The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe

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“The totem is above all a symbol, a tangible expression of something else. But of what?...From one point of view, it is the outward and visible form of what I have called the totemic principle or god; and from another, it is also the symbol of a particular society that is called the clan. It is the flag of the clan, the sign by which each clan is distinguished from the others, the visible mark of its distinctiveness, and a mark that is borne by everything that in any way belongs to the clan: men, animals, and things.” [Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 208]

Puzzling over early modern European political development has become a tradition, even a minor sport, in sociological theory. Critical transitions are supposed to have transpired in the early modern moment (which conventionally spans the years between 1500 and 1800), and those transitions to have shaped our conceptual and theoretical orientations. So for modernization theorists the early modern signals the shift between tradition and modernity; Marxists locate the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production in this period, along with the transformation of their attendant political forms. For devotees of the world-systems approach, the early modern era enshrines the end of empire and the big bang birth of the world system and modern states. Feminist theorists see the end of classical patriarchy and the invention of a new political form, fraternal liberalism. And so on. Grand dichotomies do tell us something, but they have a way of immobilizing history, rendering the past as “a picture or tableau vivant of a bygone culture” (Schorske 1998: 3), and becoming quick and dirty substitutes for more flexible concepts that can register diachronic change in relationships or systems.

On the face of it, Max Weber is as guilty as any other social theorist of joining, or rather leading, the parade of grand dichotomies. He authored many influential ideal types that are used to divide European and even world history into neat categories signaling an epochal before and after, including the vexed contrast between “traditional” and modern “rational-legal” types of legitimate domination. But he also helped bridge the yawning conceptual gap his own ideal-typical concepts created. The concept of “patrimonialism,” which Weber applied inter alia to estatist and absolutist politics of early modern Europe, is one concept that I for one could not do
without, and I hope to convince readers of its broader possibilities. Nevertheless I think it needs to be reconstructed if it is to be useful to today’s students of state formation and revolution. This paper, focused on the high patrimonial politics of early modern Europe, brings to bear post-structuralist and anti-foundationalist thinking to reshape the concept into a usable tool of analysis. I will show how there could be simultaneously “no there there” and a sturdy symbolic basis for centuries, if not thousands of years of rule.

In Weber’s Economy and Society, patrimonialism mainly refers to forms of government that are based on rulers’ family-households. The ruler’s authority is personal-familial, and the mechanics of the household are the model for political administration. The concept of patrimonialism captures a distinctive style of regulation and administration that contrasts with Weber’s ideal-typical rational-legal bureaucracy, a better known concept that has made its way into the popular lexicon. Rational-legal bureaucracies are manned by impersonal rulers and substitutable actors; they boast clear-cut spheres of competence, ordered hierarchies of personnel and procedures, and an institutional separation of the “private” and the “official” (1968: 1028-31). “Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action” (Ibid.: 987). Technical specialization and rule-governed hierarchical control are its watchwords (Ibid.: 956-58), and Weber likens it to a “machine,” a “precision instrument,” a “ceaselessly moving mechanism,” an apparatus of cogs and gears (Ibid.: 987-90). Patrimonialism is more like a manor house (ibid.: 1013) with, one would suppose, particularly extensive grounds. Patrimonial rulers cite “age-old rules and powers” – sacred tradition – as the basis of their political authority. Their power is discretionary, and the line between persons and offices notional. (Ibid.: 226; 1028-29) This at least is Weber’s analytical point of departure, and it’s a good first cut at patterns of early modern European governance.

For Weber, furthermore, patriarchy is at the heart of patrimonialism. Their linguistic connection – “patrimony” derives from the Latin patrimonium for paternal estate – is also conceptual and sociological. “Patrimonial domination is thus a special case of patriarchal domination,” Weber writes, “domestic authority decentralized through assignment of land and sometimes of equipment to sons of the house or other dependents” (ibid.: 1011) And further: “We shall speak of a patrimonial state when the prince organizes his political power over
extrapatrimonial areas and political subjects – which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion – just like the exercise of his patriarchal power” (ibid.: 1013). Patriarchal domination comes to the fore in Weber’s account for two connected reasons. It is the purest logical form of traditional authority, the one in which the conceptual skeleton is most starkly revealed. And patriarchy is the historical seed of patrimonialism, which Weber believes is a genetic extension of the patterns of governance in a ruler’s or chief’s family household. We see this historically when dependents are granted fiefs or other politico-economic privileges and immunities and become clients and agents of their ruler and now patron, separating themselves from his family-household to form their own households (ibid: 1031-32). In this defining and reiterated moment, rulers’ agents become potential rulers and patriarchal principals themselves.

While the concept of “patrimonialism” has been widely influential, and its tendencies of development spotted in just about everything from ancient Rome to the Chicago mafia to current Middle Eastern and Asian politics, the patriarchal core of Weber’s definition tends to drop out of these appropriations. Now in part that lapse, if it is a lapse, can be laid at Weber’s door. Patriarchy tended to be naturalized in *Economy and Society*. In one throwaway line, for example, Weber asserts that “[t]he woman is dependent because of the normal superiority of the physical and intellectual energies of the male...” (Ibid.: 1007). This is especially interesting because Weber produced an array of non-naturalized reasons for the relative position of other categories of patriarchal dependents, like grown children and servants (ibid.: 1007). If Weber had wanted to make a sex-based case for the primacy of the biological in patrimonialism, he might have argued that certain features of biological maleness, such as greater capacity to engage in armed single combat – given the sort of weapons prevalent at the time – made men’s claim to rule more credible. Such an argument might only apply to brawny, coordinated and well-schooled men, and it would in any case have limited applicability to the formal structures of rule in early modern Europe. But it might well pan out for other historical eras and sites. Gender has been an Achilles’ heel for all the major classical social theorists, in any case, so it is no surprise that Weber biologizes the relative position of women and men in the context of an explanation that is otherwise social. Today’s scholars of *Economy and Society*, who habitually distinguish gender from biological sex, simply ignore these interpretively awkward passages. As Weber’s
naturalized arguments have fallen by the wayside, however, so has his insight that patriarchy, father-rule, is somehow fundamental to patrimonial politics.\

There are a few stray exceptions to this rule. In his comparison of Weber’s writings on imperial China and western Europe, for example, Gary Hamilton (1984, 1990) persuasively argues that patriarchalism is fundamental to Weber’s concept of patrimonial domination as Weber links it to the organization of the state. In its pure form this meant that “…the patriarch – the person – in the form of family heads and rulers held discretionary power over rites, over legal judgments, and over the administration of households as well as the state” (Hamilton 1984: 402). Hamilton shows that imperial China emphasized roles rather than persons and their personal power (1990: 92-97). Filial piety (xiao) was institutionalized in Chinese politics, he notes, but did not necessarily empower the concrete person of the father, as he takes it to have done in western Europe, in the ur-example, ancient Rome. “With patria potestas, a person obeys his father; with xiao a person acts like a son” (1984: 411). Hamilton builds on this distinction (in the best Weberian manner) to suggest genetic explanations of forms of political order and developmental patterns specific to imperial China. Hamilton draws this stark contrast between China and western Europe, however, and quarrels with Weber’s claim that imperial China can be understood as a patriarchal patrimonial system, only because he accepts Weber’s vision of the taken-for-granted, natural authority of the father in the European historical landscape. In this Hamilton is faithful – I think too faithful – to Weber’s text.

Weber lacked the conceptual equipment that would have enabled him to recognize the constructed basis of all authorizations of political authority: constructed not out of whole cloth, as it were, or of random snippets, but of materials ready to hand. These materials include actors’ early childhood experiences of historically-specific forms of parental, and especially paternal, authority. All this is less a criticism than a comment on the present need to restructure the concepts of patriarchalism and patrimonialism – and by extension all ideal types of domination: traditional; rational-legal; charismatic, and any plausible new ideal types that we might decide to coin. Instead of seeing biological maleness and fatherhood as the politically productive force, as Weber did, we should identify the shifting meanings with which maleness is freighted as the key to understanding how it is deployed in politics. When prevailing assumptions about more or less
valued interpretations of masculinity – particularly paternity – are italicized as part of the patrimonial ideal type, we can get a better sense of how patrimonial systems work, and why they crumble. I am also going to focus on the elite, not that elite mechanisms are the only important part of the story, but they are both the piece of the historical narrative on which I’m currently working and one of Weber’s perennial objects of sociological analysis.

The symbolics of political fatherhood were (and are!) crucial in European monarchies. The court was a major theater of power in medieval and early modern states, and royal families figured prominently, indeed centrally, in the courtly drama. Monarchs and their pet ideologists were themselves quick to point this out. James I of England, who was also James VI of Scotland, was not the first or last monarch to write on this topic, but he was particularly prolific in print and passionate about his paternal ruling role. Sometimes he held up kings as nurturant fathers. “And as the Father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the nourishing, education and vertuous gouernment of his children; euen so is the king bound to care for all his subjects.” At other moments he stressed the strictures of paternal power: “Now a Father may dispose of his Inheritance to his children, at his pleasure: yea, euen disinherite the eldest vpon iust occasions, and preferre the youngest, according to his liking: make them beggers, or rich at his pleasure; restraine, or banish out of his presence, as hee findes them giue cause of offence, or restore them in fauour againe with the penitent sinner: So may the King deale with Subiects.” At times he did both in the space of a single text.6 The analogy between father and king has also been a theme of recent feminist political theory. The overthrow of early modern states and decapitation (or worse!) of monarchs fascinates feminist theorists because of what these events exemplify: the destruction and reconstruction of a patriarchal gender order, and the genesis of a politics of equality and citizenship, including among other things the discourse and practices of feminism itself. As Lynn Hunt (1992: 204) observes about the French Revolution, but might as well have said about the English Revolution, or any other thoroughgoing early modern European political upheaval, “male control of the world never went without saying after the father had been killed.” Not just the small-f father, she means, but the king himself. Why should this have made such a difference? In early modern Europe, the basic argument goes, there was a mimetic or fractal relationship between ruling family and kingdom. The continuity and legitimacy of the royal
family formed the bedrock of power relations and underwrote the stability of rule itself. For a monarch, sustaining these images and relations of rule entailed being seen to subsume and control the royal family-household and, by metaphorical extension, the entire kingdom or empire.\(^7\)

Now I would like to press this line of thought further, beginning from the supposition that the category of “patriarch” itself can be seen as an ongoing cultural and social achievement. The people who first soldered together separate signs like “father” and “ruler” had real political imagination.\(^8\) Later propagandists who sought to defend the value of their conjunction – especially in the face of others’ efforts to tear them apart – were often astute analysts of the categories of everyday practice and good political tacticians. Some, like Willem I, Vader Vaderlands of the Dutch Republic, were agitating on behalf of the oppressed by trying to substitute one father-ruler for another (in Willem’s case, himself as the representative of the Republic against the Spanish overlord).\(^9\) Others were fighting a rearguard battle against national or international challenges to patriarchy. For example, the opening chapter of Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha – “That the first kings were fathers of families” – sets the tone for his ringing defense of patriarchal patrimonialism in an England beleaguered by arguments for “liberty” by “usurpers of the right of such fathers” (1991: 1-68, esp. 1-2).\(^10\) Whatever their politics, and their enthusiasm for patriarchal privilege (which will doubtless displease most of my readers), these early modern elites were capable of real cultural creativity, of signification as action. The less influential folk who made everyday use of these same homely familial signs and images – whether attracted or repelled by the specific connection between paternity and rule – introduced and embroidered variations of their own. They were all inventors of tradition, paradoxically recreating what Weber called “the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them,” but not by referring them either to capital-N nature or to some rock of “established belief,” as Weber supposed (Weber 1968: 215).\(^11\) Here I depart both from Weber, Weberianism and from contemporary materialist theorists who see the “father-ruler” as a simple reflection or production of “male power” or dominance. And note that these tropes of father-rule are with us today, trumpeted by the dynastic rulers of Middle Eastern monarchies, now more defiantly than of old. They are certainly not just a thing of the European or American past.\(^12\)
The meanings that these actors invoked and produced rested on other meanings, signs upon signs. By “signs” I mean, following Saussure (1965), arrays of signifiers that get linked to concepts/meanings (signifieds) in more or less stable formations. Signifiers are primarily sounds and written patterns in Saussurean linguistics, but anything can stand in as a signifier and a vehicle for signification. “The soldier who falls defending his flag certainly does not believe he has sacrificed himself to a piece of cloth,” as Emile Durkheim succinctly put it (Durkheim 1995: 229). The weightiest signifier in medieval and early modern European politics was the king’s mortal body, which came to represent many connected concepts in political theology – the Crown; the collective assemblage of corporate bodies; the body politic – but only after a long and tortuous historical path. It was not until the early sixteenth century that the English maxim “the king as King never dies” and France’s “Le roi est mort! Vive le roi!”made their debut as the defining public aphorisms of royal funerary ceremonies (Kantorowicz 1957: 409-418). This relationship of representation was repeatedly dramatized across Europe, most brilliantly at court.

What linked the monarch’s own body and the series of bodies it represented, culminating in the whole body politic, was the signifier of the patrilineage, which encoded, in the repeated father/son relationship, heredity, masculinity, and the transcendant promise of immortality. These representations extended far beyond the nodal point of the “collective ruler” – the monarch, royal family and its agents, and lesser but still privileged rulers – reaching up to a vision of God-the-Father and down to the lowly subjects who would be ordered and mobilized as heads of family-households with authority over their dependents. What interests me here about this representation of the great (patriarchal) chain of being are the patriarchal rulers and their agents or staffs – the specific network node that is Weber’s favorite point of analytical leverage on systems of legitimate domination. Highlighting the “patriarchy” in patrimonialism means flagging the representation of two kinds of relations that traverse this nodal point: (1) that between fathers and sons as dominant and subordinate masculinities ordered around images of fatherhood and filiality, and (2) that of the political relation among father-rulers, conducted on the basis of their socially-recognized paternal status. This is the symbolic code of interest. These representations could be folded into the single, concentrated sign of the king’s body, and
like an accordion, unfolded and extended.

Signs are not a part of Weber’s sociology of patrimonial domination, or a broader sociology of domination and freedom, but they should be. Kings, princes and lesser rulers in patrimonial politics invoked the vision of patrilineage – a line extending back into the past and forward to the future, and composed of their ancestors and future, desired, descendants – to appeal for allegiance. Ruling elites purchased property and made investments under the sign of fatherhood, stood in judgment on their communities, proclaimed war, schooled their children, and so on. They called upon their children to act on behalf of the family line, with a modicum of success. Signs of political fatherhood and the vertical genealogies of office that they helped organize created a basis for both the intergenerational continuity in rule and stable relationship between princes and lesser rulers in both absolutist monarchies and estatist republican regimes. The sign of patrilineage knotted horizontal ties as well, not just among monarchs, but among ruling elites of lesser stature. These men directed appeals at others who were seen as equivalents, opposite numbers in the formation of a ruling group – a set of elites who could come to recognize themselves as having shared identities, characteristics and goals. The formation and cohesion of any ruling group depends on members’ self-recognitions.¹⁷ The lateral recognitions of family head to family head – both within what we have come to think of as local and national contexts and apparatuses and over great geographic distances, via international princely marriages – made possible the pervasive elite pacts that undergirded early modern state-formation, of which more anon. What is more, the vertical and horizontal dimensions were interdependent. An individual man could not gain entry to a ruling group without having made an effective claim to honorable lineal descent. Would the members of that group let their daughters marry his sons – or their sons marry his daughters? Conversely, however fictive his family lineage, it would be workable if backed up by others’ willingness to incorporate him into the circuits of exchange.

Did this pervasive masculinism reduce women to ciphers? I don’t think so, although this is a complicated issue, worth lingering on for a bit.¹⁸ It is true that women functioned as objects of exchange and signs of relationships among men – particularly among the elite. This was not their sole role, but it was a constitutive one, without which the interlocked systems of marriage and inheritance would have tottered and collapsed. Of course women also pursued independent
projects, just as men did, and they were eminently capable of “the mystification of manipulation as disinterested empathy,” which Stephen Greenblatt (1980) calls the characteristic Renaissance mode of courtly action, elaborated in and definitive of courtly life. For every real life Iago there was a would-be Marquise de Merteuil. Women were also authorized to perform crucial roles that were defined as both feminine and central in the courtly or manorial theater of power. They gave birth to heirs, and their scripted parts extended to vital supporting performances that dramatized and conferred familial political power. But elite women clearly commanded the largest sphere of action when they operated from the symbolic place of the patriarch. When there was a hiccup in the male line, women were called in as the agents or representatives of men, to act on the behalf of the lineage, the ruling group, and their mimetic extensions, including the nation. In these moments -- extraordinary and rule-bound -- women assumed the mantle of the patriarchs themselves.

Women rulers in patriarchal patrimonialism were anomalies, and as such likely to be coded as polluting or actively threatening, as sources of unwelcome ambiguity and instability in the categories of rule. (Douglas 1966: 40-41; 122) Most struggled or foundered in the ensuing contradictions, but a few, a very few, surmounted them with discursive elan. Here is Queen Elizabeth I at Tilbury, famously rallying her troops against the invasion of the Spanish Armada:

“I know I have the body but of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of England, too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which rather than any dishonour shall grow by me, I myself will take up arms, I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarde of every one of your virtues in the field.” (Elizabeth I, 1993 [1588]: 999)

Again and again in speeches, letters and diplomatic encounters on the national and international political stage, Elizabeth proved able to use to her rhetorical and political advantage not simply her symbolic position as a patrilineal patriarch, a king or prince, as she often called herself, but also the signs of femininity, which were systematically subordinated and even derided as the opposite and underside of father-rule. Not the least part of her discursive success – in a patriarchal patrilineal society in which women were defined as the portals through which external pollution might enter – was her insistence on the twin signifiers of Virgin Queen. So there was a
price to pay, or at least sustained cultural work to be done: the relentless, delicately balanced public performance of inviolate celibacy, of marriage to a kingdom not a king, especially a foreign one. But perhaps she enjoyed the challenge.

For ruling women, there was always a gap between presentation of self-as-signifier and the totemic body of the absent king, prince or other ruler for whom they were substituting, a gap widened by worries about the continuity of the patrilineage, and thus the state, itself. But I want to stress that male as well as female rulers felt the bite of this disjunction between totem and flesh; the gap was always there, albeit to varying degrees. There was some ironic amusement to be had from it when kings or other rulers were posthumous babies, and the contrast between magnificent throne and diminutive occupant a wellspring of humor as well as collective anxiety – but rather more symbolic panic when the men whom the bloodline had produced were physically damaged, weak-willed or crazy. Part of the ruler’s role was molding the simulacrum of self into a charismatic signifier, and some family incumbents were simply not up to the job of incarnating the sacred center. Furthermore, the role of agent-in-chief of the ruling patrilineages (and God-the-Father) got harder throughout the early modern era, I think, as people grew to expect rulers to be responsible for political tasks and to perceive that they had the requisite power to execute them. Perhaps this general tendency is a clue to early modern rulers’ increasing public distance from the ruled, and the greater formality and aristocratic “Frenchification” of the 18th century European elites, of which so many contemporaries bitterly or mockingly complained. As they confronted these difficulties, in any case, ruling families and broader elite groups actively, even consciously, represented themselves to rivals, agents, allies and subjects, doing culture-work to suture the gap between totem and imperfect mortal representatives. There are interesting variations to be explored: the Habsburgs, for example, may have been particularly adept at manipulating what I would call familial signifiers during their long term project of dynastic rule (Wheatcroft 1997). How the familial actors in question would have drawn boundaries around their particular political kin group and regulated the right to signify on its behalf – whether women would have been allowed to stand in as patriarchs in times of need – these things also varied, and with Weber’s revised ideal type in hand, we are better equipped for future explorations into how and why they did.
While men made many claims on others, and on themselves, in their guise as father-rulers in early modern Europe, only a fraction of these claims won practical support, with flows of men, money and materiel. These flows or media included streams of daily and generational labor that reproduced the bodies and souls slotted into various patrimonial apparatuses; cash; marriageable women; political and spiritual allegiance, and the mobilization of military force to back up one’s own and allies’ family lineage claims to territory and monopoly positions in trading networks, the state or other institutions. Many flows were transitory, a flash in the pan, but in some situations, recognized participants made binding agreements as family heads to circulate chunks of resource-bearing political privilege and to duly police both the flow of recognitions and resources. Let me give two brief examples. In the England of the early seventeenth century, culminating under James I and his successor Charles I, virtually every office could be bought, whether from the crown, crown favorites who sold crown patronage, or officeholders who were entitled to dispose of offices under their jurisdiction. This extravagant hand-out of politico-economic privilege went to familially-linked magnate and gentry groupings in the landed elite (Aylmer 1961: 279) and, as Robert Brenner (1993: 61-73, 89-90) has shown, to the representatives of merchant dynasties encamped in chartered companies, the City of London’s key political positions, and finally the customs farm, the most important branch of what was (nominally) the crown’s revenue administration, and the largest single source of state revenue. Likewise, the “Family-State Compact” is Sarah Hanley’s term for a systematic pattern of regulation that emerged in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France, “designed to bring family formation under parental (that is patriarchal) control in the first instance and under the magisterial control of the Parlement of Paris in the second” (Hanley 1989: 8). For Hanley, the axis of the deal lay between the king and his household on the one hand – who got perquisites from selling offices and privileges – and the legists on the other, who were able advance their dynastic holdings in state property (ibid.: 7). There were thus two key levels to the Compact – a set of contractual arrangements between king and individual elite family heads – and arrangements that collectively aggregated and bound those family heads one to another. This basic genre of contract has been discussed by historians and social scientists, with acumen and learning, but our differentiated modernist theories of social stratification – in fact the
modernist map of social life and the related divisions of labor within and among academic
disciplines – continue to make its specificity hard to grasp. These pacts were not simply family
affairs, as some would have it. They were not class coalitions or the fruits of a nascent utilitarian
orientation toward property. They were not temporal or spiritual power made manifest. They
were all of these things and more, and thus Weber’s patriarchal patrimonialism is an appropriate
multifocal lens through which to view them. These particular arrangements projected an entire
group’s patriarchal property in power into the future, simultaneously broadening and deepening
that group as a collective principal capable of political action. The pacts transcended faction and
strengthened elite networks and institutions in a whole series of medieval and early modern
European settings.27 They set the seal on an enviable degree of political stability – an important
foundation for state building – but also opened up systematic vulnerabilities and developmental
possibilities.

As the elite – or rather elite men and masculinity – was collectively disciplined, state-
builders (who included those very men) could put the institutions that they were constructing on
an even keel for decades or more.28 The elite could now plan for a fantasized future, anticipating
possible familial rhythms of reproduction that might shift the order of rotation of sons and sons’
sons into positions of politico-economic privilege. Demographic pressures could threaten
patrimonial political stability in a number of ways, as Jack Goldstone (1991: e.g. 109-125; 228-
249; 375-384) shows in his analysis of elite demography in the early modern world. Goldstone
convincingly argues that the growth of elites in certain periods, and the associated impact of
turnover and displacement on elite positions, made for a relative scarcity of offices in certain
countries, fueling rivalries and competition among elite patronage networks.29 This was certainly
so even in some areas like the Netherlands that do not figure in Goldstone’s already lengthy
roster of cases. But I also think it is crucial to point out that leading representatives of these elites
directly confronted problems of the supply and demand of patrimonial privilege, argued amongst
themselves about what to do about them, and invented explicit intergenerational solutions that
worked more (or less) well in different institutional settings. The elite family heads may not
always have been collectively successful, but nor were they blind victims of demographic forces.
And they knew that demographic disasters (and subtler reproductive unevennesses) were just one
contingency that could undermine the emergent institutional nexus of elite families, corporations and states. Some elite pacts included innovative procedures by which other, genuinely unforeseen contingencies could be met – paralleling Kreps’ (1990) arguments about the role of corporate culture in contemporary capitalism – whereby men tried to contain future shocks, the paradox of the unexpected that could always be expected to erupt into the life of the patriarchal patrimonial system.\(^{30}\)

An honest Weberian (or a cynic) might point out that rather than doing themselves untold injuries – for men killed each other less frequently where such agreements were in force – they could now take their collective capacities for violence and begin to project them outward, onto other groups, subject populations and civilizations. That monopoly of force is after all a \textit{sine qua non} of Weber’s definition of a modern state (Weber 1968: 56). Here, too, in the projection of power, lay a familial seam along which the family heads composing Weber’s collective ruler would stick together or come apart in early modern Europe. Power tends to diffuses downward in patrimonial arrangements, as rulers hand out bits of monopolistic resource-bearing political privilege, including sovereign rights to make war on foreign powers. Weber gives us some sense of this in \textit{Economy and Society}, when he comments on the agency problems – the difficulties principals had in controlling their agents or representatives – that he took to be typical of patrimonial states.\(^{31}\) Add to this a host of agency problems peculiar to early modern state-building and empire, including huge distances/long time-lags in communication; intractable problems of oversight, and an unavoidable need to recruit large numbers of indigenous elites as agents and to accommodate at least some of their demands and desires. This was a major way that state formation gained ground in Europe itself, by aggregating such previously autonomous entities, whether peacefully or by force (Tilly 1985). No wonder that rulers throughout early modern Europe hoped that the trust, special allegiance and, frankly, obedience that they took to characterize family ties could be used to counteract endemic political segmentation. The ruling patriarchs devoted much time, energy and argument to figuring out how to dissolve competing family solidarities and nourish what they saw as appropriate family sentiments among their patrimonial agents at home and abroad.\(^{32}\)

Family ideals and relationships do not always have this palliative effect on far-flung
relationships. Weber referred this effect to the mysterious workings of “tradition,” as we have seen; he also thought that one’s particular father or master merited one’s obedience because of the “mere habituation” (Weber 1968: 1011) of a concrete role relationship. This concrete particularism also derived its force, I have argued, from a general system of signification, in which it made sense for a father-ruler to command obedience, “…as if the ruled had made the content of the command, the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake” (Weber, ibid.: 946). True, the symbolic patriarch might lose this capacity when he had no more resources to give: poverty and powerlessness could make the implicit claims of elite patriarchy seem like so much hot air. Or his agents and subjects might come to resonate to new and competing family ties, a possibility that leaps out in the multiple histories of autonomous family state-building and creole nationalism in the European metropole and colonies. Some men might even abandon family altogether, vibrating to other strings of sentiment. All these things did happen in patrimonial political systems, and in the linked European and colonial revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century – which await their neo-Weberian comparative historical sociology – they can be said to have exploded full force. Meanwhile, the rulers in the metropolitan centers played on the signs and practices of patriarchy as one way of managing their perennial principal/agent woes.

In general, I would expect fathers’ family roles and the meaning of fatherhood itself to have been fortified as intergenerationally extended groups of ruling patriarchs became embedded in the familial states of seventeenth- and especially eighteenth-century Europe. Father-rulers increased what they had to distribute to dependents by appropriating political privileges through the pacts, and their threats of withdrawing favor or even of disinheriting became more meaningful. The very image of the father was enlarged. For some social scientists, this would be a perfect example of a self-reinforcing mechanism, or an early modern version of “lock-in.” (Arthur 1988; Pierson 2000). For the patrimonial patriarchs themselves, this was a reasonably comfortable position to be in as long as the monopoly niches that they had collectively captured and defended continued to relay the resources and recognition they craved. But note that elite men would also experience some paradoxical effects of their collective empowerment. As the stakes go up, first of all, the incentives rise for any such group to strengthen its contractual system, in order to make it harder for any one wayward patriarch to disrupt the intergenerational
bargain and by extension the state. The position of the individual paternal family head is thus increasingly disciplined and personally disempowered by these brilliant collective inventions. For example, the Contracts of Correspondence in the eighteenth-century Netherlands – which could, without too much of a stretch, be termed a cartel of fifty-some cities – formalized the distribution of city offices in written succession rules, laying out systems by which all eligible elite families would take turns getting mayoralties, East Indies Company directorships, and other top corporate privileges. The contracts regulated the membership in and control over corporate bodies, which were the conditions for capital accumulation, political power, and family honor. The settlements, which were ratified by the Stadholder and States-General, protected specific families' stake in an office and guaranteed that regent families' collective office genealogies would continue unbroken. They also tightened the political vise on each family head accordingly, so that he could do nothing without the permission of his fellows. The apotheosis of regulation of the inheritance of landed (and sometimes mercantile) property entailed to the male line was the procedure of strict settlement, invented in seventeenth-century England and widely diffused in the eighteenth century. Like the French Family-State Compact or the Dutch Contracts of Correspondence, strict settlements were half of a two-tier pact, collectively designed and administered, whose ultimate court of appeal was the monarch and the elite patriarchs themselves assembled in Parliament. They were the rock on which patriarchal property in power in eighteenth-century England was centralized and consolidated. But they also disadvantaged daughters, shucked off second and third sons, and decisively converted the elite father and family head into a subsidiary agent and administrator of his lineage and a mere tenant-for-life of his own estates and their political accoutrements.

Furthermore, the heightened centrality of tropes of ruling fatherhood also marked out areas of exceptional political vulnerability. Carole Pateman (1988) has argued that chaotic monarchical gender orders destabilized rule in the lead-up to the great revolutions of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe, which eventually unseated various father-kings in favor of fractious fraternal male citizenries. I also suspect that the increased patriarchalism of discourses of rule upped the general expectations of rulers’ charisma and performance and was therefore implicated in the perceived “decline” of the French Bourbons, the British Hanoverians, the Dutch
House of Orange and other ruling Houses of eighteenth century Europe. (This is a hunch, and a

topic for future research.) Elsewhere (Adams 1999) I’ve commented on the peculiar institutional

rigidity that the elite pacts could create. Here I am emphasizing the neglected dimension of

signification, which made for its own vulnerabilities. When a ruling sovereign was female or

when a female regency was created to fill a hiatus in the male lineage; when ruling dynasties

were founded by “new men” (dynastically speaking, fatherless sons); when a king failed to

enforce the gender hierarchies in his own family-household, or was merely thought to have

transgressed them in some way: these were situations in which we would expect the foundations

of political order to have been shaken. The biggest earthquakes took place when people did away

with the king or equivalent symbolic patriarch before there was a viable counter-discourse of
democracy – England during the English Revolution; the Netherlands in the Stadholderless

Periods – and tried to do without the father-ruler at the apex of the patrimonial state. This was a

recipe for anarchy and eventual Restoration.

It may be, however, that the practices of collective contestation and corporate deliberation

among elite men helped them redefine their relations as lateral ties among equals. Historians and

social scientists have stressed other sources of democratic discourses and practices in eighteenth-

century Europe, including novels and philosophy; participation in coffeehouses, salons and other

nascent public spheres; revulsion against European colonialism; religious doctrine; the dramatic

demonstration effect of the French Revolution, and so on. As the simpler, sometimes even

singular, causal models of second-wave marxisant historical sociology have receded, we have

been left with multiple genealogies, mechanisms, or other candidate explanations for the

emergence of democracy – this is yet one more, as yet rather speculative possibility. Weber

himself distinguished direct democracy, sometimes practiced by notables and other small so-
called “rational” groups (1968: 289-292), from modern large-scale democracy, which could not

subsist without the spread of market economy and status leveling; bureaucratization, and for the

full-fledged version, effective political parties and techniques of mass mobilization and

communication. The patriarchal group, he thought, was alien to both forms, since “governing

powers are normally appropriated and action is strictly bound to tradition” (ibid.: 290).

Nevertheless, suppressed alternatives always haunt political regimes, and in this case, these
alternative visions could be expected to cluster around and take their tone from the patriarchal nucleus in patrimonial politics. There was a language of political opposition from below, but it was still predominantly familial in the Old Regimes, as many writers have pointed out. Those unhappy with the monarch first called upon him to be a better, more benevolent father, and then, more radically, urged their fellow brothers-in-arms to depose him. “Liberty, equality, fraternity” were the historic watchwords, and not just in revolutionary France. These potent signifiers also took shape within the discourses of the dynastic elite itself, when some courageous men and women of the ruling classes identified themselves with the cause of the oppressed and made themselves its agents. My working hypothesis is that one key to this revolutionary transformation – ultimately to the emergence of the idea of equality and shared fate – lay in the elite pacts and related interactions that took place under the sign of hierarchical paternity. Once this had happened, it opened the discursive door to the possibility of anyone’s being considered an equal and a fellow human being – even women, people of other religions, or those who were currently held as slaves.

Not all elites were infused with a rage for democracy or revolution. There were important counter-tendencies built into patrimonial systems, including discursive reaffirmations of father-rule and political hierarchy. The elite pacts of eighteenth-century Augustan England, including the patriarchal strict settlements, were evidently compatible with a long period of hegemony and civil peace. But overall, and across Europe and beyond, some bases of elite dissent were likely nourished from within hierarchical states organized around ruler-subject relations. What makes this even more probable is that the men who formed part of Weber’s collective ruler were often the same men who were contending with some of the other experiences of symbolic leveling and desacralization that Weber discusses in *Economy and Society*, although Weber’s own typological method makes this almost impossible to see. Some of these men were hammering out new kinds of commercial contract progressively shorn of the family nimbus; within a patriarchal state, others were actually inventing rational-legal bureaucratic practices where patriarchy had no place. The characteristic pressure points of patriarchal patrimonialism were intimately experienced by the actors who were the obvious victims of such systems, to be sure, but also those who were the greatest beneficiaries. We may thus look for homegrown roots of discourses
of fraternal opposition to patrimonial rule, diffused internationally with particular vigor after the French Revolution, in the heart of relations of patriarchal subjection in both the republican/estatist as well as monarchical contexts. Precisely where we would expect it to be most secure, paternal rule and gendered order were always already unstable – resting on historically elaborated principles and relations that could under certain conditions call them into radical question. Tracing the confluence of these conditions, discursive and practical, European or not – and how men and women reacted to them – is a fascinating and worthwhile project.

In his magisterial and moving “Science as a Vocation,” Weber was more than ready to concede that scholars emphasize elements to which our value-orientations direct us. The present essay stands as an example of this interested strategy. It would be reasonable to say that I have a feminist optic, or axe to grind, am intrigued by the explanatory possibilities that present themselves when we highlight the patriarchy in patrimonialism, and hope to broaden academic definitions of the complex of problems surrounding state-formation, reproduction and revolution. All this would be true, and I take tinkering with established ideal types or introducing new ones as one vehicle for enlarging our interpretive and explanatory horizons. But I would not want to say that my version of an ideal type captures any sort of referential “essence” or turns a deliberate spotlight on something called “empirical reality.” Here I strongly disagree with Weber’s own accounts of what he was about, and with many a Weberian exegete. An ideal type can help us represent what we take to be actors’ interpretations, but this is a very different thing than revealing the real, and a much more modest claim than Weber was wont to make for his method. All categories are representations, and ideal types are also analytical translations of what we take to be categories of practice. They are subject to all the fundamental indeterminacies of translation, to borrow Quine’s phrase (Quine 1960). Does this mean that they are wrong, or that we cannot use them? Not at all. Translation is unavoidable in any case. The ideal type is itself an unstable formation of signs. For those who cannot accept the lack of fundamental foundations, we might say: the arms of the old methodological churches are opened widely and compassionately for them. Others can join me in offering a decidedly irreligious homage to the post-structuralist spirit of Elizabeth I and (whether or not they performed gender in an equivalent site of state power) other early moderns like her. Following their sense of the plasticity of gender
categories of practice, I hope I have made “patriarchal patrimonialism” even more explicitly insecure – and by the same token more scientific and less ideological – by saying nay to Weber’s unreflective effort to ground it in biology at its heart.39

My second caveat about ideal types concerns the stuff of history. The elite pacts I have discussed simultaneously marked, made possible and make sense within the historical flowering of the relationships that Weber named with his ideal type “patriarchal patrimonialism.” Certain ideal types, like this one, can be construed as “the end states of a causal process and take on their meaning from that process.” (Stinchcombe 1978: 62) (At least a genealogical or narrative process, perhaps also a causal one.) When you choose an ideal type, if one wants a very un-early modern metaphor, you are hitting the “pause” button on your analytical remote and then fiddling with the camera angle on the historical DVD. You might have picked a different “end state” or stopping point, another camera angle -- even a different film. At minimum, to the extent that a type concept is identified with an historical process, especially one that tends toward a more-or-less likely “end state,” the process and outcome should be signaled as one that historians and social scientists select theoretically rather than unreflectively or merely conventionally. Ideal types can be put to use in just this way, to capture our interpretation of actors’ orientations, suggest likely ways that those actors might come together in social action; lay out plausible tendencies, counter-tendencies and points of intersection with other historical processes named, perhaps, by other ideal types.40 In this paper, I rebuilt the concept of “patriarchal patrimonialism” for these purposes, among other things indicating why elite family heads, including monarchs, might be expected to envision themselves and act in certain ways, and illuminating the inter-elite pacts that they put together as father-rulers in early modern Europe. Those pacts intersected with an array of theoretically-defined processes and outcomes, some only touched on here, including state-building and breakdown; formations of masculinity and family; European colonialism; the making of ruling classes and elites; social revolution, etc. This list could – and will – be expanded indefinitely. Scholars influenced by Weber continue to broaden the marxisant assumptions about what is historically important that dominated the second-wave historical sociology of the 1970s and 1980s. The future continually recasts our sense of what matters about the past; it recasts the past itself.41 And any such list is always open to possibilities and
formulations that have yet to be imagined.

The newly-minted ideal type is now good for further historical comparisons and research questions. We might ask: when was “father” first defined in relation to other signs (like “mother” or “uncle”) in a particular political setting, celebrated and tied to signs of power and rule? How did these signs take shape in practices that dramatized the political authority of the male progenitor and head of household? Were these interrelated signs and practices politically productive, did they get the job done (secure relations of rule) and/or evoke counter-positions and alternative identities? With respect to signification, we are comparing formations of meaning; the processes by which people assemble and reassemble them; how these formations govern action; how they disperse. These questions obviously reach far beyond early modern Europe (e.g. Feeley-Harnick 1997), extending over the globe and up to the present moment.

Other Weberian ideal types – all, to my mind, useful materials for sociological bricolage – could benefit from an analogous feminist, post-structuralist overhaul. The definition of “charismatic authority” includes unexamined assumptions about “certain qualities” of individual personality (Weber 1968: 241). These mysterious qualities are cultural, theatrically performative, emphatically gendered, and demand systematic attention in light of what we now know about signification and audience reception. “Rational-legal authority” is an even bigger can of worms. For Weber, as Alan Sica puts it, “to theorize about social action was to bring it within rational reflection, and through ideal-typification to identify anomalies either as explainable minor deviations from the pure type or as irrationalities and therefore irrelevant” (Sica 1988: 229). Weber often used the “irrational” as “his own explanation in foreswearing examination of certain phenomena, as if to say that the irrational was *ipso facto* impenetrable.” (ibid.: 228) Weber went on to link the irrational with the signifier of the feminine – and a whole series of signifiers he took to be associated with the trope of femininity, such as the pre-modern, the family, the non-Western, the primitive, the sexual – and was therefore flummoxed when what was for him the “irrational” kept surfacing in the core of his neatly-opposed categories of rationality, as it was wont to do. Weber was in that sense a man of his time; it is even probable that his particular genius rested on these ordered Apollonian/Dionysian oppositions. But perhaps we who follow after might take disturbing and rearranging them for new uses as part of our calling. In order to
understand the things that Weber cared about, including politics and states, and to ask whether, for example, there can be patrimonialism without patriarchy, or a more or less rationalized modernity without a repressed and refused feminine underside, we have first to reexamine – and reject or reconstruct – Weber’s and our own naturalized categories. Only then we will have a Weber, and an historical social science, for the twenty-first century.
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1. “Thus there is a double sphere,” as Weber says, “a) that of action which is bound to specific traditions; b) that of action which is free of specific rules” (1968: 227). There is clearly an endemic conceptual and historical tension encoded in the concept of patrimonialism, right at the point where the notion of personal discretion meets traditional legitimation. Sometimes Weber seems to imagine a utilitarian ruler who is instrumental with respect to tradition as well as his subjects. To wit: “The exercise of power is oriented toward the consideration of how far master and staff can go in view of the subjects’ traditional compliance without arousing their resistance” (ibid.: 227) Few if any patrimonial rulers were so Machiavellian, even where Machiavellianism was traditionally legitimated.

2. Weber uses the concept of patriarchy in different ways in different parts of his work (is there any concept of Weber’s of which this could not be said?). In the first volume of *Economy and Society* – the relevant parts of which actually represent later work than the second volume – Weber defines “patriarchalism” as “the situation where, within a group (household) which is usually organized on both an economic and a kinship basis, a particular individual governs who is designated by a definite rule of inheritance” (1968: 231). In Volume Two, where Weber treats patriarchal domination as “the formally most consistent authority structure that is sanctified by tradition” (ibid.: 1009), Weber worries more about why this “particular individual” should be male (ibid.: 1007), and tends to cast patriarchy as a core feature of a wider and more motley apparatus of patrimonial domination, of what he calls, sounding like a systems theorist, “differentiated patriarchal power” (e.g. 1009-1010). I tend to privilege the Weber of Volume Two in this paper.

3. Weber himself had dueled while at school, and had the facial scars – and ensuing slap in the face from his horrified mother – to show for it (Mitzman 2002: 23-24). But Weber acquired his scars in an era in which demonstrated prowess in duels, not to mention jousts, etc., had been decoupled from the right to rule. Note that the issue here is not whether the biological differences between men and women have some sort of relationship to, and even causal role in, the historically varying taxonomies of gender, if we understand gender (as I do) to mean cultural definitions of masculinities and femininities. The problem is rather that Weber persistently elides gender and biological sex as concepts, reducing the former to the latter, and this hampers his analysis of patrimonial politics.

4. This may seem strange, as it has become more accepted in the disciplines of history, anthropology, and in Renaissance and early modern European studies that there is a gendered core of forms of power that I would call patrimonial (I discuss some of this literature below). It is still the case, however, that many historians who write on early modern European rule fail to register the patriarchal patrilineal dimension in their theoretical discussions, even as it pervades their empirical analyses.
5. Randall Collins’s (1986: 267-296) discussion of Weber’s political theory of the family includes a nice section on patriarchy, patrimonialism, and the rise and fall of the household, in which he reminds us that while elite European patriarchal households could be quite large, they did not necessarily include extended kin.

6. The two citations are drawn from Su Fang Ng’s excellent dissertation, “Family Ties, Political Fictions: Metaphorical Communities in Seventeenth-Century England,” Chapter One of which deals with James’ writings (2001: 1-37). But James’ subtle self-presentation availed him not, at least in England. According to Jenny Wormald (1983: 204), James – a dual monarch by dynastic fiat -- did better at impersonating the vision of a Scottish “soverane lord” than the more “visually impressive” idea of English “sacred majesty.” James’ immediate predecessor Elizabeth I had the advantage in ceremonial splendor, in spite of her sex (her gender was rather more ambiguous, or perhaps wilfully plural, as we shall see below). Contemporaries thought James too “lavish of his presence...so common-hackney’d in the eyes of men, so stale and cheap to vulgar company” (Shakespeare, Henry IV 1 Scene 2) – though unlike Richard II, he managed to hang onto the crown.


8. The original authors of the father-ruler couplet are lost to us, but traces of their innovation can be found in the world’s classic religious texts and practices or in the archeological footprints of ancient civilizations. See for example Lerner (1986). Once joined, the father-ruler signifiers can be put asunder. They can also be remarried. The linkage or splitting is contingent, although more or less probable in different historical circumstances.

9. For Willem I, known then and to this day as “Father of the Fatherland,” see Van Gelderen (1993).

10. The 1991 Cambridge edition of Filmer’s Patriarcha, which includes a helpful introduction by Johann P. Sommerville, should be read up against Gordon Schochet’s pioneering analysis of Filmer in his Patriarchalism in Political Thought (1975: 115-58) and two acute analyses of the specifically gendered content of Filmer’s thought: Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract (1988: 82-89) and Rachel Weil’s Political Passions: Gender, the Family and Political Argument in England, 1680-1714 (2000). Filmer borrowed from patriarchalist predecessors like Aristotle and Jean Bodin (1992), but his tract is more self-consciously engaged in digesting and countering explicit opposition to patriarchal rule. Patriarcha was probably written before the English Civil War but was only published posthumously, in 1680.
11. This pleasantly counterintuitive phrase derives from the title of Terence Ranger’s 1992 edited collection *The Invention of Tradition*.

12. On the prevalence of familial ideology in the governance of the American colonies and early republic, see for example Melvin Yazawa (1985), Mary Beth Norton (1997) and Mark Brandon (1999). The broader literature on families and states continues to grow apace. For a sense of the ever-wider field and some emergent approaches, see Lynne Haney and Lisa Pollard’s Introduction (“In a Family Way: Theorizing State and Familial Relations”) to their edited volume *Families of a New World: Gender, Politics, and State Development in a Global Context* (2003: 1-14).

13. But how do we know which signs were “weightier” than others in politics? This paper does not undertake a formal discourse analysis, so skims over this and other admittedly important issues. Barthes (1974) is an exhilarating literary example of such an analysis, penned at the moment at which structuralism tipped over into post-structuralism, and the proliferation of possible codes and readings threatened to swamp the *analyse de texte*. John Mohr (1998) reviews various approaches to “measuring meaning” current in the social sciences.

14. Gianfranco Poggi (1978: 68-69) evokes elements of the family-household public theatrics in his delightful description of the seventeenth-century French court: “The king of France was thoroughly, without residue, a “public” personage. His mother gave birth to him in public, and from that moment on his existence, down to its most trivial moments, was acted out before the eyes of attendants who were holders of dignified offices. He ate in public, went to bed in public, woke up and was clothed and groomed in public, urinated and defecated in public. He did not much bathe in public; but then neither did he do so in private. I know of no evidence that he copulated in public; but he came near enough, considering the circumstances under which he was expected to deflower his august bride. When he died (in public), his body was promptly and messily chopped up in public, and its severed parts ceremoniously handed out to the more exalted among the personages who had been attending him throughout his mortal existence.” See also Ernst Kantorowicz (1957), an early, still influential work that pursues these arguments.

15. This is not to say that the sign of the patrilineage is or was seamless. Eilberg-Schwartz (1996) is a good source on some of the cultural contradictions of the patrilineage in ancient Judaism. The patriarchal patrilineal family model of rule, “typologised in Scripture,” as Jeffrey Merrick (1993: 281-284)) reminds us, “did not have just one fixed signification.” Perhaps no signifier has “just one” – better to say that the patrilineage was obsessively marked as a privileged signifier, “with a fundamental immobility and reassuring certitude” (Derrida 1978: 279). When it frayed, whether from outside in or inside out (as a result of its internal contradictions), much anxiety followed. Weber actually contributes to the ideological effect of security and seamlessness, alas, when he installs father-rule as an ultimate given and biologically invariant ground at the core of the concept of patrimonialism.

16. This analytical nodal point is not necessarily one empirical site: it can be a singular space like Versailles, or a whole series of geographically dispersed manorial households, or some
networked combination. These differences in the geographical organization of rule had consequences for state formation in Europe and for patriarchal relations in family-households, in part because of the distinctive possibilities they offered for the dramatization of masculine power. This is relatively unexplored territory in social science history or historical social science.

17. Two recent, suggestive approaches to the general issue of how symbolics construct groups are Bourdieu (1987) and Young (1994); the original text is Durkheim’s Elementary Forms (1975). It must be said, however, that none of these texts deal with how people use signs to construct groups. People figure as trager, as mute structural supports for ideologies.

18. It’s actually worth an article or book in its own right, of course. However eagerly I would like to engage the more general issues of the historical and theoretical relationship between the order of signs of masculinity and femininity on the one hand, and the biological dichotomy of sexual difference that they comment on and play with on the other, there is no space to do so here.

19. Those two characters inhabit Shakespeare’s Othello and Laclos’ Les Liaisons Dangereuses, respectively and destructively. Scholars like Wendy Gibson (1991) who excoriate the elite women of European courts for being too strategic, too much like Laclos’ Marquise de Merteuil in their machinations, miss the historical point.

20. The feminine is a not altogether unpromising signifier for male rulers, on the occasions when they want to convey their nurturant care for the ruled. The latter is an ancient trope – the Biblical reference is to Isaiah 49: 23 – “Kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their Queens thy nursing mothers” – see for example Wildavsky (1984) on Moses as “nursing father” and political leader. Early modern patriarchal rulers occasionally tried to signal their own love – authoritative parental love, admittedly – of their subjects. As a practice of patriarchal signification, however, playing the Venus instead of the Mars card is risky, since it may also be taken to signify political weakness, even symbolic castration.

21. See Mary Douglas (1966: 127) on women, conveyed in marriage, as doors through which pollution might enter a patriarchal patrilineal system. Linda Gregerson (1995) gives us a vivid picture of the vulnerability of Elizabeth I to this popular preoccupation with pollution, a vulnerability accentuated by fears of foreign – especially French and Catholic – influence and invasion. In one sense, then, Elizabeth I is a representative figure: virtually any female ruler in early modern Europe could have served as exemplar of these dynamics. But in another sense, not: Elizabeth’s responses are particularly adroit, in comparison to both other English rulers and to rulers elsewhere: see her 1559 and 1566 Responses to Parliamentary Delegations on Her Marriage and her 1560 Response to Erik of Sweden’s Proposal. These dynamics took on an explosive importance in early modern European sites like England and the Netherlands, which were being transformed by people’s creation of the concepts and discourses of nation and nationalism, entangled, of course, with kingship. See Philip Gorski’s (2000) analysis of nationalism as a phenomenon of the early modern rather than – as is usually assumed! – modernity.

23. The felt need to close the gap between the totem and the mortal man or woman is always there, but people’s responses in one or another historical context differ in content if not in form. In Trotsky’s account of mass perceptions of (and desires swirling around) the figure of Kerensky during the Russian Revolution, for example, “Kerensky as a person has to be stripped of many of his characteristics, to be reduced from a whole man who puts on his pants one leg at a time to a public symbol whose few psychologically present characteristics are then compared with a model of what a socialist leader should look like” (Stinchcombe 1978: 73). Indeed. As the expectations of rulers’ performances grew over time in Europe, so did the sophistication of ideological operations, invoked especially when chancy bloodlines turned up rulers who – metaphorically speaking, and even with help – couldn’t put on their pants at all.

24. Women are unthinkable as public patriarchs in the contemporary Saudi ruling family, for example. The possibility of such a cultural translation is barred, ruled out. Whether a (biological) woman can be a (social) man is obsessively debated in other historical forms of patriarchal patrimonialism – witness the French controversies over Salic Law and female succession to the throne. But in some sites, including early modern England, female substitutes are deemed not only possible but even preferable to more lineally-distant or otherwise problematical males. Why can women’s biological femininity be part of a performance of ruling masculinity or fatherhood in only some sites and conjunctures? If specified with care, this question could be as fruitful for present day world politics as it is for early modern European states.

25. One might call these flows media, assets or resources (see for example Sewell on schemas and resources (1992) and Giddens on rules and resources (1984)). It is true that there are theoretical and empirical stakes involved even here, in the most abstract nomenclature for social practices. But because I am mostly intent in this paper on installing signs at the center of a Weberian ideal type, and thus reconstructing ways to think about a range of early modern European political practices and institutions, these conceptual differences matter less for the sociological task at hand.

26. Only metaphorically do the two form a single “compact,” in my view; rather they were functionally interlocked sets of contracts and practices. I have found Ralph Giesey (1977) especially helpful in disentangling the complexity of elite lineage property (propres) and patrimonial politics in early modern France. On medieval and early modern family strategies and property in land and economic assets in social reproduction, with an eye more to the lower orders than to the elite, see Bourdieu (1976); Goody and Harrison (1973), and Emigh (2001).

27. The literature on medieval and early modern European elite pacts is extensive but curiously vague. Most of these works (including one of my own articles, Adams 1994) could and should have been much more precise about whether the pacts involved were tacit or explicit, and in
describing what difference conscious thematization might have made in the processes and outcomes they examine. This strikes me as crucial for an era in which the rules governing contractual arrangements applicable to state office, family and emergent capitalist enterprise – and the idea of “contract” itself – were under construction. For medieval and early modern European examples of the operation of elite networks, many of which are rooted in elite pacts, see *inter alia* Aalbers and Prak (1987); Adams (1994; 1999); Bearman (1993); Beik (1985); Bonney (1978); Brenner (1993); Dessert (1984); Hanley (1989); Harding (1978); Kettering (1986); Lachmann (1987); McLean (1998); Padgett and Ansell (1993); Parker (1983); Peck (1990); Root (1994); Rosenthal (1998); Searle (1998); Stone and Stone (1984), and the references in footnote 32 above. Burton and Higley (1998) – who give as one of their key examples the England of the 1688-89 Glorious Revolution – discuss the more general processes underlying explicit elite settlements, adopting a modified strategic or soft-utilitarian perspective.

28. By virtue of their devaluation, ironically enough, elite women were free from some of the harsher rites prescribed for privileged men, which Norbert Elias (2000) limns in his picture of the disciplining of medieval and early modern European elite men and masculinity on the path to the state’s monopolization of the means of violence.

29. Under certain associated conditions, Goldstone argues, revolutions ensued (1991: xxiii-xxiv). I am rudely truncating a complex argument and extracting one element, but philosophical differences authorize this particular intellectual liberty. Demography comes close to being cast as a primary motor of history for the Goldstone of *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. For me it is but one mechanism among many. That deep disagreement doesn’t make Goldstone’s rich analysis of the demographic mechanism any the less useful for my and others’ neo-Weberian purposes.

30. If I were writing a fully-rounded history of elite pacts here, I would say much more about how participants created and demolished them; how they kept competitors and counterfeiters at bay; how they kept track of who was complying and enforced their own collective strictures on one another, and how the implicit and explicit features of contracts were related. On the threat of mimicry, see especially Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta (2001) on signification and trust games. Also important to underline would be women’s distinctive roles in forwarding (or at times undermining) the men’s pacts, serving as circulating media themselves and, sometimes, playing the parts of male participants. The same dynamics that I outlined above for Elizabeth I and other female rulers also hold here.


32. By this, those rulers meant a sense of binding obligation tying agents to themselves, the superordinate father-rulers of the respective home state. In his comparative analysis of medieval Maghribi trade, Avner Greif (1993) models the way that the trust and accountability characteristic of family relations could be used to counteract tendencies toward parcellization. He is dealing with economic relations, but much of his argument would also hold for the multiplex
networks of patrimonial elites. These family systems had their limits (of scale among other things), but they did make agency problems more manageable.

33. For the Contracts in, for example, the cities of Leiden, Gouda, Haarlem, and Hoorn, see respectively Prak (1985); de Jong (1985), de Jongste (1984), and Kooijmans (1985).

34. See especially Eileen Spring’s (1993: 123-147) work on the development of the English strict settlements, on entailment, and her critical review of historians’ debates about their meaning for patriarchy. Many people who have never broached a single tome of early modern history will remember Mr. Bennett’s predicament in Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*. No sons, too many daughters, not enough family money, and a pompous idiot of an heir imposed by the entail. It wasn’t Mr. Bennett himself who got to say who inherited his estate – for that had been decided before his birth – much to Mrs. Bennett’s chagrin and our readerly delight. The disaster of the entail, which threatens to set the daughters of the house adrift upon the world, is absolutely necessary to the plot.

35. As a sampling of works that may be taken to nominate specifically familial variables and mechanisms for our consideration as causes of rebellion or revolution, see for example Goldstone (1993) on demographic pressures on early modern states; Hunt (1993) regarding representations of father/son relationships and brotherhood in 18th century French novels and culture; Habermas (1989) on the emergent (male) public sphere and the bourgeoisie. There are naturally many other candidate variables and non-familial dimensions of change, not considered here, and in this deconstructive intellectual moment they are still proliferating.

36. In this vein, *Economy and Society* has some valuable things to say about the development of the limited liability company out of the household (Weber 1968: 707-729) and the rise of bureaucratic forms within a situation of rule by notables (ibid.: 951-952).

37. “Indeterminacy means not that there is no acceptable translation, but that there are many” (Quine 1987: 9). I realize that this settles nothing; it merely opens the possibility of exploring parallels and differences between translation and ideal type.

38. This is Max Weber with a twist. To wit: “To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must say: may he rather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly. The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him.” (Weber 1946: 155).

39. No doubt “the biological” (itself a complex, hazy signifier in the disciplines of history and the social sciences) plays a role, or many roles, which remain to be worked out and incorporated into historical sociological descriptions and explanations. People build their castles of signification from the materials that they find around them, and the dichotomous fact of sexual difference is a basic part of that cultural landscape. What that fact comprises or entails is far from obvious, but that people take it to exist is crystal clear. But the variable structure of gender signification and the games of meaning that people play with their perceptions of what it is to be
male or female cannot simply be referred to, analytically exhausted by, the dichotomy of sexual difference. It’s what people do with it that counts. That those imaginative practices are subject to further biological selection mechanisms should go without saying.

40. I have found Fritz Ringer’s (1997: 110-121) to be a particularly useful summary discussion of ideal types in Weber’s thought. Ringer references Weber’s 1904 essay “Objectivity” to define ideal types as “pure constructs of relationships” that we conceive as “sufficiently motivated,” “objectively probable” and thus causally “adequate” in the light of our “nomological knowledge.” He notes further that ideal types are designed with pragmatic purposes in mind, “They are valuable as cognitive means, to the extent that they lead to knowledge of concrete cultural phenomena in their interconnections, their causes, and their significance.” (ibid.: 111-112)

41. Historical sociologists and sociological historians blithely assume what count as important political outcomes, all the time, but it’s a more difficult proposition than it seems. For here be methodological monsters. Andrew Abbott’s (2004) essay on how “outcome” has been understood in American sociology sheds a good deal of light on this murky issue. Also see Adams, Clemens and Orloff (2003) on the limits of second-wave historical sociological definitions of political outcome and the range of third-wave opinion on the topic.