more unlikely than other unauthorized migrants to respond to government surveys (Bachmeier, Van Hook, and Bean 2014). In short, the trend of increased reliance on such documents for entry may also contribute to a rise in coverage error for the Mexican-born population.

15. Over the past two decades, the waiting time for Mexican applicants to obtain legal permanent residence through the family reunification provisions has gone from two years to five years (Bachmeier et al. 2011; U.S. Department of State 2011).

REFERENCES


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