Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology

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“We shall set to work and meet the ‘demands of the day,’ in human relations as well as in our vocation. This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very life.” (Max Weber 1958: 156)

“Discontinuity is freedom.” (Harold Bloom 1997: 39)

Sociology as a discipline is intimately entwined with modernity, both as lived and theorized. Sociologists have galvanized distinctive mechanisms of social rationalization and technical regulation (not least statistics and surveys) and authored ideas of the modern social space as a realm that we denizens inhabit and control. Sociologists have also helped define modernity’s significant Others, including the categories of tradition and post-modernity. They have applied their intellectual energy to formulating what might be called the “sociological modern”: situating actors and institutions in terms of these categories, understanding the paths by which they develop or change, and communicating these understandings to states, citizens, all manner of organizations and social movements – as well as vast armies of students. On this basis, sociologists have helped build and manage today’s sprawling, globally extended social edifice, while simultaneously trying to diagnose and dismantle its disciplinary aspects and iron cages. The discipline is itself a product of modernity, not simply in its institutions but, as we will argue, in its theoretical core.

The formation of modernity now figures as a place of disorder as well as dynamism – troubled, fissured, perhaps even in civilizational crisis. This is all the more ironic now that capitalism – surely a core constituent of modernity – is thought by some to have arrived at a point of triumphant stasis, the highest stage and culmination of history.¹ In this unsettled time, the discipline of sociology finds itself in an interesting position. It is prey to heightened theoretical dispersion and home to a confused array of possible stances toward the place of the “modern” in ongoing global transitions, reconfigurations and cataclysms. Many sociologists still embrace the familiar contrast between tradition and modernity and assume that a directional development from the former to the latter is underway.² They may celebrate or


²The stubborn persistence of modernization theory in demography and family sociology is critically discussed in Arland Thornton’s 2001 Presidential Address to the Population Association of America (Thornton 2001: 449-465). Ian Roxborough’s “Modernization Theory Revisited: A Review Article” finds modernization theory to be “alive and
mourn the modernist rationalization and disenchantment of the social world against which romantic or neo-traditional energies are aimed and from which “we moderns” cannot turn back. Others, particularly of a more cultural studies bent, insist on the plasticity of all such distinctions or celebrate the viability of alternative modernities. And so on. Yet what is often missing in the stew of sociological discussion, research and political prescription is a sense of history as more than a vague preamble to the current moment.

Historical sociology is one place for reflection about theory in the broader discipline, its connections to other academic and intellectual formations and to the quandaries inherent in the “sociological modern” as it plays out in the social world. In part that is because historical sociologists have offered analyses and narratives of how people and societies became modern or not – what was it that changed in the series of Great Transformations, and how these manifold processes are continuing to reshape the contemporary world. At times historical sociologists have done even more. “Doing justice to the reality of history is not a matter of noting the way in which the past provides a background to the present,” as Philip Abrams (1982: 8) eloquently put it: “it is a matter of treating what people do in the present as a struggle to create a future out of the past, of seeing the past not just as the womb of the present but the only raw material out of which the present can be constructed.” In this Introduction, we offer an archaeology and analysis of the three waves of historical sociology specifically in order to inform these reflections about theory, doing sociology and the future scholarship that might emerge from present debates.

**Sociology’s Historical Imagination**

For much of its own history, sociological theory has evinced a deep concern for historical thinking. Attention to history has been tightly coupled to theoretical exploration as sociologists addressed the central questions of the discipline: how did societies come to be recognizably “modern”? how did selves come to be understood as individuated, coherently centered and rationally-acting human subjects? From Thomas Hobbes through Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, W. E. B. DuBois, Thorstein Veblen and Norbert Elias, various lines of theory developed as an effort to understand the processes by which social structures and social actors were created and transformed over the course of the transition from “traditional” or feudal societies to some distinctly “modern” social life. How

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3The notion that “modernity is not one, but many” is explored in Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar’s “On Alternative Modernities,” as well as the other essays in Gaonkar’s edited volume *Alternative Modernities* (2001). In historical sociology, Paul Gilroy’s contribution to a vision of “alternative modernities” has been particularly influential, especially his *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (1993). See the section below on “World Systems, Postcoloniality, and Remapping the World after the Second Wave.”


5There are of course multiple lines of theory that can be identified in the sociological canon, and multiple readings of theorists. And people change. The Durkheim of *The Division of Labor in Society* was closer to the stylized evolutionary models of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer than was the Durkheim of the *Moral Education*, especially
modernity was understood varied, of course: it might involve the rise of capitalism and class-structured actors, as in Marx; the formation of the disciplined bourgeois subject and his confinement in the iron cage of rationalized collective life, as in Weber; the twinned inventions of Enlightenment individualism and a new order of racial subordination, as in DuBois, or still other broad evolutionary visions. The proposed mechanisms of change were framed differently as well, whether in terms of political revolutions; the growth of the division of labor; colonialism and empire; pressures to manage the manifold anxieties of the self; opportunities for group cultural distinction, and so on. Yet within this diverse intellectual landscape, social theorists converged on a fundamentally historical project.

Sociological theory, however, has been marked by striking shifts in just how it has attended to history. As sociology was institutionalized in this century, particularly as it took shape in the United States, this historically-informed theoretical vision gave way to more ahistorical models of social and cultural change. Structural-functionalism and other allied approaches invoked highly general and abstracted characteristics, processes or sequences while claiming to explain change over time. These approaches paid little or no attention to the temporally-bound logics of particular social and cultural configurations. Moreover, they lacked an emphasis on critical turning points, and tended to assume that many constituent and possibly disjoint processes could be coherently collapsed or fused under one general and rather vague heading – “modernization.” Ironically, these approaches either deployed the concepts of “modern,” “modernity” and “modernization” in unreflective ways, with minimal explicit substantive content, or aligned the “modern” with a roster of associated static concepts. Yet by the 1970s and 1980s, these ahistorical approaches served as the foil for a resurgence of historical inquiry. Of course this arid, desert background is partly fictive. A certain reading of one master theorist, Talcott Parsons, came to stand for, to signify, a broader and more complicated intermediary epoch. Intellectual lineages are constructed out of many materials, including people’s desire to claim forebears who will lend them academic credibility; the dynamics of disciplinary competition and collaboration, and authors’ conscious and unconscious desires and identifications (Bloom 1997; Camic 1992; Gieryn 1995; Latour and Woolgar 1979). We all interpret our predecessors, polishing some and vilifying others. Nevertheless we think the general point still stands. The mid-20th century was the apex of presentism in U.S. sociology as well as the moment of highest confidence in modernity.

in his analysis of the reciprocal relationship between the modern state and the category of the individual.

6While “modernism” generally designates an aesthetic movement, coined in 1890 by a Nicaraguan poet Ruben Dario (Anderson 1998: 3), “modernity” is a messier congeries of categories with Wittgensteinian family resemblances. See below for further discussion of this point.

7For the provenance of those ahistorical models, see George Steinmetz’s essay in this volume.

8See for example Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Parsons actually oscillated among different ways of melding history and sociology. In the System of Modern Societies, for example, he is at times carefully historical in his claims in what is a “directional” argument that explicitly seeks to update Weber (1971: 139). At other points the historical materials are awkwardly subordinated to an overly-abstracted taxonomic impulse. See David Zaret, “From Max Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1980): 1180-1201.

Luckily, not all sociologists in the United States – and sociologists working in the U.S. were the most enthusiastically encamped in this presentist desert – were captured by modernization theory or its more sophisticated cousin structural-functionalism, even in their palmiest days. One immediately thinks of Barrington Moore Jr., Reinhard Bendix, Seymour Martin Lipset or the early work of Charles Tilly among others. They were in dialogue both with like-minded scholars outside the United States, and with colleagues from more presentist persuasions. Thus there were always a few engaged by fundamentally historical questions, particularly with respect to politics and political transformations. Their work nourished the next generation of historical sociologists – a “second wave” of the 1970s and 1980s – and helped inspire programmatic calls for a return to historical inquiry. The “second wave” was a “theory group” and a system of signs bound together by continuing engagement with questions.

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11In different ways, some of Lipset’s work, as well as Robert Neelly Bellah’s Tokugawa Religion: Cultural Roots of Modern Japan (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957); Neil Smelser’s Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. An Application of Theory to the British Cotton Industry (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959); and S. N. Eisenstadt’s The Political System of Empires (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963) attempted more or less successfully (opinion is still divided!) to bridge the perceived gap between the exigencies of doing justice to history and mapping structural-functionalist taxonomies. For a negative evaluation, consult Michael Anderson’s Family Structure in Nineteenth Century Lancashire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). Yet what is often forgotten is just how “historical” these works were in the context of prevailing sociological practice.


13We are not the first to use the terminology of “waves” when describing the development of historical sociology. In The Rise of Historical Sociology, Dennis Smith discusses two (long) “waves” of historical sociology, the first comprising writers who now occupy the canon of the discipline (including Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim and Weber) and the second partially overlapping what we are calling the second wave. Smith divides the second wave into three “phases,” encompassing the scholars who carried the torch of history in sociology during the ahistorical dominance of structural functionalism, and those who we identify as leading the resurgence of historical sociology in the late 1970s and 1980s; he also identifies a “third phase” (“partially overlapping” the second phase of the second wave) which comprises scholars he sees as responding to the conservative political shifts of the 1980s and the decline of Marxism. We find it more useful to classify these latter two groups together, for they share theoretical and methodological proclivities which divide them from more recent scholars. Written in 1991, Smith’s book could not have commented on more recent intellectual developments in historical sociology, such as the influence of rational choice theory or the cultural turns. Rather, his work described the intellectual contributions of various key second-wave scholars’ major works. It does not address – as we do – the theoretical contradictions which helped to create challenges to this work. From the vantage point of 2003, the movement that was still “young” at Smith’s writing has consolidated and begun to break up, as we discuss further below, producing rebellious intellectual progeny who may or may not come to share a single paradigm. Dennis Smith, The Rise of Historical Sociology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.
inspired by Marxism. It was also a social movement. (The sense of a movement was nourished both by interdisciplinary activity and by the spread of historical methods to a large number of core sociological topics, and perhaps also by the influence of historians of, for example, the Annales school, who had earlier borrowed social scientific concepts and orientations.) This is not to say everyone was then a Marxist, but that even those who were not debated on largely Marxist terrain. Indeed, most of the best-known works of the comparative-historical renaissance of the 1970s and early 1980s – even those that did not explicitly embrace a Marxist theoretical stance – take off from puzzles within the Marxian tradition to which Marxism itself could not provide satisfactory answers. To resolve these puzzles, analysts had to draw on intuitions and concepts from other theoretical traditions.

Any such characterization necessarily simplifies along two lines. First, many of those who contributed to the consolidation of the initial resurgence of historical sociology have continued to grapple with the new intellectual currents that challenge contemporary work. They have moved on after having created (and surfed) the second wave. For example, Charles Tilly is now engaged in the lively interdisciplinary work on “social mechanisms,” Theda Skocpol moved from revolutions to the emergence of the U.S. welfare state, in the process making a major contribution to the understanding of gendered politics and institutions, and Craig Calhoun has emerged a one of the leading voices of the cultural turn. The analytic contribution of a scholar in a field at one time does not exhaust her or his intellectual persona. Second, although the second wave was a broad, eclectic movement, sheltering a variety of actors who contributed to the resurgence of theoretically-informed history in sociology and allied disciplines, it was quickly typecast in terms of some of its members, and only some of their ideas. The canonical second wave was a system of signs as well as a movement of actors, and macroscopic, comparative scholars of revolution, state building, class formation became the synecdochal representative of the whole. Why should this have been so? First, the macro-political sociologists put forward programmatic statements and self-consciously forwarded historical approaches against the prevailing orthodoxy (see Abbott 2001, chapter 4). They also had a well-defined theoretical agenda which put them in dialogue with thriving marxist-inspired debates across history, anthropology and (to some extent) political science. And let us not forget the Zeitgeist, and the worldwide audience for radical politics and Marxist theory.

14We believe that the “second wave” was not primarily a generation of Young Turks engaged in the recurring ritual of overthrowing its academic predecessors (as, for example, Andrew Abbott’s witty Chaos of Disciplines [2001, 23-25] would have it), although surely Abbott is right to argue that the dynamic helped constitute it as an intellectual formation. Chaos links this to a broader argument regarding the fractal patterns of sociological knowledge. See also Craig Calhoun, “The Rise and Domestication of Historical Sociology,” in The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, Terrence J. McDonald, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 306-7. The general concept of a “theory group” derives from Nicholas C. Mullins, with the assistance of Carolyn J. Mullins. Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American Sociology. New York, New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

15Most commentators on this era of scholarship underline the generational character of the movement. Yet age alone does not determine membership in any “wave.” Senior scholars as well as precocious PhDs-in-the-making took part in the second wave resurgence, while we find among the students of the second wave “delayed” PhDs, some of the contributors to the present volume included, who took time out from academia to participate in 1970s politics before completing their degrees. Thus someone’s graduate school cohort might be one proxy for her or his “risk of participating” in various waves – but not a perfect one.

Those who worked on key intellectual questions that intersected with that theoretical formation were most likely to be seen as central.

In what follows, we walk an analytic tightrope. We discuss the second wave in terms of its canonical version, which came to represent comparative historical sociology in the academic eye. But we will also insist that during the very period of its ascendancy in the 1970s and early 1980s, a number of historical sociologists were publishing important research that fell outside the hegemonic analytic framework. One might instance Andrew Abbott, Charles Camic, David Zaret, Viviana Zelizer among others. One of the nicer ironies of the present moment – reflected in many of the chapters that follow – resides in the ongoing rediscovery of some of the substantive contributions of these and other iconoclastic historical sociologists, some of whose work was marginalized during the moment of canonical second wave dominance, and some of which represented the leading wedge that helped explode it.

As an emerging paradigm, then, second wave historical sociology was defined by a shared set of commitments: a substantive interest in political economy centered on questions of class formation, industrialization, and revolution along with a (usually implicit) utilitarian model of the actor. While motivating a forceful line of inquiry into the transformations associated with modernity, these core assumptions reproduced many of the exclusions and repressions of modernist social theory. Certain subjects – in the double sense of both topics and actors – tended to be marginalized or excluded: colonial peoples, women, and groups that we would now call people of color and queers. The analytic dimensions of gender, sexuality, race, and nation were downplayed in parallel fashion. Moreover, culture, emotion, religion, the informal aspects of organization and more were repressed by the powerful political-economic analytic framework undergirding the resurgence of historical sociology. And, in proper dialectic form, they returned. In the process, recent scholarship has greatly enriched historical sociology while shredding many of the core assumptions of second wave scholarship.

Take, for example, the combination of structural determination and the utilitarian model of action that informs canonical second-wave analyses of the influence of economic position on political action. This double reductionism has been questioned as attention to culture and identity has unearthed the complex and contingent ways in which selves and discursive positions are formed. So what count as key substantive elements of “structure” or psyche is analytically open, and getting more open all the time. The once-robust combination of structural determination and comparative methods is also deeply contested. Thinking historically, it is increasingly acknowledged, undermines comparative strategies that isolate distinct events in an empty “experimental time.” Some see salvation for explanatory claims in

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18We will have more to say about this below, and about the vigorous rational-choice theoretic counter-attack, which replaces the implicit rational-actor assumptions of earlier work with a much more explicit and sophisticated utilitarianism.

terms of “mechanisms” that may be identified across diverse temporal and social settings.\textsuperscript{20} Others pin their hopes on a more thoroughgoing reconstruction of sociology’s own categories of analysis, now themselves under the historicizing microscope.\textsuperscript{21} The latter approach owes something to post-structuralism and post-modernist critiques of Enlightenment universalism and the grand narratives of modern historical development, including those deployed by sociologists. Some sociologists have drawn on this postmodern repertoire to destabilize organizing imageries of progress and modernity in productive ways. But because these organizing imageries are constitutive of our discipline, post-modernist and post-structuralist modes of thought are anathema to many sociologists, including the many historical sociologists who get twitchy when they see the very ideas of progressive social and cultural change being put into question. Thus a congeries of lively debates and oppositions -- sometimes friendly, sometimes antagonistic -- have replaced the relatively cohesive theory group that initially reestablished historical sociology in professional associations, streams of syllabi and publications.

There is a great deal of legitimate uncertainty about what sort of claims can be made and sustained at this juncture. The open-endedness and fragmentation of the present academic moment evokes intellectual anxiety, over-determined by the epochal events of 1989 and the subsequent revitalization of liberalism, the vagaries of globalization, fundamental challenges to the order of nation-states, and the collapse of Marxism as a mode of imagining a future beyond capitalist modernity. If, as Abrams argued, a fully historicized sociology explores the construction of futures out of pasts, recent events shift figure and ground in our understanding of trajectories of social change. The present problematizes the past in new and challenging ways. Yet we also see grounds for hope: a new intellectual openness associated with this unsettled moment, a willingness to forsake old antagonisms and to experiment with new ways of thinking sociologically and historically, while drawing on the theoretical and analytical resources bequeathed by the sociological pioneers, our predecessors and their critics. We see this moment as an opportunity to examine some crucial questions: Is there a distinctive theoretical project (or projects plural) for historical sociology in informing approaches to social and cultural transformation? What are we to make of the irony that the programmatic calls for a more historical sociology have inspired much better sociological history and rather less consensus on theory? To what extent can newer varieties of historical sociology contribute to a reconsideration, perhaps a reconstruction, of theories of social and cultural change, and of modernity or modernities?

\textsuperscript{20}Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly offer one definition of “mechanism”: “Mechanisms are a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001: 24). See also Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also Arthur Stinchcombe in “The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science” (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 21 #3 (September): 367-87). As a social science signifier, “mechanism” is fast becoming as messy and capacious as “modernity.”

\textsuperscript{21}Craig Calhoun, “Domestication of Historical Sociology,” pp.306, 313 (see footnote 4).
These are hard questions, but tackling them will propel sociological and cross-disciplinary conversations about social theory. No one person can successfully address them, and no one approach will do. We gathered a diverse group of sociologists, first at a conference and then as contributors to this volume, to assess the accomplishments of the resurgence of historical inquiry and to peer into the future, delineating the challenges to come. We editors made certain choices, among several possible strategies, in assembling the group. We chose to limit ourselves to sociologists currently working in the U.S. (although some in the group originally hail from other countries). This decision wasn’t just a matter of money! Historical sociology, as international as it was and is, has clearly had its own history in the American academy; the concept of “historical sociology” itself was adopted most enthusiastically in the United States, for reasons including the “brain drain” of historical sociologists to the U.S. from abroad.22

We deliberately included people who reflect a wide range of theoretical orientations and a broad spectrum of understandings of what constitutes historical sociology. Some would sign onto what Craig Calhoun calls a minimalist list of inherent historical sociological objects: “rare but important sociological phenomena (e.g., revolutions); critical cases – particular events or cases which bear on theory, or have intrinsic interest (e.g., Japanese capitalism); phenomena that occur over extended period of time (e.g., industrialization, state formation, creation of “modern” family forms); phenomena for which changing historical context is a major set of explanatory variables (e.g., changing international trade opportunities, political pressures, technologies shape the conditions for economic development)” (Calhoun 1996: 313-14). Other members of our group still understand historical sociology as it was defined by Theda Skocpol in Vision and Method: works that “ask questions about social structures or processes understood to be concretely situated in time and space ... address processes over time, and take temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes ... attend to the interplay of meaningful actions and structural contexts, in order to make sense of the unfolding of unintended as well as intended outcomes in individual lives and social transformations ... [and] highlight the particular and varying features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change [author’s emphasis]” (Skocpol 1984: 1). And still others would insist that even this is too limiting a frame, and that the rightful province of historical sociology is the "problematic of structuring" -- and therefore all of history and sociology. Here is Phillip Abrams again: "Sociology must be concerned with eventuation, because that is how structuring happens. History must be theoretical, because that is how structuring is apprehended." (1982: p. x) We aren't fully satisfied with any of these definitions. But since what historical sociology is is now sharply contested, we sought to reflect rather than constrain the diversity of understandings.23

We editors also elected to bring together sociologists, rather than a cross-disciplinary group. This may at first seem surprising. Historical sociologists are enthusiastically interdisciplinary. In examining any particular historical event or transformation, our own work – and that of all the contributors – has been deeply engaged in conversations with historians, political scientists, literary theorists, economists

22In his “They Do Things Differently There, Or, The Contribution of British Historical Sociology” (The British Journal of Sociology 40 #4, December 1989: 544-564), for example, John A. Hall describes the lineage of British historical sociology and laments the impact of the “brain drain” of historical sociologists from Britain to the United States (p. 564).

23For that reason, we editors invited members of our own mid-career and younger cohorts, rather than scholars who were originally the leading lights of the official or unofficial second wave. We expected this decision to create a conversation that was freer from people’s (including our own) stock assumptions about representative figures and canonical intellectual positions. The intention was not to create or police new intellectual boundaries, but to take collective temperatures and open further space for thought, discussion and action. As should be obvious, the scholars assembled in this book compose a loose and contingent coalition rather than a theory group.
and anthropologists. And we recognize that the “historic turn,” or the move to historicize social inquiry, is decidedly a cross-disciplinary project. The contributors to this volume are joining with a broad range of scholars responding to the classics of social theory, and to the problems of modernity, post-modernity or alternative modernities, however understood. Political theorists interrogate the classical canon for its textual silences or rhetorics; ethnographers in the “new ethnography” incorporate the situated nature of anthropology and sociology in the construction of the distinction, still alive and kicking, between the “modern” self and the “traditional” other, to cope with problems of power and modernity. Sociologists have much in common with these categories or groups of scholars, but they also make distinctive contributions. Those of us who pursue a historicized sociology can tackle the processes conventionally grouped under the heading of “transitions to capitalist modernity” on empirical as well as theoretical ground. Of course, historical sociology is about not only the past, but also the ways in which the past shapes the present and future, inviting our remaking of modernist social analysis and the concept of modernity itself, which has significant disciplinary specificities. So perhaps we even have an intellectual responsibility, born of our middleman position, both to our own discipline and to others.

Disciplines – like any structure – provide both distinctive constraints and capacities embedded in theoretical and methodological orientations, transmitted through graduate education, hiring, the tenure process, and the gate-keeping of fellowship, research proposal and manuscript review. We can illustrate this point with reference to the treatment of “race” in U.S. historical sociology versus historical political science. Why is it that historical work foregrounding race and ethnicity has been less typically found among the most-cited works of historical sociology, while it has been central to studies of American political development, a core constituency in historical political science? In the historical study of American politics, the problems of race, slavery and political freedom have loomed large, motivated both by the foundational position of liberalism in political theory and the national crisis of the Civil War. Given these theoretical and empirical foci, work on race could not be so easily marginalized. Yet in historical sociology, “race” has been one of the areas of scholarship that had to be “brought back in” in the current period (although work on racial formations and identities was flourishing in other areas of sociology). Key programmatic statements of historical sociology explicitly mention “race” as a keyword in the survey of current literature; for example, Skocpol’s Vision and Method includes in its survey,

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26 We are grateful to Ira Katznelson and John Lie for helpful discussions on this issue.
among others, Orlando Patterson’s work on slavery.\textsuperscript{27} Yet the analysis of race was sidelined by the second wave’s orientation to Marxian questions about the transition to capitalism, revolution, class conflict and the state in modern Europe. The larger point is that disciplinary specificity still matters. Trans-disciplinary intellectual projects – the historic, linguistic, or cultural turns, gender studies, Marxism, rational choice theory – attempt to reform or revolutionize knowledge and academic practices across these boundaries, yet their success will be reflected in their penetration of disciplinary canons and graduate training practices, and this requires engagement with the substantive, methodological and theoretical particularities of each discipline.

Sociology is also a symptomatic site where people from a variety of disciplines can get a bird’s-eye view of processes of paradigm formation, contention and implosion. Historical sociology in particular lies at the crossroads of current intersecting trends in knowledges that touch all the social science disciplines – the rise of cultural analysis, neo-positivism, the revival of the mechanism metaphor, to name but a few. Other disciplines have experienced some of these developments, of course, but not simultaneously; political science has witnessed the juggernaut of rational-choice theory, while culturalist trends are almost entirely absent outside the subfields of political theory and constructionist international relations. Anthropology and history, on the other hand, have been most influenced by culturalist and poststructuralist trends, and have proved inhospitable to rational choice approaches. But all of these orientations are well-represented in sociology – and their representatives are fighting over claims to define the overall disciplinary field. Readers from many points in this range of contending perspectives, and from the other disciplines, should be interested in how these debates are progressing in the discipline where the alternative perspectives are most directly contending.

Finally, our group has given substantive pride of place to politics, broadly understood to include not simply forms of authoritative sovereign power but much of what, since Michel Foucault burst on the American academic scene, has come to be thought of as disciplinary power dispersed throughout the social landscape. The political focus has enabled participants to respond to a central legacy of historical sociology, while at the same time broadening its concerns in light of the developments we signaled above. In their essays for \textit{Remaking Modernity}, the authors have engaged a range of analytic strategies and/or theoretical models in light of more recent sociological research on a process or dimension of historical change. In some cases, there is an obvious continuity between classical theory and contemporary research. Given that secularization – including the changing institutional relations between church and state and the making of a “bourgeois” and secular self -- was identified by Max Weber and others as an important aspect of modernity, for example, how do these claims and assumptions inform recent research? How is current work revealing the limits of these claims and theories? For other themes, the redefinition of key processes is critical. State formation, the transition to capitalism and professionalization were originally theorized as European phenomena, so what happens when we widen our frame to take in post-socialist, colonial or post-colonial states as well? Finally, for some topics, the absence of attention in classical theory is an important feature: how should we reconceptualize theories of social and cultural change in light of research on race, gender, sexuality, nation and other concepts that were marginalized -- or simply unknown -- in earlier theoretical debates?

We think about these revisions and reformulations under the general heading of “remaking modernity.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines modern as “of or pertaining to the present and recent times, as distinguished from the remote past.” To be modern is to be in the now and (if the metaphor still has life in it) at the cutting edge of history. The concept remains eternally fresh because it is a moving index. It points to everything—and nothing. In the face of such slipperiness, the authors in this book have gravitated toward alternative responses. Some of our contributors try to endow “modernity” with fixed referential content that can be defended as a platform for generalization and explanation, usually with “capitalism” or “industrialism” at the conceptual and causal core. As Max Weber observed, “As Max Weber observed,” say Michael Lowy and Robert Sayre, “the principal characteristics of modernity—the calculating spirit (Rechnenhaftigkeit), the disenchantment of the world (Entzauberung der Welt), instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität), and bureaucratic domination—are inseparable from the advent of the ‘spirit of capitalism.’” Others who want a stable and univocal definition gesture toward Marx, whether modernity is taken to signal “the cultural articulations that accompany processes of capital accumulation” (Pred and Watts 1992: xiii) or a “mode of vital experience—experience of space and time, of the self and others, of life’s possibilities and perils—that is shared by men and women all over the world today....To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, ‘all that is solid melts into air.’” These various approaches may or may not be compatible: the arguments over problems and affiliated research are ongoing, and readers must judge.

Alternatively, one could abandon the whole family of concepts—modern, modernity, etc.—as social science concepts. This we think would be a mistake, if it’s even possible. We editors would advocate approaching “modernity” as a conceptually unstable historical concept. Our definitions should capture both people’s changing ideas of what is or isn’t modern (or traditional, or backward, or postmodern) and the valences of emotion and moral judgment that these mappings assume in varieties of discourse and institutions. Historical sociologists would be wise to at least think about why, in today’s world, the idea of the modern (and its associated practices) is invested with such desires and hatreds, and has such political force—and to do that, we need to better understand it.

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28a At its simplest, modernity is a shorthand term for modern society or industrial civilization,” p. 94 in Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).


31 In a sharp and amusing broadside, Alan Knight writes that “modernity” is one of “a series of buzzwords that populate the new cultural history like drones in a hive...”; one of many redundant tropes that “take up space and claim attention out of all proportion to their semantic contribution” (Knight, “Subalterns, Signifiers, and Statistics: Perspectives on Mexican Historiography,” Latin American Research Review 37 #2, 2002: 149, 149 n. 10). But Knight greatly underestimates the extent to which the concept is unreflectively implanted in social science of all stripes. For one example, see Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values,” American Sociological Review 65 #1 (2000): 19-51.
The theme of “remaking modernity” is far too grand to approach as an integrated totality; we do not want to reinstate a grand narrative of the present day, a new Key to All Mythologies\textsuperscript{32} that the very terms modernity and post-modernity may seem to invite. And in fact the contributors to this volume differ on many important questions -- together, they represent a range of responses rather than a single consolidated position. But we do imagine that our still-separate revisions will clarify our collective understanding of what is at stake in debates about modernity and post-modernity, perhaps even lead to a better grasp of what is entailed in fashionable claims that alternative or distinct modernities are possible, if they do not already exist. We see these questions and concerns as crucial not only for historical sociology but for the fabric of our discipline -- and for the human sciences more generally.

\textit{The Second Wave and the Reappropriation of the Classics}

In justifying their turn to history, the second wave latched onto the classics in a very particular way. The disciplinary canon with which they operated, filtered through Talcott Parsons, had enshrined Weber, Durkheim and latterly Marx as the major scholars of reference.\textsuperscript{33} Second wave scholars wanted to bring to the fore class inequality, power and the conflicts these engendered, and Marx became the most important figure for them, as they cast themselves as the leading protagonists against the postulates of modernization theory, particularly the claim that all paths of development led from the “traditional” to the “modern.”\textsuperscript{34} From Marx they took their emphases on the importance of the “material” (understood as separate from and determinative of the “ideal”) modes of production, class conflict as the basis of politics and the motor of history. The history that the second wavers drew out was one of conflict, particularly of class conflict, expropriation and bloody oppression. It was also one that was built around the tendential development of social structures and epochal transitions.\textsuperscript{35} It is important to note that their Marx was leavened with an emphasis on elements of Weber’s writings, as we will see below, and laced with a strong refusal of Durkheim, who was understood as the patron saint of the twin evils of cultural values and structural functionalism.\textsuperscript{36}

The second wave – memorably described as an “uppity generation” by Theda Skocpol --


\textsuperscript{33}Talcott Parsons, \textit{The Structure of Social Action}, 2 vols.(New York: The Free Press, 1937). Marx was classified as a utilitarian in \textit{Structure}, and therefore received short shrift.

\textsuperscript{34} For example, Charles Tilly, the editor of \textit{The Formation of National States in Western Europe} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), the final volume in Princeton University Press’s “Studies in Political Development” series (under the leadership of Lucien Pye), used the volume to critique the argument of the preceding seven volumes and of the whole “political development” project.

\textsuperscript{35} “Marxism is one of the theories most attuned to the need to specify clear breaks between epochs and to develop historically specific conceptual tools for understanding each.” Craig Calhoun, “The Rise and Domestication of Historical Sociology,” p.322 (see footnote 4).

consigned modernization theory and structural-functionalism to the dustbin of intellectual history.\textsuperscript{37} The radical political movements of the 1960s and 1970s had inspired many students to go on to graduate study, where they linked their political concerns to intellectual questions, and found guidance from that historically-inclined minority of senior scholars even as they rebelled against their more presentist colleagues. In sociology, Andrew Abbott notes that rebellious impulses helped to direct many younger sociologists to \textit{historical} approaches, which allowed criticism of two then-dominant tendencies: Parsonian functionalism and atheoretical and ahistorical empirical work.

Theoretically, historical sociology was for them a way to attack the Parsonian framework on its weakest front—its approach to social change—and a way to bring Marx into sociology. Methodologically, historical sociology damned the status attainment model for its micro focus, its anti-historical and anti-structural character, its reifications, its scientism.\textsuperscript{38}

Ensuing sociological debates arrayed second wave scholars against more orthodox Marxists of various complexions. Second wavers, who tended to prefer an eclectic theoretical approach, were nevertheless powerfully pulled into the current of the Marxist problematic.\textsuperscript{39} Modes of production were the basic units of comparison, and transitions from one mode to another marked the significant historical transformations—that which was to be explained. Wallerstein's world-systems theory, castigated as shockingly “circulationist” by many Marxists at the time, can in retrospect be seen as a close cousin and marxisant variant.\textsuperscript{40} Scholars of the second wave found this broad tradition of work useful, but thought that it discouraged comparative work to explain variation across regions, countries, cities and other sites within the same mode of production or position within the world system. Even more problematically, it

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\item \textsuperscript{37}Theda Skocpol, “An ‘Uppity Generation’ and the Revitalization of Macroscopic Sociology.” \textit{Theory and Society} 17 (1988): 627-643. Unfortunately, this meant that the big phenomena that modernization theorists had tried to explain—such as totalitarianism, or the relatively uniform rise of education, urbanization or democracy—disappeared from most second-wave scholarship. (We are grateful to Arthur Stinchcombe for helpful discussion of this point.) As we will see below, this disappearance set up opportunities for historically-oriented scholars—particularly John Meyer and his students—to retrieve these issues in the 1990s.
\item \textsuperscript{38}Andrew Abbott, \textit{Chaos of Disciplines}. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, p.94. Craig Calhoun, in “The Rise and Domestication of Historical Sociology,” p. 305, sees the battle with the quantitative empiricists as having been thrust upon the historical sociologists when the “dominant quantitative, scientistic branch of the discipline dismissed their work as dangerously ‘idiographic,’ excessively political, and in any case somehow not quite ‘real’ sociology.” In any event, historicity split this intellectual movement from then-dominant forces.
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tended to consign history to the realm of the singular and idiographic, grist for the nomothetic mill of Marxist theory. Still, while second wave historical sociologists in the American academy appreciated Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* for the prominent role it awarded politics in nineteenth-century France, and excavated it as a meaty source of aphorisms on history as tragedy and farce, they had yet to appreciate its full potential as a source of anti-structuralist and cultural analysis.

The questions posed by the Second Wave derived from a Marxist theoretical agenda; their answers pushed beyond. The question of why revolutions didn’t happen how and where Marxists expected them animated exciting work by authors including Theda Skocpol, who drew on the Weberian tradition in her discussion of the “great revolutions” of France, Russia and China, and Mark Gould, who recruited Parsonian theory in his work on the English Revolution. Immanuel Wallerstein worried about why socialism could not succeed in one country, and if his “one world system” answer was novel, it was certainly addressed to an ongoing preoccupation of the Marxian tradition. A different sort of challenge to Marxist thinking on states which also deployed the idea of a (cultural) system of states emerged from the collaborative work of John Meyer, Michael Hannan, George Thomas, Francisco Ramirez and John Boli. Ronald Aminzade, Victoria Bonnell, Craig Calhoun, Jeffery Paige, Sonya Rose, William Sewell,

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41In their now-canonical second wave article, Skocpol and Somers argued that this was similar to the way in which Neil Smelser had deployed history to illustrate modernization theory in *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959). See Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22(1980):174-197. However, Smelser’s choice of topic was itself a form of resistance to Parsons’ mentoring.


Jr., Mark Traugott, Charles Tilly, and many others worked on the Marxian problem posed by the collective action of what were thought to be intermediary, transitional or surprising groups like artisans, counter-revolutionary peasants, women workers, intellectuals and so on.46 Perry Anderson studied absolutism – a state form emerging from within an economic context where it “shouldn’t have” appeared.45 This conundrum made sense within the space of Marxian theory, to which Anderson wedded fundamentally Weberian insights about state forms. Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, Gianfranco Poggi, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly (to name just a few) interrogated the sources of state formation and dissolution, highlighting the dynamics of war-making and violence that were emphasized by Weber and Hintze but given short shrift in Marxian theory.48 Randall Collins staged a “confrontation” between Weberian and Marxian theories of capitalism.49 Michael Burawoy highlighted the “color of class” in a historical analysis of the Zambian copper mines; Michael Hechter studied the “Celtic fringe” and the puzzle of nation for issues of class formation; Judith Stacey’s pioneering analysis tackled the role of gender in the Chinese revolution, and John Stephens and Walter Korpi sought to understand the socialist potential of social democracy and the welfare state in capitalist countries.50 This is, of course, just a


partial list of contributors to what was an incredibly exciting moment of intellectual ferment. When we explore these individual works, we find that they differ on many important matters. They also have distinctive takes that relate to national and regional genealogies of intellectual debate. But in retrospect there is also an incredible level of international conversation and convergence.

These trends extended across all the social sciences and history in the 1970s and early 1980s: one thinks of Louise Tilly and Joan Scott’s ground-breaking research on women workers and David Abraham’s class analysis of the breakdown of the Weimar Republic; Ira Katznelson’s investigations of the ethnic and racial complications of working-class formation, or the interdisciplinary “Brenner Debate” on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Indeed, this was also a period in which social scientists were avidly reading historians’ work and forging interdisciplinary allegiances and ties, especially with the resurgent social history typified by the work of E. P. Thompson, Sheila Rowbotham and the History Workshop Journal, with the work of Fernand Braudel and the Annales school, and marxisant historians who were pondering the intersection between family and economic forms. Consequently, the historical turn in sociology was linked to the erosion of the boundaries between social theory, scientific method and historical research, exemplified by the changing contents of key journals such as Comparative Studies in Society and History, and by the growth of the Social Science History Association, incorporated in 1974. Reflecting the broader trends characterizing social science and history, the SSHA was at first a meeting place for historians (“cliometricians”) wanting to learn methods


53Many structuralist social scientists found particularly congenial the Annales school’s broadly sociological approach and antagonism to an understanding of history as a “mere sequence” of events. See Francois Dosse (1997). One could also include, by the 1980s – before the American appropriation of the cultural turn had hit full force – work on mentalities (e.g., Natalie Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-century Miller (translated by John and Anne Tedeschi) (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), which was beginning to deal with the cultural, but in the context of “total history” and a still-materialist framework [see pp.204-05 in Geoff Eley, “Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later,” in T. McDonald, ed., The Historical Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 193-243.]

54We are thinking, for example, of the debates over proto-industrialization, catalyzed by Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm (1981).
from social scientists, then in the 1980s and 1990s became the place for social scientists who wanted to do history, with a second wave twist, and for both social scientists and historians who wanted to explore the cultural and linguistic turns, the uses of narrative and network analyses, as well as substantive work that crossed the fields.  

The Marxian heritage of the second wave functioned as an overall regime of knowledge. The second-wave comparative-historical sociologists varied in the extent to which they conceived their project as revising Marxism or as combining diverse theoretical insights to create fresh understandings of important processes and events, but they consistently read and argued with each other. Even as they challenged this tradition, they leaned on its coherence, especially in terms of what Geoff Eley calls “social determination” or the claims that collective action, subjectivities, politics and culture rested on “material interests,” themselves embedded in material life, however conceived. And while it raised hackles from the very beginning and continues to be controversial today, the work of these sociologists and others working in allied disciplines is in our view of lasting significance. Their attention to politics opened up a tremendously fruitful vein of analysis, which gained force in the 1980s and early 1990s and continues today. In fact, it is that impossibly cumbersome phrase, “the relative autonomy of the political,” that best characterizes both the promise and the limits of second wave work.

It is also true that the appropriation of classical theory by second wave scholars emphasized the political-economic and material, understood as opposed to the cultural and ideal, while the ironies and irrationalities of modernity hinted at by classical theorists disappeared from view. The enduring structuralist Marxist leanings of the second wave, emphasizing the necessary and sufficient conditions for transitions between modes of production, effaced the Marx who theorized the continuing cataclysm of

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55 See Alice Bee Kasakoff, “Is There a Place for Anthropology in Social Science History?” Social Science History 23 #4 (1999): 535-559. Abbott (1991, 2001) points out that sociologists and historians approached the task of melding “history” and “sociology” from very different disciplinary starting points, and gravitated toward the Social Science History Association for different reasons. He also argues that there was a sharp distinction between two groups of historical sociologists, only one of which – the quantitative historical sociologists (which he calls HS2) – was active in SSHA and, in his account, friendly to an essentially historical and narrative approach. The other group (HS1), the macro-political comparativists, dominated the American Sociological Association’s section on Comparative and Historical Sociology (ASACHS). In the revised account of SSHA history in Chaos of Disciplines, Abbott indicates some ways in which the division between HS1 and HS2 has come undone. At this point, the two groups have pretty thoroughly commingled. In fact, by asking Ann Orloff to start the SSHA’s States and Societies Network as a focus for “HS1”-type work, Abbott himself helped organize this process of dedifferentiation. The States and Societies network is thriving, and there are more conversations between this group and political history scholars in SSHA. The ASACHS now incorporates both HS1 and HS2 (e.g., prizes have gone to macro-comparative, quantitative and narrative analysts, and people who mix these styles). ASACHS has now taken on questions of narrative -- in various panels about analytic approach, in debates among section-affiliated authors like Margaret Somers, Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, and so on. The institutional differences between HS1 and HS2, if they were ever as sharp as Abbott argued (which we doubt), have eroded.


57 Note that vast majority of historical work on social movements published in ASR and AJS over the past two decades has been on the French revolution or the U.S. Progressive Era and New Deal period. Elisabeth Clemens and Martin Hughes, “Recovering Past Protest: Archival Research on Social Movements,” In S. Staggenborg and B. Klandermans, eds., Methods in Social Movement Research (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).
capitalist development, including its contradictory impact on the individuals whom it continually reconstituted. “Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify.” 58 Where was this modernist Marx in the second wave? Similarly, the second wave sociologists reached out to Weber’s writings on the specificity of the organizational and politico-economic, drawing on his analyses of ideal types of organization, of relations between rulers and staffs, of power politics. Yet this resurgence of politics in a debate dominated by material determinism came at the cost of excising the Weber of The Protestant Ethic, of complexes of meaning, the historical ironist who saw the personal losses and terrors instilled by processes of rationalization. 59 The second wave historical sociologists were by no means apologists for capitalism, and they clearly understood that the development of post-revolutionary states, democracy, social welfare, and so on, were not linear and progressive – but they also viewed these matters and processes as neatly contained, and often reducible to a single analytical principle. Certainly their own theoretical categories, and their position as analysts, remained serenely above the fray.


The legacy of the classical sociologists is more productive than the flattened 1950s version or the second wave reappropriation would indicate – and also more troubling. Weber offered a textured sense of the manifold ambiguities inscribed in elements of what came to be thought of as “the modern.” He traced one long-run counterintuitive result of people’s rational conduct in pursuit of a calling: the emptying of the world of subjective meaning.60 The expansion of scientific rationality, he thought, would entrain “an ever more devastating senselessness... a senseless hustle in the service of worthless, moreover self-contradictory, and mutually antagonistic ends.” Following Weber and Freud, Norbert Elias thought that the fruits of the “civilizing process” could only be had at the price of internalized regulation, discipline and social repression. Marx and Engels wrote as apocalyptically (but with more hope for the future of humankind) when they celebrated the “most revolutionary part” played by the bourgeoisie in not only building the capitalist order but dialectically engendering the proletariat, “its own gravediggers.”61 “The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products.”62 Durkheim saw the rise of the modern state as instrumental in creating the individuated selves that would in turn raise fundamental challenges for and to the state itself.63 The unintended consequences of human action could and did issue in the opposite of what was desired or envisioned. The classical sociologists made passionate arguments for the historical genesis and limits of social formations and selves – and of their own foundational concepts. They described paradoxes and ironies that worked themselves out historically – and this infused their intellectual and practical encounters with “modernity” with lasting grandeur as well as pathos.

For all its complexity, however, this theoretical heritage inscribed a potential conceptual dualism, assigning a whole series of subordinate concepts to the category of the “not modern.” This continued to be the case in second wave work and, as we will argue, still characterizes much contemporary historical sociology, particularly within the institutional and rational-choice approaches. On one side were grouped capitalism, rationality, bureaucracy, the public; on the other feudalism, traditionalism, and so forth. And these oppositions took on strikingly gendered and racialized meanings. Men were aligned with the “rational” and women with the “irrational” and “traditional,” while the “civilization of the metropole” was juxtaposed to “an Other whose main feature was its primitiveness.”64 Of course this mode of dualistic and devaluative thought predated the classical sociologists, deriving from earlier lines of

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62Ibid., p. 50.


conservative and Enlightenment reasoning and from the properties of modernity itself – for example, the separation of home and work in the rise of industrial capitalism; the disembedding of family and state; the impact on the metropole itself of the massive waves of European colonialism. These oversimplified oppositions embedded in core concepts of the classical sociological tradition functioned not only as a shared conceptual language but as both a source of theoretical closure and ideological consolation. It was all too tempting to juxtapose the supposed rationality of one’s modernity to the irrationality of tradition – much more comfortable than analyzing the substantive irrationalities embedded in the process of rationalization itself. Herein lay the foundation for both the 1950s “pattern variable” version of what had been a great historical intellectual tradition, and the second-wave appropriations of sanitized concepts of modernization, industrialization, bureaucracy, and so on. Nonetheless, what was expelled from the idea of the modern could not be easily excised, even in theory. It continued to structure, in a subterranean way, the conscious text of social theory itself. We will return to this point below, in our discussion of the theoretical challenges that beset -- and are remaking -- historical sociology.

**The Second Wave Under Pressure**

Like all significant intellectual innovations, the second wave courted its own upending. Theoretically, we claim, their hyper-structuralism invited assertions of agency and process. Their conceding modes of production such a role in determining social formations and intellectual problems prompted counter-claims of the constitutive significance of culture. The apotheosis of the image of the coercive, central state apparatus provoked counter-imageries of productive capillary power. Moreover, their repressions of key aspects of modernity – religion, emotion, habit, the arational core of war and state violence – virtually invited work that would bring all of those elements “back in.” And the exclusion of various subaltern subjects has been challenged by those who would speak in their name. We will turn to these theoretical issues below.

Methodologically and epistemologically, the combination of a language of Humean constant conjunction (if complicated and conditional constant conjunction) with a research program that called for comparative historical work was unstable at best. Attempting to satisfy the requisites of positivistically-minded sociological gatekeepers did not (and perhaps cannot) mix easily with attention to history.

65 Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*.


67 The argument that the economic was determinate only in the last instance did not go far enough, in our view. But for one influential attempt to spell out why, within a Marxian paradigm and inspired by some of Friedrich Engels’ remarks, the “lonely hour of the last instance” never comes, see Louis Althusser’s “Contradiction and Overdetermination: Appendix,” pp. 117-128 in *For Marx* (New York, NY: Verso, 1990 [1965]).

68 Two essays in this volume that frontally address this issue of repression are Gorski’s (for religion) and Kestnbaum’s (on war).

69 “If A then B” is the simplest and most general form of a Humean statement of “constant conjunction.” David Hume, 1975 [1748]. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Moreover, second wave scholars ignored the textual foundations of their own practices at a time when distinctions between literary and scientific argument were coming under increased question, both from mavens of science studies and post-structuralists.\textsuperscript{70} As we will see below, these characteristics of the approach itself articulated with pressures and pulls from other scholarly communities. Finally, second wave historical sociology proved ill-equipped to deal with key developments outside the academy including new social movements, innovative forms of political action, identity politics, and the partial displacement of nation-states as the central organizing nodes of politics.

From the outset, second wave historical sociology evolved methodological and epistemological practices that elicited challenges from both historians and more conventional social scientists. Second wave scholars were – and many of their intellectual descendants still are – “interested in generalizing across multiple instances of a phenomenon under investigation – whenever this can be done with fidelity to conceptually defined contexts and with due attention to the causal complexities of historically embedded conjunctures and processes.”\textsuperscript{71} Early efforts to explain the distinctive methodological approaches and benefits of historical sociology usually began from the premise that this work was as scientific, or at least as systematic, as the positivist researchers’. Second wave scholars brandished John Stuart Mill’s \textit{A System of Logic}\textsuperscript{72} to show how analyses of substantively-significant but relatively rare outcomes could still satisfy the requisites of conventional social science.\textsuperscript{73} By insisting on historical sociology as preeminently rigorous comparative method, practitioners sought and gained some tenuous legitimacy vis-a-vis the mainstream of sociology, a point that many have made but that Craig Calhoun


\textsuperscript{71}Theda Skocpol, “Doubly Engaged Social Science: The Promise of Comparative Historical Analysis,” in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, eds., \textit{Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences}. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 515.

\textsuperscript{72}John Stuart Mill, \textit{A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation} (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1875).

\textsuperscript{73}For example, again, the now-classic Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry,” \textit{Comparative Studies in Society and History} 22(1980):174-197. Even the \textit{comparative} dimension of historical sociological work has generated a great deal of scholarly controversy and commentary, for it is here that some principal figures of what got defined as the official second wave staked their claims for the scientific standing of historical sociology and for their leadership of the burgeoning social movement that was bringing history back into sociology. Skocpol and Somers (1980, 1995) identified three major analytic strategies within comparative history (that is, “explicit juxtapositions of distinct histories,” p.72): “comparative history as the \textit{parallel demonstration of theory},” as “the \textit{contrast of contexts},” or as “\textit{macro-causal analysis}” (p.73). It was in connection with the last of these that Skocpol and Somers invoked the enormously influential use of John Stuart Mill’s methods of difference and agreement, a template that structured many an ensuing dissertation, but that has since become a particular target of critics.
captured best with his aphoristic reference to the “domestication” of historical sociology. However, second wave scholars were also uncomfortable with what they took to be vague and general sociological concepts that hadn’t been built up from the ground of historical particulars, and they were absolutely allergic to covering laws. None was willing to consign history to the merely idiographic. Second wavers overall embraced historians’ emphasis on sequence and timing.

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74 Craig Calhoun, “Domestication of Historical Sociology” (see footnote 4).

75 On covering laws and history, see especially Maurice Mandelbaum, “Historical Explanation: The Problem of Covering Laws,” History and Theory 1 (3): 229-242. In his unjustly neglected Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences (Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 1976), Neil J. Smelser points out that “[nomothetic and idiographic] approaches – insofar as both attempt to explain – do not necessarily differ substantively with respect to the nature of the causal forces invoked...do not call for different theoretical grounding points. The differences between them lie more in the mode of explanation, the mode of organizing variables, and the techniques of research employed” (pp. 204-205). Of course it is now the case that some historical sociologists (particularly those influenced by Foucauldian genealogical methods) would not see themselves as engaged in any version of an explanatory project.

76 Historical sociologists are collectively thinking through the implications of the interventions that seek to displace comparative method in favor of narrative, or couple the two in some way. This task that is made still more challenging by lack of agreement over what might be entailed in that move, already underway in some areas of our field (see special issues on narrative in Social Science History 1992). Are some forms of historical narrative more analytically acceptable, perhaps more “sociological” than others, and more easily integrated into accepted canons of social science research? (See Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 98 #5 (March 1993), pp. 1094-1133.) Or is that too narrow a way to contemplate this important problem and opportunity? Roberto Franzosi provides a recent overview in “Narrative Analysis – Why (and How) Sociologists Should Be Interested in Narrative,” in pp. 517-54, John Hagan, ed., The Annual Review of Sociology, Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, 1998.
Whether they conducted archival historical work or drew from secondary sources, in the context of 1970s and early 1980s sociology, they were unusually respectful of the histories of the countries, regions and periods in which the processes at the center of their analyses unrolled.

Historical sociologists were attacking entrenched practices and violating disciplinary boundaries in sociology and history, and they stepped on some toes in the process. The response by mainstream sociologists has been heated, focusing on the supposed failure of comparative and historical sociologists to satisfy the requisites of social scientific method, as conventionally, positivistically, understood. These critics have argued that the choice of a “small-n” research design is inherently flawed because it suffers from too few degrees of freedom to cope with large numbers of potential causal factors; that “selecting on the dependent variable” introduces unacceptable bias into conclusions; that the failure to seek universal knowledge in the form of covering laws means that comparative-historical researchers are really no better than hopelessly idiosyncratic historians – in short, they’re not real social scientists. But the critics have no good answer to how we should better study relatively rare, over-determined but significant phenomena, or processes unfolding over the longue durée, with which so many historical sociologists are concerned. Nor can they help us with dimensions of social processes that function more like a language and less like a set of billiard balls. To the extent that historical sociologists underline the fundamental historicity of the categories and concepts of social life, in any case, they will inevitably be at odds with social scientists seeking universal covering laws.

Comparative-historical researchers have in time grown less fond of Mill, and some claim to have found firmer ground for claiming methodological advantages – even if it is often unclear whether they are claiming to escape positivist methodological prescriptions or to better satisfy them. Some have moved into a less defensive position, arguing that conventional statistical analysis rarely satisfies the methodological requisites of its own favored quantitative techniques. Historical sociologists have long

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78Indeed, it is partly on these grounds that contemporary defenses of comparative and historical analyses are based. For example, see Lieberson’s critique of Orloff and Skocpol, in which he uses traffic incidents to illustrate his criticism of their analysis of the initiation of modern welfare programs in Britain and the U.S. (Lieberson, “Small N’s and Big Conclusions,” cited above in note 46; Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, “Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900-1911, and the United States, 1880s-1920,” American Sociological Review 49(1984):726-750). For the concept of the longue durée, see Fernand Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée,” in Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 25-34).

79Charles Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). “In Ragin’s view,” James Mahoney comments, “the challenge is for statistical researchers to adapt their research to the more demanding
insisted on the significance of the temporal dimensions of analysis.80 Some, like Andrew Abbott and Roberto Franzosi, are also developing formal methods for analyzing sequences.81 Charles Ragin makes a strong case for a holistic, case-based logic of comparative research that addresses situations of multiple, conjunctural causation – the majority of “cases” that interest us – better than does the array of standard quantitative techniques.82 Some call our attention to the need for more systematic methods of discourse analysis.83 Others emphasize “biography as historical sociology.”84 Still others point to the ongoing debates among representatives of various post-positivist perspectives that have appeared across the human sciences.85 The participants in all these debates and discussions certainly differ among themselves, but together they have revealed that the positivist empiricism that characterizes much mainstream sociology rests on shaky ground. These debates take on additional urgency because they are occurring in virtually every discipline with any scientific aspirations, at a time when the growing


sophistication of science studies illuminates the unsteady foundations for unreflective claims to the scientific. Some science studies work in historical sociology questions quite basic assumptions of positivist social science, such as concept-independence or the assumption of temporal invariability that underlies scientific laws. Defenders of positivism are under assault themselves, in other words, and the critical arrows have penetrated multiple chinks in their defenses. New attempts to please positivistically-minded social scientists — whether by invoking sociology as physics-in-the-making or by policing the practices of historical sociologists with invocations against “unscientific interpretation” — are just as likely to fail as earlier efforts and will keep us from bringing to bear our combined forces on important aspects of social life.

While mainstream social scientists attacked historical sociologists from the premise that we should be more general, abstract and “scientific,” historians often criticized historical sociology for its lack of engagement with the particularities of each case; its failure to plumb relevant primary documents; its condescending treatment of historians’ theoretical debates; its reduction of historiographical debate to fact, and its tendency to lose itself in ungrounded, compounded abstractions — to create what Lawrence Stone memorably called “sociological unicorns.” Ironically, these stinging and, one must admit, sometimes just accusations stem from the very legacy of interdisciplinarity that historical sociologists have fostered and prized. As historical sociologists are increasingly evaluated from within the disciplinary canons of History as well as their home discipline, they are expected to do the kind of high-quality original archival primary source research expected of historians without sacrificing the impulse toward sociological generalization. Meeting this expectation has made the work inherently more difficult and, some argue, less doable — at least by the lonely artisanal scholar who is still the norm in this corner of our discipline. And if the call to “go to the archives, young woman” was not sufficiently challenging, historical sociologists are now pulled by the cultural turn in History and the humanities, which underlines a whole series of symbolic mediations: that archival documents are problematic texts, themselves in need of discursive deciphering; that explanatory accounts of History-writ-large must be understood as narratives with their own rhetorical devices and plots; that every observation and utterance makes sense only in the context of a symbolic order.

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The methodological pulls of history and “proper” social science are powerful forces in creating cleavages among historical sociologists. In conjunction with the whip-hand of tenure, academic review, and gate-keeping more generally, these have pulled what was once a more unitary body of historical sociologists in wildly different methodological directions.\(^{89}\) Within departments, universities and subfields, the local balance of forces between neo-positivist and various post-positivist approaches help explain why particular individuals have taken certain scholarly paths. Thus, some are attuned to problems raised from the interpretive disciplines about texts, sources, and systems of meaning, and many have become more suspicious of claims that studies of the social can be scientific in the conventional sense. Others, however, are still attempting to speak to the critiques from the mainstream of social science – we think of James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer’s recent edited volume, which in many ways continues the second wave’s project of seeking scholarly legitimacy through emphasizing the ways in which comparative-historical sociology fulfills the requisites of social science.\(^{90}\) Those who attend to history, especially if they make use of narrative forms or appeal to textuality, rhetoric and semiotics, are too often set up as straw men, spinners of Just-So stories. We editors see historically-minded sociologists using a variety of ways to discipline their inquiries. All these strategies are both legitimate and at least potentially productive.

These methodological debates are obviously fascinating, thoroughly contested terrain. The contributors to this volume do touch on them, but our main brief is theory: the theoretical issues associated with understanding social and cultural change in the light of the intellectual challenges that beset and entice the present generation of historical sociologists. In that context, and before we delve into these challenges, we wish to signal some general, and paradigmatically related, theoretical problems of the analyses of the second wave. As more than one commentator has noted, most are relentlessly structural – and the structures are those of the political economy – and the work remains curiously dissociated from human experience and aspirations.\(^{91}\) Since these features actually lent their work legitimacy in the academy, and helped make the organizational case for historical sociology, they have proven notoriously hard to shake. However, it is perhaps the attempt to shake them that best characterizes the theoretical impulses that motivate extremely diverse approaches within historical sociology today.

The problem is not with “structure” as a sociological category. It’s certainly useful – nay, indispensable – if it is conceptualized as relatively enduring relations among bounded units of some kind. But the second wavers interpreted “structure” in a particular way, one that authorized certain sorts of

\(^{89}\) Certain aspects of the infrastructure of the discipline affect us in distinctive ways: research funding is still geared to more positivist approaches to social analysis (see Steinmetz, this volume), while the press system – more important to us than some of our colleagues because we are still, preeminently, “book people” – faces increasing difficulty in publishing monographs not geared to popular audiences (see Elisabeth S. Clemens, Walter W. Powell, Kris McIlwaine, and Dina Okamoto, “Careers in Print: Books, Journals, and Scholarly Reputations,” American Journal of Sociology, 101 (1997): 433-94).

\(^{90}\) James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, editors, Comparative-Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

intellectual advances, yet ultimately proved too limiting. They wanted to rescue sociology from what they saw as overly individualistic or voluntaristic accounts of human action and complex social outcomes; “structures” were held up as the mediating feature that constrained human action but also crystallized its emergent properties. The analytic recourse to “structures” as a binarized sign in opposition to “culture” should be situated in the political and intellectual landscape of the time. Culture was often invoked to “blame the victim” (e.g., in so-called “culture of poverty” arguments), or to rationalize the persistence of repressive political regimes by pointing to values that legitimized the status quo. Unfortunately, “structures” as a particular power term also authorized a naive structure/culture opposition – and that in spite of the fact that social life is unthinkable without cultural structures, like language and other systems of representation in which the bounded units in relationship are signs. In their responses to simplistic notions of culture and individual action, moreover, the second-wave analysts also shied away from analyzing properties of modernity that were not formal-organizational, and as a result their writings often seem strangely one-sided.

It was not just the internal weaknesses of their particular understanding of structure that undermined the approach that characterized the classics of the second wave. The paradigm that guided second wave work proved unable to deal with a whole series of epochal transformations, summed up in the events or rather signs of “1968” and “1989.” 1968 is shorthand for a welter of things, but among them it stands for the genesis of “new” movements – feminism, gay liberation, ongoing rebellions among post-colonials and racial and ethnic minorities within the metropole, “post-materialism” – that challenged Marxist-based organizations politically, and opened the way for feminist theory, postcolonial theory, queer theory, and critical race studies to pull apart Marxism in the decades after. Of course, these challenges to modernist principles also applied to modernist and universalizing liberalism. “1989” signals the subsequent revival of liberalism, the vagaries of globalization, fundamental challenges to the order of nation-states, and the collapse of Marxism as a mode of imagining a future beyond capitalist modernity. These signs, and the processes and events they reference, triggered the rethinking of the

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It seems obvious -- now -- that we can’t understand people’s making revolutions without looking at what they thought they were doing. Yet recall that at that time, “culture” did not mean the sophisticated analytics of a Clifford Geertz or a William Sewell, Jr., but was often deployed in rather simplistic ways, understood as homogenous and nationally-unified (e.g. arguments that the U.S. lacked a proper welfare state because of its individualist national culture).

We will not be the first to point out that most of these movements are not in fact “new” to the post-WWII world, yet they were and are understood as such by many analysts. And note that is also true that “1968” is often cited as a sign for a series of explosive events fueling Marxist understandings.


Few social analysts predicted the events of 1989, and those who did so probably did so accidentally. So one can hardly fault the second wave for unique theoretical lacunae. It was clear to many that structural Marxism was not equipped to deal with the forms of difference and power that were not reducible to class, yet second-wave scholarship, like modernist social science more generally, also obscured the workings of gender, race, and other forms of difference.
landscape of modernity that is currently in process.\textsuperscript{96} The place of the state as a privileged unit of analysis is being eroded by globalization and transnationalism and the proliferation of parastatal and other ambiguous bodies.\textsuperscript{97} Moreover, historical work in the vein of postcoloniality and other approaches has stressed the ways in which metropoles have been formed by events and processes in the periphery (see Magubane, this volume). Current events or rather signifiers of events – “9/11/2001” above all for American scholars – have underlined global interdependency, sometimes cruelly. At this historical moment, the conjuncture of events both in the world and in the academy calls for rethinking certain premises of historical sociology.

Where Historical Sociology Stands Today

It is fair to say that the second wave scholars’ calls for reinfusing sociology with history have had a hearing, and have indeed inspired new generations of scholars pursuing historical research – the contributors to the present volume included.\textsuperscript{98} Historical sociologists now enjoy a hard-won though partial acceptance within the discipline of sociology. The ASA section on Comparative and Historical Sociology is well-established. Historical articles appear in the pages of American Sociological Review and American Journal of Sociology. Sociologists identify themselves as specialists in “comparative historical sociology” in the ASA Guide to Graduate Departments, and graduate departments are ranked by U.S. News and World Report in the specialty of “historical sociology,” along with economic sociology, stratification, cultural sociology and social psychology. However, we’re very far from having convinced mainstream sociologists that social inquiry demands a fundamentally historical approach which attends to the cultural and historical specificity of concepts and categories -- if indeed that is a desirable goal. Indeed, some argue that our acceptance has come at the price of our compartmentalization. We tend to be located at major research institutions, in part because these


institutions have had the resources to hire from among a sub-discipline that is still regarded – in spite of its classical legacy – as at odds with the mainstream of sociological concerns. By the standards of mainstream sociology, and despite diverse substantive foci, historical sociologists are all part of a sub-discipline that is regarded as something of a luxury good – the sociological equivalent of a Panerai watch or a Prada bag. On the one hand, our pursuits are considered arcane; on the other, pursuing them requires markers of cultural capital (e.g., theory, multiple languages, art appreciation), which may be useful in the quest for departmental “distinction” in the university setting. But any potentially serious disruption to the mainstream has been neutralized by our categorization and segregation as historical sociologists – rather than as sociologists who take seriously the claims of historicity implicit in elaborating explanations rooted in, and limited by, time and place. This segregation authorizes conventional work on contemporary – and by any seriously historicized standards, parochial -- U.S. concerns without the need to specify historical and geographical context or limits.

Historical sociologists are often seen by outsiders as united in our focus on “history,” that is, on what is not the (U.S.) present. “History” in no unitary subject, however, and even if we historical sociologists were to surrender to the urge to define ourselves solely in terms of method, larger intellectual debates over positivism, interpretation, textuality divide us. Theoretically, we find ourselves without the unifying analytic framework that undergirded second-wave efforts. This should not occasion regret or nostalgia. We know that some of the advances of the second wave scholars came burdened with troubling repressions and exclusions attendant on that regime of knowledge. This is rather an opportunity for historical sociologists, as they use new tools to re-ask the core questions that preoccupied the second wave -- but also ask new questions and identify and probe silences – particularly to do with culture, agency, the character of modernity, gender, race and the world beyond the West – in the earlier work.

Some contemporary historical sociology – notably the various institutionalisms – represents a series of friendly amendments to the second wave, while other work poses more fundamental challenges. The political-economic structuralism of the second wave is still present in institutionalist approaches, but has developed away from comparative statics towards more processual accounts, often with improved methods (e.g., network analysis) that directly engage the assumed durability of different forms of structure. Moreover, there is a greater appreciation of the range of variation in the historical and political constitution of political actors, with some loosening of strictly political-economic understandings of identities and preferences, interests or goals. Yet even so, institutionalism often operates with a utilitarian understanding of actors’ goals, as well as a strictly goal-driven rather than practice-oriented understanding of action. And among many institutionalists, many of the problematic exclusions and repressions of second wave work continue, although the emergence of culturalist and gendered institutionalisms is a hopeful development.

We see important work going on in many directions. Our metaphorical model is not the superhighway from a past imperfect to an ever-improving future. We think rather of crooked and tangled side-streets feeding into and radiating out of the broad avenues laid out by the second wave of the 1970s and 1980s. And “we’ll always have Paris” – its high modernist Haussmann boulevards and its medieval and post-modern byways. So we refrain from organizing our discussion of the current state of historical sociology as a story of progress, with successive waves of scholarship getting closer and closer to the

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99See Biernacki, this volume.
ideal theoretical and methodological approach. In what follows, we investigate strands of third-wave analysis that have developed in reaction to – and on the basis of – second-wave work. We identify five communities or foci of historical sociologists: (1) institutionalism; (2) rational-choice; (3) the cultural turn; (4) feminist challenges and (5) the scholarship on colonialism and the racial formations of empire, in which sociologists turn their eyes to the world beyond the second wave’s favorite stomping grounds, Europe and the United States. Scholars pursuing these different challenges work within a range of intellectual frames, and we see no sign of the emergence of a dominant paradigm of the sort that commanded the second wave’s allegiance. But we believe that the effort by historical sociologists to grasp their intellectual common roots as well as their points of divergence is a prerequisite to having more interesting and fruitful conversations, doing better theory and making more effective alliances with potentially sympathetic groups in and outside of sociology. *Reculer pour mieux sauter.* A more active remembering of our own histories can spark thinking across the analytic divides around agency, signification, power, repression and exclusion that have opened up in the last decade or two.

**Institutionalism: Networks, Processes and the Institutional Opportunity**

Much of the power of the second wave flowed from the invocation of structural determination. Yet this assertion of structure has been destabilized by a dialogue between Marx and Weber that echoes through much of the work described above. While questions of revolution and the transformation of economic regimes framed many of these projects, the explanations increasingly invoked Weberian themes of complex conjunctures, of the formation of social actors and creation of rationalized structures of domination as specifically historical accomplishments. With this shift in emphasis, historical sociology was reoriented to intersect with important methodological and theoretical developments elsewhere in the discipline: network analysis and the various “new institutionalisms.”100 To a greater degree than other challenges, institutional analysis both extends key projects of the second wave while opening familiar research questions to explorations of process, transformation, and agency.

The problematics of the second wave continued to inform important projects of historical research, particularly the questions of revolutions that “should or shouldn’t” have occurred, or social classes that “should or shouldn’t” have been mobilized as political challengers. And armed with new technologies of network and organization analysis, researchers could address these anomalies in new and systematic detail. Working on nineteenth-century Paris, Roger Gould explored the complex ground of class formation: why was the uprising of 1848 organized around class lines and through rhetorics of class, whereas neighborhood solidarity served as the organizing framework for the insurrection of 1871?101 Peter Bearman’s study of the English Civil War mobilized fine-grained data on social ties to explain the emergence of new connections between court and country, as well as competing blocs within

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the bourgeoisie. Richard Lachmann’s two books have examined the signal contribution of organizationally-anchored elites – as distinct from classes – to the transition to capitalism and state-formation in early modern Europe. Addressing Sombart’s classic query of “Why No Socialism in America?,” Kim Voss turns to an organizational analysis of locals of the Knights of Labor–a sweeping “producerist” organization of workers in the late nineteenth century–to identify the conditions under which local unions were formed, persisted, and engaged in active challenges to the economic order. These works all share a project defined both theoretically and empirically: to move beyond explanations that rest on the presence or absence of a particular class actor, to develop theoretical explanations and methodologically-sophisticated demonstrations of the processes through which class actors are mobilized.

While second-wave scholarship had focused on breakdowns of and failed challenges to existing political orders, more recent scholarship has moved to consider challenges that resulted in new political institutions. Some of this work engages now-classic debates on state-building in Europe, but the bulk deals with twentieth-century America. Social science history has long given a central place to American politics. But a key intellectual switching point may have been Skocpol’s 1980 article on the


New Deal and theories of the state\textsuperscript{108}, which brought in its wake renewed interest in the U.S. as a case, in at least implicitly comparative perspective.\textsuperscript{109} Others have transposed analyses of competing class fractions and state autonomy to the development of welfare states.\textsuperscript{110} As contemporary revolutionary openings seemed to close, and revolutionary outcomes to be viewed more sourly, a still-modernist sensibility moved many scholars to consider a non-revolutionary version of progress toward a more egalitarian future, the Progressive Era and New Deal origins of the U.S. welfare state.

With this renewed interest in the U.S. social policy, historical institutionalists have been drawn into vibrant comparative debates over the origins and development of welfare states. Within this multifaceted intellectual community, scholars explore the conjunctural and multiple causation of a range of policy and political outcomes, even as interest has shifted from the origins and growth of welfare states, to their contemporary character and their uncertain future.\textsuperscript{111} Of late, innovation has been especially

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notable in conceptualizing the qualitative dimensions of variation across cases and in formulating typologies of ideal types, or “welfare regimes” (at times incorporating gender), which have been linked to distinctive political coalitions and institutional configurations. While some of this work, by focusing on presences and absences, may tend toward a “comparative statics,” much of it has opened toward processual analyses. Indeed, regime types have been understood as a way of thinking about distinctive political-institutional “opportunity structures,” giving rise to varying sets of interests or preferences, identities and categories, coalitions, and administrative capacities that influence social politics in “path-dependent” ways. The tempo of history shifts from the sharp alternation of system and contradiction-driven crisis to a more even cadence of contestation and consolidation.

The encounter of classic questions with new methodologies also generated new developments on the more Weberian pole of historical sociology. Just as studies of (non) revolutions generated more processual accounts of class formation, analyses of state-formation also incorporated insights from new advances in the study of networks and identities. Influenced by the Simmelian heritage of positional network analysis, John Padgett and Christopher Ansell take fifteenth-century Florence as a major case of the “political centralization [which] lies at the heart of state building.” Their analysis of “the structure and the sequential emergence of the marriage, economic, and patronage networks that constituted the Medicean political party, used by Cosimo in 1434 to take over the budding Florentine Renaissance

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113 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94(2000):251-68. However, Ira Katznelson cautions us about institutionalism’s potential neglect of the large-scale dynamics foregrounded by “macrohistorical analysis,” especially as this is expressed in the notion of “path dependency” (“Periodization and Preferences,” pp. 270-301 in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, especially pp. 290-294).

state."\(^{115}\) This research explores how relatively strong states emerge out of webs of social relations. In *City of Capital*\(^{116}\), Bruce Carruthers extends this theoretical project, and links it with the longstanding neo-Weberian concern with the “sinews of state power”\(^{117}\) – war and money. Whether concerned with Renaissance Florence or early modern England, these studies harness the analysis of social ties and interactions to a processual account of state formation.

Although driven by network analysis and new interests in collective identities, these developments converged with broader trends in the social sciences that are grouped under the theoretical umbrella of “institutionalism.” At the most general level, institutional theory draws attention to higher-order effects or emergent processes, rejecting the reductionism and methodological individualism that informed much of post-WWII social science.\(^{118}\) In its initial formulations, institutionalism in historical analysis tended to invoke institutions as given, as opportunity structures within which strategic actors operate. The opportunities confronting mobilized groups with a particular interest, for example, will differ across centralized and decentralized political institutions. At some level, this style of analysis only loosens the combination of structural determinism and utilitarian actors characteristic of the second wave. To the extent that these assumptions inform institutional analysis, less attention is paid to both the emergent character and cultural dimensions of institutions.

More recent work, however, takes the institutional framework of states as both the outcome of historical processes and a factor that explains subsequent historical trajectories. Rather than selecting cases of revolution and insurrection, these studies focus on moments of institutional transformation or consolidation. For example, Ann Orloff’s study of the initiation of modern pension programs in Britain, the U.S., and Canada traces the political processes – as conditioned by institutional legacies – which produced the building of the new institutions of the modern welfare state.\(^{119}\) Within American history,

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the Progressive Era has provided the “classic case.” Foundational works of institutional history used narrative history embedded in case comparisons to identify the common mechanisms and critical dimensions of variation in processes of state formation. As these studies foreground complex historical narratives – often through comparisons that highlight similarities and differences of process – they move away from the empty experimental time of second wave historical sociology to a much deeper engagement with historicity and sequence.

In subsequent studies, these key insights into the dynamics of state transformation and consolidation have been coupled to the theoretical as well as methodological sensibilities that characterize the analyses of state-building presented by Padgett and Carruthers. Theories of structuration – as opposed to simply structure – highlight the processual relationships of networks, resources and cultural constructs. Institutional consolidation is understood as a project of embedding the agencies in a complex supporting coalition as well as in key experiments in service that enhanced the agencies’ reputations. The shift from a political system dominated by parties and centered on elections to one organized around interest groups and legislators was produced as political challengers transposed “organizational models” from non-political activities to political mobilization. As with new work on early modern state-formation, these accounts of institutional consolidation and transformation employ processual theories and methods to account for fundamentally Weberian questions of bureaucratization and rationalization.

With respect to the second wave, the emergence of institutionalism within historical sociology is essentially, as we said above, a friendly amendment. The substantive focus remains in the sphere of political economy, although the broadly Marxist terrain of the earlier theory group has been extended and crosscut by Weberian themes of state-building and transformation. In the place of actors whose interests could be read directly from economic position by invoking utilitarian assumptions, institutionalists have substituted actors who are boundedly-rational, operating with repertoires – of collective action, of organization, of identity – that are culturally constituted in ways specific to time and place. But as historical sociology has encountered other intellectual trends, the challenges to basic assumptions have been much more fundamental.

Rational Choice Theory and the Cultural Turn


In very different ways, both the ongoing “cultural turn” and rational choice theory have given people languages first to criticize and then – if they follow out these impulses – to depart from structuralist Marxist-influenced historical work. Rational-choice theory proceeds from rigorously worked-out utilitarian assumptions about the properties of individual and group action. As a body of thought, it too descends from classical sociological founding fathers, Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. But just as twentieth-century versions of Marxian theory elaborated and relaxed some of Marx’s core assumptions, so too has rational-choice theory been reshaped, so much so that some practitioners believe that they have solved or transcended the famous Hobbesian problem of “explaining social order” on the basis of individualistic strategic-rational assumptions.\footnote{124Talcott Parsons, _The Structure of Social Action_, 2 vols. (New York: The Free Press, 1937); James S. Coleman, _Foundations of Social Theory_ (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990).}


Except as whipping boy, rational-choice theory is not a widespread presence in today’s historical sociology – not yet. Our sense is that this theoretical tendency will become more influential for two reasons. First, like the cultural turn (with which it has some surprising if subterranean affiliations), rational choice theory is part of a powerful cross- and interdisciplinary intellectual movement, embracing
historical work in political science, economics, psychology and evolutionary biology as well as sociology. The use of rational-choice arguments in new institutionalism and historical path-dependent reasoning will almost certainly increase as a fuller engagement emerges from within historical institutionalism in political science, and as a legacy of the explicit coupling of utilitarian and neo-evolutionary reasoning is making dramatic headway all over the social sciences. Second, historical sociologists are groping for theoretical languages in which they can discuss strategic action, and rational choice theory is currently the most consistently developed paradigm. We can expect to see more historical sociological analysis emerging under several rational-choice rubrics, including game theory, which has been applied inter alia to the emergence of political actors and coalitions and the creation and reproduction of political institutions, which have figured as the equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, linked together over time. We can also expect strong resistance to these forms of analysis! Rational choice as an abstract theory has inspired hot-and-heavy reactions from other historical sociologists and will continue to do so. But rational-choices’ on-the-ground historical analyses, typically less orthodox than their self-conscious methodological pronouncements suggest, often wed utilitarian arguments to Weberian-style comparative institutional analysis or even (gasp) culture.

Historical sociologists with a rational choice bent have not had much to say about modernity per se. This is not just because such large and unruly concepts sit awkwardly with methodological individualism. Silence in this case also betrays the taken-for granted quality of a very close relationship: the detached, individualistic modern self is the utilitarian’s chief assumption and analytical building block (but see Kiser, this volume). Yet the genesis of the so-called modern rational actor is itself an outcome of historical developments, including some decidedly non-rational processes of psychic repression and restructuring described in the works of Norbert Elias, Sigmund Freud and Franz Fanon

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127Pierre Bourdieu’s work – particularly as codified in his Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) – is often cited as an alternative. Taken as a whole, however, Bourdieu’s arguments involving individual and group strategic action – developed as a relationship between “habitus” and “field” – have a conceptually incoherent relationship to utilitarian thinking.


(especially the latter’s *Black Skin, White Masks*) as foundational to the “civilizing process.”

Elias in particular argued that the capacity to think calculatively, linking ever-longer chains of means and ends, was necessarily bound up with increased self-discipline: the internalization of controls over socially inadmissible forms of anger, desire and other emotions. Rational-choice historical sociologists may well elect to ignore this, since culture is at best understood in an extremely limited and limiting way, as preferences, in utilitarian work (see Katznelson 2003) and emotions are ruled out of the theory in its rigorous version. Tactily, however, this growing body of work can help us arrive at a broader and more situated view, although it must be stressed that this view systematically departs from utilitarian frameworks. We believe that capturing the precise contours of conditional and idealized rational action can help illuminate its ascendency as the dominant mode of action and characteristic trope in today’s capitalist world. Less can be said, as yet, about the post-modern causal conditions under which forms of strategic action and utilitarian self-understanding might be extended, undermined or otherwise transformed. Certainly there is a great need for better description and analysis of the dispersion of the mode of detached utilitarian action into all sorts of surprising social spaces.

If rational choice theory has a natural enemy within historical sociology, that appears to be the “cultural turn,” at least at first blush. People’s routes to and on “the turn” vary tremendously; we would be better off abandoning the highway metaphor and speaking of turns plural. The bottom-line assumption, however, is that significatory is a constitutive part of social life, with its own logic, which cannot be reduced to or “read off” social position. In fact, those positions are themselves formed by processes of meaning-making. The cultural turn as a moniker covers an enormous intellectual field, part of the general shift toward linguistic modes of analysis in the twentieth century, with ramifying roots in structural linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, history, literary theory, cultural studies, pragmatism,
feminist and post-colonial theory – and of course sociology itself. Here we want to signal the most important theoretical themes for historical sociology.135

The argument that all conceptual categories are fundamentally social, systemically organized, and historically mutable, hails from Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics and Durkheim and Mauss’s Primitive Classification.136 One could say that Saussure introduced the concepts of sign and system of signification, and Durkheim in particular underlined its sociality and emergent properties. No wonder Emile Durkheim was the Founding Father ritually abominated by the scholars of the canonical second wave: Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1995) could serve as a totem – whether worshipped overtly or not – for ways in which scholars foregrounding the historical transformation of classification systems and practices actively disrupted the second wave’s social imaginary. Andrew Abbott’s The System of Professions (1988), to take one influential example, showed that jurisdictional claims – which revolve around “differences between archetypes” (p. 61) – and struggles among actors over whether and how those archetypical arrangements would be recognized, and perhaps institutionalized, anchor an interdependent system of professions. The major dynamics of system-level change reside in a number of external and internal factors, including technologies and organizations, but the professional formations of valued knowledge, the attendant arguments for recognition, including rhetorics and the migration of metaphors, have their own cultural properties and tendencies of development (Abbott 1988: 57-113).137 Pierre Bourdieu’s analyses of systems of taste and political language play out the relationship among objects of consumption or ways of speaking that function as signs of class difference in organized fields in which each element takes on its meaning in relationship to others. These elements are then available for actors’ manipulation, accumulation, and so forth, but their relationships also constrain the possibilities for strategic action and thus of systemic transformation.138

135For manifold other aspects, see the excellent review by Eley (1996). Ronald Grigor Suny considers the state of the cultural turn/rational choice face-off in political science in his review essay “Back and Beyond: Reversing the Cultural Turn?” (Pp. 1476-1499 of American Historical Review, December 2002).

136Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss were responding to Immanuel Kant. See their Primitive Classification (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) as well as the foundational Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (New York, NY: Philosophical Library, 1959).

137While System defines the archetypical units as “organized groups of individuals” (p. 117), in practice the argument is more complicated, recognizing two levels of archetypes - one a formation of signs, the other a concatenation of individuals and aggregates of individuals. Signs and relations among signs are treated as relatively fixed for purposes of the theory, however, thereby stabilizing and streamlining what is already a complex argument.

Classification systems continue to generate wonderful historical sociological work. Their evolving modes of abstraction and application have been examined across a series of social fields, including double-entry bookkeeping and law.\(^{139}\) As classification systems receive renewed attention, the construction and policing of boundaries necessarily comes to the fore, whether they be boundaries among institutionalized formations of knowledge; among perceived racial and class groupings; among medieval and early-modern European status groups; among categories of children, and so on.\(^{140}\) Some historical sociologists engaged by the disciplinary power residing in categorization also take Michel Foucault as one reference point.\(^{141}\) Foucault’s own unclassifiable work, which if not that of a standard *sociologue* certainly flirts with historical sociology and is taught in many of our graduate theory courses, captures the historical emergence of normalizing discourses and “technologies of the self,” and traces the processes by which they are embedded in and help create a range of disciplinary complexes including the prison, clinic, confessional, and state apparatuses. These discourses contribute to creating the very individuals that they describe and regulate. These arguments have been one impetus for exciting sociological work detecting the fingerprints of power on shifting historical categories.\(^{142}\)

Ironically, the state-centric heritage of the second wave has actually been helpful to historical sociologists working in the Foucauldian vein, helping them dodge two dangerous temptations. First, rather than displacing the central in favor of the capillary, or washing out their analytical differences (as Foucault himself tended to do), historical sociologists have sought to reconnect them and trace the genealogies of their institutionalization in forms of rule and the formation of subjects. There Foucault meets Weber, one might say. Thus Ivan Evans analyzes the relationship between racialized forms of local


\(^{141}\)Foucault was not the first to examine the ways that categories come to be “transfer points” of power; his philosophical lineage rests on Nietzsche, Heidegger, Saussure, Derrida and others, as well as the first wave of classical historical sociology. Two texts have been particularly influential in today’s historical sociology: *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York, NY: Vintage, 1979); *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1978).

vigilantism and state power in the twentieth-century U.S. and South Africa, while Philip Gorski traces the way in which capillary forms of Calvinist social discipline forged in the crucible of the Reformation are incorporated into state projects in early modern Europe. The second temptation involves the reification of categories. We see this form of vulgar Foucauldianism whenever categories are deemed coextensive with identities and subjectivities (and either celebrated or excoriated as such!), or when categories get treated as homogeneous, suffocating, instrumentally deployed weapons by which the powerful unfailingly repress the less powerful. The growing body of work on identities in historical sociology has by and large evaded this trap. A serious engagement with history makes it hard to ignore the complexity of actors or the unintended consequences of action for those on top as well as on the bottom of the social heap.

The categories of politics – particularly with respect to nations and citizenship – attract the most scholarly attention in historical sociology. The power-political emphasis owes something to the second wave. But before that wave ebbed, politics was considered an arena of rational contestation, not aesthetic spectacle, and categories like citizenship and nationhood were erased or “forgotten” (see Somers, this volume; Spillman and Feages, this volume). No longer. There is now an analytical space for politics as the mobilization of desires and categories, not just interests. Citizenship has been analytically reconstructed through the lens of the cultural turn, and a wealth of work engages the formation of nations and national identities in many forms of politics. Benedict Anderson’s influential concept of nations as “imagined communities”146 has been a touchstone and an inspiration. Some of the new


146Anderson writes in keeping with the darker impulse behind some of the cultural turn – recall that his project began as an attempt to understand the wars between Vietnam, Cambodia and China. “Who can be confident,” he asked with depressing prescience in the 1983 first edition, “that Yugoslavia and Albania will not one day come to blows?” (Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), p. 12.
scholarship foregrounds Europe; other scholarship looks beyond. Many of these works on nations and national identities take conceptually hybrid forms as well, dovetailing with other foci. For example, Eiko Ikegami deploys the lens of collective identities in conjunction with institutionalism to locate the honorific culture of the samurai as the source of the nationally distinctive combination of collaboration and competition that characterizes the government institutions as well as corporations of modern Japan. Frank Dobbin weds cultural analysis to the national specificities of industrial policy in his study of how policy-makers’ perceptions influenced the building of the railways in the nineteenth-century United States, Britain and France. And John Meyer and his collaborators have demonstrated that nation-state institutional forms and capacities for action have become a set of standardized, modular and reproducible cultural templates in today’s “world society.”

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The making of modernity is central to the cultural turn in historical sociology in at least two ways. First, sociologists engage the substantive problems and questions associated with the formation of historically evolving cultural categories and practices. Often (but not always) these have an explicitly power-political focus.\textsuperscript{152} How, Meyer Kestnbaum wonders in this volume, do we describe and explain the ways in which “the people” have become involved in war – as citizens or in the name of other identities – and the corresponding critical relationship between popular uprisings and military mobilization? Or to take another example, one which returns us to the root class-based concerns of the second wave but with a novel culturalist twist, how are class-based identities historically constructed and reconstructed, and what might that mean for politics, work, family life, community action and so on? Howard Kimeldorf has examined such questions with special reference to the Wobblies in U.S. labor history.\textsuperscript{153} Marc Steinberg’s Fighting Words examines the discursive construction of working-class boundaries in early nineteenth-century English politics; Richard Biernacki has analyzed the ways that distinctive conceptions of labor as a commodity shaped the practices of work in the textile industries of Germany and Britain.\textsuperscript{154} There are many other possible examples. In fact, this general genealogical project is almost definitive of the way that the cultural turn has played out in historical sociology.

Second, more generally, the very concept of identity, thought to inhere primarily in an authorized individual subject, is the result of a long historical process in which that authorizing power, originally socially located in God or Nature, descends to and is inherited by “the self.”\textsuperscript{155} Weber’s Protestant Ethic marked out one significant moment of that embattled process.\textsuperscript{156} We are now located at an interesting intellectual and political moment at which this notion of the sovereign self and its associated practices are simultaneously being intellectually reinvigorated (for example, in rational-choice theory) and quite thoroughly undermined. Powerful voices outside the academy are reasserting fantasized fundamentalist

\textsuperscript{152} For two delightful counter-examples see Wendy Griswold, Renaissance Revivals: City Comedy and Revenge Tragedy in the London Theatre, 1576-1980 (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986) and Allan Silver, “Friendship and Trust as Moral Ideals: An Historical Approach,” Archives Europeenes de Sociologie (1989) 30: 274-97. We can expect the choice of analytic objects to broaden further as the second wave recedes.


versions of tradition and personhood. But perhaps the strongest credible intellectual challenge to date emanates from the inroads of post-structuralism and postmodernism – currents that reached American sociology later than some of the other human sciences. The relevant critiques of the subject, Enlightenment universalism and the grand narratives of modern historical development are by now familiar. Perhaps this shift has become so overriding, bringing with it a sense of meaning as simultaneously crucial and fragile, because social processes associated with modernity and modernization are disenchanting the world. No doubt the horrific political events of the twentieth and now twenty-first century are also an influence – including the total wars that ushered in Eric Hobsbawm’s “age of catastrophe” and seem to “confirm what many have always suspected, that history – among many other and more important things – is the record of the crimes and follies of mankind.”

Whereas the utilitarian vision aims for the crystalline clarity of a mathematical model, some of those who have taken “the turn” see through a glass darkly. But it must also be said that others find fundamental uncertainties exhilarating, and take them as an invitation to playful resignification and cultural creativity.

Because modernist theoretical imageries are deeply constitutive of our discipline, however, postmodernist and post-structuralist modes of thought raise substantial problems for sociologists in general and historical sociologists in particular. Opinion is therefore divided within the sociological community with respect to the more avowedly “postie” versions of the cultural turn. Some historical sociologists are grappling with this repertoire, trying to destabilize organizing imageries of progress and modernity in constructive (rather than simply deconstructive) ways. Others have responded by seeking to define these currents out of existence – or at least out of comparative historical sociology – in an attempt to make common cause with the more soi-disant scientific and soft-utilitarian sub-discipline of historical institutionalist political science. For James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “comparative historical analysis” should by definition exclude most interpretivists, whom they also call “cultural theorists.”

157 “Cleric, rabbi, sadhi, and mullah mount the rostrum, occupy the public place, seeking to ordinate society according to a text originating outside of it.” The quote is from p. 236 of Roger Friedland, “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation,” Annual Review of Sociology 27, 2001: 125-152.


159 The sense of progress, of progressive change, is one casualty. In her comparison of the late nineteenth and late twentieth century commemorations, Lynette Spillman found that faith in progress had diminished in the twentieth century, even though there was more progress – by nineteenth century criteria – in the twentieth. Lynette Spillman, Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).


161 Mayer N. Zald. 1996. “More Fragmentation? Unfinished Business in Linking the Social Sciences and the Humanities,” Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (2): 251-61. Things are complicated by the fact that “cultural sociology” has in part been constituted in reaction to cultural studies and “postie” thought – at the same time that it has been influenced by them, and is itself a product of the same intellectual and historical moment. All the more reason to render the “turn” in cultural turn in the plural!
danger of not taking sides on this issue,” they warn, “is that promising young researchers may be steered toward the theoretical nihilism embraced in the more extreme forms of postmodern theory.”

This latter strategy – *je refuse!* – seems as misconceived as it is to be expected. Work in the historical sociology of science – itself a wonderfully alive area in the cultural turn, as we noted above – would suggest that these efforts at boundary maintenance are characteristic of not only normal science but also of legitimatory moves emerging from within sociology. Think, for example, of the repressions that Charles Camic (1992) has shown were part and parcel of the Parsonian project of grand theorizing and institution-building. Why should historical sociology be immune from this hegemonizing impulse? Nevertheless, we should resist it – and ironically there are good scientific grounds for doing so. Innovations in fundamental knowledge often emerge from the encounter with other fundamental knowledges, as Arthur Stinchcombe notes, and fundamental knowledge is not stratified along a single dimension. There is plenty to criticize about “the turn” – including some of its methods of analysis, which are as yet in their infancy – and criticism should be vigorously pursued. But given the rapid transformation of these knowledges, and the world that they are seeking to map, who is to prophesy from whence will come the “cultural toolkit” for the historical sociologists of the third, fourth or future waves?

**Feminist Challenges**

Like their *companeras* in other parts of the human sciences, feminists within historical sociology have contested the exclusions and repressions that have characterized social analysis, and have revealed both the promises and limits of universalist modern categories and of modern social structures themselves. They are but one small wing of a set of multifaceted intellectual and political movements, emerging in the 1960s and continuing today, that has transformed social life and social theory across the globe. These movements, some of the most successful grass-roots ventures in United States and, indeed, world history, have been dedicated to expressing what has been understood to be women’s interests and identities, and to reversing exclusions of women from modernity’s privileged intellectual spaces and fields of practice, including social theory and the university. Even with women’s movements past their peak of popular mobilization, scholars in gender studies – including historical sociologists – often

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162 James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer, *Comparative-Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 24. Since every prohibition is also an incitement, to paraphrase Foucault, we would have thought that such finger-wagging would only add to the temptations luring today’s academic youth to their culturalist doom.


165 The current renaissance of feminist intellectual work got underway in the late 1960s, concurrent with our second-wave historical sociologists; feminist academics in historical sociology and other disciplines have been allied with a social movement – the “second wave” women’s movement that peaked in the 1970s, but continues in more institutionalized forms even today.
continue to be linked to feminist political activities outside academia. This differentiates them from some of the other challenges to second-wave work discussed above, and gives the feminist challenges to historical sociology – usually, but not always, mounted by women – a stronger political charge than we find in most other areas.

Working against disciplinary resistance within both heterodox fields like historical sociology and more orthodox areas like stratification research, feminists have had real though uneven successes in bringing the insights of gender scholarship to bear on theory and research. In so doing, they have upset many of the foundational concepts of modernist social theory; they continue to trouble sociological analysis. Social theorizing founders on the gendered divisions between rational and non-rational action, and the evident unsuitability of practices like mothering for theorizing agency in the rationalist mode of second-wave, rational-choice and institutionalist historical sociologists. Women and the work they do – care-giving, housekeeping, sexual labor, their varying modes of political activity, and gendered signification, have been troublesome categories for sociological analyses of politics, capitalism and modernity. Meanwhile, the gendered (masculine) character of the central sociological subjects of modernity – citizens, workers, soldiers -- and what have been seen as core constituents of modernity – markets, public spheres, states – has also been revealed by feminist analysis, challenging the universalist modern on another front. Feminist scholarly challenges raised difficulties for second-wave historical sociology, for they undermined taken-for-granted premises about who were the important political subjects and which were the critical events; upset periodization; and opened new arenas for political analysis – bodies, families, sexualities – while deepening the understanding of how gender structures even formal political spaces where women were excluded.

In the narrative of modernization theory, and in most varieties of Marxism, women have been seen to inhabit a “traditional,” “private,” world of family and home. As they move into the public sphere of the labor market, civil society and the state – as did men before them (in the transition from feudalism to modern capitalism) – they, too, become modern subjects. We can now say that women’s status and activities are important signs of what is understood to be modern or traditional, including by social scientists, even as the content and significance of these terms shifts over time and place. “Women” represent a key category of modernity’s Others, and liberal and autonomous individuals, citizens, workers, soldiers – the categories of modern subjects – are defined in opposition to what is “woman,” even when actual women were making decisions, working or fighting. Their absence helped to constitute the modern bourgeois public sphere and citizenship. Later, their inclusion signifies that modernity has arrived, even if the structures themselves retain a masculine character. Once (in the nineteenth-century heyday of the “family wage”) women’s paid labor was taken as evidence of the barbaric (if not satanic)

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167 Barbara Marshall argues that those aspects of feminism that challenge modernist premises have gone against the grain of sociology precisely because our discipline is a modernist project (see her Engendering Modernity and Configuring Gender). See also Helene Silverberg, editor, Gender and American Social Science: The Formative Years (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
character of capitalism, which had to be civilized by protecting women from paid work. Contemporary analysts often assume that modernizing developments will inevitably bring women out of what they see as traditional housewifery and into the paid labor force and that the exclusion of women from paid work demonstrates societal backwardness. Feminists have shifted this narrative decisively, showing that women’s expulsion from public social life and the erection of a public-private divide between domesticity, home and family on the one hand, and paid labor, democratic politics and states on the other is very much a modern creation, not the residue of women’s incomplete modernization.

Thanks to their cross-disciplinary ties through gender studies, feminist historical sociologists have been a conduit into the subdiscipline for a variety of intellectual trends, including women’s history, feminist political theory, cultural studies, post-structuralism, and (post)colonial studies. Women’s politics and women’s experiences, historical and contemporary – later to be subjected to deconstructive readings and political interventions – provided the initial impetus for feminist work in the human sciences over thirty years ago. Within still second-wave historical sociology, feminists brought novel arguments and analyses about gender relations, previously understood only as “sexual difference,” or marginalized as insignificant to the main action of modernization. Power and inequalities – core concerns of political and historical sociology – had a gendered face, where they had been previously understood as principally about class and (sometimes) race. In this period, feminists in historical sociology – like their colleagues in the rest of the subfield, and indeed throughout the human sciences – understood women and men to be natural groups, emerging from biological or social universals. They saw “women’s interests” in the classical Marxian-Lukacsian fashion found throughout second-wave historical sociology: identifiable by social analysts (or feminist vanguards), who could read them off social-structural locations, even as their interpretations diverged on what provided the material basis for those interests – labor, citizenship, mothering or sexuality. Sometimes these approaches construed women’s interests and political demands in the same vaguely utilitarian mode as much mainstream institutionalist analysis. Yet at times feminist historical sociologists mounted an explicit challenge to utilitarianism and the concept of the atomized, rational individual pursuing his own interests. How, for example, could such premises accommodate the activities of mothers – and indeed fathers – caring for, and sacrificing for, children? (The question remains a pertinent point of analytical vulnerability.) An even more severe break with the fantasy of clear materialist determination was to come with the various culturalist and post-structuralist moves of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

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168 Both men and women championed mothers’ domesticity, although with different aims in mind; only a minority of women pursued the goals of gaining entry to paid labor, which today would be recognized as a “feminist” position. In many places (not simply the United States and Europe), women often struggled for resources and political recognition on the basis of gender “difference,” in the instance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, on the basis of what were understood to be distinctively feminine virtues associated with mothering; see, e.g., Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States, edited by Seth Koven and Sonya Michel (New York: Routledge, 1993).


170 Some rational-choice thinkers are seeking to plug this analytical hole with a spot of evolutionary biology, but this has analytic strategy has yet to make an appearance in historical sociology. No doubt it will, and soon.
Second-wave historical sociology experienced a series of challenges to its premises about power, the construction of agents and signification with the cultural turns of the late 1980s and beyond (as we have outlined above). These challenges affected feminist historical sociologists from two directions—from within the subdiscipline and within gender studies, where parallel contestations erupted, with scholars mounting devastating attacks on the concepts of a culturally- or linguistically-unmediated experience and of a natural, pre-social and unified category of “women,” heretofore the lodestars of women’s movement politics and women’s studies scholarship. Joan Scott showed “women’s experience” to be culturally-mediated and variable yet she argued, with wide influence in historical sociology, that a (changeable) gender is “a useful category of historical analysis,” with two interrelated aspects: gender as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes” and as “a primary way of signifying relationships of power.” Not all who embraced the turn to signification and culture took Scott’s deconstructive path, but her formulation helped to establish cultural approaches for feminists doing historical work, including historical sociologists.

Another part of the culturalist challenge can be categorized as anti-essentialism, in which the category of “women” was exploded by consideration of multiple differences or post-structuralist decomposition. Analysts such as Evelyn Nakano Glenn mined the vein of difference beyond gender to unearth confounding dissimilarities and inequalities based on race and ethnicity, nationality, sexuality and the like. Much of the work around “multiple differences” or “intersecting inequalities” incorporates discursive and cultural issues, yet some of it has maintained the familiar materialist premises about groups and interests even as the possible bases of oppression multiply. Denise Riley—an influential gender scholar hailing from the humanities—demonstrated that “women” were a fiction, “historically, discursively constructed... a volatile collectivity in which female persons can be very differently positioned... synchronically and diachronically erratic as a collectivity... inconstant [for the

171 Judith Butler, who became the iconic post-structuralist feminist theorist, conceived gender as performance. Yet her innovative work was less significant for historical sociologists than the others here cited, for her analyses are for the most part historically decontextualized. Moreover, to the dismay of sociologists, the now-canonical (in gender studies) Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990) did not explore the work of such obvious predecessors as Erving Goffman. Butler’s work also lost something by this refusal to engage both Goffman and Clio.


173 Evelyn Nakano Glenn, “From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Reproductive Labor,” Signs 18(1992):1-43. The critique of the idea of a unified category of woman was extremely widespread, and the literature on what has come to be called “multiple differences” or “intersectionality” is enormous. Feminism and Race, edited by Kum-Kum Bhavnani (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) is an excellent collection on the debates around race, gender, colonialism, sexuality. For an influential piece in history, see Tessie Liu, “Teaching the Differences among Women from a Historical Perspective: Rethinking Race and Gender as Social Categories,” Women’s Studies International Forum 14(1991):265-76.

174 For “interlocking oppressions” see, for example, Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (Boston: Unwin, Hyman, 1990), and the critique of the limits on her “deconstructive zeal” by Paul Gilroy in Black Atlantic, p.232n26.
individual] and [unable to]... provide an ontological foundation.” The deconstruction of “women” also combined with concerns about multiple inequalities, raising difficult questions about what might be involved in relations among women. For example, Chandra Mohanty revealed the colonialist discursive moves embedded in the monolithic portrayal of “third world women” as Other to “Western feminism.” These sorts of challenges raised particular difficulties for large-scale comparative or *longue-durée* historical work; while historical case studies (or ethnography) may be well-suited to unpacking the complex, cultural construction of identities at the intersection of multiple forms of difference, power and inequality for small groups of women (or men), undertaking studies of what Leslie McCall calls “complex inequality” on the vast terrain of the labor market, state, revolutions and other collective political action is challenging indeed.

The intellectual shifts to representation and the multiplicity of identities and inequalities have been very powerful, and open new understandings of modernity. Yet it is important to note that within historical sociology, as across the academy, feminism retains very diverse theoretical orientations, and different attitudes about modernist analysis and its various post-alternatives. And of course feminist theory and analysis continues to develop. Feminism’s increasing internal diversity is reflected among feminist historical sociologists, who run the gamut from deconstructionism – one end of culturalist work – to standpoint theory, which assumes a still-robust social determinism. Historical sociologists, raised on earlier, largely materialist understandings of gender relations, were initially ambivalent about the deconstructionist and culturalist critiques. And, indeed, the materialist tendencies have not been extinguished, as much work continues in a still-modernist vein, within an implicitly utilitarian institutionalist or power resources framework. Of late, however, with the spread of culturalist approaches throughout the discipline, historical sociologists have become friendlier to analyses featuring signification. Many feminist historical sociologists have been influenced by the cultural turn, but most have not taken what Geoff Eley calls “the escalator” all the way to post-structuralism, and only a few have ventured into post-structuralist archaeologies of categories and concepts (especially the categories of “woman” and “man” themselves). Thus gender has entered (historical) sociology mainly as a dimension of analysis, to be incorporated into various theoretical frameworks, rather than through the adoption of feminist theories. Feminist historical sociologists are trying to strike compromise positions.

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175 Denise Riley, “Am I That Name?” *Feminism and the Category of Women in History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).


178 The project of “gendering” sociology means different things for scholars in different subdisciplines, and with different analytic and theoretical leanings. Sociologists of gender who identify with the historical wing of the discipline differ sharply from their rather presentist and too-often positivist colleagues by their concern with the explicitly political institutions of modernity. See O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver, *States, Markets, Families*, pp.10-11.

With respect to the analysis of collective political action and states, this is where we are today, on this extremely unsettled ground.

Feminist historical sociology has had some impressive intellectual successes, yet we take note of a gendered patterning in the areas of scholarship where feminist analyses have, or have not, made headway, and where they have found resistance. Gender analysis has faced resistance throughout the academy, echoing the opposition feminist politics have faced in the “real world.” This resistance takes on a distinctive character in historical sociology, with its center of gravity in the macro-political. R.W. Connell has argued that opposition to feminism grows stronger the closer one gets to what he calls the core institutions of male power: the state apparatus, especially its military wing. (He thinks feminists are capable of achieving “local reversals” in “peripheral” sites such as the family.) We do not sign onto Connell’s overall analysis of patriarchy and state power – which is extremely bleak – but we do see a parallel relationship between resistance to feminism and feminist theory and proximity of an academic discipline or subdiscipline to the commanding heights of state power. Thus, it has been easier for gendered work to take hold in English than in economics, or in the sociology of the family than in political sociology, including its historical wing. When we examine historical sociological research on the state, we find greater penetration by gender analysis in scholarship on welfare policy than in research on state formation and state building, including the symbolically masculine activities of war and coercion. The gender segregation of scholarship, ubiquitous in academia and intellectual life, disables historical sociologists from making convincing historicized accounts of modernity, capitalism, states and politics. The recurring theoretical move of shunting “concerns of gender” to women scholars or to fields of scholarship marked as feminine prevents analyses of “core” political institutions and practices from understanding their gendered character – and thus, results in fatally misunderstanding them. And gender scholarship is reciprocally impoverished by the lack of work on institutions and practices that are also central to the constitution of gender relations.

Feminists in the last two to three decades have built up a significant body of research on gendered processes of reproduction, understood broadly as encompassing biological, social, and cultural elements; of gendered processes of identity-formation within classes, nations, racial/ethnic formations; of gendered collective action and citizenship practices; of gendered systems of social provision (welfare states). This research took off from the distinguished line of work among Marxist feminists on class reproduction, families and gender, but has evolved its own post-Marxist character. Nicola Beisel’s Imperiled Innocents, for example, argues for the central role of the family, gender and sexual politics in

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class formation and reproduction – including cultural aspects of these processes, and links these to the formation of Anthony Comstock’s anti-vice movement in Victorian America.\textsuperscript{183}

Nevertheless it must be said that the masculine preserves of states remain analytically off limits. There have been few if any historical analyses of the gendered mechanics of warmaking itself – this in spite of the implicit invitation in Norbert Elias’ \textit{The Civilizing Process}, a text about, above all, the social disciplining and internalization of forms of masculinized coercion involved in the formation of “modern” states and male subjects.\textsuperscript{184} And studies of state formation, one of the most significant and influential areas of scholarly activity by comparative-historical sociologists, have remained relatively untouched by gender analysis. For too many scholars in these areas, masculinity remains unmarked, and gender continues to signify women.\textsuperscript{185} Yet recent work by historians and political theorists has revealed not only elements of women’s role in state-making, but also the ways in which masculine identities and men’s gendered aims were implicated in the political activities that established modern states and democratic orders.\textsuperscript{186} Other analyses highlight the ways in which “woman” or particular women functioned as signs in sexualized political discourses and political culture.\textsuperscript{187} Among historical sociologists, Pavla Miller has traced the making and unmaking of different forms of patriarchal governance across a number of Western sites, relating gender and family dynamics, technologies of the self and larger processes of state-making and capitalist industrialization.\textsuperscript{188} Gary Hamilton compares the intersection of families and states in China and Western Europe, reevaluating Weber’s arguments about patriarchy and patrimonialism.\textsuperscript{189} Julia Adams’ work on the Netherlands, England and France uncovers the way in which representatives of family lineages mobilized signifiers of fatherhood and rule in the formation of patrimonial political structures, and shows how the articulation of signs of paternity, elite family forms and political structures

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184}Norbert Elias, \textit{The Civilizing Process} (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1939). On the other hand, historical and political theoretical studies of representations of war abound. See, for example, the sections on masculinity and representations of war in Jean Bethke Elshtain’s \textit{Women and War} (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
\item \textsuperscript{185}Terrell Carver, \textit{Gender Is Not a Synonym for Women} (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner, 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{188}Pavla Miller, \textit{Transformations of Patriarchy in the West, 1500-1900} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998).
\item \textsuperscript{189}Gary G. Hamilton, “Patriarchy, Patrimonialism, and Filial Piety: A Comparison of China and Western Europe,” \textit{The British Journal of Sociology} 41 #1 (March 1990): 77-104.
\end{itemize}
contributed to the different fates of these three states.\textsuperscript{190} This general body of work has mostly concentrated on Europe – a limitation, to be sure, but also a rhetorical advantage, since Europe was often rendered as the premiere site of rationalized state-making – the site in which gender, associated with notions of traditionalism, was supposed to have been progressively extirpated.\textsuperscript{191}

While work on “the sinews of power” – war, bureaucratization, fiscal extraction – has not yet become a favored site for feminist historical sociology, it is not the case that they have neglected states altogether. Far from it. Gender analysts in historical sociology have thoroughly worked the ground of states and their critical role in social reproduction, particularly in systems of social provision and regulation – today’s welfare states and their precursors (see Orloff, this volume). Feminist historical sociologists have changed the way welfare states or regimes are conceptualized. By beginning from feminist premises about “women’s (and men’s) interests,” focusing on different capacities to exercise citizenship rights, the distribution of paid and unpaid labor, employment opportunities, poverty levels, and support for caregiving, they have upended much of the common wisdom about the modern welfare state and citizenship, including the periodization of citizenship rights, the categorization of regimes, the import of key concepts like “decommodification,” and the prerequisites for state welfare. To take only one of these accomplishments: Mainstream scholars of the early years of modern state welfare saw workingmen utilizing political rights to demand social rights, which in turn strengthened their collective political capacities. Feminists brought out the gendered content of these struggles, showing that trade unionists, employers and others had gender and familial as well as occupational or class interests. In the struggles over protective legislation for women and for family provision, for example, many workingmen wanted women to be constructed as wives, male employers wanted them to be (subordinate, cheap) workers, and women themselves often wanted recognition as mothers or as (equally-paid and equal) workers.\textsuperscript{192} Which group won out differed across countries and time periods. Furthermore, historical sociologists showed that for women, social rights preceded political rights – reversing the periodization handed down by T.H. Marshall to historical sociologists of welfare – and that women utilized distinctive political strategies and forms to win passage of legislation in the absence of the franchise.\textsuperscript{193}

Gender analysts of welfare systems for the most part have followed the basic intellectual contours of institutionalism, including many of its utilitarian assumptions. But by starting with women, many institutionalist premises are unravelled. And considerations of gender often bleed into topics outside the normally dry parameters of institutionalist analysis, such as body rights or, even more


\textsuperscript{193} Skocpol, \textit{Protecting Soldiers and Mothers}; Clemens, \textit{People’s Lobby}. 
commonly, unpaid care work. These subjects are difficult to assimilate to certain aspects of the utilitarian model of the actor, which depends on notions of an autonomous liberal individual, whose gender is unmarked but masculine and is unburdened by care or other attachments. Moreover, opening up questions about care, women’s exclusion, and bodies has troubled assumptions about the easy interpretability of “interests” apart from politics, culture and signification. For example, many scholars have looked at different political struggles around the proper relationship of motherhood and paid labor, citizenship and welfare benefits, finding that different groups of men and women take varying positions over time and across countries. Debates around the meanings of all these statuses are shifting and politically and culturally charged. Within this research area, many are paying increased attention to the ways in which states create categories and subjects, which is leading some to consider the ways in which making claims on the state incorporates cultural or discursive dimensions, as in a host of studies on the ways in which discursive categories have been institutionalized in state agencies and professional-administrative practices at the local level, and either embraced or resisted by those to whom they have been applied.

Scholars working on the broad topic of collective action – which has always been a contentious area with respect to gender – uncovered the contribution of women to class politics and social movements, then moved to consider the ways in which gendered identities and gender relations are politically and culturally created, sustained or challenged by social movements and in the routines of institutionalized politics. Facile assumptions about working-class solidarity across gender lines or the content of political demands were undermined by the research of historical sociologists such as Ava Baron, Johanna Brenner, Elizabeth Faue, Ruth Milkman, Sonya Rose and Carole Turbin, writing in the 1980s and early 1990s on the history of working-class or middle-class women, gender in the workplace,

194 O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, States, Markets, Families; Orloff, “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship.”


the gender politics of the labor movement, and the role of the state in creating sex segregation. Others chronicled the rise of the different waves of women’s movements. But their close ties to history also meant they felt the pull of the cultural turn, and the associated shift from the “history of women” to the post-structuralist historical construction of sexual difference. The construction of distinctive masculinities and femininities in diverse contexts, and the sources of gendered political action, have been examined by many analysts, including, for example, Mary Ann Clawson in an analysis of nineteenth century U.S. fraternal organizations or Raka Ray in a study of women’s movements in two Indian cities, while Kathleen Blee incorporated the racialized dimensions of women’s identities in a study of women’s participation in the Ku Klux Klan. This focus on gendered mobilization extends to the formation of nations and states as well – for example, Gay Seidman’s examination of post-apartheid South Africa and Daina Stukuls’ study of processes of gendered normalization in post-Soviet Latvia. Theda Skocpol’s analysis of the emergence and successes of “maternalist” movements in the first decades of the twentieth century challenged understandings of U.S. political and policy history and of the sources of collective action that had formed the basis for much political sociology. In all of these studies, we see not only better historical documentation of the varying forms and levels of gendered collective action (including armed struggle), but also interesting attempts to integrate culturalist preoccupations with political


200 For example, Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); see also Eley, “Is All the World a Text?,” pp. 202-03.


203 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.
struggles and structures. Much of this work deals with the ways in which gender relations are interwoven with political struggles and gendered signs and symbols are constitutive of political discourse.

Feminists in historical sociology have conducted a spirited campaign to bring gender into the political and still-masculinized core of modernity. The masculine redoubts of the working class (like welfare states) have been revealed in exemplary historical sociological research as sites of gendered contestation and sources of gendering broader social orders, but we have been less successful in entering the corporate headquarters of modernity. We think this means less satisfying explanatory accounts of social transformation for all of us. Sociologists who want to incorporate gender analysis into their work will continue to find the road hard going, but we hope they will keep up their efforts. We editors also hope that they will resist certain intellectual tendencies within gender studies, particularly those that automatically reject any further congress between the liberal subject and womanhood. This rejection would be a grievous mistake at a moment when gendered meanings of “tradition” and “modernity,” swirling around women’s bodies and practices yet again, threaten to engulf whatever progress – situated and relative though it may be – women have achieved through a qualified embrace of modernity.

With respect to the wider community of historical sociologists, and the discipline of sociology itself, “la lucha continua” (as we used to say). Linda Zerilli points out in her study of classical political theory and the signifier “woman” that political theory as an intellectual enterprise also participates in the construction of gender – the same point may be made of historical sociology. Witness the ways in which areas of sociology in which gender analyses have scored some successes may be subject to redefinition by those who would prefer, consciously or not, to dispense with it. The gendering encounters on intellectual territory are never finally fixed.

**World-Systems, Postcoloniality and Remapping the World after the Second Wave**

Historical sociology is built on theories of transitions to capitalist modernity, and those theories have been historically been centered around versions of the European Experience. Both first and second wave sociologists overemphasized the originary importance of European historical lineages, as we have seen, and many simply assumed that the concepts and theories deriving from those lineages applied around the world. Certain key features of those lineages (such as their linkage to colonialism or Islam) were also off the table. As people in and outside the academy reexamine these assumptions, the process of academic soul-searching in historical sociology is underway on three main fronts.

First, some scholars are critically reevaluating and extending second wave work and debates. The filiation is often explicitly marked. Thus the reciprocal relationship between organized violence – including war-making – and state centralization highlighted by Charles Tilly among others has been qualified and reformulated by Karen Barkey, based on the case of the Ottoman Empire, and Miguel

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204 Adams, “Feminist Theory as Fifth Columnist or Discursive Vanguard”; Baron, “Romancing the Field”; Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*.

205 Some might wonder if the machine terminology attached to the intellectual move to “social mechanisms” is not at least partially an attempt to reclaim masculine intellectual space, for example! 
What role ideology might play in the genesis of revolutions, the topic of a well-known debate between Theda Skocpol and William Sewell, Jr., spurred Mansoor Moaddel’s study of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Revolutionary processes and outcomes established in the state-centered tradition of second-wave research have been reexamined in non-European states by Jeff Goodwin, Timothy Wickham-Crowley and others. Do certain class coalitions make particular paths of political development more likely? James Mahoney and Jeffery Paige revisit Barrington Moore Jr.’s classic arguments in their respective studies of liberalism and the rise of democracy in Central America. Does a state’s relative autonomy not simply from the bourgeoisie, but from a colonial power, help secure the conditions of modernization? Muge Gocek reexamines the familiar second wave Marxian question in her study of the Ottoman Empire.

This is only a sampling of recent scholarship in this genre. “While history may perhaps suffer less from this confusion than the social sciences,” write Miguel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves, “we are all used to assumptions that peasant means French, state means Germany, revolution means Russia, and democracy means Westminster.” These and other excellent


works disorganize these assumptions, tell us about Other Cases, and rewrite the empirical generalizations and sociological theories of state-formation derived from internalist and nationally-specific European histories.\textsuperscript{212}

Another version of this approach, which we might call critical extensions of second wave scholarship, follows in the path of Fernando Cardoso, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and other pioneers of dependency theory and world systems analysis.\textsuperscript{213} This vision has been taken up in a variety of fruitful ways by Janet Abu-Lughod; Giovanni Arrighi; Terry Boswell; Georgi Derluguian; Peter Evans; John Foran; Harriet Friedman, and David Strang among others.\textsuperscript{214} In the broadest sense, it has diffused beyond the boundaries of world-systems analysis: the general world-systems intuition is now quite widespread, with plenty of historical sociologists who do not sign onto the theory making free with some vague version of the concept. True, few historical sociologists have adopted Wallerstein’s full argument that there is something one might call a “world system”: a single network of core, peripheral and semi-peripheral nodes sustained by the extraction of surplus based on economic specialization and rationalization rather than imperial force. Nevertheless the impulse behind world systems analysis was a

\textsuperscript{212}Note that individual scholars with second wave affiliations have followed the threads into other areas as well, such as historical institutionalism. Karen Barkey, for example, has since written on network organization in the Ottoman Empire in the manner of the “institutionalist challenge” described above. See Barkey’s and Ronan Van Rossem’s “Networks of Contention: Villages and Regional Structure in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” American Journal of Sociology 102 #5 (March 1997): 1345-1382. In general, this whole category of work overlaps substantially with similar moves in historical institutionalist political science.


remarkable one, and it is still one that all of us might profitably take up, particularly when it comes to jettisoning the automatic identification of important social processes with the boundaries of contemporary sovereign states and nation-state borders.\textsuperscript{215}

In all this work, we continue to see the signs of the rending and tearing of the second wave paradigm along several fault lines. Those who hold by its core dimensions, who try to explain what they’re about in terms of expanding the reach and generalizability of second-wave models, are prey to increasingly sharp analytic tensions. Sometimes those tensions are explicitly thematized. Jeff Goodwin, for example, discusses the limitations of his “state-centered perspective” (pp. 55-58), including its failure to tackle associational networks and culture. These limits are reasonable trade-offs, he argues, when one is looking for a parsimonious rather than exhaustive explanation (p. 58). But the basic question – which Goodwin himself raises elsewhere in his work -- is whether the omitted dimensions structure the state of affairs that sociologists are examining.\textsuperscript{216} World systems analysts for their part want to incorporate dynamics of race, ethnicity, even religion into their analyses, but find themselves corseted by the economistic propositions about what organizes the relationships among relevant network nodes.\textsuperscript{217} The further insistence that there must exist a social totality, an integrated and in this case global regime, has blocked off valuable avenues of discussion with people of other theoretical inclinations.\textsuperscript{218}

\textsuperscript{215}See Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996). The report of the commission, which was chaired by Wallerstein, includes an excellent section on the analytic problems associated with “state-centric thinking” (pp. 80-85). This does not mean that we should all analyze the world – a dubious project in any case, subject to all the objections that were raised about the vaulting ambition of Braudelian “total history.” (See especially J. H. Hexter’s critical (and often hilarious) comments on Braudel in his On Historians: Reappraisals of Some of the Makers of Modern History (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).) Note that Wallerstein also continues to make impassioned and inspiring arguments for not simply interdisciplinary but de-disciplinary historical analysis. See his The End of the World as We Know It. Social Science for the Twenty-First Century (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{216}In Goodwin’s “The Libidinal Constitution of a High-Risk Social Movement: Affectual Ties and Solidarity in the Huk Rebellion, 1946 to 1954,” American Sociological Review 62 #1, 1997, pp. 53-69, he examines the absence of “sexual relationships and affectual ties” from social science analyses of collective action. Here’s the memorable first sentence: “If the modern era is characterized by “a veritable discursive explosion” (Foucault 1978: 17) about sexuality, then social-movement theory remains deeply embedded in the \textit{ancien regime}.” (P. 53)

\textsuperscript{217}A symptom of this problem is the widening distance between the theoretical propositions and the historical analyses or predictions that are adduced from them. See for example the five concluding propositions in Arrighi and Silver, pp. 271-289 of Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System. The book is admirably historical; for example, it treats this era’s hegemonic arrangements in relationship to previous hegemonic systems. But it is very difficult to see how propositions at this level of abstraction can be qualified by empirical evidence, much less gained. The problem then is that historical materials take on a purely illustrative character. We would feel more confident of the overall argument if the authors also presented some materials that they felt were puzzling or less automatically incorporated into their theoretical system.

In general, the category of “race” is one symptomatic flashpoint at which these sorts of paradigmatic strains ignite. Race is easily digested within second wave paradigms as long as it is taken to index fixed, underlying and even biologically-given attributes rather than shifting sets of signifiers that are not tethered to referents in any essential way. (The parallel developed in the above section on feminist challenges to historical sociology is the reduction of gender to the category of biological sex.) Actors are assumed to have certain attributes and to fall into natural groups on this basis, groups that have one or another economic or political function within a social formation. Note that some superb second wave work on the historical sociology of race, class and states was conducted within this rubric. But the analytical line in the sand drawn by the second wave precluded many of us historical sociologists from recognizing the plasticity and autonomy of systems of racial classification and their relationship to the structuring of societies and subjectivities. This has been problematic for the analysis of the entwined European, African and American historical trajectories themselves – because of the deep importance of chattel slavery and its unfolding impact on systems of racial classification and nationhood.

These trajectories and systems are precisely what is at issue in a second category of scholarship that problematizes the lines of connection between colonizer and colonized. This might mean explaining historical transitions between colonial formations that were basically bipolar at the outset of empire-building but then sprouted more rival heads than a Hydra. Rulers might disagree among themselves, or the subject population split into factions, or middlemen set up on their own accounts, having escaped mechanisms of colonial and post-colonial control delivered through principal-agent networks (on agency relations and empire, see Kiser and Tong 1992; Stinchcombe 1995; Adams 1996). This relational research tradition dovetails with ongoing efforts in political science and historical economics to induct more well-known cases into more general utilitarian understandings of colonialism and post-colonialism.

Much of this family of work on connections between colonizer and colonized, however, focuses on the circulation of discourses, categorization and identification in colonial and post-colonial settings. A

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number of the authors whose writings fall into these category are represented in this volume. Nader Sohrabi, for example, analyzes the role of constitutionalist discourses in key political conjunctures in pre-revolutionary Iran. Zine Magubane charts the historical development of discourses about race, some of which were legally institutionalized, that circulate between Britain and South Africa. George Steinmetz, who deploys post-colonial theory to pinpoint and analyze shifts among colonialists – and their indigenous inheritors – “native policy models” – racial discourses which categorize “natives” as civilizable – or not. These discourses, he argues, are differentially implicated in genocidal state policies. This style of historical sociology has some affinities with the broader field of post-colonial scholarship which, Catherine Hall (1996: 70) notes, argues that “the political and institutional histories of ‘the centre’ and its outer circles [are] more mutually constituted than we used to think.” What is being constituted here is not typically economics, but the nexus of politics and culture. “Provincializing Europe” – to borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s catchy phrase – is the overall intellectual project. This is a crucial but tricky business: it involves tacking back and forth between deconstructing and deploying European universalistic notions embedded in social theorizing and political practice. These notions were

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221See in particular the bibliographical references to Lo; Magubane; Sohrabi; Spellman and Steinmetz, and the relevant essays in this volume. These and other historical sociological works do not take Geoff Eley’s (1996) post-structuralist escalator all the way to complete concept-dependence. On the other hand, who does? (This was always a utopian – or dystopian, if you hail from other theoretical persuasions – formulation.) There are referents as well as signifiers and signifieds in their stories, and the problem of the relationship between signification and other mechanisms is also perennially on the table. For some of these authors, Marshall Sahlins’ Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1981) is a theoretical touchstone.


not developed in the isolated modernizing capitalist spaces of Europe – as second wave historical sociology would have had it – but during centuries of colonial encounters that actors based in Europe organized and experienced. That this formative process was mutual is clear, but its contours remain hazy and much detective work remains to be done, in historical sociology as well as elsewhere. On the purely theoretical level, as Zine Magubane discusses (this volume), historical sociologists are just beginning to ask how the particular colonialist optic of the classical theorists constitute the terms of their concepts and theories, and when that affects claims to universal applicability and reach. This part of the provincialization project should also include scrutinizing the particular versions of world history embedded in classical theories that many sociologists still take as emblematic of – and sometimes a substitute for – history itself.

Having ignored the “colonial Other” for so long, sad to say, historical sociologists are at least relatively free of romantic visions of the “agency” of that “Other” or of its self-appointed academic representatives. Perhaps we can escape the trap of romanticizing the supposed collective communitas of the East as an antidote to the liberal individual, thus avoiding re-Orientalizing non-Western societies and selves. Let us hope so, for we will otherwise find ourselves flummoxed when professions of modernity and liberal individualism among political actors make an indigenous appearance in contexts far beyond the second wave’s imagined European and North American spaces. As they do and will!

Finally, meta-narrative and synoptic grand theory are making a comeback as a third variety of the historical sociology that reaches beyond the second wave’s internalist version of Europe and the United States. One major example is the work of S. N. Eisenstadt and others on the world’s axial civilizations.

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225 C. L. R. James’ pioneering *The Black Jacobins* (New York: Vintage, 1963 [1938]) has been a foundational text for those making this argument.


227 One controversial complaint is Arif Dirlik’s, delivered from a Marxist perspective, excoriating post-colonial studies and its intellectual avatars. See his “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” *Critical Inquiry* 20 (1997: pp. 328-56). Some might argue that American sociologists have been busy romanticizing the agency of internal “Others” instead – particularly Black Americans. See the Review Symposium in the *American Journal of Sociology* 107 #6 (May 2002): 1468-1599, in which Loic Wacquant finds fault with the ethnographic work of Mitchell Dunier, Elijah Anderson and Katherine Newman on just these grounds, and is roundly criticized in return.


This move toward grand civilizational narratives is part of a more general intellectual impulse, we believe, and it is thoroughly understandable in this age of academic dispersion and global religious resurgence. We editors sympathize with the urge, but find it simultaneously nostalgic and premature. There are far too many open questions of theory and method in historical sociology – many of them detailed in this document – that cannot be readily folded into a new totalizing narrative. Rather, historical sociologists need to ask, as concretely as possible, whether there are alternative practices conducted under the sign of modernity that have emerged from colonial and post-colonial encounters and if so, what they look like. How are categories and practices that are tagged by the actors themselves as “modern” or “Western” picked up, modified, rejected, recombined, transported, elaborated and so on? Are dimensions of social and cultural life that historical sociologists in the U.S. and elsewhere take for granted as part of a modernist ensemble connected differently – or not at all – in different historical settings? There are many ways to approach these questions without falling back into simplistic polarities between the categories of “the West and the Rest.” One strategy would analyze how notions of and practices associated with, say, property, or “civil society” and “public sphere,” are appropriated and transformed in non-Western contexts – including Eastern Europe, which often gets lost in the binarizing shuffle. A second strategy might involve analyzing non-Western colonialisms – such as Japan’s colonization of Taiwan. Yet another, engaging in historicized ethnographies of global connections

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230For samples of such engagements in other fields see, for example, Samuel Huntington (1996); Andrew Sherratt, “Reviving the Grand Narrative: Archaeology and Long-Term Change,” Journal of European Archaeology 3 (1995); Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens, ed. Conceptualizing Global History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

231Are they “the same but not quite” or are they radically different, and if so, how? At the core of colonial discourse, Homi K. Bhabha (1994) argues, there is a fundamental ambivalence and “classificatory confusion”: “colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite.” (p. 86) [italics in original] On alternative modernities, see for starters Charles Taylor (1999): 153-174 and Nilufer Gole. “Global Expectations, Local Experiences: Non-Western Modernities,” in Wil Arts, ed. Through a Glass, Darkly: The Blurred Images of Cultural Tradition and Modernity over Distance and Time (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill).


emerging in today’s “postmodern world.”

This is a thoroughly interdisciplinary arena of discussion, where sociologists have both plenty to learn and some distinctive theoretical and methodological tools for identifying social and cultural conditions for cosmopolitanism and other vaunted goals. No matter what the authors’ preferred theory, values or political position – no matter what their relationship to “modernity” – it is clear that such analyses are not antiquarian exercises. We live in an historical moment during which many academics and intellectuals assert that the Enlightenment notions of personhood, rights, reason embedded in the “sociological modern” should be expunged as vestiges of imperialism. Others (including Adams, Clemens and Orloff) think that these notions – reclaimed, revised, retranslated – are essential to critical intellectual and political projects everywhere.

Conclusion: Remaking Modernity, Historicizing Sociology

If these challenges represent a theoretical and substantive enrichment of historical sociology, they have also come with costs. As the careful reader will have noticed, the present moment lacks both the topical and theoretical coherence of the second wave. The marxisant framework identified important problems, such as revolution; provided a dominant narrative of change fueled by class conflict; and tied contemporary concerns to past processes. The events of 1968 and imagined future rebellions were understood – both theoretically and viscerally – as belonging to a historical series that began with the English and French Revolutions, and that had roots in the transitions to, and ongoing developments of, capitalism. For the core substantive topics of the second wave – revolution, transitions to democracy, the welfare state – past and present are linked in ongoing processes of social change.

It seems clear to us that historical sociology will die if left solely to modify the second wave’s answers to Marxist questions generated in the heat of the 1960s and 1970s. Although a powerful heuristic, this intellectual framework is too confining and incompatible with the openness of the current moment, our interest in differences along many dimensions. Surely new questions emerge from the current encounters of modernity and Islam, post-colonialism, postsocialism, aboriginality; from the ongoing transformations of capitalist modernity in its core, and from many other moments in world historical time. There is not the same political cohesiveness that we saw during the height of the second wave, but more than enough intellectual reasons to insist that answering these new questions of modernity will require a historicized sociology.


236There are clear parallels to the ongoing arguments about multiculturalism and history in the U.S. academy. Will Kymlicka advocates accommodations to “minority nationalism” in “American Multiculturalism in the International Arena,” Dissent (Fall 1998): 73-79. Claims to cultural “authenticity” are fictive (if nonetheless deeply felt and historically institutionalized) argues David A. Hollinger in Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York, Basic Books, 1995).
Note that we emphasize “historicized” than simply “historical” sociology. We reject the segregation of historical inquiry to a designated set of problems located securely in the past, and reinforce the conviction that inspired the revival of historical sociology in the 1970s: that the past is connected to, and informs our understanding of, the present and future. The close identification of historical sociology with methods of archival research or systematic comparison based largely in secondary sources – perhaps a necessary strategy for initially professionalizing a project with roots in political commitments – now unnecessarily limits the enterprise’s scope, which we would take to be the whole canvas of modern social transformations, including those ongoing in the present. 237 The very label “historical sociology” may have occluded this possibility of linking of past to present, of redescribing the past to inform our understanding of contemporary and future processes. Much of the “transitions” literature – the burgeoning body of research on post-socialist societies – illustrates the failure of historical sociology to make a connection to questions of dramatic societal transformation (see Emigh, this volume). In these debates, the theoretical underpinnings of historical sociology are often rejected, both for their association with the collapsed political regimes and because the phenomena themselves – the creation of markets and civil societies – appear to fall outside the empirical ambit of studies of revolution and class formation, especially when they were informed by a loosely marxist teleology. In the place of this theoretical framework, an implicit imagery of modernization and convergence with the West prevails: how are the institutions of credit or property rights constructed? How are network ties rooted in party membership transformed into resources for entrepreneurial endeavors? And so on. What we need, as Martin Shaw (1998) put it, is an “historical sociology of the present and future.”

How then to proceed? From our discussion of third-wave challenges – institutionalist, rational choice, culturalist, feminist and colonial/post-colonial studies – we can identify four main axes of theoretical descent and dissent from the second wave paradigm. First, there are assertions of agency, or attempts to theorize agency, against the second wave’s structuralist approach, in which subjects’ interests and ideologies were more or less automatically given by their social-structural location (see for example the chapters by Biernacki; Kiser and Baer). 238 Second, we have challenges to the exclusions of second wavers and their modernist forebears from scholars speaking on behalf of diverse subaltern groups and invoking the heretofore repressed dimensions of social life connected to relations between the unmarked, dominant subjects of modernity and these “others” (gender, sexuality, “race,” nation, etc.). Fueled in part by attention to the constitution of domination outside the formal polity, a third tendency has expanded the analysis of power to include capillary processes working through classification systems, therapeutic discourses, and other technologies of order. Finally, there are scholars investigating those

237 Take the phenomenon of formerly “historical sociologists” claiming that they “no longer do historical sociology” as they have taken up work on contemporary topics. The contemporary subject matter is usually linked theoretically with their earlier work, and reflects an extension of the analysis of social change to the present moment -- but simply does not demand use of conventionally historical sources (archival or secondary).

elements of the social that were repressed by the second wave’s focus on the structures of the political economy (see for example the chapters by Gorski and Kestnbaum). Here we find a whole variety of approaches grouped under the rubric of the cultural turn or turns, efforts to “bring back in” religion, emotion, violence, habit, and all the non-rational elements of social life.

These tendencies have resulted in a burst of topical differentiation and theoretical reformulation. The domain of the political has been stretched to include the interplay of politics and religion (e.g. Gorski, this volume) and the cultural constitution of nation and citizenship (e.g. Somers; Spillman and Faeges, this volume). Even within the domain of the economic, recent historical sociology extends the second wave’s central interest in relations of production to include explorations in the creation of markets and relations of consumption (see the chapters by Carruthers and Emigh). In these lines of inquiry, as well as many others, both actors and the relationships among them are understood as profoundly constituted, by culture and historical conjuncture, rather than as reflections of some underlying system of economic relations (see for example the chapters by Biernacki, Brubaker, Magubane, and Lo). Thus power relationships are reconceptualized in terms of classification systems, and formal political institutions are embedded within broader systems of capillary power that harness categories to projects of domination and contestation (Orloff, Sohrabi). With a recognition of the multiplicity of structures, new sites of agency are located where actors transgress and transpose the constraints of local but established interaction orders (see Gould, this volume).

Thus the kaleidoscopic quality of historical sociology – ranging from the Dutch patrimonial state and its Indonesian colonies to the origins of welfare states and interest groups (to cite only our own concerns) – may easily obscure a more coherent set of theoretical engagements with the defining problematics of the second wave. In place of the combination of structural determinism, a singular focus on political economy, and a model of the rational actor, much recent work documents the multiplicity of structures, the underdetermination of outcomes, and the complex constitution of human agency (Clemens, this volume). While this new combination might appear doomed to fragmentation, this is not inevitable. In making a case for “global ethnography,” Michael Burawoy and his collaborators “emphasized the way the external ‘system’ colonized the subject lifeworld and how that lifeworld, in turn, negotiated the terms of domination, created alternatives, or took to collective protest.” Their ambition was to accommodate “empirical findings to wider contexts of determination” (2000: 25). Recent historical sociology complements this move, demonstrating how structures, subjects or institutions are inflected by particular settings and, in the process, potentially transformed. Neither grand general theory nor particular case studies are adequate to the task of understanding social change, its continuities and unprecedented transformations.

For historical sociologists, like global ethnographers, new directions of inquiry may require (but not be defined by) new research strategies. As a practical matter, today’s historical sociologists proceed from both extremes in order to understand the interpenetration of general processes and local settings as played out in world historical time. Some produce rich case studies that explore that explore conjunctures and their consequences. In her study of Taiwanese doctors under Japanese colonialism, for example, Ming-Cheng Lo illuminates “the importance of the ‘agents’ of modernity by attending to how different social groups negotiate between the powerful narrative of the universality of science and the concrete political and social relationships through which science is delivered and developed” (2002: 10). Others harness the analytic power of comparison by tracking the inflection of a large-scale project – German colonialism for Steinmetz (2003), the Marshall Plan for Djelic (1998) – across a series of settings to
exploit the analysis of variation deeply embedded in world historical time. For fundamental theoretical reasons, these comparative strategies reject the criterion of the independence of cases. The repertoire of comparative methods that complemented the political economy of the second wave (world systems theory notably excluded) tended to explore the unfolding of capitalism and modernity in an implicitly empty world or one in which “tradition” would collapse and be erased by the progress of a modernizing social order. In contrast to the imagery of clearly-bounded cases existing in the empty “experimental time” of comparative methods, these studies define their objects as fully embedded in world historical time and explore conjunctures in which institutional legacies other than Western capitalism or democracy resist or transform the allegedly homogenizing tendencies of globalization. Beyond this, historical sociology needs to attend to encounters generated by other dynamic institutional orders such as other world religious traditions as well as to the backlash within capitalism itself, the transformative effects of free trade on the labor markets and economic organization of the core.

Prediction is a dangerous game, particularly for historical sociologists. We are, after all, daughters and sons of Clio as well as of sociology (which, being a creation of modernity, has no muse). But this vision of a more fully historicized sociology builds on the conviction that the study of the past illuminates both present and future. The current conversation among historical sociologists is symptomatic of a moment when world events, the reordering of signs and trajectories of social change have confounded many people’s expectations. Yet as new manifestations of political, cultural, and religious past infuse the current moment, it is impossible to take this defeat of expectations as a signal of some sharp caesura between present and past. Perhaps different parts of the past demand our attention as we strive to understand processes of social change that have operated behind and beside those foregrounded by historical sociology’s second wave. “But the danger of continuity types of argument is that they bring us back to where theoretically we started: normalizing a phenomenon in advance of rethinking it” (p. 826, author’s italics). Perhaps this is also a genuinely unprecedented historical moment. We should consider these possibilities, carefully but urgently. Figure and ground have been disturbed; new figures are there to be found.

Many Americans in particular see their way of life as newly unsettled. For although the majority of the world’s peoples have lived with this condition much longer than we have, this is a moment in which both world and theory have been shaken in the core. Historical sociologists, like other academics and intellectuals, have unconsciously depended on this sense of settlement, of achieved modernity, and are disoriented by its loss. So it is natural when they react with nostalgia for old totalities, a past of imagined theoretical stability, or with a sense of perceived threat – by policing the boundaries of intellectual inquiry to try to forcibly settle things anew, or by simply refusing to debate or consider new ways of thinking. But unsettled times demand open minds. In a speech in Munich, in 1918, at just such another troubling moment, Max Weber said that although “the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion,” science – which he meant in the broadest sense, as Wissenschaft – offers us tools and training for thought; technologies for action, and the possibility of gaining some clarity about where we stand (1919: 150-151, 152). His

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239Peter Baehr’s excellent “Identifying the Unprecedented: Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, and the Critique of Sociology,” American Sociological Review 67 (December 2002: pp. 804-831) deals with the inability of 1930s sociologists to grasp the novelty and importance of National Socialism and the Nazi concentration camps; it also includes a discussion of the unprecedented character of al-Qaeda and 9/11/2001.
vision of historical sociology still seems right to us – refusing ultimate guarantees or fundamental foundations; generous, not cramped; focused on “the demands of the day,” and wide open to the future.\textsuperscript{240}

\textit{Overview of the Volume}

These challenges and responses crosscut the various contributions to this volume. The first section contains a trio of chapters that engage the development of sociology as a discipline. George Steinmetz explores the historical constitution of the mid-century discipline of sociology against which a resurgent historical sociology defined itself. Zine Magubane turns her eyes back toward the classical sociologists, and to the ongoing debate over the shaping presence of particular visions of colonialism and empire in their (and our) work. Richard Biernacki then looks towards future theoretical possibilities in which assumptions of the goal-oriented actor, encoded in Parsonian sociology, are displaced by a developed theory of practice, attuned to the historical and cultural constitution of rationalities and other modes of action.

The Weberian imprint on historical sociology is most evident in the attention paid to state formation. Drawing on rational choice arguments, Edgar Kiser and Justin Baer reconsider processes of bureaucratization. Close attention to the strategic choices confronting elites replaces a functional account of efficiency with analyses of the risks and benefits of domination via different means. But if the bureaucratic state developed as a mechanism for extracting resources, it now also delivers benefits, although with some hefty conditions. Ann Shola Orloff surveys the development of systems of social provision and regulation (including welfare states), a central topic for students of the second wave but now very much under reconstruction. Finally, Philip Gorski argues that historical analyses of both state formation and religious change have been hampered by the failure to address the deep mutual implication of these two processes.

The next trio of chapters shifts perspective, examining politics from the vantage point of political contention, including the mobilization of violence. Meyer Kestnbaum turns to a topic which, with the hindsight of the twentieth century, is strangely absent from classical sociological theory: war. Long acknowledged as an exogenous shock which might catalyze economic or political contradictions, war-making has only recently received sustained analysis in the context of state-making and the changing relations between states and peoples. Nader Sohrabi addresses the flourishing research on revolutions, emphasizing how theorizing has been reshaped by attention to cases beyond Europe and to the intersecting politics of nations embedded in transnational relations and cultural conversations. And in an essay on contentious politics, the late Roger Gould (to whom this volume is dedicated) offers a bracing corrective to historicist tendencies, arguing that robust patterns have been identified across episodes and contexts of political conflict.

Just as historical sociologists have reconsidered the centrality of the tropes of the utilitarian and goal-oriented actor, so too has historical research transformed our understanding of the home turf of that

\textsuperscript{240} Here is the full quote, the last sentences in Weber’s “Science As a Vocation”: “We shall set to work and meet the ‘demands of the day,’ in human relations as well as in our vocation. This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very life.” (Weber 1946: 156)
actor: the economy. Rebecca Jean Emigh surveys responses to what was a central preoccupation of the first wave: the transition to capitalism. Historical research across a growing set of cases, both positive and negative, has redefined the puzzle as one of transitions to capitalisms, plural, just as the transformations signaled by “1989” have raised questions of the generalizability of historical explanation. Bruce Carruthers then traces the path of another great question for classical theory – the development of markets – which after decades of exile in economic history now reemerges as a critical topic for historical sociology. The connections among race, ethnicity, class, and gender, along with colonial domination, anchor Ming-Cheng Lo’s reconsideration of work on the history of the professions. As both a relic of guild society and a vehicle of rationalizing experts, these collectivities provide a powerful lens on the internal ambiguities of modernity.

The historical sociologies of both state-building and political conflict have burst the boundaries of institutional politics to address the formation of collective identities. Wars transform the relations between states and peoples, states are differentially embedded in religious communities and practices. Lynette Spillman and Russell Faeges directly explore these relationships in an essay on another of the surprising absences in classical theory: the nation. Margaret Somers’ essay addresses the curiously chequered history of citizenship in historical sociology, in hopes that new approaches can help us think not just about citizens and subjects, but also about the stateless. Rogers Brubaker joins this general conversation, interrogating a concept both central and utterly taken-for-granted – the group – in the context of the politics of race and ethnicity.

Across a range of topics, the contributors to this volume explore how recent work in historical sociology has confronted the challenges and opportunities discussed throughout this introduction. Although these essays reveal few signs of an emergent theory group, patterns do emerge: key theoretical appropriations, persistent lines of division. In a concluding chapter, Elisabeth Clemens surveys these local maps of current historical sociology, arguing that recent research is at least partially organized around a set of theoretical puzzles – the articulation of practices, the embedding of institutional domains – rather than substantive questions such as which classes were or were not revolutionary.

Whereas many discussions of historical sociology have focused on questions of method, these chapters privilege the substantive and theoretical challenges presented by the making of modernity, by social change writ large. Many of the weightiest processes and events, both past and present, resist standard sociological methods but our discipline is fundamentally poorer if we ignore them for this reason. We hope that Remaking Modernity illuminates the possibilities of historical sociology and the large-scale transformations that made and continue to make our worlds.
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