

## **Protest in Congress**

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### **Introduction and Research Questions**

There is a rich yet understudied tradition of legislators protesting within Congress. Consider, for instance, Representative Bobby Rush, who wore a hoodie on the House floor, defying congressional norms to protest Trayvon Martin's murder (Helderman 2012). Or when Representative John Lewis led 170 colleagues in a day-long sit-in over the lack of gun control legislation (Walsh et al. 2016). In 2019, over two dozen Republicans stormed a closed-door hearing opposing President Donald Trump's impeachment inquiry (McDonald 2019). More recently, legislators slept outside the Capitol to protest the end of the eviction moratorium (Cohen 2021). Despite the prevalence of this behavior, there is a shortage of theory or comprehensive data on legislators' protests. We will fill this gap by building on existing legislative behavior and protest theories, compiling new data that we will make publicly available, and conducting empirical analyses on the implication of legislators' protests. We will answer: Which legislators protest? Why do they protest? And what are the political consequences of this understudied phenomenon?

### **Relationship to RSF's Core Interests**

The first contribution of this project is to provide a concrete definition of legislators' protests. We do so based on literature related to legislator behavior and norms and social movement theory. We define a legislator's protest outside of Congress as akin to citizens' participation in marches, rallies, sit-ins, acts of civil disobedience, and similar collective action events (e.g., Gause 2022a; Gause 2022b; McAdam and Su 2022). It includes any action (1) taking place publicly, (2) outside of the physical domain of Congress, (3) involving multiple people, and (4) expressing disapproval or support of a policy or issue area. To distinguish legislators' protests within Congress from other legislative behaviors, we define a legislator's protest within Congress as any activity that is (1) publicly observable and (2) disrupts regular day-to-day institutional functioning or violates institutional norms to (3) communicate or achieve a political goal, as opposed to a strictly personal one (e.g., Schmoll and Leung Ting 2023; Alexander 2021; Phadnis 2021; Spary 2013). Examples of legislators' protests within Congress include walkouts and sit-ins, quorum breaking, and

violations of Congressional decorum and norms (e.g., speaking disrespectfully or wearing inappropriate attire).

Legislators' protest is a critical activity that legislators perform in a time of growing polarization and persistent racism, sexism, classism, and other dimensions of inequality that challenge legislators' capacities to represent their constituents. Indeed, we argue that legislators protest when traditional, institutional legislative levers fail to help them achieve their political goals. The need to protest is particularly acute among legislators who are marginalized due to their race, ethnicity, gender, or ideology. This innovative project relates well to the Russell Sage Foundation's Social, Political, and Economic Inequality funding priority, which seeks to understand the causes and consequences of inequality within democratic institutions. After all, the extent and success of citizens' and denizens' protest activity are often regarded as a democratic thermometer, revealing the issues about which people are passionate and demonstrating the lengths to which people will go to communicate them (Gause 2022a; Gause 2022b; Gillion 2013). Without capturing the characteristics, motivations, and consequences of legislators' protests, there is an incomplete picture of how legislators challenge inequalities within political institutions due to their marginalization or their constituents' marginalization along similar dimensions.

### **Theory and Hypotheses**

Extant theories of legislative behavior assume that legislators behave as rational actors motivated by their constituents' desires, their own preferences, and the priorities of congressional leaders (e.g., Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974). There are numerous institutional resources available to legislators to achieve their goals. For example, they can make speeches, (co)sponsor legislation, participate in committees, or vote for or against legislation to demonstrate their commitment to policy goals, their constituents, or political parties. These extant theories explain many legislative behaviors but do little to explain legislators' protests.

Indeed, if electoral incentives are the primary driver of legislators' behavior (e.g., Mayhew 1974), then why did Rep. John Lewis (who ran unopposed in his last several elections) or Rep. Bobby Rush (who won his last election with over 70% of the vote) decide to protest? Moreover, if legislators are interested in career advancement, why would they engage in behaviors that could negatively affect their political party

(Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hall 1996)? For example, when Rep. Cori Bush protested on the Capitol steps, she was protesting the inaction of members of her political party.

Perhaps legislators protest to advertise, position take, or credit claim (e.g., Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974). However, protesting is generally more costly than the institutional behaviors typically explored by US Congress scholars. As Alexander (2021) argues in his book on legislative norms, legislators are wary of violating institutional norms due to the sanctions they are likely to face. Legislators who protest risk the favor of their constituents, party leaders, and other colleagues. Moreover, while protest has been prevalent throughout congressional history, it is still the exception. Only some legislators protest, only on select issues, and only at particular moments in time. So, again, if protesting is such a costly legislative behavior, why do some legislators do it?

Unfortunately, the scholarship on social movements does not fully explain why legislators protest. The social movement literature offers four broad reasons why *citizens* protest. Grievance theories argue that individuals protest because of some relative deprivation or perceived loss (Gurr 1970; Berkowitz 1972). However, legislators' protests are often not based on a personal grievance but on winning reelection or achieving another instrumental goal (Mayhew 1974). Second, resource mobilization scholars acknowledge that people who are not personally aggrieved may join a social movement if the selective incentives are sufficient – for instance, by appealing to an individual's sense of duty (Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Tilly 1978). However, resource mobilization theories do not explain why a legislator would incur the costs of protesting instead of relying on institutional legislative behaviors that do not violate institutional norms.

Third, political process theories argue that shifts in the political environment are necessary for individuals' protest mobilization (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998; Meyer 2004). Moreover, McAdam (1982) argues that political opportunities only mobilize individuals when subjective meanings are attached to political shifts. While legislators may look for political opportunities to help them achieve their goals, they often create political opportunities and meaning attribution (or issue framing – the fourth broad theory)

themselves. And again, legislators can embrace political opportunities with institutional behaviors, like speeches or roll call voting, instead of protesting.

In sum, like the legislative behavior literature, the protest literature is insufficient in explaining fully legislators' protests. Legislators are elite actors in the institution in which they are protesting. Most legislators elected to Congress desire to stay in Congress (Polsby 1968; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974). As such, their protest is not motivated by a choice set that includes an exit option (e.g., Hirschman 1970). Further, legislators do not face the same resource constraints as their constituents. So legislators' decisions to protest will likely differ from those that motivate citizens' protest.

We do not reject any of these theories. Rather, we build on them and also borrow from the parliamentary brawls literature to hypothesize that legislators protest because doing so allows them to (1) appeal to broader constituencies and (2) achieve important tactical goals (Schmoll and Leung Ting 2023). We argue that while legislators' protests defy traditional understandings of protest and legislative behavior, they are rational behaviors performed by legislators for whom traditional, institutional levers fail to help them achieve their instrumental goals. Given extant literature and these considerations, there are several types of legislators whom we expect to protest.

First, we hypothesize that legislators from subjugated groups (Black, Latinx, Asian American, women, and especially women of color) will be particularly likely to protest. Institutional norms underscored by racism and sexism within Congress (Dittmar et al. 2022; Hawkesworth 2003) make it difficult for members of historically marginalized groups to advance legislation through traditional lawmaking channels (Kathlene 1994; Tate 2004). Additionally, intersectionally marginalized legislators tend to represent interests that are often not "perceived as important by the dominant population" (McClain 1993, p. 2). Moreover, given that Congress is a race-gendered institution, effective coalitions around such issues seldom form, and the perspectives of race-gendered members are often devalued (e.g., Preuhs 2006; Hawkesworth 2003). Thus, legislators from subjugated groups experience significant barriers in advancing policy and representing their constituents via traditional institutional channels.

To overcome these barriers and give a policy a better chance for passage, women of color, for example, rely on distinct, institutional tactics like “tactical invisibility.” They do the hard work of legislating behind the scenes while allowing others to take credit for their work because of race-gendering norms that stigmatize women of color (Hawkesworth 2003). They also find they must do more work than their less marginalized colleagues. For instance, women legislators give speeches at higher rates than congressmen (Pearson & Dancey 2011). Black legislators substantively participate in congressional committees at higher rates than white legislators across policy issues (Gamble 2007). Women legislators collaborate more than men (Swift & VanderMolen 2021). Even more, legislators from race, ethnic, or gender minority groups cosponsor bills with each other at relatively high rates due to their exclusion from other forms of power and from gendered expectations of women to collaborate (Bratton & Rouse 2011; Holman, Mahoney & Hurler 2021). Moreover, institutionally disadvantaged legislators participate disproportionately more in non-roll call activities, including newsletters, press releases, bill (co)sponsorship, and non-legislative debate (Blum et al. 2022; Rocca & Sanchez 2008; Maltzman & Sigelman 1996).

This extant literature suggests that institutionally disadvantaged legislators must work more to represent their constituents and advance policy goals. When institutional tactics fail to realize their goals, protesting enables marginalized members to advocate for their policy priorities and gain recognition for their work. Protesting also helps disadvantaged legislators challenge and highlight the marginalization they and their constituents experience (Johnson 2013; Drexler 2007). Such was the case when Sen. Elizabeth Warren was silenced on the Senate floor while reading a letter by Coretta Scott King to oppose Jeff Sessions’s confirmation as US Attorney General. “Nevertheless, she persisted” became a rallying cry for feminist movements highlighting the sexist undertones of Warren’s marginalization within the Senate. Sen. Warren’s male counterpart, Sen. Jeff Merkley, was able to read the same letter without objection.

The legacy of protests in marginalized communities may lead legislators of color to turn to protest when traditional tactics are not gaining traction. Legislators like John Lewis, Bobby Rush, and Cori Bush, who were activists before their positions as legislators, may view protest as a viable means to advocate for policy change, even from within the system (e.g., Tilly 1978). At the same time, protesting may be a

beneficial way for legislators to appeal to broader constituencies, namely, their descriptively represented constituents who themselves feel marginalized and may view protest as a way of addressing inequality and discrimination (Mansbridge 1999).

Second, we hypothesize that extreme ideologues may use protest more than others. Legislators on the far right or left of the ideological spectrum often find traditional, institutional tactics unable to deliver on their legislative goals. We expect these legislators to protest to pressure party leaders and key veto players (Phadnis 2021; Batto & Beaulieu 2020). Protest by ideologically extreme legislators may be an even more effective legislative tool when their party is less cohesive or the party in control only has a slim majority (Schmoll & Leung Ting 2023). Moreover, ideologues in Congress may protest to signal to their constituents, who also view themselves as politically marginalized, the extent they are willing to fight for their interests.

Third, we hypothesize that legislators seeking to rise in party ranks may coordinate with their party to engage in acts of protest (Phadnis 2021; Born 1990; Larson 1990). Under certain conditions, parties may reap benefits by protesting. For instance, if a political party is expected to lose power, having some of its members engage in protest may highlight to the public their commitment to an issue (Gandrud 2016). Protesting may also be an attempt to change procedural or policy dynamics in anticipation of a loss of power (Gandrud 2016). Or, under “insecure majorities,” when party control hangs in the balance of every election, the minority party may protest to make governing hard for the majority party (Lee 2016).

We recognize and expect that protest may be helpful for any legislator willing to incur its costs to increase the likelihood of political reward. Nevertheless, as our hypotheses suggest, we are particularly interested in the ability of protest to increase the political power and descriptive representation of historically, politically, and intersectionally marginalized legislators and constituents. While we present plausible expectations for which legislators protest and why, understanding this understudied legislative behavior would benefit from rigorous, systematic theoretical and empirical study.

### **Preliminary Analyses**

We have identified and conducted preliminary analyses on two existing data sources that explore the demographics of legislators' protests. The *Legislator Misconduct Database*, compiled by Govtrack.us, scrapes information about legislators' misconduct behavior from letters of reproof, censures, expulsions from Congress, and Committee on Ethics investigations, resulting in a dataset of over 482 instances of alleged and actual legislator misconduct from 1790 to present. This existing data still needs to be analyzed in light of our definition of protest, excluding misconduct that does not satisfy the protest definition. We present preliminary findings on trends in misconduct below ([Figure 1](#)).

[Figure 1A](#) displays the distribution of misconduct allegations by party and chamber across time. It demonstrates that misconduct allegations are not dominated by one party, though more allegations occur in the House than in the Senate. There are notable peaks in allegations by party. For instance, of the thirty allegations against House Republicans in 2021, eleven were for violating House rules to wear a mask on the floor. Seven of the thirty allegations were about legislators failing to complete security screening before entering the floor, which was required in response to the January 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol. All of these examples satisfy our definition of protest. In 2009, however, there was a peak in allegations against Democrats. All such allegations were regarding violating gift acceptance or tax/financial disclosure rules, which do not satisfy our definition of protest.

To better understand how many unique legislators in each party are partaking in misconduct behavior, [Figure 1B](#) plots the percentage of (unique) legislators with misconduct allegations by party. The shaded areas indicate which party was in the majority. Generally, the proportion of members in each party accused of misconduct has risen. In 2021, 14 percent of House Republicans engaged in alleged misconduct. However, overall a relatively low percentage of House members face accusations, indicating that legislators selectively engage in misconduct. Additionally, there is no clear relationship between minority and majority party status and misconduct accusations. From 2000 to 2010, House members from the majority party faced more misconduct allegations than those from the minority party. Yet, between 2011 and 2018, when Republicans were in power, both parties received the same amount of misconduct violation allegations.

Moreover, from 2019 to 2022, House members from the minority party faced more allegations than those from the majority.

[Figure 1C](#) plots the percentage of Senators in each party accused of misconduct with area shades indicating the majority party.<sup>1</sup> Misconduct allegations in the Senate are more irregular than in the House. There are 185 allegations in the House over time, yet only 10 in the Senate. Further, Democrats are accused of misconduct at much higher rates than Republicans, regardless of which party is in power.

We merged this *Legislator Misconduct Database* with demographic data on members of Congress collected by Dr. Garcia for the 106<sup>th</sup> through 116<sup>th</sup> Congresses (2000-2020). [Figure 1D](#) plots trends in misconduct allegations by legislator's race. While white legislators are accused of misconduct more in raw counts (see [Figure 1E](#)), a higher *proportion* of Black, Latinx, and Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI) legislators are accused of misconduct. These preliminary results provide some support for our expectation that racially marginalized groups may engage in protest at higher rates. We argue that while discrimination and bias may cause racially marginalized groups to be accused of misconduct more than their counterparts, legislators are aware of the systems and practices that marginalized them. That is, racially marginalized groups protest in light of the (informal) rules that govern them, even as they recognize that those rules may be biased against them. Nevertheless, further analyses are needed to determine which of these allegations capture legislators' protests and disentangle whether these groups are protesting more or being accused more than others.

The second data source to which we have access is a collection of Rule XVII clause 4 violations (also known as the "Words Taken Down" clause) from the Congressional Record (Alexander 2021). This data tracks decorum violations in the House of Representatives from the 80th-113th Congresses (1947-2015). Decorum violations under the "Words Taken Down" clause occur when a member uses offensive

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<sup>1</sup> Note that the shaded area for 2001 is purple rather than red or blue. This is meant to indicate the fact that the party in power fluctuated throughout the year. For most of January 2001, the Senate was divided evenly with Democratic Vice President Al Gore allowing Democrats to hold the majority. Beginning on January 20, Republican Vice President Richard Cheney held the deciding vote. Majority power fluctuated again back to the Democrats in June, and then back to Republicans in November.



language, utters words deemed to be “unparliamentary” (Davis & Green 2018), or impugns the motives of another legislator or the President during a congressional hearing. Members object to such violations by demanding that the offending members’ words be taken down in the Congressional Record. If the chair agrees with the objection, the words are ruled out of order, and the offending member is not allowed to speak again that day. Our conception of legislators’ protests understands such decorum violations as an instance of protest because, again, members are aware of the institution’s rules and norms. As such, a violation can be understood as a conscious choice to publicly disrupt business-as-usual for political purposes.

[Figure 2](#) plots descriptive statistics regarding the distribution of decorum violations. [Figure 2A](#) shows the proportion of Republicans and Democrats who violated Rule XVII from the 80th-113th Congresses (see [Figure 2C](#) for the count distribution of rule violations). The shaded areas represent which party is in the majority. Given that members violate decorum rules when they are in both the minority and majority, it seems that this is a strategy of both winners and losers. [Figure 2B](#) plots decorum violations by the offending member’s race. While white members violate this rule more, a substantial proportion of Black and Latinx members break this norm. For instance, in the 106th through 108th Congresses, there were between 19 and 24 Latinx members of Congress, yet they maintained the highest rate of decorum violation among all racial groups. Interestingly, from the 107th to the 111th Congress, spikes and peaks in decorum violations by Latinx and Black legislators tracked one another. Further qualitative analysis is needed to understand if these were coordinated strategies (see Tyson 2016).

### **3. Project Design**

The existing data can provide insights into which legislators protest across time. However, significant limitations hamper a rigorous empirical analysis of legislators’ protests. For instance, the *Legislator Misconduct Database* and Alexander’s (2021) *Legislators’ Decorum Violations* dataset only capture protest activities that rise to the level of formal recognition or sanction. Protest behaviors like Rep. Bobby Rush’s in 2016 (Walsh et al. 2016) are uncaptured. Accordingly, we aim to compile the first comprehensive dataset of legislators’ protests by combining the above datasets with novel data from two sources: Newspaper

coverage of legislators' protests and statements in the Congressional Record. With this data, we will assess our hypotheses that legislators from subjugated groups, legislators with extreme ideological preferences, and legislators advancing party goals are more likely to protest than their counterparts. We will then use Google trends, legislators' newspaper mentions, campaign contributions data, and survey data to discern how constituents respond to legislators' protest activities.

**Newspaper Coverage of Legislators' Protests:** Legislators' protests are publicly observable behavior often captured by media reports communicating to the public. To collect all media coverage of legislators' protests, we have developed a protocol on Factiva and Nexis Uni to systematically search for instances of protest (see [Appendix 1](#)). This protocol includes 1) using Boolean searches to identify the universe of newspaper articles on legislators' protests and 2) using undergraduate assistants to hand-code the articles according to our coding scheme (e.g., who protested and when, against/for what they protested, how did they protest, how did colleagues respond to protest). We have already employed RAs to 1) check the efficiency of the Boolean search protocol, 2) preliminarily apply the coding scheme to ensure it captures all relevant concepts, and 3) collect protest events within Congress from articles.

We have used similar methods to collect protest data for previous research on the representation of constituents' protest behavior (Gause 2022a; Gause 2022b; Gause, Garcia, and Stout n.d.) and media coverage of protests (Gause, Moore, and Ostfeld n.d.). We believe the newspaper data overcomes many of the shortcomings of the *Legislator Misconduct Database* and *Legislators' Decorum Violations* (Alexander 2021) data. For example, newspaper articles cover protest events that are not officially condemned, perhaps because the party is unwilling to sanction co-partisans, or do not count as decorum violations (e.g., if the protest is outside of Congress or is otherwise not covered by Rule XVII). However, there are two foreseeable limitations to this data collection effort. First, newspapers may underreport the extent of legislators' protests. They only report events they are aware of and of journalistic interest. Secondly, biases in media representation may exist based on legislators' ideology, race, and gender. We contend that legislators are aware of many of these biases and account for them when deciding how to protest to

maximize the likelihood that their intended audiences are aware of their protest. Nevertheless, we turn to a final data collection effort to compensate for these shortcomings.

**Congressional Record:** We expect that statements on the floor made by legislators may be 1) protests in themselves or 2) a forum in which legislators comment on the protests of other legislators. This nuanced form of protest and commentary likely goes undetected in the existing data sources. We will use Gentzkow et al.'s Congressional Record data,<sup>2</sup> which parses every statement made on the House and Senate floor, including interruptions and procedural motions, by a speaker during the 43rd through the 114th Congresses. First, we will search for keywords and phrases often uttered during or following acts of protest by either the Speaker pro tempore in the House, the President pro tempore in the Senate, or a legislator in opposition to the act of protest. They are: “the gentleman/gentlewoman will suspend,” “not consistent with the rule(s),” “inconsistent with the rule(s),” “decorum,” “preserving order,” “violate the rule,” “taken down,” “impugn(ed),” “Rule XIX,” and “unparliamentary.” If a keyword or phrase is flagged, we will then a) look to the prior statement to see if the speaker’s words meet our definition of protest (i.e., that it disrupts regular day-to-day institutional functioning or violates institutional norms and is done to communicate or achieve a political goal), b) identify the member of Congress engaged in the protest and c) cross-reference it with the *Legislator Misconduct Database*, *Legislators’ Decorum Violations* (Alexander 2021), and newspaper articles data to eliminate duplicate events. This process allows us to identify cases of protest missed by our other datasets as it includes acts not met with formal allegations (in contrast to the *Legislator Misconduct Database*) or sanctions (in contrast to the *Legislators’ Decorum Violations* dataset).

Second, we will use RTextTools to run a computer-assisted content analysis of every statement made on the House and Senate floor (see Jurka et al. 2013; Gibbons et al. 2017). Using our legislators’ protest data from newspaper articles, RTextTools will predict if a statement in the Congressional Record includes a discussion of legislators’ protests. If RTextTools predicts that a discussion of a protest is present, we will a) assess whether the speaker is discussing something that meets our definition of protest, b) identify

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<sup>2</sup> Access to the data can be found here: [https://data.stanford.edu/congress\\_text](https://data.stanford.edu/congress_text).

the member(s) of Congress engaged in the protest, and c) cross-reference it with the *Legislator Misconduct Database*, *Legislators' Decorum Violations* (Alexander 2021), and newspaper articles data to eliminate duplicate events. By identifying floor statements where legislators are discussing protest, we may be able to identify other legislators who partook in the protest but whose actions were not captured by our other datasets. Additionally, legislators may mention other legislator protest(s) that go unnoticed by our other measures. Thus, while these speeches in and of themselves may not be acts of legislators' protest, they may provide important information about protests that our other data sources are missing.

Even more, the Congressional Record data allows us to overcome potential biases that may be present in our other datasets. For instance, the *Legislator Misconduct Database* only includes instances where formal allegations are made against a legislator. Similarly, the *Legislators' Decorum Violations* data (Alexander 2021) only includes instances when sanctions are issued under House Rule XVII clause 4. However, factors beyond the act of protest, like whether a legislator belongs to the majority party or is an extreme ideologue, may affect whether a sanction is formally issued. Moreover, newspaper articles may also be biased regarding legislators' protests. What they deem newsworthy can be shaped by various factors, including societal events, the demographics of the legislator(s), and whether editors deem the behavior distinct enough to warrant coverage. By considering statements made on the House and the Senate floor, we aim to overcome the racial, gender, ideological, partisan, and other biases in our other datasets and assess our hypotheses concerning which legislators protest and why.

**Consequences** To understand the consequences of legislators' protests, we consider their constituent-level and institutional-level implications. For constituent-level implications, we will evaluate constituents' reactions to legislators' protests to discern whether legislators' protests are successful in helping them achieve their reelection goals. First, reelection-minded legislators may protest to appeal to a broader audience (Schmoll and Leung Ting 2023) and increase their brand name among voters (e.g., Mayhew 1974). If a legislator's protest is successful in advertising their brand to a broader public, then we hypothesize that after protesting, they should appear in more Google searches and be the subject of more news articles than they did before protesting and compared to shifts in mentions for legislators who did not

protest over the same period.<sup>3</sup> We expect to see even more attention paid after protests to legislators from historically excluded demographic groups and with ideologically extreme preferences since protests by those groups are likely to be perceived as more aberrant than protests by white, male, moderate legislators.

Second, a legislator who receives more public attention may not necessarily receive more constituency support. Indeed, a legislator's protest could work at cross purposes. It can increase the public's attention but does not have a similar effect on constituents' support of the legislator or the legislator's legislative capacity in Congress. In order to better assess the potential electoral benefits legislators may receive from engaging in protest, we will evaluate constituent attitudes and campaign finance contributions. As a first attempt to assess constituent perceptions of legislators' protests, we fielded questions on the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). Each respondent received one of three questions concerning their opinions on a legislative behavior, i.e., how respondents would feel if their member of Congress sponsored legislation, violated congressional rules, or were arrested for protesting in order to represent their interests.<sup>4</sup>

As shown in [Figures 3A through C](#), preliminary analyses show that when including control variables, some constituents, namely Democrats and Black Americans, approve of legislators who engage in protest to represent their interests. These initial findings provide some support for our expectation that historically marginalized constituents may favorably view protesting as a way of addressing inequality and discrimination. However, due to the limited number of questions we could include on the CMPS and the lack of control over the survey design, we still do not know how, for instance, the race, gender, and/or partisanship of a legislator impacts constituents' evaluations. In order to better identify the mechanisms

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<sup>3</sup> We will assess Google searches from <https://trends.google.com/> and we will collect data on legislators' mentions in newspapers from our Factiva and Lexis Uni searches.

<sup>4</sup> 1) Would you approve or disapprove of a member of Congress who proposes a new law in order to represent your interests? 2) Would you approve or disapprove of a member of Congress who violates congressional rules (e.g., speaking out of turn) in order to represent your interests? 3) Would you approve or disapprove of a member of Congress who gets arrested at a protest in order to represent your interests? [Strongly Approve, Somewhat Approve; Neither Approve nor Disapprove; Somewhat Disapprove; Strongly Disapprove]

through which evaluations of legislators' protests operate, we will field a second survey experiment that oversamples Black and Latinx participants and allows more variation in the legislators' characteristics (e.g., race, party, gender, and protest tactic).

The survey questions and treatment design are available in [Appendix 2](#). The survey will help assess our hypotheses concerning the costliness and electoral benefits of protests for different legislators. That is, we hypothesize that protest is a rational behavior for 1) marginalized legislators, 2) legislators with extreme political preferences (either based on personal or constituents' preferences), and 3) legislators with partisan considerations (e.g., those who want to curry party favor). For these legislators, the benefits of protest outweigh the costs.

Our [Non-Protest Treatment](#) seeks to understand how constituents perceive legislators' traditional, institutional behavior. We will present respondents with a description of a legislator who objects to a floor debate likely to result in an infrastructure bill that will not include provisions benefiting the legislator's constituents. The legislator's objection and expressed frustration is well within the scope of institutional, legislative behaviors, as it is a legislator's duty to represent their constituents' interests fervently. However, women of color, members of racially and ethnically subordinated groups, and women are often criticized by their colleagues and constituents for performing their traditional legislative duties (e.g., Holman, Mahoney & Hurler 2021; Hawkesworth 2003; Preuhs 2006; Dittmar et al. 2022; Kathlene 1994; Tate 2004; McClain 1993). This bias suggests that the costs of protesting may be lower for legislators, regardless of what they do in office. Nevertheless, constituents tend to trust and approve of legislators who descriptively represent them (e.g., Gay 2002; Mansbridge 1999). Consequently, we expect descriptively represented respondents (based on race, ethnicity, gender, or political party) to be more likely to approve of the legislator's behavior described in the non-protesting conditions.

We include variations in legislators' race, ethnicity (Black, Latinx, or White), gender (Male or Female), and partisanship (Democrat or Republican) to assess whether constituents' support or approval of legislators performing their traditional legislative behaviors varies given the legislators' demographics. We will recruit a representative sample of 4,800 survey respondents based on power calculations (Georgiev

2023), suggesting a need for 200 respondents in each condition (Zhang & Yuan 2018). We will also include oversamples of 20 Black and Latinx respondents in each condition to assess whether Black and Latinx legislators, whom we expect to receive lower overall levels of support, are better supported by the constituents they descriptively represent. The control condition will be the Non-Protesting condition of a white male Democrat since white males are traditionally and contemporarily overrepresented in Congress. We chose a Democrat for the control condition since more Americans identify as Democrats than Republicans. Again, this non-protesting condition aims to establish the baseline by which legislators determine the costs and benefits of their protest.

The [Protest Treatment](#) describes a legislator who objects to the debate concerning the infrastructure bill by protesting. The legislator interrupts the debate and has to be escorted out of the chamber by the Capitol police. This behavior is perhaps one of the most costly protests that a legislator can engage in since it is an extra-institutional tactic that prevents the entire chamber from being able to legislate.

Once again, we include variations in legislators' race, ethnicity (Black, Latinx, or White), gender (Male or Female), and partisanship (Democrat or Republican) to assess how constituents respond to the legislators' protests. In line with our hypotheses, we expect legislators of color, women, and women of color to see the highest reward from protesting from their constituents, primarily those who share the legislators' race, ethnicity, gender, and partisanship. In particular, we expect that respondents will be more likely to agree with a co-partisan legislator's objection than the objection of a legislator from the opposing party (Non-Protesting Treatment) and that the difference in agreement will be even larger for legislators in the Protesting Treatment.

We also expect that constituents, in general, will object to the behaviors of demographically marginalized legislators more so than white male legislators—particularly in the Protest Treatment (Caballero Armendariz et al. 2020). However, the reverse will be true for constituents who share their legislator's descriptive identity. We expect constituents from marginalized groups in the Protesting Treatment will be even more likely to approve of protesting legislators who descriptively represent them than non-protesting legislators, generally, and that white legislators will see no increase in constituent

support when comparing the Non-Protesting and Protesting Treatment conditions, which demonstrates the greater benefit of protesting for marginalized legislators than white legislators.

Third, we plan to analyze campaign contributions from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (Bonica 2016). By looking at legislators' campaign contributions before and after their protest, we can assess whether the protest corresponds to (a) an increase or decrease in campaign contributions and (b) whether there are any changes in who contributes to the legislator's campaign. The DIME dataset has the contributors' gender and ideology, among other information. We can probabilistically estimate contributors' race or ethnicity from their geographic location since neighborhoods remain racially segregated in the United States. We expect legislators from historically marginalized groups to see decreases in campaign contributions from the average campaign contributor but increases in contributions from groups they descriptively represent. We expect these differences in shifts in contributions to be even greater from constituents not in a legislators' district since they may most want representation, given their general lack of descriptive representation, even in the absence of substantive representation.

At the institutional level, we will assess whether a protest affects the legislators' position within the institution. Here we will search Govtrack.us for (1) committee assignments before and after legislators engage in protest. Do the legislators change committees after their protest? Do they move to a committee with jurisdiction more relevant to the issue they protested? Are they placed on a power/prestige committee (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler 2014)? Are they removed from a power or prestige committee, perhaps reflecting punishment from party leaders? Additionally, we will evaluate whether the chair position on a (sub)committee is given or taken away after a protest. We will also (2) assess whether protest impedes or improves legislators' ability to progress their agenda through the legislative process. Using legislative effectiveness scores<sup>5</sup> (Volden and Wieseman 2014), we can determine whether legislators' ability to advance legislation changes after engaging in protest. However, considering that Congress has become more reliant on omnibus legislation (Casas et al. 2020; Krutz 2005; Sinclair 2016) and that some

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<sup>5</sup> <https://thelawmakers.org/data-download>



marginalized members of Congress may rely on the tactic of invisibility to advance their policy agenda (e.g., Hawkesworth 2003), legislative effectiveness scores are limited. Therefore, we also consider the influence legislators have via unorthodox lawmaking by relying on Eatough and Preece's (n.b.) Lawmaking Productivity Measure.<sup>6</sup> They use a text reuse measure to determine if the language used by legislators in their sponsored bills and amendments is present in omnibus legislation. We will apply a similar technique to evaluate legislators' language in omnibus legislation before and after protesting.

### **Research Team Qualifications and Responsibilities**

**LaGina Gause** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. Her research interests lie in legislative behavior, race and ethnic politics, inequality, protests, and political behavior. She has a book on legislators' representation of (costly) protesters published by *Cambridge University Press*. Other work appears in *the British Journal of Political Science*, *Political Behavior*, *PS: Political Science & Politics*, and *the Legislative Scholar*. Dr. Gause has already used archival newspaper articles and media transcripts to collect protest data for previous research on the representation of constituents' protest behavior (Gause 2022a; Gause 2022b; Gause, Garcia, and Stout n.d.) and media coverage of protests (Gause, Moore, and Ostfeld n.d.). She has also used survey experiments and observational survey data to examine how bi-racial candidates, namely Barack Obama, use their white racial ancestry to appeal to broader constituencies during their campaigns for elected office (Hutchings et al. 2021).

**Jennifer Garcia** is an assistant professor of Politics at Oberlin College whose research focuses on legislative behavior, race and ethnic politics, and political representation. She has published in journals such as *Political Communications*, *American Politics Research*, *Social Science Quarterly*, *Election Law Journal*, *Political Research Quarterly*, and *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. She and her co-author received the 2017 Best Paper in Blacks and Politics from the Western Political Science Association. She is an associate editor for *Political Research Quarterly*. She and Dr. Gause are collaborating on a project with

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<sup>6</sup> <https://lawprom.com/>

Christopher Stout to understand legislators' public statements (Gause, Garcia, and Stout n.d.). Dr. Garcia has conducted numerous surveys examining the effect of racial appeals by descriptive and non-descriptive representatives on Black Americans and surveys aimed at understanding how identity influences the perception of skin color by white, Black, and Latinx respondents. She has also used keyword searches and RTextTools to conduct computer-assisted content analyses of press releases issued by members of Congress (Garcia and Stout 2020, 2022; Garcia, Stout, and Tate n.d.)

**Alison Boehmer** is a Ph.D. candidate in the University of California San Diego political science department. Her research explores how workplaces perpetuate systems of white supremacy that suppress the political participation of racially subjugated communities and how members of racially subjugated communities use protest and other forms of resistance to navigate the suppression they experience in and outside their places of employment. She has taken a rigorous methods sequence of courses, including Qualitative Research Methods. She has been an RA for Dr. Gause and other professors for the last four years, assisting with survey (experiment) construction and distribution and qualitative/quantitative data collection and analysis. To date, Alison has been invaluable in leading the undergraduate research team in collecting data on legislators' protests. She has also assisted Drs. Gause and Garcia in finding existing data on legislators' protests.

To find any and all existing data on legislators' protests, our research team has consulted the librarians at their universities, the Library of Congress, and government websites. From our search, we collected data and began analyzing data from the *Legislator Misconduct Database* from Govtrack.us and the *Legislators' Decorum Violations* dataset (Alexander 2021). Everyone on our research team is responsible for data collection and management, theory development, team management, study design, analysis, and manuscript preparation.

### **Work Plan and Scholarly Product**

With the support of the Russell Sage Foundation, we hope to complete this project over the next two years and produce several scholarly products, including a publicly accessible dataset of Legislators' Protest, two academic journal articles, and a book manuscript addressing our three research questions.

WORK PLAN	
Pre-Award Activities	
Timeframe	Description
June 1, 2022-May 31, 2023	With the support of UCSD Academic Senate (\$XXXX) and Division of Social Sciences (\$XXXX) grants, we have convened a team of undergraduate research assistants who have begun searching and collecting newspaper articles for legislators' protests within Congress. The team was organized and managed by Ph.D. student Alison Boehmer, with the support of a graduate research assistantship granted by UCSD's Department of Political Science to work with project PI LaGina Gause.
June 2022	PIs contacted Brian Alexander to gain access to the <i>Legislators' Decorum Violations</i> (Alexander 2021) data.
August 2022	With the support of a UCSD Black Studies project grant (\$XXXX), two UCSD graduate students downloaded and coded <i>Legislator Misconduct Database</i> from GovTrack.US.
October 2022 & February 2023	PIs conducted initial descriptive analyses of the <i>Legislators' Misconduct Database</i> and <i>Legislators' Decorum Violations</i> (Alexander 2021) datasets.
June 2023	Dr. Gause will present preliminary findings at a conference at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy.
RSF Year 1 (July 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024)	
	Undergraduate RAs will finish collecting and coding Legislators' Protests data from newspaper articles and the Congressional Record.
	PIs will analyze the Legislators' Protests data from newspaper articles and the Congressional Record.
	PIs will submit an IRB proposal for a survey experiment discerning constituents' perceptions and reactions to legislators' protests. PIs will then pre-register their survey. Finally, PIs will run the survey and analyze the survey responses.
September 2023	PIs will present a paper on demographic characteristics of legislators' protests at the American Political Science Association annual meeting (pending conference paper acceptance).
Fall 2023	PIs will produce a descriptive journal article on the demographic characteristics of legislators' protests.
Year 2 (July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025)	
	RAs will collect, and PIs will analyze data (Google trends, legislators' mentions, campaign contributions, and legislators' legislative effectiveness measures) on the consequences of legislators' protests.
	PIs will submit a chapter and book proposal to academic press editors. Editors at New York, Oxford, and Chicago University Presses have expressed initial interest in the book manuscript.

### Dissemination of Findings

**Statement on Transparency and Reproducibility:** This project will follow open and transparent research practices. We will preregister our survey prior to collecting any survey responses. We will also publish all final data (in unidentifiable form for non-public officials) and their respective replication files to our personal websites or repositories for the outlets in which we publish upon publication so that other researchers can replicate our findings.



**Dissemination of Findings:** We plan to make our dataset on legislators' protests publicly available, so anyone who wishes to access them can do so. We have begun presenting our preliminary findings at academic conferences, workshops, and seminars. We will submit subsequent findings in similar forums and publish them in two academic journals and an academic book press.



To maximize our project's outreach and contribution, we aim to disseminate our findings to broader audiences. Our research team has the expertise and experience to do so. For example, in 2020, Dr. Gause


wrote a *Washington Post* Monkey Cage article based on her costly protest research to help readers understand why police departments, city councils, school boards, and other policymakers were creating policies in response to the widespread protests that erupted across the U.S. following the death of George Floyd. Additionally, she co-authored a second *Washington Post* Monkey Cage blog article based on her co-authored work with Maneesh Arora assessing the motivations for participation in the massive 2020 BLM protests. Further, Dr. Gause discussed her research as a panelist on a KPBS Community Conversation: Keeping Our Democracy: What Now? in December 2020. Dr. Gause was also featured in an *Oprah Daily* article discussing abortion rights protests following the *Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization* decision.

Similarly, Dr. Garcia co-authored a *Washington Post* Monkey Cage article with Christopher Stout based on their work on the implications of racial and ethnic diversity among candidates in the Republican Party. She has also been interviewed by *The Guardian US* for an article regarding the election of Hakeem Jeffries as the first Black Minority Leader and *PBS NewsHour* for an article on the significance of Black candidates running for statewide office. We plan to disseminate our work on legislators' protests in similar outlets.


**FIGURE 1: LEGISLATORS' MISCONDUCT OVER TIME**  
**(SOURCE: GOVTRACK.US)**










**FIGURE 2: LEGISLATORS’ DECORUM VIOLATIONS OVER TIME  
(SOURCE: ALEXANDER 2021)**










**Figure 2D: Legislators' Decorum Violations Over Time,  
By Race (106th-113th Congress)**



### FIGURE 3: PRELIMINARY CMPS FINDINGS





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## APPENDIX 1: NEWSPAPER DATA COLLECTION

To create an original dataset of newspaper accounts of legislators' protests inside and outside of Congress, we enlist a team of undergraduate RAs to engage in a three-part process detailed below: 1) Boolean Search Protocol, 2) Application of Protest Definition, and 3) Coding Procedure

### 1. *Boolean Search Protocol*

#### Protest Inside Congress

Within Factiva and Nexis Uni, RAs apply the following Boolean search terms to return as many articles as possible discussing what our definition considers to be legislators' protests *inside* Congress. They also filter returned articles to only include news sources (rather than business-to-consumer sources, blogs, industry sources, etc.), and sources within the United States. *This process has already been completed by a team of undergraduate RAs.*

(floor\* or sit-in or walk-out or sitting-out or walked-out or disobe\* or decorum\* or violat\* or censur\* or sanction\* or misconduct\* or disrupt\* or reprimand\* or rebuk\* or storm\* or rush\* or obstruct\* or protest\* or disrespect\* or respect\* or demand\* or sabotage\* or "calls for action" or "call for action" or "calling for action" or stunt\* or demur\*) same (legislator\* or lawmaker or representative or senator or "caucus" or "committee" or congress\* or Rep. or Congresswoman or Congressman) AND (hl= (floor\* or sit-in or walk-out or sitting-in or walked-out or disobe\* or decorum\* or violat\* or censur\* or sanction\* or misconduct\* or disrupt\* or reprimand\* or rebuk\* or storm\* or rush\* or obstruct\* or protest\* or disrespect\* or respect\* or demand\* or sabotage\* or "calls for action" or "call for action" or "calling for action" or stunt\* or demur\*))

#### Protest Outside Congress

Within Factiva and Nexis Uni, RAs apply the following Boolean search terms to return as many articles as possible discussing what our definition considers to be legislators' protests *outside* of Congress. They also filter returned articles to only include news sources (rather than business to consumer sources, blogs, industry sources, etc.), and sources within the United States. *This process*

would be funded by this RSF grant; the Boolean search terms copied below are tentative and subject to further refinement.

(march\* or demonstrat\* or street\* or kneel\* or detain\* or disobe\* or riot\* or "civil disobedience" or rall\* or petition\* or disrupt\* or occup\* or reprimand\* or arrest\* or rebuke\* or participat\* or protest\*) same (legislator\* or lawmaker or representative or senator or "caucus" or "committee" or congress\* or Rep. or Congresswoman or Congressman) AND hl= (or march\* or demonstrat\* or arrest\* or detain\* or disobe\* or riot\* or civil disobedience or rall\* or petition\* or disrupt\* or occup\* or reprimand\* or rebuke\* or participat\* or protest\*)

## **2. Filtering Returned Articles**

Many of the articles returned by the above search process are irrelevant to our purposes (i.e, they do not discuss legislators' protests). Therefore, the RAs then filter through each returned article, keeping only those that satisfy our definition of protest inside and outside of Congress. *Our team of RAs is currently filtering through the set of articles returned about protests inside Congress; the RSF grant will fund a team who will complete this process for articles returned about protests outside Congress.*

## **3. Coding Scheme**

The final step is to apply a coding scheme for each corpus of articles that allows us to capture details about each protest event. The scheme, copied below, has eight sections: 1) Coder and Article Details, 2) Describing the Protest Event, 3) Participant Details: Legislators, 4) Participant Details: Non-Legislators, 5) Describing the Protest: Target, Claims, 6) Consequences of Protest Event, 7) Stated Reactions to Protest Event, 8) Finish (article citation). In general, these questions allow us to capture details about who is participating in the protest (inside and outside of Congress), what they are protesting over, reactions to the protest, whether arrests were involved, and the framing of the article. Note that the scheme copied below will be used to capture articles covering protest *inside* and *outside* of Congress. *Our current team of RAs will apply this coding scheme to articles regarding protest inside Congress between March-August 2023, funded by UCSD Academic Senate and Division of Social Sciences. This RSF grant will allow a team of*

*RAs to apply this coding scheme for outside Congress protest events, after articles are collected and filtered.*

LEGISLATORS' PROTEST (inside and outside of Congress) CODEBOOK					
QUESTION #	VARIABLE NAME	DESCRIPTION	ALTERATION FOR "OUTSIDE CONGRESS" VERSION, IF APPLICABLE	ANSWER TYPE	POSSIBLE RESPONSES (IF APPLICABLE)
<b>CODER AND ARTICLE DETAILS</b>					
1	CODER NAME	Write your name in this format: "First Initial.Last Name" (A.Boehmer)		Text	
2	TODAY'S DATE	Write the date on which you coded this particular article in this format: (M/D/YYYY)		Date	
3	ARTICLE DATE	Write the date on which the article was published in this format: (M/D/YYYY)		Date	
4	NEWSPAPER/SOURCE TITLE	Write the name of the source from which the article came exactly as it appears in the text.		Text	
5	ARTICLE TITLE	Write the article title as it appears in the article; keep punctuation and capitalization as it appears in the title		Text	
<b>DESCRIBING THE PROTEST EVENT</b>					
6	EVENT DATE	Write the date on which the protest event occurred in this format: (M/D/YYYY). You may need to calculate the day on which the event occurred based on the article's publication date, as the article may say something like "last Wednesday..."		Date	
7	EVENT ID	Leave blank.			
8	NUMBER OF DAYS THE EVENT LASTED	Write the number of days the event lasted, if specified.		Text	
9	BRIEF NARRATIVE DESCRIBING PROTEST EVENT	In a few sentences and in your own words, summarize the protest event.		Text	
10	LOCATION OF EVENT-CHAMBER	Write whether the protest event occurred in the House or Senate, if specified. If not, leave blank.	NA	Choice	House, Senate, Both, Not Specified
11	LOCATION OF EVENT-PHYSICAL LOCATION	Write the exact location in which the protest event took place (e.g., House floor)	Write the approximate location in which the protest event took place (e.g., downtown DC)	Text	
<b>PARTICIPANT DETAILS: LEGISLATORS</b>					
12	EXACT NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS REPORTED	If the exact number of participants are reported, write this number. This number should include elected officials and non-elected official participants.		Text	
13	ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS REPORTED	If the article does not offer a specific number of participants, write any estimate the article gives (e.g., dozens)		Text	
14	HOW MANY FEDERAL LEGISLATORS PARTICIPATED?	If the article specifies the exact number of federal legislators who participated, select 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more than 5. If the exact participants are not named, select "EXACT PARTICIPANTS NOT NAMED".		Choice	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, MORE THAN 5, EXACT PARTICIPANTS NOT NAMED
15	IF THE NAMES OF PARTICIPATING LEGISLATORS WERE NOT GIVEN, HOW DID THE ARTICLE DESCRIBE THE CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPANTS (E.G., 16 HOUSE DEMOCRATS)?	If names of participating legislators are not specified in the article, write how they are described.		Text	
16	LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
17	LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
18	LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
19	LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
20	LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
21	REMAINING LEGISLATOR NAMES (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME; REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	If more than 5 legislators participated, write the remaining names of participants in this format, "REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME; REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)		Text	
22	PARTICIPATING GROUP(S)-PARTY, CAUCUS	Write any groups, within Congress, who participated in the protest (e.g., Black Congressional Caucus, Democratic Party)		Text	
23	INITIATING GROUP	Does the article describe who initiated/organized the protest event? If YES, select one of the options or other.	Social movement organization(s), Community organization(s), Non-profit(s), Other, Does not describe who started the protest	Choice	Individual Legislators, Legislative Group (e.g., Caucus, Committee), Outside Congress Organization, Other, Does not describe who started the protest.
24	INITIATING GROUP-Other Specify	Please specify the "Other" group(s) you indicated in the above question; separate each group with a ",".		Text	
25	INITIATING GROUP-SPECIFY	Give the names of any of the above groups you identified; separate each group by a ",".		Text	

PARTICIPANT DETAILS: NON-LEGISLATORS					
26	OUTSIDE CONGRESS PARTICIPATION	Did anyone besides federal legislators participate in the protest event? If YES, select one of the participant kind options or other.	Social movement organization(s), Community organization(s), Non-profit(s), Celebrities, Non-legislator Congressional Staff, Non-Federal Legislators, Non-Congressional Elected Officials, Other, Does not describe additional participants.	Choice	Individual non-Federal Legislators, Non-legislator Congressional Staff (e.g., "Staffers", aids, etc.), Outside Congress Organization, Other, Does not describe additional participants.
27	OUTSIDE CONGRESS PARTICIPATION-- Other Specify	Please specify the "Other" group(s) you indicated in the above question; separate each group with a ",".			
28	OUTSIDE CONGRESS PARTICIPATION-- SPECIFY	Give the names of any of the above groups you identified; separate each group by a ",".			
DESCRIBING THE PROTEST: TARGET, CLAIMS					
29	TARGET OF PROTEST	Write any groups or individuals specified in the article to be the target of a protest event.		Text	
30	COPY SENTENCES THAT MENTION "PROTEST," "WALK-OUT," "SIT-IN," "CENSURE," "MISCONDUCT," "DECORUM," "DISOBEDIENCE," OR "SANCTION"	Copy any sentences from the article that contain these words; separate each sentence by a ",".	COPY SENTENCES THAT MENTION "PROTEST," "RALLY," "DEMONSTRATION," "CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE," "ARREST," OR ANY OTHER WORDS USED TO DESCRIBE THE PROTEST ACTIVITY.	Text	
31	FORM OF PROTEST EVENT	Select the protest event category that best matches the protest identified in the article. You can select multiple.	Protest, Rally, Demonstration, Civil Disobedience, Sit-in, Other (Specify)	Choice	Walk-out, Sit-in, Decorum violation-speech, Decorum violation-dress, Decorum violation-other (specify), Other (specify)
32	FORM OF PROTEST EVENT-Other Specify	Specify the "Other" form of protest event.			
33	FORM OF PROTEST EVENT-Decorum Violation Other Specify	Specify the type of decorum violation that occurred that was not related to decorum or speech.	N/A		
34	FORM OF PROTEST EVENT-Additional Details	Please include any details about the form in which the protest event took place you feel is not captured in the previous questions.			
35	CLAIMS/JUSTIFICATIONS OF PROTEST PARTICIPANTS (in your own words)	In your own words, describe the claims or justifications of protest participants: If offered...Why are they protesting? Why are they protesting in this way?		Text	
36	CLAIMS/JUSTIFICATIONS OF PROTEST PARTICIPANTS (in their words)	If offered, copy the text that explains why the participating legislators are protesting. If multiple explanations are given, separate each statement with a ",".		Text	
37	TOPIC OF PROTEST	Select from the list of topics that which best describes the substantive topic of the protest.		Choice	0200 Anti Nuclear (Power) Movement; 0300 Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Foreigner/Anti-Asylum Movement; 0400 Small or Family Farmers or Organic Movement (Not Farm-workers); 0500 Anti-"Transnational Union" Movements; 0600 Feminist or Women's Movement; 0700 Peace Movement; 1000 International Human Rights and Civil Rights/Democratization; 1100 Environmental or Green Movement; 1300 Social; 1500 Civil Rights-Black Americans; 1600 Civil Rights-LGBTQIA+ (Including AIDS/HIV); 1700 Civil Rights-Native Americans; 1800 Civil Rights-Mexican Americans; 1900 Civil Rights-Asian Americans; 2000 Civil Rights-Pan Latino; 2100 Civil Rights-Disabled Individuals; 2200 Civil Rights-Farm Workers/Migrant Farmers; 2300 Civil Rights-Undifferentiated Minority Groups; 2400 Abortion; 2500 Anti-Ethnic Attacks/Hate or Bias Crimes; 2600 Animal Rights; 2900 Civil Rights-Seniors; 1400 Other
38	0200 Anti-Nuclear (Power) Movement: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Anti-Nuclear Plant Construction; Anti-Nuclear Plant Operating Procedures; Anti-Current Method of Nuclear Waste Disposal or Transportation
39	0300 Anti-Immigrant, Anti-Foreigner, Anti-Asylum Movement: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Anti-Immigration; Anti-Poor Treatment of Undocumented Immigrants; Anti-Sanctuary for Other Refugees; Anti-Political Asylum
40	0400 Small or Family Farmers or Organic Movement (Not Farm-workers): Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Improvement of farmers' conditions, general (including plight of 'Family Farm'); Restriction on agricultural imports; Federal Subsidies to farmers; Anti-Corporate Farming
41	0500 Anti-"Transnational Union" Movements: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Anti-NAFTA; Anti-UN; Anti-NATO

42	0600 Feminist or Women's Movement: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.	Choice	Women's Civil Rights, general; Federal/state funding for women's initiatives (shelters, clinics, etc.); Anti-violence against women; Equal Pay/Comparable worth; Gender quotas/Affirmative Action, as applied to gender, solely; Equal Rights Amendment; More positive media depictions, more depictions, fewer negative media depictions; Anti-Discrimination in Employment; Equality in Education
43	0700 Peace Movement: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.	Choice	Peace, pacifism, general; Disarmament, general; Anti-atomic testing; Anti-atomic weapons (construction, purchase, distribution, storage); Anti-Biological/chemical weapons (construction, purchase, distribution, storage); Anti-Afghanistan War; Anti-Gulf War; Anti-Yugoslavia War; Anti-Vietnam War; Anti-Military maneuvers; Anti-Military infrastructure; Anti-Export of conventional weapons; Anti-Conventional weapons (construction, purchase, distribution, storage); Anti-Draft; Anti-Korean War; Anti-US Military Involvement in Cuba; Anti-ROTC; Military/CIA recruitment on campus; Anti-US involvement in non-US Wars; Pro-Retrieving or Recovering POW/MIA's; Anti-US Involvement in Central America
44	1000 International Human and Civil Rights/Democratization	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.	Choice	Anti-Apartheid/Pro-University or Corporate Divestment; Indigenous Peoples' (outside of US) Rights; Amnesty for Political Prisoners; Intelligence services (CIA, Role of US Govt. In Supporting Right Wing Govt.); US Foreign Policy; Non-US War (with no US participation)
45	1100 Environmental or Green Movement (excluding nuclear power): Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.	Choice	Environment, general; Soil protection; Landscape protection (plants, trees); Reducing noise pollution; Air quality protection; Anti-Current Method of Solid Waste disposal; Limiting waste/recycle; Restriction of Pharmaceutical/chemicals; Water quality protection; Rainforest Preservation; Ozone Protection to prevent Global Warming, etc.; Zero Population Growth, as environmental issue
46	1300 Miscellaneous Social Issues: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.	Choice	Legalization of Illegal Substances; Increasing prices, general; Tax Increases; Plight of Homeless; Tenants' Rights Movement; Social Security Benefits; Medicaid/Medicare Benefits; AFDC/ADC ("Welfare") or Unemployment Benefits; Drug Control; Gun Control; Drunk Driving; Health Nutrition/School Lunches; Consumer Protection; Housing Issues Other; Poverty/hunger, general; Government Surveillance/Prosecution of Protesters; Child abuse, sexual crimes; Political figure; Anti-Crime movement; Government policy, n.e.c.; Freedom of Speech/Assembly; Veteran's Issues (not including POW); Education; Victims' Rights; Prisoners' Rights; Death Penatly; Not In My Backyard; Misc. Religious Claims; Anti-Pornography; AIDS/HIV Prevention, HIV/AIDS victims' rights (different from 1608/1609);
47	1500 Civil Rights-Black Americans	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.	Choice	African American Civil Rights, general; Any Desegregation Claim as applied to African Americans (School, Neighborhood, Public and Commercial Facilities); Prov-Voting Rights/Political Power; Anti-Discrimination in Housing or Employment; Affirmative Action, as applied solely to African Americans; Black Pride, entrepreneurship, separatist; Reduction of Black Poverty; Anti-Police Brutality/Harassment; More positive media depictions, more depictions, fewer negative depictions; Anti-Environmental Racism

48	Civil Rights-LGBTQIA+: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Gay and Lesbian Rights, general; Gay rights (males); Lesbian rights (female); Pro-Cohabitation/Domestic Partners Legislation; Pro-Same Sex Marriage; Anti-Discrimination in Housing or Employment; Increased Funding for AIDS/HIV Research; Anti-FDA Bureaucracy, which slows down the approval of AIDS Medication; More positive media depictions, more depictions, fewer negative media depictions; Anti-Police Brutality/Harassment; Anti-Political Under-representation
49	Civil Rights-Native Americans: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Native Am. Civil Rights, general; Anti-Environmental Racism; Pro-Bicultural/Bilingual Education; Anti-Police Brutality/Harassment; Anti-Discrimination in Housing or Employment; More positive media depictions, more depictions, fewer negative media depictions; Anti-Political Under-Representation; Historical Grievances, Anti-Land Seizures; Affirmative Action, as applied to NA;
50	1800 Civil Rights-Mexican Americans	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Mexican Am. Civil Rights, general; Anti-Environmental Racism; Pro-Bicultural/Bilingual Education; Anti-Discrimination in Housing or Employment; More Positive Media Depictions, more depictions, fewer negative depictions; Anti-Police Brutality/Harassment; Anti-Political Under-representation; Affirmative Action, as applied to Mexican Americans, solely
51	1900 Civil Rights-Asian Americans: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Asian Am. Civil Rights, general; Affirmative Action, as applied to Asian Americans, solely; Compensation for WWII Internment of Japanese Americans; Anti-Discrimination in Housing or Employment; Anti-Political Under-representation; Anti-Environmental Racism; More Positive Media Depictions, more depictions, fewer negative depictions; Anti-Police Brutality/Harassment;
52	2000 Civil Rights-Pan Latino: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Pan Latino Civil Rights, general; Pro-Bicultural/Bilingual education; Anti-Environmental Racism; More Positive Media Depictions, more depictions, fewer negative depictions; Anti-Discrimination in Housing or Employment; Anti-Police Brutality/Harassment; Affirmative Action, as applied to all or several Latino groups; Anti-Castro/Cuba; Puerto Rican Nationalism; Other movement on behalf of non-Mexican Latino Group
53	2100 Civil Rights-Disabled Individuals: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Disabled Civil Rights, general; Access for Disabled (Public or Private buildings, curbs, ramps, braille signs, parking spaces, etc.); Anti-Discrimination in Housing or Employment or Schools; More Positive Media Depictions, more depictions, fewer negative depictions; Provision of more humane medical treatment for disabled; Increase funding for disabled programs, hospitals, rehabilitation centers, etc.
54	Civil Rights-Farm Workers/Migrant: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Farmers; Anti-Pesticides (as they affect Farm Workers); Increase in Wages; Improvement of Working Conditions
55	2300 Civil Rights--Undifferentiated Minority Groups: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Affirmative Action, as applied to several/all minority groups; Pro Diversity; Desegregation, as applied to several/all minority groups
56	2500 Anti-Ethnic Attacks/Hate or Bias Crimes: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	White Supremacy, generally; Anti-Semitism; Anti-Asian; Anti-Black; Anti-Latino; Anti-Native American; Anti-Mexican; English-only; Ethnic/Racial Conflict, Melees, Riots, Confrontations (2+ groups unclear target or instigator); Anti-Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual
57	2600 Animal Rights: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Protection of Animals, general; Vegetarianism; Anti-Scientific Studies/laboratory animals; Anti-Factory Farming/Anti-Corporate Farming because of animal rights issues (not Farmers' issues); Anti-Fur/Leather

58	2900 Civil Rights-Senior Citizens: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	General Senior Citizens' Rights; Social Security; Housing (affordable, decent) for elderly; Health care, Medicare
59	1400 Other: Specify	If relevant, specify the substantive area over which the protest took place.		Choice	Labor; Basic Ideological Stance; Infrastructure; Historic Preservation; Large Scale Spectacles
60	VALENCE	Indicate whether the protest participants were for or against the above topic. For example, if you selected abortion rights as the topic of protest, were legislators protesting in support of abortion rights or opposition to abortion rights?		Choice	Support of; Opposition to; Cannot be determined
<b>CONSEQUENCES OF PROTEST EVENT</b>					
61	CONSEQUENCES OF PROTEST ACT (SEPARATE MULTIPLE CONSEQUENCES BY ";")	Write any consequences identified in the article; separate multiple consequences by a ";".		Text	
62	CONSEQUENCES OF PROTEST ACT: ARRESTS	Indicate whether the article described arrests as a consequence of the protest event.		Choice	YES; NO
63	HOW MANY PEOPLE DOES THE ARTICLE SAY WERE ARRESTED AT THE PROTEST EVENT?	If the article offers specific counts of those who were arrested, select the number or range; if it only mentions "arrests", select "General Arrests"; if the article does not mention arrests, select "No arrests mentioned".		Choice	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, MORE THAN 5, GENERAL ARRESTS, NO ARRESTS MENTIONED
64	WERE LEGISLATORS AMONG THOSE ARRESTED?	If the article specifies that legislators were among those who were arrested, select "YES"; if it does not, select "NO".		Choice	YES; NO
65	HOW MANY LEGISLATORS DOES THE ARTICLE DESCRIBE AS HAVING BEEN ARRESTED?	If the article specifies a precise number of legislators who were arrested, select the correct number; if the article only generally mentions that legislators were arrested, select "General Arrests".		Choice	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, MORE THAN 5, GENERAL ARRESTS
66	ARRESTED LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name who was arrested in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
67	ARRESTED LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name who was arrested in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
68	ARRESTED LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name who was arrested in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
69	ARRESTED LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name who was arrested in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
70	ARRESTED LEGISLATOR NAME (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	Write the participating legislator's name who was arrested in the following format, REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME).		Text	
71	REMAINING ARRESTED LEGISLATOR NAMES (REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME; REP OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)	If more than 5 legislators participated, write the remaining names of participants in this format, "REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME; REP. OR SEN. FIRST NAME LAST NAME)		Text	
72	IF THE NAMES OF PARTICIPATING LEGISLATORS WHO WERE ARRESTED WERE NOT GIVEN, HOW DID THE ARTICLE DESCRIBE THE CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPANTS (E.G., 5 HOUSE DEMOCRATS WERE ARRESTED)	If names of participating legislators are not specified in the article, write how they are described.		Text	
<b>STATED REACTIONS TO PROTEST EVENT</b>					
73	STATED REACTIONS TO PROTEST ACT	Did the article describe the reaction of anyone (e.g., legislator, political commentator, constituent—or other political actors) to this protest event?		Choice	YES; NO
74	HOW MANY STATED REACTIONS WERE GIVEN?	If yes to above, how many reactions were stated?		Choice	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, MORE THAN 5
75	Stated Reaction 1: Name	If given, what was the name of the person #1 who gave a reaction to the protest event in the article?		Text	
76	Stated Reaction 1: Position	What is the position (e.g., legislator, commentator, constituent, other) of the person who gave this reaction?		Choice	LEGISLATOR, COMMENTATOR (e.g., political journalist), COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (e.g., activist at a social movement organization), CONSTITUENT, OTHER
77	STATED REACTION: Position-Specify	Specify the "Other" position you indicated above.		Text	
78	Stated Reaction 1: Reaction	Copy any sentences from the article that describe this reaction; separate each sentence with a ";".		Text	
79	Stated Reaction 2: Name	If given, what was the name of the person #1 who gave a reaction to the protest event in the article?		Text	
80	Stated Reaction 2: Position	What is the position (e.g., legislator, commentator, constituent, other) of the person who gave this reaction?		Choice	LEGISLATOR, COMMENTATOR (e.g., political journalist), COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (e.g., activist at a social movement organization), CONSTITUENT, OTHER
81	STATED REACTION: Position-Specify	Specify the "Other" position you indicated above.		Text	
82	Stated Reaction 2: Reaction	Copy any sentences from the article that describe this reaction; separate each sentence with a ";".		Text	
83	Stated Reaction 3: Name	If given, what was the name of the person #1 who gave a reaction to the protest event in the article?		Text	

84	Stated Reaction 3: Position	What is the position (e.g., legislator, commentator, constituent, other) of the person who gave this reaction?		Choice	LEGISLATOR, COMMENTATOR (e.g., political journalist), COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (e.g., activist at a social movement organization), CONSTITUENT, OTHER
85	STATED REACTION: Position-Specify	Specify the "Other" position you indicated above.		Text	
86	Stated Reaction 3: Reaction	Copy any sentences from the article that describe this reaction; separate each sentence with a ";".		Text	
87	Stated Reaction 4: Name	If given, what was the name of the person #1 who gave a reaction to the protest event in the article?		Text	
88	Stated Reaction 4: Position	What is the position (e.g., legislator, commentator, constituent, other) of the person who gave this reaction?		Choice	LEGISLATOR, COMMENTATOR (e.g., political journalist), COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (e.g., activist at a social movement organization), CONSTITUENT, OTHER
89	STATED REACTION: Position-Specify	Specify the "Other" position you indicated above.		Text	
90	Stated Reaction 4: Reaction	Copy any sentences from the article that describe this reaction; separate each sentence with a ";".		Text	
91	Stated Reaction 5: Name	If given, what was the name of the person #1 who gave a reaction to the protest event in the article?		Text	
92	Stated Reaction 5: Position	What is the position (e.g., legislator, commentator, constituent, other) of the person who gave this reaction?		Choice	LEGISLATOR, COMMENTATOR (e.g., political journalist), COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (e.g., activist at a social movement organization), CONSTITUENT, OTHER
93	STATED REACTION: Position-Specify	Specify the "Other" position you indicated above.		Text	
94	Stated Reaction 5: Reaction	Copy any sentences from the article that describe this reaction; separate each sentence with a ";".		Text	
<b>FINISH</b>					
95	CLICK "EXPORT CITATION" AT THE TOP OF THE ENTRY AND COPY THE APA CITATION HERE				



## APPENDIX 2: REACTIONS TO LEGISLATORS' PROTESTS SURVEY INSTRUMENT

**PROTEST TREATMENT:** Participants in the “Protest Treatment” will receive one of twelve conditions, that vary along three variables: race of legislator (white, Black, Latinx), gender of legislator (woman, man), and party of legislator (Democrat, Republican). The race and gender of legislator is meant to be communicated via the legislators’ name (i.e., José/Alma Garcia–Latinx; Craig/Cindy Smith–white; Marcus/Keisha Smith–Black). The treatment is copied below.

### The US Times

#### News Feed

##### *Rep. Garcia/Smith Protests during the Infrastructure Bill Debate*

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

Representative [José/Craig/Marcus/Alma/Cindy/Keisha] [Garcia/Smith] (D/R) was escorted out of the House Chamber on Wednesday for disrupting the floor debate on an infrastructure bill after realizing that it was unlikely to include provisions that would help her Democratic/Republican constituents. While Capitol police escorted Representative [Garcia/Smith] out of the Chamber, [she/he] yelled, “You are doing a disservice to our constituents!”

The infrastructure bill is likely to pass the House and the Senate in the coming days.

**NON-PROTEST TREATMENT:** Participants in the “Non-Protest Treatment” will receive one of twelve conditions, that vary along three conditions: race of legislator (white, Black, Latinx), gender of legislator (woman, man), and party of legislator (Democrat, Republican). Crucially, the Non-Protest Treatment does not include mention of the representative being escorted out of the House Chamber, which intends to register a sense of obstruction, disruption, and disobedience. The treatment is copied below.

### The US Times

#### News Feed

##### *Rep. Garcia/Smith Protests during the Infrastructure Bill Debate*

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

Representative [José/Craig/Marcus/Alma/Cindy/Keisha] [Garcia/Smith] (D/R) was frustrated with the floor debate on an infrastructure bill after realizing that it was unlikely to include provisions that would help her/his constituents. While Representative [Garcia/Smith] was leaving the Chamber, [she/he] proclaimed, “You are doing a disservice to our constituents!”

The infrastructure bill is likely to pass the House and the Senate in the coming days.

REACTIONS TO LEGISLATOR PROTEST SURVEY INSTRUMENT			
QUESTION #	QUESTION	ANSWER TYPE	POSSIBLE RESPONSES
<b>ATTENTION CHECK</b>			
1	What was the topic of the floor debate?	Choice	Infrastructure Bill; Healthcare Bill; Education Bill; Environment Bill
<b>TREATMENT QUESTIONS</b>			
2	Do you approve of Representative [Garcia/Smith] protesting?	Choice	Strongly disapprove; Somewhat disapprove; Neither approve nor disapprove; Somewhat approve; Strongly approve
3	Do you approve of the way Congress is doing its job?	Choice	Strongly disapprove; Somewhat disapprove; Neither approve nor disapprove; Somewhat approve; Strongly approve
4	Do you approve of the way Representative [Garcia/Smith] is doing [his/her] job?	Choice	Strongly disapprove; Somewhat disapprove; Neither approve nor disapprove; Somewhat approve; Strongly approve
5	How likely are you to support Representative [Garcia/Smith] in the next election?	Choice	Extremely unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Neither likely nor unlikely; Somewhat likely; Extremely likely
6	Representative [Garcia/Smith] is seeking a leadership position in the [Democratic/Republican] Party. How likely are you to support them in [his/her] effort?	Choice	Extremely unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Neither likely nor unlikely; Somewhat likely; Extremely likely
7	Do you support the [Democratic/Republican] Party in making Representative [Garcia/Smith] chair of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee?	Choice	Definitely not; Probably not; Might or might not; Probably yes; Definitely yes
8	Do you agree that Congress should give in to Representative [Garcia/Smith]'s preferences on the infrastructure bill?	Choice	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
9	Do you agree that Representative [Garcia/Smith] is representing her/his constituents well?	Choice	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
10	Do you think it is harder for Representative [Garcia/Smith] to impact policy than most representatives in Congress?	Choice	Definitely not; Probably not; Might or might not; Probably yes; Definitely yes
11	What are your thoughts on Representative [Garcia/Smith]'s protest of the infrastructure bill?	Open-ended	
12	When you think of an infrastructure bill, what kinds of issues come to mind?	Open-ended	

Interest/Preference Questions			
13	Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested or not much interested in the political campaigns so far this year?	Choice	Not interested at all; Slightly interested; Moderately interested; Very interested; Extremely interested
14	To your memory, have you ever done any of the following?	Choice	Voted in a local/state/federal election; Discussed politics with family and friends; Worked or volunteered for a candidate, political party, or some other campaign organization; Contributed money to a candidate, political party, ballot issue, or some other campaign organization; Spoke or posted a comment at a meeting about issues facing the community; Signed a petition regarding an issue or problem that concerns you; Attended a campaign rally, meeting, or event; Attended a protest, march, demonstration, or rally
15	Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."	Choice	Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
Demographics Questions			
16	What is the month, day and year of your birth?	Date	
17	What is your relationship status?	Choice	Never married; Separated; Divorced; Widowed; Married
18	What gender do you identify with?	Choice	Male; Female; Non-binary; Transgender Male; Transgender Female; Other; Prefer not to say
19	Are you of Hispanic or Lation or Spanish origin? (Hispanic or Latino or Spanish origin is defined as a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race).	Choice	Hispanic or Latino or Spanish origin; Not Hispanic or Latino or Spanish origin
20	Choose one or more racial groups of which you consider yourself a member:	Choice	White/Caucasian; Black/African American; American Indian/Alaska Native; Asian; Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other (Specify); Prefer not to answer
21	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	Choice	Some high school or less; High school diploma or GED; Some college, but no degree; Associates or technical degree; Bachelor's degree; Graduate or professional degree (MA, MS, MBA, PhD, JD, MD, DDS, etc.); Prefer not to say

22	What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?	Choice	Less than \$25,000; \$25,000-\$49,999; \$50,000-\$74,999; \$75,000-\$99,999; \$100,000-\$149,999; \$150,000 or more; Prefer not to say
23	Below is a series of political views that people might hold, ranging from extremely liberal/progressive to extremely conservative. Where do you place yourself on this scale?	Choice	Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very Conservative
24	In 2020, Donald Trump ran on the Republican ticket against Joe Biden for the Democrats. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?	Choice	No; Yes
25	If yes to Q24, Which presidential candidate did you vote for in 2020?	Choice	Donald Trump; Joe Biden; Someone else (Specify)
26	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?	Choice	Democrat; Republican; Independent; Another party (Specify); No preference; Don't know
27	If "Republican" to Q26, Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?	Choice	Strong Republican; Not very strong Republican; Don't know
28	If "Democrat" to Q26, Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?	Choice	Strong Democrat; Not very strong Democrat; Don't know
29	If "Independent", "Another party", "No preference", or "Don't know" to Q26, Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?	Choice	Closer to Democratic Party; Neither party; Closer to Republican Party