# Varieties of Popular American Nationalism

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# Abstract

Research on American nationalism has often taken an incomplete view of its subject, focusing on subsets of nationalist attitudes (especially ethnocultural and civic nationalism) or rejecting the notion that Americans are nationalistic altogether in favor of an analysis of patriotism and national pride. This paper innovates in two respects: First, we use a data set (the 1996 General Social Survey) with an unusually broad set of measures of Americans' national self-understanding. These data give us simultaneous access to measures of national attachment, ethnocultural and civic criteria for membership in the national community, domain-specific national pride, and invidious nationalism (comparisons to other nations), thus permitting us to develop a more complete view of Americans's attitudes. Second, we take the view that no single schematic construction of the nation domain is shared by all or even most Americans, nor can the nature of the variants of nationalism be divined *a priori*. Therefore we use Latent Class Analysis, a method not previously used in the study of American nationalism or related issues, to partition the sample into classes characterized by similar patterns of attitudes. We analyze differences in the social origins of members of the four classes that this procedure yields, and also explore how members of these classes differ with respect to a range of other attitudes towards social issues and public policies. We find that the conventional distinctions between ethnocultural and civic nationalism (or between nationalism and patriotism, or between "blind" and "constructive" patriotism) fail to describe adequately (even as an approximation) much more than about half of the U.S. population. A large class of Americans, primarily younger and better education than the average, appears detached from any strong form of patriotic sentiment; whereas a somewhat smaller class, primarily older and less well educated, embraces every form of nationalist sentiment with enthusiasm. Nationalist views are associated with respondents' self-identification as liberals or conservatives to a modest degree, but are largely decoupled from partisan affiliation. Classes vary significantly in their attitudes towards race, immigration, and America's role in the world. Support for ethnocultural criteria of exclusion (including the view that the U.S. is a Christian nation) are associated with racial antagonism, invidious nationalism is associated with isolationist, protectionist, and strong-sovereignty positions on international relations, and both are associated with negative views of immigrants and immigration. There is some evidence that national pride serves as an inoculant against such effects, especially for respondents in the most nationalistic class.

# Varieties of Popular American Nationalism

Social-science research on nationalism has tended to focus either on 20th-century European politics or on state-building in the post-colonial era. Ernest Gellner's classic *Nations and Nationalism* (1983: 109) mentions the U.S. only once and then in a note, as an exception to the rule that industrialization in culturally diverse societies engenders nationalism. A thorough review of U.S. public-opinion polls conducted between 1988 and 2008 revealed that the term "nationalism" never appeared, except in reference to ethnic tensions *outside of* the United States (Bonikowski 2008b). American nationalism – by which we refer to the complex of ideas, senti-ments, and representations by which Americans understand the United States and their relationship to it – has largely been the province of American historians and political psychologists. The former have focused upon those moments at which American statehood was problematic: the first years of the Republic and the period after the Civil War (Kohn 1957; Waldstreicher 1997). With a few exceptions (Citrin, Haas, Muste and Reingold 1994), the latter have examined parts of the phenomenon – patriotism, national identity, national attachment – often in isolation from its other aspects. And, despite the significant contributions of sociologists to the scholarly literature on nationalism (Gellner 1983; Tilly 1994; Brubaker 1996; Calhoun 1997), sociologists have tended to avoid the American case.

Yet by almost any definition, the United States has been no stranger to nationalism. Scholars recognize the impact of nationalist thought in both politics and everyday life (Calhoun 1997; Billig 1995; Lieven 2004; Smith 1997). Historians have chronicled its ebbs and flows (Waldstreicher 1997; Zelinsky 1988). Political nationalism fueled military expansion during the era of Manifest Destiny; and an unusually strong sense of national sovereignty often has led

American political leaders to reject international governance structures, from the League of Nations to the Kyoto Accord.   Americans cherish national symbols – most notably the flag -- to a degree unusual in the advanced democracies (Collins 2004).

What then explains this relative neglect?   Much research on nationalism has focused on subnational separatist movements, which have been largely absent from American politics since the conclusion of the Civil War.  Research has also tended to focus on explicitly ethnocultural nationalism, whereas civic nationalism – a nationalism of shared values rather than shared ethnicity -- has dominated U.S. public discourse.   Nationalism has often been a weapon of the aggrieved, of groups that have lost territorial control of their homelands or of nations defeated in war.  History's winners have less reason for bitterness and more power to frame debates.   As Michael Billig puts it (2004: 55) "'Our' nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien.  A new identity, a different label, is found for it. 'Our' nationalism appears as `patriotism' – a beneficial, necessary, and, often, American force."

We believe that this state of affairs, understandable as it may be, is unfortunate for three reasons.  First, the American case is significant from a comparative perspective, due to the distinctive position of the United States as "the first new nation" (Lipset 1963), its survival as a multiethnic and multiracial polity over several centuries, its position as a global hegemon, and the prominence of civic nationalism in the American "civil religion" (Bellah 1967).  Compared to most European nations, public ethnocultural claims have been relatively muted in postwar discourse, yet Canadian-style multiculturalism receives little support.

Second, understanding how Americans imagine and feel about and talk to one another about their homeland, is a necessary but ordinarily omitted aspect of the political contention of the late 20th and early 21st century about which both sociologists and political scientists have

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written so much (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005). As Hunter (1991) has argued, participants in cultural contention often base their arguments on beliefs about the appropriate scope of the state's relationship to the individual and the boundaries (or lack thereof) between government and such other social institutions as religion; and on assumptions about legitimate membership in the national polity.

Third, it is critical to understand American nationalism for its potentially fateful influence on American politics and foreign policy and, through those influences, on the role that the United States plays in the world (Lieven 2004). Understanding how Americans conceive of their nation may provide hints into the limits political leaders may face when they prosecute foreign wars or seek international cooperation; and insight into public responses to terrorist attacks.

Our purpose in this paper is to provide an overview of American nationalism as it is expressed in the responses of Americans to a series of survey items on attitudes related to nation and national identity. Based on previous work, we assume that more than one version of nationalist thought organizes Americans' views of the nation and their relation to it. We proceed inductively, selecting attitude items on theoretical grounds and using Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to identify four classes -- subsets of Americans surveyed by the General Social Survey in 1996 who vary systematically in their responses. After characterizing the views of those classes' members, we analyze the determinants of class assignment and explore the extent to which the persons assigned to these classes vary not only in their views, but also in the linkages among attitudes towards nationalism and other political views. Finally, we explore whether class assignment is independently associated with attitudes towards immigration, race, social welfare, national boundaries, and foreign policy, net of the impact of sociodemographic measures, partisan affiliation, and self-reported political ideology.

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This paper makes three distinctive contributions. First, whereas most studies of nationalist attitudes and beliefs focus on a limited range of attitudes (often restricting their attention to measures of national identification, patriotism, or national attachment), we explore attitudes on four dimensions of nationalism simultaneously: national identification (feelings of connectedness to the nation); American identity (what makes someone "truly American"); pride in nation; and invidious nationalism (beliefs entailing invidious comparison between the U.S. and other countries). At the same time, we exclude attitudes towards policy issues like immigration and social welfare that, while arguably related to views of nationhood, are not themselves constitutive of those views, reserving these for subsequent analyses as covariates of nationalism measures.

Second, we believe that our study is the first study of American attitudes related to nationalism to use Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to identify groups of respondents with distinctive patterns of response. LCA is designed for cases in which the observed distribution of some set of variables reflects the mixing of two or more heterogeneous groups. Unlike factor analysis, which clusters variables that are associated with one another across an entire sample, LCA finds sets of respondents for whom attitudes are associated in distinctive ways (McCutcheon 1987; Vermunt and Magidson 2000). Because most work on U.S. nationalism asserts that there are distinct modes of national self-understanding with different emphases and patterns of association, LCA is especially well suited to this research problem.

Third, our interpretation is driven by a theoretical framework that views attitude responses as reflections of underlying schemata – linked representations constituting a cognitive framework through which new information is processed – organizing the domain of nationality and citizenship (Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov 2004; DiMaggio 1997). We anticipate that

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persons vary not simply in the particular attitudes they hold, but in their construals of the connections amongst these attitudes, in the affective loadings of the representations these attitudes evoke, and in linkages between nation-schema and other schema, of which ties to the self-schema (the centrality of "American" to personal identity) are especially important. This view leads us to employ LCA as a means of identifying groups; and, having identified them, to look closely at how these groups vary in the linkages between nationalism attitude measures and attitudes towards immigration and other policy variables.

Our results depict a polity whose members share high levels of national identification, as well as high levels of pride and a sense of national superiority. Beyond that, respondents divide into four classes of roughly equal size: Two extreme classes, characterized, respectively, by very high and relatively low levels of endorsement of all types of nationalist claims; and two less extreme classes, one with limiting views of what kinds of people are "truly American" but comparatively modest levels of national pride, and one with very high levels of national pride, but a relatively inclusive definition of American identity. Notably, disagreement about whether a real American must be a Christian is a central axis of division. Indeed, religion is a highly significant predictor of class assignment, as are race and education. And class membership, in turn, significantly predicts attitudes towards immigration and other social issues, even after controlling for a wide range of sociodemographic variables, political party identification, and self-identification on a liberal-to-conservative spectrum. In sum, then, beneath a general consensus on the virtues of the United States, Americans differ markedly both in the extent of their nationalistic feelings and in the character of their national self-understandings.

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### *Nationalism Defined*

Definitions of nationalism are varied, and the relationships between "nationalism," on the one hand, and such concepts as "patriotism" or "national attachment," on the other, are diverse as well.[1] Calhoun (1997) describes nationalism as at once a political project, an ethical imperative, and a discourse. Gellner (1983) emphasized the political element, defining nationalism as "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." Others view it as a cultural, cognitively embedded, construct: Lieven (2004) defines nationalism as "a devotion to an ideal, abstract, unrealized notion of one's country, often coupled with a belief in some wider national mission to humanity." Anderson (1988) famously depicted nationalism as based on socially constructed notions of tradition. Brubaker (2004), whose view we share, depicts it as "national self-understanding," a schema or network of cognitive elements that structures understanding, perception and information processing relative to one's membership in a national society.

Because political psychologists work with operational constructs, they tend to define nationalism more precisely, often in terms closely linked to particular survey items. Some researchers counterpose "nationalism" to "patriotism," treating nationalism, in effect, as patriotism's chauvinistic evil twin. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) define nationalism as "a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance" and patriotism as "a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation." Others have made the same distinction without mentioning "nationalism" at all, instead referring to "blind" and "constructive" forms of patriotism (Schatz, Staub and Levine 1999).

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[1] For an extended discussion of these issues, see Bonikowski (2008a).

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*Figure 1: Conceptions of Nationalism*

|  | Political (focus on elites and on nationalism as an element in political strategy) | Cultural/Cognitive (focus on lived culture, ideas, and/or sentiments of non-elites) |
|---|---|---|
| Narrow: "nationalism" refers to specific ideology | Gellner (1983): "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" | Kosterman and Feshbach (1989): "a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance" |
| Broad: "nationalism" refers to domain but does not specify content | Tilly (2002): top-down nationalism as claims-making by states on citizens on the basis of collective narratives; bottom-up as claims-making on states by subnational groups based on similar stories. | Brubaker (2004): "a heterogen-eous set of 'nation'-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or 'endemic' in modern cultural and political life." |

To simplify somewhat, definitions of nationalism vary across two main dimensions. (See Figure 1.) The first distinguishes theories, mostly from the field of comparative politics and some historical comparative sociology, that depict nationalism as an ideology that political elites (both in the state and in social movements) use strategically to mobilize mass support for elite-organized ventures, from theories that portray nationalism as an element of culture, located in the hearts and minds of citizens and in the environment of popular symbols and practices that citizens encounter in their everyday lives (what Billig [1995] refers to as "banal nationalism"). We regard both definitions as legitimate, but our interest in political culture as a popular phenomenon and our use in this paper of data from national opinion surveys, leads us to gravitate towards the latter. The reference in this paper's title to *popular* American nationalism acknowledges this emphasis.

A second dimension distinguishes definitions of nationalism that identify it with a specific set of beliefs, as compared to definitions that identify nationalism with a *domain* of

attitudes, but do not specify the content of that domain. For example, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) describe nationalism as "a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance," thus excluding from nationalism views of the nation that may entail pride and other forms of positive affect but do not entail an orientation toward dominance (see also Smith and Kim [2006] on the distinctions between patriotism, nationalism and "national pride"). By contrast, Brubaker (2004) defines "nationalism" in a way that identifies a domain -- "a heterogeneous set of 'nation'-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or 'endemic' in modern cultural and political life" – and limiting factors (that the elements be nation-oriented and endemic), but does not prescribe that nationalist idioms or practices must have a specific content. We adopt the broader definition of nationalism as a domain rather than a specific set of ideas or symbols. For most analytic purposes, what is important, we believe, is *the distribution of* forms of national self-understanding. We are less interested in calling one particular set of beliefs, attitudes and sentiments – *e.g.*, love of country, bellicosity towards outsiders, or critical engagement -- "nationalist," than we are in understanding how such views are distributed, how they respond to external events, and how they link to other attitudes and policy preferences. In other words, we understand the proper focus of research on nationalism to be representations of the nation (in popular culture, in everyday talk, and in popular ideas and sentiments), the interaction of these representations, and their consequences for social identity and political action. In examining attitude data, we reserve "nationalism" for reference to views reflective of the respondent's nation- schema and use other, more specific, terms (national attachment, pride, chauvinism) to refer to the content of these attitudes.

## *Varieties of American Nationalism*

In February 1940, Europe was at war, the Depression lingered in the United States, and singer Kate Smith's rendition of "God Bless America" emanated from every radio and jukebox. Put off by the song's bland patriotism, folksinger Woody Guthrie wrote what would become an even more famous anthem, celebrating America but claiming it for the nation's working men and women (Cray 2004). Irving Berlin's song, written during the First World War, asked for God to support America in a time of crisis; Berlin wrote a new introduction for the Kate Smith record-ing, calling on Americans to "swear allegiance to a land that's free" and to "be grateful for a land so fair," Guthrie's original lyrics adopted a Whitmanesque tone to describe America's plenitude, but he did not mention God. Instead Guthrie praised the men in the relief line and struck a defiant pose: "Was a high wall there that tried to stop me; A sign was painted, said: Private Property; But on the back side it didn't say nothing…This land was made for you and me."[2]

More than four decades later, as Americans entered the 1984 presidential campaign season, country singer Lee Greenwood wrote and recorded a song, "God Bless the USA," that sailed high onto the country charts with a paean to freedom, the flag, military might and national pride. That summer, another country singer, Waylon Jennings, released "America," by Atlanta songwriter Sammy Johns. Whereas Greenwood's recording was technically polished, dramatically orchestrated, and sung in unaccented American English, the gravel-voiced Jennings softly drawled the lyric, backed by a repetitive country rhythm of guitar, bass, and drums.

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[2] "God Bless America" lyrics at http://www.geocities.com/god_bless_america_lyrics/; "This Land is Your Land" lyrics at http://www.geocities.com/nashville/3448/thisl1.html. Guthrie's lyrics changed over time, with some versions eliminating the verse about "private property" and others, including the one on his son Arlo's website, changing "private property" to "no tresspassin'." "God Bless the USA" lyrics at http://www.usdreams.com/Greenwood79.html. "America" lyrics at http://www.sweetslyrics.com/99886.WAYLON%20JENNINGS%20-%20AMERICA.html All last visited June 24, 2008.

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Assuming Guthrie's persona of a traveling man witnessing America's natural beauty, Jennings celebrated racial diversity and acknowledged America's debt to the continent's native peoples. Far from invoking military imagery, "America" praises the nation's reconciliation with "the men who would not fight, in a war that didn't seem right..."  Not surprisingly, Greenwood's song became a staple of Republican election rallies, while Jennings's recording could sometimes be heard where Democrats gathered.

These competing songs --- Smith *vs*. Guthrie in 1940, Greenwood *vs*. Jennings in 1984 – represent well the two public faces of American nationalism, one bellicose and God-fearing, one celebrating the land and its people but criticizing government (Lieven 2004).  We often see a similar, though less sharp, divergence in Republican and Democrat campaign rhetoric.  For example, the senior author's analysis of representations of the phrase "strong America" on the websites of Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama and Republican primary candidate Mitt Romney in February 2008 found varying entailments of "strong America" based on explicit linkages and textual proximity.   Both candidates associated national strength to military power and each emphasizes the need to collaborate with the nation's foreign allies.  From there, however, the representations diverged, Romney's emphasizing military firepower and the existential threat of Islamic terrorism, and Obama referring to negotiation with America's enemies, along with domestic themes of good jobs and equal opportunity through education as constitutive of a "strong America."

Scholars agree two or more understandings of nation and citizenship co-exist and compete within American political culture, but neither political theorists nor survey-research analysts agree on the number and nature of these views.  Rogers Smith's important study of American ideology argues that U.S. political culture has been shaped by three traditions: the

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liberal tradition that emphasizes universal rights and individualism; a republican tradition that

focuses on community self-governance and collective rights and obligations; and an

ethnocultural nationalism that reflects the white, Anglo-Saxon population's desire for continued

dominance (1988; 1997). Other authors have discerned two main currents: on the one hand, a

main public narrative that articulates civic values of universalism, commitment to nation,

rationality, tolerance, equality of opportunity and the rule of law; and, on the other, a more

reactionary, xenophobic counter-narrative, often associated with conservative Protestantism and

the tradition of Jacksonian nationalism (Lieven 2004 articulates this position especially

effectively; see also Spencer 1994; Kaufmann 2000; and Blum 2005). Citrin, Haas, Muste and

Reingold (1994) add to the creedal liberal and nativist perspectives a third, multicultural,

definition of American nationhood. Walzer (1990) distinguishes between pluralist liberalism and

Rousseauian republicanism, identifying the latter with stronger obligations for political

commitment and undivided allegiance and a more restrictive sense of who is truly American.

Empirical studies of American nationalism (and of such closely related topics as

patriotism) have often used factor analysis to identify conflicting themes in Americans' national

self-understanding. Based on a survey of college students, Schatz, Staub and Lavine

distinguished between "blind patriotism" ("a rigid and inflexible attachment to country,

characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance and intolerance of

criticism") and "constructive patriotism" (characterized by "questioning and criticism of current

group practices that are driven by a desire for positive change"). Parker (2007a) drew similar

conclusions from data from a sample of adult Californians. Based on an analysis of focus group

transcripts, Schildkraut (2003) confirmed the existence of Rogers Smith's three forms of national

ideology, as well as a fourth, "incorporationism," that depicts the United States as a nation of immigrants continually strengthened by the infusion and assimilation of successive waves.

In the pages that follow we use data from the 1996 General Social Survey to address several questions that flow from this literature. What varieties of American nationalism emerge when responses to a range of survey items are subjected to Latent Class Analysis, and how do these categories compare to those posited by theorists and revealed by researchers using other methods on other data sets? What sociodemographic, political and ideological characteristics are associated with assignment to each of these classes? To what extent do respondents assigned to different classes vary in their social attitudes and public policy beyond what one would expect based on their sociodemographic characteristics and political orientations and affiliations? To what extent do the views of members of these classes reflect different schematic organizations of the nation domain, such that the relation among elements within the domain and between the nation domain and other domains vary among classes?

## *Data*

Data for these analyses come from the 1996 National Identity Supplement to the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a full-probability, personal-interview survey designed to monitor changes in social characteristics and attitudes. It has been conducted annually and, later, bi-annually by the National Opinion Research Center since 1972. Since the mid-1980s, the GSS has included topical modules investigating specific areas in greater depth than the ongoing core survey permits (Davis and Smith [1992]). After reviewing thirty-one publicly available data sets with items related to the measurement of nationalist attitudes and sentiments, we chose the GSS data as the most complete in the number of dimensions of nationalism that it covered and in the range and quality of its covariates (Bonikowski 2008c).

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## Table 1:  Nationalism Measures: Ns and Frequencies*

| How close do you feel to your… | N | 1<br>Not close at all | 2<br>Not very close | 3<br>Close | 4<br>Very close |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Your town or city | 1,325 | 8.1 | 31.3 | 48.1 | 12.5 |
| Your state | 1,311 | 9.6 | 28.3 | 48.5 | 13.6 |
| America | 1,316 | 4.0 | 15.0 | 47.1 | 33.9 |
| North America | 1,250 | 11.5 | 30.0 | 41.2 | 17.3 |

| Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? | N | 1<br>Not important at all | 2<br>Not very important | 3<br>Fairly important | 4<br>Very important |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| To have been born in America | 1,332 | 11.9 | 19.7 | 27.1 | 41.2 |
| To be a Christian | 1,312 | 25.1 | 22.2 | 15.2 | 37.5 |
| To have American citizenship | 1,346 | 2.3 | 5.5 | 17.1 | 75.1 |
| To be able to speak English | 1,343 | 1.9 | 5.3 | 21.6 | 71.2 |
| To feel American | 1,331 | 3.2 | 9.9 | 25.0 | 61.9 |
| To respect America's political institutions and laws | 1,330 | 1.8 | 4.8 | 28.8 | 64.6 |
| To have lived in America for most of one's life | 1,327 | 6.3 | 20.5 | 29.4 | 43.9 |

| How proud are you of America in each of the following? | N | 1<br>Not proud at all | 2<br>Not very proud | 3<br>Somewhat proud | 4<br>Very proud |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Its achievements in the arts and literature | 1,242 | 2.5 | 9.5 | 57.6 | 30.4 |
| The way democracy works | 1,286 | 3.3 | 13.9 | 54.8 | 28.0 |
| America's economic achievements | 1,290 | 3.2 | 16.0 | 51.8 | 29.1 |
| Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society | 1,284 | 11.7 | 30.5 | 40.1 | 17.6 |
| Its history | 1,297 | 4.2 | 8.2 | 38.8 | 48.8 |
| America's armed forces | 1,294 | 2.2 | 6.3 | 42.5 | 49.0 |
| Its political influence in the world | 1,282 | 3.6 | 17.2 | 58.1 | 21.1 |
| Its scientific and technological achievements | 1,282 | 0.9 | 4.2 | 44.0 | 50.9 |
| Its achievements in sports | 1,272 | 3.3 | 8.0 | 51.1 | 37.5 |
| Its social security system | 1,303 | 12.0 | 38.8 | 35.8 | 13.3 |

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| How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? | N | 1 Strongly disagree | 2 Disagree | 3 Neither a nor d | 4 Agree | 5 Strongly agree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries | 1,334 | 1.5 | 5.0 | 12.1 | 42.3 | 39.1 |
| I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world | 1,349 | 0.6 | 2.1 | 6.3 | 19.9 | 71.0 |
| The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans | 1,311 | 4.6 | 22.1 | 33.8 | 25.3 | 14.1 |
| People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong | 1,322 | 11.3 | 38.5 | 18.6 | 21.6 | 10.1 |

*Source*: General Social Survey, 1996.   In most cases, the measures have been recoded to render high values consistent with more nationalistic attitudes.

Our analysis focuses on four dimensions of American nationalism: *national (and other forms of) identification*; *American identity*; *national pride;* and *invidious nationalism*.  We discuss each set of measures in turn.

   *National identification*.  National identification – the importance of national identity amongst the various aspects of personal identity -- is a central part of many conceptions of nationalism.  Historical accounts of American nationalism (Kohn 1957) have emphasized the critical importance of the shift from the primacy of state identifications to identification with the national government in the early days of the Republic; and the nation fought a Civil War to decide the primacy of national *vs.* regional identification (Faust 1988).  According to Citrin, Haas, Muste and Reingold (1994) "nationalism is successful when it takes precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion, economic interest, race or language."  Respondents were asked "How close do you feel to your [town or city; state; America; North America]" with options on a four-point scale ranging from "not close at all" to "very close."  Respondents were about twice as likely (34 percent) to report feeling "very close"

to "America" than to any other category. More than 80 percent reported feeling "close" or "very close" to America, compared to approximately 60 percent for the other kinds of affiliation.

*American identity*. Most accounts of American nationalism regard answers to the question of "Who is an American?" as a critical difference between the liberal (or civic) and ethnocultural traditions (Smith 1988; Walzer 1990; Lieven 2004). The former embraces the liberal creed of tolerance and universalism, whereas the latter draws strong boundaries based on such characteristics as birthplace, language, religion and race. Historically, the U.S. has oscillated between the openness to newcomers inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, on the one hand, and recurrent episodes of nativist exclusion, on the other (Higham 1983 [1955]). Defining "American identity" as "characteristics that subjectively define membership in a particular political community," Citrin, Reingold, Walters and Green (1990) find strong support among a sample of Californians for creedal liberalism, yet substantial support, as well, for the salience of linguistic and religious boundaries.

Respondents were asked "Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?" The list included the following criteria for American identity: "to have been born in America"; "to be a Christian"; "to have American citizenship"; "to be able to speak English"; "to feel American"; "to respect America's political institutions and laws"; and "to have lived in America for most of one's life." The four response options ranged from "not important at all" to "very important." A broad consensus emerged around the importance of American citizenship, ability to speak English, and respecting institutions and laws, with large majorities calling these "very important" and with more than 90 percent believing that these were "fairly important" or "very important" in defining someone as "truly American." A majority also cited "to feel

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American" as very important, with 86 percent calling it "very" or "fairly" important. Fewer

than half of the respondents regarded being born in American or having lived in America for

most of one's life in the U.S. as very important for American identity, but these criteria received

substantial support nonetheless, with more than two of three respondents selecting "fairly" or

"very" important and responses monotonically distributed with a mode of "very important." By

contrast, respondents were polarized in their views of the centrality of Christianity to American

identity: A plurality (38 percent) chose "very important," but the next most popular response,

from 25 percent of respondents, was "not important at all." Overall, 53 percent reported that

religion was a fairly or very important criterion, whereas 47 percent selected "not very

important" or "not important at all."

*National pride*. Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) define national pride as central to

patriotism (which they regard as closely linked to nationalism). Pride is associated with but

different from identification, in the sense that emotional gratification from the achievements of

an entity increase with the subjective proximity of that entity to the self. As Smith and Kim

(2006) put it, "National identity is the cohesive force that both holds nation states together and

shapes their relationships with other states. National pride is the positive affect that the public

feels towards their country, resulting from their national identity."

Respondents were asked "How proud are you of America in each of the following?"

Four response alternatives ranged from "not proud at all" to "very proud." The items about

which they were asked were: "its achievements in the arts and literature"; "the way democracy

works"; "America's economic achievements"; Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in

society"; "its history"; "America's armed forces"; "Its political influence in the world"; "its

scientific and technological achievements"; "its achievements in sports"; and "its social security

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system." Respondents were most proud of the U.S.'s scientific and technological achievements, its armed forces, and its history: approximately half the sample described themselves as "very proud" of each, with more than 85 percent "very" or "somewhat" proud of each. Other sources of pride were achievement in sports and its achievements in art and literature (88 percent somewhat or very proud of each), the way democracy works (83 percent), the nation's economic achievements (81 percent), and its geopolitical influence (79 percent). Respondents rated two items markedly lower: fair and equal treatment of all groups (just 58 percent) and the social security system (just 49 percent). Most respondents who expressed little or no pride in America's treatment of all groups were probably universalists who viewed their country as underperforming on this value, although some might have been racists or nativists who regarded universalism as unimportant or even pernicious. The majority who failed to take pride in the "social security system" probably understood the question to refer not the quality of the nation's safety net as a whole, so much as the condition of a particular government program generally mentioned in the news only when depicted as threatened or infirm.

*Invidious nationalism.* The dictionary definition of "chauvinism" portrays it as form of patriotism that both is extreme in extent and entails not only pride in one's own group but assertions of superiority over others. We avoid the term because of its strong value connotations, but do employ a set of items that reflect national pride, but are both general and expressive in referring to the U.S. rather than to anything specific *about* the U.S. and that are invidious in the sense that they express a preference for the U.S. as compared to other nations (or, in one case, an unconditional view of the citizen's obligations if the U.S. is at odds with other countries). We employ most of the measures that Smith and Kim (2006) refer to as "general pride" (as opposed to domain-specific pride). This construct is also consistent with Citrin, Wong and Duff's

distinction (2001) between "patriotism" ("feelings of closeness to and pride in one's country and its symbols") and chauvinism" ("an extreme and bounded loyalty, the belief in one's country's superiority, whether it's right or wrong"). A number of authors equate invidious nationalism without nationalism as a whole. DeFiguieredo and Elkins (2003) likewise draw a distinction between pride in the nation's achievements, which they call "patriotism," and "belief in the nation's superiority" over other nations, which they call "nationalism." Williams (1970), in a classic text on U.S. society, defined nationalism as "the belief that U.S. values and institutions are the very best in the world."

Four GSS agree/disagree items tap this dimension of nationalist belief and sentiment. In each case the respondent is given five response options ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree," with "neither agree nor disagree" as the midpoint. Two of the statements reflect judgments that, while invidious, are not necessarily chauvinistic: "Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries"; and "I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world". The first of these is true in the sense that the U.S. ranks higher than most countries (though not necessarily most developed countries) on most indicators of social welfare, political stability and civil liberties. The second could be motivated by pure self-interest rather than chauvinism. These views received extensive support, with 91 percent of respondents endorsing the latter and 81 percent agreeing with the former.

Items in the second pair are more classically chauvinistic: "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans"; and "People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong." By contrast to the first pair, agreement with these two statements was far more measured. Just 37 percent reported wishing that people from other countries were more like Americans, with a plurality placing themselves at the midpoint of

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the scale.  Only 32 percent endorsed the view of "my country right or wrong," fewer than the 50

percent of respondents who took exception to this position.

## *Results*

### *Implementation of Latent Class Analysis*

We begin our analysis by using Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to identify classes (subsets of

respondents) with distinctive patterns of responses across all the survey items measuring these

four dimensions of nationalism.   LCA is a nonparametric method that makes no assumptions

about linearity, normality, or homoscedasticity.   LCA, which we implemented using the Latent

Gold program, first identifies latent classes and then assigns respondents to these latent classes,

giving each a probability of being correctly assigned based on the fit between the pattern of

responses and the profile of conditional response probabilities (the probability of a given

response to each item) for the class.   Conditional response probabilities are determined through

Maximum Likelihood Estimation, and Bayesian methods are used to generate posterior

probabilities for the assignment of each respondent to a class.

The LCA was based on analysis of the 25 variables in Table 1.   Variables were treated as

ordinal for the purpose of the analysis.  LCA assumes conditional independence between variab-

les in each class: i.e., it forms classes of respondents for whom the criterion variables are uncor-

related.   This constraint may be relaxed for particular pairs of variables that are likely to be cor-

related throughout the population, as when (as with these data) design or response-set effects

may produce positive correlations for indicators of the same underlying concept.  We relaxed the

assumption of local independence for several pairs of variables with especially high residual val-

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ues, which yielded an improvement of fit.[3]  All pairs unconstrained in this way measured the

same concept and were prone to correlation due to both design and response-set effects.

For the actual analyses, after listwise deletion of missing data, the sample size was 909.

A four-cluster solution was chosen based on the Bayesian Information Coefficient (BIC) and the

*p* value for a likelihood-based chi-squared test calculated using a parametric bootstrap procedure

(the preferred technique for sparse tables [Langeheine, Panneokek and Van de Pol 1996]).

Although goodness-of-fit indicators for the four- and five-class solution were nearly identical,

the additional class contained very few members, rendering the four-class solution preferable on

grounds of parsimony.  Likelihood ratio tests for outcome combinations, based on a multinomial

logit model with modal cluster assignment as the dependent variable and a standard set of

sociodemographic covariates as independent variables, confirmed that each class was

significantly different from all others (Long and Freese 2006).  Bootstrapping was used to

generate $L^2$ probabilities due to small cell sizes.[4]

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[3] The orthogonality constraint was relaxed for the following pairs of items: Proud of politics with proud of democracy and with proud of the economy; proud of the military with proud of sports; proud of art with proud of science and with proud of sport; proud of equal treatment of groups with proud of history; close to north America with close to US and with close to state; close to state with close to town and close to US; proud of equal treatment of groups with proud of history; American speaks English with American is citizen and with American has lived here most of life; American has live here most of life with American is citizen and with American is born in US; American is citizen with American is born in US; American is Christian with American is born in US and with American has lived here most of live;  America is better with others should be more like Americans.

[4] The 4-class solution performed reasonably well in allocating individual unambiguously to classes. Of the four classes, between 80 and 90 percent of members of each class were assigned to that class with a probability of 95 percent or higher.  We also looked at cases in which respondents were placed close to more than one class, defining marginality (i.e., placement in the margin between two classes) as occurring when  $abs(p_{im} - p_{max}) < 0.2$ AND $abs(p_{in} - p_{max}) < 0.2$, where $p_{im}$ is the probability that case *i* is assigned to class *m*,  $p_{in}$ is the probability the case *i* is assigned to class *n*, and $p_{max}$ is the maximum probability of assignment to any class.  By this criterion,  just 6.5 percent of respondents were located in the margins between two classes, and fewer than 1 percent were marginal to three classes.  Of these, 3.4 percent were marginally associated with the two intermediate classes described below (which we refer to as the creedal and restrictive nationalists); 1.5 percent were marginally placed between the creedal nationalists and the reserved nationalists;  1.2 percent between the ultranationalists and the restrictive nationalists; 1 percent each between the restrictive and reserved nationalists and between the creedal and ultranationalists, respectively; and none between the reserved and the ultranationalists.  We regressed a binary variable that took the value of 1 if a case was judged to be marginal to any pair of classes against a set of predictors that included age, gender, race and Hispanic ethnicity, whether the respondent was born in the U.S., years of schooling, family income, party self-identification, ideological self-identification, religious faith and region.  The

| Table 2: Goodness-of-fit Criteria, LCA Solutions | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Classes | | | | |
| Fit Criterion | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| BIC | 46,857 | 45,398 | 45,023 | 44,913 | 44,913 |
| *p (bootstrapped)* | 0.302 | 0.508 | 0.398 | 0.396 | 0.350 |

The bootstrapped p-value for the 2-class solution was considerably higher than that generated by the 4-class solution.  The 2-class model also performed better on some indicators of class assignment of individual cases.  To determine the preferred model, we performed a conditional bootstrap analysis (Vermunt and Magidson 2005).  The analysis iterates each of the nested models 500 times and compares the resulting log-likelihood estimates to determine whether the inclusion of additional classes significantly improvement the model fit.  The results of the analysis for the 2-class and 4-class solutions indicated that the 4-class solution significantly improved the model fit ($p < 0.001$).

### Varieties of American Popular Nationalism

Of the four classes, two were extreme – notable for high and low values, respectively, on all of the nationalist items.  Two others were less easily placed on a continuum of more or less nationalistic, one defining "true American" in a very restricted manner but expressing relatively low levels of pride in America's achievements, and one expressing high levels of pride, but defining membership in a much more relaxed way.

*Ultranationalists*.  Members of one of the extreme classes, which we call the *ultra-nat- ionalists*, were more likely than members of any other class to feel very close to America *and* to

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pseudo-$R^2$ for this analysis was only .043, and only self-identification as a strong Democrat was significantly (and negatively) related to marginality.  We performed the same analysis to predict marginality between the restrictive-nationalist and creedal-nationalist classes (the only pair with enough marginal cases to make such an analysis feasible)  In this analysis the seudo-$R^2$ was .086, and only self-reported strong liberalism was significantly (and positively) associated with marginal placement, net other predictors.   .

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their town, state and North America as a whole; more likely to say it was "very important" for a true American to have each of the seven characteristics about which respondents were asked; most likely to report being "very proud" of all ten potential sources of pride about which the survey asked; and more likely than any other to agree or strongly agree that the U.S. is a better country than most others, that they would rather be a citizen of the U.S. than of any other country (100 percent agreement), that the world would be a better place if more people were like Americans, and that people should support their country whether it is right or wrong.  (See *Table 3.*)

The ultranationalists constituted the smallest of the four classes, with 16.5 percent of respondents.  Although they scored highest on every type of nationalism – identification, identity and boundary strength, pride, and invidious nationalism -- they were not indiscriminate in their endorsements of the nationalism items.   They were far more likely to feel "very close" (59 percent) to America than to their state or town.  Although more than half believed each criterion of true American identity was "very important," nearly all endorsed citizenship, ability to speak English, feeling American, and respecting institutions and laws as criteria, whereas considerably fewer believed it was very important that a true American have lived in the United States most of his or her life (75 percent), be born in America (67 percent) or be a Christian (64 percent).  Nonetheless, it is striking that such large majorities are apparently prepared to view Jews, Muslims, agnostics, and naturalized citizens as something less than "true Americans."

Nearly all of the ultranationalists reported being "very proud" of America's armed forces, achievements in science and technology, and history.  Considerably fewer expressed great pride in the country's fair and equal treatment of all groups (58 percent) or its social security system (43 percent).   Other pride items fell in between.  Every member of this class expressed a preference for being a citizen of the U.S. and all but one agreed that America is a "bet-

ter country" than most others.  Just over two thirds (69 percent) felt the world would be a better place if people in other countries were more like Americans and just 59 percent, even of this most nationalistic group, believed people should support their country if it was in the wrong.[5]

The typical member of this class was an older white male Catholic or Evangelical Protestant with relatively little formal education, living in the upper Midwest or the Southeast. The ultranationalists were more than a decade older than the sample as a whole, with a mean age of 55.  They had the lowest incomes and were substantially more likely (24 percent) to have discontinued their schooling before graduating from high school.   Most were male, and a notably high proportion – 23 percent compared to 17 percent in the next highest class -- were of Eastern or Southern European ancestry.   They were relatively scarce in the Northeast (including New England) and in the Mountain/Pacific region.  Catholics were well represented in their ranks, as were Evangelical Protestants.

Politically, the ultranationalists were more likely than others to call themselves con-servative and considerably *less* likely to self-report as liberals.  Less predictably, however, their ranks included the *highest* proportion of self-proclaimed "strong Democrats" – 21 percent compared to no more than 13 percent for any other group – albeit *fewer* respondents who described themselves as weak Democrats or Democratic leaners.   The strong Democrats in this class were not typical: just 26 percent described themselves as liberal, compared to 52 percent of strong Democrats as a whole.  They also had the largest percentage of strong Republicans (though by a small margin), making this class the most heterogeneous in terms of partisan affiliation.

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[5] Because the item asked respondents if people in general should support their country when it was wrong, and not if Americans should do so, these responses are difficult to interpret.  It is possible that some respondents who disagreed actually do believe that *Americans* should support their country right or wrong, but are not prepared to hold citizens of Turkmenistan or Zimbabwe to that same standard.

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*Reserved nationalists.*  The other extreme class was the largest (albeit only by three members), with 28.8 percent of the sample.  It consists of what we call the "reserved nationalists" – "reserved" because they hold back from the strongest endorsement of even the most widely held forms of nationalist belief and sentiment, and because they reserve their selves from wholesale engagement with a national identity.  The strongest evidence for the latter inference come from responses to the national identification item: fewer than 10 percent of the men and women in this group report feeling very close to the nation, compared to well over 40 percent for the sample as a whole.   The overall pattern of responses to the affiliation items suggest a general disengagement rather than alternative foci of attachment: fewer also report feeling "very close" to their town or city, state, or to North America, though the differences from other classes are smaller.

They were also least likely to endorse *any* characteristic as "very important" for establishing that a person is "truly American," often by wide margins (with the exception of Christian faith, which members of one other class endorsed at even lower rates).  Even respect for institutions and laws, which 74 to 95 percent of other classes viewed as constitutive of American identity, was described as "very important" by just 30 percent of these respondents.  Even citizenship was termed "very important" by just 39 percent.  Such criteria as being Christian, being born in the U.S., or having lived in the U.S. for most of one's life were endorsed as very important by fewer than one in five.

The reserved nationalists were also less likely than members of other classes to express high levels of pride in *any* of the American achievements about which they were asked.  Some of these results suggest a negative evaluation of the U.S.'s performance on elements of the national creed: Just 6 percent reported being "very proud" in how American democracy works; just 4

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percent expressed great pride in universalistic treatment; and only 16 percent expressed pride in American history. But they also expressed lower levels of pride in field like science and technology (26 percent) or arts and literature (16 percent) where American achievements arguably have been demonstrably significant. These latter figures suggest that this set of respondents is not only critical of the U.S. on some dimensions, but may also identify less strongly with the country. Just as a parent is likely to feel more pride in the athletic or scholarly achievements of her or his own child than in those of an equally accomplished classmate, these respondents may take less pride in achievements they would evaluate highly on the merits, because their nationality is linked less closely to their sense of self. Not surprisingly, the reserved nationalists are also least likely to endorse any of the invidious nationalism items.

Who are these least nationalistic Americans? With a mean age of 38 years, they are the youngest of any class. Compared to the ultranationalists, they are more likely to be women (57 percent compared to 49 percent), more often African-American or Hispanic (19 percent, compared to 8 percent), more likely (than those in any class) to have been born outside the U.S. (13 percent vs. 7 percent), and less often of Eastern or Southern European ancestry (15 compared to 23 percent). They are much more likely to have graduated from college (39 percent compared to 22 percent), have higher family incomes ($43,600 compared to $35.800) and far less likely to have ended their schooling before high school (9 percent vs. 24 percent). Although roughly the same percentage of the most and least nationalistic describe themselves as Democrats or Democrat-leaning, in line with their weak levels of national attachment, the reserved are *less* likely to report that they are "strong" Democrats, *more* likely to say they are weak Democrats or

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### Table 3: Nationalistic Attitudes by LCA Class

| | Ultrana-tionalists | Restrictive Nationalists | Creedal Nationalitsts | Reserved Nationalists |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Feels "very close"** | | | | |
| Your town or city | 24.7 | 10.4 | 14.3 | 8.0 |
| Your state | 30.0 | 12.0 | 12.6 | 5.7 |
| America | 58.7 | 43.2 | 42.4 | 9.5 |
| North America | 36.0 | 17.0 | 19.3 | 5.7 |
| **"Very important" for being "truly American"** | | | | |
| Born in America | 67.3 | 63.3 | 17.2 | 14.1 |
| Christian | 64.0 | 60.2 | 10.5 | 13.7 |
| American citizen | 98.0 | 95.8 | 72.3 | 39.3 |
| Able to speak English | 95.3 | 94.6 | 60.1 | 40.8 |
| Feel American | 98.7 | 86.9 | 48.2 | 25.6 |
| Respect institutions/laws | 95.3 | 75.3 | 74.4 | 30.2 |
| Lived here most of life | 75.3 | 69.5 | 19.3 | 17.6 |
| **"Very proud" of America for** | | | | |
| Arts and literature | 74.7 | 20.9 | 33.6 | 16.0 |
| Way democracy works | 77.3 | 12.4 | 43.3 | 5.7 |
| Economic achievements | 79.3 | 11.6 | 45.4 | 6.9 |
| Fair and equal treatment | 58.0 | 12.4 | 16.4 | 3.8 |
| History | 92.0 | 54.8 | 58.8 | 15.7 |
| Armed Forces | 96.7 | 52.9 | 57.1 | 14.9 |
| World political influence | 67.3 | 10.0 | 31.9 | 3.8 |
| Science and technology | 94 | 28.2 | 83.6 | 26.0 |
| Sports | 88.7 | 34.4 | 37.0 | 13.7 |
| Social Security system | 42.7 | 6.6 | 15.6 | 4.6 |
| **Agree/Strongly agree** | | | | |
| America better country | 99.4 | 93.0 | 87.4 | 56.8 |
| Rather be U.S. citizen | 100.0 | 99.5 | 97.5 | 72.1 |
| More like Americans | 68.6 | 56.0 | 26.0 | 18.0 |
| Country right or wrong | 58.6 | 40.6 | 21.0 | 18.7 |
| N | 150 | 259 | 238 | 262 |
| Percentage | 16.5 | 28.5 | 26.2 | 28.8 |

*Source: 1996 General Social Survey.*

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## Table 4: Respondents with Selected Attributes by Percentage of Class

| | Ultra-Nationalists | Restrictive Nationalists | Creedal Nationalists | Reserved Nationalists |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male | 51.3 | 44.0 | 53.4 | 42.8 |
| | | | | |
| White | 86.0 | 85.0 | 87.8 | 77.5 |
| Black | 8.0 | 12.7 | 4.6 | 13.4 |
| Hispanic | - | 2.3 | 4.6 | 5.3 |
| | | | | |
| Born outside U.S. | 7.3 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 13.0 |
| | | | | |
| East/South European Ancestry | 22.6 | 12.6 | 16.5 | 14.5 |
| | | | | |
| Education – BA or more | 22.0 | 17.0 | 41.2 | 38.6 |
| Education -- < HS | 24.0 | 15.8 | 6.7 | 8.8 |
| | | | | |
| Strong Democrat | 20.7 | 12.9 | 11.7 | 12.9 |
| Democrat* | 28.7 | 32.9 | 30.4 | 40.2 |
| Republican* | 26.0 | 29.4 | 33.0 | 24.6 |
| Strong Republican | 15.3 | 11.0 | 13.9 | 6.6 |
| | | | | |
| Liberal or slightly liberal | 13.6 | 20.4 | 32.3 | 35.3 |
| Conservative or slightly conservative | 46.3 | 39.6 | 39.6 | 22.8 |
| | | | | |
| Lives in northeast | 16.7 | 17.4 | 21.4 | 23.7 |
| Lives in north central states | 30.0 | 24.3 | 26.5 | 23.3 |
| Lives in South Atlantic | 22.7 | 19.7 | 14.7 | 18.3 |
| Lives in mountain/Pacific states | 15.3 | 18.9 | 27.3 | 25.6 |
| | | | | |
| Black Protestant | 6.7 | 10.0 | 1.3 | 8.4 |
| Evangelical Protestant | 33.3 | 38.6 | 23.5 | 14.1 |
| Mainline Protestant | 18.0 | 18.5 | 21.4 | 21.4 |
| Catholic | 29.3 | 19.3 | 26.5 | 26.3 |
| None | 4.0 | 7.7 | 13.5 | 16.4 |
| Other | 8.7 | 5.8 | 13.9 | 13.4 |
| | | | | |
| Mean Age | 55 | 43.8 | 43.8 | 38 |
| Mean income | 35,772 | 39,526 | 54,209 | 43,591 |

*Includes Independents who report leaning Democrat or Republican, respectively.

*Source: 1996 General Social Survey.*

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Democratic leaners.   They are less likely (7, the lowest of any class, vs. 15 percent) to report

that they are strong Republicans but, again going against stereotype, they are *not* significantly

less likely to describe themselves as weakly or leaning Republican.

Consistent with stereotype, however, they were considerably more likely than the ultra-

nationalists (35 percent, more than any other class, vs. 14 percent) to self report as liberals and

were least likely (23 percent compared to 40 percent or more for the other three classes) to call

themselves conservatives.  Compared to the ultranationalists they were more likely to live in the

northeast or Pacific, and less likely to live in the upper Midwest.   In terms of religion, they were

least likely to report membership in an Evangelical Protestant denomination (14 percent

compared to 33 percent for the ultranationalists) and four times as likely (16 percent vs. 4

percent) to report that they had no religious affiliation.

*Restrictive nationalists*.   Unlike the classes we have described, the two remaining classes

do *not* fall into a monotonic continuum from more to less nationalistic.  Although neither is as

strongly nationalistic as the ultranationalists nor as weakly nationalistic as the reserved

nationalists, the two are moderate in very different ways.  One class, which we refer to as the

*restrictive nationalists*, consists of respondents who express only moderately high levels of

national pride, but who define American identity in particularly restrictive ways.  The other

class, which we refer to as *creedal nationalists* because their profile of attitudes suggests fidelity

to the American creed of liberal universalism, consists of respondents who express high levels of

national pride alongside a reluctance to qualify "truly American" with many strong conditions.

We begin with the former, whom we refer to as the "restrictive nationalists."   Members

of this group are no different than creedal nationalists in their national identification, and only

moderately less likely to report feeling "very close" to America than are the ultranationalists (43

percent compared to 59 percent). They also resemble the ultranationalists in their embrace of invidious nationalism (with more than 90 percent agreeing that there is no better country than the U.S., all but one preferring to be U.S. citizens, more than half wishing agreeing that people in other countries should be more like Americans, and 40 percent endorsing the view that one should support one's country even when it is wrong). They are also similar to, though less extreme than, the ultranationalists in placing conditions upon who should be viewed as a "true American." Three in five appear to endorse the view that only Christians can be "truly American"; and approximately two in three believe that it is "very important" that a "true American" be born in the U.S. (63 percent) or have lived in the U.S. for most of his or her life (70 percent). Oddly, the one criterion the restrictive nationalists are substantially less likely to endorse than are the ultranationalists is respect for American institutions and laws. Paired with the reluctance of many members of this class to accept anyone but native-born Christians as "true Americans," this pattern suggests that this group's views might be characterized as ethnocultural rather than creedal nationalism.

Given their high level of support for restrictions on American identity, few members of this class report being "very proud" of American achievements. Indeed, their responses are closer – in most cases, much closer -- to those of the least nationalistic set of respondents than to those of the ultranationalists. Majorities express great pride in only American history and America's armed forces. By contrast, just 23 percent (compared to 77 percent of the ultranationalists) report being very proud in American democracy; and just 10 percent express great pride in America's world political influence, as compared to more than two thirds of the ultranationalists.

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Who are these respondents who define true American identity so restrictively yet evince such low levels of national pride?  Women were overrepresented among the restrictive nationalists (at 56 percent). Average incomes were relatively low, though not so low as those of the ultranationalists; and a smaller percentage of these respondents (17 percent) held college degrees than of any other group.  African-Americans and, especially, Black Protestants were over-represented among the restrictive nationalists, as were Evangelical Protestants, who represented almost 39 percent of this class's members, even more than their share of ultranationalists.  By contrast, Catholics, who were also prominent among the ultranationalists, constituted a *smaller* percentage of this class (just 19 percent) than of any other.  Not surprisingly, few were born outside the U.S.; and relatively few reported Eastern or Southern European ancestry.  Respondents in this group were less likely than any but the ultranationalists to describe themselves as liberal or slightly liberal (20 percent compared to 14 percent of ultranationalists and about one third of other respondents).

*Creedal nationalists*.  "Creedal nationalism" --- the form of national self-understanding associated with a set of ideological principles sometimes referred to as the American Creed – features the primacy of universalism democracy, and the rule of law (Smith 1988; Lieven 2004). The class of respondents we refer to as *creedal nationalists* fit this profile more aptly than any other subset of respondents.  Theirs is a moderate form of nationalism that is high on national pride, but that places few restrictions on who can claim a "truly American" identity.  Creedal nationalists exhibit moderately high levels of national identification, with 42 percent reporting that they feel "very close" to America, a percentage comparable to that of the restrictive nationalists.  They are less likely than the ultranationalists to report being "very proud" of American achievements, but more likely to do so than either the restrictive nationalists or the

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reserved nationalists.   Forty-three percent express great pride in the "way democracy works,"

compared to just 12 percent of the restrictive nationalists; and about four times as many express

pride in America's economic achievements, as well (45 percent to 12 percent).  With respect to

pride in science and technology, they are much closer to the ultranationalists than to any other

group, with 84 percent saying they are "very proud" as well.   Like all but the reserved

nationalists, they strongly endorse the ideas that America is a better country than most and that it

is better to be a citizen of the U.S.   But their responses to the items that tap chauvinist beliefs are

more similar to those of the reserved nationalists than to any other class, with just 26 percent

wishing that people in the rest of the world could be more like Americans and just 21 percent

endorsing the view that people should support their countries even when they are wrong.

That creedal nationalists differ from the restrictive nationalists is most evident in their

responses to the questions about the qualities that are very important in making someone "truly

American."  Consistent with liberal nationalism, they are almost as likely as the restrictive

nationalists (74 vs. 75 percent) to say that respect for American institutions and laws is very

important; and more than 70 percent contend that it is very important that one be an American

citizen.  By contrast, however, few of the creedal nationalists say that being a Christian (11

percent), having been born in the U.S. (17 percent), or having lived here most of one's life (19

percent) are important criteria.  In other words, the creedal nationalists differentiate between

degrees of Americanness, but not on the basis of ascribed characteristics.

The mean age of the creedal nationalists is the same (43.8) as that of the restrictive

nationalists, but in other respects they diverge.  Their family incomes ($54,200) are the highest

of any group of respondents, and they are the most likely to have graduated from college (41

percent) and the least likely to have dropped out of high school.   Few were born outside the U.S.

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and few (just 4.6 percent) are African-American. Their partisan affiliations are similar to those
of the sample as a whole. With respect to ideology they are more likely than ultranationalists or
restrictive nationalists to describe themselves as liberal, but no *less* likely than restrictive
nationalists to describe themselves as conservative or slightly conservative. Creedal nationalists
are least likely (14.7 percent) to live in the South Atlantic region and most likely to reside in the
mountain/Pacific states (27.3 percent). Black Protestants are virtually absent from their ranks
(just 1.3 percent), and Evangelical Protestants are underrepresented (23.5 percent) though more
present than among the reserved nationalists. More than one in four (27.4 percent) report a faith
other than Protestant or Catholic or report having no religious affiliation at all, a higher rate than
any class but the reserved nationalists and twice as many as the restrictive nationalists.

*Summary*. The LCA analyses yielded four classes of respondent. Two of these were
extreme classes, one characterized by high levels of national identification, restrictive attitudes
towards national identity, high levels of national pride and high levels of invidious nationalism,
respectively; and one characterized by the opposite of these. Between the two extremes, two
classes appeared more closely aligned with the distinction (in Lieven 2004, Smith 1988, and
others) between ethnocultural and creedal (or liberal) nationalism. The existence of the extreme
classes is one that previous research would not have led one to anticipate and appears to be a
consequence, first, of the broad range of indicators included in this analysis and, second, of the
capacity of LCA to isolate subsets of respondents with distinctive types of response in cases
where data violates assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. The presence of the
extreme classes suggests that almost half of Americans possess national self-understandings that
owe much more to sentiment than ideology – i.e., that lead them to embrace or to reject almost
every element of a kind of restrictively patriotic nationalism indiscriminately. By contrast, just

over half of respondents fall into groups differentiated by what might be interpreted as ideological coherent principles.   To be sure there are patterns common to all the classes – a relative priority placed on citizenship and English speaking compared to other warrants of American identity; greater pride in America's achievements in science and technology than in the social security system; more willingness to endorse the proposition that citizenship in the U.S. is to be preferred to citizenship in any other country than to endorse the principle of "my country right or wrong."  But the differences are striking.

Members of different classes also differ markedly with respect to a variety of sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics.  In the next section, we focus on the relative importance of these characteristics in determining class membership in a multivariate framework.

### *What Predicts Class Assignment?*

We use logistic regression models to predict three measures of class membership (see Table 5). For each class, we predict: (a) the likelihood that the case will be assigned to that class rather than to any other, as a function of a vector of sociodemographic measures and measures of political views and religious affiliation; (b) the likelihood that the case will be assigned to the core membership of the class (i.e., assigned with an LCA probability of 95 percent or more) as a function of the same predictors; and (c) the LCA-determined probability of assignment to that class as a function of the same predictors.  We use logistic regression analysis for the first two models; for the third we use the general linear model with a binomial distribution and a logit link.

Perhaps the most striking result is the significant impact of years of schooling on views of the nation and one's relation to it.   The more education one has, the more likely one is to be a

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member of the reserved-nationalist class and the less likely one is to be found among the restrictive nationalists, by all three measures. (Citrin, Reingold and Green also found education negatively associated with a restricted definition of "true American," and Smith and Kim [2006] found it negatively associated with what we call invidious nationalism, but positively associated with pride in the nation's achievements.) Education is also strongly related to membership in the creedal nationalist class (though it falls just shy of significance for the core members) and is negatively related to ultranationalism (again falling just short in predicting core membership). Income, by contrast, is a relatively weak predictor: It negatively predicts assignment to the core of the reserved class, and positively predicts two of three measures of assignment to the creedal conservatives.

Rahn and Rudolph (2001) have demonstrated that national attachment is stronger among older persons throughout the U.S. and Europe. Consistent with this view, age is also an important predictor of membership in the extreme classes: the older one is, the greater one's chance of being an ultranationalist, and the lower one's probability of being classified among the reserved nationalists. If patriotism and national attachment are indicators of social capital, then the age differences observed here are consistent with arguments that social capital has been in decline since the 1950s (Putnam 2000). They are also consistent with arguments suggesting that globalization – of information, media, culture and business careers – have rendered problematic traditional forms of national attachment (Castells 2001).

Gender has no influence on class assignments. This is surprising in light of folk wisdom and some theory that holds that men are either naturally or through socialization more bellicose and authoritarian than women and that bellicosity and authoritarianism are related to high levels of nationalism and a concern with symbolic boundaries. Given that many more men than women

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have served in the military, it is also surprising in the light of the expectation that military service (of which our data unfortunately contain no direct measure) might enhance national attachment and national pride.

Race and ethnicity played a smaller role than we anticipated in predicting nationalist attitudes and sentiments.[6] Consistent with Parker's (2007b) findings that African-Americans scored lower on "constructive patriotism" than Euro-Americans, Black respondents were significantly more likely to be assigned as core members of the restrictive-nationalist class, consistent with observations of frequency distributions, but this tendency fell short of significance as a predictor of both assignment into the class as a whole or proximity to the class. We suspect that collinearity with the Black Protestant religious category may have produced some instability in estimates. Americans of Hispanic background were completely absent from the ultranationalist camp, and Hispanic ethnicity was strongly negative predictor of the probability assigned to belonging to the ultranationalist class. This was true even net of the effect of having been born in or outside of the U.S., which was a major predictor of assignment to the reserved-nationalist class (the native-born were far less likely than the foreign born to be among this least nationalist group); and of the probability of being assigned to the restrictive-nationality class (which was not surprisingly higher for the native born). These results are broadly consistent with the expectation that dominant groups in ethnically stratified societies express greater national pride and greater commitment to central symbols and values than members of dominated groups (Sidenius, Feshbach, Levin and Pratto 1997). Members of other races – predominantly Asian – also had very low probabilities of assignment to the restrictive class but, surprisingly, were strongly overrepresented (net their other characteristics) among the

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[6] Hispanic respondents were identified on the basis of national origin; non-Hispanic respondents were divided by race on the basis of their responses to the GSS race item.

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ultranationalists. It is not clear to what extent this latter finding reflects intense nationalism and to what extent it may reflect social-desirability bias.

If the effects of race and ethnicity were relatively modest, the impact of religion was strong.[7] Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson (2008) argue that the Evangelical Protestant belief in biblical inerrancy engenders support for militarism and heightens nationalism. We found relatively weak evidence for this position. Compared to mainline Protestants (the omitted category in our analysis), Evangelical Protestants were twice as likely to be assigned to the restrictive-nationalist category (though not to its core) and well under half as likely to appear in the least nationalistic class (by any measure). But Catholics were also significantly underrepresented (by any measure) among the least nationalistic, and well over twice as likely (by any measure) to appear among the ultranationalists. Black Protestants were significantly less likely to be classified as creedal nationalists, though they fell short of significant difference with respect to that class's core. The different forms of nationalist ideology to which Evangelicals and Catholics gravitated may be consistent with the sense of threat that some Evangelicals feel and some of their leaders have cultivated (Smith 1998); as well as with the upward mobility of many Southern and Eastern Europe Catholics whose ancestors immigrated to the U.S. between 1880 and 1920.

Research has demonstrated that political-party identification has become the primary axis of ideological cleavage, especially with respect to issues that invoke symbolic opposition and value dissensus (DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996; Evans 2003; Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2004). One might expect, then, that partisanship would play a significant role in structuring understandings of the nation, national attachment, and national identity, which are highly

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[7] We follow he procedure described in Steensland, Park, Regnerus, Robinson, Wilcox, and Woodberry (2000) to aggregate denominations into denominational categories. This procedure distinguishes Evangelicals more precisely from Mainline Protestants than other methods, and distinguishes both from historically African-American Protestant denominations.

**Table 5: Models predicting class membership – exponentiated coefficients**

| | Restrictive | | | Reserved | | | Creedal | | | Ultranationalists | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All | Core | Probability | All | Core | Probability | All | Core | Probability | All | Core | Probability |
| Age | 0.986* | 1.000 | 0.991 | 0.964*** | 0.955*** | 0.964*** | 1.008 | 1.008 | 1.004 | 1.044*** | 1.045*** | 1.043*** |
| Male | 0.904 | 0.973 | 0.942 | 0.811 | 0.852 | 0.807 | 1.117 | 1.514 | 1.117 | 1.324 | 1.032 | 1.252 |
| Black | 0.888 | 2.896* | 1.143 | 1.369 | 1.163 | 1.198 | 0.851 | 0.827 | 0.697 | 0.854 | 0.965 | 1.019 |
| Hispanic | 0.420 | 0.345 | 0.504 | 1.677 | 2.351 | 1.737 | 2.290 | 1.815 | 1.677 | - | - | 0.195* |
| Other race | - | - | 0.751*** | 0.691 | 0.528 | 0.624 | 1.359 | 0.395 | 1.229 | 6.877*** | 9.648*** | 6.083** |
| Born in US | 2.500 | 2.732 | 3.45** | 0.349** | 0.290*** | 0.370*** | 2.092 | 0.899 | 1.627 | 1.311 | 0.829 | 1.135 |
| Years schooling | .886*** | 0.829*** | 0.890*** | 1.122*** | 1.137** | 1.120*** | 1.098** | 1.056 | 1.088** | 0.899* | 0.915 | 0.909* |
| Family income | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.999* | 1.000 | 1.001** | 1.001** | 1.0001*** | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Strong Democrat | 0.985 | 1.001 | 1.039 | 0.727 | 1.056 | 0.820 | 0.582 | 0.601 | 0.527* | 2.899* | 3.488* | 2.688* |
| Democrat | 1.054 | 0.970 | 1.108 | 0.901 | 1.114 | 1.009 | 0.884 | 0.499 | 0.778 | 1.298 | 1.428 | 1.248 |
| Republican | 0.971 | 0.939 | 1.013 | 0.816 | 0.739 | 0.887 | 1.148 | 0.565 | 1.012 | 1.289 | 1.197 | 1.271 |
| Strong Republican | 0.561 | 0.255* | 0.662 | 0.849 | 0.251* | 0.712 | 1.837 | 1.437 | 1.650 | 1.486 | 1.340 | 1.489 |
| Liberal | 0.548 | 0.613 | 0.613 | 0.818 | 0.833 | 0.953 | 2.693*** | 1.187 | 2.064** | 0.610 | 0.568 | 0.590 |
| Slightly liberal | 0.939 | 0.663 | 0.917 | 0.909 | 0.942 | 0.956 | 1.915* | 1.925 | 1.809** | 0.340* | 0.156** | 0.352* |
| Slightly conservative | 0.896 | 0.899 | 0.955 | 0.405*** | 0.363** | 0.431*** | 1.996** | 2.103* | 1.818** | 1.597 | 0.794 | 1.444 |
| Conservative | 1.616 | 1.686 | 1.542* | 0.349*** | 0.644 | 0.410*** | 1.100 | 1.037 | 1.075 | 1.400 | 1.204 | 1.268 |
| North Central | 0.992 | 0.868 | 0.893 | 0.815 | 0.880 | 0.884 | 1.010 | 0.803 | 1.001 | 1.330 | 1.297 | 1.312 |
| South Atlantic | 1.116 | 1.431 | 1.154 | 0.900 | 0.974 | 0.846 | 0.711 | 0.620 | 0.807 | 1.585 | 1.009 | 1.366 |
| South Central | 1.298 | 1.921 | 1.293 | 0.510 | 0.812 | 0.532* | 0.975 | 0.870 | 0.962 | 1.565 | 1.334 | 1.435 |
| Mountain Pacific | 1.251 | 1.003 | 1.143 | 0.935 | 1.106 | 0.943 | 0.936 | 1.062 | 0.997 | 0.836 | 0.640 | 0.828 |
| Black Protestant | 2.657 | 0.913 | 1.871 | 0.661 | 0.436 | 0.688 | 0.240* | 0.314 | 0.471 | 1.075 | 1.196 | 0.910 |
| Evangelical | 2.012** | 1.543 | 1.829** | 0.417** | 0.324*** | 0.425*** | 0.824 | 0.718 | 0.913 | 1.280 | 1.299 | 1.232 |
| Catholic | 1.099 | 1.193 | 1.103 | 0.516* | 0.341*** | 0.508** | 0.982 | 0.896 | 1.003 | 2.351** | 2.561* | 2.249** |
| No religion | 0.682 | 0.622 | 0.547 | 0.897 | 0.793 | 0.890 | 1.306 | 1.584 | 1.466 | 0.484 | 0.787 | 0.585 |
| Other religion | 0.629 | 0.114* | 0.679 | 0.969 | 0.651 | 0.884 | 1.115 | 1.174 | 1.210 | 1.278 | 1.166 | 1.192 |
| N | 773 | 773 | 794 | 794 | 794 | 794 | 794 | 794 | 794 | 767 | 767 | 794 |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.135 | 0.084 | --- | 0.138 | 0.174 | --- | 0.090 | 0.094 | --- | 0.183 | 0.187 | --- |

*Source:* 1996 General Social Survey.  * p≤.05  **p≤. .01  ***p≤. .001.  Assignment of all and core members to latent classes are predicted by logistic regression models.  Core membership defined as assignment with a probability of .95 or greater.  Probability of class assignment is predicted using general linear models with a binomial distribution and a logit link.  All coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted as odds ratios.

symbolic and connected to fundamental dimensions of value and self. Indeed, Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990), in an analysis of data from a California survey, found Republicans more supportive of ethnocultural nationalism.

Surprisingly, however, the impact of party identification is notably week. Once one controls for self-declared conservatism, religion, and demographic factors, party affiliation has relatively few effects – and those it has are actually the reverse of what one would ordinarily expect.[8] The major headline is that respondents who describe themselves as "strong Democrats" are between 2.7 and 3.5 times as likely to be classified as ultranationalists as respondents who report that they are independents. Interestingly, with respect to nationalism, "independence" does not represent a true midpoint: Members of every group are more likely than the independents to be in the ultranationalist category. The lesson in this is that attachment to and identification with the nation is associated with attachment to and identification with party (of any kind), and people who reject party labels are less likely to feel strong ties to country as well. But only in the case of the strong Democrats is the difference from the omitted moderate category statistically significant.

Almost as surprisingly (and in contrast to the findings of Citrin, Ringold and Green 1990), strong Republicans are significantly less likely to be classified into the core of the restrictive nationalists (as well as, more expectedly, less likely to be classified into the core of the reserved group).[9] Strong Democrats, by contrast, have a significantly lower LCA-assigned probability of assignment to the creedal-nationalist class. (They are similarly unlikely to be

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[8] The few respondents who gave their party affiliation as "other" were eliminated from the analysis. Weak Democrats and Democrat-leaning independents were merged into a single category, as were weak Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. Independents were the omitted category.

[9] There are a number of possible explanations for the differing results: Citrin et al's data came from California in the 1980s, whereas we use national data from 1996. Citrin et al. treated party identification as an ordinal scale (controlling separately for a measure of intensity of partisan identification), whereas we treat party identification as a series of categorical variables (a decision which seems right given the departures from monotonicity that characterize our results).

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assigned to the class or to its core, but the difference is not quite statistically significant.)   What is especially striking about these results is that, with ideology, religion, age and other factors controlled, strength of partisanship – more than the nature of that partisanship – appears to make the difference.  Only *strong* Democrats and Republicans are significantly different than moderates; effects are rarely monotonic and never linear as one moves from strong Republicans to strong Democrats; and the particular differences between strong Democrats and Republicans and others in many cases run counter to stereotype.  What we may see here is a homology between strong commitment to party and strong commitment to nation, with persons capable of one more likely to also hold the other.

Self-assigned political ideology (ranging from liberal to conservative) has a stronger and more predictable influence.[10]   Liberals were significantly more likely to be assigned to the creedal-nationalist class and to be assigned high probabilities of belonging in that location. (They were not significantly more likely to be assigned to the core, however.)  This makes sense given the affinity of creedal nationalism to liberal virtues of tolerance, openness to difference, and seems to belie the perception that liberals lack pride in nation.  But centrist conservatives were also overrepresented among creedal nationalists, and were the only group to be significantly overrepresented in the core of this group.  This provides some support for the notion that creedal nationalism represents a kind of consensus of the politically engaged – a consensus from which only strong conservatives and self-identified moderates (who may be politically less engaged than those who express conservative or liberal preferences) are missing.

Interestingly enough, although conservatives (especially centrist conservatives) were significantly underrepresented in the reserved class, liberals were *not* overrepresented relative

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[10] The extreme liberal and liberal categories were merged, as were the extreme conservative and conservative categories.  Self-identified "moderates" constitute the omitted categories.

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moderates. Liberals were less likely to be assigned to the ultranationalist class, but oddly

enough, only centrist liberals, and not stronger liberals, were *significantly* underrepresented in

this class.

Despite the widespread notion that the southeastern states, with their conservative politics

and military tradition, are the heartland of American nationalism, the only significant regional

effect of any kind was that persons living in the South Central states were less likely to be

assigned high LCA probabilities of placement in the "reserved nationalist" class. Aside from

this, region has no impact on type of nationalism once we control for other factors.

To summarize: nationalist ideas and sentiments appeared to be shaped most broadly by

age and educational attainment, with religious faith, immigrant status, and political ideology also

playing strong roles. Respondents with strong partisan attachments are significantly different

than political independents, but not always in ways that one would anticipate: Views of nation

are still relatively free of the partisan ordering that has affected many other symbolic political

issues. Plausible theories that tie nationalist views to gender, income, race, or region receive

little support.

Because of the central role of belief that Christian faith is very important to being a "true

American," we undertook an analysis to see what predicted endorsement of this view. The

reader will recall that this variable cleaved the sample, dividing ultranationalists and restrictive

nationalists, who strongly endorsed this position, from creedal nationalists and restricted

nationalists, who strongly disagreed with it. The results of two kinds of analyses (an OLS

model predicting placement on the 4-point ordinal scale and a logistic regression model

predicting who reported that it was a fairly or very important criterion) converged in identifying

the following patterns. (See Appendix Table 2.) The more years of schooling respondents had,

the less likely they were to view Christianity as a criterion of true American identity. Income was also associated with rejecting this criterion, though not nearly so strongly. Older Americans were more likely to endorse this position, and African Americans were about four times as likely as whites to view Christianity as constitutive of American identity. In this respect, they exceeded even white Evangelicals (who were about twice as likely as mainline Protestants to agree) in their endorsement. By contrast the unchurched and members of non-Christian faiths took strong exception to this view. Americans living in the South Atlantic and South Central states were more likely than northeasterners to view the U.S. as a Christian nation. Political ideology was relatively unimportant as a predictor (respondents who identified as liberals or extreme liberals were more likely to reject this view), and partisan affiliation was completely unrelated. Thus positions on this key dividing line are shaped by race, religion, educational attainment, age and, to a lesser extent, income, liberal ideology, and region. This is a large and complex set of determinants of a simple view that seems to divide Americans more than any other dimension of national belief.

### Is nationalism linked to social attitudes and views of policy?

Put another way, does nationalism matter? Is it associated with Americans' attitudes on important social issues or with their policy preferences to the extent that knowing American's attitudes and sentiments toward the nation enables us to predict these other attitudes more effectively than we could based on information about their age, gender, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, country of birth, religious faith, region of residence, political party identification, or view of themselves as liberal or conservative. The presence of such factors as ideology and partisanship poses a high hurdle. If different types of nationalists still vary significantly after we control for all these other factors, we may infer, first, that our LCA

analysis identified dimensions of conviction that are central to a broad spectrum of belief and opinion; and, second, that, despite the common threads between them, people in each group are meaningfully different from one another in their views.

Tables 6 and 7 describe the impact of nationalist class assignment on twenty-eight attitudes and six scales covering the following topics: racial attitudes; views on policies related to race; social welfare policies; attitudes towards immigration; attitudes toward the rest of the world and to multiculturalism; and foreign-policy attitudes touching on U.S. sovereignty. The controls mentioned above are included in all models, but are not displayed for the sake of clarity. Creedal nationalism is the omitted class to which the others classes are compared. In order to help interpret the class effects, the models with scales as dependent variables include measures of scales tapping distinctive dimensions of nationalism, as well. We include the measure of national attachment (how close one feels to America); a scale of American identity items associated with creedal nationalism (citizenship, respect for institutions and laws, feeling American, speaking English)[11]; a scale of American identity items associated with ethnocultural nationalism (having been born in the U.S., having lived in the U.S. most of one's life, and being a Christian); a national pride scale (built form all of the specific pride items); and an invidious nationalism scale (built from the invidious nationalism items, rescaled to receive equal weight). The other attitude scales are built from standardized items, reverse-coded when necessary to maintain consistency of meaning. (Because GSS asks many questions only to subsets of

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[11] Much of the literature views belief in the importance of English as a form of ethnocultural nationalism (Citrin, Reingold, Walters and Green 1990). But as Brubaker has pointed out, one can also characterize policies promoting a common language as "positively civic, that is, as indispensable for the promotion of republican citizenship" (2004: 139). Certainly if civic nationalism aspires to a Habermasian "ideal speech situation," then a prerequisite to that condition is that participants in a dialogue understand the words that one another say. Our position is not a normative one: Effectively mandated bilingualism would be almost as effective and somewhat more egalitarian as a means to the same republican ends. But, in practice, support for English as a criterion of full American identity is far more widespread than support for less ambiguously ethnocultural criteria, so we believe it is would be misleading to include in the ethnocultural scale. Consequently, we do not include support for English as a criterion of "true American" status in *either* of the two factors comprising other items from the same series of questions.

respondents and because we deleted some cases due to missing item responses, the Ns for many of these analyses are low.)  In each case, the first model includes only class assignments; the second includes only attitude-dimension scales; and the third includes both.  With one exception (noted in Table 6) all the models are OLS.

Previous research gives us much reason to anticipate that people's understanding of the meaning of nation and their relationships to it would be linked to other attitudes.  This should be especially true of attitudes that are related to in-group/out-group dynamics (Tajfel 1982) and concerns about social boundaries and ritual penetration (Douglas 1966), such as views of race, immigration, and trade.  It should also be the case for attitudes towards America's relationship to the rest of the world and concerns about national sovereignty.  And understandings of the national community may also be linked to people's views about the government's obligation to provide social services to its members.  Indeed, Sears (1993) and Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) have both argued that subjective understandings of national identity may be better predictors of Americans' policy preferences than economic self-interest.

Previous research has found evidence of this for attitudes towards intergroup relations. Smith and Kim (2006:134) report that what we call invidious nationalism, but not national pride, is related to "a more restricted sense of what makes someone a `true' member of a nationality." Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) find that what they call "Americanism" predicts attitudes towards immigrants and immigration more effectively than demographic measures or even exposure to a perceived threat.  At the same time, different forms of nationalist belief and sentiment may have differing implications for attitudes towards outgroups.   Parker (2007a), in an analysis of California's Field Poll, reports that "blind patriotism" ("America right or wrong") is related to negative views of racial and religious minorities, whereas what he calls "symbolic

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patriotism" (attachment to patriotic symbols and core American values) was associated with open and embracing responses. Li and Brewer (2004) report that experimental subjects primed with appeals to group solidarity, collective interest and good citizenship expressed high levels of tolerance; whereas subjects primed with messages that emphasize intergroup *differences* are relatively more authoritarian and bellicose. It may follow from this view that invidious nationalism and a restrictive view of membership in the national community would influence attitudes differently than national attachment and pride in America's achievements. Distinguishing between domain-specific pride and invidious nationalism, DeFiguieredo and Elkins' (2003) work on attitudes towards immigrants support this expectation.

At the same time, we should not be too quick to assume that logical affinities between nationalist views and other attitudes will lead to empirical associations. As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann observe in *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), humans tend to believe that there is much more coherence in culture than can be empirically demonstrated. Psychologists have also demonstrated high levels of domain independence in human cognition, such that traits or attitudes that would appear to be general in nature often differ markedly between domains (DiMaggio 1997; Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994; Mischel and Shoda 1995).

*Racial attitudes*. Like the authors of the studies reviewed above, we find strong effects of particular forms of nationalism on a range of attitudes. (We use the term "effect" to refer to statistical effects, with the understanding that our results speak to degrees of association as

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## Table 6: Impact of Class Membership on Social and Policy Attitudes with Controls

**Racial attitudes**

| | racpushr | Racsegr | racopenr | blksimpr | raceant[a] | affrmact | busing | wrkwayupr |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| restrictive | 0.417*** | 0.327*** | -0.036 | -0.120 | 0.098*** | -0.018 | 0.070 | 0.215 |
| | (0.118) | (0.093) | (0.116) | (0.078) | (0.024) | (0.105) | (0.058) | (0.127) |
| reserved | 0.196 | 0.112 | -0.043 | -0.295*** | 0.061** | -0.049 | 0.075 | -0.074 |
| | (0.115) | (0.092) | (0.108) | (0.077) | (0.023) | (0.103) | (0.057) | (0.124) |
| ultranationalists | 0.455*** | 0.238* | 0.100 | -0.067 | 0.040 | -0.159 | -0.015 | 0.178 |
| | (0.135) | (0.107) | (0.131) | (0.095) | (0.028) | (0.129) | (0.071) | (0.155) |
| N | 511 | 511 | 521 | 526 | 521 | 522 | 508 | 534 |
| R-sq | 0.287 | 0.214 | 0.124 | 0.162 | 0.141 | 0.237 | 0.183 | 0.129 |

[a]Additive scale of racial antagonism, consisting of rachafr2 (would you send your child to a school with 50 percent of the children of another race?), racmarr2 (should government forbid interracial marriage?), and racpresr (would you vote for a black presidential candidate?), weighted by the number of non-missing items used.

**Social Welfare Issues**

| | Helpblk | helpnot | helppoor | helpsick |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| restricted | 0.126 | -0.140 | -0.033 | 0.034 |
| | (0.143) | (0.145) | (0.132) | (0.144) |
| reserved | -0.185 | -0.141 | -0.234 | -0.140 |
| | (0.134) | (0.135) | (0.124) | (0.134) |
| ultranationalists | -0.167 | -0.219 | -0.247 | -0.209 |
| | (0.165) | (0.166) | (0.152) | (0.164) |
| N | 519 | 511 | 517 | 518 |
| R-sq | 0.288 | 0.245 | 0.212 | 0.175 |

**Immigration**

| | Immameco | immcrimer | immideas | immjobsr |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| restrictive | 0.388*** | 0.455*** | 0.473*** | 0.390*** |
| | (0.095) | (0.102) | (0.091) | (0.106) |
| reserved | 0.196* | 0.111 | 0.322*** | 0.032 |
| | (0.093) | (0.099) | (0.088) | (0.103) |
| ultranationalists | -0.008 | 0.401*** | 0.146 | 0.497*** |
| | (0.111) | (0.119) | (0.106) | (0.124) |
| N | 746 | 751 | 761 | 761 |
| R-sq | 0.177 | 0.166 | 0.162 | 0.199 |

**Attitudes toward the rest of the world**

| | amtvr | excldimmr | forlandr | forlang | importsr | letin1 | meltpot1ra | mincult | refugees |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| restrictive" | 0.526*** | 0.112 | 0.368** | 0.206* | 0.350*** | 0.328** | 1.330 | -0.165 | 0.354** |
| | (0.095) | (0.094) | (0.113) | (0.093) | (0.097) | (0.108) | (0.335) | (0.101) | (0.112) |
| reserved | -0.037 | -0.265** | 0.040 | -0.034 | -0.033 | 0.015 | 0.790 | -0.301** | 0.135 |
| | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.109) | (0.089) | (0.093) | (0.105) | (0.193) | (0.098) | (0.107) |
| ultranationalist | 0.505*** | 0.200 | 0.268* | 0.007 | 0.469*** | 0.103 | 2.001* | -0.279* | 0.148 |
| | (0.110) | (0.110) | (0.132) | (0.108) | (0.113) | (0.125) | (0.614) | (0.118) | (0.130) |
| N | 788 | 761 | 788 | 792 | 784 | 701 | 598 | 754 | 746 |
| R-sq | 0.263 | 0.168 | 0.116 | 0.077 | 0.205 | 0.112 | 0.088b | 0.170 | 0.085 |

[a]Odds-ratios rather than regression coefficients are reported for "melting pot" model, and pseudo-R squared statistic used, as results were generated using a logistic regression.

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## Table 6 (con.): Impact of Class Membership on Social and Policy Attitudes with Controls

**Foreign Policy**

| | 1b<br>amownwayr | 2b<br>nafta2 | 3b<br>wrldgovt |
|---|---|---|---|
| restrictive | 0.357*** | 0.182* | -0.076 |
| | (0.100) | (0.091) | (0.098) |
| reserved | -0.106 | 0.268** | 0.103 |
| | (0.097) | (0.088) | (0.095) |
| ultranationalist | 0.494*** | 0.056 | -0.052 |
| | (0.117) | (0.107) | (0.115) |
| N | 783 | 787 | 780 |
| R-sq | 0.165 | 0.163 | 0.094 |

Data are from 1996 General Social Survey
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| racpushr | Black people pushing too hard | immideas | Immigrants don't bring new ideas |
| racsegr | Segregation should be permitted | immjobsr | immigrants take jobs |
| racopenr | Opposes open housing laws | amtvr | US tv should show US films |
| blksimp | Thing improving for Blacks | excldimmr | keep out illegal immigrants |
| raceanta | See legend under table | forlandr | don't let foreigners buy land |
| affrmact | Opposes affirmative action | forlangr | don't teach foreign languages in school |
| busing | Opposes busing to desegregate | importsr | America should limit imports |
| wrkwayupr | Blacks should work way up on own | letin1 | U.S. should admit fewer immigrants |
| helpblk | Government should help Blacks | meltpot1ra | Better if groups blend in |
| helpnot | Government should do more to solve problems | mincult | Don't help ethnic groups keep cultures |
| helppoor | Government should help poor | refugees | Don't let refugees stay in U.S. |
| helpsick | Government should help with medical care | refugees | Don't let refugees stay in U.S. |
| immameco | Immigrants bad for economy | amownwayr | U.S. should pursue interests no matter what |
| immcrimer | Immigrants increase crime | nafta2 | NAFTA is bad for U.S. |
| | | wrldgovt | Opposes international environmental powers |

Covariates: All models include controls for age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of schooling, family income, whether born in U.S., religious affiliation, party identification, ideological self-characterization and region of residence.

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### Table 7: Effects of Class Assignment and Nationalism Scales on Social Attitudes and Policy Preferences (with full controls)

| | Racial attitudes | Racial attitudes | Racial attitudes | Racial policies | Racial policies | Racial policies |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restrictive | 0.171* | | 0.050 | -0.127 | | -0.237* |
| | (0.069) | | (0.083) | (0.101) | | (0.119) |
| Reserved | -0.043 | | 0.049 | -0.081 | | -0.102 |
| | (0.067) | | (0.093) | (0.094) | | (0.130) |
| Ultra | 0.232** | | 0.022 | -0.194 | | -0.273 |
| | (0.084) | | (0.102) | (0.125) | | (0.147) |
| Close to America | | -0.035 | -0.033 | | -0.011 | -0.013 |
| | | (0.037) | (0.038) | | (0.051) | (0.053) |
| True American: Civic | | 0.004 | 0.008 | | -0.025 | -0.019 |
| | | (0.042) | (0.046) | | (0.055) | (0.062) |
| True American: Ethnocultural | | 0.122*** | 0.113** | | -0.003 | 0.047 |
| | | (0.036) | (0.040) | | (0.049) | (0.054) |
| Pride | | 0.046 | 0.065 | | -0.063 | -0.075 |
| | | (0.051) | (0.065) | | (0.070) | (0.085) |
| Invidious Nationalism | | 0.100* | 0.098* | | 0.099 | 0.130 |
| | | (0.044) | (0.048) | | (0.066) | (0.068) |

| | Social welfare | Social welfare | Social welfare | Immigration attitudes | Immigration attitudes | Immigration attitudes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restrictive | -0.043 | | 0.006 | 0.420*** | | 0.131 |
| | (0.088) | | (0.103) | (0.070) | | (0.084) |
| Reserved | -0.153 | | 0.060 | 0.167* | | 0.112 |
| | (0.083) | | (0.121) | (0.068) | | (0.097) |
| Ultra | -0.187 | | -0.273* | 0.243** | | 0.091 |
| | (0.101) | | (0.123) | (0.082) | | (0.100) |
| Close to America | | 0.060 | 0.058 | | 0.026 | 0.029 |
| | | (0.045) | (0.046) | | (0.036) | (0.037) |
| True American: Civic | | 0.047 | 0.060 | | 0.014 | 0.021 |
| | | (0.050) | (0.057) | | (0.043) | (0.048) |
| True American: Ethnocultural | | -0.071 | -0.059 | | 0.186*** | 0.159*** |
| | | (0.044) | (0.048) | | (0.036) | (0.040) |
| Pride | | 0.015 | 0.111 | | -0.266*** | -0.227*** |
| | | (0.062) | (0.081) | | (0.051) | (0.068) |
| Invidious Nationalism | | 0.034 | 0.064 | | 0.204*** | 0.193*** |
| | | (0.057) | (0.061) | | (0.046) | (0.050) |

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**Table 7 (con.): Effects of Class Assignment and Nationalism Scales on Social Attitudes and Policy Preferences (with full controls)**

| | Relations w/ world | Relations w/ world | Relations w/ world | Foreign policy | Foreign policy | Foreign policy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restrictive | 0.243*** | | 0.075 | 0.153** | | 0.090 |
| | (0.046) | | (0.054) | (0.058) | | (0.069) |
| Reserved | -0.068 | | -0.052 | 0.094 | | 0.156* |
| | (0.045) | | (0.063) | (0.056) | | (0.079) |
| Ultra | 0.182*** | | 0.060 | 0.167* | | 0.062 |
| | (0.054) | | (0.065) | (0.067) | | (0.083) |
| Close to America | | 0.038 | 0.029 | | 0.004 | 0.014 |
| | | (0.024) | (0.024) | | (0.030) | (0.031) |
| True American: Civic | | 0.051 | 0.029 | | -0.038 | -0.015 |
| | | (0.028) | (0.031) | | (0.035) | (0.039) |
| True American: Ethnocultural | | 0.113*** | 0.097*** | | 0.038 | 0.021 |
| | | (0.024) | (0.026) | | (0.030) | (0.033) |
| Pride | | -0.097** | -0.104* | | -0.048 | -0.005 |
| | | (0.033) | (0.043) | | (0.041) | (0.054) |
| Invidious Nationalism | | 0.138*** | 0.116*** | | 0.137*** | 0.141*** |
| | | (0.029) | (0.032) | | (0.037) | (0.040) |

*Source:* 1996 General Social Survey

Covariates: age, gender, race/ethnicity, born in U.S., years of education, family income, party affiliation, liberal-conservative self-identification, religious affiliation, region of residence

opposed to causation.) Even with extensive controls for sociodemographic factors, partisanship and ideology, and religious faith, the racial attitudes of creedal nationalists tend to be significantly more positive than those of members of other classes (with particular comparisons varying from item to item). Consistent with their support for restrictive definitions of "true American" and their high values on invidious nationalism, restrictive nationalists and ultranationalists are much more likely than creedal nationalists to endorse the view that African-Americans "shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted" and the position that whites have the right to keep African-Americans out of "their" neighborhoods. Restrictive nationalists and reserved nationalists also scored higher (with controls) on a scale comprising three low-frequency measures of racial antagonism (government should outlaw interracial marriage;

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objection to sending children to a school where half or more of the children were nonwhite, and

refusal to vote for a Black presidential candidate of one's own party). The effect for reserved

nationalists is surprising, as this group would seem to be relatively liberal, given its pattern of

responses to the nationalism items. But it is not a fluke: reserved nationalists were also

significantly likely than the creedal nationalists *and* the ultranationalists to endorse the view that

conditions for Black Americans have improved in recent years, a relative position often

associated with symbolic racism. It is likely that nationalist views interact with racial attitudes in

complex ways: Insofar as Blacks are considered somewhat less than fully American, more

broadly restrictive views on national membership and invidious nationalism may be linked to

racial antagonism; whereas for whites who regard Blacks as fully American, national pride and

national attachment may be positively linked. Even though the reserved nationalists endorse few

restrictions and are low on invidious nationalism, their lack of engagement with the national

community may be associated with a lack of empathy for African-American citizens. In other

words, under some conditions, racism may be associated with too much of the wrong kind of

nationalism *or* too little of the right kind.

The models in Table 7 reinforce the conclusions of the detailed analyses in Table 6 that

restrictive nationalists and ultranationalists have significantly more negative attitudes than

reserved or, especially, creedal nationalists.[12] The second racial-attitudes model in Table 7

indicates that racial animosity is associated with ethnocultural definitions of what constitutes a

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[12] Specific items in the racial-attitudes scale include reaction to the views that African-Americans "shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted," that Blacks should "work their way up" without special help, and that whites have a right to a segregated neighborhood; have conditions for Blacks in the U.S. improved?; and a scale of segregationist beliefs including attitudes towards whether government forbid racial intermarriage: whether the respondent would object to his or her child's attending a school in which half of the students were of another race; and whether the respondent would vote for an African-American presidential candidate. Items were rescaled so that high values were associated with racial antagonism.

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"true American" and with invidious nationalism (two dimensions on which the ultranationalists and restrictive nationalists are both high) but that prejudice is *not* related to national attachment, civic conditions on "true-American" status, or national pride.   When both class assignment and attitude scales are included in the models, coefficients for the former become nonsignificant, while those for the latter retain significance.

A separate racial policy scale taps four attitudes related to social policies likely to assist Blacks: affirmative action; busing for school desegregation; open housing laws; and support for more government programs that target support to African-Americans.  Items were rescaled so that high scores represented opposition to government policies that favor African-Americans.  A striking result of our analyses of specific racial policy items is that there are no differences between the classes (net of controls) on views of policy issues related to race: no significant differences with respect to affirmative action, open housing laws, busing for school desegregation, or whether government should help Blacks.  Nor are they significantly associated with views towards government's role in maintaining social welfare more broadly: There are no significant differences between classes with respect to their views of whether government should do more to solve pressing social problems, to help the poor get ahead, or to help provide medical care to those who need it.  The same is true when we use scales as dependent variables (Table 7): when entered separately, neither class assignments *nor* nationalism-attitude scales have significant effects, suggesting that nationalist sentiments may be linked to issues of *personal* values and sentiment, while remaining relatively decoupled from deliberation over *public* policy options, at least in the domains of race and social welfare.  When class assignments and attitude dimensions are entered into the model simultaneously, however, restrictive nationalists become distinctly *less* opposed to racial policies designed to benefit African-Americans than creedal

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nationalists (controlling, of course, for their views on the nationalism dimensions, as well as their sociodemographic characteristics and political and religious commitments). We also see an interaction when we include all of the measures in the model predicting attitudes towards social welfare policies, with ultranationalists becoming significantly *more* supportive of government action than other groups. These surprising results could reflect a complex interaction effect (one can view class assignments as, in effect, representing distinctive interactions among the nation-alism-attitude dimensions); or it could signify problematic multicollinearity.

*Attitudes towards immigrants.* We would expect nationalist sentiments --- especially sentiments about the boundaries of the nation and national membership --- to influence view of immigrants, and they do. Restrictive nationalists are significantly more likely than creedal nationalists to believe that immigrants cause crime and take jobs from Americans; and sig-nificantly less likely to agree that immigrants help America by bringing in new ideas and cultures; and they are significantly more likely than both creedal nationalists *and* ultranationalists to disagree with the view that immigration is helpful to the economy. Ultranationalists (who tend to endorse qualifications to "true American status") are also significantly more likely than creedal nationalists to agree that immigrants cause crime and take away American jobs. Yet a restrictive view of national membership is not a prerequisite to negative views of immigration: The reserved nationalists are also significantly less likely than creedal nationalists to agree that immigration is good for the economy or that immigrants are a valuable source of new ideas. Once again, an absence of national pride and attachment – as well as a surfeit of restrictive and invidious nationalism – appear to be associated with negative views of members of outgroups.

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We see this even more clearly when we combine the four immigration items into a single scale (Table 7).[13] Creedal nationalists are significantly more favorably inclined towards immigrants than members of other classes, even the reserved nationalists, with the restrictive nationalists expressing the most negative views. When nationalist-attitude dimensions are introduced into the model, we see what drives these class differences: ethnocultural qualifications on "true-American" status and invidious nationalism are significantly related to negative views of immigrants and immigration, whereas national pride is significantly related to positive attitudes. When class-assignment and nationalist-attitude measures are introduced simultaneously, the significant effects of the former disappear and those of the latter persist.

*Attitudes toward America's boundaries.* Attitudes towards immigrants are a special case of a broader class of attitudes towards the penetration of American boundaries by people, cultures, and money from abroad. Results are similar, except that reserved nationalists are more similar to creedal nationalists in their responses to these items. Restrictive nationalists are most opposed to incursions from abroad: They are significantly more likely than creedal *or* reserved nationalists to endorse the views that American media should favor American films, that foreigners should not be permitted to own land in the U.S., that teaching foreign languages should be a low priority in U.S. schools (in this respect they are significantly different from ultranationalists as well), that the U.S. should cut back on imports, and that the U.S. should cut back on legal immigration, They are also significantly more likely than creedal nationalists to object to the view that the U.S. should welcome refugees from abroad.

Ultranationalists are more selective in the isolationist views that they support: They are significantly more likely than creedal nationalists or reserved nationalists to believe that U.S.

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[13] Items elicited response to the views that "immigrants are good for America," "immigrants increase the crime rate," "immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures," "immigrants take away jobs."

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media should favor American films, that foreigners should be prevented from owning land in the

U.S., that the U.S. should cut back on imports. And they are twice as likely as the creedal

nationalists to favor assimilation of ethnic and cultural minorities. Surprisingly, however, it is

the *creedal* nationalists who (as always, with full controls) most strongly *oppose* the broadly

unpopular proposal that government should support the preservation of the customs and

traditions of ethnic minorities, and do so significantly *more* than the ultranationalists (or the

reserved nationalists).[14] In addition to their relatively tolerant view of public funding to preserve

minority cultures, the ultranationalists are *not* significantly more likely than anyone else to

oppose taking in refugees or teaching foreign languages more effectively, nor are they sig-

nificantly more inclined to reduce the number of legal immigrants. The reserved nationalists are

similar to the creedal nationalists in their international attitudes, with the exception that they are

*less* concerned with illegal immigration (an issue with respect to which the creedal nationalists –

consistent with their emphasis on support for the nation's laws – do not differ significantly from

the ultranationalists or restrictive nationalists).

We produced a scale of these items, with components scaled so that high values indicate

isolationist/protectionist views.[15] As expected from the more detailed analyses, the

ultranationalists and, especially, the restrictive nationalists, scored significantly higher on these

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[14] Our initial reaction to this finding was that there must be an error, but after checking it thoroughly, we suspect that it reflects a republican bias that may limit the creedal nationalists' support for multiculturalism (compared to what one would expect from respondents who were equally liberal and well educated) . This would appear to belie the finding that the creedal nationalists are twice as likely as the ultranationalists to believe that it is better for groups to maintain their distinct cultures and traditions. Note, however, that while respondents are fairly evenly split on the latter item, only one in six favor government funding of ethnic-minority cultures, and responses to the two items are correlated The two multiculturalism measures – assimilation vs. distinctness and government support for ethnic cultures – are correlated at low levels (.177 in the full GSS sample, .164 in the subsample used in our analyses), suggesting that they are tapping distinct measures of opinion. Both, however, are associated with liberalism (for which, of course, we control in our regression models).

[15] Items included reactions to items about whether American television stations should give preference to American films; American schools should teach foreign languages; America should exclude illegal immigrants; America should limit imports of foreign products; foreigners should be forbidden to own land; the U.S. should let in more or fewer legal immigrants; whether it is better for cultural groups to remain distinct or to assimilate; ethnic minorities should be given government support to maintain traditions; and the U.S. should accept refugees.

scales than the creedal or reserved nationalists. Ethnocultural qualifications on "true-American" status and invidious nationalism were significantly related to xenophobic and isolationist posit- ions. Just as pride in America is associated with positive views of immigration, it is related to a more open posture towards the rest of the world. Once again, when class assignments and attitude scales are entered simultaneously into the model, coefficients for the nationalist-attitude scales remain statistically significant, whereas those for class assignments do not.

*Foreign Policy.* Three items focus on issues related to the strength of American sover- eignty – a general statement asserting that the U.S. should pursue its national interest even when that leads to international conflict; a question about NAFTA; and a hypothetical about whether the U.S. should grant international bodies the power to enforce environmental agreements. Con- sistent with their high scores on invidious nationalism, the restrictive nationalists and ultranation- alists were significantly more likely than either the creedal or reserved nationalists to endorse the position that the U.S. should follow its own interests at all costs. The restrictive nationalists and, surprisingly, the reserved nationalists were more likely to oppose NAFTA. There were no sig- nificant differences in the coefficients predicting opposition to giving international bodies envir- onmental enforcement powers. When the three items were scaled (Table 7), ultranationalists and restrictive nationalists were significantly more protective of U.S. sovereignty than creedal nationalists, with reserved nationalists in between. Of the nationalist-dimension scales, only invidious nationalism (which includes support of the view that the U.S. should go its own way in international affairs) was a significant predictor. When the scales and the class assignments were both included in the models, the impact of invidious nationalism remained strong, accounting for the entire difference between restrictive nationalists and ultranationalists; but the reserved nationalists were significantly more isolationist than the creedal nationalists.

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*Summary*.  Several conclusions emerge from these analyses.   First, the external validity of the classes that emerged from the LCA analyses is supported by the fact that the respondent's class assignment significantly influences a wide range of social and policy positions.  These significant effects are observed *after* controlling for a wide range of sociodemographic variables, for political party identification, for ideological self-identification, and for religious faith.

Second, the versions of nationalism associated with each class represent distinctive blends of attitudes and sentiments.   Consistent with previous research, invidious nationalism and ethnocultural nationalism are associated with prejudice and xenophobia; whereas pride in national achievements is associated with a more open and engaged posture both to American minorities and to the world at large.

Third, nationalism seems more closely linked to evaluations and affective responses than to policy preferences, especially in the area of race relations and social welfare policy.  Racial attitudes are strongly affected by nationalism type, yet the classes do not differ significantly (after controls) in their racial or social-welfare policy preferences.

Fourth, even after controls, restrictive nationalists and, to a lesser extent, ultranationalists differ significantly from creedal nationalists on a wide range of attitudes related to race, immigration, and America's relation to the world.  Indeed, creedal nationalists differ significantly from restrictive nationalists on fourteen of the twenty-eight items that we investigated; and from the ultranationalists on ten of twenty-eight.

Fifth, the pattern of difference suggests that the combination of strong concern with boundaries and invidious nationalism and relatively weak pride in the nation's accomplishments that characterizes the restrictive nationalists generalizes to negative views of internal minorities and of immigrants, as well as fear of all kinds of penetration of the nation's boundaries; whereas

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the creedal nationalists universalistic standards for inclusion in the American polity and strong pride in American achievements militates towards an openness both to domestic difference and to international contact. Note, however, that this is not simply to say that creedal nationalists are liberals and restrictive nationalists conservatives: The differences we describe are observed *after* controlling for partisan identification, liberal-conservative self-identification and many other factors.

Sixth, pride in the nation's accomplishments and national attachment may inoculate Americans to some degree against the most extreme forms of racial or ethnic exclusion and xenophobia. We see this in the fact that the most fervently nationalist Americans – the ultranationalists – are less extreme on these dimensions that the restrictive nationalists. It is also evident in the tendency of the *least* nationalist set of respondents to express somewhat more prejudiced views of African-Americans and somewhat less positive views of the impact of immigration on U.S. economy and culture.

### Do Classes Organize the Nation Domain in Different Ways?

Having identified classes with distinctive patterns of nationalistic attitudes and sentiments, in this section we ask if members of these classes appear to organize the nationalism domain in different ways. By this, we mean, are their attitudes towards the nation linked to one another and to other beliefs (for example, about immigration or social welfare) in different ways. We believe that we can make inferences about groups' understandings of nationalism by understanding how particular attitudes covary within them. For example, if members of one group who express high levels of national attachment are more likely to oppose immigration, whereas members of another group who express high levels of national attachment are more likely to favor it, we can infer that the two groups understand the meaning of America in

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different ways --- in one case viewing it as vulnerable and under siege; in the other case understanding it as magnanimous and welcoming.   If attitudes towards nation and immigrants are in turn linked to other attitudes (e.g. support for civil liberties or free market ideology) in different ways, we can begin to construct images of how groups organize knowledge and sentiment about the nation and how they connect it to other domains.

We must do this very tentatively, because of problems associated with using LCA to identify classes.   LCA by design minimizes correlations between the attitude measures that are used to partition the sample – directly by attempting to optimize local independence (absence of correlation among variables within each class) and indirectly by clustering respondents with similar responses, thus reducing within-class variance.   Thus we should not find any significant correlations among variables within a class (except those for which the assumption of independence was relaxed *a priori*); and we should expect to find relatively low within-class correlations (due to truncated variance) between attitudes towards nationalism and attitudes towards other policy issues.   Nonetheless we look for variation in correlations of nationalism attitudes and other social attitudes and policy opinions; and also comment upon the implications of the patterns of response that characterize each class.

The latter are relatively simple.   For both the ultranationalists and the reserved nationalists appear to treat all kinds of nationalism – attachment, identity and boundaries, pride, and invidious comparison – as a single dimension.   From the standpoint of these groups, it makes sense that if one has pride in one's country's achievements and feels close to that country, one will prefer one's country to and defend it against others, and view national identity as a gift to be guarded closely – and that, conversely, the absence of each of these beliefs and sentiments implies the absence of all the others.   It is not that these respondents make no distinctions (the

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ultranationalists, for example, are less proud of social security than of the nation's other achievements) but that they are especially nationalistic in every respect (so that they are more likely to be proud of social security than are members of other classes). Similarly, the reserved nationalists are less willing to restrict the "truly American" to any particular characteristic than are members of other classes, yet they are more likely to treat citizenship or knowledge of English as a criterion than American nativity or Christian faith.

The restrictive nationalists and the creedal nationalists also have something in common: They decouple national pride from the desire to place restrictions upon American identity. Unlike the ultranationalists and the reserved nationalists, these groups do not seem to experience a connection between these two dimensions of nationalism. Because both are high on national attachment, this also implies a different logic of connection between attachment and other beliefs: For the restrictive nationalists, one's attachment is reflected in a desire to protect, restrict and defend. For the creedal nationalists, it is expressed in pride and openness to diversity.

Table 8 shows the results of separate models predicting a range of scaled social and policy attitudes for each class. Nationalism attitudes are independent variables predicting the other attitudes. Our focus here is on cases in which coefficients for two classes are notably different, suggesting different logics connecting types of attitude. We report regression coefficients from a model including only the nationalism scales; and coefficients from a model also including age, gender, race and ethnicity, whether the respondent was born in the U.S., age, years of schooling, income, party self-identification, ideological self-identification, religion, and region of residence. (See Appendix Table 1 for more detailed information about the attitude scales and their components.) Insofar as LCA has aligned respondents with different nation-schema --- i.e. respondents who organize the domain of information and sentiment about the nation and their

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relationship to it differently – we would expect that linkages between this domain and others would likewise vary. Whether coefficients from the model without or with controls are better indicators is debatable: Given that our primary interest is in the relationship among beliefs and sentiments rather than explaining their causes, we tend to favor the model without controls. At the same time, one may argue that the model with controls is preferable insofar as it reduces the possibility of spurious correlation.

*Racial attitudes*. The racial attitudes scale includes items including social attitudes towards race, with high values indicating higher levels of racial prejudice and antagonism. Invidious nationalism was significantly related to racism (in both models) for the restrictive nationalists, but not for others. The strongest contrast was to the ultranationalists, for whom invidious nationalism was a negative predictor. The restrictive nationalists also expressed more negative attitudes towards African-Americans if they were higher on the civic nationalism scale, but, oddly, not ethnocultural nationalism. By contrast, the reserved nationalists who ranked higher on the ethnocultural "true American" scale had more antagonistic racial attitudes in both models (though class means on this scale were relatively low). In the model with controls, ultranationalists with higher values on the civic-nationalism scale reported significantly more positive attitudes towards African-Americans. Perhaps reserved nationalists and restrictive nationalists (for whom measures of nationalism are associated with negative views of Blacks) link African-Americans more strongly to immigrants and to others they view as outsiders, whereas creedal nationalists (for whom no measure of nationalism was related to racial antagonism)and ultranationalists view African-Americans (who tend to have resided in the U.S. for generations and who are overwhelmingly Christian) as part of the national "us," in contrast to immigrants and other outsiders.

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*Policies related to race*.  For creedal nationalists, several forms of nationalism – civic responses to the "true American" items, national pride, and invidious nationalism – were associated with opposition to public policies favoring African-Americans, although only before the introduction of sociodemographic controls.  This finding tends to disconfirm the suggestion that creedal nationalists view African-Americans as part of the national "us" (in which case negative attitudes towards them would not be linked to representations of nation).  It is possible that for creedal nationalists who score relatively high on (for the class) on these measures, they may be linked to a form of "symbolic racism" (Kinder and Sears 1981).  By contrast, among ultranationalists invidious nationalism is significantly related (before controls) to *support* for public policies meant to benefit African-Americans, reinforcing the inference (from responses to the racial attitude measures) that ultranationalists include African-Americans in the American "we."

*Attitudes toward immigration*.  The immigration scale consists of five items that explore respondents' views of immigrants and immigration, scaled so that high values reflect antagonism to immigration.  Invidious nationalism is negatively associated with opposition to immigration for every class but the ultranationalists – and for the restrictive and reserved nationalists it is associated significantly with anti-immigrant views in both models.  After controls are introduced, the difference between the restricted and reserved nationalists and the ultranationalists in the effect of invidious nationalism on attitudes towards immigration becomes significant – again, suggesting that (at the high end of the range that the ultranationalists occupy) nationalist views are not necessarily connected to conservative social attitudes.  Belying this interpretation, how-

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## Table 8: Separate Regressions Predicting Social and Policy Attitudes by Class

| | **Racial Attitudes** | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Restrictive | | Reserved | | Creedal | | Ultra | |
| | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls |
| Feeling close to US | -0.046 | -0.114 | -0.027 | -0.041 | -0.024 | -0.037 | 0.048 | 0.083 |
| | (0.078) | (0.084) | (0.067) | (0.075) | (0.063) | (0.072) | (0.097) | (0.109) |
| True American scale: civic | 0.235 | 0.370* | -0.053 | -0.023 | 0.030 | -0.010 | -0.722 | -1.243* |
| | (0.145) | (0.161) | (0.058) | (0.069) | (0.080) | (0.092) | (0.408) | (0.501) |
| True American scale: ethnocultural | -0.000 | -0.011 | 0.191* | 0.209* | 0.057 | 0.097 | 0.018 | 0.125 |
| | (0.099) | (0.104) | (0.074) | (0.085) | (0.055) | (0.062) | (0.096) | (0.117) |
| National pride scale | 0.182 | 0.003 | 0.147 | 0.033 | 0.220 | 0.153 | -0.098 | -0.436 |
| | (0.148) | (0.157) | (0.098) | (0.112) | (0.119) | (0.130) | (0.247) | (0.287) |
| Invidious nationalism scale | 0.466*** | 0.298* | 0.083 | 0.032 | 0.082 | 0.058 | -0.166 | -0.198 |
| | (0.113) | (0.120) | (0.069) | (0.074) | (0.088) | (0.104) | (0.166) | (0.208) |
| Intercept | 0.079 | 0.193 | 0.061 | 0.762 | -0.060 | 0.299 | 0.745 | 1.707 |
| | (0.279) | (0.702) | (0.211) | (0.418) | (0.219) | (0.445) | (0.512) | (0.887) |
| N | 169 | 145 | 166 | 148 | 162 | 140 | 87 | 79 |
| R-sq | 0.118 | 0.380 | 0.071 | 0.318 | 0.039 | 0.277 | 0.055 | 0.544 |

| | **Racial Policies** | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Restrictive | | Reserved | | Creedal | | Ultra | |
| | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls |
| Feeling close to US | -0.049 | 0.050 | -0.088 | -0.078 | 0.118 | 0.094 | -0.091 | -0.048 |
| | (0.123) | (0.136) | (0.090) | (0.097) | (0.110) | (0.137) | (0.170) | (0.312) |
| True American scale: civic | -0.141 | 0.336 | -0.052 | -0.055 | 0.273* | 0.260 | 0.190 | -0.796 |
| | (0.228) | (0.316) | (0.075) | (0.087) | (0.136) | (0.165) | (0.640) | (0.967) |
| True American scale: ethnocultural | -0.268 | -0.126 | 0.158 | 0.080 | 0.018 | 0.032 | -0.275 | -0.087 |
| | (0.164) | (0.169) | (0.098) | (0.110) | (0.092) | (0.101) | (0.193) | (0.249) |
| National pride scale | 0.031 | -0.190 | -0.099 | -0.177 | 0.471* | 0.276 | -0.102 | -0.113 |
| | (0.201) | (0.209) | (0.130) | (0.130) | (0.190) | (0.204) | (0.440) | (0.706) |
| Invidious nationalism scale | 0.285 | 0.279 | 0.071 | 0.192 | 0.480** | 0.256 | -0.641* | -0.161 |
| | (0.202) | (0.223) | (0.093) | (0.110) | (0.152) | (0.187) | (0.267) | (0.468) |
| Intercept | 0.295 | -1.199 | 0.147 | -0.482 | -0.313 | -0.797 | 0.922 | -0.468 |
| | (0.459) | (1.323) | (0.282) | (0.593) | (0.391) | (0.951) | (0.833) | (2.202) |
| N | 83 | 72 | 93 | 85 | 86 | 76 | 42 | 38 |
| R-sq | 0.056 | 0.644 | 0.068 | 0.528 | 0.203 | 0.594 | 0.177 | 0.816 |

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**Social Welfare**

| | Restrictive | | Reserved | | Creedal | | Ultra | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls |
| Feeling close to US | 0.076 | 0.025 | 0.037 | 0.103 | 0.070 | -0.010 | -0.062 | -0.014 |
| | (0.098) | (0.113) | (0.071) | (0.074) | (0.101) | (0.105) | (0.117) | (0.125) |
| True American scale: civic | -0.243 | -0.195 | 0.131 | 0.141 | 0.012 | 0.040 | -0.167 | -0.166 |
| | (0.193) | (0.215) | (0.068) | (0.073) | (0.128) | (0.130) | (0.499) | (0.495) |
| True American scale: ethnocultural | -0.138 | 0.029 | -0.094 | -0.066 | -0.145 | -0.204* | 0.058 | -0.029 |
| | (0.122) | (0.144) | (0.072) | (0.078) | (0.088) | (0.095) | (0.140) | (0.172) |
| National pride scale | 0.083 | -0.090 | 0.266* | 0.187 | -0.027 | -0.055 | -0.345 | -0.074 |
| | (0.174) | (0.215) | (0.110) | (0.109) | (0.186) | (0.189) | (0.338) | (0.420) |
| Invidious nationalism scale | 0.020 | 0.035 | 0.100 | 0.102 | 0.300* | 0.086 | -0.664*** | -0.318 |
| | (0.156) | (0.178) | (0.079) | (0.090) | (0.135) | (0.146) | (0.184) | (0.242) |
| Intercept | -0.024 | -1.707 | 0.002 | -0.868 | -0.107 | -1.647* | 0.978 | -1.568 |
| | (0.372) | (0.951) | (0.230) | (0.451) | (0.351) | (0.687) | (0.555) | (1.241) |
| N | 162 | 134 | 177 | 162 | 157 | 140 | 97 | 88 |
| R-sq | 0.025 | 0.367 | 0.081 | 0.403 | 0.058 | 0.440 | 0.152 | 0.479 |

**Immigration**

| | Restrictive | | Reserved | | Creedal | | Ultra | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls |
| Feeling close to US | 0.056 | 0.102 | -0.128* | -0.084 | 0.001 | 0.039 | 0.241* | 0.133 |
| | (0.068) | (0.078) | (0.059) | (0.064) | (0.068) | (0.076) | (0.094) | (0.105) |
| True American scale: civic | 0.016 | -0.147 | 0.044 | 0.109 | -0.006 | 0.006 | -0.313 | -0.125 |
| | (0.126) | (0.149) | (0.057) | (0.064) | (0.088) | (0.098) | (0.425) | (0.476) |
| True American scale: ethnocultural | 0.085 | 0.018 | 0.329*** | 0.235** | 0.228*** | 0.174* | 0.124 | -0.004 |
| | (0.085) | (0.098) | (0.061) | (0.071) | (0.062) | (0.071) | (0.106) | (0.136) |
| National pride scale | -0.225 | -0.099 | -0.145 | -0.173 | -0.146 | -0.072 | -0.956*** | -0.846* |
| | (0.132) | (0.160) | (0.092) | (0.099) | (0.130) | (0.144) | (0.258) | (0.325) |
| Invidious nationalism scale | 0.304** | 0.342** | 0.308*** | 0.166* | 0.277** | 0.159 | 0.174 | -0.085 |
| | (0.101) | (0.113) | (0.068) | (0.078) | (0.092) | (0.108) | (0.153) | (0.194) |
| Intercept | -0.016 | 0.603 | 0.482** | 0.976** | -0.108 | 0.550 | 0.067 | -0.134 |
| | (0.249) | (0.628) | (0.185) | (0.364) | (0.236) | (0.480) | (0.474) | (0.873) |
| N | 246 | 205 | 245 | 220 | 232 | 203 | 144 | 128 |
| R-sq | 0.055 | 0.217 | 0.250 | 0.395 | 0.097 | 0.296 | 0.133 | 0.324 |

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**Attitudes towards the rest of the world**

| | Restrictive | | Reserved | | Creedal | | Ultra | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls |
| Feeling close to US | 0.004 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.100* | 0.058 | 0.056 | 0.040 |
| | (0.043) | (0.051) | (0.041) | (0.044) | (0.048) | (0.049) | (0.056) | (0.059) |
| True American scale: civic | 0.056 | 0.064 | -0.030 | 0.015 | 0.003 | -0.011 | -0.155 | -0.150 |
| | (0.080) | (0.096) | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.062) | (0.064) | (0.256) | (0.273) |
| True American scale: ethnocultural | -0.065 | -0.081 | 0.257*** | 0.223*** | 0.138** | 0.063 | 0.094 | -0.002 |
| | (0.053) | (0.064) | (0.043) | (0.049) | (0.043) | (0.046) | (0.061) | (0.074) |
| National pride scale | -0.046 | 0.013 | -0.024 | -0.039 | -0.122 | -0.113 | -0.595*** | -0.225 |
| | (0.081) | (0.100) | (0.060) | (0.064) | (0.091) | (0.093) | (0.156) | (0.188) |
| Invidious nationalism scale | 0.143* | 0.109 | 0.252*** | 0.160** | 0.157* | -0.018 | 0.027 | -0.072 |
| | (0.064) | (0.074) | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.064) | (0.069) | (0.092) | (0.111) |
| Intercept | 0.194 | 0.005 | -0.038 | 0.607* | -0.330* | 0.223 | 0.491 | 0.297 |
| | (0.156) | (0.415) | (0.129) | (0.256) | (0.164) | (0.309) | (0.286) | (0.502) |
| N | 257 | 215 | 260 | 233 | 238 | 209 | 148 | 132 |
| R-sq | 0.025 | 0.108 | 0.254 | 0.388 | 0.089 | 0.399 | 0.106 | 0.320 |

**Foreign Policy**

| | Restrictive | | Reserved | | Creedal | | Ultra | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls | Scales only | With Controls |
| Feeling close to US | -0.065 | -0.075 | 0.004 | 0.037 | 0.068 | 0.105 | -0.009 | -0.073 |
| | (0.054) | (0.061) | (0.049) | (0.052) | (0.059) | (0.065) | (0.080) | (0.086) |
| True American scale: civic | 0.098 | -0.013 | -0.055 | -0.040 | -0.116 | -0.141 | 0.214 | 0.176 |
| | (0.101) | (0.114) | (0.046) | (0.051) | (0.076) | (0.084) | (0.362) | (0.394) |
| True American scale: ethnocultural | 0.005 | -0.079 | 0.142** | 0.037 | 0.131* | 0.020 | 0.036 | -0.006 |
| | (0.067) | (0.075) | (0.052) | (0.058) | (0.053) | (0.060) | (0.088) | (0.108) |
| National pride scale | -0.138 | -0.159 | 0.025 | 0.032 | 0.171 | 0.121 | -0.229 | -0.236 |
| | (0.102) | (0.118) | (0.073) | (0.077) | (0.112) | (0.123) | (0.218) | (0.265) |
| Invidious nationalism scale | 0.128 | 0.017 | 0.319*** | 0.298*** | 0.172* | 0.083 | -0.087 | -0.354* |
| | (0.080) | (0.087) | (0.055) | (0.060) | (0.080) | (0.091) | (0.130) | (0.161) |
| Intercept | 0.292 | 1.871*** | 0.142 | 0.966** | -0.356 | -0.659 | 0.300 | 1.133 |
| | (0.197) | (0.489) | (0.155) | (0.306) | (0.203) | (0.407) | (0.404) | (0.726) |
| N | 259 | 216 | 261 | 234 | 237 | 208 | 148 | 132 |
| R-sq | 0.025 | 0.244 | 0.167 | 0.320 | 0.079 | 0.289 | 0.016 | 0.335 |

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001

*Source: 1996 General Social Survey*

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ever, national attachment *is* significantly linked to anti-immigrant beliefs for the ultranationalists,

although only in the model without sociodemographic controls. By contrast (and also only in

model 1), national attachment is more strongly connected to positive attitudes towards immigration among the reserved nationalists – perhaps suggesting nonlinear effects at the bottom and top of the national-attachment range. Support for ethnocultural restrictions on "true American" identity is predictive of negative attitudes towards immigration in both models for reserved and creedal nationalists, again suggesting that ethnocultural nationalism may be an especially salient belief for creedal nationalists who possess more of it than their peers -- but not for ultranationalists, for whom the coefficient becomes nonsignificantly negative with controls. Again, ultranationalists are notable for the absence of a link that appears in other classes between a dimension of nationalism and conservative social attitudes.

*Social welfare policy*. This scale comprises three items, rescaled so that high values signify conservative views (opposition to government assistance): whether government should do more to help the poor, whether government should do more to help the sick, and whether it should do more to help solve social problems. The reserved nationalists express more conservative positions (before controls) insofar as they are relatively high (within their truncated range) in national pride. Nationalist attitudes are unrelated to policy preferences in this area for restrictive nationalists. Creedal nationalists are *less* supportive of expanded government programs (in model 1) if they score higher on invidious nationalism, and *more* so (in model 2) to the extent that they endorse ethnocultural restrictions on "true-American" identity. Once again, a measure of nationalism (in this case invidious nationalism) is significantly related to a more liberal position (before the introduction of sociodemographic controls) for the ultranationalists, representing a statistically significant difference from creedal nationalists. For ultranationalists, some nationalist views may be linked to a more communitarian conception of the nation (both in terms of breadth of membership and in terms of mutual obligation).

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*Attitudes towards relations with the rest of the world.*  One might expect nationalism to be associated with a protectionist stance toward the rest of the world.   Not surprisingly, invidious nationalism – the view the America is superior to other countries and requires citizens' unwavering loyalty – was significantly related to isolationist views for every class but the ultranationalists.   Only for the reserved nationalists did the effect survive the introduction of controls, rendering this group significantly different from both the creedal nationalists and ultranationalists in the second model.   Ethnocultural nationalism was significantly related to isolationism for the reserved nationalists as well (in both models), and for the creedal nationalists (only in the model without controls).   National attachment was also related (before controls) to isolationism for the creedal liberals.   For ultranationalists (before the introduction of controls), national pride was strongly associated with more liberal attitudes towards the rest of the world.

*Foreign policy.*   Is nationalism related to commitment to national sovereignty in different ways for different classes?   A foreign policy scale included three items, scaled so that high values reflected unwillingness to surrender sovereignty.   The items tapped respondents' opinions about NAFTA, about whether international bodies should ever have the right to enforce environmental agreements, and whether the U.S. should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflict with other countries.  As with attitudes towards the world at large, nationalist attitudes – and specifically ethnocultural restrictions on the "true-American label" and invidious nationalism – most strongly affected the reserved nationalists and creedal nationalists, the classes that scored lowest on these characteristics  -- with only invidious nationalism surviving the introduction of sociodemographic controls and only for the reserved nationalists.   No type of nationalism bore any relation to foreign-policy attitudes for the restricted nationalists or, with only attitudes in the model, the ultranationalists.  With the introduction of sociodemographic

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controls, however, invidious nationalism actually became negatively associated with isolationist views for this group.

*Summary*.   Research on nationalism and related attitudes has largely failed to explore the possibility that different attitudes and sentiments mean different things to different respondents, who organize them into distinct narratives.  The sole studies we found in an extensive review were Parker's (2007b) analysis of the views of California's whites, Blacks, and Hispanics and Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin and Pratto's (1997) study comparing the relationship between nationalism and racial attitudes for Blacks and whites.  The former study reported that whereas, for whites, what the author calls constructive, conventional, and blind patriotism constituted separate and mutually exclusive varieties of patriotism, for Blacks and Hispanics the three are positively correlated.   The latter found that national pride was related to ethnic pride and racism for whites, whereas it was negatively associated with ethnic pride and positively linked to egalitarianism for African-Americans.

Rather than assume that heterogeneity in the construction of the nationalism domain hews to the contours of a single kind of identity like race and ethnicity, we identified classes of respondents inductively and then explored variation in attitudes within each class.   The advantage of this approach is that it can capture variation that is unrelated to any single identity. The disadvantage is that it leaves us with truncated variance in the nationalism measures. Nonetheless, our results persuade us that this is a productive line of inquiry and that generalizations about associations among attitudes based on national samples are likely to be misleading.  We found provocative differences among the classes in the relationship between dimensions of nationalist thought and sentiment, on the one hand, and policy preferences on the other.  The restrictive nationalists, not surprisingly, linked invidious nationalism to views of local

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and international outgroups, including African-Americans, immigrants and foreigners. In this respect, they were very much like the reserved nationalists despite the fact that the restrictive nationalists were high in invidious nationalism whereas the reserved nationalists were particularly low on this dimension. This result is one of several that underscore the difference between modal belief and schematic logic, by which we refer to the way in which beliefs are linked into a sensible narrative. Support for ethnocultural restrictions also had especially strong effects on the views of the reserved and creedal nationalists, again despite their relatively low support for such restrictions overall. By contrast, ultranationalists appeared to decouple nationalist views from policy preferences, even preferences (like views of immigration or national sovereignty) to which they would seem connected; or, in some cases, to link positive and protective views of the nation to more liberal views. Further analysis is required to explore the meaning of these patterns.[16]

## Summary and Conclusions

### *Major findings*

To our knowledge, this paper undertakes the most thorough analysis of the most complete data containing attitudes on dimensions of national self-understanding and sentiment from a national

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[16] In analyses available on request, we also tested for the presence of interaction effects between class assignment and dimensions of nationalism (with all of the usual covariates controlled). Because multiple interactions increased collinearity to unacceptable levels, we were only able to test for interactions with one of the nationalism-dimension scales at a time. With five nationalist-attitude scales, three class-assignment measures (the creedal nationalists being the omitted category), and six dependent variables, we tested ninety interactions in all. Of these, eight were statistically significant at $p \leq .05$, just a few more than one would expect by chance. Three of these were strongly negative interactions between invidious nationalism and membership in the ultranationalist class (for racial, welfare, and foreign policies), reinforcing the finding that invidious nationalism was significantly less strongly associated with conservative positions on policy issues (or even associated with liberal positions) for ultranationalists than for the creedal nationalists. Given the high scores of the ultranationalists on invidious nationalism, a reasonable interpretation is that the impact of invidious nationalism tapers off or reverses in the highest part of the range. National attachment and national pride were associated with more positive views of policies intended to help African-Americans for the reserved nationalists but not for others – perhaps suggesting a stronger liberalizing impact of these measures at the lower end of the range (where the reserved nationalists controlled the franchise).

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sample of Americans.   It is also, to our knowledge, the first to employ Latent Class Analysis, a method that has enabled us to identify the way that combinations of attitudes are held by sets of concrete persons.   Taking this approach has enabled us to affirm and extend some of the results of previous research, while also making discoveries at odds with much of the existing literature.

Our study converges with and extends previous work by strongly confirming that there are very different forms of national self-understandings, and that nationalist attitudes and sentiments (by which we refer to positive, protective, prideful and extensive views of the American nation) have different sources and different implications for views in other domains. Our work is most strongly consistent with previous research in demonstrating that a willingness to place ethnocultural restrictions on membership in the national community and what we call invidious nationalism are associated with prejudice towards African-Americans, negative views of immigrants and immigration, and isolationist and protectionists views of the rest of the world. We extent this work by demonstrating the effects of such views (or differences among classes of Americans who hold and do not hold such views, respectively) on attitudes towards such matters as NAFTA, unilateralism in foreign policy, cultural and economic protectionism, America's obligations to refugees, multiculturalism, language teaching in the schools, and multiculturalism, We also demonstrate that, as one moves away from matters of value and sentiment towards more pragmatic policy preferences (for example, attitudes towards government spending on health and social welfare) nationalism becomes decreasingly relevant.

Our findings also diverge from the results of previous research in several respects.  Many observers of nationalism have noted the relative integrity of such intellectual traditions and tendencies as ethnoculturalism, creedal nationalism, republicanism, and so on – and have also observed that statistical measures of persons' adherence to such views are associated (as we

ourselves have reported) with attitudes towards minorities, immigration, and other social issues. In so doing, they have sometimes written as if such attitudes mapped neatly onto natural persons, so that one can understand the politics of nationalism as a debate, for example, between Americans who place their faith in the American creed and those who (consciously or unconsciously) view America as a white, Protestant Republic. Some scholars of nationalism, most notably Rogers Brubaker (2004), have criticized this view, but their arguments have not yet penetrated empirical research on social attitudes.

The innovation of this study in this respect is in using Latent Class Analysis to decouple the problem of how attitudes cluster empirically into coherent forms, on the one hand, and the patterns that characterize the belief systems of concrete persons. Such patterns are often relatively untidy, compared to the ideological dimensions that make sense to specialists and observers, and the study of nationalism is no exception. Our analysis both affirms Brubaker's skepticism about the exhaustiveness and clarity of the distinction between ethnocultural and creedal nationalism *and* provides explicit estimates of the limits of this view. Essentially, we find that just over half of American adults (the 54.8 percent whom we describe as restrictive or creedal nationalists) hold positions that can be understood from this perspective. Nearly half (the 45.3 percent whom we describe as ultranationalists and reserved nationalists) either endorse promiscuously central tenets of both positions (the ultranationalists) or are only lukewarmly committed to any form of nationalist thought (the reserved nationalists). Perhaps most surprisingly, this somewhat alienated group constitutes (by a slim margin) the largest proportion of respondents to the 1996 GSS, with the restrictive nationalists – the group whose views fit the pattern of ethnocultural nationalism most strongly – nearly equal in size.

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The ethnocultural vs. creedal distinction captures imperfectly the views of even half of Americans of whom it is arguably descriptive.  A substantial majority of the creedal nationalists endorse the view that someone who does not speak English is not quite "truly American."  And we call the "restrictive nationalists" restrictive rather than ethnocultural because majorities endorse *all* of the restrictions on the definition of the "truly American" that the survey offers, and not simply place of birth, religion and language.

Our analysis also casts new light on the demographic, political and religious factors that predict the forms of nationalism to which Americans adhere.   Because we focus on predicting assignment to classes rather than positions on distinct attitudinal dimensions, we are in effect trying to explain how perspectives combine and map onto sets of persons who share similar views.   The most important findings are both positive and negative.

Positively, our results point to strong linkages between religious and national identity in the United States.  Belief that being Christian is very important to being truly American is the attitude that most strongly distinguishes between the creedal and reserved nationalists on the one hand and the restrictive and ultranationalists on the other.  And religious faith – especially, the affinity of Evangelical Protestants and of Catholics with ultranationalism – is an important predictor of class assignment.   Although American historians have long appreciated the deep connection between faith in God and faith in country, fewer social scientists have appreciated the significance of this link.

Negatively, the weak and counterintuitive effects of political party affiliation on national-ist views surprised us, especially given the increasing importance of partisan affiliation for many other value positions.   Moreover, we were especially surprised by the very strong affinity of re-spondents who identify as "strong Democrats" for ultranationalism.  Views of country, it would

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seem from this and other results, are only partially embedded in the value politics that occupy political culture warriors, perhaps genuinely above partisanship for many Americans.

Our study reveals signs that conventional patriotism may be undergoing a demographic transition, as ultranationalism is associated strongly with older Americans and the youth is positively associated with reserved nationalism. It would be premature to call this a trend – some currently disengaged young Americans may age into higher levels of nationalist commitment, or historical events may provoke a secular increase in patriotism. But as of the mid-1990s, the association between age and national self-understanding and sentiment was evident.

### *Limitations to findings*

Our confidence in the findings is limited by several factors. First, although the GSS data are the most complete we found in an extensive review, they are still imperfect. We see several problems:

1. For one thing, the measure of national attachment ("how close do you feel to America") barely gets at what, from a cognitive perspective, is the central issue – the proximity and degree of connectedness of the nation-schema and the self-schema. It should be replaced by a battery of items, informed by experimental research, that capture the degree of identification with the nation. Moreover, central to the notion of nationalism is that commitment to the nation take "precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion, economic interest, race or language…nationalism implies that membership in the nation is the most critical of all loyalties an individual carries as part of his or her political identity" (Citrin, Haas, Muste and Reingold 1994: 2). Therefore, it is essential to assess not only the degree of identification with the nation, but also the relative importance of national identification and competing forms

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of identification (for example, with a racial or ethnic group, with one's religious faith, or with one's profession).

2. The GSS items use the term "America" throughout, rather than the nation's actual name, the "United States of America." The term America is both associated with patriotic songs ("America," "God Bless America," "America the Beautiful") and symbols (the *American* flag, not the U.S. flag); and has also been the brunt of criticism both domestically (both white leftists and African nationalists have employed the corrupted forms, Amerika, Amerikka, and Amerikkka as terms of opprobrium) and hemispherically (by those who resent the appropriation of the name of two continents for U.S. nationals, against the claims of Canadians, Mexicans, and other Latin Americans). By contrast, the "United States" appears in government documents and correspondence, and is more commonly used in everyday bureaucratic and instrumental contexts. In other words, we suspect "America" is an affectively hot term that invokes the sacred site of nationhood; "United States" is a more quotidian term that invokes the profane elements of nationhood. If this suspicion is correct, then using "America" rather than "the United States" in survey items is likely to increase levels of identification, pride, and nationalist arousal for most respondents, and perhaps exacerbate negative affect and alienation for some others. A small survey with a split-sample design would be effective in testing this hypothesis.

3. The GSS "true American" series contains more items that tap ethnocultural forms of nationalism than civic nationalism. Creedal nationalism has been said to include commitment to political and racial tolerance, as well as respect for institutions and laws (Citrin, Reingold and Green 1990). Moreover, the republican tradition (Smith 1997; and for empirical support for the existence of this tradition in popular thought and discourse, see Theiss-Morse [1993] and Schild-kraut [2002]) suggests that participation in the political process is an obligation of membership in

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the national community. An adequate data set would include measures of the importance of political tolerance, support for freedom of expression, and political participation to qualification as a "true American." The "true American" items are further flawed because they conflate several rather different issues: The extent to which respondents believe certain qualities to be important parts of the definition of an American, their views of (a few) of the obligations of membership in the national community, and their willingness to exclude people from that community.

A second limitation of our study is that methods to detect the presence of heterogeneous schema – i.e., alternative narratives that link together elements of a person's understanding of a substantive domain like the nation, and link that domain to such other domains as self and family – are underdeveloped in the survey-research field. This is especially true if, as is almost always the case, no simple way of partitioning respondents based on demographic characteristics is likely to sort them into internally homogeneous groups. We employed Latent Class Analysis to partition our sample into classes. The result was successful in that LCA produced a partition that was both statistically acceptable in terms of conventional criteria and substantively meaningful. LCA partitions identify heterogeneous classes and identify the key patterns of item response that distinguish them from one another. Precisely because it classifies respondents in ways that dramatically reduce variance on key items, LCA limits the analyst's ability to address the second-order problem of how patterns of association between domain-specific attitudes and outside-domain attitudes (from which one may infer relations of relevance and entailment) vary between groups. Addressing this problem is essential to linking the study of opinion (which focuses on the distribution of attitudes throughout a population) to the study of culture (which focuses on the nature and distribution of narratives or schemata).

### *Beyond Attitudes*

Public opinion surveys provide an invaluable means of understanding the broad contours of national self-understanding in a manner that can be generalized across a large population. As such, they are indispensable in approaching the problem of American nationalism. At the same time, a comprehensive research program on nationalism requires an integration of three domains in which nationalism becomes manifest: (1) individual responses to social surveys; (2) nationalist talk and the deployment of nationalist symbols in social interaction; (3) and the appearance of nationalist symbols and cues in the broader social environment. To understand the translation of nationalist ideas into political action, one must understand the ways in which events trigger variation in nationalist talk and the symbolic environment, and how change in patterns of interaction and in the environment selectively arouse or deactivate competing conceptions of nation and citizenship.

To date, social scientists who study U.S. nationalism have focused more on survey data than on either interaction or the symbolic environment. Some of the most interesting survey studies have focused on the impact of events on change, with special attention to changes in national attitudes before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Smith, Rasinksi, and Toce [2001]; Rasinski, Berktold, Smith and Albertson [2002]; Schildkraut 2002) . Throughout U.S. history, nativism and xenophobia have increased in periods of political threat and economic privation (Higham 1983 [1955])  Rahn (2004) suggests that such events and their representation in the media affect the public mood (with individual variation in response depending on the extent to which national identity is central to personal identity), leading to increases in the volume of national talk and, potentially, to political mobilization. Consistent with this argument, Perrin (2005), in a creative analysis of letters sent to editors of a North Carolina newspaper,

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found that the attacks aroused an increase in both authoritarian *and* anti-authoritarian discourse, acting largely to stimulate concern in the national domain rather than dictating a particular response to that concern.

One limitation of survey-based attitude research is that (with the exception of studies employing survey experiments) it ordinarily assumes that particular understandings are chronically activated in particular respondents, so that survey responses are reasonably stable at the individual level. Yet most people understand and have access to the most broadly available cultural understandings of nation and citizenship, and in some people, at least, activation of alternative narratives may stand in relative balance. So one must ask what kinds of events and interactions are most likely to prime and elicit particular versions of nationalism. Experimental research has been useful in this regard. Li and Brewer (2004) were able to elicit significant variations in political tolerance and invidious nationalism by framing questions in terms of, reflectively, communitarian vs. essentialist notions of societal membership. Experimental research is also useful in revealing aspects of schematic organization that operate during automatic cognition, but which may be overridden by deliberation implicit in the survey situation. Devos and Banaji (2005), for example, demonstrated that U.S. college students of all races perceived whites (including white Europeans) as "more American" than African-Americans or Asian-Americans, even though they may have been unaware of this bias.

Direct observation of the social environment is an invaluable source of understanding. Billig (2004) calls attention to the importance of what he refers to as "banal nationalism," the "ideological habits which enable established nations of the West to be reproduced" through indexical expressions that constitute the state as a reified entity. Eliasoph (1998) and Eliasoph and Lichterman's (2003) exemplary work illuminates the ways in which social contexts elicit

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and reinforce differing representations of national citizenship. In addition to demonstrating that nationalism can be as much a feature of environments as of persons, such research also highlights the complexity of simple typologies: for example, both Billig (2004) and Brubaker (2004) demonstrate the interpenetration of civic and ethnocultural nationalism (and the difficulty of distinguishing between them) in concrete political talk and action.

The idea that nationalism is a feature of context as well as individual cognition guides our attention to the symbolic environment. Brubaker's (2004) definition of nationalism as a "set of idioms, practices, and possibilities…continuously available … in modern cultural and politic life" captures nicely the importance of the environment in priming and reinforcing individual understandings. Spillman's (1997) study of U.S. and Australia commemorations of nationhood highlights the varying representations of the nation and national membership that such settings summon to the attention of a nation's residents. A full understanding of American nationalism will require both an apprehension of the beliefs and sentiments that Americans reveal to survey researchers *and* an understanding of the social mechanisms that activate certain beliefs and sentiments in particular settings and engender their conversion into political action.

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## **Appendix Table 1: Descriptive statistics for additive scales***

| **chauv_s** | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Invidious nationalism scale (composed of **ambetterr, amcitiznr, belikeusr, ifwrongr**) | 909 | 0.659 | Min: Less chauvinist<br>Max: More chauvinist | 0.000 | 0.703 | -2.71 | 1.26 |

| **forpol_s** | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Foreign policy attitude scale (composed of **amownwayr nafta2 wrldgovt**) | 905 | 0.130 | Min: Internationalist<br>Max: Isolationist | 0.005 | 0.611 | -1.57 | 1.88 |

| **imm_s** | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Immigration attitude scale (composed of **immameco, immcrimer, immideas, immjobsr**) | 867 | 0.762 | Min: Pro-immigration<br>Max: Anti-immigration | 0.001 | 0.764 | -1.85 | 2.10 |

| **proud_s** | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| National pride scale (composed of **prouddemr, proudpolr, proudecor, proudsssr, proudscir, proudsptr, proudartr, proudmilr, proudhisr, proudgrpr**) | 909 | 0.817 | Min: Less proud<br>Max: More proud | 0.000 | 0.615 | -2.94 | 1.19 |

| **race_s** | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Racial attitude scale (composed of **racpushr, racsegr, blksimpr, raceant, wrkwayup**) | 584 | 0.567 | Min: Less racist<br>Max: More racist | -0.007 | 0.627 | -1.66 | 2.02 |

| **raceant** | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Racial antagonism scale (composed of **rachafr2, racmarr2, racpres**) | 594 | 0.490 | Min: Less antagonistic<br>Max: More antagonistic | 0.102 | 0.226 | 0.00 | 1.00 |

| **racpol_s** | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Race policy scale (composed of **affrmact, busing, racopenr, helpblk**) | 304 | 0.595 | Min: Progressive<br>Max: Conservative | 0.000 | 0.675 | -1.68 | 1.09 |

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| truamciv_s | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| True American scale - civic nationalism items (composed of **amcitr, amfeelr, amgovtr**) | 909 | 0.610 | Min: Less restrictive<br>Max: More restrictive | 0.000 | 0.749 | -3.62 | 0.62 |

| truamethn_s | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| True American scale - ethnic nationalism items (composed of **amborninr, amchrstnr, amlivedr**) | 909 | 0.793 | Min: Less restrictive<br>Max: More restrictive | 0.000 | 0.841 | -1.78 | 1.06 |

| welfr_s | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare policy scale (composed of **helpnot, helppoor, helpsick**) | 593 | 0.676 | Min: Government assistance<br>Max: Individual responsibility | -0.002 | 0.781 | -1.63 | 1.85 |

| world_s | N | Alpha | Values (min, max) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scale of attitudes toward rest of world (composed of **amtv, excldimmr, forlandr, forlang, importsr, letin1, meltpot1r, mincult, refugees**) | 903 | 0.663 | Min: Liberal/Internationalist<br>Max: Conservative/Protectionist | -0.002 | 0.525 | -2.12 | 1.30 |

* All scales are based on standardized items. Cases with missing values for half or more of the items in a given scale were omitted from the calculation of that scale. Scale values were created by dividing the sum of standardized item values by the number of items with valid values in that scale.

**Appendix Table 2: Predictors of the Belief**
**that Christian Faith is Very Important for being "Truly American"**

| | OLS Model | | | Logit Model | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coef. | Std. Err. | P>t | OR | Std. Err. | P>z |
| Age | 0.009 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 1.018 | 0.006 | 0.002 |
| Male | -0.070 | 0.073 | 0.334 | 0.878 | 0.152 | 0.454 |
| African-American | 0.640 | 0.180 | 0.000 | 3.839 | 1.705 | 0.002 |
| Hispanic | -0.172 | 0.206 | 0.406 | 0.850 | 0.397 | 0.729 |
| Other race | -0.051 | 0.234 | 0.828 | 0.897 | 0.515 | 0.851 |
| Born in the U.S. | 0.074 | 0.153 | 0.628 | 1.128 | 0.414 | 0.742 |
| Education | -0.085 | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.845 | 0.030 | 0.000 |
| Family income | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.042 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.011 |
| Strong Democrat | 0.139 | 0.153 | 0.367 | 1.162 | 0.442 | 0.693 |
| Democrat | -0.020 | 0.121 | 0.867 | 0.874 | 0.252 | 0.642 |
| Republican | 0.104 | 0.124 | 0.404 | 1.167 | 0.340 | 0.595 |
| Strong Republican | -0.032 | 0.159 | 0.838 | 1.340 | 0.504 | 0.437 |
| Liberal | -0.329 | 0.118 | 0.006 | 0.515 | 0.157 | 0.029 |
| Slightly liberal | -0.158 | 0.120 | 0.187 | 0.703 | 0.200 | 0.214 |
| Slightly conservative | 0.081 | 0.106 | 0.442 | 1.057 | 0.261 | 0.821 |
| Conservative | 0.196 | 0.110 | 0.076 | 1.408 | 0.366 | 0.188 |
| North Central | 0.177 | 0.108 | 0.099 | 1.388 | 0.351 | 0.194 |
| South Atlantic | 0.323 | 0.120 | 0.007 | 1.836 | 0.517 | 0.031 |
| South Central | 0.336 | 0.133 | 0.012 | 1.928 | 0.608 | 0.038 |
| Mountain Pacific | 0.115 | 0.113 | 0.310 | 1.173 | 0.318 | 0.556 |
| Black Protestant | 0.151 | 0.222 | 0.498 | 1.316 | 0.718 | 0.615 |
| Evangelical Protestant | 0.432 | 0.109 | 0.000 | 1.881 | 0.466 | 0.011 |
| Catholic | -0.011 | 0.109 | 0.917 | 0.914 | 0.219 | 0.706 |
| No religion | -0.867 | 0.141 | 0.000 | 0.144 | 0.060 | 0.000 |
| Other religion | -0.563 | 0.141 | 0.000 | 0.319 | 0.110 | 0.001 |
| _Intercept | 3.216 | 0.306 | 0.000 | - | - | - |
| N | 794 | | | 794 | | |
| Adj R2 / Pseudo R2 | 0.323 | | | 0.227 | | |

[1]OLS with ordinal dependent variable (amchristnr): from not important at all (0) to very important (4)
[2]Logit with binary dependent variable (amchristnr2): not important at all or not very important (0) vs. fairly important or very important (1)