ADMINISTRATION OF RELIEF ABROAD

A Series of Occasional Papers

THE NEAR EAST RELIEF
1915–1930

By JAMES L. BARTON

Edited by DONALD S. HOWARD

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

FOREWORD

This pamphlet is the second of a projected series of Occasional Papers under the editorship of Donald S. Howard, assistant director of the Charity Organization Department. It is intended to offer those interested in planning or administering relief abroad a digest of pertinent material prepared under auspices other than our own and not readily available. Some of the texts included in this series have never been published, some are out of print; since they are inaccessible to many readers, it has not been felt necessary to designate the exact pages quoted.

Restrictions upon the use of paper in the present emergency make it necessary sharply to limit the length of these Occasional Papers. The material has therefore been cut severely. Except for certain headings and subheadings, and insertions enclosed in brackets, the wording of the text is that of the original author. Only omissions *within* paragraphs are shown by dots. In order to give a consecutive, though curtailed account, the order of the paragraphs has sometimes been rearranged.

To the Macmillan Company the Russell Sage Foundation is deeply grateful for the fine-spirited co-operation which has made this pamphlet possible.

JOANNA C. COLCORD, *Director*
Charity Organization Department

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THE NEAR EAST RELIEF, 1915–1930[1]

Organization and Program

In October, 1915, . . . $100,000 had been cabled to . . . [Henry] Morgenthau [U.S. Ambassador to Turkey]. Upon receipt of the money, a committee was organized in Constantinople to allocate the funds to points of greatest need in the interior. The members were: the Ambassador; President Gates of Robert College, Chairman; Lewis Heck, of the American Embassy, Secretary; William W. Peet of the American Board, Treasurer; Mrs. George Huntington and Luther Fowle.

In Syria a committee of the members of the staff of Beirut University and the Presbyterian Mission combined into a distributing agency.

In Persia the early funds were remitted to a committee of American diplomatic, educational and missionary residents at Teheran and Tabriz.

It was definitely known that large masses of Armenians had fled from eastern Turkey and from Persia to the Russian Caucasus. Disease and famine were in their midst. Over two hundred thousand refugees were reported there, desperately in need and accessible. In this region there were no American institutions and no American residents except the United States government officials. Consul F. Willoughby Smith and his staff, stationed at Tiflis in Georgia, appealed for relief funds and workers and in response the Rockefeller Foundation co-operated by making a substantial appropriation. Work in the Caucasus was carried on in co-operation with the British Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Bryce.

The American missionary, educational and consular agents in . . . [Turkey], aided by some Swiss, German and Danish workers, organized relief units to reach the destitute. . . . Without this large force of experienced men and women available for immediate service, without expense to the general funds, familiar with the language and with local conditions, the relief work during the war would have been impossible, even though ample funds had been generously contributed, for the country was closed under stress of war to new workers.

No relief organization ever had a more experienced body of distributors at the crucial points of need and ready to function as soon as funds were available. The missionaries, educators, doctors and nurses in all areas understood the local languages and could speak without the use of interpreters to the

[1] Excerpts from Story of Near East Relief (1915–1930): An Interpretation. By James L. Barton. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930. 479 pp. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

people and the officials. They were deeply sympathetic with those to whom they ministered. Many of them had lived in the countries for from twenty to forty years. Some of them had had experience in distributing relief during previous periods of distress, which had been altogether too prevalent. Those regions had been afflicted by locusts, by drought, by political disaster and by the maladministration of governments, resulting in widespread suffering and need. Moreover, such workers were not suspected of having ulterior motives or of being political agents.

When America entered the war against the Central Powers, President Wilson, sympathetically interested in the American institutions, the American personnel and American influence in the Near East, withheld a formal declaration of war against Turkey and Turkey simply broke off diplomatic relations. For protection and compliance with international practice, the American relief workers who remained were made attachés of the Swedish Legation which had been charged with the care of American interests in Turkey. The breaking of diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1917, when America entered the war, did not affect the attitude of the Turkish government toward the relief work. Diplomatic representatives returned to America . . . but most of the other Americans remained at their stations.

All the distributors of relief overseas were supported by the organizations under which they were serving. No costs whatever for administration were charged against the funds of the [Near East] relief organization. This continued until the armistice.

After the armistice, when it became possible to send relief workers overseas, high ideals were maintained in the character and qualification of those who were appointed. For the new workers who were recruited, a booklet of general instructions was prepared as a guide for all personnel in their relations to the work and the peoples of the Near East. A few of these "suggestions" are quoted:

Be particularly careful in your attitude to the local personnel, at least as careful as you would be were they of your own race. It is so easy to grow impatient with them. Many a mistake arises from their thinking they understand you when they don't. Remember how very strange an American's aims, ideas, and methods are to them, especially when they have only a smattering of his language and understand very little of his culture and orientation. To expect too much is an error of judgment, while to condemn them wholesale is a ghastly self-revelation.

Never make a promise that you have not the intention and ability to carry out. A reputation for reliability and absolute veracity is the thing you should covet most, as it is that which will serve you best.

Always remember that it is nothing to your credit that the Americans have made some headway and have had chances which have not come the way of others. The only real "superiority" is that of service.

Do not lower moral standards or sully the fountains of idealism. The people of the Near East have an amazing capacity for learning by imitation. Their standards

are not unworthy. Every American man and woman has a high responsibility in this matter.

Be honest — scrupulously, pedantically honest — in all your dealings with the people of the Near East.

In dealing with the government officials be even more respectful than you would at home. Impoliteness is unpardonable.

Listen to real grievances, and do your best to remove them. To give a hearing will, in itself, save much discontent.

Needs to Be Met

[When] Ambassador Morgenthau returned to the United States on February 22, 1916, [he] . . . reported that there were a million or more Armenians who had survived in the Near East, a large part of whom were women, boys and girls. They were destitute, without sufficient clothing, without belongings of any kind and without food. He stated that they must be given help until they could recover their physical strength, find new homes and harvest new crops.

As most of the territory in which the [Near East Relief] . . . was operating was at that time under the military control of England, France and Italy, the Commission [sent to the Near East] proceeded first to London.

During the ten days of conference in London an understanding was reached with the British authorities by which the relief organization was to have the free use of the warehouses, docks, wharves and railways under British control in the Near East, and assurance was given that British officers and men in all areas would co-operate with the relief forces.

Bread was selling in Constantinople and in cities in the interior for more than twice the normal price. Speculators had cornered the small supply of grain. The Commission secured the co-operation of Howard Heinz, Mr. Hoover's representative, and the assistance of the American Relief Administration. It was arranged to bring shiploads of flour and sell it at cost, less than half the current price. Bakers were furnished with this flour provided they made it into bread and did not resell it. The press was informed that there was ample flour at reasonable prices and that it was being sold daily to any baker who would sell bread at a reasonable price. Each night the flour for the next day's bread was delivered. British and French soldiers watched the bakeries and reported upon the way they carried out the contract. Any baker who did not adhere to his agreement received no flour and was forced out of business by his competitors who were selling cheaper and better bread. The bakers who bought relief flour made fair profits on less capital and the Commission was receiving full cost price for the flour it sold. A carload of flour was sent to Konia. The speculators immediately dropped their prices and the flour was used for the orphanages and relief. Five hundred tons of flour [were] . . . sent to Samsun, about midway along the southern

shore of the Black Sea, which was the port for an extensive grain country in the interior. This was sufficient to break the speculative price of bread.

During the periods of actual deportation, it was almost impossible to aid in any way the unfortunate people as they were corralled and marched out of the cities and towns. . . . Boys and girls escaped from their village homes in terror and sought protection in the American buildings.

Two thousand refugee children were reported as living in churches or other buildings in the city of Aleppo and under the care of the relief workers. The refugees everywhere were without warm clothing or goods of any kind. For their very life they depended upon the protection and tolerance of the peoples in the new lands to which they had been driven.

The people commonly and casually referred to as refugees were before the war prosperous citizens of the Ottoman Empire, Persia and Russia. They were landowners, artisans, merchants, doctors, teachers and farmers, men and women of enterprise, with strong traditions of home life. Many were former students of American colleges.

[Because] well-armed Turkish patrols incessantly annoyed the inhabitants by raiding parties and finally lay siege to [Marash] . . . in January, 1920 . . . [the] French were forced ultimately to withdraw in the midst of winter when the passes were covered with snow and the panic-stricken people again marched to exile, a pathetic caravan of helpless, struggling, dying refugees. The scenes of these tragic days are described by Dr. Mabel Elliott, the American doctor in charge of the relief hospital in Marash:

With trembling hearts we stumbled out into the darkness. This was at 10:30 P.M., February 10, 1920.

It was difficult going . . . for the darkness blinded us and we did not follow the road, but went across rough fields, guided by hundreds of other marchers as lost as we were. We were not taking the long road to Aleppo. but were to strike out over the mountains in an attempt to reach Islahai.

Such a night; A turquoise sky flooded with moonlight over a white world, and across the snow, stretching as far as the eye could see, a line of camp fires, horses, wagons, soldiers, refugees, camels, donkeys, carts, all a mixture and confusion of sound and sight. We sat down to rest by a fire of straw and got colder and colder. The poor soldiers kept coming in with their frozen, wet feet to get a taste of fire, which was hardly warmer than candlelight. We had rested less than three-quarters of an hour when the order came to march. We did not stop again until late the next morning, and by that time we had begun to pass children and some women, dropping in the snow, unable to go on.

. . . On again, with no pause and no more food until we reached El Oghly at three o'clock that afternoon. . . . We slept in a mud house that night — At five in the morning we were on the march again. . . .

That night we camped at Bel Puvar. . . . At five o'clock, in the darkness, we were awakened — we must start at once; there was a blizzard. The swirling snow was so thick we could see only a few feet, and that with difficulty. Four thousand men were trying to get into line, more than 5,000 refugees were struggling in the confusion and terror. Screams of horses, shrieks of women who could not find

their children, wails of children wallowing in the snow alone, creaking of gun carriages, shouts of officers and men, sudden looming up of camels that grunted and bit, all coming out of a swirling whiteness. I thought of my nurses, of my patients from the hospital, women with new-born babies, struggling in that madness. Impossible to find anyone, to do anything. We got somehow into the frantic line and started on the long tramp. It lasted fourteen hours. In a very few hours we were passing the dying all along the way.

The column was quite quiet. There was hardly a sound for hours, except the scream of someone falling. Always, just when endurance broke, they screamed once as they fell. The column went on silently, leaving them there.

Armenian women have a way of carrying children on their backs, holding the two hands clutched against the mother's breast and the child's weight on the bent back. When children are carried in this way, almost always one sees their little bare feet, side by side. Working with refugees, I see this perhaps a hundred times a day, and never without remembering the road to Islahai. That morning we passed hundreds of mothers, carrying their children in this way. First a vague darkness in the swirling snow, then the mother's bent body, and the child's little bare feet. I would reach out and tuck them up in a corner of shawl or blanket as I went by. I do not know how many hours we had been walking, when I found the first dead child on its mother's back. I walked beside her, examining it; she trudged on, bent under the weight, doggedly lifting one foot and then the other through the snow, blind and deaf to everything. The child was certainly dead, and she did not know it. I spoke to her, touched her, finally shook her arm violently to arouse her. When she looked up I pointed to the child and said, "Finish." The mother seemed not to understand at first, trudged onward for a few steps, and then let go the child's hands. The body fell, and the mother went on, blind and deaf as before, all her life in that lifting of one foot after the other through the snow.

This was the first one. There were perhaps fifty more after that, always the same. No complaint, no protest, a little time to understand what had happened, and then a dumb letting go of the hands and the weight. Strength was so exhausted in these women who had carried their children so far, that there was no emotion left, simply the last shreds of animal endurance. If I had not spoken to them, they would have carried the dead until they dropped and died in the snow. . . .

Five thousand Armenians had left Marash, and perhaps a third of them lived to reach Islahai. . . . To understand the lives of these Armenians, remember that the evacuation of Marash was not an isolated calamity. . . . These people had lived through the deportations in Turkey during the war; for six years they had been suffering and dying as they suffered and died on the road to Islahai. It was those few months of anxious peace in Marash that was the novelty to them; those few months of patiently beginning again to rebuild ruined houses and broken lives. . . .

Racial, Religious, Political, and Other Problems

The Ottoman Empire was occupied by numerous races, each professing a different form of religion which was regarded not merely as a theological belief, but as a badge and mark of nationality. . . . Racial groups defended their religion as others might protect their national honor. The Turkish government recognized Mohammedanism as the national religion and the non-Moslem had no place in the political organization.

The non-Moslem populations throughout the country did not have confidence in the justice of the government or the administration of its rulers. The application of the laws was erratic, arbitrary and corrupt. Taxation was unjust and exorbitant, life and property were uncertain. Each non-Moslem must rely upon the protection and assistance of Moslem friends.

No country in history has been known to use mass killing during periods of special political or social stress as a method of governmental suppression and administration in the same measure as that practiced in the Ottoman Empire.

The Committee had to win the confidence of each and every one of the countries and secure the fullest possible co-operation of the people and the government officials. Strict neutrality, on the part of the Committee and the workers, as far as the war and political conditions were concerned, became absolutely imperative. No nationals of Turkey, Persia, Russia, Armenia or Greece were members of the Committee. It was an American committee organized for relief purposes alone.

Syria. In 1915, part of the deported Armenian population from the north was forced into Syria.

Syria was faced with actual starvation during the years of the war. Hundreds of deserted villages, scores of empty houses in every community, were found throughout the country when the blockade was lifted as General Allenby's army advanced northward to Aleppo.

The Americans early discovered that Jemal Pasha, the Turkish commander, had issued an order that no foreigner should give food to a native under penalty of arrest.

Although forbidden to organize a formal relief committee and adopt the usual measures for the distribution of food, there was a persistent personal effort on the part of each American to discover ways by which relief could reach those desperately in need. The Syrian and Armenian organizations were used. Under pretext that Syrians in America, not Americans, were sending foods, villages were aided. But within a short period the conditions became so distressing that Jemal Pasha relaxed and without withdrawing his original orders he ignored their enforcement, so that the Americans, without openly forming a committee, were permitted to carry on inconspicuous relief activities.

Armenia. In the spring of 1921, the Bolshevik army had subdued Georgia and the government at Moscow was in control of the entire Caucasus.

There was some reasonable doubt at first relative to the attitude of the Bolshevik government toward Americans and the relief work. All American official representatives and all foreigners in the Caucasus had withdrawn before the occupation of the country by the Red army. For some weeks the future of the relief work hung in the balance, with the weight of thousands

of helpless, hungry, orphaned children dragging on the scales. The question of personal safety was removed from the consideration of the problem by each one of the workers volunteering to remain on duty, whatever the consequences.

Soon . . . government officials . . . learned from the people who had been fed that the Americans were not political agents, but messengers of humanity; that they were not interested in the vicissitudes of government, but in the permanence of childhood.

The new government finally accepted the Americans and their work as evidence of good will — not hostility.

Within a year an agreement was arranged mutually which gave the Committee concessions and privileges not accorded to any other foreign company or organization. The conclusions were of such importance . . . that we quote here the most significant items from the agreement, entered into in 1922:

Agreement Between the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia and the Near East Relief

1. This agreement is between the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia, hereinafter referred to in this document as The Government, and The Near East Relief.

2. The Near East Relief is a purely humanitarian organization incorporated by special act of Congress of the United States of America. . . .

3. The Near East Relief has no political objective, motive or purpose, and neither represents nor promotes any particular form of political, social or industrial organization.

4. The Near East Relief has no commercial or financial objective. It does not promote, directly or indirectly, any private commercial or trade enterprise, and neither its trustees nor its contributors derive financial or commercial advantage from any of its activities.

5. The American personnel and workers with the Near East Relief derive no personal, financial or commercial advantage from any of its operations.

6. The funds and food supplies of the Near East Relief are contributed voluntarily by individuals as an expression of the spirit of human brotherhood actuated solely by a disinterested desire to help the dispossessed refugees, orphans and other less fortunate people.

7. Acting under the above-mentioned Congressional charter and motive, the Near East Relief and associated agencies have expended more than twenty-five million dollars in the area and for the benefit of the people of the Federated Republics of Transcaucasia.

8. The Near East Relief is willing to the full extent of its resources to continue this ministry of relief, desiring to render any service within its power toward the establishment of prosperity and economic advancement in the area of the Soviet Republic, with the full sympathy and co-operation of the Government.

9. Taking into consideration the above declaration of principles on the part of the Near East Relief, the Socialist Soviet Government of Armenia announces its desire to work in full and unreserved co-operation with the Near East Relief.

10. With the understanding that this paragraph does not modify or change any existing written contracts, the Government hereby confirms the tenancy and un-

hampered occupancy and use, during the continuation of the Near East Relief activities, of all houses, lands and other properties now occupied or used by the Near East Relief, or that may hereafter be allocated to the Near East Relief.

11. The Government promises to protect the operations of the Near East Relief from interference on the part of unauthorized agents of local authorities and on the part of any branch or department of the Government that may not be represented by the signatures of this document.

12. All relief supplies, local products, machinery, equipment and property occupied or used for relief purposes or by American Near East Relief personnel shall be exempt from confiscation, requisition, taxation or rent.

13. All supplies imported for relief purposes or for the use of American Near East Relief personnel shall be exempt from custom-house taxes or other duties.

14. The Government agrees to provide without cost railway transportation for the movement from Batum or other port of entry into Transcaucasia of relief supplies and of such personnel as may be necessary for the efficient control and administration of relief operations, and will, for the duration of these relief operations, confirm to the Near East Relief for the sole use of its personnel and transport such railway carriages as the Near East Relief is now operating. The transportation of relief supplies over the railway lines shall have priority over commercial and other shipments when in the judgment of the Near East Relief such preferential treatment is required.

15. The Government will grant to the Near East Relief without cost the use of existing telegraph, telephone, post and courier service, and will secure for the Near East Relief the same priority in the expeditious transmission of messages as may be enjoyed by the Government. The Government will provide for the Near East Relief the free use of water and electric light service where it is available for use in hospitals, orphanages and homes of American relief workers.

16. The Government grants to the Near East Relief the right to cut and transport such amount of fire-wood and charcoal from the forests of Transcaucasia as are required for its relief work, from places designated by the Government and easily accessible to the railroad. The Government will secure for the Near East Relief an adequate supply of fuel oil, lubricating oil, kerosene, benzine, and other oils necessary for relief and transportation.

17. The Government will acquaint the people of the Transcaucasian Republics with the aims and methods of the relief work of the Near East Relief in order to promote mutual understanding and co-operation between the Near East Relief and the people, and to secure the maximum of efficiency in the relief operations.

18. The Government grants to all American Near East personnel engaged in relief work the right of free and unimpeded residence and movement within the Transcaucasian Republics, and freedom from personal search, arrest and detention.

19. To facilitate co-operation between the Government and the Near East Relief there may be elected or appointed by the Government a person acceptable to the Near East Relief whose duty it shall be to promote mutual understanding and co-operation between the Near East Relief and the Government. This representative may be changed at any time upon request of either the Government or the Near East Relief, a successor being appointed as provided above.

20. In view of the fact that the Near East Relief is unique and distinct from all commercial and profit-making organizations in that (a) it is engaged exclusively in an effort to help people by giving employment to the unemployed, (b) the major portion of its resources are used for the benefit of orphaned and dependent children, and (c) there is no private profit derived from any of its operations; it is hereby agreed that the Near East Relief shall, for the purpose of labor contracts,

be regarded as a Government organization and shall have the same privileges that are accorded to Government agencies.

21. For the receipt and forwarding of mail of the Near East Relief the following regulations are mutually accepted:

Outgoing Mail. — Mail bags containing outgoing mail of the Near East Relief may be inspected and sealed with the Soviet diplomatic seals by the representative of the Government with the Near East Relief referred to in Paragraph 19, or by a person authorized by him. The bags thus sealed are inviolate and are not subject to further inspection, and may be forwarded promptly without delay to their destination.

Incoming Mail. — Incoming mail bags arriving from abroad are to be sealed at the point of entry by the representative of the Near East Relief and the representative of the Government without being opened or inspected. The mail thus sealed is inviolate and will be immediately forwarded to the Near East Relief, seals to remain unbroken until arrival at destination.

22. Representatives of the Near East Relief have the right of free access to steamers arriving at Batum or other port of entry, as well as those leaving. For this purpose proper credentials will, upon request of the Near East Relief, be issued by the Government. The Government undertakes to secure for the Near East Relief suitable docking and warehouse facilities at Batum or other port of entry for the handling of relief supplies.

23. The present agreement is signed and recorded in English and Russian languages. Both texts have equal value.

Signed for the Government:

A. Mravian
Vice President S.S. Republic of Armenia

N. Tergazarian
Government Commissioner for co-operation with N.E.R.

Signed for the Near East Relief:

C. V. Vickrey
General Secretary and Member of the Executive Committee, New York

H. C. Jaquith
Member of the Administrative Committee, and Managing Director, Constantinople

Jesse K. Marden
Acting Director, Caucasus Branch

Turkey. The relief work within the territory of the Great National Assembly at Angora was handicapped by war conditions and the usual restrictions on communication and transportation. At each large station there was a complete unit — director, doctor, nurse, orphanage supervisor and accountant. It was possible to secure the essential food from the local markets at a price below the cost of importation. The buildings loaned by the American Board of Missions were well adapted to orphanage and hospital activities and provided comfortable living quarters for the personnel.

The fact that the United States had no diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government at Angora necessitated establishing direct contacts with all the governmental departments and ministers.

Transportation Problems. The problem of transportation became more

acute after the armistice when an effort was made to replenish the war-depleted supplies and it was found that the few railroad lines were in disrepair and that the few roads had disintegrated under the heavy military usage.

The ordinary roads, throughout the regions where relief was needed, were animal paths which had been used for centuries by pack animals which were the chief method of moving freight or people. This kind of transportation would have been adequate for ordinary needs had there been a sufficient number of these animals. The horse, mule and camel supplied the demand and under normal conditions met the requirements of the country. During the war all these animals were requisitioned for campaign purposes in Syria and Palestine. The absence of the usual means of transportation from the interior villages made it impossible to sell the grain and food supplies except within a narrow radius of the harvest fields. This made grain and food obtainable for the needs of the relief workers in the remote centers within Turkey, requiring only that funds be made available.

Forms of Assistance

Emergency Care and Shelter. For the first four years the relief problems were simple, as far as the Committee was concerned.

Large groups of buildings and extensive equipment were available. The schools had been forced to close, as most of the students had been Armenians and Greeks. The buildings of the American College at Aintab; Euphrates College, Kharput; Anatolia College, Marsovan; and of schools in Caesarea, Marash, Mardin and Sivas were turned into relief centers and the mission property was used without expense to the relief funds.

Well equipped American hospitals, staffed by American doctors and nurses and trained native assistants . . . became an integral part of the relief program and equipment.

The presence of experienced Americans and of compounds sufficiently large to harbor thousands of children and adults, and the unquestioned prestige of the American medical service, prepared to meet the emergency situation, solved the vital question of personnel and location. Each mission station became a relief station and the children were gathered into the buildings in a few months.

Various problems of general relief cover almost the entire period of the [Near East Relief] activities. . . . Shiploads of supplies followed in rapid succession after the armistice. Milk, corn grits and other commodities were contributed generously in America and sent to the Near East. Old clothing, aggregating millions of pounds, was distributed in Armenia, Bulgaria, Greece, Syria and Turkey.

Clothing. The clothing arrived pressed in bales. Refugee women were employed to assort, classify and repair it. A nominal price was placed on each article. The refugee with his small earnings could reclothe the entire family. The small returns were used to pay the refugee sorters and repairers, and the cost of distribution.

It was necessary to prevent this attractive clothing from falling into the hands of speculators and to apportion it equitably among the hundreds of thousands of needy families. Every refugee was registered by the government and provided with an identification booklet which contained a photograph and a detailed statement of the number of dependent members in the family. This registration card was supplemented by data from the local Association of Refugees which certified that the individual or family was in need of clothing. This was rechecked by the organization staff and permit cards were issued. On the reverse side full instructions and a list of the articles available were printed. Fifty bales were handled and assorted daily, averaging between 13,000 and 14,000 pieces of clothing. A large building provided by the government was converted into a huge industrial workshop. Each process, from the opening of the bales to the sales to the refugees, was analyzed and arranged progressively to economize time and space. Nothing was wasted. Garments that could not be used for clothing were made into rag carpets to cover earthen floors. Sweaters incapable of being repaired were unraveled, the yarn re-dyed and woven into oriental rugs. The gunnysacking which enveloped the bales was also unraveled, colored and made into carpeting. The baling wire was made into shoe pegs and used to repair the contributed old shoes. The loose buttons nearly supplied the needs of the city of Salonika.

Various distribution centers were maintained in the refugee districts of Macedonia. The government provided free transportation for all supplies. To reach certain areas a railroad car was fitted up as an old clothing store and moved from one siding to another. In a single year 1,909,532 pounds of clothing were distributed without cost to the organization except collection expenses in America. Hundreds of needy women were employed reconditioning the garments and over half the refugees in Greece were given an opportunity to reclothe their entire families.

Work Relief. The distribution of food and clothing, medical care for the sick and undernourished, the temporary housing of orphaned children, the various attempts to rehabilitate the refugees, and the establishment of workshops to replace bread lines, all were an integral part of the efforts of the relief workers to meet the rapidly changing war emergency situations. Personnel were scattered in isolated areas. Funds available to meet the overwhelming need were comparatively small, but experience had taught the American residents of the Near East certain fundamentals of giving without

pauperizing. They insisted on labor, whenever possible, in return for the relief which they were able to distribute.

The principle of requiring work in exchange for commodities . . . was not the simplest or quickest way of feeding or clothing the refugees; it required careful and constant supervision and much planning. It was the more difficult method of distributing relief but it was less demoralizing and more permanent. Conditions made it impossible to follow the procedure at all times. Frequently there was only one way to prevent wholesale death by starvation and exposure and this was the direct allotment of food rations and the organization of soup kitchens, but among the masses of homeless people aided, few were found who were not eager to work in return for what they received. Because of an insistence upon a fair exchange of labor for food and clothing, the distribution of enormous relief funds did not demoralize or humiliate the persons who were the recipients of American charity during a period of unprecedented national and international upheavals.

The problem of the relief workers was to turn the bread lines into working units. . . . Public improvements were projected by the local relief committees. Gradually, the muddy, impassable streets were reconstructed and paved by the refugee laborers. Some of the highways leading out from the cities were also repaired. At Tabriz a dike was built on one side of the city to save the lower sections from spring inundations.

In the Caucasus the marching of armies to and fro destroyed the irrigation ditches upon which the fertility of whole areas was entirely dependent. Refugees, receiving corn grits as a principal ration, were organized to repair some of these main waterways. Large sections of land were made available for recultivation and resettlement.

The minutes [of a local committee] of March 28, 1917, contained a report from Erivan and Alexandropol, where the policy of providing work as a relief measure had been placed in operation. More than 2,500 women were employed spinning cotton and wool, in knitting 25,000 pairs of stockings for distribution, and in making 6,000 quilts for the utterly destitute. The spinning wheels and looms were made by refugee carpenters, giving employment to 200 men. For two years all the clothing and bedding which were given in large quantities to the refugees, were made by other refugee women in the industrial workshops.

During the later years of the general relief program the orphanage director . . . [at Samsun] requested funds for emergency feeding, conditioned upon the government granting permission to fill in a mosquito-breeding swamp which had infected Samsun with malaria for decades. The task was completed before the refugees were transferred to Constantinople and later to Greece.

As the relief resources of the Committee were limited the wages were ex-

tremely small, sufficient to meet only the minimum needs of life for the workers and their dependents.

The second category of refugees consisted of women—widows, and widows with children. The majority of the refugees who escaped southward into Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia were women or children; few of the men reached these havens of safety. . . . Workshops for women were not easily organized under the uncertainties of war in the Near East. The emergency needs of orphans, temporarily gathered into shelters and institutions, provided labor through washing, carding, spinning and weaving, all by hand, and the making of cotton and woolen cloth for garments. In the Caucasus and in Persia the local relief committees contracted with the armies for quantities of underclothing and stockings and organized the refugee women to supply the needs of the soldiers and receive in return rations of food. Owing to the scarcity of manufactured goods and the distance from any base of supplies, these industrial activities assumed large proportions, providing thousands of women with a means of earning a livelihood, and enabled the relief workers to aid a much greater number than their restricted funds would have permitted ordinarily.

[Fifty thousand] Armenian and Assyrian refugees . . . in an encampment near Baghdad . . . spun cotton and wool, and wove cloth for garments for the use of the British troops. With the payment of even small wages a large part of the camp became self-supporting.

One of the problems growing out of the unusual conditions of the war in the Near East was the care of Christian girls who had been rescued from harems after the armistice. Allied police control made it safe for these unfortunate victims to escape. Homes were established under the supervision of local committees and work was provided as an antidote for the previous experiences and to enable them to become gradually self-supporting. They had long been separated and lost from all their relatives. The League of Nations later, through special funds, appointed special representatives to care for this problem.

Following the armistice this general theory of helping women by providing an opportunity to work developed into the Near East Industries. The refugees, whenever permitted to move, naturally gravitated to the larger centers under foreign protection. Constantinople, Beirut, and later Athens and Salonika, amassed unabsorbable numbers of homeless women and children, with a faint scattering of men. Searching and pleading for some kind of work, some small wage, they were denied this simple request because there was little or no demand for labor. Yet these women were adept at any kind of handiwork. They offered embroidery and laces on the streets and whenever they could they borrowed money for a little cloth and thread. This native ability was organized in workrooms. Some native cloth was woven

and some linen was imported. Designs calculated to attract the interest of foreign residents and visitors were embroidered into table covers, runners, handkerchiefs and other useful articles. People were induced to purchase the finished products as a method of helping the refugee women and at the same time securing something very attractive for the home or as a gift. As these handwork industries developed, women from the American institutions, wives of diplomats and others gave orders for dresses and other garments.

Gradually this phase of the relief program expanded and became self-supporting. The local trade was augmented by the yearly arrival of thousands of tourists.

Goods were ordered regularly from America to meet the sales requirements. Most of the handwork was done in the refugee homes from designs and material supplied from a small workshop bureau. The finished product was received, inspected and if acceptable laundered and prepared for shipment or sale.

In Tabriz, during the war, the local committee had followed the general policy of giving aid in return for labor. More streets were repaired, more permanent improvements were made for the general benefit in Tabriz than in any other place as a by-product of the distribution of relief. A large portion of the paved streets in the city today are the work of the refugees. Women were employed in industrial workshops, making rugs, weaving cloth, preparing wool and cotton for spinning and in handiwork of many varieties. At one time over 1,000 women were given work and in return received sufficient wages to provide for the minimum necessities of life.

Sanitation and Medical Care. The existence of American hospitals supervised by American missionary doctors and nurses in the larger cities of the Ottoman Empire and Persia, with an American medical school at Beirut, is the necessary explanation of the extensive medical relief work accomplished during the war. The staff of health experts, most of them long resident in the country, speaking the language of the people and holding their confidence, devoted themselves unreservedly to the refugees, fighting epidemics, undernourishment and disease. Many were stricken with sickness. . . . At the first opportunity after the armistice medical reënforcements of doctors, nurses and supplies were sent to relieve those who had been isolated and unaided during the war . . . [and] fifteen complete hospital units and adequate medical supplies were purchased.

The medical staff faced three problems: sickness and epidemics among the refugee population; the restoring to health of the disease-ridden orphans; and the care of the American and local personnel. The refugees who survived the tragedy were undernourished and weakened by disease. Living in deplorable conditions, they were the easy victims of epidemics and a score of contagious illnesses. Diseases uncommon and even unknown in America

were virulent and destructive in the East — typhus, cholera, favus, trachoma and dysentery. Tuberculosis was a white plague. Malaria, intestinal diseases and fevers were the common burden of the people. . . . The continued existence of large, unassimilated refugee populations, living in insanitary conditions, invited the recurrence of epidemics.

The second problem was the restoration of health to the children gathered from the streets and out of the refugee camps into orphanages. . . . The first process of orphanage life was medical. Each institution had its infirmary, its hospital and its daily clinic. Even the menu was supervised by the medical department.

In Armenia [wrote Dr. Mabel E. Elliott, medical director in the Caucasus], we found the medical relief of 30,000 children on our hands. I mean this literally. There was not one healthy child among them.

As fast as the children could be taken in, they were undressed by nurses with rolled-up sleeves and handy basins of antiseptics; the rags that were taken off were put with tongs into a fire; the child was bathed, its head was shaved, and it went into the hands of the nurse who dressed its sores. Contagious diseases were isolated as much as possible, but all the children had the contagious diseases of favus and trachoma.

As rapidly as possible they were sorted out, and the orphanages were graded by scale of diseases. Fourteen hospitals were opened. But every orphanage was also a hospital, every child was a patient, and medical treatment was as much a part of the orphanage routine as meal time. Every morning in Alexandropol the insides of the eyelids of 18,000 children were rubbed with a copper pencil — treatment for trachoma, the eye disease that blinds — and every child had his own copper pencil numbered and filed in a box.

The third problem was the health of the American personnel. The workers daily were exposed to disease. . . . Hardly a single member of the relief staff returned without contracting some debilitating illness, some were unable to complete their term of service and others died overseas.

Another type of medical problem continually confronting the Committee was the protection of the orphanages and orphans against infection from an unhealthy surrounding community and the making of the community safe and healthy for the outplaced child. . . . An epidemic of malaria attacked the children [sent into an orphanage school]. . . . Miss Alice Carr, the American nurse in charge of the health of the children, . . . organized a work group of fifty older orphan boys with picks and spades. She opened a clinic in the town and purchased a quantity of kerosene. She started the boys opening a channel to drain the old innerport of ancient Corinth and the adjacent marshes. Personally accompanied by a gendarme, either walking or riding a donkey, she inspected every back yard, every stagnant pool and ordered them drained. If upon a second inspection they were untouched she poured oil in their open cisterns and over pools. She inspected, within a radius of three miles, the vineyards and farms that surrounded the town and insisted on their covering their irrigating reservoirs and draining their overgrown

ditches. Seven hundred and eighty-five open cisterns were covered, 20 uncovered irrigation reservoirs were oiled, a small stream channeled, a swamp drained, fifty miles of irrigation ditches opened. During the campaign 300 homes were visited daily and 2,000 pounds of petroleum were used weekly. Within a year malaria was eradicated from Corinth. A few recurrent cases continued to be treated at the clinic. The orphanage remained in the army barracks, free from malaria.

The requests of the outplaced orphans, some of them living in remote villages without access to a doctor or clinic, led to the equipment of itinerant health wagons, with a regular schedule to the villages. The service was not restricted to the orphans but was extended to the entire community. The program was first introduced into the Caucasus and later adopted in Syria.

The medical department was responsible for the care of the physically and mentally defective child. In the solution of these problem cases the co-operation of local agencies and governments was enlisted, resulting often in the development of special programs and institutions for handicapped children.

Tuberculosis was a great scourge, which followed as a natural consequence of malnutrition and life in refugee camps. . . . In addition to the special care and consideration given to children suffering from tuberculosis, various efforts were made to co-operate with local authorities and local organizations in common action against the increase and spread of the disease, as the problem was too large for private philanthropy.

Resettlement. Abandoned palaces along the Bosporus had been turned into refugee camps. The refugees could find little work. They were afraid to leave the city. Their morale was rapidly declining. There seemed only one solution possible, namely, the transfer of the people from the miserable camp conditions of the overcrowded city to the then partially unoccupied wheat lands of eastern Thrace, less than a hundred miles south, on the Sea of Marmora. The refugees did not want to go. To them it was another exodus to a strange and unfriendly country, for Thrace was then Grecian territory. The order was issued to stop the relief rations and to close the camps. Simultaneously, a steamer was chartered, anchored in sight of the refugees and conspicuously loaded with attractive food supplies. They had to choose between starving in the streets of the city and embarking for the new farm colonies in Thrace. One hundred and eighty families took ship—the rest dispersed into unknown quarters in the city.

Two villages were built by these refugees on abandoned estates. The organization assured them food supplies until the first harvest, provided a small quantity of building materials, furnished seeds and one work animal and agricultural tools for each three families. . . . Within a year they were fully self-supporting, had a year's food supply from their own crops and began to refund to the organization the cost of the animals and permanent

equipment. Two new villages of happy citizens replaced the despair of the city refugee camps.

In the rural villages [near Erivan and Alexandropol] the surplus refugee families were more quickly made self-supporting. Draft animals were purchased and assigned on the ration of one beast to three families. Wheat and barley were bought and given to the people for sowing their first harvest. Up to January, 1917, the committee had supplied 3,000 water buffaloes, oxen and other animals in this settlement project.[1]

Institutional Care of Children. The child was the center about which the relief work revolved for many years. The appeal of the orphan touched the heartstrings of the entire country and the response was unfailing.

The relief funds were uncertain and would not warrant the establishment of orphanages on a scale adequate to care for all the waifs. Social welfare practice directed that half-orphans should be kept with their mothers and orphans should be maintained with their village groups. Even in the interior of Turkey, where the unused mission school buildings were turned into shelters for unclaimed children, deposits of the tragic days of 1915, the relief workers did not venture to call them orphanages. They were just temporary homes until some relative or parental friend should return from exile at the close of the war and remake the home.

The emergency character of the relief work was emphasized constantly. Anything that implied a continuing responsibility was dismissed as outside the immediate financial capacities of the Committee. Aid could be given to children gathered in refugee camps without assuming a continuing obligation should contributions to the relief funds seriously decline. . . . There was a recognition of moral responsibility on the part of the [Near East Relief] Committee if it authorized the relief workers overseas to segregate the vast number of children into orphanages which caused the Committee to hesitate until it was confident that the public, which was supporting the work, would continue even after the war was over. There would have been a second tragedy in the separation of these children in the camps from the friends and mothers if they were kept for a few months in an orphanage home and then the Committee was forced to open the doors and order them out into a life of vagabondage.

The lowest estimate of the number of orphans in the mass of refugees was 100,000 and the highest 150,000. At least $5.00 a month would be required to care for each child, making a monthly budget of not less than $500,000. . . . Gratifying financial response enabled the Committee . . . to undertake an orphanage program for the homeless children with the assurance of ultimate completion.

[1] Editor's note: A detailed report of the activities of the League of Nations' Commission which was responsible for settling refugees in Greece is included in Greece and the Greek Refugees, by Charles B. Eddy, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1931.

Whenever the relief funds were inadequate for the whole program, after this date, the child was given the first claim and attention. There was no question in the minds of the executive officers and the Committee that the greatest good to the Greek, Syrian, Armenian and other races, would be achieved by saving and training their orphaned children. They were the hope of the future. If given sound bodies and well-trained minds they could help shape that future.

These children were not the by-products of irregular home life, they were the sons and daughters of . . . intellectual and business leaders. . . . They were a cross section of the race, children of merchants, farmers, teachers and craftsmen. They were blighted in their schooling and starved in body and soul. They were gathered from the highways and the refugee camps, wandering vagabonds searching for a morsel of food, ragged waifs casting their uncertain lot with the old, the decrepit and the sick. Disease, from the insanitary, crowded camps, had covered many with repulsive sores and made them untouchable. They lived in dirt and filth without a change of clothing for their shredded rags, vermin infested. The unclean, wizened, emaciated, pathetic faces, pleading for bread, gave no hint of a forgotten happiness, an abandoned home. Hunger was stalking about on feeble skeleton legs, in a leather, mummified skin stretched tightly over protruding bones with eyes that did not see but only stared. From such as these was to come the recreated childhood of tomorrow, the hope of a new Near East.

The organization of these orphanage units, usually called American schools by the local people, while not precisely uniform, followed similar lines of development and management. Institutions with more than 1,000 children had an American director and an American nurse in charge of the hospital, clinic and general health, with a local doctor assistant.

The organization of orphanages for this mob of neglected children . . . was a slow and difficult process. The first problem was housing. In the Armenian province of the Caucasus the frontier posts of the Russian army had built enormous blocks of stone buildings, adequate to provide winter quarters for fifteen to twenty thousand troops, at Kars and Alexandropol. After the collapse of Russia these barracks and warehouses had been abandoned and refugees used them for shelter, taking the removable wood for fuel and warmth and leaving the buildings dilapidated and uninhabitable. These buildings were the only available space for nearly 30,000 unhoused orphans in the Caucasus in 1919. Extensive repairs were made, windows replaced, equipment furnished and the largest orphanage city in the world was organized and maintained at Alexandropol with a second city of children of lesser size installed in Kars.

In the interior of Turkey the relief workers had collected stray children into the unused school buildings belonging to the American Board of Mis-

sions and fed and clothed them. . . . In Constantinople the local orphanages were inadequate to hold the homeless children and the Committee rented, at a nominal price, unused Turkish palaces along the Bosporus, where transportation was convenient. In Syria and Palestine former schools or orphanages were utilized and in Persia, where buildings were not available without cost, houses were rented temporarily.[1]

The second major problem was food for the army of children scattered in orphanages thousands of miles apart. The various countries emerged from the World War as from a famine. The unsettled conditions and mass movements of population which did not stabilize for another five years, left an annual shortage of food. The bulk of the Committee's supplies were purchased and shipped from America. . . . The daily menu arranged in consultation with the medical department seemed the simplification of simple living. . . . But every day necessitated three meals and the quantity these children consumed yearly made a complicated purchasing and distributing problem for the supply department, both in America and overseas, best illustrated by a statement of the yearly requirements for one area, the Caucasus, where 25,000 were being fed: 1,175,040 pounds of beans; 146,880 pounds of cocoa; 5,702,400 pounds of flour wheat; 250,560 pounds of figs; 246,240 pounds of raisins; 708,480 pounds of grits; 905,940 pounds of milk; 146,880 pounds of oil; 259,200 pounds of macaroni; 648,000 pounds of rice; 432,000 pounds of salt; 518,400 pounds of sugar; 2,160 pounds of tea; 56,160 pounds of tomatoes; 56,160 pounds of vinegar; 518,400 pounds of beets; 1,058,400 pounds of cabbage; 259,200 pounds of carrots; 518,400 pounds of onions; and 1,080,000 pounds of potatoes, making a total of 14,688,900 pounds of supplies. . . . The unprepared food supplies cost approximately two dollars per child per month. The rations sent from America were augmented by the purchase of local supplies, especially vegetables, and occasionally meats and fish. Later, as local conditions improved, more native foodstuffs were available and added to the variety of the menu.

Institutional life required mass cooking, mass feeding and mass serving. Under the general supervision of personnel the boys and girls did most of the actual work in the bakeries, in the kitchens and in the dining rooms. It was a

[1] "The physical dimensions of the three major orphanage posts of Polygon, Kazachi, and Seversky, all in the city of Alexandropol, are enormous. To say that there are 170 buildings in the three posts may help one to comprehend the size of the job; among them are half a dozen warehouses somewhere near 1,000 feet long, about 40 two-story converted barracks of capacities ranging from 250 up to 1,000 child inhabitants, school buildings of 24 to 30 classrooms, all kinds and sizes of service buildings, administration, medical, policing, fueling, lighting, cooking, baking, laundries, bath houses, etc. Stables and garages are important because the railroad touches only one post and supplies of every kind must be transported to the other separate centers on the outskirts of the town four miles distant. By the way, it is worth remembering that the roads connecting these posts were remade by refugee labor paid for by the Near East Relief in rations of corn grits." — From an article by Frank C. Bray.

part of the self-help organization of the orphanage, installed as a factor in training and as a matter of economy of operation.

Recreation was an integral part of the daily program under the supervision of special leaders.

Religious instruction was included in the school curriculum in keeping with the practice in local schools.

The individual was never submerged and lost in the mass. In classes they were called by their names. Numbers were used only to mark their clothing and to facilitate the keeping of records. The directors, the teachers and personnel were chosen because of their interest and devotion to the children and they in return were the recipients of the loyalty and hero worship of the orphans who lavished the accumulated surplus of hitherto unexpressed affection upon these, their new foster parents.

The whole organization functioned for the ultimate development of untutored, undisciplined child life into potential manhood and womanhood. Never did a child welfare organization face more baffling problems, and there were no precedents for their solution. Starved, diseased, unschooled children formed the raw material that had to be remolded and remade. Many had no remembrance of parents or home. Others had a dim recollection of a tragic upheaval followed by confusion, wandering and a terrific struggle for existence. Only the hardy could survive the physical testings of those days, months and even years of neglect and hunger. Social instincts had been crushed in the selfish quest for food. Suspicion and fear overshadowed their lives, for they had dwelt in continual insecurity and uncertainty. Few of the older children had attended school since the outbreak of the war, when education ceased. The smaller children had received no education and scarcely recognized the simplest expression in their mother tongue. But underneath the animal instincts of self-preservation, beneath the diseased, underfed body and forbidding exterior, there lay hidden the potentialities of youth to be nourished and trained for leadership in an emerging new Near East.

Every director found difficulty in discovering the child's correct name. Many were too young to remember, others had wandered far and adopted fictitious nicknames to conceal their identity or to curry favor with the inhabitants of the new lands, others had made new friendships and adopted their companion's name. This question of true names was forever a source of annoyance and amusement. A director reported:

> I went down the lower hall of the orphanage one day and found a group of my teachers around a little girl. She was such a pitiful mite, covered with dirt and grime, her little head all broken out with sores, her tiny body covered with scabies. . . . After she had been cleaned up and fed I called her and one of the teachers to me and tried to find out who she was. When we asked her what her name was she said "Salema." We asked her her mother's name. She did not know, but recognized the name "mother." Although we named over all the native names of

women it brought no response from her. . . . Where [her] . . . home was or who her parents were we never found out.

Even children do not smile easily after years of tragic experiences. A director from Syria recorded a typical experience of all relief workers:

Najeebe was good, patient and wistfully content to sit with her little hands folded and her eyes cast down, apart and aloof, taking no interest in the other children. Her eyes, old for her years, never smiled.

No one knew anything about Najeebe. . . . She had no memory of father, mother, sisters, or brothers. The other children were fond of her. They tried to interest her but finally gave it up and left her to sit quietly in her corner with folded hands. And then the miracle happened!

One day in the yard, as teachers were watching the children playing their games, they heard a low chuckle and then a shriek of delight from behind. They turned and saw Najeebe on her hands and knees playing with a little fluffy white kitten. Najeebe had laughed aloud! The spell was broken and she took her place in the happy life of the other children.

Individual Placement of Children. Careful investigation revealed the fact that not all these waifs gathered into orphanages were full orphans. In the slow readjustment following the war, in the efforts to reunite broken families, mothers, aunts, relatives of the second and third degree were located and the child replaced under family responsibility. The children with a known refugee relative were not separated from even slender family ties. Supplementary rations were distributed to the child, frequently to the destitute mother or relative and the broken family was kept together. The children under these refugee conditions had fewer opportunities than the full orphans in the institution where all the necessities of life were provided, including education, but the half-orphan had a semblance of a home, had individual affection and care, and when the refugee in later years was the recipient of a new home from the Settlement Commission, the half-orphan, without further adjustment, was restored to normal community relationship even though under scanty living conditions.

Every known child welfare method practiced by social workers in America was tried in the Near East as an aid toward the solution of the problem and several new ideas were put into practice to meet the unusual conditions which existed.

First, an effort was made to discover parents or near relatives. During the deportations families had become separated and existed apart in complete ignorance until reunited through the searchings of the Committee aided by items in local papers, and notices and personal search in the refugee camps. Most of the families which had been separated were also broken; perhaps only a mother survived who was usually in quite as pitiable plight as the child. If the child remained in the orphanage contact was maintained with the mother. If the mother were able to establish a small home a modest subsidy was granted to the child for a limited period.

Relatives were sought in America and other countries to which an earlier generation from the Near East had migrated, and where immigration laws permitted the children were sent to the relatives.

The outplacing of children without relatives proceeded as rapidly as opportunities could be discovered, investigated and adoptions arranged. The child had to be protected against exploitation. The new home must be of the same nationality. The outplaced orphan had access to the Committee supervisor, and the members of the staff frequently visited the homes. Agreements were made between the organization and the adopting or protecting foster parent and rigidly enforced.

The distributing process was laboriously slow. Most of the children were outplaced from the orphanage into work between the ages of fifteen and sixteen, although the girls were kept usually until they could be placed safely in homes. The Committee adopted sixteen as the average age for boys, and the orphanage educational policies were adjusted accordingly. In the East children mature younger and are accustomed to accept responsibility earlier. It was felt that a longer period of orphanage life would be detrimental to the child. The children were encouraged to look forward to independence and to a life in a home. Their psychology was directed toward the values outside the institution. When the educational program was completed and they arrived at the age of sixteen they were eagerly prepared for the transition into independent life.

There was no accepted method of placing out which was not tried in an effort to adapt the child welfare program to the correct solution of the orphanage problem. After a child had arrived at the age of theoretical self-support, sixteen, and work had been found for him and he was formally dismissed from the orphanage rolls, then he was transferred to the child welfare extension division, where he was given guidance, help and kept under careful supervision until such time as the organization's representative felt he had made a reasonable adjustment to the new condition of independence and potential citizenship.

No child was outplaced or released to discovered relatives before health had been restored. Special isolation and treatments were given where it was definitely known that a child had a prospective foster home. Clinics were maintained to which outplaced children could come for free examination and treatment. In some areas the supervisor of outplaced children was assisted by nurses who, upon their visits, were especially careful to examine the child against the recurrence of disease.

It was necessary for the Americans in charge of reuniting . . . broken families to train local investigators who were directed in systematic visitation of all the newly established refugee villages. Every villager was questioned—was there a mother who had lost a child—an adult whose near family had

been lost with possible surviving children? A careful record was made of conversation and this mass of information was transmitted to the Athens headquarters and analyzed and compared with the facts on each orphan's record card. When the office data gave a probable clue this was amplified by further information from the orphanage, accompanied by a picture of the orphan in question. The data and picture were taken to the village by the investigator and again checked. Upon proper confirmation of all the evidence and upon assurance that the relatives or villagers were able to care for the orphan, the child was brought from the orphanage to Athens, sent with a worker to Macedonia and placed with the newly found relative. Another broken family was recorded as having been reunited. Not a single case was noted of a relative, no matter how distant, showing the slightest evidence of unwillingness to accept full responsibility for the child, no matter how meager their economic circumstances. The expressions of gratitude at the time of reunion made a profound impression on the workers as recorded in their reports.

Frequently a mother and child could be brought together in a common shelter, but the widow living in refugee conditions and unable to find sustaining employment was not considered by the investigator as in a position to take the child and give it even the semblance of food and clothing necessary. In many of these cases, especially where more than one child was involved, the investigator would help set up a small home by granting the mother a monthly subsidy sufficient to provide for the simple necessities of the home. Thus the child was returned to a near-normal living environment; at the same time the home conditions were continually supervised to protect the welfare of the child. Another modification of this subsidy program was the maintenance of a department known as the "fatherless children."

The placing of children in strange homes, but not for full adoption, required the most careful investigation and constant watchful visitation to prevent the child from being neglected, abused or exploited as a servant. Before a family assumed responsibility for a girl the home was surveyed by an American, not a native worker. The supervision of such cases was strictly maintained. . . . Americans were admitted to the homes and their visitations were not resented, nor were their decisions questioned. This common American method, applied as a solution of the orphanage problem, was new to the Near East and its successful application was undoubtedly largely due to its being made operative by American personnel.

The permanently defective children were a distinct problem. The general absence of governmental facilities for subnormals, handicapped and incapacitated children, and the overcrowded conditions in the few local institutions, made it necessary for the organization to retain a lengthier obligation, including specialized training.

For the majority of the children in the orphanages no homes could be found, no relatives discovered or opportunities offered for apprenticeship under sixteen. For these the vocational training, in a multitude of skills, was provided, with the expectation that not later than sixteen each child must leave the institution. The psychology was directed toward the merits of independence and self-support. The attitude of the older boys and girls was remarkable. When their course of training was completed they were eager to make good outside. They evidenced complete confidence in the decisions of the American directors. When told that tomorrow they were being sent from Greece to Egypt, or France, or transferred to another part of Russia, they neither questioned nor reasoned why but, like the courageous orphan recruits they were, they went straight forward, adapting themselves in good spirit to their new circumstances.

No child was set adrift. They were placed out or "inplaced" as we preferred to call it under supervision. Each child was adequately provided with clothing and shoes and when necessary with a bed and bedding.

The transition period, from the life of certainty within the orphanage to the insecure future without, was guarded and guided by a post-orphanage program. . . . When the period of simple training was finished, or the lack of funds made it necessary for the boys fourteen and fifteen, and even younger, to leave the orphanage, they went into a strange and a generally unfriendly environment. . . . They were alone against the world. . . . Adult refugees, swarming everywhere, were eager to work for merely bread enough to keep them from actual starvation. Yet it was necessary to place out thousands of boys and girls from the orphanages each year under such conditions. These same children were the inescapable reason for developing a full post-orphanage program.

Every effort was made to find work for each boy, something that offered suitable opportunity for the future, not merely a day laborer's wages. The fact that these boys had some American training was a decided asset in persuading employers to give them their first chance.

Most of the orphan children were strangers in new countries, they were not only surplus labor but they were foreigners. . . . The disintegrating influences of irresponsible individuals and groups had to be matched with stronger constructive forces. The organization established working boys' and girls' homes, night schools, recreational centers, clinics and libraries and above all the leadership and inspiration of American personnel assisted by young men and women chosen locally. The program was not a mere antidote for the numerous negative influences but it was a challenge to the best in each child.

American personnel, supervising the placing-out work, soon found that the greatest ex-orphan need was a clean bed in decent surroundings. To meet the

situation small houses were rented and equipped. . . . A matron was placed in charge of several houses to maintain the standard of cleanliness and order. The boys from the first paid one day's wage a month toward the laundry and care of the home. As rapidly as the boy's financial condition improved his payments increased. When he was able, either alone or as a co-operator with others, to find livable quarters elsewhere he was dismissed from the home and a younger boy took his place. These homes were located as near as possible to the working centers where groups might be served readily and soon became an indispensable part of the post-orphanage program.

Homes for working girls were fewer and less needed since the outplacement program had graduated most of the girls into foster homes. Some girls had been trained as teachers and nurses, and they entered almost immediately upon their professional duties. The number of girls who were placed out in shops or general employment was comparatively small. The service rendered this limited group of girls, in providing a home, evening classes, supervised recreation, savings accounts and an employment bureau, was unique in that part of the world.

Some form of supplementary education was essential for the children after they had been placed out and separated from the orphanage.

Night schools were organized to meet this distinctively post-orphanage situation. Where possible these classes were connected with the working boys' homes, club centers or new refugee camps, where a comparatively large number of ex-orphans were living near together.

Achievements

In all the countries around the Eastern Mediterranean and along the shores of the Black Sea, the names "American Near East Relief" and "American Committee" are held in affectionate regard.

Not only has life been saved, but economic, social, intellectual and moral forces have been released. New methods in child welfare, in public health and in practical education have been introduced. A new sense of the value of the child, a new conception of religion in action and a new hope for a better social order have been aroused.

The organization maintained a policy of strict neutrality and the distribution of its beneficences was according to needs, irrespective of race or creed. It continued to operate through the most radical political upheavals. Tragic events within the old Ottoman Empire called the Committee into being but it remained on to serve a new Turkey. Russian imperial autocracy crumbled, passed away; new economic order appeared and the organization worked with both.

The Commission [to Persia] strengthened the neutrality of the Persian government [which was at the time an increasingly uncertain factor in the war], enhanced the prestige of America and enlarged the scope of the relief activities.

No apologies are offered for the relatively large space given to the children, to their education, their adjustment into economic self-support and to their future. . . . It is through childhood growing into manhood and womanhood that America has chiefly influenced the changing Near East.

Measures have been adopted already by the governments of Russia, Turkey, Greece and elsewhere for perpetuating and extending child welfare work into towns and rural communities. The child is assuming a new place in the social thinking of all the different races in the Near East, especially among the Persians, Armenians, Russians, Turks, Greeks and Syrians. "Child welfare" has become an expression conveying a new idea, not only in thinking, but in the construction of educational and social programs. The people of the Near East have been given an ocular demonstration of child care and child protection which has made a profound impression. The child has attained a new and important position in the community.

Physical values are reckoned among the least important, but possibly the most obvious to the casual observer. It is, however, worthy of record that there remain in all the countries where the Committee has operated hundreds of miles of substantially made roads and well-paved streets; water courses opened for irrigation purposes and thousands of acres of arable land reclaimed; permanent buildings erected; old buildings repaired; and all accomplished by refugee labor that gave work in return for food. New industries have been introduced and established. A new agriculture has been demonstrated and new breeds in cattle and poultry have been imported. Better seeds of corn, cotton, wheat and other grains and vegetables have been planted and are now coming into common use, producing fruit after their kind. Modern tractors and other improved agricultural machinery have been introduced and their economic value demonstrated to the local farmers. These are but a few of the many physical improvements which have taken root and are being promoted by the peasantry and backed by the governments. The presence in those countries of thousands of youths, whose education has made them familiar with these modern ideas and innovations, gives a degree of assurance that the new methods of physical and economic improvement will find ready proponents and users.

Disease, in all the east once regarded as a scourge of God, has lost much of its former terror. Native doctors and thoughtful leaders have seen the most severe epidemics attacked and mastered by medicine, sanitation and organization. . . . Areas in Greece, Turkey and other places that had become uninhabitable by malaria have been made safe dwelling places.