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Journal of the Social Sciences

*Asian Americans and the
Immigrant Integration Agenda*

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Asian Americans and the Immigrant Integration Agenda

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From Narrative Scarcity to Research Plenitude for Asian Americans

JENNIFER LEE AND KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN

In *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War*, Pulitzer Prize–winning author Viet Thanh Nguyen (2016) asserts that all wars are fought twice—first on the battlefield and then in our collective memory. Our collective memory of the Vietnam War is constructed from manifold narratives, but most are told from the point of view of the majority—in this case, White Americans who fought in the war or protested it. Nguyen points out that the majority group enjoys narrative plenitude; most of the stories focus on them and are told from their perspective. Minoritized groups, by contrast, experience narrative scarcity. Relatively few stories are told about them and even fewer are told from a minority perspective. Thus, for example, the blockbuster movie *Crazy Rich Asians* featured an all-Asian cast and was a meaningful step toward greater representation of Asian Americans in leading Hollywood roles. Yet because of nar-

rative scarcity, millions of Americans saw only a thin slice of Asian American life and had no comparable opportunities to gain insight into the varied experiences, attitudes, and behavior of the majority of Asian Americans who are neither wealthy nor East Asian.

Nguyen has stated that individual writers and artists cannot achieve narrative plenitude on their own but need influence over all levels of narrative production. To this, we provide an addendum: as social scientists, we can work toward narrative plenitude by contributing to both research production and plentitude. This requires systematically designing and collecting research, accurately relaying narratives based on it, and in the process, correcting biased assumptions of Asian Americans and other minoritized populations. The compilation of original research articles in this issue is a critical step toward research plenitude in

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pushing back against the one-dimensional narratives in which stereotypes, tropes, and dated assumptions about Asian Americans prevail. By raising fundamental questions about the diversity of the U.S. Asian population and identifying points of convergence in their experiences, attitudes, and behaviors, the authors in this issue significantly advance our knowledge about Asian Americans in the contemporary period. The issue is thus a foundational endeavor from narrative scarcity to research plenitude of Asian Americans.

The rapid growth of the Asian American population underscores the urgency of this project. The fastest growing U.S. racial group, Asian Americans increased from less than 1 percent of the country's population in 1970 to 6.4 percent today. By 2060, demographers project that the figure will be 10 percent. And, unlike other groups, such as Hispanics who are growing mainly through natural births, the U.S. Asian population is growing primarily through immigration. China and India have long surpassed Mexico as the leading sources of new immigrants to the United States. By 2055, Asians will surpass Hispanics as the largest immigrant group in the country (Colby and Ortman 2015; U.S. Census Bureau 2015).

The surge in immigration, accompanied by the low birth rate of U.S. Asians, has resulted in a population that is majority foreign born: two in three Asian Americans are immigrants, a figure that increases to nearly four in five among Asian adults. Asian Americans are the only racial group in the United States who are majority foreign born, a fact that belies stereotypes of Hispanics as the quintessential immigrant group. (In reality, the majority of Hispanic Americans are native born.) Indeed, 90 percent of U.S. Asians are either immigrants or the children of immigrants. Moreover, one in seven Asian immigrants is undocumented, and the Asian undocumented population is increasing at a faster rate than the counterpart Mexican and Central American populations (Ramakrishnan and Shah 2017). Hence, not only is Asian the new face of immigration, it is also the new face of undocumented immigration.

Finally, when it comes to immigrant voters, Asians are about as numerous nationally as Hispanics, each constituting nearly one-third of the adult naturalized population and roughly equal proportions of naturalized citizens who are registered to vote.[1] Hispanics may have been synecdoche for U.S. immigrants in the latter part of the twentieth century; Asian Americans occupy that role in the beginning of the twenty-first. Indeed, it is impossible today to accurately understand immigrant incorporation without including the Asian American population.

THE DIVERSITY-CONVERGENCE PARADOX

The new face of immigration may be Asian, but Asian is a catch-all category that includes tremendous heterogeneity. According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which guides the U.S. Census Bureau and other federal agencies, Asian is a racial category alongside White, Black, American Indian or Alaskan Native, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. In 1997, the *Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity* defined Asian as a "person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam" (OMB 1997).

The national-origin groups subsumed under the Asian rubric do not have a common language, ethnicity, culture, or religion; nor do these groups fully correspond to the geographic scope of Asia. Although seemingly arbitrary, the definition is born of centuries of racial exclusion in the United States that denied state protections and U.S. citizenship to immigrants from Asian countries such as China, Japan, Korea, and India (Colbern and Ramakrishnan

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1. Data from the Current Population Survey reveal that during the 2016 election, Asian Americans and Hispanics constituted 33 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of naturalized citizens who were registered to vote. Similarly, data from the 2017 American Community Survey reveal that Asian Americans and Hispanics constitute 32 percent and 33 percent, respectively, of naturalized adult citizens.

2020). Defined as non-White, these groups were deemed "unassimilable," full of filth and disease, and unfit for U.S. citizenship (Lee 2015; Lew-Williams 2018; Ngai 2004; Wu 2015). Two landmark Supreme Court cases in the 1920s (*Ozawa v. United States* and *United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind*) held that Asians could not be considered racially White even if they had fair complexions (*Ozawa*), or even though some prevailing theories held some Asian groups to be Caucasian (*Thind*).[2] Hence exclusion from U.S. citizenship was the basis of Asian group formation and panethnic political mobilization.

Mobilization initially took the form of fighting for the right to naturalize. Indians and Filipinos spearheaded this fight and pushed for that right under the 1946 Luce-Celler Act, but all Asian American groups continued to advocate for the removal of national-origin barriers to naturalization, which was finally granted with the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. Soon thereafter, Dalip Singh Saund, who had mobilized for passage of the Luce-Celler Act in 1946, became the first Asian American to be elected to Congress—a mere seven years after securing naturalization in 1949 (U.S. House of Representatives 2020). Subsequent pivotal moments of Asian group formation included large-scale protests against racial discrimination and the Vietnam War in the 1960s, successful efforts to create Asian American studies and ethnic studies programs starting in the late 1960s, and then bids for official census recognition in the 1970s. The federal government's recognition of Asian as a racial category in 1977 was a critical turning point in subsuming diverse national-origin groups under a single rubric (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2014; Omi and Winant 1994).

Accompanying diverse national origins are diverse migration histories—including contexts of exit from countries of origin and contexts of reception in the United States (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Chinese are the oldest Asian immigrant group that initially arrived primarily as low-wage migrant laborers; Japanese, Filipino, and Korean immigrants followed (Lew-Williams 2018). The U.S. Census first counted Chinese residents in 1870 and began

counting the Japanese population in 1890. By 1920, Filipinos, Koreans, and Hindus were included as census categories, reflecting the demographic realities of workers in California and other Western states.

Despite the presence of Asian immigrants in the United States since the nineteenth century, the Asian population remained at less than 1 percent of the country's total even as late as 1970. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, combined with a series of other highly restrictive Asian exclusion laws that lasted for six decades, prevented the growth of the U.S. Asian population until the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Ngai 2004). Abolishing national-origin quotas, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act created new preferences for foreign-born applicants based on family reunification, preferences for particular skills, and refugee status. As a result of changes in immigration law, the earliest post-1965 Asian immigrants were highly educated, highly skilled professionals—including doctors, nurses, and engineers—who fulfilled labor shortages in particular occupational niches. So highly selected are contemporary U.S. Asian immigrants from China, India, the Philippines, and Korea that Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou (2015) characterize them as *hyper-selected* to reflect their dual positive immigrant selectivity: they are more likely to have graduated from college than their nonmigrant counterparts in their countries of origin, and also more likely to hold a college degree than the U.S. mean. Their hyper-selectivity has put them and their second-generation children at more favorable starting points relative not only to hypo-selected immigrant groups such as Mexicans (Diaz and Lee 2020), but also to native-born Whites and Blacks.

Groups such as Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hmong, and Laotians began arriving en masse in the late 1970s as refugees (Hein 2006; Zhou and Bankston 1998). Fleeing turbulent political regimes, these groups displayed a range of socioeconomic profiles, with the first wave typically highly educated and hyper-selected, and later waves significantly less so. Not only did their contexts of exit differ from that of volun-

2. *Ozawa v. United States,* 260 U.S. 178 (1922); *United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,* 261 U.S. 204 (1923).

tary immigrants like Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans but so did their context of reception; the U.S. government provided various forms of resettlement assistance to help ease the incorporation of war-torn refugees.

Today's newest Asian immigrants are increasingly from South Asia—including such countries as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—and exhibit an array of skills and education levels. Indians are among the most highly educated, hyper-selected Asian immigrants, with three-quarters holding a college degree. Bangladeshis, by contrast, fall at the lower end of the socioeconomic distribution, in regard to both educational attainment and income. The shift in national origins among Asian immigrants has resulted in unprecedented diversity within the U.S. Asian population. South and Southeast Asians now make up 27 and 33 percent of the Asian American population, respectively; East Asians make up only 36 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2016).

Folding such diverse national-origin groups into a single U.S. racial category has had the unanticipated consequence of masking intragroup inequality. The inequality was unveiled in a recent report by the Pew Research Center (2018), which pointed to Asians as the U.S. racial group with the highest level of income inequality, with the top tenth of the income distribution earning nearly eleven times those in the bottom tenth. Much of this income inequality is related to national origin, with Asian Indians having median household incomes of $100,000 and Burmese and Bangladeshis of $36,000 and $49,800, respectively.

Income is only one of many indicators in which Asians exhibit tremendous inequality. Other measures include educational attainment, English-language proficiency, poverty levels, welfare receipt, access to health care, and health outcomes (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Wong et al. 2011). Indeed, like Black Americans, Asian Americans exhibit more intragroup variation on these socioeconomic indicators than intergroup variation between them and other U.S. racial groups.

Despite this tremendous heterogeneity, Asian Americans converge in several notable ways, including experiences with certain types of discrimination, voting behavior, and atti-

tudes on policies from environmental protection to gun control to higher taxation and social service provision, and, more recently, affirmative action. This seeming paradox—of convergence despite divergence in national origins and socioeconomic status—provides one of the central puzzles animating research on Asian Americans today. Explaining the *diversity-convergence paradox* can be addressed only by collecting and analyzing disaggregated data broken down by ethnicity, detailed origin, and immigrant generation so that researchers can identify points of convergence as well as the contexts and conditions that bolster it.

DATA DISAGGREGATION AS A CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE

The inequality among Asians has led to the argument that data disaggregation is a civil rights issue for Asian Americans (Lee, Ramakrishnan, and Wong 2018). Not only does data disaggregation provide a more accurate count of the U.S. Asian population, it also provides a more detailed portrait of Asian Americans' socioeconomic, political, and health outcomes. These detailed portraits challenge some of the most pernicious narratives of Asian Americans, including the reigning misperception that Asians are America's model minority. We provide several illustrative examples of how data disaggregation helps correct this biased narrative.

First, Asians are touted as academic high achievers who outperform other groups in high school, gain admission to the most selective universities, and graduate from college at the highest rates. Yet data disaggregation shows immense variation in educational attainment among Asian Americans: Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong fall well below the U.S. mean, and Indians, Chinese, Koreans rise far above it (Lee and Zhou 2015). As figure 1 shows, 75 percent of Indians, 54 percent of Chinese, and 56 percent of Koreans hold a bachelor's degree or higher, yet fewer than 25 percent of Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong claim the same. In fact, the latter groups are less likely than African Americans or Hispanics to have graduated from college. When we disaggregate even further, we find that the majority of Asian Americans do not attend elite universities—a misperception that has been buttressed by

Figure 1. Bachelor's Degree or Higher Among Asian Americans

Taiwanese	78%
Asian Indian	75
Pakistani	58
Korean	56
Chinese	54
Japanese	52
Indonesian	50
Filipino	49
Bangladeshi	46
Nepalese	45
Thai	42
Vietnamese	30
Hmong	24
Burmese	22
Cambodian	20
Laotian	16

Source: Authors' tabulation based on analysis of 2017 American Community Survey 1-year estimates.

prominent coverage of the latest battles over race-conscious affirmative action policies at Ivy League institutions, including *Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard* and the Department of Justice's investigation into Yale's admission practices.[3] In fact, the majority of Asian American students attend community college (Fong 2017).

Because educational attainment is directly correlated with median household income, poverty levels, and welfare receipt, the differences in educational attainment directly translate into glaring socioeconomic disparities among Asians (Shah and Ramakrishnan 2017). Although the most highly educated Asian groups boast median household incomes higher than those of native-born Whites, Asians at the other tail of the distribution have some of the highest levels of poverty and welfare receipt of all U.S. groups (figure 2). Relying solely on means and medians thus reifies the dated trope that Asian Americans are a uniformly highly educated, high-earning group, which in turn has damaging consequences, including

Asian American exclusion from policies and programs that address poverty, including welfare receipt and housing insecurity.

Second, Asians exhibit an extreme range in limited English-language proficiency (LEP), defined as speaking a language other than English at home and speaking English "less than very well." More than one-third (35 percent) of the U.S. Asian population has limited proficiency in English—a rate that surpasses that of Hispanics and leaves Asians as having the highest LEP. Again, the mean masks tremendous heterogeneity, as figure 3 shows. The rate of limited English proficiency ranges from a high of 64 percent among Burmese to a low of 19 percent among Asian Indians.

Like differences in educational attainment, differences in English-language proficiency also translate into differences in outcomes, including earnings, occupational status, the quality of health care, and health outcomes. Limited English-language proficiency also hampers the ability of Asian Americans to gain access to federal government programs and participate

3. *Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard,* 261 F.Supp.3d 99 (2017).

Figure 2. Poverty Rates Among Asian Americans

Group	Rate
Burmese	28.4%
Nepalese	17.4
Bangladeshi	16.6
Hmong	15.9
Pakistani	13.9
Cambodian	11.9
Thai	10.7
Vietnamese	10.7
Chinese	10.1
Korean	8.7
Laotian	8.3
Indonesian	7.7
Taiwanese	6.9
Asian Indian	4.1
Filipino	4.1
Japanese	3.8

Source: Authors' tabulation based on analysis of 2017 American Community Survey 1-year estimates.

in civic and political life. Again, disaggregated data are critical to providing services to the U.S. Asian population. For example, data disaggregation provides public hospitals in smaller-population counties with the necessary tools to calculate the costs and benefits of translation services in Vietnamese, Korean, and other Asian ethnic languages. In a similar vein, data disaggregation allows policymakers to assess which Asian groups need translation services to get language access under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.

Third, data disaggregation has implications for access to health care, preventative health, and health-care interventions. Some Asian ethnic groups are more susceptible to certain health risks than others: Vietnamese men and women have the highest rates of lung cancer of all Asian American groups, and Korean men and women have some of the highest rates of colorectal cancer (American Cancer Society 2016). Understanding interethnic differences is critical to targeting federal policies so that resources are allocated in ways that improve the unique health challenges of Asian ethnic groups, which is only possible with disaggregated data.

Fourth, data disaggregation also reveals the diversity in experiences with different types of discrimination. The 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) shows significantly higher self-reports of employment discrimination among South Asians than among East Asians, and other survey data reveal that Indians are eight times more likely than Chinese to report that they have been unfairly stopped or unfairly treated by police (NPR 2017). In the wake of COVID-19, however, East Asians—and especially Chinese Americans—are far more likely than South Asians to report experiences with racially charged verbal assaults (Stop AAPI Hate 2020).

Finally, on patterns of intermarriage, data disaggregation points to a pattern of Indian exceptionalism. Although U.S.-born Asians, on average, have high rates of intermarriage, the patterns differ starkly across ethnic groups: it is far lower for Indians (32 percent) than for Koreans (54 percent), Chinese (56 percent), Filipinos (63 percent) and Japanese (69 percent) (Min and Kim 2009).

Data disaggregation is also critical to understanding the diversity in attitudes, but here we find far greater convergence in Asian American public opinion than we might expect based on

Figure 3. Limited English Proficiency Among Asian Americans

Group	Percentage
Burmese	64.3%
Vietnamese	48.9
Nepalese	47.5
Chinese	45
Bangladeshi	44.7
Thai	42.8
Cambodian	39.5
Korean	39.4
Taiwanese	38.4
Laotian	37.6
Hmong	32.9
Indonesian	30.5
Pakistani	25.4
Japanese	22.4
Filipino	20.9
Asian Indian	18.7

Source: Authors' tabulation based on analysis of 2017 American Community Survey 1-year estimates.

differences in socioeconomic status alone. Thus, for example, even though Indian Americans have among the highest levels of income in the United States, they also strongly support paying higher taxes and protecting key elements of the social safety net, including the provision of affordable health care (Pew Research Center 2012; Ramakrishnan and Lee 2012). Much of this pattern can be explained by the relatively high levels of Democratic Party identification among Indian Americans. However, support for universal health care is also very high among Vietnamese Americans, even though they tend to be the most Republican-leaning Asian American group, which suggests the potential importance of other aspects of immigrant socialization in the United States (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018; Wong et al. 2011). Convergence is also greater than expected among Asian Americans on issues such as environmental protection and gun control, as well as for political behavior such as presidential vote choice (Ramakrishnan and Ahmad 2014). To underscore, only by collecting disaggregated data by ethnicity are we able to point to areas of convergence among Asian Americans.

Disaggregated opinion data also reveal the contexts and conditions under which Asian Americans are likely to diverge in their public opinion. On issues such as abortion, gay rights, and transgender rights, Asian Americans who are Christian hold far more conservative views than those who are not (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018). Moreover, opposition to affirmative action has been much stronger among Chinese Americans than among other Asian American groups in 2016—pointing to a pattern of Chinese exceptionalism. So exceptional were Chinese relative to other Asian groups in their opposition that they alone accounted for the drop in support for affirmative action among Asian American registered voters from 2012 to 2016 (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018).

Galvanizing through ethnic social media platforms like WeChat, conservative Chinese immigrants effectively mobilized to protest against affirmative action (Rong 2019; Wong 2018). Their successful mobilization within and outside Chinese ethnic communities led to a nearly 50 percent drop in support for affirmative action among Chinese American registered voters between 2012 and 2016 (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018). Apart from Chinese Americans, however, nearly three-quarters of Asian registered voters

Figure 4. Changes in Support for Affirmative Action Among Asian Americans

Source: Authors' tabulation based on analysis of the 2012 National Asian American Survey and the 2014 and 2016 Asian American Voter Surveys.

supported affirmative action in higher education and the workplace in 2016 (see figure 4). Yet because Chinese are the largest Asian group, accounting for one-fifth of the U.S. Asian population, their views are often taken (and sometimes mistaken) to represent the views of all Asians (Lee and Ramakrishnan 2020a).

Other types of disaggregation also reveal important differences in Asian American public opinion. Support for affirmative action is stronger among younger, native-born Asian Americans, who are also more likely to hold more progressive attitudes on issues such as environmental protection, immigrant rights, and gun control (Lee and Tran 2019; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018). Disaggregating opinion data not only by ethnicity but also by nativity and age is vital to examine points of Asian American divergence as well as convergence across a range of issues. Thus, disaggregation is critical to address two leading questions that guide the study of Asian Americans in the social sciences, which many authors in this issue tackle. First, is there a common policy agenda among Asian Americans? Second, what conditions promote greater convergence in Asian American public opinion?

GROUP FORMATION

Although diversity is a hallmark of the U.S. Asian population, robust research that focuses

on how that diversity affects group formation is slim (Alba, Jiménez, and Marrow 2014; Wimmer 2013). This question is particularly germane for the U.S. Asian population given that only 57 percent of Asian Americans believe they have a common race, and 49 percent believe they have common political interests. They are more likely to believe they have a common culture and economic interests, at 65 and 66 percent, respectively (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018). Whether Asian American constitutes a meaningful social, political, or cultural category will become an increasingly salient question as the U.S. Asian population continues to grow and diversify. Which social, political, economic, and cultural issues and experiences will galvanize and mobilize an Asian American political agenda and racial identity, and which will fracture them? Moreover, in spite of their diversity, will Asian Americans respond to a sense of linked fate that has historically bound African Americans?

African Americans evince a strong sense of linked fate—the belief that one's life chances are inextricably tied to the success and advancement of one's racial group (Dawson 1994). Because race has historically been the most salient status characteristic in determining the life chances of Black Americans, they prioritize the well-being of their racial group, even if doing so operates against their self-interest. Their

strength of linked fate is most evident in their voting behavior, their support for the Democratic Party, and unified policy views, even in spite of their growing socioeconomic diversity. And though this socioeconomic diversity has also increased their political diversity, Black Americans have not lost strength in their racial identity or their commitment to racial justice (Hochschild and Weaver 2015).

Recent research has also shown evidence of linked fate among Asians, with 67 percent agreeing that what happens to Asian Americans as a group will affect what happens to them (Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016). Whether linked fate manifests into similar patterns of political behavior and policy attitudes as it does for African Americans is an evolving question, but as noted, public opinion data already show greater than expected convergence on a number of policy issues. As the Asian American population grows, diversifies, and evolves through immigration, intermarriage, and multiracial identification, a key question is whether the points of convergence will be durable enough to keep the Asian group boundary intact, or whether cleavages along the lines of national origin, nativity, generational status, class, and phenotype will fracture it.

We also add a word of caution here: simply adopting concepts such as linked fate—which was born out of the African American experience—and applying it to Asian Americans may not be the most judicious way to understand Asian group formation. Asians have never fit neatly into the Black-White divide that has long dominated theories and research on racial classification, group formation, and race relations in the United States. Yet because the Black-White color line has been the most enduring, questions about the experiences of new immigrant groups like Asians and Hispanics have been posed and addressed using a Black-White framework, theories, and concepts.

Studies of intermarriage and multiracial identification show that Asians and Hispanics are more likely than Blacks to intermarry with Whites as well as more likely to adopt a multiracial identification (Alba 2020; Lee and Bean 2010). And because younger, native-born Asians and Hispanics are significantly more likely to intermarry and claim a multiracial identifica-

tion than their older, foreign-born counterparts, some social scientists have concluded that Asians and Hispanics are following the footsteps of their European predecessors and are the next in line to become White. This is a viable hypothesis, but it rests on the assumption that the boundaries around the Asian category are as permeable and fluid as they were for European ethnics, but history has shown that this has never been the case (Lee 2015; Lew-Williams 2018; Ngai 2004).

The hypothesis that Asians are becoming White or honorary White also privileges the experiences and narratives of only some Asians—namely highly educated, hyper-selected East Asians (Lee and Ramakrishnan 2020a). When we count only East Asians as Asian, the possibility that Asians will become White or honorary White is not entirely implausible. But the experiences and outcomes of South and Southeast Asian groups—including the deportation of Cambodian immigrants, hate crimes against Sikh Americans, and lower rates of intermarriage among South Asians—make this forecast seem much more unlikely. Of course, the boundaries of Whiteness and Blackness, as well as the question of who is Asian, are subject to change. Racial classification depends not only on how government agencies classify individuals, what Lee and Ramakrishnan (2020a) call official group assignment, but also how Asians and non-Asians accept or refute those racial classifications. That even multiracial Asians and East Asians who have been in the United States for generations continue to experience racial insults, acts of microaggression and discrimination, and perceived foreignness make the prospect of becoming White or honorary White seem highly implausible (Darling-Hammond et al. 2020; Zou and Cheryan 2017). At no recent time has this become more apparent than as the country and world struggle with the social, economic, and public health devastations wrought by COVID-19.

A MOMENT OF RECKONING IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19

As fears and insecurities about the novel coronavirus mount among Americans, so have attacks on Asian Americans. They have been stabbed, beaten, bullied, spit on, pushed, ha-

rassed, and vilified based on the false assumption that they are to blame for the spread of COVID-19. Faulting China for the origin and spread of the coronavirus, President Trump variously dubbed it the China virus, the Wuhan virus, and "kung flu," and largely turned a blind eye to the rise in anti-Asian bias. The spike in the term *China virus* in the media increased beliefs among politically conservative Americans that Asian Americans are "perpetual foreigners." Although this perception had been declining among Americans for thirteen years, the mere reference to COVID-19 as the China virus reinvigorated xenophobia enough to offset more than three years of declines (Darling-Hammond et al. 2020). In one fell swoop, the coronavirus—and President Trump's blithe description of it—reanimated a century-old racist and xenophobic trope that Asians are foreign vectors of filth and disease, and exposed the precariousness of their status (Lee and Yadav 2020).

More overt forms of anti-Asian hate have also surfaced. In Texas, for example, a man stabbed a Burmese American family—a father and two young children (ages two and six)—because he thought they were Chinese and were infecting people with the coronavirus (Kennedy 2020). In Brooklyn, New York, a man poured acid on an Asian woman while she was taking out the trash from her home, severely burning her head, neck, and back (Moore and Cassady 2020). In midtown Manhattan, a Korean woman was grabbed by the hair and punched in the face. Even Asian American nurses, doctors, and pharmacists serving on the front lines of the pandemic find themselves fighting racial discrimination as the virus spreads.

The racist and xenophobic reactions directed at Asian Americans are reminiscent of those directed at South Asian and Muslim Americans after September 11 when they were falsely accused of condoning terrorism against the United States—indicating just how rapidly Asian Americans can fall on the "wrong side" of the nativist divide. However, some differences between the post-2001 and post-2019 periods are especially significant. Murders of Asian Americans were higher in the immediate post-9/11 period than today (Ahmad 2004), but President George W. Bush was also quick to

condemn anti-Muslim and anti-Asian hate. As a result, after 9/11, the spike in hate crimes began to subside within two months (Byers and Jones 2007). President Trump, by contrast, sustained his attacks on China and continued to say "China virus" in his references to COVID-19, consequently fueling xenophobic and racist tropes against Asian Americans.

Much like his anti-immigrant rhetoric leading to negative sentiments against immigrants and Hispanics, Trump's coronavirus rhetoric amplified the vilification of Asian Americans. Hate incidents against Asian Americans remain high: nearly one-third (32 percent) of Americans have witnessed someone blaming Asians for the coronavirus, and about twice as many Asian Americans (60 percent) have reported the same (Ipsos 2020). For reference, threats, harassment, and insults toward Asian Americans have skyrocketed between 2016 and 2020. When compared with data from Ipsos in 2020, data from 2016 NAAS show that only 9 percent of Asian Americans reported having been threatened or harassed, and 14 percent reported having been insulted or called names, as figures 5 and 6 show. In addition, in 2016, Chinese Americans were among the least likely Asian groups to experience these forms of assault. But things changed quickly in the wake of COVID-19: Chinese Americans are now the most likely group to report being threatened, harassed, insulted, or called names, comprising more than 40 percent of all self-reported cases among Asian Americans (Stop AAPI Hate 2020).

Faced with the precariousness of their racial status, many Asian Americans are confronting the brutal realization that economic privilege and proximity to Whiteness are no shields against racist and nativist hate. Actor John Cho (2020) articulated this harsh reality as he described in a *Los Angeles Times* column what it means when one's belonging and membership in the United States is conditional: one can be embraced as American in one moment and then derided as a foreigner who "brought" the virus to the United States in the next. As Cho notes, "When I became an actor . . . doors were open, strangers were kinder. In some ways, I began to lead a life devoid of race. But I've learned that a moment always comes along to

Figure 5. Experienced Threats or Harassment Among Asian Americans

Group	Percentage
Vietnamese	4%
Chinese	6
Indian	8
Pakistani	10
Korean	10
Japanese	11
Hmong	13
Cambodian	13
Bangladeshi	14
Filipino	15
Asian American Average	9

Source: Authors' tabulation based on analysis of the 2016 National Asian American Survey.

Figure 6. Experienced Insults or Called Names Among Asian Americans

Group	Percentage
Chinese	9%
Cambodian	10
Pakistani	10
Vietnamese	12
Indian	14
Japanese	15
Korean	16
Bangladeshi	20
Hmong	20
Filipino	21
Asian American Average	14

Source: Authors' tabulation based on analysis of the 2016 National Asian American Survey.

remind you that your race defines you above all else."

Times of crisis also present unanticipated opportunities, or, as Arundhati Roy (2020) describes it, a portal: "We can choose to walk through it, dragging the carcasses of our prejudice and hatred, our avarice, our data banks and dead ideas, our dead rivers and smoky skies behind us. Or we can walk through lightly, with little luggage, ready to imagine another world." In his column, Cho reflects on how the pandemic has reminded him of the numerous times that his Indian American colleague, Kal Penn, got pulled over for airport screenings after 9/11, as well as the internment of Japanese Americans after World War II. Reflections like

Cho's point to the possibility that Asian Americans may emerge from the Trump era with a stronger racial identity, a more purposive sense of linked fate, a more profound solidarity with other Asian Americans, and perhaps a stronger pan-minority identity with other minoritized groups in the United States. The increase in support for affirmative action in higher education in 2020 among Asian American registered voters, and, in particular, among Chinese Americans, suggests that this may, indeed, be a possibility (Lee and Ramakrishnan 2020b).

2016 NATIONAL ASIAN AMERICAN SURVEY

Until recently, social scientists lacked nationally representative survey data to study the diversity, heterogeneity, and group formation among Asian Americans. The 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) was designed to rectify this shortcoming. The 2016 NAAS builds on the work of the 2008 survey of the same name that included many measures of civic engagement and political participation but was relatively limited in its exploration of important social dynamics such as racial attitudes, immigrant adaptation, and experiences with microaggressions and discrimination. In addition to these measures, the 2016 survey also included demographic information such as age, race, language, gender, country of birth, educational attainment, employment status, marital status, legal status, income, and household size. The average length of the survey was thirty-five minutes.

The 2016 NAAS is the only nationally representative survey of the U.S. Asian population that includes ten Asian ethnic groups, and focuses on the social, political, and economic attitudes and experiences of Asians (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018). The survey also includes sizable samples of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, making interracial comparisons possible. A telephone survey conducted between November 10, 2016, and March 2, 2017, the 2016 NAAS includes 4,393 adult respondents who report their ancestry or at least one parent's ancestry from countries in Asia. About two-thirds (63 percent) of the interviews were conducted by landline, and the remainder (37 percent) by cell phone.

Whereas many prior surveys of the U.S.

Asian population focus on a few large Asian ethnic groups and are conducted only in English, the 2016 NAAS includes sizable subsamples of ten Asian groups: Chinese (475), Indian (504), Filipino (505), Korean (499), Vietnamese (501), Japanese (517), Pakistani (320), Bangladeshi (320), Hmong (351), and Cambodian (401). Together, these groups account for more than 85 percent of the national Asian American population. The survey also includes four non-Asian groups: Hispanics (1,126); non-Hispanic Whites (408); non-Hispanic Blacks (401); and Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islanders (120), allowing us to assess the levels and drivers of support of affirmative action for both Asian and non-Asian groups.

Moreover, the 2016 NAAS was offered in English, Spanish, and ten Asian languages: Mandarin, Cantonese, Korean, Vietnamese, Hindi, Tagalog, Japanese, Hmong, Cambodian, and Laotian. This is critical for data validity, given that 74 percent of U.S. Asian adults speak a language other than English at home, and 35 percent are limited in English-language proficiency (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). Providing the option to complete the survey in a native language generates a more reliable sample of the Asian population because it avoids biasing the sample toward English-proficient, U.S.-born, highly educated, and younger Asians (APIA Vote, National Asian American Survey, and Asian American Justice Center 2013).

The 2016 NAAS is weighted to reflect the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) population distribution in the following demographic characteristics: gender, age, state of residence, nativity, educational attainment, and citizenship status (see table 1). For example, the proportion of foreign-born Asian respondents in the NAAS sample (78 percent) is nearly identical to the proportion in the ACS sample (79 percent). The proportions of Asians with more than a high school degree (71 percent) and of female Asians respondents (54 percent) are identical in both the 2016 NAAS and ACS samples.

Although the 2016 NAAS is a landmark survey for its coverage of Asian American groups and language support, some limitations are notable. First, the survey does not include many smaller detailed origin groups such as Thai, Indonesian, and Mongolian, who together ac-

Table 1. Sample Characteristics of Asian American Respondents

	NAAS Asian Adults	ACS Asian Adults
Bangladeshi	7	1
Cambodian	9	2
Chinese	11	24
Filipino	12	17
Hmong	8	1
Indian	11	20
Japanese	12	6
Korean	11	10
Pakistani	7	2
Vietnamese	11	10
Other Asian	—	8
Foreign born	76	79
Native born	24	21
Less than high school	18	13
High school or GED	17	16
More than high school	65	71
Male	53	46
Female	47	54
California	34	33
New York	11	10
Texas	4	7
New Jersey	3	5
Other states	48	45

Source: Authors' tabulation based on 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).
Note: Numbers in percentages. The 2016 NAAS sample is weighted, using a raking procedure, to reflect the distribution of race and Asian detailed origin by each of the following dimensions: state of residence, gender, nativity, citizenship status, and educational attainment.

count for upward of 15 percent of the Asian American population. In addition, the NAAS is based on listed samples of Asian American voter registration and consumer data, and ethnic and racial classification are based on propensity scores derived from analyses of an individual's name and the racial composition of the census tract of residence. This means that Asian Americans who have fully Anglicized names (including both first and last name) would be less likely to be included for consideration in the survey.[4] The principal investigators of the 2016 NAAS chose the route of listed

samples because fully randomized methods (such as random-digit telephone dialing) would have been cost prohibitive.

Although Asian Americans are a rapidly growing population, they still only account for less than 6 percent of the U.S. adult population. Asian Americans are also less likely to be residentially segregated than Blacks and Hispanics, so methods of random sampling stratified by geographic areas such as census tracts would have to cover far more places. The logistical difficulty of random dialing of all residents to identify representative samples of Asian

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4. It is not impossible for such individuals to be interviewed for the 2016 NAAS because the survey also included samples of residents classified as White, Black, Hispanic, and Pacific Islander according to the same name analysis, and respondents would be reclassified as Asian based on their survey responses.

Americans is made even more extreme when considering that about one-third of Asian American adults are limited in their English proficiency. A random telephone survey would thus need to ensure that interviewers are able to detect language need efficiently, and that contacted individuals would be just as likely as English-proficient individuals to take the survey with Asian-language support when contacted again by a bilingual interviewer. For all of these reasons, the 2016 NAAS relied on a listed sample approach to identifying potential Asian American survey respondents.

THE ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE

This volume offers innovative approaches to the study of Asian Americans from social scientists from various disciplines, including sociology, political science, Asian American studies, demography, and urban planning. Each exploits the unique features of the 2016 National Asian American Survey, and addresses timely, relevant, and vexing social and political issues. Although the authors address a broad range of issues that vary in scope and method, each adopts a comparative perspective that involves intergroup comparisons between Asians and other ethnoracial groups, interethnic comparisons among Asians, or alternate axes of intergroup differentiation among Asians.

The first articles adopt the latter approach, offering latent class modeling that breaks with our dominant understanding of Asian American differences as defined primarily by national origin. Although such categorization of Asian Americans is deeply rooted in particular migration histories, exclusionary laws, and contexts of settlement and reception in the United States, authors who use latent class modeling argue instead to go where the observable data take us. Depending on the kinds of indicators being included, we may indeed find new ways of understanding and differentiating Asian Americans rather than through the standard lenses of national origin and ethnicity, which themselves can mask considerable heterogeneity by income, educational attainment, and the like.

Lucas Drouhot and Filiz Garip (2021) argue for such a data-driven approach to group dif-ferentiation, noting that the standard practice of disaggregating Asians by national origin results in the reification of new categories that can limit our understanding of variations in Asian immigrant incorporation. The authors pool both the pre- and post-election waves of the 2016 NAAS and identify five latent categories of differentiation based on the selectivity of migrant flows (as measured by gender, education, and income) as well as the context of reception in the United States (as measured by immigrant generation and region of settlement). The authors find five differentiated subgroups among Asian Americans, which they label as vulnerable, ordinary, hyper-selected, rooted, and assimilating. These five categories are a parsimonious way of capturing the complexity of the Asian American population and are highly predictive of experiences with discrimination as well as the relationships between discrimination and health, political behavior, and panethnic identity.

Sunmin Kim (2021) also uses latent class analysis to suggest new ways of categorizing the Asian American population. However, rather than relying on attributes related to immigrant incorporation, he relies on attributes related to public opinion on government interventions in areas that range from health care and education, to climate change, immigrant rights, and racial justice. He then examines whether certain groups of Asian Americans (by national origin, education, nativity, and party identification) are more or less likely to align with different latent opinion categories. He finds that, despite significant convergence in opinion across types of government intervention, important differences are revealed in immigration and refugee policy that point to potential future divisions in Asian American opinion.

The second set of articles focuses on political commonality and heterogeneity among Asian Americans. Similar to Kim, Janelle Wong and Sono Shah (2021) raise the question of whether an Asian American political agenda ties together such diverse national origin groups and analyzes data using both the pre-election and post-election 2016 National Asian American Survey. Wong and Shah note that significant variation across national-origin groups on educational attainment, income, and experiences

with immigrant incorporation would suggest dramatically different patterns in public opinion. They find that this is indeed the case when it comes to opinion on immigration policy and affirmative action in higher education. However, on many other issues, such as health care, taxes, and efforts to ensure racial equality outside of the affirmative action context, Wong and Shah unveil a degree of opinion convergence that beats expectations based on standard theories of socioeconomic differences in opinion. At the same time, however, they acknowledge that these generally held views might not adequately capture dynamics involving issue activists, and that selective mobilization on issues such as affirmative action in higher education could still generate bigger fissures in Asian American public opinion in the future.

Maneesh Arora, Sara Sadhwani, and Sono Shah (2021) also analyze group similarities and differences in public opinion, but they focus as much on intergroup differences across racial groups as on intragroup differences within the Asian category. They posit that policy convergence in key issue arenas and perceived interest alignment are key building blocks, or potential constraints, to coalition building across communities. They find that some Asian American groups, such as Bangladeshi, Hmong, and Pakistani Americans, display far greater commonality with Latino/as and Blacks on many issues of public opinion than with other groups such as Cambodian, Chinese, and Japanese Americans. Although these patterns are unlikely to change the ways some Asian groups might categorize themselves racially, they nevertheless point to greater possibilities of cross-racial coalitions with Blacks and Latino/as among some Asian groups than among others.

Ali Chaudhary and Quan Mai (2021) shift the lens from policy attitudes to civic participation and examine variation within a racial group that is often perceived as only weakly engaged in U.S. politics. Much research on Asian American political participation has focused on the civic paradox of socioeconomic status (SES): even though Asian Americans have, on average, high levels of education and income, they have among the lowest levels of voting participation. Studies have indicated that this gap between expectations and reality can largely be attrib-

uted to the large proportion of first-generation immigrants among the Asian adult citizen population, the lack of parental socialization into U.S. political parties, lack of exposure to American politics in Asian colleges and universities, and lack of party contact and mobilization all playing important roles (Hajnal and Lee 2013; Ramakrishnan 2005; Wong 2006; Wong et al. 2011). These studies have paid little attention, however, to processes of transnationalism and foreign socialization into politics prior to arrival in the United States. Chaudhary and Mai lay out a theoretical case for paying greater attention to pre-migration characteristics related to political socialization and offer some empirical support for these expectations by examining differences in civic participation based on where respondents received their college degrees.

The third set of articles shifts our attention from political to social attitudes. Rujun Yang and Maria Charles (2021) focus on gender and sexual politics in the United States and address the question of how Asians compare with other ethnoracial groups in regard to the extension of rights and protections to women and sexual and gender minorities. Given the high proportion of first-generation immigrants among the Asian adult population, one might expect opinion on these issues to be largely conservative, echoing traditional views in many Asian countries. Yang and Charles also posit that expectations of a culture war between men and women might lead us to expect significant gender differences in opinion among Asian Americans. Yet the authors find no support for either set of hypotheses. Instead, they find a significant variation in opinion across groups according to the type of issue being considered. Thus, for example, religion (Catholic identification, Christian fundamentalism, and frequency of religious attendance) explains variation in Asian opinion on abortion rights and LGBTQ rights, but not on support for affirmative action for women. Similarly, the relationship between gender and opinion on rights and protections accorded to women and sexual minorities is neither clear nor consistent. The authors point to the need for further transnational studies of gender attitudes that take into account distinctive gender regimes in countries of origin,

as well as contexts of reception in the United States.

Van Tran and Natasha Warikoo (2021) turn our attention to immigration policies and shed light on the differences in public opinion among a group that is both diverse and majority foreign born. While one might assume that Asian Americans' immigrant experiences may make them the most liberal or progressive group on immigration policy, Tran and Warikoo show that they hold the least progressive opinions when it comes to policies that favor undocumented immigrants. Although lower support than Latino/as on these issues may be understandable given the lower share of unauthorized among the Asian foreign born, the authors do not find greater support among Asians on other immigration policies, such as increasing work visas and family visas. Further, less support for a pathway to citizenship relative to Blacks and Whites is surprising, given the larger share of undocumented immigrants among Asian Americans than among the latter two groups. The authors find that age, political identity, immigrant generation, and contact with Latino/as are significant predictors of Asian American public opinion on immigration policy; they surmise that a lack of awareness about the realities of immigration policy and unauthorized immigration may account for some of these surprising findings on Asian American public opinion.

The final set of articles focuses on responses to discrimination. Tiffany Huang (2021) examines how experiences with different types of discrimination affect perceptions of linked fate among Asians as well as feelings of commonality with other ethnoracial groups. Capitalizing on the inclusion of multiple types and contexts of discrimination in the 2016 NAAS, Huang finds that the type of discrimination experienced is relevant for feelings of political commonality with non-Asian groups. For example, interpersonal discrimination is a key predictor of feelings of commonality with Hispanic Americans, and labor-market discrimination is a key predictor of feelings of commonality with Black Americans. No type of discrimination is associated with feelings of commonality with White Americans, however. Moreover, the type of reported discrimination is also associated

with racial linked fate with other Asians and ethnic linked fate with coethnics. Huang interprets these finding through the lens of the common in-group identity model: Asian Americans will feel more warmth toward their racial and ethnic group if they view experiences with discrimination as a common feature of members of the in-group.

The volume closes with Vincent Reina and Claudia Aiken's (2021) study of housing access among Asian Americans and Latino/as, combining analyses of these groups in the 2016 NAAS with ethnographic and administrative data in Philadelphia. The authors note that greater ethnic diversification and immigration add significant challenges to Asian American housing access, and they show that experiences in housing discrimination vary by national origin for Asian Americans. Next, looking at the case of Philadelphia where the resident population was 80 percent non-Hispanic White and Black as late as 2010, Asians and Latino/as have become a growing share of the city's population. Despite their rapid growth, both remain underrepresented in almost every housing program offered by both the city and the housing authority relative to their share of the income-eligible households.

One reason for their underrepresentation is that many of these government resources have already been allocated to highly impoverished populations that have lived longer in Philadelphia. Yet a host of other factors impede the allocation of resources to Philadelphia's Asian and Latino/a communities, including language barriers, financial and digital illiteracy, and cultural barriers, including distrust. Among Asians, their sheer diversity in ethnic origin and native languages coupled with the model minority stereotype present unique barriers to access to affordable housing resources. Reina and Aiken's (2021) research powerfully debunks the dated perception that Asian immigrants do not need government services to ease their integration and underscores the moral urgency of addressing the complex fair housing challenges both Asians and Latino/as face.

In sum, the authors in this issue address a broad range of timely and pressing research questions that underscore the diversity of Asian Americans, yet also unveil the social and po-

litical issues and experiences that usher convergence among them. As the only majority foreign-born U.S. racial group, Asian Americans converge in ways that exceed expectations—highlighting a unique feature of Asian American experience. Joining diverse social science disciplines to tackle the diversity-convergence paradox, we contribute to theory and research on immigrant integration, and push social science research from narrative scarcity toward research plenitude for Asian Americans.

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PART I

Latent Class Modeling: Differentiation Among Asian Americans

What's Behind a Racial Category? Uncovering Heterogeneity Among Asian Americans Through a Data-Driven Typology

LUCAS G. DROUHOT ⊙ AND FILIZ GARIP

Despite emphasis on the importance of intragroup heterogeneity in much theoretically inclined migration and race scholarship, quantitative research routinely relies on split sample approaches in which ethnoracial groups are the categories of analysis. This cumulatively contributes to the reification of groups under study when research findings are assessed and groups compared side by side. In this paper, we ask: How are Asian Americans internally differentiated, and how does this heterogeneity matter for broader patterns of immigrant inclusion? Using latent class analysis, we produce a typology at the intersection of class, gender, regional location, and immigrant generation, pointing to vulnerable, ordinary, hyper-selected, rooted, *and* achieving *Asian Americans. These subgroups reveal differentiation in the experience of race and suggest that racialization and inclusion dynamics are jointly occurring social forces among Asian Americans. Our approach offers a blueprint for inductive analyses of immigrant-origin groups emphasizing heterogeneity and reflexivity vis-à-vis racial and national-origin categories.*

Keywords: Asian Americans, heterogeneity, latent class analysis, assimilation, race

Contemporary sociological theories of immigrant incorporation and migration-driven diversity share a central concern for population heterogeneity. In the United States, segmented assimilation emphasizes the diversity of incorporation pathways among the second generation (Portes and Zhou 1993), while neoassimilation theory revamps Milton Gordon's classic assimilation model (1964) through a characterization of the mainstream as diverse and flexible rather than a White, middle-class reference point (Alba and Nee 2003). In Europe, meanwhile, Steven Vertovec's (2007) influential theorizing points to the importance of heterogeneity occurring at the intersection of multiple social categories of difference within "superdiverse" immigrant groups.

Despite a theoretical consensus on the im-

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portance of heterogeneity in studying immigrant incorporation, however, quantitative research routinely relies on split-sample approaches in which ethnic and racial groups are the categories of analysis. The "general linear reality" and average-case focus of regression-based approaches (Abbott 1988) invariably flattens the social structure of the ethnoracial groups under study and cumulatively contributes to their reification when research findings are assessed and groups compared side by side. A recent review of empirical trends across large, census-based racial and national-origin categories (Drouhot and Nee 2019) shows that Asian-origin immigrants are collectively thought to be successfully incorporating in the United States (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009; Nee and Holbrow 2013) relative to Hispanic-origin groups, thanks in particular to their high rates of academic achievement (Hsin and Xie 2014). This overall positive picture, however, has led to calls to avoid essentializing Asian Americans as a model minority with a set of values leading to success (Lee and Zhou 2015), and to instead pay attention to intragroup heterogeneity in terms of socioeconomic attainment and racial experiences (N. Kim 2007; Min 2002; Dhingra 2007). An analytic strategy attentive to within-group heterogeneity would produce an epistemological break from everyday categories of practice (Brubaker 2013) and popular discourse reifying Asians as a cohesive group endowed with culture and agency. It would be further justified if it showed that the analytic payoffs of analyses across multiple empirical subgroups outweigh the costs to parsimony and statistical power of traditional analyses.

This article proposes and implements such an approach to intragroup heterogeneity among Asian Americans. We pool the pre- and post-election waves of the National Asian American Survey (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017) and use latent class analysis to create a data-driven typology of Asian Americans pointing to five major, clearly differentiated subgroups occurring at the intersection of class, gender, regional location, and immigrant generation: vulnerable, ordinary, hyper-selected, rooted, and achieving Asian Americans. Together, these categories capture *patterned differentiation*—the complex

aggregation of class, gender, and other characteristics in non-intuitive, yet nonrandom ways that reflects the temporal and geographic heterogeneity of Asian migration streams to the United States—in a more inductive and parsimonious manner than approaches relying on national origins.

Our contribution is twofold. First, we show the empirical potential of data-driven classifications to reconcile divergent empirical findings. We switch the focus from the question of how much assimilation or racialization occurs among Asian Americans as a whole, to who experiences what in this diverse population. Our analyses suggest new patterns of racialized incorporation, and reveal heterogeneity in the subjective experience of race and perceived discrimination across the national-origin groups making up the Asian American category. Second, our approach showcases the theoretical and epistemological potential of data-driven classification methods such as latent class analysis to study immigrant groups without "groupism" (Brubaker 2004)—that is, without importing racial or national-origin categories from everyday life and reifying them by a priori assuming their analytical relevance.

HETEROGENEITY AS A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUE IN MIGRATION RESEARCH

The importance of heterogeneity among native and immigrant groups is a leitmotiv in theoretically inclined migration research. According to segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993), the unprecedented ethnic and racial diversity of post-1965 immigration flows results in distinct modes of incorporation. Specifically, race interacts with government reception and characteristics of the ethnic community to create myriad trajectories for different groups. Often construed as an intellectual rival, the neoassimilation model (Alba and Nee 2003) differs in important respects but shares a concern for heterogeneity among immigrant groups—particularly their differential endowment in various forms of capital. This model jettisons the ethnocentric and essentialist definition of the mainstream as a White, middle-class core in Gordon's (1964) canonical model, and instead emphasizes the mainstream as het-

erogeneous and accommodative of cultural difference. Meanwhile, in Europe, the importance of heterogeneity finds its clearest expression in Vertovec's (2007) concept of superdiversity, which captures the interaction of multiple categories such as gender, place, and legal status that internally differentiate immigrant groups.

These three approaches are theoretical touchstones for large bodies of literature on both sides of the Atlantic. In spite of their differences, intragroup heterogeneity—that of immigrant or native groups—is central and theoretically generative in each. The concern for heterogeneity is both analytical and normative. That is, researchers need to accommodate increasingly diverse immigrant groups in a single theoretical model and to avoid essentializing minority and majority groups as homogenous entities with static traits and culture. This latter concern animates much of qualitative research on immigrant and other racial minorities, where long-standing debates on the relationship between minority culture and poverty have turned intragroup heterogeneity into a recurrent empirical and rhetorical motif used to avoid reifying stereotypes (Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010). To take just one influential and well-regarded example, Philip Kasinitz and his colleagues (2008, 23) write a cautionary note in their study of the second generation in New York City:

> We further recognize it is possible to read group comparisons as stereotypes or even racist generalizations. Let us be clear: any reference to group differences makes groups appear more homogeneous than they actually are. Our young respondents belonged not only to ethnic groups but also to social classes, genders, social groups, and neighborhoods. Like all modern people, they had a multiplicity of interacting social roles and identities. Although a quick reading of a table comparing groups will not always make this apparent, we have tried to remain sensitive to individual variation without losing sight of the real differences that ethnicity makes.

A generalized wariness to pointing out intergroup differences per se also reflects the influence of intersectional approaches (McCall 2005), for which a neglect of intragroup variation is responsible for blind spots on the experience of those belonging to intersecting social categories, as well as recent waves of Bourdieu-influenced theorizing on ethnicity, which advocates treating ethnic categories as neither bounded nor internally cohesive (Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 2009).

Despite such strong intellectual currents, survey-based analyses still rely on broad ethnoracial categories in the form of dummy variables (or split samples) for immigrant groups (defined typically by national origins) in regression analyses, cumulatively amounting to an "ethnoracial Olympics" (FitzGerald 2014) in which groups are assessed side by side on various incorporation outcomes. This approach has been undeniably fruitful (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Drouhot and Nee 2019). Yet the average-case focus on regression approaches also presumes a "general linear reality" (Abbott 1988) that erases within-group variation. Many empirical findings, as a result, remain blind to the social structure of immigrant groups—the specific configurations of attributes making up distinct types of immigrants within broad racial or national-origin categories (Garip 2012; Brubaker 2004). One can discover such configurations with regression models that include interaction terms between indicators of immigrant groups and other social categories (such as gender or regional location), but one would quickly run into the untenable issue of data sparsity. Given these difficulties, much contemporary quantitative migration research has eschewed the issue of immigrant heterogeneity despite its salience in theoretical and qualitative work. Here, we propose and implement an analytic approach attentive to the "consolidated parameters of the social structure"—that is, the patterned but not intuitive interrelations of various forms of social differentiation (Blau 1974).

TENSIONS ACROSS RESEARCH COMMUNITIES

Existing empirical accounts suggest that Asian-origin immigrants are successfully incorporating into the United States (Drouhot and Nee 2019; Zhou and Gonzales 2019; Kasinitz et al.

2008; Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009; Nee and Holbrow 2013) relative to Hispanic-origin groups, in particular on the basis of their extraordinarily high rates of academic achievement (Hsin and Xie 2014; Lee and Zhou 2015). Specialized literatures document tell-tale signs of assimilation, such as high rates of intermarriage (Qian and Lichter 2011) and residential attainment in immigrant middle-class neighborhoods that form "ethnoburbs" (Li 2009; Matsumoto 2018) where Whites are relegated to being "just alright," as Tomás Jiménez and Adam Horowitz's (2013) ethnographic research vividly describes.

The aggregate trend of Asian American assimilation is a "stylized fact" (Hirschmann 2016)—an "empirical regularity in need of an explanation." Dominant explanations for the aggregate success of Asian American groups in the United States emphasize immigrant selectivity (Lee and Zhou 2015), legal status and immigration law privileging high-skilled migration (Nee and Holbrow 2013), and—directly related to selectivity patterns—a culture and community norms of academic and professional success (Hsin and Xie 2014; Kasinitz et al. 2008). Although sociologists have traditionally steered clear of depicting Asian Americans as a model minority, the stylized fact of Asian American assimilation remains vivid when contrasted with the trajectories of Hispanic-origin migrants, whose legal status and endowment in various forms of capital are far more precarious (Drouhot and Nee 2019; Zhou and Gonzales 2019; Pew Research Center 2012).

In the assimilation narrative, the law shapes the selectivity of migration flows and resulting assimilation trajectories, not race. As Victor Nee and Hilary Holbrow write, "the mainstream success of so many Asian American immigrants suggests that race may not be such a decisive factor in shaping socioeconomic attainment as it was in the American past, and that assimilation still is as characteristic of the course of contemporary immigration as it was for earlier immigration from Europe. In an increasingly inclusive mainstream, the significance of race has declined considerably. Instead, patterns of legal and illegal entry are more consistently determinative of immigrant access to mainstream opportunities" (2013, 72).

Other sociologists have criticized this interpretation, pointing instead to the persisting influence of race in shaping the social experience of Asian Americans and treating the model minority stereotype as a myth (Chou and Feagin 2008). These perspectives—which we refer to broadly as *critical race*—hold that Asian Americans have yet to reach equality with the White majority. The overeducation thesis suggests that Asian Americans compensate for their racial disadvantage by being more educated than Whites to secure similar incomes or jobs (Takaki 1998). Others point to a "bamboo ceiling" blocking high-achieving Asian Americans from leadership positions in the workplace as evidence of persisting discrimination (Varma 2004), and document racial stereotypes specific to this group, such as being asocial, subservient, and shy in creativity (Lin et al. 2005; Sue et al. 2007). The perception of racial stigma and discrimination has been linked to health outcomes (Paradies et al. 2015; Gee et al. 2009), political participation (Lien 2001; Wong et al. 2011), and panethnic identity (Masuoka 2006; Kibria 1998; Okamoto 2003) among Asian Americans in past work. We revisit this point later.

A second critique of the assimilation perspective is concerned with the homogenization of Asian Americans as a racial group endowed with a specific culture of success (Lee and Zhou 2015). This work typically focuses on educational and socioeconomic attainment, and sets out to "unravel" (Lee 1996), "complicate" (Ngo and Lee 2007) or "deconstruct" (Museus and Kiang 2009) the model minority narrative. Empirical studies focus on subgroups whose experience diverges from the assimilation narrative—for instance, academic low-achievers (Lee 1996) or severely disadvantaged groups, such as the Hmong and Laotians who largely came to the United States as refugees (Ngo and Lee 2007; Museus and Kiang 2009)—and seek to mitigate the optimism induced by aggregate census trends. As reviewed, the emphasis on heterogeneity has an *analytical* rationale (depicting a group's complex reality) as well as a *normative* one (avoiding the essentialization of Asian Americans as a successful group, implicitly blaming other immigrants for their lower attainment).

MOTIVATION OF THIS STUDY

An overview of the work on Asian Americans shows different strands of research in significant tensions with one another. Although the assimilation literature depicts an optimistic trend of progress toward the mainstream, other lines of work highlight the importance of race in shaping incorporation, and drawing attention to less advantaged groups, such as those originating from Southeast Asia. Our goal is to implement an empirical approach to describe heterogeneity among Asian Americans and productively reconcile these divergent perspectives. We also seek to put into practice longstanding theoretical concerns about intragroup heterogeneity discussed earlier (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993; Vertovec 2007).

Our analysis of within-group heterogeneity switches the focus from how much Asian Americans are experiencing either assimilation or racialization, to who is undergoing which processes in this diverse population. We expect that incorporation processes might work differently across subgroups. We seek to identify patterned differentiation among Asian Americans and to assess the relative prevalence of each subgroup, and productively circumvent the intellectual stalemate between the assimilation perspective highlighting aggregate trends and more recent work focused on small but unrepresentative subgroups. Further, we study how the experience and perception of race varies across the subgroups making up Asian Americans. Last, we illustrate the differential impact of racial discrimination across subgroups on three key outcomes: health, political participation, and panethnic identity.

This study is not the first to consider heterogeneity among Asian Americans. Instead, it is something many scholars have called for in their research. For example, Nadia Kim writes, "Socioeconomic data on Asian Americans need also be *disaggregated*. Asian Americans—consisting of Bangladeshi, Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Laotian, Pakistani, Vietnamese, Pacific Islander ethnics, and so on—are among the most diverse of the racialized groups and are internally stratified in profound ways. Yet social scientists tend to lump all of these groups together, not differentiating between ethnic/national groups that are

highly dissimilar" (2007, 565, emphasis in the original).

Nadia Kim's call for disaggregation echoes historical perspectives emphasizing the political nature of the Asian American panethnic category—one born out of long-standing patterns of racial exclusion as well as political struggles for recognition among otherwise dissimilar migrant groups (see Le Espiritu 1992; S. Kim 2020, 4–9; Takaki 1998). Quantitative studies indeed often disaggregate Asian Americans by national origins (Srinivasan and Guillermo 2000; Hsin and Xie 2014; Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009; Kim and Sakamoto 2010), to "problematize the model minority image of Asian Americans" (Zhou and Xiong 2005, 1). Yet national origins constitute only one possible dimension of differentiation among many competing ones (such as social class, immigrant generation, region of settlement), and its use leads to methodological nationalism—the naturalization of nation-states as categories of analysis by social scientists (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003). In our case, assuming that Asian Americans are primarily made up of national-origin groups would replace a much-criticized racial essentialism with an ethnic one whereby national-origin groups are implicitly assumed to have a common fate and culture. Therefore, we consider the salience of ethnic differences among Asian Americans as an open question, and one to be answered empirically rather than methodologically "baked in" (Brubaker 2004, chapter 1).

EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND DATA

Our goal is to characterize social heterogeneity among Asian Americans. Researchers use split samples, interaction terms, or hierarchical models to show the heterogeneity in factors relevant to immigrant integration outcomes. Studies on Asian Americans, for example, highlight differences among men and women (Min and Kim 2009), among different national-origin groups (Qian, Blair, and Ruf 2001), or across geographic contexts (Okamoto 2007). But such approaches overlook the fact that different dimensions might work in conjunction to produce different outcomes for different individuals. This idea—captured most vividly in writings on intersectionality (McCall 2005) and super-

diversity (Vertovec 2007)—suggests a particular direction for empirical work: rather than focusing on a single dimension of social life, we need to think about configurations of multiple dimensions to understand heterogeneity in the social experiences of immigrant groups. This is difficult to do with regression analysis, where higher-order interactions needed to capture such patterns are often uninterpretable and hard to estimate because of data sparsity for certain categorical combinations.

Consider a simple case. We want to study the heterogeneity in integration outcomes across two binary attributes: gender (man or woman) and income (high and low). In combination, the two attributes yield four possible categories. It is easy to consider each category with a two-way interaction in a regression model, and to make sense of comparative evaluations across categories. Now, add two additional binary attributes: immigrant generation (first or subsequent) and education (high school or college). If we cross-classify all four attributes, we get two to the fourth power, or sixteen possible categories. It is difficult to interpret variation across all sixteen, let alone identify patterns with statistical analysis (which would require four-way interactions in regression models, and possibly lead to data sparsity issues if some of these categories are scarcely populated).

One way around this problem comes from recognizing that not all possible combinations are equally prevalent in the data. This is because many attributes (such as education, income, immigrant generation) are highly correlated with one another, which implies that individuals naturally cluster around a few distinct configurations. Therefore, in this study, rather than dissecting the data or including multiple interaction terms to consider different combinations of a few selected attributes, we focus on identifying these configurations.

Several methods identify the configurations that define distinct groups among Asian Americans. Many scholars turn to cluster analysis or latent class analysis (LCA). For example, Filiz Garip (2012, 2016) uses cluster analysis to identify four distinct groups among first-time Mexico-U.S. migrants, whereas Bart Bonikowski and Paul DiMaggio (2016) use latent class analysis to characterize four types of popular nationalism in the United States (see also Drouhot, forthcoming, for another example of cluster analysis). Both cluster analysis and LCA partition the data into groups and fall under the general umbrella of unsupervised machine learning—a suite of methods from computer science that search for representations of a set of attributes (X) that is more useful than X itself (Molina and Garip 2019). These methods are data driven or inductive because they use the data—not prenotions from the researcher—to identify a categorization scheme, that is, a model through which that data can be understood. These methods are an efficient way to describe the data and to study their inherent heterogeneity parsimoniously.

We use latent class analysis, which estimates a latent (unobserved) variable that accounts for the covariance between the observed attributes (see also S. Kim 2021, this issue). This variable is assumed to have a categorical distribution with each value corresponding to a "latent class" (group) in data. LCA is similar to cluster analysis in that it detects underlying groups. It differs from cluster analysis in that it uses a model to describe the distribution of the data, and is therefore probabilistic rather than deterministic.[1] LCA enables estimating the probability that a case belongs to a particular latent class (rather than rigidly assigning each case to a group, as often done in cluster analysis). When assigning a case to a latent class, we use posterior probabilities to create multinomial

1. Besides, mainstream clustering algorithms such as the popular *k-means* algorithm are not able to incorporate nominal variables—which feature prominently in our approach—without inducing significant distortion in the data partitioning process (Magidson and Vermunt 2002). K-means algorithm and nominal data are incompatible since distance functions on nominal data spaces are not meaningful. One workaround involves dichotomizing each category, but this leads to nominal variables taking excessive weights as multiple, highly correlated binary variables in the computation and final clustering results altogether. The integration of nominal data within cluster analysis remains an area of active research within data and computer science (see, for example, Roy and Sharma 2010).

distributions and assign cases at random based on these distributions so that our assignment is probabilistic. The appendix formally describes our empirical approach and provides further technical details.

Our analyses are based on the pooled pre- and post-election waves from the 2016 National Asian American Survey (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017). To discover groups in data, we chose a set of attributes shown to shape immigrant experiences in the United States. These include indicators for education (less than high school, high school or some college, college degree or more), income (earning $100K or more), gender, immigrant generation (first, second, third, or more), residence (California, West excluding California, East, Midwest, South, or Pacific), and are intended to capture both the selectivity of the migrant flows (with respect to gender, education, and income) and their context of reception (as proxied by immigrant generation and residential region in the United States).[2] Gender, for instance, is key to shaping migration reasons and strategies, as well as integration outcomes in destination (Donato et al. 2006). Socioeconomic class of respondents captures both the reasons underlying migration among first-generation migrants and the trajectories of integration among the second or third generation (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Drouhot and Nee 2019). Similarly, region of residence captures both the likely pull of existing social networks in place (Sue, Riosmena, and Lepree 2019) as well as varying levels of receptivity to immigrants in the United States (Waters and Eschbach 1995). In keeping with our intention to avoid methodological nationalism, we do not include national origins in the latent class modeling.[3] Likewise, we do not include cultural or attitudinal variables because our focus is on the sociodemographic dimensions reflecting social structural differentiation among Asian Americans.[4]

LCA requires researchers to specify a priori the number of classes in the data. To avoid obtaining artificial groupings, researchers use goodness-of-fit measures to choose the optimal number of classes. This process resembles model selection in regression analysis, where researchers rely on a criterion like the likelihood ratio to choose the best and most parsimonious model for the data. Here, we used two measures—the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)—to select the optimal number of classes. Both measures capture the trade-off between goodness-of-fit (which is improved by making the model more complex, for example, by specifying more classes to describe the data) and parsimony (where simpler models are presumed to be better). BIC gives stronger weight to parsimony.

Figure 1 shows AIC and BIC values when we estimate the LCA model with different numbers of classes, ranging from three to eight. For both measures, smaller values indicate better model fit. For BIC, models with three, four, and five classes yield the lowest values of the index. For AIC, models with five classes or higher minimize the index. We select the five-class model for two reasons. First, both AIC and BIC indicate it as nearly optimal. Second, our inspection of alternative models suggests this solution to be ideal for identifying substantively meaningful heterogeneity while retaining interpretability.

As an alternative evaluation of the selected model, we rely on national-origin indicators—which were deliberately left out from the attribute set used in the discovery of classes—to

2. Because of data constraints, we consider all foreign-born respondents as first generation, including those who migrated at an early age. The post-election survey, which we merge with the pre-election survey for our analyses, does not feature a question on year of arrival that would allow us to create a 1.5 generational status (indicating arrival at or before adolescence). Additionally, the binary age variables (younger or older than thirty-five) are not precise enough for that purpose.

3. We repeated our analyses with national-origin categories included and obtained substantively similar groupings (results available on request).

4. See Sunmin Kim's article in this issue for an analogous application of latent class modeling to attitudinal items from the same data (2021).

Figure 1. Model Fit Indices for Latent Class Analysis

LCA Model Fit Indices by Number of Classes

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
Note: For both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), lower values indicate better model fit.

perform substantive validity checks. Earlier work relied on similar strategies to validate findings from data-driven methods. For example, Garip (2016) confirms that four migrant types in her data—obtained by clustering survey responses alone—related differently to macro-level economic and political indicators. Similarly, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) test whether four varieties of nationalism in their data correlated with social and policy attitudes that were not used in the identification of the typology. In the same spirit, we confirm that the distributions of national-origin groups across our five classes conform to the general patterns for these groups identified in empirical work. We first describe the five classes and then examine how class membership is associated with the subjective experience of race across subgroups. In a third step, we examine heterogeneity in the statistical relationship of experienced discrimination with self-reported health, political participation, panethnic identity—three outcomes on which discrimination is presumed to have a causal impact in past work.

RESULTS

Identifying Heterogeneity Among Asian Americans

The five columns in table 1 show the mean values of characteristics used in latent class analysis for each of the five classes. The last row shows the number of respondents in each class. The characteristics include binary indicators for education (less than high school and college degree or more), income (earning $100K or more per year), gender (female), immigrant generation (first, second, and third or higher), region (California, West excluding California, East, Midwest, South, and Pacific). For each characteristic, bold values are significantly higher than the next highest value across five classes ($p<.05$, one-tailed test).

The first class contains the highest share of respondents with less than a high school degree (0.69), as well as the highest share of women (0.68) and the first generation (0.99) across all groups. The class includes the smallest share (0.03) of respondents earning a high income. Close to half of respondents in this

Table 1. Patterned Differentiation Among Asian Americans

	Class 1 Vulnerable	Class 2 Ordinary	Class 3 Hyper-selected	Class 4 Rooted	Class 5 Achieving	Grand Mean
Nativity (proportion)						
First generation	**0.99**	**0.89**	0.91	**0.17**	**0.51**	0.76
Second generation	0.00	**0.11**	**0.06**	**0.22**	**0.46**	0.15
Third generation and above	**0.01**	0.00	0.03	**0.61**	**0.02**	0.08
Socioeconomic status (proportion)						
Less than a high school diploma	**0.69**	**0.18**	**0.02**	0.00	0.00	0.20
College degree or more	0.07	**0.12**	**0.67**	**0.42**	**0.53**	0.36
Earning more than $100K	0.03	**0.08**	**0.45**	**0.31**	**0.38**	0.25
Region (proportion)						
California	**0.44**	**0.30**	0.24	0.32	**0.62**	0.38
Western United States other than California	**0.08**	**0.14**	0.10	0.10	0.05	0.10
Eastern United States	0.19	0.19	**0.18**	0.00	**0.14**	0.16
Midwestern United States	0.19	**0.11**	0.07	0.05	**0.17**	0.12
Southern United States	**0.08**	**0.19**	**0.41**	0.03	0.02	0.17
Pacific United States	**0.02**	**0.07**	0.00	**0.50**	0.00	0.08
Gender (proportion female)	**0.68**	0.47	0.32	0.48	**0.44**	0.48
Observations	1,372	1,227	1,425	663	1,171	5,858

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
Note: Table shows the composition of each class (columns) in terms of various characteristics (rows) included in the analysis. Bolded values are significantly higher than the next lowest value ($p < .05$, one-tailed test).

class live in California (0.44); about one-fifth (0.19) each reside in the East and the Midwest. Respondents here are by far the most disadvantaged among all groups given their low education, low income, and first-generation status. We therefore call them the vulnerable.

The majority of respondents in the second class hold a high school degree or have some college experience (0.70, not shown). About one in five (0.18) has not completed high school, and about one in ten (0.12) has a college degree or more. Given the educational distribution, it is not surprising that less than one in ten (0.08) earns an income of $100K or more. This group is gender balanced and includes a large majority (0.89) of the first generation. The most likely destination is California (0.30), followed by the East (0.19) and the South (0.19). The respondents in the class are not as disadvantaged as those in the first group, but they are also not

nearly as educated or high earning as those in the next three groups. Given these characteristics in a population whose depictions are polarized as either extremely successful or disadvantaged, we call them the ordinary.

The third class contains the best-educated and highest-earning respondents across all groups. Two-thirds (0.67) hold a college degree or higher and about a half (0.45) earn more than $100K. The group is predominantly male (0.68) and first generation (0.91). A majority lives in the South (0.41) or in California (0.24). This class echoes the literature on upward mobility and professional attainment among Asian Americans emphasizing "hyper" selectivity in the composition of Asian migration flows in terms of human capital, and the role of such selectivity in producing the stereotypical, high-achieving Asian American groups (Lee and Zhou 2015; Nee and Holbrow 2013). In recogni-

Figure 2. Relative Proportions of Five Classes Among Asian Americans

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
Note: Proportions are adjusted by sample weights.

tion of its high socioeconomic standing and large majority of foreign born, we label this group the hyper-selected.[5]

The fourth group is also educated and high earning, though not quite at the level of the hyper-selected. About 40 percent of respondents hold a bachelor's degree or higher, and close to one-third (0.31) earn $100K or more. The most likely destination (0.50) is the Pacific region, followed by California (0.32). Unlike the first three groups, which contain mostly the first generation (the immigrants), most respondents here are third generation (0.61). To highlight this distinctive trait, we call this class the rooted.

The fifth and final class is between the rooted and the hyper-selected in terms of education and income. About half of the respondents (0.53) in this group are college educated or hold graduate degrees, and more than one-third (0.38) earn $100K or more. The group is almost equally split between the first generation (0.51) and the second (0.46). Most of the

group (0.62) are settled in California, and the remainder mostly in the East (0.14) and Midwest (0.17). Following ethnographic description of Asian-origin families in California emphasizing academic success among their children (Jiménez and Horowitz 2013), and to recognize its relatively high socioeconomic attainment as well as its mixed generational status, we call this group the achieving.

Figure 2 displays the distribution of the sample across the five classes.[6] The hyper-selected make up one-third (33 percent) of the adjusted sample, the achieving account for over a fourth (27 percent), and the rooted less than one-tenth (8 percent). Together, these three groups, which are closest to the model minority stereotype, account for more than two-thirds of Asian Americans in the sample. This statistical dominance helps explain the popularity of this narrative as well the stylized fact of Asian American immigrant success in the literature based on average-case analyses and samples aggregated by racial groups (Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim

5. Supplementary analyses (not shown) indicate that a large majority of respondents in this class (more than 70 percent) completed their high level of education before migrating to the United States, which supports our interpretation emphasizing selectivity.

6. The shares shown on the chart adjust for sampling weights, and therefore slightly differ from the shares implied by the class sizes in the last row of table 1.

2009; Kao and Thompson 2003; Hsin and Xie 2014). By contrast, the vulnerable cluster (15 percent) is more reminiscent of Southeast Asian subgroups who mainly came to the United States as refugees with little human capital (Ngo and Lee 2007; Gordon 1987).

The gender composition of each class is noteworthy. Only three (ordinary, rooted, and achieving) of our five groups are gender balanced. The vulnerable are predominantly female, the hyper-selected predominantly male. This gendered pattern—where women occupy disadvantaged positions relative to men—is not attributable to national origins alone, given that both the vulnerable and hyper-selected include all the nationalities in the sample (figure 3). Our categorization suggests complex linkages between gender, national origins, and socioeconomic status that are underappreciated in existing research.

Finally, our five classes reveal an increasing diversity among the first and second generation than among subsequent generations. Whereas the first generation is distributed across the vulnerable, ordinary, hyper-selected, and achieving categories, members of the third generation are mainly in the rooted group. This pattern suggests that earlier arrivals to the United States are relatively similar to one another in terms of education, income, and state of residence. By contrast, the later arrivals (mostly in the post-1965 era) show greater variation.

Figure 3 shows bar charts with the distribution of national origins among respondents in each of the five classes (panel A), and vice versa (panel B). Two general patterns are evident. First, the composition of each group is well aligned with descriptions of national-origin groups in the literature. For example, the hyperselected and achieving groups both include a large share of Indians and Koreans, two countries often noted for the selectivity of their U.S.-bound migrants (Krogstad and Radford 2018). The vulnerable group, by contrast, includes large shares of Cambodian and Hmong migrants, two groups with less education than the native-born population and who largely entered the United States as refugees (Gordon 1987). The rooted category has the most overlap with a single national-origin group—namely, the

Japanese, whose economic integration across three immigrant generations has been the object of past work in economic sociology (Bonacich and Modell 1980). The comparison of our five classes against known patterns on national-origin groups thus offers a substantive validation of our categorization.

Second, each of our five classes contains all national origins but in varying compositions. For example, although the hyper-selected identifies Indians and Koreans as its largest constituent national groups, it also includes Cambodians and Hmong. Likewise, Chinese immigrant groups are present in all latent classes. The diversity of each group with respect to national origins confirms a point often made but rarely implemented in quantitative analyses. Treating nations as a taken-for-granted category of analysis, or methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003), blinds us to important differences within each national group. It also does not allow us to consider potential similarities among individuals across national groups. For instance, national-origin groups often heralded for their academic success and upward mobility, such as the Chinese and the Koreans, are present in latent classes characterized by social disadvantage (for example, the vulnerable and to a lesser extent the ordinary). National-origin groups (panel B) appear more diverse than commonly depicted in the literature, where ethnic origins often proxy certain dominant traits—such as the high human capital of Indian-origin immigrants or the socially disadvantaged character of the Hmong.

Linking Patterned Differentiation to Heterogeneity in the Subjective Experience of Race

In their review, Jennifer Lee and Samuel Kye (2016, 255) argue for "examin[ing] more critically the processes, not just the outcomes" of Asian American assimilation. Our approach seeks to do just that by, first, identifying the distinct configurations of characteristics that define different groups among Asian Americans, and then investigating the orientation of each group to its racial identity as well as its experience with the American mainstream. We, in other words, characterize the diversity in the

Figure 3. Distribution of National Origins

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
Note: Distribution of national origins within five classes of Asian Americans (panel A) and distribution of class membership by national origins (panel B). Groups are stacked according to the order of the legend to facilitate reading. The optimal way to view this figure is in color. We refer readers of the print edition of this article to https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/7/2/22 to view the color version.

Figure 4. Differences Across Five Classes, Subjective Experience of Race

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
Note: Color-coded bars show the average proportions within each group that strongly identify as Asian American (upper-left panel), report having received unfair treatment in the past (upper-right panel), report strong perceptions of racially linked fate (lower-left panel), and report having experienced stereotyping as "model minority" (lower-right panel). The brackets over each bar indicate 95 percent confidence intervals around the average value.

population to allow for diversity in various outcomes, and to better understand the mechanisms underlying it.

Figure 4 compares the share of respondents in each class that report experiences with four outcomes related to the subjective experience of race.[7] The upper left panel shows that the proportion reporting a strong racial identity is significantly higher in the vulnerable and ordinary groups (>70 percent) than the hyper-selected, rooted, and achieving (~60 percent). Although racial identification is prevalent in all groups, it seems to weaken across immigrant generations, or through achievement of higher socioeconomic status. The share of respondents strongly identifying as Asian American is higher among groups dominated by the first generation (vulnerable and ordinary) than among those dominated by the second and third generation (rooted and achieving). The hyper-selected offer a notable exception. Al-

though this group is predominantly first generation, it displays levels of racial identification comparable to more established migrant groups, presumably due to its high socioeconomic status.

The upper right panel displays group-specific shares experiencing unfair treatment. About 25 percent of the vulnerable and ordinary report discrimination, versus nearly 40 percent of the hyper-selected, rooted, and achieving. The vulnerable contain mostly women; the ordinary include a majority of respondents without a college degree.

In line with the growing literature providing evidence for discrimination against Asian Americans, our findings question the seamless assimilation story often implied for this group (Ancheta 2006; Chou and Feagin 2008; C. Kim 1999; N. Kim 2007). Our categorization shows unfair treatment to be more common among the relatively advantaged groups, which is in

7. For the survey items used in the construction of the race-related variables, see online appendix C (https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/7/2/22/tab-supplemental).

line with critical race work exploring the specific experiences of racism among highly educated, (upper) middle-class Asians (Chou and Feagin 2008). Across our subgroups, reports of past discrimination among Asian Americans appear to increase among more settled and educated groups. This makes sense, as both factors are associated with increased expectations for equal treatment and perceptions of discrimination in past work (Banerjee 2008).

Relatedly, the lower-right panel shows that the hyper-selected and achieving—the most educated groups in our data—contain significantly higher shares of individuals (~70 percent) who have been stereotyped as model minority relative to the remaining three groups. The rooted and ordinary in turn include a significantly higher proportion (~50 percent) reporting this stereotype than the vulnerable—the group in which this stereotype is least common (~30 percent). We interpret this pattern as reflecting both emergent racialization as well as differential endowments in the social resources associated with the model minority stereotypes. That stereotype reporting is still common for the vulnerable and ordinary subgroups suggests that these stereotypes are generically applied to most people that can be identified as Asian in interpersonal encounters.

We find that experiences with unfair treatment do not go hand in hand with strong racial identification. The relatively advantaged groups (the hyper-selected, achieving, and rooted), who report experiencing discrimination at greater rates, are less likely to identify strongly with their racial category than the less advantaged (the vulnerable and ordinary). This contrasts with social psychological findings of "reactive racial identity" among African Americans in the United States—that is, higher in-group attachment as a result of experiencing stigma of the in-group (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999).

The lower left panel in figure 4 shows group-specific perceptions of a racially linked fate. These perceptions seem least prevalent among the vulnerable (~50 percent), moderately present in the ordinary, hyper-selected, and rooted groups (~57 percent), and slightly higher among the achieving (~64 percent). The relative ordering of the five groups on perceptions of a racially linked fate seems to be the mirror image of their ordering on strong racial identification. As the more settled groups report more discrimination, and weaker racial identity, they also solidify their sense of racially shared fate.

Our categorization confirms some existing observations (for example, prevalence of discrimination and the model minority stereotype among the highly educated), but also show new patterns (such as contradictory stances on racial identification and racially linked fates). These latter results are important: the decreasing significance of race on life chances—the key signal of assimilation into the mainstream as conceived in neoassimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003, 12)—does not appear to be accompanied by a decreasing salience in the perceived weight of race in one's personal life. This decoupling between structural and subjective significance of race can be understood as part of "racialized assimilation" among Asian Americans (Lee and Kye 2016), in which increasing cultural-political embeddedness into the United States is not signaled by the strength of racial identification as much as the emergent sense of "us" as a racial group endowed with a collective destiny.

One might ask how our inductive classes fare relative to national-origin categories in explaining these race-related outcomes. That is, do we gain any explanatory power with our groupings? To answer this question, we undertake a simple exercise. For each of the four outcomes related to racial experience in figure 4, we estimate two analyses of variance models. These models help determine whether the means of included groups in the outcome are truly different. An F-test compares the variation between group means to the variation within groups to statistically test the equality of means (the null hypothesis).

The first set of models includes indicators for our five classes. For each of the four outcomes, the F-test allows us to reject the null hypothesis ($p<.05$). The second set of models includes indicators for national origins. Again, for each outcome, the F-test leads us to reject the equality-of-means hypothesis ($p<.05$). But, the important question for us is how the former models compare with the latter ones. Lacking formal statistical tests for this purpose, we rely

Figure 5. Comparison of Results from Analyses of Variance for Latent Classes and National Origins for Selected Outcomes

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

on an F-test ratio, where we divide the F-test value from the first model by the same value from the second model. Figure 5 shows the results. For each outcome, the F-test ratio is substantially greater than 1, meaning that, in each case, the null hypothesis is more strongly rejected for the five classes than it is for the national-origin indicators. Although this is not strictly a statistical test (as we cannot assign confidence intervals to the F-test ratio), the results still suggest that the inductive categorization creates better differentiated groupings of Asian Americans in terms of their racial experiences in the United States.

Another plausible related criticism of our approach may be that we recover groups based on compositional variation and that such variation can be better accounted for with a more parsimonious linear model in which differences in the experience of race follow from differences in socioeconomic sources—that is, income and education. It is easy to counter that argument because our regression models establish an association between class membership and four race-related outcomes above and beyond compositional variation in socioeconomic resources between latent classes—as indicated by the statistical significance of the main terms for latent class membership. Ad-

ditionally, interaction terms show that the relationship of socioeconomic indicators to race-related outcomes vary by latent class. Substantively, this establishes that differences in the subjective experience of race among latent classes exist above and beyond compositional differences between classes in terms of socioeconomic resources.[8]

Intragroup Heterogeneity Matters for the Effect of Discrimination on Health, Political Behavior, and Panethnic Identity

The analysis established that the experiences of race among Asian Americans follows axes of patterned differentiation. We now illustrate the analytical benefits of subgroup-specific modeling relative to a pooled sample approach. We revisit the statistical relationships in the literature (documented or theorized) regarding the effect of discrimination on three outcomes. A large body of work—to which we cannot do justice given space constraints—finds a negative relationship between the experience of discrimination and self-reported health (Paradies et al. 2015). Studies also document a positive relationship between perceptions of unfair treatment and political participation that is presumed to work through increased group consciousness (Lien 2001; Ramakrishnan and

8. These analyses are available in online appendix B (https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/7/2/22/tab-supplemental).

Figure 6. Effect Sizes of the Experience of Discrimination on Three Outcomes

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
Note: Sizes in percentage change.

Espenshade 2001). Finally, scholars theorize and observe a positive relationship between discrimination and panethnic identity (Masuoka 2006; Kibria 1998) among Asian Americans. We now test whether the link between discrimination and these outcomes varies across our five classes.

The three panels in figure 6 show results from logistic regressions of three outcomes—whether the respondent reported poor health, whether the respondent registered as a voter, and whether the respondent claimed a panethnic identity (such as Asian American rather than Chinese American in the case of a respondent of Chinese origins)—on the respondent's experience with unfair treatment. All models include controls for respondent's education, income, and gender. Each panel presents coefficient estimates (dots) with confidence intervals (lines) for the key variable (experience with discrimination) estimated on the pooled sample (bottom coefficient) as well as on samples containing each of our five classes.

The impact of discrimination on reporting poor health (left panel) is positive for all groups, but not statistically significant for the vulnerable and achieving. One temptation is to attribute the null effect of discrimination for the achieving to the group's high education and income. The hyper-selected and rooted, how-

ever, experience a negative impact of discrimination on health despite being similarly advantaged. The null effect for the vulnerable is also surprising, given the low status of this group and its presumed fragility. A key takeaway is the differential impact of discrimination across subgroups. The pooled coefficient reflects the situation of the ordinary, hyper-selected, and rooted respondents, but hides the absent (yet expected based on the literature) relationship for the other two groups.

The middle panel similarly suggests the potential for the pooled analysis to mask heterogeneous effects of discrimination on political participation. Although the effect appears positive in the overall sample, it is driven by the more recently settled groups. Given that the vast majority of Asian Americans are foreign born, this pattern indicates that the politicizing influence of discrimination decays with immigrant generation. Finally, similar observations apply to the right side panel. The pooled analysis suggests that unfair treatment pushes respondents to claim a panethnic identity, but group-specific models reveal that this positive effect is driven by the more recent and disadvantaged groups in the data, namely, the vulnerable and ordinary. For the remaining four groups, discrimination has no significant association with panethnic identification. It is

Figure 7. Effect Sizes of the Experience of Discrimination on Three Outcomes

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
Note: Sizes in percentage change.

unlikely for the differences in significance be-tween pooled and split-sample coefficients to follow from differences in statistical power. The negative effect of discrimination on health re-mains significant for the rooted, for example, which is much smaller than the other groups; meanwhile, the confidence intervals are large for the vulnerable (and overlapping with zero) despite the large size of the group. These dif-ferences therefore likely reflect the differenti-ated effect of discrimination across subgroups.

This analysis suggests the utility of our in-ductive categorization for clarifying the com-plex relationship of racial experiences (cap-tured via discrimination here) to key integration outcomes (health and panethnic identification) and behaviors (registering as voters). The rela-tionship—which is often presumed uniform across Asian Americans in comparative analy-ses with other racial groups like African Amer-icans and Hispanics—varies substantially across groups occupying different structural positions. Inferences from parameter estimates from pooled samples can lead to misleading conclusions for the majority of Asian Ameri-cans. Conversely, inferences from highly visible groups such as those closest to the model mi-

nority stereotype can lead to similarly incorrect conclusions for the racial group as a whole—such as the hyper-selected subgroup for voting registration and panethnicity.

An analytical benefit of our typology (which relies on a relatively small number of induc-tively identified groups) is the preservation of statistical power for within-subgroup analyses and between-subgroup comparison. To illus-trate this benefit, we replicated the analyses in figure 6, replacing our subgroups with national-origin categories.

Figure 7 shows the results. Many coefficients appear positive but lack significance. The high number of national-origin categories and rela-tively low number of respondents per category make it difficult to adjudicate if non-effects are truly non-effects, or if non-effects are a result of low statistical power. This issue, known as type 2 error, is much less salient with our ap-proach, which creates larger categories cutting across national origins. Thus, in addition to theoretical concerns about methodological na-tionalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003) and calls for reflexivity on ethnic and racial cat-egories of analyses (Brubaker 2004), data-driven classifications facilitate subgroup comparison

and allow researchers to remain attentive to heterogeneity while retaining statistical power.

DISCUSSION: ASIAN AMERICANS—A DIVERSE GROUP BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND RACIALIZATION

The characterization of the incorporation trajectories among Asian Americans has led to tensions among sociologists of migration—among those identifying the Asian American experience as one of rapid entrance into the American mainstream (Nee and Holbrow 2013; Drouhot and Nee 2019), others focusing on the continuing significance of race and characterizing the model minority narrative as a myth (N. Kim 2007; Chou and Feagin 2008), and yet others seeking a balanced view through the articulation of "racialized assimilation" (Lee and Kye 2016; see also Golash-Bosa 2006). We contend that these tensions map onto different methodological cultures. Much quantitative work evaluates assimilation among Asian Americans with large, aggregate samples and side-by-side comparisons with other racial groups, thus ruling out within-group heterogeneity a priori. Qualitative and ethnographic work attends to intragroup variation but does not offer generalizations beyond its rich descriptions of the case at hand. In this article, we seek to resolve the theoretical and methodological tensions by switching the focus asking how much assimilation or racialization occurs among Asian Americans as a whole, to who experiences what in this diverse population. We do so while avoiding methodological nationalism and thereby rejecting the assumption that heterogeneity among Asian Americans necessarily follows ethnic lines.[9]

Our first empirical contribution is to identify patterned differentiation—the nonintuitive, yet nonrandom configurations of social attributes making up distinct types—among Asian Americans. Using latent class analysis, we uncovered five major, clearly differentiated subgroups occurring at the intersection of class, gender, regional location, and immigrant generation: vulnerable, ordinary, hyperselected, rooted, and achieving Asian Americans, and showed that this typology captures heterogeneity in the experience of race in a manner that is more inductive and parsimonious than a grouping based on national origins.

In turn, comparing the subjective experience of race among these subgroups leads to a second empirical contribution. Rather than forcing a choice between assimilation and the opposing perspective emphasizing the enduring weight of race, our approach allowed us to combine both perspectives, and thus pointed to a productive way forward. The numeric dominance of three groups (hyper-selected, rooted, and achieving) in our data, which make up more than two-thirds of our sample and conform most closely to the model minority stereotype, helps explain the empirical grounding of the assimilation narrative in past work documenting average trends for Asian Americans in samples aggregated by race (Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Nee and Holbrow 2013). Yet we saw that these groups are also the ones reporting higher levels of discrimination, and a higher sense of racially linked fate, without necessarily reporting stronger attachment to their racial identities. These findings are in line with past work from a critical race tradition, which investigates the subjective experience of race and belonging among upwardly mobile Asian Americans who need to negotiate social spaces dominated by Whites (Chou and Feagin 2008; Dhingra 2007). Among our subgroups, those closer to the assimilation pattern are in fact those most affected by a sense of subjective racialization. The assimilation and critical race perspectives may therefore not be as contradictory as typically thought; rather, it might be precisely because many Asian American are structurally (in terms of socioeconomic status) successful—as emphasized in the neoassimilation perspective—that they experience a subjective sense of racializa-

9. In doing so, we do not claim to invalidate national origins as a way to apprehend within-group diversity among Asian Americans. National origins surely capture a substantial amount of differentiation within Asian Americans (for an empirical study of ethnic heterogeneity in public opinion among Asian Americans, see S. Kim 2021, this issue). However, we argue that national origins is only one way to capture intragroup heterogeneity and not a particularly reflexive and parsimonious one.

tion—in the form of higher perception of discrimination and a sense of racially linked fate—as they come into social spaces dominated by the White majority group. This interpretation is also in line with ethnographic and interview-based studies of upwardly mobile Black immigrants (Vickerman 1999). Supplementary analyses reveal that subgroup membership is significantly associated with such race-related outcomes (perceptions of discrimination), even after we control for socioeconomic indicators at the individual level (see online appendix B). In other words, these subgroups capture distinct aspects of the subjective experience of race that are not attributable to socioeconomic status differences alone.

Although Asian Americans' life chances are not structurally shaped by their racial category in the post–civil rights era (Drouhot and Nee 2019; Nee and Holbrow 2013), their subjective racial experience and sense of belonging are. Our results indicate a decoupling between the structural aspects of assimilation (relating to upward mobility) and symbolic aspects such as perceptions of racially linked fate. These findings counter canonical accounts, such as Gordon's (1964) multistep model of assimilation, which conceive of identification and a shared sense of "peoplehood" as proceeding from immigrant economic integration. We show that immigrants and their children may continue to experience subjective forms of stigma and racialized group consciousness in spite of high socioeconomic attainment. This reconciliation of assimilation as socioeconomic attainment and the subjective salience of race complements recent descriptions of "racialized assimilation" among Asian Americans (Lee and Kye 2016). Together, these findings suggest avenues for renewed theoretical work on the relationships between assimilation, immigrant upward mobility, and the subjective experience of race.

Bridging Theory and Empirics with Data-Driven Classification Methods

In this article, we implemented an empirical approach attentive to long-standing concerns for within-group heterogeneity in several strands of migration-focused theorizing, such as those on segmented assimilation, and super-diversity (Portes and Zhou 1993; Vertovec 2007).

Although empirical descriptions of heterogeneity and within-group differentiation are a mainstay of qualitative work, they are not as common in quantitative work. The general linear reality and average-case focus of regression-based approaches (Abbott 1988) flattens the social structure of the ethnoracial groups under study, and cumulatively contributes to their reification when research findings are assessed and groups compared side by side. The polarization of research between generalized findings from aggregate data and average case–based method, on the one hand, and thicker, qualitative description from smaller and ungeneralizable samples, on the other, contributes to maintaining an undesirable intellectual stalemate between potentially complementary approaches. Data-driven classification methods provide an avenue for bringing together the search for broad patterns while remaining attentive to subgroup-specific processes and intragroup heterogeneity.

In the Asian American case, we identify five rather large subgroups that cross-cut ten national-origin groups and therefore preserve enough statistical power for meaningful subgroup comparison, as well as within-subgroup modeling. Similar comparisons across national-origin groups were not fruitful given small sample sizes for each group. Beyond addressing a theoretical concern for heterogeneity, our analyses demonstrated the analytical benefit of comparing statistical relationships across subgroups. Specifically, we show that the effect of reported experience of unfair treatment has a differential impact on various outcomes across the five subgroups under the Asian American category. This finding stands in stark contrast to work estimating a single coefficient (assumed to apply uniformly to the entire sample at hand) for the effect of unfair treatment on outcomes such as reported health and panethnic identity. For the latter outcome, our analyses shows that a positive and significant coefficient obtained for a category-level (pooling all Asian Americans) analysis is entirely carried by a very large coefficient for one subgroup—the "vulnerable"—and is not replicated for the other four subgroups, for whom perceived unfair treatment has no sizable effect on the probability of reporting a strong panethnic identity.

Being rooted in historical patterns of exclusion and inclusion and being imprinted on the law, racial and national-origin categories are powerful, naturalized, and cognitively salient—among the general public and scholars alike. Quite simply, the "groupness" of Asian Americans is real in part because ordinary individuals, taking cues from venerable institutions such as the U.S. Census, think it is real. To be clear, we do not interpret our approach and results as suggesting that racial categories such as Asian American are imaginary or artificial. What motivated our analyses is precisely the opposite: the cognitive pull of racial categories is such that it warrants reflexivity and attention to heterogeneity in scholarly analyses involving their application. In that regard, data-driven classification methods such as LCA offer migration researchers possibilities to produce an epistemological break from "categories of practice"—categories from everyday life such as those serving bureaucratic purposes (for example, in the census)—and create inductive and reflexive "categories of analysis" (Brubaker 2004). As Rogers Brubaker (2013, 2) notes, "the heavy traffic between the two, in both directions, means that we risk using pre-constructed categories of journalistic, political or religious common sense as our categories of analysis." Simply put, dividing a sample of immigrants by national origins or racial categories is already assuming that national origins or race matter and should organize one's look at the data. In our case, this amounts to naturalizing the analytical and empirical relevance of racial (Asian American) and national-origin (such as Chinese) categories when taking them as categories of analysis. However, both racial and national-origin categories are primarily categories of practice intimately linked to state bureaucracies, minority activist politics, and national projects whose very interests reside in the naturalization of such categories as principles for the "vision and division of the world" (Brubaker 2004, 2013; Wimmer 2009; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003).

In this article, we implement a novel approach to studying Asian Americans, a particular immigrant group, "without groupism" (Brubaker 2004)—that is, without reifying neither race as a natural boundary to the processes affecting those self-identifying as Asian Americans, nor the ethnic categories existing beneath this racial label. Data-driven classification methods offer a promising avenue to implement such broad theoretical concerns for the adoption of sound categories of analysis without unwittingly baking racial or ethnic groupism in our research designs (Wimmer 2013). We hope our study offers a blueprint for future analyses attentive to such analytical and epistemological problems. Future research could go further than what has been presented here by pooling samples across racial groups, and letting racial or ethnic differentiation emerge from the data rather than imposing it a priori in the research design and research question formulation stage.

APPENDIX: TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS WITH STOCHASTIC ASSIGNMENT

LCA estimates a latent (that is, unobserved) variable that accounts for the covariance between the observed attributes. This latent variable is assumed to have a categorical distribution with each value corresponding to a "latent class" or a group in data. An LCA model with observed response items u has a categorical latent (unobserved) variable c with k classes. Formally:

$$P(u_j = 1) = \Sigma_{K=1}^{K} P(c = k) \, P(u_j = 1 \mid c = k). \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) yields the marginal item probability for item u_j. For s number of response items to be clustered upon, the class probabilities of each individual respondent—the so-called posterior probabilities—are given by:

$$P_{ik} = P(c = k \mid u_1, u_2, \dots, u_s) =$$
$$\frac{P(c = k) \, P(u_1 \mid c = k) \, P(u_2 \mid c = k) \dots P(u_s \mid c = k)}{P(u_1, u_2, \dots, u_s)}. \quad (2)$$

A common practice in LCA applications is to use a so-called modal assignment—that is, to assign cases to classes for which they have the highest posterior probability of belonging. In our view, this remains too close to the deterministic assignment issue associated with hard clustering, in which class membership is treated as an exact, observed variable. Because

modal assignment effectively erases assignment ambiguity for cases that have large probabilities of belonging to multiple classes (such as a set of posterior probabilities of 0.43, 0.37 and 0.20 belonging to three classes), standard errors obtained in post-assignment analysis can be deceptively small, and inferences from such analysis potentially erroneous (Clark and Muthén 2009). Rather than a statistical or analytical nuisance, we regard assignment uncertainty as meaningful as it reflects the blurry boundaries between ideal-typical subgroups making up the Asian American category. The so-called three-step approach to LCA calls for correcting for classification error as it can lead to underestimation of the relationships between obtained classes and other covariates in the third step (Vermunt 2010; Bakk et al. 2013). We, though, choose to rely on ambiguous assignment (without the correction for classification errors) to obtain a more conservative test in subsequent investigations of differences across subgroups.[10]

For our class assignment to be probabilistic and take membership uncertainty into account, we implement a stochastic assignment procedure in which a case's class is randomly drawn from the distribution of the posterior probabilities. Formally, respondent j's assignment A is thus given by:

$$A_i \sim Multinomial(\boldsymbol{p}_i), \text{ where } A_i \in \{1, 2, \dots, k\}, \quad (3)$$

where

$$\boldsymbol{p}_i : \{p_{i1}, p_{i2}, \dots, p_{ik}\},$$

$\boldsymbol{p}$ being respondent i's distribution of posterior probabilities. We estimated latent classes with the *lclass* command in Stata 15. In a second step, we used the posterior probabilities to assign individuals to a class based on a random draw using the *Hmisc::rMultinom* command in *R*. We analyzed the resulting classes back in Stata 15.

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10. Other extensions of LCA allow researchers to consider the local dependence between the survey responses (see S. Kim 2021, this issue). This approach is useful when researchers consider many highly correlated variables (for example, based on attitudinal questions trying to get at the same construct), but is not necessary in our case given the few (five) dimensions we include in analysis. Another extension allows researchers to include additional variables (which are not included in the identification of latent classes) during the phase of assigning individual cases to classes. As we employ all variables of interest in the first phase (identification of latent classes), this extension is not relevant for our purposes.

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Fault Lines Among Asian Americans: Convergence and Divergence in Policy Opinion

SUNMIN KIM

Sociologists have long argued that a racial and ethnic category can be made under certain circumstances and remade under anothers. The panethnic category of Asian American was in fact devised to mobilize different immigrant-origin groups in the 1960s. Today's Asian Americans have diverse opinions on numerous issues. Given this divergence, it is possible that the category will be subject to remaking or unmaking. Using survey questions from the 2016 pre-election National Asian American Survey, this article analyzes where respondents' policy opinions converge and diverge. Using latent class models, it shows that though many Asian Americans support government interventions in health care, education, climate change, and racial justice, some diverge sharply in regard to Muslim immigration. Logistic regression models show that different experiences of immigration and differences in national origins undergird such divergence. I discuss the implications of these fault lines for the future of the Asian American category.

Keywords: Asian American, NAAS, policy opinions, immigration, latent class models

Broadly speaking, Asian Americans are people who can trace their roots to countries throughout East Asia, South Asia, and South East Asia. Obscured by this broad definition of "Asian" and "Asian American" is a staggering diversity of peoples that represent twenty-four distinct groups. . . . it is fair to ask whether there is even one "Asian American," or one "Asian American History." Asian Americans with long roots in this country may wonder what they have in common with today's recent arrivals. Similarly, new Asian immigrants and their descendants may not think that the histories of earlier Asian Americans are relevant to their own experiences. But they should.

> Erika Lee, *The Making of Asian America: A History*

In her comprehensive history of Asian America, Erika Lee (2015) opens her discussion by acknowledging the complex meaning of the term

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Asian American. Undercutting the purported unity of geographic origin—the continent of Asia covers more than 30 percent of the earth's total land area—is "a staggering diversity of peoples" whose experiences diverge sharply from one another. This heterogeneity notwithstanding, Lee argues, these peoples should believe in the relevance of a collective past to their everyday lives. In Lee's account, each successive generation of immigrants from Asia faced similar sets of challenges in the United States, and in immigrant communities, often relied on the direct and indirect support of the their predecessors, however disparate, while forging pathways in their newfound homeland. In a way, diverse groups of immigrants from different parts of the vast continent of Asia have been connected and continue to connect through the shared history of immigration and adaptation.

Whether they could or actually do believe and invest in a common identity as a people is, however, an empirical question. Philosophers and historians of science have studied various occasions in which "making up people" occurred (Hacking 2002). Sociologists have tirelessly pointed out the historical contingency of labels such as race, ethnicity, and nation. That is, although these labels have exercised much power over the making of our times, they are by no means natural entities that spontaneously emerge from shared traits among individuals. Instead, they are products of particular social and historical circumstances, and as such can be made, unmade, and remade through state policies, social movements, and cultural campaigns, to mention just a few factors (Wimmer 2012; Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004; Anderson 1983).

The mutable character of ethnicity is especially more prominent in the case of panethnic categories such as Asian American, in which both primordial and instrumental dimensions of ethnicity give way to political and cultural processes (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto and Mora 2014). In the first half of the twentieth century, immigrants moving to the United States from various parts of the continent labeled Asia did not identify as Asians. When asked by inspectors of immigration stations, such as in Angel Island (Lee and Yung 2010), where they were from, they uttered village name, regional origin, point of departure, or family pedigree. Usually, however, they stuck to their national origins, in most cases China or Japan. As David Hollinger (1995) explains through his concept of "ethno-racial pentagon," it was not until the aftermath of the civil rights and antiwar movement of the 1960s that the category of Asian American emerged as a collective identity encompassing these diverse groups of immigrants and their children, presumably to range them alongside whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans—who were, in fact, also equally heterogeneous in their own regard.

In short, Asian American was a category made from the particular circumstances of the 1960s out of diverse experiences of immigration. Hence its content and boundaries can be renegotiated in different circumstances. Moreover, in an unlikely but not entirely impossible scenario, we can even imagine an unmaking of the category, in which various subgroups making up the panethnic label embark on their identity formation or regroup under different banners. Although many Asian Americans have made notable strides in education and business in the latter half of the twentieth century (Alba and Nee 2003), many of the prejudices and stereotypes targeting Asian Americans (C. Kim 1999)—such as "foreign," unable to speak English, lacking in leadership and creative qualities, overachieving, and so on—have not disappeared entirely. In fact, in many cases Asian Americans are slotted in marginal, technical positions in organizations and barred from the powerful, decision-making posts—the phenomenon commonly referred to as "bamboo ceiling" (Chin 2020). In addition, with a turn toward the knowledge economy and the rise of Silicon Valley geek culture, the stereotype of smart but unimaginative Indian and Chinese tech workers emerged as a target of anti-immigrant advocates, who imagined such undeserving and "un-American" workers taking jobs that should be given to "American" workers.

Yet in recent years, Asian Americans have also witnessed important changes in how they were understood in American society. The economic development of East Asian countries—"Asian Ascendancy" (Hoang 2015)—and in-

creasing significance of pan-Pacific economic connections are complicating the positions of Asian Americans in American society. As the widely popular movie *Crazy Rich Asians* (2018) showcased, Asian Americans are now being portrayed not just as perpetual foreigners but also as gatekeepers to glamorous foreign wealth. Andrew Yang's unexpected performance in the presidential primary suggested that the wealth and cultural competency depicted in the movie have a potential to turn into real-world political gains. However, the most recent turn of events seems to negate all these incremental positive changes: the incendiary rhetoric of "kung flu" amid the unprecedented global pandemic ushered a new wave of physical and verbal abuse targeting all Asian-looking persons across the United States, regardless of their citizenship status or immigration history, once again reminding Asian Americans that their social standing in American society has not moved very far from that of the Yellow Peril era (Lee and Yadav 2020). Although Asian Americans have certainly grown in numbers and gained some visibility, in the popular imagination they remain at the margins of American social and cultural landscape. Kung flu is a cruel reminder that their social standing is still precarious after all these years in the United States, despite their achievements in education, culture, and economy.

It is unclear how these trends will affect Asian American as a category of identity. They may turn the clock backward and remake or unmake the category, possibly reenforcing peoplehood based on national origins and class over panethnic identity. It is equally plausible, however, to expect Asian American to increase its significance and gravity for the generation born well after the emergence of the label. As researchers of the National Asian American Survey (NAAS) project have recently demonstrated (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018), Asian Americans are becoming a political force to be reckoned with, especially as the most dedicated supporters of the Democratic party and its liberal policies (see also Wong and Shah 2021, this issue). Thus it is reasonable to assume that politically Asian American will be more prominent as a category, even as the people linked to the label become culturally and socioeconomi-

cally more differentiated (see Drouhot and Garip 2021, this issue).

This article attempts to identify some of the potential fault lines among Asian Americans, based on which making, remaking, and even unmaking of the category can occur in the future. In the 1960s, a common cause united immigrant families from China, Japan, and other parts of the world as Asian Americans. Using survey data on policy opinions of Asian Americans from the 2016 pre-election NAAS, I explore whether a common cause still holds together various constituents of the category and how different subsections of the Asian American population converge and diverge on the important issues of our times. Latent class models on seven policy opinion questions ranging from the Affordable Care Act and free college tuition to the admission of Syrian refugees and the Muslim travel ban reveal that opinions on the latter two policies sharply diverge among different subgroups of Asian Americans who otherwise share the support for active government intervention on other issues. Certain demographic variables correlate to the policy positions. Analysis reveals how these findings map onto ethnic divisions, forming fault lines within particular Asian American subgroups. Combined with the results from additional regression analyses of the questions on Syrian refugees and the Muslim travel ban, the analysis shows a major divide within the Asian American category: the older, less educated, and foreign born versus the younger, educated, and native born. The ethnic division between Southeast Asians (Cambodian and Vietnamese) and other Asians (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indians) somewhat corresponds to this divide but not entirely.

PANETHNIC IDENTITY AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Before the twentieth century, the people living in the continent designated Asia by Europeans did not see themselves through a unified category, or as Asians. The long, often violent, history of Sinocentrism in China shows that within Asia, ethnic differences mattered more than the panethnic identity, and the complicated histories of various states in South and

Central Asia invalidate such simple categorization. Even when European race theorists embarked on their long journey to catalog and categorize peoples of the world, Asia was seldom seen as a place for one people. For instance, in the late eighteenth century, Johann Fredrich Blumenbach, known for coining the "color races" scheme (white, black, yellow, and so on), distinguished between yellow and brown people, or between Mongolians and Malayans (Keevak 2011). The rise of nationalism and imperialism in the nineteenth century complicated this scheme further, adding ever more fine-grained divisions among peoples of Asia and other parts of the world to account for their supposed differences (Gossett 1963).

The demise of scientific racism and challenges against European imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century changed the situation somewhat. As Donna Jones (2010) demonstrates in her reading of early twentieth-century Caribbean writers, pan-African consciousness emerged as an aesthetic and political counterpoint to pan-European conceptions of whiteness, those which undergirded the cultural landscape of imperialism. In an entirely different context, the discussions around immigrant assimilation in the United States also forged a way for a less monolithic concept of whiteness that encompassed differences among various European immigrants (Roediger 2005; Jacobson 1999).

The situation was, however, quite different for various immigrants of Asian origin. From the 1880s and onward, ethnic rivalry and conflict among Asian immigrant groups had always been boiling under the blanket imposition of white supremacy and nativism. Nativists in California used the term Oriental to simultaneously deride Chinese, Japanese, and Korean immigrants, but members of these groups strongly rejected the term, not only because it was demeaning but also because they did not appreciate being labeled into a single category with other groups. As the historian Eiichiro Azuma (2005) discusses at length, asserting distinction from Chinese workers was in fact a focal point of the early Japanese immigrant identity. Chinese immigrants to the United States in the nineteenth century were mostly poor farmers from rural villages of Guangdong province. As

such, they seldom had any education before they immigrated and were often victims of extortion and trafficking by both Chinese and American labor brokers. Many were temporary workers in the most demanding and dangerous jobs, such as railroad construction and mining, and intended to return to their hometowns as soon as they saved enough money. To the progressive reformers of the era, these Chinese workers cannot be any more at odds with the American ideals of citizenship upholding the value of free, dignified labor (Jung 2006).

After passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Japanese immigrants began to arrive to fill the gap in the labor market left by the Chinese workers who had returned to China. Unlike their Chinese predecessors, Japanese immigrants had enjoyed relative high standing in Japanese society, as sons of independent farmers and Samurais, but then experienced relative downward mobility after the Meiji restoration. Given this background, many had secondary education, often from Western-influenced schools, and hoped to eventually continue their education in the United States. They saw themselves as settlers, not sojourners, and envisioned a future in which they would command the respect of Americans—native-born whites, to be specific—through honest work and upward social mobility. Although Chinese and Japanese workers were often working alongside each other as farmworkers in the Central Valley and domestic servants in San Francisco households, in their minds they could not have been any more different from each other. That Americans confused or did not care enough to differentiate these two groups frustrated ambitious Japanese immigrants. Hence they distanced themselves from Chinese immigrants whenever the opportunity was presented, and made such distancing ("desinofication") a major strategy to advance their position in American society.

Korean immigrants maintained a similar attitude to assert their difference from the Japanese. Although the peninsula was colonized by Japan in the early twentieth century and Koreans were officially the subjects of the Japanese empire, in many instances they strongly denied such affiliation, instead opting to argue for Korean identity and supporting the independence

movement. Filipino immigrants were situated in a very different position from these groups because they were once U.S. subjects through colonization and culturally identified more with Spanish-speaking, Catholic communities, such as Mexicans. South Asians were known as Hindoos, but no one thought to group them together with other Asian immigrants. In short, the idea that these immigrants from Asia had something in common—other than being immigrants and working in manual jobs, which was also true for many European and Mexican immigrants—was in this historical context virtually unthinkable (for a comprehensive history of these immigrant communities, see E. Lee 2015). The 1920s ushered in a series of immigration policies focused on restriction, and all of these groups were barred from entering the United States under the Asiatic barred zone. Under the influence of the Naturalization Act of 1790, which only allowed whites to become citizens, no one with origins in Asia was permitted to naturalize, though many mounted legal challenges that tested the cultural boundaries of whiteness (Haney-Lopéz 2006). In the meantime, the children of these immigrants were being born on U.S. soil and, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, were automatically granted U.S. citizenship, even though they did not enjoy the full civic and social rights reserved for whites.

In the 1960s, however, the circumstances around Asian immigrants and their children changed somewhat. As the Jim Crow regime and restrictive immigration policies were struck down through the Civil Rights Act and the Immigration Act of 1965, various actors began to reimagine racial and ethnic identity. The Black Power movement, spearheaded by the Black Panther Party, envisioned a collective front of "black people" united against white supremacy, a movement that included not only African Americans but also all members of the African diaspora in various colonies of the world (Bloom and Martin 2012). Panthers later extended their conception of blackness, arguing that, just like the color itself, blackness can and should encompass all people of color, most notably the peoples of Vietnam and North Korea, who were engaged in their own struggles against U.S. imperialism. Many others followed

this frame and envisioned political movements of panethnic "people." The "red power" movement and American Indian ethnic identity renewal (Nagel 1997) was partially inspired by the black militancy of the 1960s and 1970s. Although the Hispanic category emerged more through the cultural work of experts rather than popular social movements (Mora 2014), the renewed sensibility around the political usefulness of panethnic identity certainly helped its initial take-off (Espiritu 1992).

Asian Americans, however, were directly influenced by the Black Power movement, at least in terms of how they came to envision their collective identity (Ishizuka 2016). Drawing on interviews of the activists, William Wei (1993) pinpoints the specific time and place in which the term Asian American emerged. In 1968, Berkeley and San Francisco were the hotbeds of everything radical, including new forms of political mobilization based on racial and ethnic identity. During the Third World Liberation Front strike at San Francisco State College, student and community activists of Chinese and Japanese origins needed a new way of overcoming differences among themselves and mobilizing for political action. Just like many other Americans of their generation, these activists grew up surrounded by the consumer-oriented, conservative culture of the 1950s, but came to witness the social ills woven into the ostensibly peaceful fabric of Cold War era material abundance. In their eyes, domestic racism, of which they were direct victims, and the war in Vietnam were the two sides of the same coin representing the contradictions of white supremacy. They became active participants of campus-based social movements, including the Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panthers. Neither organization, however, wholly embraced the presence of Chinese and Japanese participants, and those children of immigrants started to question their places in a society marked by the black-white divide. In the end, they realized that they needed their own social movement, one that addressed their shared concerns around war, racism, and their immigrant communities. The category of Asian American was consciously devised to address these circumstances.

After the turbulent decade in which Asian

American was used more as a slogan in street demonstrations than as an everyday term, the term finally became a part of the official lexicon. In 1977, Asian American was enshrined into civil rights legislation as a rightful component of the "ethno-racial pentagon" through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Statistical Directive No. 15 (Hollinger 1995), and suddenly it seemed that Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, and other immigrant groups had something in common with each other, as Asian Americans.

Although the term has survived to our times, the actual makeup of the people under the label shifted dramatically. In the 1960s, Asian Americans denoted mostly those of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino origins but included a small number of immigrants and their children from South Asia. Because of the immigration restrictions placed in the 1920s, these people have been in the United States for a generation or two, and the young members of these groups grew up effectively cut off from their parents' or grandparents' homelands. But they came to see each other as members of a unified racial group, largely through shared opinions on issues (such as the Vietnam War and racism) and consequent political mobilization. As noted in the introduction, the Vietnam War ended a long time ago and Asia has since become an economic powerhouse; many Asian Americans have moved out of ethnic enclaves and some of them exercise a considerable amount of economic and cultural power within American society (Jiménez 2017). Many more waves of newcomers, some of them refugees, from different parts of Asia arrived since the 1960s, embodying a dizzying array of diversity in their social and cultural backgrounds. Young members of these groups maintain vibrant connections to their origins and other countries of Asia, navigating a very different cultural landscape than the one presented to Chinese and Japanese youth of the 1960s. Political mobilization under the label of Asian American still remains, but in a different format and with less passion. The discontinuity between the Asian Americans of the 1960s and those of the 2020s is pronounced, yet as the kung flu reference to the coronavirus has painfully demonstrated, a clear connection exists between the marginalized positions on which

the old and new groups stand. In other words, just like then, today's Asian Americans cannot be separated from their direct and indirect experiences of immigration, and thus are vulnerable to the nativist ideology that plagues the American political culture every so often.

Where, then, does this put Asian American as a category, given rifts and shifts among groups? It is one thing to trace how the American public—mostly native-born whites, to be specific—perceived Asian Americans, but how Asian Americans saw themselves is an entirely different matter. In the 1960s, shared opinions on the Vietnam War and domestic racism brought together different immigrant youth into the panethnic label of Asian American, supposedly to empower their collective mobilization. How do today's Asian Americans feel about issues? Do they have a more or less common and coherent stance on various policies, or are there points of divergence within people categorized as Asian Americans?

POLICY OPINIONS: CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?

Based on this historical overview, we arrive at a succinct articulation of the relationship between policy opinions and group-making in the case of Asian Americans. First, panethnic identity, such as Asian American, is made when policy opinions converge among ethnic groups; second, and conversely, panethnic identity can be remade or even unmade when policy opinions diverge, not only along ethnic lines but also in terms of demographic characteristics. The first point is well documented in the emergence of the Asian American label in the late 1960s, and the second in the demise of Asian American movement in 1970s. The aim of this article is to draw inspirations from these experiences and examine whether any of the trajectories are useful in thinking about contemporary Asian Americans.

In doing so, I focus on five policy dimensions: welfare, immigration, culture, environment, and race. Each is an important pillar of contemporary political divide, progressives and conservatives diverging sharply on how government should approach them. In terms of welfare, I use the questions on the most visible government-led programs, which are often top-

ics of debate: the Affordable Care Act and the proposal for government-sponsored free college tuition. The same applies to the questions related to immigration: Syrian refugees and the Muslim ban had received much media attention in the period leading up to the time of the survey. Culture, environment, and racial justice are each measured by a single question asking for opinion on specific government policy—legalization of marijuana, limiting coal-based power plants, and government stepping up its role in assisting blacks. Although these five dimensions leave out some of the important, volatile policy issues—religion, gender, international relations, and economic policy come to mind—they should provide enough grounds on which policy opinions can converge or diverge.

To map out convergence and divergence along these dimensions, I focus on identifying clusters of opinions. That is, using an exploratory data analysis technique—latent class analysis (LCA), to be specific—I highlight how opinions on different issues appear together in groups of respondents. One cluster of respondents may support all of the seven policies being questioned; in another respondents may support five out of seven; in still another respondents may object to a specific policy but support all the others. Although permutations of these configurations are quite large, LCA statistically reduces the potential possibilities into a legible number, demonstrating existence of statistically plausible clusters. The dividing lines that mark the boundaries between clusters can be read as potential fault lines on which remaking or unmaking of the category can occur in the future.

In term of expectations, I envision the results to fall between the two somewhat extreme possibilities. First, we can imagine a near-perfect convergence of policy opinions among Asian Americans: a large chunk of respondents will belong to a single cluster, leaving not many for other clusters, and because the single cluster is so large, ethnic differences in policy opinion clusters will be minimal. This result is close to what occurred among the activists in the 1960s, in which many Chinese and Japanese children of immigrants rallied behind the label of Asian American based on their shared opposition to the Vietnam War and domestic racism. Second is the opposite scenario, in which the divergence of policy opinions is marked: many clusters will have unique configurations, and their distribution will show a sharp divergence along ethnic lines. This result is similar to the times before or after the 1960s, in which differences in opinions along ethnic lines undermined the potential panethnic mobilization under the label of Asian American. In the first case of near-perfect convergence, the category of Asian American is stable and the possibility for its dissolution minimal. In the second case, we can conclude that the possibility that Asian American category will be remade or even unmade is strong.

Both possibilities are extreme scenarios, and the results are not likely to point conclusively one way or the other. The result will be far from a near-perfect convergence but not close to a complete divergence along ethnic lines, either. More productive than testing the two unrealistic hypotheses, though, is to statistically pinpoint where the status of Asian American category lies between the two scenarios. Moreover, by closely combing through the results and considering not only ethnic differences but also demographics, I aim to identify the potential fault lines along which the Asian American category can be remade or unmade in the future. Scholars interested in the political future of Asian Americans would benefit much from paying attention to these fault lines.

I explore these possibilities by applying latent class models to the 2016 pre-election NAAS (for theoretical and methodological principles on using LCA to study racial and ethnic differences, see S. Kim 2019; Drouhot and Garip 2021, this issue). I also use logistics regression models for a closer examination of key variables that emerge from latent class analysis.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD

Data are drawn from the 2016 pre-election NAAS (N = 4,787), a nationally representative, multilingual survey of Asian Americans. The data set includes nine national origin and ethnic groups (Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese, Hmong, Cambodian, and Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander) as well as whites, blacks, and Latinos as comparison

groups. Except in figure 1, in which I compare Asian American policy opinions with those of whites, blacks, and Latinos, my analyses focus exclusively on the nine groups (N = 3,170). I use the person weight included in the NAAS data set on all models, including the comparison presented in figure 1.[1]

Variables

The main variables used to construct latent classes are questions on policy opinions. The question wording is as follows:

"Next, we will ask your opinions on certain policies. In each case please tell me if you support or oppose."

Q1. Do you support or oppose the health care law passed by Barack Obama and Congress in 2010?

Q2. Do you support or oppose major new spending by the federal government that would help undergraduates pay tuition at public colleges without needing loans?

Q3. Do you support or oppose accepting Syrian refugees into the United States?

Q4. Do you support or oppose legalizing the possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use?

Q5. Do you support or oppose banning people who are Muslim from entering the United States?

Q6. Do you support or oppose setting stricter emission limits on power plants in order to address climate change?

Q7. Do you support or oppose the government doing more to give blacks equal rights with whites?

The responses were coded as support, oppose, or "don't know or refused to answer," providing $3^7 = 2,187$ possible variations in combinations of the answers. In addition, I included an array of individual-level demographic characteristics (gender, education level, foreign-born status, and party identification) as covariates to further substantiate the profiles of classes. For racial and ethnic categories, I followed the initial sampling frame and used the nine national origin and ethnic groups.

Table 1 displays the overall response patterns for the seven indicator variables, and figure 1 summarizes how the policy opinions of Asian Americans as a group compare with whites, blacks, and Latinos on those variables. As widely noted, Asian Americans have considerably liberal policy opinions when it comes to government actions: an overwhelming majority support the Affordable Care Act, free college tuition, limits on power plants, and interventions on behalf of blacks. In the same light, 65 percent of the Asian American respondents oppose the Muslim travel ban. However, Asian Americans are less supportive of Syrian refugees (51 percent support and 31 percent oppose) while many oppose the legalization of marijuana (42 percent support and 49 percent oppose). As shown in figure 1, these numbers demonstrate that Asian Americans are far more progressive than native whites, almost on par with Latinos, and slightly behind blacks.

For each question, a considerable number of respondents (from 10 to 20 percent, except for free college tuition) opted to answer don't know or refused to answer. In his famed essay criticizing public opinion research, "Public Opinion Does Not Exist," Pierre Bourdieu (1979) argues that public opinion has two layers: the first layer is the ability to have an opinion and express it in a survey interview; and the second layer is the opinion itself. To become legible in public opinion surveys, respondents need to overcome the first hurdle of "having" and "expressing" an opinion on issues, even before deciding what those opinions are. For instance, to properly answer the question on the Syrian refugees, a person needs to understand who these refugees are and why they became an issue in contemporary politics (the first layer), before deciding whether to support or oppose

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Table 1. Response Percentages for Indicator Variables (Asian Americans Only)

Affordable Care Act		Muslim travel ban	
Support	0.60	Support	0.18
Oppose	0.26	Oppose	0.65
Don't know	0.14	Don't know	0.16
Free college tuition		**Limits on power plants**	
Support	0.78	Support	0.71
Oppose	0.14	Oppose	0.17
Don't know	0.07	Don't know	0.12
Admitting Syrian refugees		**Government should do more for blacks**	
Support	0.51	Support	0.76
Oppose	0.31	Oppose	0.12
Don't know	0.19	Don't know	0.12
Marijuana legalization			
Support	0.42		
Oppose	0.49		
Don't know	0.10		

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).

Figure 1. Asian American Policy Opinions Relative to White, Black, and Latino

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).
Note: Only shows the percentages for support.

their admission to the country (the second layer).

Many scholars of public opinion, according to Bourdieu, only pay attention to those who are capable of expressing opinion, and ignore many members of the public who don't know or are hesitant to reveal their opinion. However, this does not mean that they are not a part of the democratic public. As Taeku Lee (2002) has shown through his study on the changes in latent public opinion leading up to the civil rights movement, people express what they think through various means, and these expressions may or may not be captured through standard public opinion surveys (see also Lee and Pérez 2014). This criticism is especially meaningful in light of the fact that fewer than half of the Asian American respondents in the 2016 pre-election NAAS data set expressed firm opinions for all of the seven questions, and that more than half had at least one don't know answer. To affirm these answers as an expression of

opinion, I consider don't know as a valid response alongside support or oppose and use the response as an important dimension along which subgroups of respondents diverge.

Method: Latent Class Analysis

LCA considers observed variables, such as survey responses, as a function of underlying, unobserved categorical variables termed latent classes. Using a maximum-likelihood approach, LCA finds the optimal number of categories for the latent class variable to explain the variation in the observed variables (Goodman 1974). More intuitively, this approach is akin to how a doctor would diagnose a disease from observed characteristics of a patient. That is, a doctor who saw fever, runny nose, and coughing (observed variables) would likely point to cold (latent class), an underlying variable that predicts all these features. In a nutshell, LCA is a model-based data reduction tool that reduces complexity in real-world data by providing a few templates to think through variations. Some scholars have argued that LCA is close to the "ideal types" usually employed in the analysis of qualitative data (Hagenaars and Halman 1989). The formal equation of the model I use here is as follows (see Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016):

$$P(Y = y) = \Sigma_t P(X = t)P(Y = y \mid X = t). \quad (1)$$

The left side of the formula notes the probability of a given combination of observations on the variables (y) included in the model. X stands for latent variable, which comprises a number of latent classes (t) (see also Goodman 1974). Latent class models attempt to identify the minimum number of latent classes, or t, to account for the variations in data.

I also explore three extensions of LCA (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; see also Knight and Brinton 2018). First, in constructing latent class variables with the seven survey questions on policy opinions, I consider local dependence between the survey responses (Vermunt and Magidson 2002). Standard latent class models assume that all of the indicator variables for latent class variables are independent from each other, but this assumption in many cases is not satisfied, which results in under-

fitting of the model. Local dependence is usually confirmed by observing bivariate residuals between indicators after the model's initial fitting. Specifying these relationships in the model improves the fit in many cases. Second, I include a number of individual-level demographic characteristics as covariates, which do not intervene in construction of latent classes but do contribute to the assignment of individual cases into the classes. Scholars use covariates in LCA much like independent variables in regression models, to assess how individual-level background characteristics map onto latent classes. Third, in observing distribution of latent classes across racial and ethnic groups, I use the improved three-step approach developed by Jeroen Vermunt (2010). A simple observation of distributions often ignores classification errors embedded in the individual assignment of classes, and therefore produces biased results. The three-step method takes a probabilistic approach to latent class allocation and thereby produces a more accurate distribution across categories. I use Latent Gold 5.1 for all analyses (for a detailed mathematical exposition of latent class models, see Drouhot and Garip 2021, this issue).

RESULTS

No single, absolute criterion has been established to determine the number of classes for a given latent class model. Many scholars, though, adopt Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), along with other parameters and substantive meaning of the model, as their guideline. Unlike other parameters, BIC considers both model fit and number of variables to examine whether an additional class actually provides more information or merely makes the results more difficult to interpret. In my analysis shown in table 2 and figure 2, BIC reaches the lowest point at five classes, and flattens out afterward, indicating that having more than five classes does not improve the quality of the information generated. I therefore choose a five-class model for my analysis.

After initial fitting of the model, I identified three pairs of indicators that had considerable bivariate residuals, which signaled that the pairs are far from independent of each other.

Table 2. Estimate of Fit for Latent Class Models

		LL	BIC (LL)	Npar	Chi-square	df	*p*-value	Classification Error
Model 1	1-Class	−20811.51	41736.2434	14	6489.5397	2172	3.0e−424	0
Model 2	2-Class	−19432.148	39098.8295	29	3730.8158	2157	1.30E−87	0.0456
Model 3	3-Class	−18825.928	38007.6986	44	2518.3749	2142	2.50E−08	0.1239
Model 4	4-Class	−18577.278	37631.7079	59	2021.0743	2127	0.95	0.15
Model 5	**5-Class**	**−18435.68**	**37469.822**	**74**	**1737.8784**	**2112**	**1**	**0.189**
Model 6	6-Class	−18394.068	37507.908	89	1654.6544	2097	1	0.2122

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).

Figure 2. BIC by Number of Classes

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).

As it turned out, these pairs were closely related in terms of their substance as well as statistical properties. The support for Affordable Care Act (Q1) usually appeared together with the support for free college tuition (Q2); those who opposed Syrian refugees (Q3) tended to support the Muslim travel ban (Q5); and respondents who supported limits on power plants (Q6) also thought the government should do more to help blacks (Q7). The model was revised to recognize the relationships of local dependence in these indicators.

Five Classes
Table 3 displays the profiles of five classes, along with the overall percentage of respondents slotted into each class (overall class size) and overall response rate for the questions (overall). The conditional probabilities for response categories should be considered alongside overall response rate. In other words, 0.55 for the Affordable Care Act support in class A indicates that those in this class are likely to support Affordable Care Act (0.55) less (0.05) than the overall average (0.60) of respondents across all classes, though the number in itself is high. However, 0.27 for the support of the Muslim travel ban in class A may be not be high in itself but relative to the overall support rate (0.18) is quite substantial. In fact, class A comes in as the most likely to support the Muslim travel ban, the policy that remains generally unpopular among Asian Americans.

Among the five classes, classes D and E lend themselves to relatively straightforward categorizations. Class E, the smallest in size (0.04),

Table 3. Class Profiles

	A	B	C	D	E	Overall
Overall class size	0.35	0.26	0.24	0.10	0.04	
Affordable Care Act						
Support	0.55	0.93	0.52	0.18	0.27	0.60
Oppose	0.35	0.05	0.20	0.74	0.00	0.26
Don't know	0.10	0.02	0.28	0.08	0.73	0.14
Free college tuition						
Support	0.70	0.89	0.60	0.17	0.16	0.78
Oppose	0.25	0.06	0.15	0.70	0.00	0.14
Don't know	0.04	0.05	0.25	0.10	0.84	0.07
Admitting Syrian refugees						
Support	0.39	0.98	0.21	0.03	0.00	0.51
Oppose	0.49	0.00	0.30	0.93	0.02	0.31
Don't know	0.10	0.02	0.49	0.05	0.98	0.19
Marijuana legalization						
Support	0.32	0.68	0.09	0.11	0.01	0.42
Oppose	0.68	0.27	0.71	0.83	0.07	0.49
Don't know	0.00	0.05	0.20	0.07	0.91	0.10
Muslim travel ban						
Support	0.27	0.12	0.20	0.16	0.00	0.18
Oppose	0.67	0.86	0.37	0.61	0.00	0.65
Don't know	0.06	0.02	0.42	0.23	1.00	0.16
Limits on power plants						
Support	0.85	0.92	0.68	0.35	0.03	0.71
Oppose	0.14	0.02	0.07	0.43	0.00	0.17
Don't know	0.01	0.06	0.25	0.22	0.97	0.12
Government should do more for blacks						
Support	0.80	0.64	0.72	0.22	0.06	0.76
Oppose	0.20	0.06	0.06	0.49	0.00	0.12
Don't know	0.00	0.30	0.22	0.29	0.94	0.12

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).

features very high likelihood of answering don't know for all seven questions, indicating that these are respondents who belong to Bourdieu's first layer of public opinion, in which they are unable—or unwilling—to express their opinion. On the other hand, compared with A, B, and C, those in class D express considerably less support for all of the policies being discussed. One may label this as conservative but that they support the Muslim travel ban less than the average (0.16 to 0.18) puts that assessment into question. Nevertheless, class D is the only one among the five classes whose opinions consistently leans conservative. More interesting are the differences between A, B, and C, all of which express strong support for at least some of the policies. Class B is easier to understand than others: they seem to follow the standard progressive line in all of the policies, supporting active government intervention on health care, education, climate change, and racial justice, welcoming immigrants, and even espousing cultural liberalism through marijuana legalization.

Table 4. Conditional Probabilities of Covariates

	A	B	C	D	E
Education					
Less than high school	−0.04	−0.14	0.15	−0.01	0.04
High school graduate	0.02	−0.06	0.03	0.01	0.01
College or above	0.00	0.04	−0.03	0.00	−0.01
Gender					
Men	0.02	0.04	−0.03	0.00	−0.02
Women	−0.01	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.01
Nativity					
Native born	−0.02	0.19	−0.13	−0.02	−0.02
Foreign born	0.01	−0.06	0.04	0.01	0.01
Party ID					
Democrat	0.01	0.06	−0.02	−0.03	−0.02
Republican	0.02	0.00	−0.02	0.03	−0.03
Independent	−0.03	−0.11	0.06	0.01	0.07

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).

The profiles of A and C are less straightforward to interpret, but A displays a unique feature: strongest support for the Muslim travel ban (0.27 relative to the average of 0.18). Moreover, their opposition to the admission of Syrian refugees comes in second only to class D (0.49 and 0.93, respectively). Considering their relative strong support for the Muslim travel ban, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of those in class A are thinking of Syrian refugees and Muslims along the same line, as unwanted Others who should not be admitted to the country. In regard to other policy opinions, they seem to be following the progressive line, other than that they oppose the legalization of marijuana. The respondents in class C express moderate opinions on many issues, having slightly higher rates of don't know than other classes except E. This pattern is most visible in the two immigration-related questions, on Syrian refugees and the Muslim travel ban, showing high probabilities of answering don't know to these questions.

Covariates

Table 4 displays conditional probabilities for covariates, standardized around the overall average. A positive value indicates that the class is more likely to overlap with the respective categorical variable. Higher education, as expected, is strongly correlated with having an opinion (not answering don't know), though women tend toward don't know more than men. Interestingly, classes A and C, who were more likely to oppose Syrian refugees and support the Muslim travel ban than others (except for D), are also more likely to be foreign born than native born, indicating that many of them are immigrants themselves. Party identification aligns with policy opinions: B aligns with Democrats and A and D lean Republican; C and E, which have a relatively high proportion of don't know, are more likely to overlap with independents.

Distribution Across Racial and Ethnic Categories

Table 5 displays distribution of classes by racial and ethnic groups, using the three-step approach. The numbers indicate the absolute percentages and the plus and minus numbers in parentheses represent standardized percentages around the overall class size. For instance, 0.48(+13) for class A indicates that 48 percent of Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islanders was allocated into class A, and this is larger (+13) than

Table 5. Classes by Racial and Ethnic Groups

	A	B	C	D	E
Class size	0.36	0.26	0.24	0.10	0.04
NHPI	0.48 (+13)	0.18 (−9)	0.17 (−12)	0.21 (+11)	0.01 (−3)
Indian	0.30 (−6)	0.40 (+16)	0.19 (−5)	0.06 (−4)	0.02 (−2)
Cambodian	0.48 (+12)	0.19 (−8)	0.19 (−5)	0.04 (−7)	0.11 (+7)
Chinese	0.39 (+4)	0.20 (−7)	0.22 (−2)	0.14 (+4)	0.04 (+1)
Filipino	0.37 (+2)	0.21 (−5)	0.20 (−4)	0.17 (+7)	0.04 (+0)
Hmong	0.33 (−2)	0.38 (+12)	0.22 (−2)	0.04 (−7)	0.03 (−1)
Japanese	0.31 (−4)	0.41 (+14)	0.15 (−9)	0.09 (−1)	0.03 (0)
Korean	0.43 (+7)	0.24 (−2)	0.28 (+4)	0.04 (−7)	0.02 (−2)
Vietnamese	0.26 (−1)	0.16 (−10)	0.48 (+25)	0.02 (−8)	0.07 (+3)

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).
Note: NHPI = Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander.

the average rate (0.36).[2] Therefore, a plus sign indicates that the group is relatively more likely to belong to the class, whereas minus indicates less. These results can be interpreted in various ways but the most important finding is that racial and ethnic groups are not monolithic entities with a unified opinion on policy issues. On the contrary, they are nested structures that encompass a diversity of opinions, represented by different classes (S. Kim 2019). In other words, as expected, policy opinions do not converge perfectly among Asian Americans, but at the same time do not diverge perfectly along ethnic divide either. There are dominant clusters in each group, but all five classes are present through most of the nine groups included in the analysis.

Table 6 summarizes the results, presented in a schematic fashion. Taking a step further from the specific features of each class, we are now able to witness the three axes of differentiation among five classes, each nested in one another. The first axis concerns those who have an opinion and those who do not (Bourdieu 1979), and puts class E against all other classes. Thus I name class E undecided, indicating that the absolute majority of them do not express their opinions on the issues being discussed. The second axis reveals the conventional liberal-conservative divide, between classes D and A, B, and C. Although class D features less-than-average support for the Muslim travel ban, I name the class conservative, noting their otherwise very consistent opposition against government interventions in many issues. The final axis differentiates class B from classes A and C along the lines of their opinions on, among other things, immigration—Syrian refugees and the Muslim travel ban, to be specific. Respondents in these three classes express considerable support for active government intervention in the realms of health care, education, climate change, and racial justice, but class A is relatively less enthusiastic about any form of Muslim immigration, and class C seems to maintain no strong opinion on the issue. On the contrary, individuals in class B express strong support for Muslim immigration. Hence I designate class B progressives; A immigration reservationists; and C immigration undecided. Whereas immigration undecided are reluctant to express a clear opposition to immigration, immigration reservationists come in second to conservatives in terms of their ambivalence to the Muslim immigration. I interpret their attitude as not necessarily opposed to immigration in general, but as having second thoughts about certain kinds of immigrants—Muslims, to be specific. Although it is not clear from the data whether this ambivalent attitude of immi-

2. The numbers in parentheses do not exactly add up with class size because the probabilities for class allocation were rounded up to the second digits.

Table 6. Simplified Profiles of Classes

	Immigration Realists	Progressives	Immigration Undecided	Conservatives	Undecided
Affordable Care Act	S	S	M	O	DK
Free tuition	S	S	M	O	DK
Syrian refugees	O	S	DK	O	DK
Marijuana	O	S	O	O	DK
Muslim travel ban	M	O	DK	M	DK
Limits power plants	S	S	S	O	DK
Government help blacks	S	S	S	O	DK
Education	Medium	High	Low	Medium	Low
Gender	Men	Men	Women	N/A	Women
Nativity	Foreign born	Native	Foreign born	Foreign born	Foreign born
Party ID	Mixed	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Independent
Major groups	Cambodian Korean	Indian Japanese Hmong	Vietnamese	NHPI Filipino Chinese	Cambodian
Secondary groups	Chinese Filipino	Korean Filipino	Korean		
Class size	36	26	24	10	4

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).

Note: S = support, O = oppose, M = moderate, DK = don't know. NHPI = Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander.

gration reservationists extends to other kinds of immigrants, it is fair to assume that their support for immigration is not as wholehearted as that of progressives. Also, given the intense anti-immigrant political agitation in contemporary politics, this ambivalent feeling could turn into a negative one.

The results from covariate analysis add another interesting dimension to these findings. As expected, foreign-born, less educated, and female respondents incline toward don't know responses more than their counterparts. Yet immigration reservationists are slightly more likely to be foreign born than native born, indicating that immigrants are espousing an ambivalent attitude toward Muslim immigrants, even more so than progressives, who are more likely to be native born. Cambodians and Koreans are major groups in this class, with the Chinese and Filipinos following.

In summary, results from the five-class latent class model show that Muslim immigration divides an otherwise very coherent coalition of active government supporters (immigration reservationists, progressives, and immigration undecided) and that foreign-born status, education level, and ethnicity provide additional points of divergence.

Additional Analysis: Logistic Regression Models

To further explore the divergence of opinion around the issues of Syrian refugees and the Muslim travel ban, I conducted additional analysis using two sets of logistic regression models, including the two questions as dependent variables and including a series of demographic variables as independent variables, respectively. Table 7 presents the simplified results.

The response categories for the question of Syrian refugees were reverse-coded (0 = support the admission; 1 = oppose the admission), so the positive coefficients represent negative opinions on immigrants in both questions. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *ref* indicates the reference category to which the coefficients of independent variable is compared. The most notable pattern concerns the age of respondents: older respondents are more likely to hold negative opinions on Muslim immigration. In addition, foreign-born re-

spondents are significantly more likely to oppose the admission of Syrian refugees, though this was not true for the Muslim ban. Ethnic differences are also notable, with some groups (Indian, Filipino, Hmong, Japanese, and Korean for Syrian refugees; Indian for the Muslim ban) significantly less likely to support anti-immigration policies.

Interestingly, Cambodians emerge as having the strongest support of the Muslim ban, showcasing the largest (1.001) coefficient among all the variables in the analysis. This hostility may be attributable to the homeland politics in the mainland Southeast Asia. The Chams, an ethnic minority group that traces its roots to the ancient kingdom of Champa, have lived in the region for centuries and maintained a distinctive religious identity through their Muslim faith (Trankell and Ovesen 2004; Scupin 1995). Although their numbers are small—0.2 and 1.6 percent of the overall population in Vietnam and Cambodia, respectively (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2009)—they have often been the target of prosecution by various regimes that governed this region. Most notably in Cambodia, the Chams were subjected to genocide under the Khmer Rouge regime. Although their social visibility dwindled after the fall of the dictatorship, recently the minority group emerged once again as the beneficiaries of Islamic internationalism as aid from the Arab world and Malaysia poured in to assist them in their religious practices and education (Bruckmayr 2006). Although it is not clear how these trends factor into the attitudes of Asian Americans from this region, it is reasonable to assume that the Muslim minority in the mainland Southeast Asia had been stigmatized in the past, and that the stigma still holds some effect among the diaspora in the United States, especially for first-generation immigrants above a certain age. The results presented in table 7 suggest this, but additional studies are needed to accurately assess the contours and origins of the anti-Muslim sentiments among Cambodians, or Asian Americans more generally.

Interestingly, the Hmong are significantly more likely to support the admission of Syrian refugees although many of them hail from the same geographical region as Cambodians. I

Table 7. Results from Logistic Regression Models

Variable	Opposing Syrian Refugees	Supporting Muslim Ban
Education (reference: less than high school)		
High school graduate	0.156	−0.385
	(0.272)	(0.289)
College or higher	−0.019	−0.322
	(0.269)	(0.265)
Age thirty-five or above (reference: < 35)	1.55*	0.638*
	(0.206)	(0.226)
Foreign born (reference: native born)	0.455*	0.369
	(0.209)	(0.272)
Christian (reference: non-Christian)	0.364	−0.280
	(0.272)	(0.216)
Female (reference: male)	0.133	0.135
	(0.176)	(0.172)
Party ID (reference: Democrats)		
Republican	0.120	0.035
	(0.222)	(0.199)
Independent	0.527*	−0.014
	(0.216)	(0.239)
Ethnicity (reference: NHPI)		
Indian	−0.884*	−1.072*
	(0.011)	(.410)
Cambodian	−0.011	1.001*
	(0.499)	(0.469)
Chinese	−0.443	0.095
	(0.376)	(0.388)
Filipino	−0.573*	−0.241
	(0.283)	(0.349)
Hmong	−0.785*	0.420
	(0.341)	(0.383)
Japanese	−1.260*	−0.367
	(0.307)	(0.369)
Korean	−0.933*	0.510
	(0.316)	(0.350)
Vietnamese	−0.522	0.708
	(0.312)	(0.402)
Constant	−1.462*	−1.457*
	(0.464)	(0.460)

Source: Author's tabulation based on data from the NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018).
Note: NHPI = Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander.
*p < .05

speculate that the lasting impact of refugee experiences in the Hmong community (see E. Lee 2015, chapter 15) may have contributed to this unique pattern, although further research, most likely based on interview data, is required to unpack the dynamic beneath this "refugee consciousness" across ethnoracial lines.[3]

3. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this point.

DISCUSSION: IMMIGRATION AS POTENTIAL FAULT LINE?

In the 1960s, the shared concern around war and racism led Japanese and Chinese children of immigrants to rally around Asian American identity. They envisioned a political force based on the panethnic category, which would transcend old rivalries between different immigrant groups. As William Wei (1993) narrates, however, this unity did not last long. For instance, in New York City, older, more educated Japanese Americans soon discovered that their concerns were quite different from those of their younger Chinese American comrades who grew up in Manhattan's Chinatown. Whereas Japanese Americans wanted to focus more on antiwar activism and follow the lines of Students for a Democratic Society, young Chinese Americans were inspired by the Panthers, and focused more on the community politics around Chinatown. In New York City and other places, internal disputes like these led many Asian American organizations to dissolve in the 1970s, leading to the decline of active mobilization around the category. In other words, while the shared opinions on war and racism led to the emergence of a panethnic identity, the differences based on generation, class, and ethnicity led to differences in policy opinions, eventually resulting in the decline of activism centered on the Asian American category.

The arc of history around the Asian American movement dramatically demonstrates that categories can be made, unmade, and remade over time as political mobilization around shared concerns waxes and wanes. The results presented in tables 6 and 7 suggest several potential fault lines, many of which form a cluster without completely overlapping with each other. The different experiences of immigration, captured through nativity and age, are correlated with different levels of education and, consequently, different social positions within American society (see Alba and Nee 2003; Drouhot and Garip 2021, this issue). On one side are first-generation, older immigrants with less experience of American institutions, including educational ones; on the other side are second- and third-generation, young Asian Americans, with extensive experience. This divide maps roughly—but not entirely—onto the ethnic divide, with the newcomers (Southeast Asians) on the one side and the more established immigrants and their children (East Asians and Indians) on the other. Finally, although many Asian Americans on both sides of this divide support active government interventions on the issues such as health care, education, climate change, and racial justice, they seem to diverge on the issue of immigration, or, more precisely, on the question of Muslim immigration.

Although we cannot be sure whether the concerns about Muslim immigration will extend to Mexican immigration or immigration more generally, it is certainly possible that a significant subsection of Asian Americans will either oppose or be indifferent to future immigrants, especially when those immigrants are actively framed by politicians and media as the symbolic Other posing a threat to the established social order. We can imagine a populist-type candidate appealing to less educated Korean and Cambodian first-generation immigrant men, campaigning for active government intervention on the economy while using Trump-like rhetoric to target some immigrant groups.

Implausible as it may sound, my analysis of the NAAS indicates multiple subgroups of Asian Americans under the overall, simplified understanding of them as devout Democrats. The results from other articles in this issue also point in this direction. Van Tran and Natasha Warikoo (2021) show different levels (and even directions) of support for immigration policies among Asian Americans of different backgrounds. Most notably, whereas later generations of Asian Americans strongly support the pathway for citizenship for undocumented immigrants, they seem to be less enthusiastic about work visas and family unification policies. A strong ethnic divide is also evident, although its exact configuration differs considerably from my analysis. Rujun Yang and Maria Charles (2021) also identify divergence of opinions among Asian Americans on issues of gender politics, such as abortion, LGBTQ rights, and transgender rights. Here again, experiences of immigration emerge as an important fault line along with the differences by ethnicity.

In other words, in many dimensions we are looking at the two distinctive subgroups of Asian Americans, who not only differ in their immigration experiences and socioeconomic standings but also diverge sharply in policy opinions. The stereotypical understandings of Asian Americans as model minority or ardent supporters of the Democratic party do not fully encompass these differences. Whereas second- and third-generation, young, highly educated Asian Americans of East Asian and Indian descent may fit this bill, older, first-generation immigrants of Southeast Asian origin hold very different opinions on many issues. If we hypothesize that the latter population may feel less comfortable expressing their opinions through surveys—as the high rate of don't know in my analysis suggests—the divide between the two groups may be more substantial than we infer from available data sources. The results presented here suggest that Muslim immigration may serve as a catalyst in exposing such divide.

To be clear, I do not dispute that a strong convergence toward progressive opinions on policy exists among Asian Americans, as shown in table 1. As Janelle Wong and Sono Shah (2021, this issue) point out, an overwhelming majority of Asian Americans support active government interventions in domains such as health care and education, and many support more humane and inclusive immigration policy as well as actions for environmental and racial justice. This finding demonstrates that as of now the image of Asian Americans as devout, unified supporters of the Democratic party holds true. My analysis, on the other hand, looks toward the future—the future in which more progressive and less progressive factions of Asian Americans may take their differences seriously, and, consequently, begin to doubt whether they really belong to a unified category. The possibility seems far-fetched, but the recent leftward drift of political consciousness, especially among nonwhites, may accelerate this process of remaking and unmaking of the panethnic category. The stigma of kung flu may be a contributing factor as well.

Recently, most visible political competition occurred not in swing states between the two major parties, but in Democratic strongholds such as New York City between liberals and radicals. Considering that a majority of Asian Americans live in coastal Democratic stronghold states, it is not entirely implausible that this contest between liberals and radicals will play out within Asian American communities, if it had not begun already. My analysis preempts possible topics of debate that may emerge in those contests. In any case, my analysis does not take the Asian American category as granted and explores the potential fault lines beneath its smooth surface. Regardless of whether one stands for or against panethnic mobilization around the Asian American identity, the underlying geography of the panethnic category will be useful in thinking about the future of Asian American politics.

This analysis was severely limited by the available NAAS questions on policy opinions, which only had seven items. If we regard the antipathy toward Muslim immigration as an expression of fear against the generalized Other, we can expect the same patterns of opinion will emerge in other policy areas, especially in ones concerning minorities, such as LGBTQ rights and affirmative action. In addition, the survey items analyzed in this study only concerned domestic issues, and we do not have much information on the opinions of Asian Americans regarding international issues. In the past century, Asian Americans were generally regarded as voters who cared deeply about international issues, such as the Vietnam War, the China-Taiwan relationship, and the India-Pakistan conflict, to mention a few (Wong et al. 2011). In light of the sea change in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration, what is the state of opinion among Asian Americans on international issues? How are they reacting to the trade war with China? How about the protest in Hong Kong and the talks with North Korea? What do they think about the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Future studies can examine how these questions map onto the fault lines described in these results.

Last, the NAAS pre-election survey was administered in 2016, and the analysis featured in this article was mostly conducted during the fall of 2019. As we are all painfully aware, the COVID-19 pandemic brought significant changes in how Asian Americans are perceived

in American society. To say their presence was questioned would be an understatement: in the manner reminiscent of the Chinese exclusion era, Asian Americans were stigmatized as a "disease" plaguing the body politic, both literally and figuratively. They were exposed to physical assault and political demonization, and ensuing immigration restrictions separated their families and jeopardized their careers. This article does not speak to this turn of events, at least directly. It is certainly possible that, after experiencing these attacks, Asian Americans would become even more progressive, especially on issues relating to immigration. Conversely, it is also possible that non-Chinese groups would attempt to distance themselves from the Chinese, further leading to dissolution of a coherent panethnic identity and political mobilization based on it. Future data collection efforts should pay attention to these possibilities.

CONCLUSION: NEW POLITICS FOR ASIAN AMERICANS?

Just fifty years ago, Asian American was a term uttered only on college campuses by activists, most likely San Francisco State University and University of California, Berkeley. In San Francisco's Chinatown and Japantown, only a few miles away from these campuses, many immigrants and their children went on about their businesses, seeing themselves as Chinese and Japanese, respectively, and not much as American, let alone Asian American. The social movement based on shared concerns around the Vietnam War and domestic racism changed the situation. A new group emerged with a new identity and voice, and they were recognized by the government and became a part of common sense knowledge for the generation who came afterwards. Although active mobilization based on the identity has dwindled somewhat relative to its heyday, we live in the age where Asian American is a clearly defined, commonsensical term.

At the same time, however, the category is broad and masks internal divisions. As noted earlier, twenty-four ethnic groups are included in the Asian American category, each with its own distinctive culture and immigration history. Today, it is not clear who and how many

among these newcomers identify strongly as Asian American; most likely they understand what Asian American means and would not deny that they belong to the category, but not too many of them would imbue it with cultural meanings, let alone political implications. An analysis of the 2016 post-election NAAS data revealed that different ethnic groups have different opinions on what Asian Americans share as a panethnic group. For instance, whereas 79 percent of Hmong respondents answered that Asian Americans have a common economic interest, slightly more than 50 percent of Korean and Japanese respondents had the same opinion. The answers also diverge in terms of having a common culture and political interest; and, most interestingly, opinion differs on whether Asian Americans are of a common race (Ramakrishnan et al. 2016).

In light of these findings, this analysis demonstrates two interesting patterns: first, convergence of opinion is remarkable on issues such as health care, education, climate change, and racial justice, a majority of Asian Americans supporting active government intervention on these issues; second, the divergence around the issue of Muslim immigration, which maps onto differences in immigration experience and ethnicity, is less notable but still important. Whereas popular imagination, such as embodied in *Crazy Rich Asians*, presents the caricature of Asian Americans as young, educated, second or third generation of East Asian origin, this analysis shows that other caricatures are equally possible, most notably of old, less educated, first-generation immigrants of Southeast Asian origin. Although these two groups have much in common in terms of policy opinions, they diverge on some issues, including Muslim immigration, undocumented immigration (Tran and Warikoo 2021, this issue), and gender politics (Yang and Charles 2021, this issue). If a new politics around Asian American identity arises, it will focus on these social divisions, which will function as a catalyst igniting different forms of mobilizations based on different identities.

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PART II

Political Commonality and Heterogeneity: Policy Support and Civic Participation

Convergence Across Difference: Understanding the Political Ties That Bind with the 2016 National Asian American Survey

JANELLE WONG AND SONO SHAH

Increased diversity has accompanied dramatic demographic growth of the Asian American population in recent years. If the common characteristic of Asian Americans is a diversity of origins, languages, resources, and cultural traits, what holds this group together, particularly in the political sphere? The model minority stereotype suggests that Asian Americans might converge around education policies. That most Asian Americans are foreign born and the tenacious power of attendant "forever foreigner" tropes suggest that immigration issues might be the basis for a shared political agenda. Analysis of the 2016 National Asian American Survey, however, shows surprising political consensus within the Asian American population outside the policy realms of education and immigration. In other policy issues, particularly those involving the government's role, important points of convergence among these groups on certain public policies are clear. Political differences within the Asian American community are between those who are progressive and those who are even more so.

Keywords: Asian American, politics, political agenda, diversity

The Asian American population is the fastest growing racial group in the United States. Whereas Latinos increased 14 percent from 2010 to 2016, Asian Americans increased 21 percent (AAAJ-LA 2017). Perhaps not surprisingly, increased diversity within the Asian American population has accompanied this dramatic demographic growth. For example, East Asians, dominant for much of Asian American history in the country, are now a decreasing proportion (Wang and Ramakrishnan 2017). As the Asian American community has increased in numbers, it has become more internally diverse not only in terms of national origin, but also along other dimensions, including immigrant generation, socioeconomic status, region, and religion. In fact, Min Zhou, Anthony Ocampo, and J. V. Gatewood claim that "diversity is the hallmark of the Asian American community" (2016, 123). If the characteristic that Asian Americans share is a diversity of origins, languages, resources and other traits, what holds

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the members of this heterogeneous group together, particularly in the political sphere? This question drives the analysis that follows. To what extent, we ask, do Asian Americans have a common political agenda?

The answer to this question is critical. The goal of this article is to better understand the political cohesion of Asian Americans. If Asian Americans are indeed a cohesive political group with distinct policy preferences, then their political empowerment is best achieved through an ethnic politics model grounded in group identity and coethnic representation. In this case, Asian Americans would be expected to unite toward common political goals. If they are not a coherent political group but instead diverge a great deal in terms of political attitudes, then working together under a panethnic Asian American label makes little sense (Nakanishi and Lai 2002; Okamoto 2014).

Because of the different dimensions of diversity among Asian Americans, they are a particularly appropriate group for studying the associations between race and intragroup cohesion and divergence (Lien 2001; Junn and Masuoka 2008). However, because all groups show considerable internal diversity, the approach taken here to uncover the parameters of a group-based political agenda is instructive for those studying race and politics more generally. About 10 percent of Black Americans are foreign born and differences within the Black population are stark in terms of generation and average income. Among Latinos, internal divisions are evident in national origin, generation, region, and religion. About 25 percent identify as Protestant and a little more than 50 percent as Catholic, for example. White Americans, too, vary in terms of wealth, region, and religion. Taking a close look at Asian Americans' internal diversity may therefore be useful for approaching other diversity and political formations.

ASIAN AMERICAN DIVERSITY

Across almost any demographic dimension, real differences in the Asian American community are apparent (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Wong et al. 2011). National origin is the most commonly cited source of diversity. In their book *Asian American Politics,* Andrew Aoki and Okiyoshi Takeda ask, "Can Chinese Americans and South Asian Americans find enough mutual interests . . . ? Can a fourth-generation Japanese American legislator effectively represent the interests of Southeast Asian refugees?" (2008, 98). Every major textbook on Asian Americans testifies to national-origin diversity as a central feature of contemporary Asian America (see Kitano and Daniels 2000; Zhou and Gatewood 2000; Vo and Bonus 2002; Fong 2002; Min 2006). One claims that "national origins evoke drastic differences in homeland cultures, such as languages, religions, foodways, and customs; histories of international relations, contexts of emigration; reception in the host society; and adaptation patterns" (Zhou and Gatewood 2000, 19). Indeed, disaggregating Asian Americans by national origin instantly reveals major differences in migration history, socioeconomic resources, settlement patterns, population size, religion, and even skin tone. Since the 1990s, for example, Indian applicants have been granted more visas designated for high-skilled immigrants to the United States than any other national-origin group (Zong and Batalova 2017). Indians have the highest average education among all Americans. Most Asian Indians in the United States are foreign born. Most Japanese Americans, by contrast, are not foreign born and many trace their roots in the United States to recruitment as farm laborers in the late 1800s to the 1920s. The distinct migration histories of the two groups is apparent. At the same time, both groups' histories are marked by discrimination based on race. The height of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, as is well known, occurred during World War II, when more than one hundred thousand Japanese, including U.S. citizens, were forcibly interned. Indian Americans have faced intense discrimination as the result of the so-called war on terror since 2001. In the recent past, Indian Americans have been the target of racially and religiously motivated hate crimes based on skin tone and presumed religious background. The latter is largely a function of pervasive Islamophobia (see Chaudhary et al. 2020; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Iyer 2017), although the majority of Indians in the United States identify as Hindu (and some express strong forms of religious nationalist at-

titudes, see Mishra 2016). Similar to Sunmin Kim (2021, this issue), our research assesses the degree to which Indians and Japanese, as well as other Asian national-origin groups, demonstrate shared political orientations and policy attitudes.

Whereas immigrants from East Asia, including China, Japan, and Korea, dominated the immigration stream at the turn from the nineteenth century and following the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, today most Asian Americans are not of East Asian origin. Recent data from the U.S. Census show that fully three-fifths of the Asian American community are of South or Southeast Asian origin (Wang and Ramakrishnan 2017). Not only are Asian Americans distinct in terms of national origin, regional formations within the Asian American community are also important (Mishra 2016).

The importance of attending to national- and regional-origin differences among Asian Americans, especially in the political and policy arenas, is underscored by long-standing campaigns to ensure that, rather than assume that all who fall under the Asian American label have similar characteristics, state and federal agencies disaggregate statistics on Asian Americans (see iCount 2015; Teranishi, Nguyen, and Alcantar 2015). Jennifer Lee, Karthick Ramakrishnan, and Janelle Wong assert that "the accuracy of counting Asian Americans—including detailed counting by national origin—is a civil rights issue; it is essential to the equitable allocation of federal, state, and local funding for America's fastest growing, most diverse group" (2018, 201).

Although national origin is certainly a primary axis of distinction within Asian America, other critical areas of diversity also merit attention. For instance, age and immigrant generation might drive political differences. In terms of age, Asian Americans tend to be younger than White Americans and older than Black and Latino Americans (Gao 2016). More than 30 percent of the Asian American population are younger than twenty-four. About half fall between twenty-five and fifty, and the remainder are older than fifty. Some variation in political attitudes across age within the Asian American population is only to be expected. In particular,

like the general U.S. population, more conservative attitudes are typical among older cohorts (Maniam and Smith 2017).

Immigrant generation is a particularly interesting intracommunity distinction. Nearly 40 percent of Asian Americans were born in the United States (Pew Research Center 2013a). Of the U.S. born, most are the second-generation children of immigrants (Pew Research Center 2013b). Of course, those who are U.S. born are more likely to be English dominant, to attend school in the United States, and to be younger than the foreign born. These differences may lead to political differences as well. The past two decades have seen increasing scholarly attention to generational differences within the Asian American population, studies focusing on adaptation to U.S. life, socioeconomic mobility, and the development of racial identity (see Zhou and Xiong 2005; Park and Myers 2010; Lee and Zhou 2014; Zhou and Lee 2017). Intergenerational conflict is a major theme in the literature on Asian Americans (see Chung 2001; Lee and Liu 2001). Does generational conflict translate into conflict over a political agenda in the United States as well?

Profound differences in socioeconomic status characterize the Asian American population and might be expected to map onto political interests, as well. Not only do economic and educational differences correspond with national origin—within the various Asian national-origin groups we see economic polarization. Arthur Sakamoto and Yu Xie report, for instance, that "foreign born Chinese and Koreans have relatively high poverty rates . . . despite having higher than average wages than whites. . . . These results reveal a general pattern of socioeconomic polarization among Asian Americans" (2006, 74). A 2019 survey shows that though Southeast Asian and Pacific Islander groups are most likely to experience economic hardship, because of their sizable proportions in the Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) populations, the bulk of the AAPI working poor is made up of Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians (AAPI Data and PRRI 2019). A 2019 report notes that Asian Americans are overrepresented relative to their numbers in the population in occupations making less than $20,000 per year full time as well as occu-

Figure 1. Across Three 2016 Surveys, Chinese Americans Are More Opposed to Affirmative Action

Source: Wong, Lee, and Tran 2018.

pations making more than $100,000 per year full time (APALA 2019; see also Hassan and Carlsen 2018). To the extent that we see class differences in Asian America, the analysis explores the ways socioeconomic status drives political attitudes within the group.

Asian Americans are far from a homogeneous group in terms of national origin, age, nativity-generation, or socioeconomic status. But the degree to which these internal divisions translate into differences in political attitudes and orientations remains an open question. Do Asian Americans, a group marked by crosscutting demographic cleavages and distinct settlement histories, constitute a meaningful political category with shared policy views?

POCKETS OF DISUNITY AGAINST A BACKDROP OF CONSOLIDATION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The model minority stereotype suggests that Asian Americans might converge around education policies. That most Asian Americans were born outside the United States leads to assumptions that Asian Americans might converge around immigration issues. In fact, though, education and immigration do not ap-

pear to be consensus issues. Affirmative action, the most prominent educational policy paired with Asian Americans in national discourse, is far from a consensus issue. In 2018, the national media zeroed in on opposing viewpoints on this issue within the Asian American community, describing how a lawsuit that sought to eliminate race-conscious admissions at Harvard was "exposing a chasm among members of the demographic" (Camera 2018). This divide over affirmative action pits those who believe that Asian Americans are disadvantaged by policies that take race into consideration against those who see race-conscious policies as a fundamental aspect of the broader civil rights agenda (Poon and Segoshi 2018). Over the past decade, a new wave of political activism among Chinese American groups points to the role that national-origin-specific experiences play in shaping policy attitudes among Asian Americans. For example, the most visible opposition to race-based affirmative action policies in college admissions have been led by Chinese Americans, and immigrant members of this group, in particular (Eligon 2018). Analysis of attitudes related to affirmative action show that although most Asian Americans

support affirmative action (Wong, Lee, and Tran 2018), Chinese American opposition has grown dramatically relative to other groups (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018). Today, Chinese Americans are the only group that demonstrate consistent and visible opposition to this policy (figure 1).

But on other education issues, too, such as whether the "federal government should enact major new spending that would help undergraduates pay tuition at public colleges without needing loans," differences are apparent in support by national origin, from more than 70 percent who strongly agree among Bangladeshi, Hmong, Vietnamese, and Pakistani registered voters to less than 50 percent who strongly agree among Chinese (40 percent), Japanese (44 percent), and Koreans (44 percent) (Ramakrishnan et al. 2016). At the same time, national origin is only one window into understanding Asian American attitudes toward affirmative action. OiYan Poon and Janelle Wong (2019), for example, report that Chinese Americans age eighteen to twenty-four (who are also more likely to be second-generation immigrants) are much more open to race-based affirmative action in admissions than Chinese Americans thirty-five or older. That is, age is as important for understanding divisions over affirmative action as national origin.

We observe similar divides in Asian America over immigration policy. One might assume that because they are a majority immigrant community that has directly benefited from current U.S. immigration policies, Asian Americans would be particularly strong supporters of increasing family-based and employment-based visas or demonstrate distinct views when it comes to immigration policies. However, Asian American views on legal migration pathways are very similar to those of other Americans (Shah and Wong 2019; Carter and Wong 2020; Tran and Warikoo 2021, this issue). A strong majority of Americans support allowing undocumented immigrants already in the country to be allowed to stay and eventually become citizens. Asian American public opinion, in the aggregate, is quite consistent with and not especially distinct from these trends (Ramakrishnan et al. 2016).

When it comes to policies related to undocumented immigrants, national-origin differences are evident (Shah and Wong 2019). For example, data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey show that although a plurality of all Asian American groups support the creation of a path to citizenship ("Undocumented or illegal immigrants should be allowed to have an opportunity to eventually become U.S. citizens"), this policy elicits some important variations across national-origin groups. For instance, Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese respondents are less likely to support such a path than Hmong, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Filipino respondents (figure 2). Fully one in five Chinese respondents claim to not have a position on this policy, the highest of any of the national-origin groups queried. Even though Chinese are the second-largest group of undocumented immigrants within the Asian American population, Chinese respondents were among the least supportive groups in terms of support of policies that would provide driver's licenses regardless of immigration status (Ramakrishnan and Shah 2017). Although the number of Korean immigrants without documents is estimated at around two hundred thousand, this group, too, is less supportive of providing driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants other than Asian American groups (for a discussion on partisanship and education as strong predictors of immigration-related attitudes within distinct Asian American groups, see Arora, Sadhwani, and Shah 2021, this issue).

Even with intense attention devoted to the issue of race-conscious college admissions by the mainstream and social media and a notable drop in support for the policy among the largest Asian American group, Chinese Americans, conflict within the community over affirmative action and other issues is playing out against dramatic consolidation of Asian Americans around Democratic candidates over the past two decades (Ramakrishnan 2016). The overall trend is described clearly in the *New York Times*: "In 1992, the year national exit polls started reporting Asian American sentiment, the group leaned Republican, supporting George Bush over Bill Clinton 55 percent to 31 percent. But by 2012, that had reversed. Asian-Americans

Figure 2. Asian American Support for Progressive Immigration Policy

Share Somewhat or Strongly Agree

Source: Shah and Wong 2019, figure 1.

overwhelmingly supported President Obama over Mitt Romney—3 percent to 26 percent, almost the same margin by which Hispanics favored Mr. Obama. A Pew Research Center report released last month showed that Asian-Americans have since 2008 embraced the Democratic Party at a faster rate than any other ethnic group" (Peters 2016).

In 2016, estimates of the Asian American vote for Hillary Clinton ranged from 65 to 69 percent (CNN 2016; Ramakrishnan et al. 2016). Surveys show that Asian Americans are much more likely to identify as Democrat than Republican, though a large proportion also do not identify with either party (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Masuoka et al. 2018). More recent data suggest that the proportion of nonpartisans within the Asian American community is shrinking, with attendant gains favoring the Democrats (Lee 2018).

We argue that to understand Asian American politics today, we need to look beyond the issues of immigration and education, including affirmative action. On other policy issues, it becomes clear that despite differences in national origin, age, immigrant generation, and socioeconomic status within the Asian American community, points of convergence on a key set of public policies are clear.

DATA

We use data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey pre- and post-election surveys (2016 NAAS-Pre and 2016 NAAS-Post) to explore Asian American political attitudes and to take a closer look at how within-group differences translate into support for a specific range of policy attitudes. The 2016 NAAS-Pre includes 2,238 Asian American and 305 Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander adult interviews conducted by telephone from August 10 to September 29, 2016. The study relied on listed samples using registered voter and commercial vendor samples and classified for ethnicity by name, listed race where applicable, and tract-level ethnic concentration. The sample includes nonregistered people, as well as those who were randomly drawn from the registered voter list. We surveyed nine U.S. Asian and Pacific national origin groups in total, starting with the six largest U.S. Asian ethnic groups. These six largest groups alone account for more than 80 percent of the Asian American adult population. In this report, we analyze data from the following nine groups: Asian Indian (274), Cambodian (59), Chinese (281), Filipino (201), Hmong (151), Korean (286), Japanese (147), Vietnamese (295), and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (291). Interviews were conducted in English as well

as in ten other languages—Mandarin, Cantonese, Tagalog, Hindi, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Hmong, and Cambodian—and on both landlines (72 percent) and mobile phones (28 percent).[1]

The 2016 NAAS-Post includes 4,393 telephone (landline and mobile) interviews of Asian American adults conducted between November 10, 2016, and March 2, 2017. The same sampling process described, relying on both registered voter and commercial vendor lists (including nonregistered people), was used. The 2016 NAAS-Post study included ten national origins: Chinese (475), Asian Indian (504), Filipino (505), Korean (499), Vietnamese (501), Japanese (517), Pakistani (320), Bangladeshi (320), Hmong (351), and Cambodian (401). All data, pre- and post-, were weighted by ethnicity and gender, age, state of residence, education, and nativity.[2]

The 2016 NAAS-Pre and NAAS-Post include national samples but are not national probability samples. This method produces a sample that looks similar to a probability sample on matched characteristics but may still differ in unknown ways on unmatched characteristics. A probability sample will not yield a study sample large enough to conduct within-group analysis given that Asian Americans are a hard-to-reach population making up less than 7 percent of the total U.S. population (Barreto et al. 2018).

For much of the analysis, we combine results for those who are both registered and nonregistered people. Registered voters made up about 75 percent of the Asian American and Pacific Islander pre-election samples and 88 percent of the post-election.[3] For analysis of partisanship and candidate vote choice, we focus on registered voters. Again, with the exceptions of partisanship and candidate vote choice, we include nonregistered people in the analysis. Although one does not need to be registered to vote to identify with a party or support a candidate, registration is directly related to both. One must affirmatively note their party identification in the process of registering to vote and one cannot vote for a candidate without registering. Attitudes about political issues, however, may develop apart from registration and we sought to include the broadest swath of the Asian American sample in this analysis (for more on the distinctions between registered and nonregistered respondents, see note 3).

POLITICAL CONVERGENCE AMONG ASIAN AMERICANS

A critical point of convergence among Asian Americans is vote choice. Despite much speculation about which demographic groups helped secure Donald Trump's victory in 2016, it appears Asian Americans demonstrated little enthusiasm for him. The 2016 NAAS-Pre showed that 17 percent of registered Asian Americans were planning to vote for Trump, and 72 per-

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1. Overall margin of error +/– 3.0 percent.

2. Overall margin of error for the 2016 NAAS-Post, which includes design effect: 2.5 percent landline (63 percent) and cell phones (37 percent).

3. Note that the NAAS sample includes more registered voters than the general Asian American population. About 54 percent of all Asian Americans were registered to vote during the survey period (KFF 2018). Registered Asian American voters are more likely to be native born, characterized by higher levels of educational attainment, and identify with a major party (rather than as nonpartisan) than nonregistered people. At the same time, the majority of foreign-born Asian Americans are registered to vote, and foreign-born Asian Americans make up majorities of our samples (similar to the general Asian American population). For example, in the pre-election sample, about 78 percent of the sample are foreign born. About 73 percent of Asian American adults are foreign born (Pew Research Center 2013a). Because registered voters are overrepresented in this analysis, they are also likely to be more educated and partisan than the general Asian American population. Thus, when it comes to issue attitudes, we speculate that the survey respondents may be more likely than the general Asian American population to have formed a clear opinion about the various issues presented to them. Because this article investigates whether Asian Americans converge or diverge on policy attitudes, the biases in this sample capture those who are more likely to express an opinion, so it is important to consider that the trends described here are developing over time.

Table 1. Distribution of Asian Americans by Party Affiliation

2016 NAAS-Pre	Democrat	Independent/No Party	Republican
All	46	25	29
Registered	50	19	30
Not registered	28	43	29

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Note: Numbers in percentages. Distribution based on 2016 NAAS pre-election survey, Independent = DK, ref, no party, "Do not think in terms of political parties"; leaners included with major party.

cent for Hillary Clinton. In the 2016 NAAS-Post, fielded after the election, support for Trump had ticked up a bit, to 25 percent, but a majority of Asian American voters (69 percent) still claimed to support Clinton. The 2016 NAAS-Post survey numbers are consistent with national exit polls, which showed strong support for Clinton (65 percent) over Trump (27 percent) among Asian Americans. It is important to keep in mind that the national exit polls do not offer the survey in Asian languages.

Support for Clinton over Trump is largely a function of partisanship. Table 1 shows that, as described, Asian Americans are most likely to identify as Democrat, especially those registered to vote. A relatively large proportion identify as Independent. Among the registered, this group numbers nearly one in five people. Among those who are not registered, this group is larger than either group that identifies with a major political party.

The political science literature suggests that the strong trend toward Democratic partisanship among Asian Americans over the past quarter-century is a function of geography (Bishop 2009), education (Pew Research Center 2018), and issue alignment (for a good discussion, see Carsey and Layman 2006) though the causal direction here is a matter of debate (see Margolis 2018; Mason 2018). The latter consideration, issues, is an important one for our analysis. We contend here that it is possible to identify the emergence of a policy agenda among Asian Americans by focusing on the following questions in the NAAS pre-election study:

1. Do you support or oppose the health-care law passed by Barack Obama and Congress in 2010?

2. Do you support or oppose banning people who are Muslim from entering the United States?

3. Do you support or oppose setting stricter emission limits on power plants in order to address climate change?

4. Do you support or oppose the government doing more to give Blacks equal rights with Whites?

Using the 2016 NAAS post-election study, we focus on the following question:

5. [Agree or Disagree] The federal government should increase income taxes on people making over a million dollars a year.

The 2016 NAAS pre- and post-election studies reveal that on these issues, the Asian American community as a whole leans more progressive than conservative. Figure 3, for example, shows that a strong majority of all Asian Americans support the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), stricter emissions limits on power plants to address climate change, and raising taxes on the rich. A majority of Asian Americans also oppose a Muslim ban. One factor that surveys do not capture that is likely to be quite important for attitudes in this area is how politicians and the media frame immigration from majority Muslim countries (S. Kim 2021, this issue).

Asian Americans may not agree on all issues, but support is strong for those policies that might be associated with the U.S. government's taking a strong role in providing social services and addressing major societal problems, such as climate change and the government's role in addressing racial equality (figure 3). However,

Figure 3. Toward an Asian American Policy Agenda: Five Issues

2016 NAAS Policy Agenda
All Respondents

Source: Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.

to understand the strength of this potential political agenda, we need to delve deeper into whether these policy positions hold across different and diverse segments of the Asian American community. The bulk of our analysis is descriptive. To further explore the degree to which party identification, socioeconomic status, nativity, age, national origin, and region are associated with distinct political attitudes, we use a multivariate model.

CONVERGENCE ACROSS DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDES

Internal diversity is one of the most often cited features of the Asian American community. Asian Americans do not have much in common when it comes to national origin, historical settlement patterns in the United States, language, religion, or even physical appearance. These differences are underscored by variations in who Americans as a whole, and Asian Americans themselves, classify as Asian (Lee and Ramakrishnan 2019). Given so little in common, one might wonder why we would expect political convergence among distinct segments of the Asian American population. The following data flip this script to some extent by showing that despite critical differences in national origin, generation, class, and even partisanship, Asian Americans demonstrate a surprising degree of political commonality. That is, on issues ranging from the environment to immigration to race, we ob-

serve astounding convergence among Asian Americans across party identification, socioeconomic status, nativity, age, and even national origin and region. We highlight five policy issues to illustrate this remarkable level of consensus within the extremely diverse Asian American population.

Taxing the Rich

A long-standing assumption in U.S. politics is that Asian Americans are conservative when it comes to U.S. tax policy. This assumption is based in part on the visibility of Asian American small business owners in ethnic niches, such as urban grocery stores and nail care (Kang 2003; Brettell 2005). However, data from the 2016 NAAS-Post suggests that progressive tax policies are a point of political convergence among Asian Americans. More than 75 percent of both Asian American Democrats and Republicans support increasing taxes on the rich to provide a tax cut for the middle class. In contrast, about 80 percent of Democrats more generally support taxing the rich versus fewer than 60 percent of Republicans in the general population (Casselman and Tankersley 2019). Perhaps even more striking, about 80 percent of those Asian Americans earning up to $125,000 per year support taxing the rich, regardless of their own income category. Even among the very highest-income earners, those making $250,000 or more, fully 70 percent favor taxing the rich.

Table 2. Asian American Consensus: Increase Taxes on Rich

Characteristic	Value	Agree	Disagree	DK/Ref	Neither
Partisanship	Democrat	84.4	10.0	2.6	3.0
	Republican	77.3	15.5	2.7	4.5
	Independent	70.6	13.4	6.9	9.0
Age	18 to 24	87.6	6.4	1.0	5.0
	25 to 34	77.1	14.5	1.7	6.6
	35 to 49	73.6	16.0	6.1	4.2
	50 to 64	76.8	12.1	5.1	6.0
	65+	78.7	11.3	4.8	5.2
Asian region	East Asian	79.3	11.7	2.3	6.7
	South Asian	81.6	11.8	2.8	3.9
	Southeast Asian	74.2	14.2	6.9	4.7
Asian region II	Chinese	78.5	11.9	1.8	7.8
	East Asian	80.5	11.4	3.0	5.1
	Indian	82.3	12.3	1.9	3.5
	South Asian	77.4	8.8	7.9	5.9
	Southeast Asian	73.5	16.5	5.3	4.7
	Vietnamese	75.6	9.9	9.9	4.7
Income	Up to $20,000	80.7	7.0	6.1	6.2
	$20,000 to $50,000	83.1	8.7	3.3	4.9
	$50,000 to $75,000	78.7	11.2	3.5	6.6
	$75,000 to $100,000	79.3	12.8	3.7	4.2
	$100,000 to $125,000	82.1	9.7	3.4	4.7
	$125,000 to $250,000	78.4	15.8	1.9	3.9
	$250,000 and over	71.9	22.1	1.6	4.4
	Don't know	67.1	17.5	7.6	7.8
	Refused	72.8	18.5	3.8	5.0
Nativity	Native born	82.0	13.3	1.3	3.5
	Foreign	77.1	12.4	4.7	5.8

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Note: Numbers in percentages.

Strong support for taxing the rich runs counter to assumptions that Asian Americans will resist government taxation because of high rates of small business ownership. It is true that Asian Americans make up about one-third of small business owners (Atilano and Wong 2018). It is also true that the vast majority (90 percent) do not own small businesses. Further, fewer than 15 percent of any Asian American national-origin group is self-employed. So, although Asian Americans, particularly immigrants, tend to be self-employed and own small businesses at higher rates than the general population, most do not fall into these economic categories.

Progressive tax policies are supported at nearly the same level regardless of region or nation of origin (tables 2–6). Indian Americans, who typically have the highest levels of family income, support taxing the rich (82 percent) at rates similar to Vietnamese (75 percent), who typically have relatively lower levels of economic resources. Few differences are apparent across regional origin (East Asian, South Asian, Southeast Asian).

Finally, although younger (between eighteen and twenty-four) and native-born Asian Americans tend to be slightly more progressive on tax policy than their older or foreign-born counterparts, more than two-thirds of the latter group support taxing the rich.

Table 3. Asian American Consensus: Affordable Care Act

Characteristic	Value	Support	Oppose	DK/Ref
Partisanship	Democrat	71.0	18.7	10.3
	Republican	52.3	34.6	13.1
	Independent	47.0	29.5	23.5
Age	18 to 24	77.8	14.2	8.0
	25 to 34	65.9	26.4	7.7
	35 to 49	59.2	26.3	14.6
	50 to 64	57.4	30.5	12.1
	65+	52.4	25.0	22.6
Asian region	East Asian	66.4	24.1	9.5
	South Asian	57.0	27.3	15.6
	Southeast Asian	58.7	25.4	15.9
Asian region II	Chinese	55.9	28.2	15.8
	Indian	66.4	24.1	9.5
	Other East Asian	58.7	25.9	15.3
	Other Southeast Asian	60.6	26.5	12.9
	Vietnamese	55.2	23.3	21.5
Income	Up to $20,000	61.9	14.8	23.4
	$20,000 to $50,000	59.4	21.6	19.1
	$50,000 to $75,000	56.2	31.7	12.2
	$75,000 to $100,000	60.5	27.6	11.9
	$100,000 to $125,000	61.5	31.3	7.2
	$125,000 to $250,000	59.6	34.4	6.0
	$250,000 and over	69.7	25.7	4.6
	Don't know	66.9	12.4	20.7
	Refused	51.2	36.0	12.7
Nativity	Native born	68.3	24.5	7.2
	Foreign	57.4	26.3	16.3

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Note: Numbers in percentages.

Table 4. Asian American Consensus: Stricter Emissions Standards

Characteristic	Value	Support	Oppose	DK/Ref
Partisanship	Democrat	78.3	13.0	8.7
	Republican	76.9	12.6	10.5
	Independent	67.8	7.7	24.5
Age	18 to 24	85.3	11.2	3.5
	25 to 34	83.6	8.8	7.6
	35 to 49	75.5	10.6	13.9
	50 to 64	75.0	13.7	11.4
	65+	68.1	11.3	20.6
Asian region	East Asian	80.3	8.0	11.7
	South Asian	76.8	12.6	10.6
	Southeast Asian	70.1	12.6	17.3
Asian region II	Chinese	75.2	14.6	10.2
	Indian	80.3	8.0	11.7
	Other East Asian	79.3	9.6	11.1
	Other Southeast Asian	66.1	15.6	18.3
	Vietnamese	77.8	6.9	15.3

Table 4. (*continued*)

Characteristic	Value	Support	Oppose	DK/Ref
Income	Up to $20,000	68.8	13.4	17.8
	$20,000 to $50,000	78.6	10.9	10.5
	$50,000 to $75,000	80.4	8.7	10.8
	$75,000 to $100,000	76.0	12.6	11.4
	$100,000 to $125,000	85.6	8.2	6.1
	$125,000 to $250,000	84.3	13.0	2.6
	$250,000 and over	83.7	7.2	9.1
	Don't know	63.4	6.4	30.2
	Refused	66.1	17.2	16.7
Nativity	Native born	81.0	9.9	9.2
	Foreign	73.8	12.0	14.2

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Note: Numbers in percentages.

Table 5. Asian American Consensus: Travel Ban

Characteristic	Value	Support	Oppose	DK/Ref
Partisanship	Democrat	18.9	66.1	15.0
	Republican	21.2	65.4	13.4
	Independent	17.2	49.9	32.8
Age	18 to 24	16.6	77.7	5.7
	25 to 34	14.1	79.9	6.0
	35 to 49	18.8	63.8	17.4
	50 to 64	19.4	61.4	19.2
	65+	22.3	46.2	31.5
Asian region	East Asian	10.6	79.5	9.9
	South Asian	22.4	59.1	18.5
	Southeast Asian	20.4	54.2	25.4
Asian region II	Chinese	21.2	58.1	20.6
	Indian	10.6	79.5	9.9
	Other East Asian	24.3	60.5	15.2
	Other Southeast Asian	16.7	62.1	21.2
	Vietnamese	27.7	39.0	33.3
Income	Up to $20,000	24.6	45.1	30.2
	$20,000 to $50,000	19.6	55.8	24.7
	$50,000 to $75,000	24.6	63.8	11.5
	$75,000 to $100,000	19.7	68.0	12.2
	$100,000 to $125,000	20.1	72.7	7.3
	$125,000 to $250,000	14.5	80.3	5.3
	$250,000 and over	9.2	87.1	3.7
	Don't know	14.4	58.1	27.5
	Refused	18.3	54.8	26.9
Nativity	Native born	14.7	77.6	7.7
	Foreign	20.3	57.7	22.0

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Note: Numbers in percentages.

Table 6. Asian American Consensus: Racial Equality for Blacks

Characteristic	Value	Support	Oppose	DK/Ref
Partisanship	Democrat	78.4	10.6	11.0
	Republican	74.3	17.2	8.5
	Independent	59.4	16.2	24.4
Age	18 to 24	87.1	7.9	5.0
	25 to 34	78.7	12.6	8.7
	35 to 49	71.7	11.1	17.2
	50 to 64	71.2	17.4	11.4
	65+	65.9	15.7	18.4
Asian region	East Asian	81.3	7.1	11.7
	South Asian	70.2	17.0	12.7
	Southeast Asian	69.8	14.3	15.9
Asian region II	Chinese	66.0	19.4	14.6
	Indian	81.3	7.1	11.7
	Other East Asian	76.7	13.3	9.9
	Other Southeast Asian	68.2	18.8	12.9
	Vietnamese	72.8	5.6	21.6
Income	Up to $20,000	68.4	14.1	17.5
	$20,000 to $50,000	75.4	13.5	11.1
	$50,000 to $75,000	80.5	10.3	9.2
	$75,000 to $100,000	74.1	12.9	12.9
	$100,000 to $125,000	78.4	15.3	6.3
	$125,000 to $250,000	69.3	24.3	6.4
	$250,000 and over	80.1	10.9	9.0
	Don't know	66.2	8.1	25.7
	Refused	66.3	14.0	19.6
Nativity	Native born	75.2	14.3	10.5
	Foreign	71.8	13.8	14.4

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Note: Numbers in percentages.

Climate Change

Asian American Republicans and Democrats are virtually indistinguishable when it comes to setting stricter emissions standards to address climate change, at rates above 75 percent. This kind of environmental protection policy thus cannot be considered a partisan issue within the Asian American community. Polarization along party lines is far less than among the U.S. population in general in this area. The Pew Research Center (2015) finds that just 50 percent of Republicans in the general public favored limits on emissions.

Support for environmental protection varies only slightly by age. Younger Asian Americans, similar to the general public, are more likely to support stricter emissions standards than older Asian Americans—85 percent of those eighteen to twenty-four favor such standards versus 75 percent of those age fifty to sixty-four and 68 percent of those sixty-five and older. In terms of national origin, Indians and those of East Asian origin, including the largest East Asian group, Chinese, are more likely to support emission restrictions than those of Southeast Asian origin. This may have to do with pressing environmental challenges faced in countries like China and India, such that awareness of environmental degradation remains acute among immigrants from those places.

Environmental protections are more heavily favored by Asian Americans in upper income brackets (about 85 percent of those earning a household income of $100,000 or more favor

restricting emissions, versus just under 70 percent of those earning less than $20,000). Still, most Asian Americans express strong support for stricter emissions standards.

Government-Sponsored Health Care

At first glance, partisan divides seem in evidence when we examine Asian American attitudes toward government-sponsored health care. Fully 71 percent of Democrats but only 52 percent of Republicans favored "the health care law passed by Barack Obama and Congress in 2010" in our 2016 study. These results, however, show a much narrower partisan divide than observed among Democrats and Republicans in the broader public. In November of 2016, just 7 percent of Republicans in the general population supported the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) (Norman 2017).

Partisanship also appears to be the only driver of (relatively moderate) differences in attitudes toward government-sponsored health care. A majority of Asian Americans, regardless of age category, region, national origin, household income, or nativity say that they support the health-care law passed by President Obama and Congress in 2010. In contrast, about 45 percent of all Americans expressed favorable opinions of the act during the same period our survey was in the field (KKF 2018).

Travel Ban

In 2015 while on the campaign trail, then Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump called for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States" (Johnson 2015). In March 2016, 45 percent of all Americans expressed support for a ban—32 percent of Democrats and 81 percent of Republicans (Moore 2016). Again, this is a policy area where Asian Americans demonstrate distinct attitudes from the general U.S. population and show more consensus. In our sample, collected a few months prior to the election, most oppose a ban. Again, evidence is limited that any particular segment of the Asian American population is driving attitudes around this issue. Both Democrats and Republicans, at about 65 percent, oppose a ban. Although opposition is weaker among nonpartisans, the lower number is primarily

because more among this group are unsure about their opinion on the issue (a relatively large proportion of nonpartisan respondents claimed that they did not know how to answer the question).

Some of the exceptions to the broad opposition among Asian Americans across party lines are notable. In terms of age, those under thirty-five express relatively more opposition (over 75 percent) relative to the very oldest (46 percent). Vietnamese are the only group for which the proportion opposing the ban is under 50 percent. Still, even though opposition is tempered, more oppose (39 percent) than support (28 percent) such restrictions. Similarly, only those at the lowest family income level, earning less than $20,000, show weaker levels of opposition to a travel ban. For all of these groups (the oldest Asian Americans, Vietnamese, and lower-income Asian Americans), rates of support for a travel ban are not particularly high. Instead, we see that these groups were more likely to express lack of understanding or less familiarity with the travel-ban issue, as indicated by relatively high rates of don't know in responses to the question. In other words, differences in public opinion on this issue between demographic categories does not necessarily imply lack of consensus, but variation in issue-related information.

Government Intervention

In the general U.S. public, Republicans and Democrats show little commonality on attitudes about racial inequality (Pew Research Center 2017). However, convergence among Asian Americans is remarkable on the question of "the government doing more to give blacks equal rights with whites." Specifically, 78 percent of Democrats and 74 percent of Republicans support this position. Majorities of each age group, each regional group, and each income group also support government intervention to support racial equality. Similarly, support among the U.S. and foreign born differs little. Although the trends move in directions we might expect, Democratic, younger, and U.S.-born Asian Americans expressing the strongest levels of support for progressive policies related to racial equality, convergence on this issue is striking.

Table 7. Asian Americans That Take Same Position on Policy Issues

Number of Issues	Frequency	Percent
0	195	7.00
1	328	11.77
2	698	25.04
3	918	32.94
4	648	23.25
Total	2,787	100.00

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Note: Issues include support for the Affordable Care Act, support for stricter emissions standards, support for government intervention to ensure Blacks have equal rights with Whites, and opposition to a travel ban on people from certain Muslim-majority countries. 0 indicates no progressive position on any of the above issues; 1 indicates progressive position on at least one of the above issues.

GOING DEEPER: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

We conducted additional multivariate analysis to better understand the ways in which different demographic characteristics might be tied to Asian American policy positions. Using the NAAS-Pre, we created a composite variable including support for the 2010 health-care law, stricter emissions, the government doing more to give Blacks equal rights with Whites, and opposition to a Muslim ban. If respondents took a politically progressive position on at least three of these measures, they were coded as 1. If they did not, they were coded as 0. Responses of "don't know" were coded as 0. We did not use the tax policy measure, because that was part of the NAAS-Post. More than 56 percent of Asian Americans adopted a progressive position on at least three of the policies (see table 7).[4] We use a standard logistic model, regressing the dichotomous composite policy variable described on the key independent variables identified in this article—national-regional origin, socioeconomic status (education and income), party identification, immigrant generation, and age.

In a model designed to show the associations between our composite policy measure and Asian national-regional origin (Chinese be-

ing the excluded category), socioeconomic status, partisanship, immigrant generation, and age, Indian Americans are the only national-origin group that appears to be distinct from Chinese Americans on support for the four policies included in the analysis (table 8). That is, although those who identify as Indian tend to be more supportive on these issues than those who identify as Chinese, those from other places (Vietnam, other East Asia, other Southeast Asia) do not, even when other covariates are taken into account.

Indian Americans exhibit more policy consensus (they are more likely to agree with at least three of the policies) than Chinese Americans, but, overall, national origin does not seem to be the critical determinant. Instead, these data indicate very little difference between groups, except that Indians are particularly progressive on at least three of the four policies (including support for the 2010 health-care law, stricter emissions, the government doing more to give Blacks equal rights with Whites, and opposition to a Muslim ban). That is, the coefficient associated with the variable indicating Indian identity is positive and statistically significant, but none of the other national-origin-related coefficients show the same association with the comparison cate-

4. Those who did not affirmatively express a progressive position (don't know) were coded as 0. This is a conservative approach to coding progressive policy positions among Asian Americans versus including those who claimed they don't know their position on the issues presented. Thus we can be more confident that we are capturing progressive positions with this coding choice.

Table 8. Multivariate Analysis (Logistic Regression), Support for Asian American Policy Agenda

Independent Variable	Odds Ratios (Standard Error)
Asian region	
Chinese	Reference category
Indian	1.821** (2.78)
Vietnamese	0.937 (–0.35)
Other East Asian	1.174 (0.91)
Other Southeast Asian	1.001 (0.01)
Education	
0. Less than high school	Reference category
1. High school graduate	0.823 (–1.24)
2. College or higher	0.992 (–0.05)
Income	
1. Up to $20,000	Reference category
2. $20,000 to $50,000	0.989 (–0.08)
3. $50,000 to $75,000	0.770 (–1.56)
4. $75,000 to $100,000	0.774 (–1.37)
5. $100,000 to $125,000	1.002 (0.01)
6. $125,000 to $250,000	0.818 (–0.97)
7. $250,000 and over	1.227 (0.81)
Partisanship	
Democrat	Reference category
Independent	0.369*** (–7.70)
Republican	0.576*** (–4.95)
Generation	
Generation = 1	Reference category
Generation = 2	1.151 (0.89)
Generation = 3	1.502* (2.11)
Age (continuous)	0.979*** (–6.50)
Observations	1,962

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2016.
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 = respondent shares at least three of four policy positions (health care, emissions standards, racial equality, travel ban), 0 = else. Exponentiated coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses. Imputing income for those missing income information (19.4 percent of sample) does not change substantive results.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

gory, Chinese (the largest Asian American group). Further, when we ran the model with Indian as the comparison category, the variables associated with the other national-origin and regional identities were positive and statistically significant.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans and those who do not identify with either of the two major parties to express progressive views on at least three of the policy issues included in the composite variable. An association is also evident between Democratic partisanship and shared policy views, all else equal. Interestingly, those who identify as nonpartisan or as having

no party are less likely to converge around these agenda issues than those who identify as Republican.

Although our multivariate model reveals differences between Indians and other Asian Americans and between Democrats and those who do not identify as Democrats, and more minor differences related to generational status (differences between the first and second generation are not statistically significant, but differences between the first and third generation are evident) in views toward the four policy issues, it is critical to keep in mind that majorities in all of these categories exhibit a progressive view on each. That is, our multivariate analysis identifies more fine-tuned distinctions in level of support among groups that, in the aggregate, express similar viewpoints on issues ranging from health care to the environment to government efforts to reduce racial inequality between Blacks and Whites. At the same time, the multivariate model includes a substantially reduced number of observations relative to the bivariate analyses (1,962 to 2,787). This reduction is due to missing data, particularly in regard to the income variable. Imputing income for those missing income information (19.4 percent of sample) does not change substantive results.

CONCLUSION

Our analysis shows that despite important distinctions among Asian Americans in terms of national origin, generation, socioeconomic status, and party identification, consensus on certain policy issues is remarkable. These issues include expanded government-sponsored health care, taxing the rich to give the middle class a tax break, federal environmental protections, opposition to religious exclusion (in the form of a ban against Muslims entering the country), and support for the federal government doing more to ensure equality between Blacks and Whites. Those Asian Americans who are younger and third generation are more progressive on these issues than those who are older and first generation, and Indians appear to be more progressive than other Asian Americans. However, our bivariate and multivariate analyses point to a surprising degree of politi-

cal convergence within the Asian American population.

This is not to say that Asian Americans are more politically cohesive than other groups, such as African Americans or Latinxs. We suspect that they are not as cohesive. But because diversity has been called the hallmark of the Asian American community, it is conspicuous that our research suggests that demographic, national- and regional-origin, and even partisan differences do not necessarily translate into deep political divisions. In fact, majorities of all Asian Americans tend to take a more progressive position on these issues. The political differences we observe are between those who are progressive on each of the policies and those who are even more progressive. Given the heterogeneity that characterizes the Asian American population, this is an important finding.

This issue convergence tracks a dramatic shift over the past two decades in terms of presidential vote choice among Asian Americans. As Karthick Ramakrishnan (2016) notes, in 1992, Democrat Bill Clinton won less than 35 percent of the Asian American vote. By 2012, Democrat Barack Obama garnered more than 70 percent and won majorities of every Asian American national-origin group. The findings presented here help account for the astounding alignment with the Democrats among Asian Americans voters over time. Asian American voters support the core elements of the Democratic agenda—they support big government and environment regulations. They are open to economic redistribution and exhibit a moderate-left stance on discrimination related to race and religion.

As made clear in our earlier discussion, areas of contentious politics within the Asian American community suggest the potential for a more reactionary stance going forward. Sunmin Kim's article in this issue makes this possibility quite clear (2021). The most visible areas have to do with education and immigration. Although Asian Americans are more likely to support than oppose race-conscious admissions policies, support for affirmative action in higher education varies among Asian Americans with policy framing (Lee 2017) and na-

tional origin. Chinese Americans in particular tend to be much less supportive of affirmative action than other Asian Americans, who have long supported the policy (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018). Resistance to specific policies designed to increase diversity and access to education is visible and acute among Asian Americans. It is directed toward efforts to expand admissions to specialized high schools and gifted and talented programs based on geography or other factors that do not rely on taking students' racial identities into account (see Baker 2019; C. Kim 2018). This conservative activism, associated mainly with Chinese Americans, has been both national and local. *Washington Post* reporter Bill Turque covered the resistance of Chinese American immigrants to proposals to create "sanctuary" jurisdictions in Maryland for undocumented immigrants (local agreements to protect undocumented immigrants by limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities). He describes the position of some Asian Americans in that state:

> As state and local lawmakers in Maryland consider proposals to protect undocumented immigrants by limiting cooperation with federal authorities, some of the most persistent and passionate voices in opposition have been Chinese American. . . . Leaders of the movement say President Trump's aggressive immigration agenda has resonated with at least a segment of the roughly 60,000 Chinese Americans in the Maryland suburbs. They depict undocumented immigrants as a source of increased crime—a claim not supported by local or national data—and a financial drain on schools. The prospect of enhanced protection for those here illegally seems to offend this particular group of immigrants at a core level. (Turque 2017)

Underscoring political divisions within the community, Turque describes this opposition to undocumented immigrants as "at odds with the mainstream of Asian American civil rights groups and elected leaders, who generally support 'sanctuary' communities and a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants" (2017). Asian American opposition to sanctuary

jurisdictions highlights the importance of national versus local political activism. Asian Americans have not mounted a national anti-immigrant or anti-undocumented-immigrant campaign. They have moderate to progressive attitudes on federal immigration policies. However, protests in Maryland and in particular counties in that state suggest a willingness on the part of some members of the community to take a more conservative stand in their own localities and may portend the power of NIMBY-ism (Not in My Back Yard) at the grassroots level.

These conflicts over affirmative action and certain immigration policies among Asian Americans are taking place against a backdrop of consensus, however. That consensus, described in this article, revolves around shared Asian American attitudes about the fundamental role of government in American life in terms of providing services like health care, the government stepping in to reduce racial inequality (in principle), and protecting the environment. Many of those Asian Americans vociferously condemning race-conscious admissions policies and protesting sanctuary for undocumented immigrants are not right-wing White supremacists, but instead staunch supporters of the Democratic Party and its core commitments related to health care, the environment, and economic redistribution. This dynamic aligns with research by Howard Schuman and his colleagues that finds that Americans express a strong consensus for the principles of equality, but support for policies designed to achieve equality erodes as they get more specific (Schuman et al. 1997). That is, consensus is considerable on general policies among Asian Americans in regard to racial equality and other issues, but may weaken as more details on those policies are provided or with perceived personal or local impact. They are the drivers behind a new kind of racial conservatism in the United States that is powerful but, as this research shows, possibly limited by a progressive consensus on a set of core issues.

The extent to which Asian Americans are willing to act on their policy preferences seems to vary a great deal by issue area. Asian American opponents of affirmative action have joined

conservative legal activist Edward Blum in a national campaign to dismantle race-conscious admissions (Eligon 2018). Their activism is grassroots and shows no sign of diminishing. Although certainly Asian American organizations and Asian American leaders are working on health-care reform, environmental protections, economic justice, and racial justice issues, these issues have not mobilized the same degree of widespread, consistent activism that has accompanied legal and legislative fights over affirmative action. Despite broad consensus on health care, the environment, and economic redistribution, the salience of these issues does not match that of affirmative action. At the same time, the consensus around these issues goes a long way toward explaining why Asian Americans have moved so dramatically over the past two decades toward Democratic candidates.

We acknowledge that diversity within the Asian American community extends beyond the demographic and partisan divides described here. For example, the Asian American community is among the most religiously diverse in the nation (Pew Research Center 2013a). Previous work has explored these religious divides in depth (Pew Research Center 2012; Wong 2018).

In conclusion, the Asian American political agenda is anchored by an expansive view about the role of the federal government in U.S. life (especially in terms of health and the environment) and moderate views when it comes to income redistribution and the need to address discrimination against religious minorities (Muslims) and Black Americans. Consensus around these issues is widespread and suggests areas where an ethnic politics model and pan-ethnic organizing are most likely. At the same time, this set of issues taps into general principles, not ethnic-specific concerns, and so it seems unlikely that these general viewpoints will translate into a more a passionate and active political movement that is distinctly Asian American.

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Unpacking Identity: Opportunities and Constraints for Cross-Racial Collaboration

MANEESH ARORA, SARA SADHWANI, AND SONO SHAH

We argue that two factors are important for cross-racial coalition building: policy convergence in key issue arenas and perceived interest alignment with other racial groups. Drawing on the 2016 National Asian American Survey, we examine two of the most salient issues Asian Americans consistently rate as among the most important: immigration and economic policy. Using principal component analysis, we plot mean scores by group to analyze national-origin clustering along these two dimensions. Next, we analyze national-origin differences in perceived interest alignment with Blacks and Latinos. Combining these two factors, we identify clusters of groups that have a strong potential for cross-racial coalition building and that face greater constraints. In sum, we propose a theoretical framework for understanding cross-racial coalition building that includes disaggregating Asian Americans by national origin, and then identify which national-origin groups have the greater opportunity to form such coalitions.

Keywords: Asian American, policy preferences, national origin, coalition building

Demographic change is a distinguishing feature of the United States today. The shifting composition of racial and ethnic groups, driven largely by immigration, has led to speculation about the future of ethnic coalitions and race relations. Developing multiracial coalitions can be a powerful way to bring about meaningful, lasting change. In the mid- to late 1990s, multiracial coalitions were credited with increasing voting rights, mitigating the harmful effects of segregation, and improving conomic opportunities for people of color (Richeson 2015). More recent examples inlcude opposing police brutality and supporting the Black Lives Matter movement (Arora, Stout, and Kretschmer 2020). As Jennifer Richeson (2015) succinctly puts it, "it is when groups come together that real change becomes possible."

Although a significant number of studies have considered the prospects for coalition building between African Americans and Latinos (Jones-Correa 2011; Kaufman 2003; Mc-

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Clain et al. 2006; Morin, Sanchez, and Barreto 2011; Jones-Correa, Wallace, and Zepeda-Milan 2016), the potential role of Asian Americans in a rainbow coalition is less developed. The opportunity for bringing Asian Americans into cross-racial coalitions was highlighted by the 2016 presidential election. Although Asian American voters have exhibited a persistent pattern of nonpartisanship (Le and Ong 2018), studies found that most joined the majority of African Americans and Latinos in supporting Democrat Hillary Clinton (Masuoka et al. 2018), some exit polls finding Asian American support at 77 percent, outpacing even Latino support for Clinton.[1] In this study, rather than emphasizing partisanship or candidate vote selection, which prior scholarship has shown to be a fluid and complex construct in immigrant communities (Hajnal and Lee 2011), we instead focus on attitudes toward specific policies and the extent to which groups perceive their interests as being aligned. We argue that commonalities in policy positions and perceptions of interest alignment represent opportunities for the development of cross-racial collaboration and coalition building.

To assert that Asian Americans are not a monolith has been a major aim of the social scientific literature (Tam 1995). Recent scholarship finds that even now, among most Americans, the default view of Asian American is East Asians who are recent immigrants (Lee and Ramakrishnan 2020). Yet many studies that consider variations in political behavior across racial groups do so by comparing African Americans and Latinos with Asian Americans as an aggregated, panethnic group (see, for example, Fraga 2016; Schildkraut 2013; Phoenix and Arora 2018). Failure to disaggregate and examine Asian Americans by their national-origin subgroup may mask important distinctions. Although panethnic identity is an essential component of the Asian American experience, that identity is not derived exclusively from a national-origin identity (Okamoto 2014). The study of Asian Americans by national-origin subgroup therefore remains prudent. Rather than asking whether opportunities exist for

panethnic Asian Americans to form coalitions with African Americans and Latinos, we attempt to be more precise in our examination. We instead ask which Asian national-origin subgroups have the greatest potential for coalition building with Blacks and Latinos based on commonality of policy positions and perceived interest alignment.

We theorize that examining Asian American subgroups based on national origin and immigrant generation will identify clusters that have more liberal policy preferences and other clusters with more conservative policy leanings, which add additional dimensions to our understanding of Asian American public opinion and signal potential opportunities and constraints for cross-racial collaboration. As discussed in other articles in this issue, most prominently in Janelle Wong and Sono Shah's article, national origin and generation are two of the many meaningful cleavages in the AAPI community. We therefore also examine factors such as socioeconomic status, party identification, and experiences with discrimination in our regression analysis.

Using principal component analyses (PCA) to develop issue dimensions from survey responses from the 2016 National Asian American Survey, we calculate factor scores along two broad dimensions: economic policy and immigration policy. To unpack the panethnic Asian American identity, we identify meaningful differences between Asian American national-origin subgroups. For example, we find that Pakistani, Hmong, and Bangladeshi Americans hold consistently liberal positions on key policy dimensions, and that Korean, Japanese, and Chinese Americans are more conservative. Second, we examine the extent to which members of different subgroups perceive their interests as being aligned with other racial or ethnic groups. Our findings indicate that Asian American national-origin subgroups that are most similar to Blacks and Latinos on the economic and immigration policy dimensions are also the most likely to view their interests as being aligned. We contend that these groups have the greatest opportunity for collaboration and co-

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1. For examples of polling figures, see CNN, "Exit Polls," 2018, https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/exit-polls (accessed November 2, 2020).

alition partnership with Blacks and Latinos on issues of economic justice and immigration reform. Meanwhile, Asian American national-origin subgroups that are dissimilar on economic and immigration policy dimensions and low in perceived interest alignment have greater constraints in building cross-racial coalitions in these particular policy arenas.

COMMONALITY, PERCEPTION, AND COLLABORATION

Many factors, including organizational infrastructure and mass public opinion, play a role in collective action and the development of coalitions. Indeed, scholars have long recognized the importance of organizations in collective action (Tilly 1978) and the development of cross-racial coalitions (Okamoto, Feldman, and Gast 2013). In interviews with leaders of Asian American community-based organizations in San Francisco, Dina Okamoto, Valerie Feldman, and Melanie Gast (2013) find that funding incentives and organizational survival help encourage cross-racial efforts between Asian American communities and other racial groups. Scholars have also emphasized the importance of leadership dynamics and the development of meaningful relationship and trust between communities and organizations (Oliver and Grant 1995; Saito and Park 2000).

Research that considers the role of mass public opinion in collaboration and coalitions, though, is far less developed. Shared ideology, interests, and opinions have all been found to be important precursors to the formation of cross-racial collaboration (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; Staggenborg 2010). To form an effective coalition, communities need shared interests, goals, or common threats to rally around.

In recent years, the number of race-based attacks has risen dramatically, from anti-immigrant policies to high-profile police killings to rhetorical attacks from elites. Resistance movements to these attacks have shown potential for cross-racial coalition building, most notably with Asian American and Latinx communities rallying with African Americans to support the Black Lives Matter movement (Mosley 2020). Given the level of racial upheaval and race-based attacks that communities have

felt in recent years, the potential for cross-racial coalition building continues to grow. As such, we take as our task identifying places of policy convergence between minority groups. We theorize that shared interests and a perception of commonality are the antecedents to greater cooperation and collaboration.

Paula McClain (1993) theorizes three potential pathways for relationships between minority groups. First, groups can have interests that are independent of one another, such as Indian Americans who are concerned with the creation of Hindu temples in the United States (Mazumdar and Mazumdar 2006) or the movement to secure citizenship and redress for Filipino veterans who supported the United States during World War II (Raimundo 2010). Second, a zero-sum scenario in which groups hold competing interests is a possibility for interracial relations. Examples of competing interests resulting in conflict between Asian Americans and other racial groups are numerous. For example, Chinese and Mexican American communities opposed a desegregation lawsuit filed by the NAACP in the 1970s because they viewed the lawsuit as clashing with their interest in bilingual education (Brilliant 2010). The history of conflict between Korean American and Black communities in Los Angeles and other urban areas is well documented (Kim 2003). More recent conflicts have taken place between Chinese American and other Asian American organizations and Black organizations over affirmative action (Kim 2018). Yet these conflicts can obscure major national-origin and generational cleavages among Asian Americans. Indeed, almost three-quarters of non–Chinese Asian Americans support affirmative action policies (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018) and support is particularly high among second-generation and later Asian Americans (Lee and Tran 2019).

A third scenario, however, is possible, in which minorities may attempt to cooperate and reap benefits from joint political action if they conclude that they share common interests. In his study of race relations in Los Angeles, Raphael Sonenshein (1993) argues that the primary basis for political coalitions between racial groups was ideological and that although shared interests may not be enough for inter-

group cooperation, they were a necessary component. Indeed, Bindi Shah (2008) argues that the potential for cross-racial coalitions is "based on political commitments and shared interests" (464). These conceptualizations of interracial or interethnic collaboration are grounded in a more basic "issue engagement theory," which contends that substantive policy concerns can play an essential role in motivating political activity (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

In this vein, numerous studies have sought to identify commonalities between groups. The group consciousness literature, for example, argues that shared perceptions and experiences of discrimination can foster feelings of commonality and linked fate (Sanchez 2006). In their assessment of immigrant rights marches of 2006, Michael Jones-Correa, Sophia Wallace, and Chris Zepeda-Milan (2016) find that the reinforcement and politicization of in-group identities for Latinos lead to a sense of commonality and perception of interest alignment with African Americans. Similarly, Leland Saito (1998) finds that shared interests and similar histories of discrimination led Asian Americans and Latinos in the 1980s and 1990s in Los Angeles to form interracial coalitions around issues of redistricting and anti-immigrant legislation. Maneesh Arora and Christopher Stout (2019) find that exposure to positive messages about the Black Lives Matter movement predicted greater levels of support for the movement, and more positive views of African Americans among Asian American respondents. Thus, although interracial collaboration and coalition building involves on-the-ground community organizing and relationship building, we contend that shared interests and a perception of commonality are the antecedents to greater cooperation and collaboration.

This is especially true of policy arenas that matter deeply to a large proportion of each racial group. Economic and immigration policy are two issues that Asian American voters consistently rank among the most important national issues. A report of the 2018 election issued by APIAVote and APIA Data finds that 50

percent of Asian American voters reported jobs and the economy as extremely important to their vote decision and 36 percent said immigration was. Asian American voters, however, are relatively split in their view of which party has the advantage on these issues. Democrats hold a 14 point lead on immigration (a smaller gap than any other issue on which the party holds an advantage) and Republicans have a 6 point lead in jobs and the economy.

Asian American activism has a history around economic and immigration policy. In a review, Daryl Maeda (2016) shows that Asian American groups in communities around the country, working together and sometimes with other racial groups, organized around issues of labor, land, housing, social services, and employment. Indeed, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean, and Indian Americans had been participating in struggles for fairer wages and better working conditions long before the height of the Asian American movement in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, Asian Americans have participated in cross-racial collaborations against wage theft. A 2010 survey of nearly two thousand Latino, Black, Chinese, and Korean low-wage workers identified the shared interests and opinions of these affected communities (Milkman, Gonzales, and Narro 2010). In California, the report led to cross-racial organizing leading to the eventual passage of the Fair Days Pay Day (SB588) in California in 2015 (Kirkham 2015). Largely due to a long history of exclusionary immigration policies and the construction of the "forever foreigner" stereotype, immigration has long been an arena for activism among many Asian Americans (Aguirre and Lio 2008) and continues to be a flashpoint issue today.[2]

Moreover, both issue arenas can provide ample opportunity for cross-racial coalition building with Blacks and Latinos. Examples of Asian American groups working together with other racial groups on immigration issues (Saito 1998; Saito and Park 2000) and economic issues are also numerous (Saito and Park 2000; Kim and Lee 2001). Finally, both issue areas are likely to garner a great deal of focus in the 2020

Figure 1. Asian American Interest Alignment with Blacks and Latinos

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

election and beyond. Therefore, economic and immigration policies are not only two of the most important issues arenas for Asian American voters, but also ripe for cross-racial coalition building if policy preferences converge and these distinct groups perceive interest alignment.

EXAMINING ASIAN AMERICAN POLICY ATTITUDES AND PERCEIVED INTEREST ALIGNMENT

From 2000 to 2010, the Asian American population grew by 46 percent, and from 2010 to 2015 by 18 percent (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017). Further, a recent report of the 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) finds that the number of eligible Asian American voters has increased by more than one million in each of the last three election cycles. Not only are Asian Americans the fastest growing racial group in the United States, they are rapidly being integrated into the electorate. Moreover, engagement in the voting process, and interest in politics generally, has expanded in recent years. According to a report from AAPI Data, voter turnout among Asian Americans was 42 percent in 2018, up from 28 percent in 2014 (Ramakrishnan, Shah, and Shao 2019).

Asian Americans are an increasingly important part of the U.S. electorate, and a potentially key group in the so-called rainbow coalition. Indeed, Asian Americans have voted largely

Democratic in recent election cycles, similar to other minority groups like Blacks and Latinos (Masuoka et al. 2018; Ramakrishnan 2014). But less is known about how Asian Americans perceive their political interests relative to these other groups. In other words, less is known about whether interest alignment between Asian Americans and Blacks and Latinos expands beyond electoral choice. Karthick Ramakrishnan (2014) examines this question using the 2008 and 2012 NAAS. If looking only at the data on perceived interest alignment, he writes, we would conclude that "Asian American commitment to the Obama coalition is temporary and relatively shallow" (523). Although he goes on to argue that other factors suggest greater potential for cross-racial coalition building, it is telling that levels of perceived interest alignment were low enough to offer that conclusion. Yet our analysis of the 2016 NAAS suggests major changes in the last few years. Indeed, figure 1 demonstrates that the percentage of Asian Americans who perceive a lot or some in common with Latinos in 2016 is 13 percentage points higher than 2012 or 2008, and the percentage who perceive a lot or some in common with Blacks is 17 points higher. Thus, the potential for coalition building is higher given the higher rates of perceived interest alignment.

To further identify areas of commonality across racial groups, we examine attitudes to-

ward public policy issues to identify areas of cross-racial policy convergence. To date, the empirical analysis of Asian American public policy preferences is relatively underdeveloped in the scholarly literature. Following racial tensions in Los Angeles in the early 1990s, several studies examined Asian American policy attitudes to shed light on similarities and differences with African Americans, Latinos, and Whites (Bobo and Johnson 2000; Kim and Lee 2001). Capturing Asian American attitudes and opinions, however, is always problematic. Too often Asian Americans are excluded from national surveys that are not linguistically appropriate. The NAAS offers a unique opportunity to extensively examine the contours of Asian American public opinion on key policy issues by subgroups based on national origin and immigrant generation. The 2008 and 2012 surveys provided an essential opportunity for researchers to examine Asian American public policy preferences and disaggregate preferences based on national origin and nativity (Wong et al. 2011). Building on this work, we disaggregate Asian American policy preferences by national origin and nativity to systematically identify points of convergence between groups. We theorize that doing so will identify clusters of subgroups with more liberal policy preferences and others with more conservative leanings. Analysis of AAPI policy preferences have found substantial variation by national origin and acculturation (Wong et al. 2011), though this variation has not been analyzed systematically. Despite a relative lack of scholarship on AAPI policy preferences, that on Latinos, a similarly diverse panethnic group with a substantial proportion of foreign born, guides our theoretical expectations. Analysis of Latino policy preferences have found substantial variation by national origin (De La Garza et al. 1992), acculturation (Branton 2007), and group consciousness (Sanchez 2006; Sanchez and Vargas 2016). We therefore interrogate policy preferences based on national origin, immigrant generation, and party identification.

Finding these areas of policy convergence, combined with perceived interest alignment, provides two important benefits. First, it helps identify which Asian American communities have high potential for cross-racial coalition building. Which national-origin groups are the most natural allies for cross-racial coalitions? Do cleavages like nativity and party identification matter? Second, it helps identify policy arenas in which these Asian American groups are most likely to form coalitions and work cross-racially.

METHODOLOGY

We posit that potential for cross-racial coalition building consists of two major ingredients: policy convergence on key policy issues and perceived interest alignment. To measure policy preferences and interest alignment among the broader AAPI community, we turn to the 2016 National Asian American Survey. The 2016 NAAS is an ideal data source for four main reasons. First, it includes a variety of policy-related questions that allow us to calculate issue dimensions. Second, it includes a question asking Asian Americans how much they have in common with Blacks and Latinos in terms of government services, political power, and representation. Third, it includes a large, nationally representative sample of Asian American respondents, which allows us to investigate heterogeneity in policy preferences and perceived interest alignment based on national origin, nativity, gender, class, party identification, strength of group identity, and residence. Fourth, it includes nationally representative samples of Blacks and Latinos to allow for cross-racial and cross-ethnic comparisons.

We first used principal component analysis (PCA) to fit related survey questions into issue dimensions. PCA is a statistical technique that reduces multiple variables into specific dimensions by "creating new uncorrelated variables that successively maximize variance" (Jolliffe and Cadima 2016). The benefit of PCA is that it increases the interpretability of the data while minimizing information loss. Using the PCA results, we then calculated factor scores for two broad issue dimensions: economic policy and immigration policy. Scores are calculated such that higher scores correspond to the most liberal policy views and lower scores to the most conservative views. Many studies indicate that

issue dimensions, as opposed to single policy issues, provide a "meaningful framework for electoral choice" (Dalton 2019, 6; see also Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). For Asian Americans, economic and immigration views based on broad issue dimensions are likely more relevant to electoral preferences and political behavior than any specific economic or immigration issue.

We then plot mean scores of Asian American national-origin groups, Blacks, and Latinos on the two issue dimensions. This serves two purposes. First, we can examine variation in policy preferences among Asian American national-origin groups. Second, we can measure proximity of these groups' scores on the issue dimensions to the scores of Blacks and Latinos to determine the extent to which cross-racial policy convergence on economic and immigration policy exists.

The second ingredient in the recipe for cross-racial coalition building is perceived interest alignment, which we measure using the following question, "Thinking about government services, political power and representation, would you say [RACES] have a lot in common, some, little in common, or nothing at all in common with." Each group in the NAAS is asked about every other group. For example, Asian American respondents are asked the question about Blacks, Latinos, and Whites. We coded this variable with the highest score corresponding to perceiving "a lot in common" and the lowest to "nothing at all in common." We then plot mean commonality scores for Asian American national-origin groups to assess variation in perceived interest alignment with Blacks and Latinos among these groups.

Finally, we create cluster maps that plot Asian American national-origin groups mean scores on each issue dimension on the x-axis and their perceived interest alignment scores with Blacks and Latinos on the y-axis. We posit that national-origin groups whose issue dimension scores are similar to Blacks and Latinos, and have high perceived interest alignment scores, have the greatest opportunity for coalition building with these groups. Conversely, the national-origin groups whose issue dimension scores are dissimilar to Blacks and Latinos, and

who have low perceived interest alignment scores, likely face the most constraints (see appendix).

RESULTS

The first set of results compares mean factor scores on the two issue dimensions among all of the Asian American national-origin groups, Blacks, and Latinos. Figure 2 displays mean factor scores and standard errors for the economic policy dimension. The results show that Black Americans have the most liberal economic policy views and White Americans the most conservative. Variation is considerable in economic policy views among Asian American national-origin groups, ranging from Japanese Americans as most conservative to Pakistani Americans, who are most liberal. Pakistani Americans' economic policy views are more similar to those of Black Americans. Several other groups, notably Bangladeshi, Vietnamese, Hmong, and Indian Americans have views similar to those of Latinos, and are only somewhat more conservative than Blacks. In terms of policy convergence, these particular Asian American national-origin groups have the greatest opportunity for cross-racial coalition building with Blacks and Latinos on economic policy issues. Groups such as Japanese, Chinese, and Cambodian Americans face greater constraints.

Figure 3 displays mean factor scores and standard errors for the immigration policy dimension. On this scale, Latinos, on average, hold the most liberal policy views. Hmong, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi Americans are closest to Latinos and, at least in terms of policy convergence, make the most natural allies on immigration policy issues. Vietnamese, Korean, and Chinese Americans in particular appear to be most conservative on immigration policy, and the furthest from Latinos. The mean score for Blacks is closer to the sample mean and similar to mean scores for Filipino and Cambodian Americans.

The next set of results come from survey weighted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models in which we examine the relationship between nativity, party identification, education level, and income level on policy preferences among the ten largest Asian Amer-

Figure 2. Mean Economic Policy Dimension Scores

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

Figure 3. Mean Immigration Policy Scores

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

Table 1. Economic Policy Dimension Regression Results

	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong
Native born	−0.004	0.262	−0.119	0.116	−0.195
	(0.119)	(0.239)	(0.226)	(0.108)	(0.222)
Republican	−0.243*	0.008	−0.010	−0.344***	−0.227
	(0.139)	(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.132)	(0.172)
Independent	−0.517***	−0.174	0.023	−0.435***	0.175
	(0.188)	(0.210)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.172)
BA or higher	−0.020	−0.209	0.069	0.150	−0.433
	(0.123)	(0.300)	(0.128)	(0.106)	(0.263)
$75K and higher	0.214*	0.050	−0.334**	−0.016	−0.029
	(0.121)	(0.271)	(0.143)	(0.118)	(0.186)
Constant	0.434***	−0.095	−0.030	0.036	0.183
	(0.107)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.100)	(0.161)
N	234	358	339	415	298

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

Table 2. Economic Policy Dimension Regression Results

	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
Native born	−0.091	−0.076	0.361***	−0.096	−0.624***
	(0.131)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.168)	(0.157)
Republican	−0.454***	−0.831***	−0.287***	−0.075	−0.188
	(0.155)	(0.132)	(0.096)	(0.137)	(0.117)
Independent	−0.292**	−0.425***	−0.248	−0.147	−0.185
	(0.135)	(0.144)	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.115)
BA or higher	−0.085	0.201*	0.051	−0.343***	0.057
	(0.149)	(0.107)	(0.086)	(0.116)	(0.104)
$75K and higher	−0.437***	−0.363***	−0.237***	0.168	−0.383***
	(0.142)	(0.119)	(0.090)	(0.124)	(0.140)
Constant	0.682***	0.121	0.090	0.667***	0.546***
	(0.128)	(0.103)	(0.074)	(0.100)	(0.099)
N	394	419	460	246	449

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

ican national-origin groups.[3] The dependent variable in the models in tables 1 and 2 are the factor scores on the economic policy dimension. Several patterns are evident from the findings. First, identifying as a Republican predicts more conservative scores on the economic pol-icy dimension. Income has a somewhat mixed effect. For most groups (Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Americans), higher income predicts more conservative economic policy preferences. But for Bangladeshi Americans, higher income predicts more lib-

3. For unweighted results, see the online appendix (https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/7/2/93/tab-supplemental).

Table 3. Immigration Policy Regression Results

	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong
Native born	0.150	0.0002	0.217	0.217**	–0.009
	(0.157)	(0.180)	(0.137)	(0.106)	(0.209)
Republican	–0.036	–0.047	0.103	–0.363***	–0.490**
	(0.154)	(0.179)	(0.145)	(0.127)	(0.196)
Independent	–0.226	–0.218	0.045	–0.305**	–0.115
	(0.269)	(0.151)	(0.127)	(0.150)	(0.149)
BA or higher	–0.188	0.120	0.201*	–0.035	–0.593**
	(0.177)	(0.191)	(0.111)	(0.119)	(0.239)
$75K and higher	0.131	–0.083	–0.063	–0.124	–0.131
	(0.143)	(0.178)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.173)
Constant	0.370*	0.205	–0.319***	0.225*	0.623***
	(0.197)	(0.127)	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.135)
N	234	358	339	415	298

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

Table 4. Immigration Policy Regression Results

	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
Native born	0.499***	0.104	1.021***	0.411***	0.157
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.118)	(0.157)	(0.233)
Republican	–0.335**	–0.496***	–0.062	0.110	0.137
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.112)	(0.204)	(0.141)
Independent	–0.254	–0.202	0.159	–0.703**	0.038
	(0.188)	(0.139)	(0.188)	(0.295)	(0.151)
BA or higher	–0.591***	0.095	0.187	–0.071	0.352***
	(0.218)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.204)	(0.133)
$75K and higher	–0.166	0.142	0.153	0.069	0.389**
	(0.167)	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.168)	(0.193)
Constant	0.593***	–0.107	–0.847***	0.318	–0.890***
	(0.225)	(0.139)	(0.103)	(0.235)	(0.129)
N	394	419	460	246	449

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

eral views. The results for foreign born and education are also mixed. Foreign-born Korean Americans have more liberal views on economic policy and foreign-born Vietnamese Americans have more conservative views. Similarly, Japanese Americans with bachelor's degrees have more liberal views than their coethnic counterparts without bachelor's degrees, but the effect is reversed for Pakistani Americans. Indeed, Pakistani Americans have the most liberal views of any national-origin group

and this seems to be driven primarily by group members who do not have bachelor's degrees.

Tables 3 and 4 display regression results for each national-origin group for the immigration policy dimension. Here we see a similar pattern for party identification. Identifying as a Republican predicts more conservative immigration policy preferences among Filipino, Hmong, Indian, and Japanese Americans. Foreign-born Filipino, Indian, Korean, and Pakistani Americans are more liberal on immigration than

Figure 4. Perceived Interest Alignment with Blacks

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

their native-born coethnic counterparts. Education is mixed, with college degrees predicting more liberal views among Chinese and Vietnamese Americans but more conservative ones among Hmong and Indian Americans. Finally, higher income predicts more liberal views among Vietnamese Americans.

In sum, variation is substantial among Asian American national-origin groups on economic and immigration policy preferences. Some groups are clustered close to Blacks and Latinos in these policy arenas and others are more closely aligned with Whites. Findings from regression models help indicate which subgroups among each national-origin group are more liberal and which are more conservative on both policy dimensions. Again, variation is substantial, certain covariates, such as income and education, having differing effects. Findings from the regression models further clarify how opportunities and constraints for cross-racial coalition building play out among Asian American national-origin groups.

PERCEIVED INTEREST ALIGNMENT

The second major factor for cross-racial coalition building is perceived interest alignment. Figure 4 displays mean perceived interest alignment with Black Americans among the ten most populous Asian American national-origin groups. Higher scores indicate greater perceived interest alignment and lower scores the

opposite. Variation is substantial among the groups. In particular, we see that Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Hmong respondents perceive high interest alignment. Interestingly, Japanese, Chinese, and Cambodian respondents have the lowest levels of perceived interest alignment with Blacks.

Figure 5 displays mean perceived interest alignment with Latinos. There are striking similarities and differences between the two figures. Bangladeshi and Hmong Americans have among the highest perceived interest alignment with both groups while Cambodian, Chinese, and Japanese Americans have the lowest perceived interest alignment for both. But Pakistani Americans are more likely to perceive commonality with Blacks than Latinos.

Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 present results from OLS regression models that examine the relationship between nativity, party identification, education, and income on perceived interest alignment with Blacks (tables 5 and 6) and Latinos (tables 7 and 8). The clearest pattern we can glean is that native-born respondents tend to perceive greater commonality with both groups than their foreign-born coethnic counterparts. Higher levels of education predict higher perceptions of commonality with Blacks among Cambodian and Vietnamese Americans. Identifying as Independent predicts lower levels of commonality with Blacks among Filipino and Japanese Americans. Identifying as an Indepen-

Figure 5. Perceived Interest Alignment with Latinos

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

Table 5. Perceived Interest Alignment with Blacks

	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong
Native born	−0.074	0.118**	0.110	0.045	0.052
	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.032)	(0.072)
Republican	−0.075	0.060	0.079	−0.033	0.028
	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.040)	(0.062)
Independent	−0.057	−0.054	0.046	−0.115**	0.011
	(0.080)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.055)
BA or higher	−0.081	0.191***	0.056	0.015	0.071
	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.063)
$75K and higher	0.080	0.101*	−0.023	−0.018	−0.141*
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.075)
Constant	0.623***	0.279***	0.354***	0.553***	0.545***
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.037)	(0.045)
N	212	278	280	398	208

*Source:* Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

Table 6. Perceived Interest Alignment with Blacks

	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
Native born	0.045	0.161***	0.075**	0.038	0.011
	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.060)	(0.055)
Republican	0.009	−0.047	−0.006	−0.004	−0.056
	(0.062)	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.047)
Independent	−0.092	−0.091*	−0.012	−0.087	−0.056
	(0.082)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.044)
BA or higher	0.012	0.039	0.017	0.074	0.108***
	(0.091)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.066)	(0.038)

Table 6. (*continued*)

	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
$75K and higher	−0.064	−0.003	−0.020	0.038	0.029
	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.055)	(0.038)
Constant	0.553***	0.400***	0.514***	0.495***	0.534***
	(0.115)	(0.055)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.041)
N	377	397	427	229	397

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

Table 7. Perceived Interest Alignment with Latinos

	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong
Native born	0.011	0.004	0.090*	0.098***	−0.029
	(0.052)	(0.078)	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.072)
Republican	0.043	0.035	0.102*	0.012	−0.009
	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.080)
Independent	0.036	−0.067	0.057	0.039	0.129**
	(0.086)	(0.072)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.058)
BA or higher	0.017	0.214***	0.015	0.045	0.032
	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.078)
$75K and higher	0.068	0.087	0.045	0.022	−0.121
	(0.054)	(0.086)	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.084)
Constant	0.509***	0.335***	0.329***	0.430***	0.482***
	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.051)
N	213	280	280	389	234

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

Table 8. Perceived Interest Alignment with Latinos

	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
Native born	−0.030	0.100***	0.059*	0.037	−0.004
	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.076)	(0.069)
Republican	−0.008	−0.087**	0.004	−0.004	−0.025
	(0.070)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.061)	(0.050)
Independent	−0.150***	−0.128**	0.026	−0.022	−0.118**
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.087)	(0.052)
BA or higher	−0.001	0.016	0.032	0.077	0.049
	(0.063)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.069)	(0.051)
$75K and higher	−0.040	0.011	−0.034	0.144***	0.068
	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.055)	(0.059)
Constant	0.579***	0.410***	0.465***	0.365***	0.534***
	(0.079)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.065)	(0.043)
N	370	397	438	230	384

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).
***$p < .01$; **$p < .05$; *$p < .1$

Figure 6. Economic Policy by Interest Alignment with Blacks

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

dent has a similarly negative effect on perceptions of commonality with Latinos among Indian, Japanese, and Vietnamese Americans (though it has the opposite effect for Hmong Americans). Similar to previous regression results, the findings from tables 5 through 8 provide greater clarity for national-origin groups most likely to perceive cross-racial commonality.

Figure 6 is a cluster map of the relationship between scores on the economic policy dimension and commonality with Blacks. We display the results this way because Blacks hold the most liberal economic policy views. From it, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Americans clearly have similar economic policy preferences and high perceived interest alignment with Black Americans. These two ingredients, we posit, are most important for the development of coalitions. We therefore contend that these groups have a strong potential for coalition building. On the other end of the spectrum, Cambodian, Chinese, and Japanese Americans may face the most constraints because policy convergence is less and perceived interest alignment is lower.

Figure 7 is a similar cluster map of the relationship between scores on the immigration policy dimension and commonality with Latinos. As earlier, we include commonality with Latinos because they are most liberal on immigration policy. We contend that Hmong and

Bangladeshi Americans have strong potential for coalition building with Latinos because they have similar immigration policy preferences and high perceived interest alignment. Meanwhile, Chinese Americans have more conservative views on immigration policy and lower perceived interest alignment so may face greater constraints.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Jesse Jackson's rainbow coalition of the 1980s fostered a vision of a multiracial and multicultural America. Since that time, scholarship on the opportunities for and constraints on building cross-racial alliances has grown. This multifaceted body of work has provided significant insights on questions of commonality and perception and has largely emphasized collaboration between African Americans and Latinos. Rapid and ongoing demographic change, however, suggests that the Black-Brown paradigm will continue to evolve. For two decades, Asian Americans have been the fastest growing immigrant group in the country and are expected to be the largest immigrant group in the nation by 2055 (Pew Research Center 2015). But Asian Americans are not a monolith and must be studied and understood both as a panethnic group and in their national-origin subgroups.

We find that the disaggregation of Asian Americans leads to natural alliances on issues of economic and immigration policy. Pakistani

Figure 7. Immigration Policy by Interest Alignment with Latinos

Source: Authors' tabulation based on data from the 2016 NAAS (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

and Bangladeshi Americans appear to have the greatest opportunities for cross-racial collaboration with Blacks on economic policy whereas Hmong and Bangladeshi Americans do with Latinos on immigration policy given overlap in policy preferences and high perceived interest alignment. Specifically, Pakistani Americans without college degrees and Bangladeshi Americans who identify as Democrats are natural allies for Blacks on economic policy issues. Similarly, Bangladeshi Americans without college degrees and Hmong Americans who identify as Democrats are strongly aligned with Latinos on immigration policy. Thus we are able to identify clusters of Asian American subgroups closely aligned with other racial minority groups in two policy arenas that are consistently viewed as the most crucial among the Asian American community.

Although the disaggregation of Asian American national-origin groups allows for a rich information environment that includes many considerations for opportunities and constraints on cross-racial coalition building, it does not accommodate all potential considerations. For example, given limitations in data availability, we were unable to disaggregate Latinos by national origin. Future studies can examine coalition building with a more granular view of Latinos by similarly disaggregating Mexican, Salvadoran, Puerto Rican, or Cuban subgroups. Similarly, we acknowledge that coalition building efforts are typically contextual

and localized at the neighborhood level (Oliver and Wong 2003). Similarly, although policy convergence and perception of interest alignment are essential foundations for coalition building, peer-to-peer contact also strongly influences coalition outcomes. Geocoded data, not currently available, would allow a second stage of research to map not only convergence of attitudes by groups but to contextualize their physical location to one another and advance additional opportunities and constraints for collaboration. Nevertheless, in the era of social media organizing, understanding commonality between groups can still be consequential for cross-racial collaboration (Boulianne 2015).

In this study, we identify opportunities and constraints for Asian American participation in cross-racial coalition building efforts. In 2008 and 2012, Asian Americans voted in record numbers to support the United States' first Black president. Their vote participation was maintained and strengthened in 2016, a strong majority of Asian Americans joining African Americans and Latinos to support Hillary Clinton. Although vote choice and partisanship offer insights into the possibility of Asian American participation with Latinos and African Americans, our study takes the next step to examine convergence on key public policy areas and identifies potential pathways for Asian Americans to engage more fully in cross-racial coalition building in the future.

APPENDIX: ECONOMIC POLICY DIMENSION

Question Text: This set of items ask about the role of the U.S. federal government in the economy and your views on policies related to the economy and inequality. For each statement below, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.

The federal government should do more to reduce income differences between the richest and the poorest households.

The federal government should do more to regulate banks.

The federal government should raise the minimum wage to allow every working American a decent standard of living.

The federal government should increase income taxes on people making over a million dollars a year.

The federal government should enact major new spending that would help undergraduates pay tuition at public colleges without needing loans.

Immigration Policy Dimension: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. [PROBE: Would you say you strongly or somewhat?]

Undocumented or illegal immigrants should be allowed to have an opportunity to eventually become U.S. citizens.

Congress needs to increase the number of work visas it issues every year.

Congress needs to increase the number of family visas it issues every year.

States should provide driver's licenses to all residents, regardless of their immigration status.

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Educational Place, Simultaneity, and Civic Participation in Asian America

ALI R. CHAUDHARY AND QUAN D. MAI

Educational attainment is widely assumed to be positively correlated with civic participation in the United States. Yet Asian immigrants represent a civic paradox because they often report low rates of civic participation despite having relatively high educational attainment. This study investigates how educational place mediates civic participation among six Asian immigrant groups in the United States. We use the concept of simultaneity *to examine the extent to which foreign and domestic educational environments mediate Asian immigrant proclivities for civic participation. Using survey data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey pre-election survey, we find exposure to foreign educational place decreases civic participation for all Asian immigrants; and educational place mediates subgroup group-level proclivities for civic participation. We conclude by discussing the significance of educational contexts relative to collective transnational simultaneity.*

Keywords: Asian American, civic participation, education place, simultaneity, transnational

Existing scholarship on the political and civic participation of immigrants largely finds that educational attainment remains positively associated with voting and nonvoting types of civic participation such as volunteering or joining a charitable association (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Handy and Greenspan 2009). Yet nearly two decades of scholarship suggests that high levels of education may not be positively correlated with civic participation for Asian immigrants in the United States (Wong 2000; Wong et al. 2011; Lien 2004; Masuoka, Ramanathan, and Junn 2019). Accordingly, research finds that foreign educational attainment is negatively associated with civic participation among Asian immigrants in the United States (Lien 2004; Wong et al. 2011). We explore the apparent paradoxical relationship

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between educational attainment and civic participation by investigating how variation in exposure to foreign and domestic educational environments mediates civic participation among six contemporary Asian immigrant ethnonational communities in the United States.

Educational attainment is widely deployed as an additive measure of human capital in most research on political and civic participation (Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2018). However, research on immigrants as well as other segments of the U.S. population suggests that standard theories of civic participation should focus on the relative rather than the absolute value of educational attainment (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Campbell, Levinson, and Hess 2012). Concomitantly, research on the political incorporation of immigrants calls for a reconceptualization of conventional theories and models of citizenship and civic engagement (Bauböck 1994; Jones-Correa 2001; Wong et al. 2011; Ramakrishnan 2013; Bloemraad and Sheares 2017). We heed this call by deploying a "transnational optic" (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007) to investigate how exposure to foreign and domestic educational environments mediates civic participation across our six Asian ethnonational subgroups.

Deployment of a transnational optic requires analysts to consider how cross-border activities, transnational processes, binational linkages, and perceptions of simultaneity affect acculturation, socioeconomic integration, civic participation, collective action, and organizational capacities of immigrant communities (Faist 2016; Vertovec 2003; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Chaudhary 2020; Erdal 2020) We accomplish this by examining the extent to which exposure to different national educational environment (foreign or domestic) mediates intragroup variation in civic participation among Asian immigrants in the United States.

Because educational settings (schools) are considered primary sites for the political socialization of children and youth into patterns of partisanship, political attitudes, and civic participation (Campbell, Levinson, and Hess 2012; Torney-Purta 2002; Wong et al. 2011), variation in national educational environments may correspond to differences in the substance of political exposure (Wong 2000). We draw on Levitt and Schiller's (2004) notion of simultaneity to guide our inquiry and interpret our results. Simultaneity was originally conceptualized regarding the increasing embeddedness of immigrants in transnational social fields, cross-border networks, and the circulation of knowledge and ideas between those who emigrate and those who stay behind (Levitt and Schiller 2004). Indeed, research on immigrant cross-border politics suggests a small but significant minority of immigrants simultaneously engage in both domestic and homeland-oriented politics (Waldinger 2015; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Sørensen 2019). In other words, some immigrants experience and participate in a form of individual level "simultaneity" whereby their political actions are embedded and informed by their respective places of origin and settlement.

However, simultaneity may also reflect collective or group-based ways of being and belonging within transnationally embedded immigrant communities (Levitt and Schiller 2004). We posit that individual and collective perceptions of transnational simultaneity are cultivated through both the volume and frequency of cross-border activities (such as remittances, external voting, and the like), transnational institutional linkages, and individual as well as collective perceptions of belonging (Levitt and Schiller 2004). Accordingly, we focus here on the extent to which exposure to different national educational environments (foreign or domestic) accounts for the paradoxical relationship observed relative to Asian immigrants' high education and low civic participation in the United States.

Two questions guide our inquiry. First, to what extent does educational place operate as a mechanism to account for low rates of Asian immigrant civic participation? Second, does educational place mediate civic participation rates in the same way for each of our six Asian ethnonational subgroups? Using survey data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey pre-election survey (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017), we disaggregate the Asian American ethnoracial category into six immigrant ethnonational subgroups (Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Korean, Cambodian, and Vietnamese), and investigate the mediating effect of educational place on

Asian immigrant nonvoting civic participation. Findings reveal that foreign education is an important mechanism that accounts for variation in civic participation for all six subgroups, but the extent to which it matters varies across these subgroups. In explaining civic participation, foreign education mediates collective proclivities for civic participation more for Korean and Indian immigrants, and less for Chinese and Vietnamese respondents. We interpret foreign education as a critical mechanism and posit that exposure to variation in national educational environments may result in political exposure or socialization processes, which may depress Asian immigrants' civic participation. At the same time, findings also suggest that foreign "educational place" matters in different ways to different Asian ethnonational subgroups in explaining their civic participation rates.

This study along with the other contributions in this issue highlight the tremendous heterogeneity among Asian immigrants and the urgent need for data disaggregation with respect to existing empirical insights and discourses pertaining to Asian America (Lee and Ramakrishnan 2021). We advance this agenda by interrogating the apparent mismatch between Asian immigrants' high educational attainment and their low civic participation. In so doing, this article emphasizes the importance of the relative context of educational attainment and the need to deploy transnational optics when seeking to understand group-level disparities in civic participation.

EDUCATION AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN ASIAN AMERICA

Education attainment has long been theorized as a primary predictor for many forms of civic engagement including voting, voluntary behavior, and associational membership (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Putnam 2001; Campbell 2009). Indeed, research examining educational contexts and curricula in the United States suggests that schools and educational environments foster civic knowledge, skills, and political tolerance (Campbell 2008; Campbell, Levinson, and Hess 2012). Studies looking at the civic participation of immigrant and ethnoracial minorities find similar positive

correlations between educational attainment and electoral and non-electoral civic engagement (Jones-Correa 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005; Wong 2000). However, research on the political participation of Asian Americans suggests that high levels of education are not positively associated with civic participation in the United States.

In their nationally representative analyses of Asian American political participation during the 2008 U.S. presidential election, Janelle Wong and colleagues (2011) find that high levels of education among foreign-born Asians were paradoxically associated with lower rates of civic and political participation. This paradox is observed again in preliminary analyses of the 2016 election. Asian immigrants maintained higher than average levels of educational attainment and lower rates of civic participation relative to respondents with commensurate educational qualifications (Masuoka, Ramanathan, and Junn 2019; Ramakrishnan et al. 2016). These contrarian findings observed with regards to Asian immigrant civic participation lend support to past studies, which further challenge the assumptions surrounding the additive and linear association between education and civic participation (Campbell 2009; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).

EDUCATION PLACE AND SIMULTANEITY

Despite its ubiquity in social science research as a common statistical control, the mechanism and precise linkages between education and civic participation remain relegated to a proverbial "black box" (Campbell 2009). Efforts to interrogate how education informs civic and political participation suggest scholars should pay closer attention to the relative rather than the absolute effect of educational attainment (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Campbell, Levinson, and Hess 2012). This can be accomplished by factoring in how the effects of educational attainment on civic participation vary by age, place, and types of participation (Campbell 2009). Given that relative value of educational attainment appears to affect the civic participation behaviors of the general U.S. population (Campbell 2009), it is quite likely that exposure to different national educational en-

vironments may correspond to different sets of civic knowledge and by extension, proclivities for civic participation.

Using a transnational optic (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Chaudhary 2018, 2020; Erdal 2020), we analyze how educational place (foreign or domestic) informs disparate civic participation rates among six Asian immigrant ethnonational subgroups in the United States. We build on prior scholarship emphasizing the significance of national origins for understanding the political and civic behaviors of Asian Americans (Lien 2010; Wong et al. 2011). We also draw conceptually on Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller's (2004) notion of simultaneity as a collective way of being and belonging within and across immigrant communities. Throughout the world, such communities are increasingly defined by a collective understanding of simultaneity (Levitt and Schiller 2004; Levitt 2015; Boccagni, Lafleur, and Levitt 2016), whereby increased frequency and salience of transnational linkages, networks, and processes foster community-level perceptions and understanding of transnational collective simultaneity and binational embeddedness.

In contrast to research on the simultaneous cross-border political activities of individual migrants (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Waldinger 2015; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Sørensen 2019), we theorize simultaneity as a collective feature of immigrant communities that are directly or indirectly affected by historic and contemporary binational and cross-border linkages between places of origin and settlement. A collective or group-level interpretation of simultaneity accounts for how and why intersocietal processes can produce similar consequences for community members in both places of origin and places of settlement (Levitt and Schiller 2004). Such interstate and transnational linkages have been found to foster new iterations of citizenship (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017; Lafleur 2013), grassroots development and social change (Portes and Zhou 2012; Boccagni, Lafleur, and Levitt 2016), and access to legal protections. Conversely, the same binational and cross-border linkages can potentially constrain or impede immigrant civic and political actions (Chaudhary and Moss 2019; Chaudhary 2020). In rec-

ognizing that cross-border linkages and transnational contexts may not always correspond to opportunities, we consider the extent to which foreign and domestic educational place mediate collective propensities for civic participation among Asian immigrants in the United States.

DATA AND METHODS

Using data from the 2016 pre-election National Asian American Survey (NAAS), we explore the linkages between different racial-ethnonational groups, educational place, and civic participation (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017). The NAAS is a nationally representative survey that includes adults in the United States who identified any family background from Asian countries. Survey interviews were conducted by telephone from August to September 2016. Rather than relying on the commonly used voter supplement of the Current Population Survey or small internet-based surveys (such as the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey), we use the 2016 pre-election NAAS for three reasons. First, the NAAS data contain sufficient samples of several Asian ethnonational subgroups, including the six largest—Indian, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Vietnamese, and Cambodian. The data also include information on respondents associated with certain non-Asian racial categories (such as White, Black, and Latino/a), enabling us to examine interracial as well as intra-Asian differences in civic participation.

Second, the NAAS pre-election survey contains data on nonvoting civic participation. This information is essential for research on immigrant civic participation because, unlike voting, many other forms of participation do not require formal citizenship. Moreover, scholarship suggests nonvoting civic engagement may often be a better indicator of civic engagement because both citizens and noncitizens can participate (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008; Masuoka, Ramanathan, and Junn 2019).

Third, the NAAS pre-election survey contains information on whether respondents were educated in the United States or abroad. This enables us to use foreign education as a mediating factor for our analyses of civic participation. In sum, the 2016 NAAS is the most

Figure 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Depicting Construction of Dependent Variable

Model Fit Indices χ^2 = 79.88*** (14), RMSEA = .048, SRMR = .056, AGFI = .979, TLI = .976, CFI = .984

Source: Authors' tabulation.

comprehensive survey to date of the civic and political engagement of Asians in the United States and has many advantages over comparable data such as the Current Population Survey voter supplements (Ramakrishnan et al. 2016). We further restrict our sample by generation status and exclude all U.S.-born second- or third-generation Asian Americans from the analysis. Because our study is primarily focused on ethnonational group differences and foreign educational place, it is imperative to focus on Asian immigrants.

Dependent Variable: Civic Participation

Our dependent variable captures respondents' self-reported civic participation. To derive this measure, we used seven items: in the last twelve months, have you contacted your representative or a government official; worked with others in your community to solve a problem; joined an organization; attended a public meeting such as for school board or city council; attended a protest march, demonstration, or rally; signed a petition; bought or boycotted a certain product or service because of the social or political values of the company that provides it. We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test how the seven items load on to one single latent construct of civic participation. Figure 1 displays the CFA output. All loadings are positive, statistically significant at the .001 level, and moderate in size. The goodness of fit indices are all within recommended thresholds (McDonald and Ho 2002). These results suggest the model represents a good fit.

In addition to the CFA, we conducted several other statistical procedures to assess the items' internal consistency and verified that they load on to one underlying construct. The Cronbach α value is 0.86, suggesting good reliability. Dropping any item reduces the alpha, providing further evidence for acceptable overall reliability. We also tested for other estimates of reliability. Guttman's fourth lower-bound $\lambda 4$ is 0.89, indicating a good level of reliability. Additionally, the ωt value is 0.90, once again suggesting that the items are internally consistent (Revelle and Zinbarg 2009). Altogether, the CFA and other indices such as Cronbach α, $\lambda 4$, and ωt suggest that the seven items load on to civic participation as a single underlying latent variable (Mai, Jacobs, and Schieman 2019). After list-wise deletion of all missing data from the seven items, the sample includes 2,013 observations. We extract the factor score from the CFA and use it as the dependent variable.

Key Predictors: Asian Ethnonational Subgroups

To interrogate the ethnonational heterogeneity among Asian Americans, our key predictors of interest are the Asian ethnonational categories with which respondents self-identify. Since our theorization centers on educational place in foreign and domestic environments, we do not expect our predictions to extend to U.S.-born Asian Americans. Although the NAAS includes data on several subnational Asian groups, our focus on educational attainment and place required us to remove some ethnonational subgroups because they comprised primarily non-immigrants or could not be linked to a single country of origin. Accordingly, we removed the Japanese and Hmong subgroups from our analysis.

Our decision to remove Japanese respondents stems from the fact that the immigration and integration histories of Japanese Americans are significantly different from most post-1965 Asian immigrants. In contrast to our six selected subgroups, Japanese respondents are largely native born, rendering them outside our analytic emphasis on immigrants and variation in educational place. Similarly, our theoretical emphasis on the effects of domestic and foreign national educational environments is problematic in the case of our Hmong respondents because, unlike respondents in the six selected Asian subgroups, Hmong immigrants are not linked to a single country of origin. Therefore, we restrict our sample and focus on the six largest Asian immigrant ethnonational subgroups with discernable binational linkages.

Mediator: Foreign Education

We examine the effects of foreign or domestic educational place by constructing a measure that can account for whether a respondent was educated entirely in the United States or partly elsewhere. We construct a dichotomous variable that separates respondents who completed all education in the United States versus respondents who completed any schooling abroad. This enables us to measure how experience with a foreign educational environment mediates the group-level differences in participation rates across Asian subgroups.

Control Variables

Besides our key predictors and mediator, all model specifications have standard control variables including gender, level of education (less than high school, high school graduate, and college or higher), employment status (employed versus not employed), income (less than $50,000, $50,000 to $100,000, and more than $100,000), marital status, years since arrival, citizenship status, whether respondent lives in California, whether respondent has children, English proficiency (no English versus some English), Party ID (Democrat, Republican, Independent), frequency of political discussion (often versus not often), and religious attendance (more than "once or twice a month" versus otherwise). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in this analysis.

Modeling Techniques

In addition to standard multivariate regression, our analysis makes use of a mediation model with a latent variable. This causes us to rely on a structural equation model. We construct and test a mediation model with educational place (M) mediating the association between race-ethnonational group (X) and civic participation (Y). Given our interest in disaggregating Asian-Americans, our primary independent variables or predictors are racial-ethnonationality group categories. Our focus on analyzing variation across multiple group-level categories makes estimating such a model challenging because most statistical literature on mediation has been based on the condition that the main predictor is continuous or dichotomous.

To fully appreciate the heterogeneity within Asian American groups, and to understand how different Asian American groups might relate differently to the mediator and the outcome variable, we rely on the "mediation analysis with a multi-categorical independent variable" (Hayes and Preacher 2014). We specify a structural equation model based on formulas (1) and (2), where "educational place" represents M in these models. In these models, Non-Hispanic native-born Whites are treated as the reference category. The nine a coefficients quantify the differences between racial-

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N = 2,013)

Variables	Range	Mean or Proportion	Standard Deviation
Dependent variable			
Civic participation (factor score)	–.57–1.49	.03	.56
Independent variable			
Main predictor – racial-ethnonational subgroups			
White	0–1	18.52	–
Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander	0–1	13.26	–
Black	0–1	18.73	–
Latino	0–1	18.82	–
Indian	0–1	5.21	–
Cambodian	0–1	4.97	–
Chinese	0–1	5.61	–
Filipino	0–1	5.26	–
Korean	0–1	3.52	–
Vietnamese	0–1	6.06	–
Mediator			
Place of education (ref = some education elsewhere)	0–1	65.87	–
Other predictors			
Discuss politics (ref = not too often or less)	0–1	43.41	–
Party affiliation (ref = Democrat)			
Independent		23.05	–
Republican		14.70	–
Religious attendance (ref = few times a year or less)	0–1	48.73	–
Employed (ref = not employed)	0–1	58.82	–
Control variables			
Female	0–1	51.31	–
Income (ref = less than $50k)			
$50k–$100k		28.66	–
More than $100k		22.70	–
Years since arrival	0–97	38.62	18.52
Noncitizen	0–1	5.81	–
Living in California	0–1	61.64	–
Educational attainment (ref = less than high school)			
High school	0–1	18.82	
College	0–1	68.31	
Speaking English	0–1	96.37	
Not having children	0–1	29.75	–
Not married	0–1	40.44	–

Source: Authors' tabulation.

ethnonational groups on the mediator (place of education). The nine c' coefficients (or direct effects) capture the difference between racial-ethnonational groups on civic participation controlling for the mediator. U refers to a vector of control variables. The nine indirect effects of racial-ethnonational group (X) on civic engagement (Y) through educational place (M) are quantified by the nine products of the a coefficients in the model and the b coefficient in model 1. Figure 2 displays this structural equation model.

Figure 2. A Structural Equation Model of Place of Education Mediating the Association Between Racial-Ethnonational Groups and Civic Participation

Source: Authors' tabulation.

$$M = i_1 + a_1 \text{ NHPI} + a_2 \text{ Black} + a_3 \text{ Latino}$$
$$+ a_4 \text{ AsianIndian} + a_5 \text{ Cambodian}$$
$$+ a_6 \text{ Chinese} + a_7 \text{ Filipino} + a_8 \text{ Korean}$$
$$+ a_9 \text{ Vietnamese} + U_M + e_{-M}. \quad (1)$$

$$Y = i_2 + b^*M + c'_1 \text{ NHPI} + c'_2 \text{ Black}$$
$$+ c'_3 \text{ Latino} + c'_4 \text{ AsianIndian}$$
$$+ c'_5 \text{ Cambodian} + c'_6 \text{ Chinese}$$
$$+ c'_7 \text{ Filipino} + c'_8 \text{ Korean}$$
$$+ c'_9 \text{ Vietnamese} + U_Y + e_Y. \quad (2)$$

FINDINGS

Figure 3 displays a series of boxplots with the civic participation factor scores on the vertical axes and various racial groups on the horizontal ones. The boxes are sorted by group median. In this set of boxplots, the outcome variables are broken down by race and Asian ethnonational subgroup. The figure demonstrates that with respect to the measures of civic engagement: Cambodian, Chinese, and Filipino registered the lowest scores; White, Black or African American, and Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander (NHPI) registered the highest; and Vietnamese, Korean, Latino, and Indian being between the others. Among Cambodian, Chinese, and Filipino, the median civic engagement score equals the minimum score. This suggests that the median Cambodian, Chinese, and Filipino in our sample did not engage in any kind of civic engagement or replied no to all seven survey items that loaded on to the latent construct that makes up the dependent variable. These initial results indicate that though in the aggregate Asian Americans score low in civic participation relative to other racial categories, there is substantial variability across ethnonational groups. We now turn to an overview of group-level variation in educational environments.

Figure 4 presents a bar graph that juxtaposes the proportion of respondents with exclusively

Figure 3. Civic Participation Rates by Race and Asian Ethnonational Subgroup

Source: Authors' tabulation.

Figure 4. Place of Education by Ethnonational Subgroup

Source: Authors' tabulation based on National Asian American Survey data (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017).

domestic educational attainment with conationals who have had some education outside the United States. The proportion of respondents with domestic and foreign educational experience is disaggregated by race and Asian ethnonational subgroup. The lighter bars represent the proportion of the respondents who completed all their education in the United States, the darker bars the proportion who completed some of their education elsewhere. The figure displays a stark contrast between Asian subgroups and other Americans in the sample. The overwhelming majority of non–Asian Americans completed their education exclusively in the United States across all racial categories (Whites 97 percent, Blacks 95 percent, Pacific Islanders 84 percent, Latino/a 67 percent). The pattern is reversed among Asian immigrants (see figure 4), the overwhelming majority of whom appear to have completed some of their education outside the United States. Asian respondents with an exclusively domestic

education constitute a minority. These proportions range from just under 10 percent (among Koreans) to just over 25 percent (among Vietnamese). The dramatic differences between Asian immigrants and other Americans with respect to educational place suggest the environmental contexts, in which educational attainment takes place for most Asians, diverge from most of the general American population. We now turn to our multivariate results to examine how differences in educational place mediate group-level differences in civic participation.

Multivariate Results

Table 2 displays a series of models predicting our civic participation outcome. Model 1 only includes various racial-ethnonational groups. Model 2 adds control variables; model 3 adds our core predictor of interest—measure of educational place. Models 4, 5, and 6 include all variables in the previous models, but add measures of political interest, religious involvement, and employment status. The coefficients associated with all Asian subgroups are negative and statistically significant in all model specifications. These results confirm findings on Asian Americans in that we find all Asian ethnonational subgroups have lower participation rates than Whites. The low rates of participation observed for Asians remain even after holding constant various measures of immigrant adaptation, political interest, religiosity, demographics, and, of course, educational attainment.

Turning to education, our initial results suggest educational attainment and educational place are important factors associated with civic participation. Consistent with decades of research, results indicate educational attainment is positively associated with civic participation for all groups in our sample. When educational attainment is treated as distinct categories (less than high school, high school, college, or higher), results show that only college-level educational attainment is statistically significant and positively associated with participation. Thus, at the individual level, our results lend support to the assumption that higher levels of education correspond with in-

creased civic participation. However, when we look at the effect of educational environment, results suggest that education completed exclusively in the receiving society (the United States) is associated with increased civic participation. In other words, people educated only in the United States reported significantly higher participation rates relative to those with some education abroad, ceteris paribus. These coefficients remain robust as specifications get more stringent. This suggests educational place is an important contextual factor that may shed light on how the relationship between educational attainment and civic participation varies for different groups. We explore this in the mediation analysis. However, first we briefly discuss some of the observed associations between our controls and the dependent variable in table 2.

As for measures of political interest, frequent discussion of politics is predicted to be associated with civic engagement. Relative to Democrats, Republicans are predicted to show lower levels of civic participation. Religion also plays an important role, confirming prior studies by suggesting religious attendance is predicted to increase civic participation. The coefficient associated with religious attendance in model 5 is marginally significant ($p = .0507$). Unsurprisingly, we also found that being employed increases civic participation, as does income. Although not the core focus of this article, the findings related to various control variables are also noteworthy. Civic engagement is predicted to increase with income and to decrease with time spent in the United States. Gender, citizenship status, residence in California, English-speaking skills, parental status, and marital status seem generally unrelated to the outcome variable. Altogether, the predictors account for about 20 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. However, these results cannot show the extent to which the association between various racial-ethnonational groups and civic participation can be explained through educational place. Table 3 presents a formal test of how educational place serves as a mechanism that partially accounts for the group-level proclivities for civic participation.

Table 2. OLS Regression Models of Factors Predicting Civic Participation

	Dependent Variable: Civic Participation					
	Baseline (1)	Baseline and Controls (2)	+ Place of Education (3)	+ Politics (4)	+ Religion (5)	+ Employment (6)
Racial-ethnonational subgroups (ref = White)						
NHPI	−.07	−.03	−.02	.02	.01	.01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Black	−.03	.02	.02	.01	.001	.001
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Latino	−.26**	−.14**	−.13**	−.11*	−.12**	−.12**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Asian Indian	−.25**	−.38**	−.31**	−.28**	−.29**	−.29**
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Cambodian	−.58**	−.29**	−.24**	−.21**	−.20*	−.20*
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Chinese	−.58**	−.40**	−.34**	−.33**	−.32**	−.31**
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Filipino	−.48**	−.47**	−.40**	−.34**	−.36**	−.35**
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)
Korean	−.41**	−.40**	−.33**	−.26**	−.27**	−.26**
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Vietnamese	−.38**	−.28**	−.24**	−.25**	−.25**	−.24**
	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Educational place (ref = some education elsewhere)						
All education in United States			.11**	.15**	.15**	.14**
			(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Politics						
Discuss politics (ref = not too often or less)				.15**	.15**	.15**
				(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Party (ref = Democrat)						
Independent				−.002	−.001	−.0004
				(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Republican				−.11**	−.12**	−.11**
				(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Religion						
Religious attendance (ref = few times a year or less)					.05	.05*
					(.03)	(.03)
Employment						
Employed (ref = not employed)						.07*
						(.03)

(*continued*)

Table 2. (*continued*)

	Baseline (1)	Baseline and Controls (2)	+ Place of Education (3)	+ Politics (4)	+ Religion (5)	+ Employment (6)
			Dependent Variable: Civic Participation			
Control variables						
Women		–.003	–.005	–.002	–.01	–.004
		(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Income (ref = less than $50k)						
$50k–$100k		.11**	.10**	.09**	.09**	.08*
		(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
More than $100k		.19**	.18**	.15**	.15**	.14**
		(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years since arrival		–.003**	–.003**	–.003**	–.003**	–.003**
		(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Noncitizen		–.07	–.04	–.05	–.05	–.05
		(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Living in California		–.03	–.02	–.02	–.02	–.02
		(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Not having children		.02	.003	.01	.02	.02
		(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Not married		–.02	–.02	–.06	–.06	–.06
		(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Education (ref = less than high school)						
High school		.13*	.10	.08	.08	.07
		(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
College or higher		.31**	.28**	.26**	.26**	.25**
		(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Speaks no English (ref = speaks some English)		–.10	–.09	–.04	–.04	–.03
		(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Constant	.24**	–.01	–.03	–.07	–.09	–.13
	(.03)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
N	2,013	1,752	1,749	1,549	1,547	1,547
Adjusted R^2	.12	.19	.19	.20	.20	.20

Source: Authors' tabulation.
Note: Standardized coefficients, two-tailed tests.
*p < .05; **p < .01

Mediation Results

Results presented from the ordinary least squares regression models in table 2 show that the coefficients associated with Asian subgroups predicting civic engagement decrease as more predictors and controls are added to the specifications. The reference group for the mediator are people who did not complete all of their education in the United States. All *a* coefficients associated with Asian subgroups (*a*4–*a*9) are negative and statistically significant in predicting the mediator, suggesting that all

Table 3. Standardized Parameters from Mediation Model Predicting Civic Participation with Educational Place as Mediator

			All U.S. Education (Mediator)				Civic Engagement (Outcome)				Indirect Effect Effect of $X \to Y$ through M			Proportion Mediated Mediated Effect/Total Effect	
			Coef.	SE			Coef.	SE			Coef.	SE		Coef.	SE
All U.S. education (M)					b	$\to$	0.053**	(0.020)							
Racial-ethnonational subgroups (X)															
NHPI	a1	$\to$	-0.611**	(0.209)	c'1	$\to$	0.016*	(0.044)	a1*b	$\to$	-0.032*	(0.016)		1.940	(4.959)
Black	a2	$\to$	-0.018	(0.222)	c'2	$\to$	0.017*	(0.040)	a2*b	$\to$	-0.001	(0.012)		-0.059	(0.741)
Latino	a3	$\to$	-0.516**	(0.202)	c'3	$\to$	-0.097*	(0.041)	a3*b	$\to$	-0.027	(0.015)		0.219	(0.134)
Indian	a4	$\to$	-2.280***	(0.248)	c'4	$\to$	-0.247	(0.079)	a4*b	$\to$	-0.120*	(0.047)		0.327*	(0.140)
Cambodian	a5	$\to$	-1.542***	(0.271)	c'5	$\to$	-0.169	(0.082)	a5*b	$\to$	-0.081*	(0.034)		0.324*	(0.163)
Chinese	a6	$\to$	-1.780***	(0.250)	c'6	$\to$	-0.375	(0.082)	a6*b	$\to$	-0.094*	(0.038)		0.200*	(0.086)
Filipino	a7	$\to$	-2.621***	(0.262)	c'7	$\to$	-0.287	(0.085)	a7*b	$\to$	-0.138*	(0.053)		0.324*	(0.135)
Korean	a8	$\to$	-2.368***	(0.298)	c'8	$\to$	-0.218	(0.086)	a8*b	$\to$	-0.124*	(0.049)		0.363*	(0.161)
Vietnamese	a9	$\to$	-1.325***	(0.240)	c'9	$\to$	-0.233	(0.065)	a9*b	$\to$	-0.070*	(0.029)		0.230*	(0.104)

Source: Authors' tabulation.

Note: Standardized coefficients, two-tailed tests. Control variables included: party identification, discussing politics, religious attendance, employment status, gender, income, years since arrival, citizen, living in California, have child, marital status, level of education, and English proficiency.

*p < .05; **p < .01

Asian subgroups are less likely to complete all their education in the United States relative to Whites (the reference group). Consistent with the results shown in table 2, the *b* coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that respondents who completed their education in the United States are predicted to show higher levels of civic participation. Notably, all of the indirect effects associated with Asian subgroups are negative and significant. This suggests that for all Asian subgroups, foreign educational place operates as a key mechanism that explains low rates of civic participation. The proportions of mediated effects are statistically significant at the 0.05 level for all Asian subgroups. Additionally, we observed between-group variation in the proportion mediated. More than 36 percent of the total effect of race-ethnonationality on civic engagement is mediated by foreign education for Korean respondents. This is the highest mediated proportion among all groups. Indians, Cambodians, and Filipinos also report high mediated proportions, 32.7 percent for the first group and 32.4 percent for the latter two. The smallest proportion mediated observed are reported among Vietnamese (23 percent) and Chinese (20 percent).

In sum, these results robustly demonstrate that foreign educational place is a key mechanism explaining the civic participation rates among all Asian groups. Despite variation in proportion mediated, educational place plays an important role, as it accounts for about 20 to 36 percent of the association between groups and their rates of civic participation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

As one of the fastest growing segments of the U.S. population, Asian immigrants and U.S.-born children reflect a diverse array of emerging political constituencies, collective identities, and civic organizational infrastructures (Lien 2010; Wong et al. 2011; Hung and Ong 2012; Okamoto 2014; Lee and Zhou 2015). Recent efforts to study the political and civic participation of Asian Americans suggest standard theories and perspectives on civic participation may need to be reconceptualized so they can better account for the distinct immigration experiences of Asian ethnonational subgroups in the United States (Masuoka, Ramanathan, and

Junn 2019; Wong et al. 2011). Accordingly, we sought to investigate how transnational (foreign or domestic) contexts of educational attainment (educational place) may mediate the group-level differences in the relationship between educational and civic participation across six significant Asian immigrant ethnonational subgroups.

Scholarship suggests Asian immigrants have relatively low rates of civic participation when compared to other Americans with commensurate educational attainment (Lien 2004; Wong et al. 2011; Ramakrishnan et al. 2016; Masuoka, Ramanathan, and Junn 2019). The high levels of education and low civic participation observed in past studies of Asian Americans indicate a paradox. The negative association observed between educational attainment and civic participation for Asian immigrants in the United States challenges the assumed linearity and positive directionality in extant literature on civic participation (Campbell 2009). This study sought to interrogate this paradox by examining the extent to which foreign and domestic educational environments—educational place—mediate proclivities for civic participation across six Asian immigrant ethnonational subgroups.

Our analysis confirms insights from previous work: we find that after controlling for a host of characteristics, Asian immigrants do have relatively low rates of civic participation. However, we uncover a critical mechanism that corresponds with the observed low participation rates. Our mediation analysis reveals that educational place partially explains why Asian immigrants have lower civic participation rates than other respondents with commensurate education. Our findings suggest decreased civic participation among Asian immigrants in the United States may in part stem from exposure to foreign educational environments. Additionally, results suggest the mediating effects of educational place vary to some extent by Asian ethnonationality.

Educational place accounts for the largest proportion of variation among Koreans and Indians, and the least among Vietnamese and Chinese. In sum, experience with a foreign educational context appears to account for a low of 20 percent and a high of 36 percent of the

observed subgroup-level variation in Asian immigrant civic participation rates. The observed significance of educational place confirms studies advocating for analysts to rethink the standard assumptions that educational attainment is an absolute and additive measure of human capital (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Campbell 2008, 2009). Educational environments are key sites for civic knowledge and exposure to civic norms, skills, and tolerance across most societies (Campbell, Levinson, and Hess 2012; Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2018).

Our findings also help make sense of the Asian immigrant civic paradox by highlighting how the relationship varies across scales of analysis. We find that the paradoxical relationship between education and participation among Asian Americans is limited to group-level comparisons with other ethnoracial categorical groups (Blacks, Whites, and others). Indeed, consistent with past research on Asian and Latino/a immigrants (DeSipio 1996; Ramakrishnan 2005), as well as general scholarship on civic participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Campbell, Levinson, and Hess 2012; Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2018), we find that educational attainment increases individual-level civic participation rates across all subgroups. Specifically, university-level education appears to increase civic participation for all groups in our sample. Exposure to foreign educational environments appears to reduce group-level proclivities for civic participation. This suggests domestic educational attainment may foster more civic participation among Asian immigrants residing in the United States.

Despite yielding important findings, this research is not without limitations. As with all cross-sectional analyses on relatively small numbers of observations, our study and results have limitations with respect to what the findings can and cannot tell us. Although they show that educational place matters, the data are limited because we cannot explain why it matters. As a result, we cannot isolate educational place from other potentially confounding factors such as transnational networks or other types of cross-border linkages. Our study reveals how much foreign-domestic educational place matters differently for different groups,

especially the six Asian immigrant ethno-national subgroups.

Further inquiry into why education matters requires data that unfortunately cannot be collected in cross-sectional surveys conducted exclusively in immigrants' places of settlement. Ethnographic methods and research designs may better reveal how and why educational contexts vary cross-nationally and how these differences translate into divergent motivations and propensities for civic participation for Asian immigrants in the United States. Such efforts can be accomplished by collecting and analyzing data from immigrants and non-immigrants in both their places of origin and settlement (see Carling 2002; De Haas 2007; Mazzucato 2008). These alternative approaches may shed light on how educational place varies across Asian-origin societies and how these contextual differences generate divergent experiences for Asian immigrants in the United States.

Another limitation centers on our inability to account for the temporal or long-term effects of foreign education on civic participation over the life course. Does the role of foreign education "wear off" in the long run or remain relatively durable? Is it possible that this effect tapers off for some groups but persists for others? We sought to isolate the effect of educational place by controlling for time since arrival and other conventional measures of immigrant adaptation and found that place still matters. However, the extent to which educational place matters over time is beyond the scope of this study. Efforts to better understand how variation in educational place affects the civic participation of Asian or Latino/a immigrants over the life course may want to use longitudinal or panel data to better identify how educational place shapes Asian immigrant civic participation at different stages of the life course. Such data would allow scholars to parse out how enduring the effect of a foreign education is on civic engagement.

Despite these limitations, this study advances and updates research on Asian American civic participation in two ways. First, we refine our understanding of the civic paradox observed in research on Asian immigrants in the United States by showing that the relation-

ship between education and civic participation varies according to scale of analysis. Although Asian Americans' aggregated high educational attainment and low civic participation appear paradoxical, this group-level pattern is not observed at the individual level. Indeed, educational attainment remains positively associated at the individual-level for all respondents in the sample, including Asian immigrants. This suggests that although the assumed linearity between education and civic participation persists at the level of individuals, the relationship is nonlinear and uneven when scales and units of analysis shift from individuals to groups.

Second, we find that educational place is a significant, albeit often overlooked, factor that can affect Asian immigrant proclivities for civic participation. If large numbers of immigrants have foreign educational experiences, the community may be reflective of a collective transnational simultaneity where immigrants' civic knowledge and political exposure are informed by their direct and indirect experiences with foreign and domestic educational environments. By focusing on the environmental contexts of educational attainment, this study supports calls for a reinterpretation of educational attainment as a relative rather than absolute measure of human capital (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).

We build on research suggesting foreign education decreases Asian immigrant civic participation (Lien 2004; Wong et al. 2011) by expanding our analysis to investigate the mediating effects of educational place on Asian immigrant civic participation. We also reveal that foreign educational place does not affect Asian subgroups the same way. This suggests educational attainment should be reconsidered with a "transnational optic" (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Faist 2016; Chaudhary 2018) to further account for how cross-national variation in education environments may correspond with disparate forms of political exposure and participation (Wong 2000). In the case of Asian immigrants in the United States, any education obtained abroad appears to decrease civic participation relative to respondents who have been educated only in the United States. This suggests that educational place is an important factor that may inform immigrant knowledge,

skills, and motivations necessary for civic life in American society.

Although this study focuses on education and civic participation, the collective interpretation of simultaneity may be useful for better understanding group-level variation in a variety of social, economic, and political behaviors and integration-related processes. In doing so, this study further disaggregates the Asian category and advances recent calls among sociologists and political scientists to interrogate intragroup tensions and solidarities within Asian America (Wong et al. 2011; Okamoto 2014; Lee and Zhou 2015) We examined how variation in national educational context can affect individual and group-level proclivities for civic participation among Asian immigrants in the United States. In showing that contextual variation in educational place is an important factor shaping civic participation, we conclude that exposure to education outside of the receiving country may correspond with different sets of civic knowledge, tolerance, and skills relative to individuals who are educated only domestically.

In addition to contributing new empirical insights into the civic participation of Asian immigrants, our findings are consistent with recent theoretical scholarship that urges scholars to explore and theorize how transnational linkages and processes operate at multiple scales (Faist 2016; Chaudhary and Moss 2019; Erdal 2020). Future efforts to interrogate the links between education and civic participation should systematically compare how the substance and access to civic education varies between immigrants' origin and receiving societies. In doing so, researchers may be able to better determine how and why exposure to foreign education corresponds with consistently low rates of civic participation among some Asian immigrants' communities in the United States.

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PART III

Social Attitudes: Gender, Sexuality, and Immigration

Traditional Asians? Race, Ethnicity, and Gender Policy Attitudes in the United States

RUJUN YANG AND MARIA CHARLES

American stereotypes depict the pan-Asian culture as monolithically traditional in matters of gender and sexual politics. Most national surveys include too few Asian respondents to assess the validity of these claims, much less to interrogate differences across Asian-ancestry groups. Using data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey, this study examines racial and ethnic variability in support for policies that would extend rights and protections to women and to sexual and gender minorities. Results provide no evidence of pan-Asian gender traditionalism, and they show much more attitudinal heterogeneity across Asian ethnic groups than is popularly recognized. Some of this heterogeneity is linked to ethnic differences in sociocultural traits, including religion, politics, nativity, education, and gender-identity salience. Substantial variability across Asian American groups remains unexplained, however. Future research should explore how this variability maps onto distinctive gender regimes in ancestral countries and different histories of immigrant reception within the United States.

Keywords: ideology, gender, race-ethnicity, Asian American

Since the resurgence of the feminist movement in the 1960s, attitudes relating to gender and sexuality have maintained a powerful capacity to mobilize American voters and shape laws and policies that affect the social, economic, and reproductive rights of more than half the U.S. population. Debates about abortion, affirmative action, and the rights of sexual minorities are particularly contentious.

Given the sociopolitical significance of these policy positions, it is surprising that their racial and ethnic contours have received relatively little analytical attention. Especially under-researched are attitudes of Asian Americans, the fastest growing racial group in the United States today.

Popular American stereotypes depict the pan-Asian culture in monolithic terms—as gen-

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der traditional, resistant to egalitarian ideals, and less accepting of homosexuality (Chow 1987; Chou 2012; Nemoto 2006; Semrow et al. 2019). Asian men are portrayed as simultaneously effeminate and patriarchal (Chen 1999), and Asian women as exotic and submissive or as passive sex objects (Pyke and Johnson 2003). Accounts of interracial relationships also reflect the symbolic dichotomy between pan-Asian traditionalism and white egalitarianism. Asian men's masculinity is commonly pitted against both white egalitarianism and white hegemonic masculinity, and it is often presumed that Asian women marry into the white world to flee gender traditionalism (Kim 2006; Nemoto 2006, 2008; Chou 2012). Stereotypes about Asian homophobia also abound in mainstream American culture and in the gay community (Takagi 1994; Han 2015; Semrow et al. 2019). Asian traditionalism is placed in rhetorical contrast to a white egalitarian world, having regard for neither the pervasiveness of gender- and sexuality-based inequalities among white Americans nor the diversity of gender practices within the pan-Asian population.

Most nationally representative surveys of public opinion have included too few Asian respondents to provide much evidence on the relative traditionalism or liberalism of Asian American beliefs about gender and sexuality, much less about how these beliefs vary across Asian-ancestry groups. This study addresses that gap. Using data from the post-election wave of the 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS), we explore racial and ethnic variability in attitudes toward four hot-button social issues: abortion rights, affirmative action for women, legal protections for sexual minorities, and transgender bathroom access. The NAAS includes oversamples large enough to allow comparison across ten Asian-origin groups, as well as between Asians and other major U.S. racial groups. This makes a first comparative view of gender and sexual politics within the Asian American population possible.

Before turning to the empirical analysis, we describe the broader context of American policy debates related to gender and sexuality and review the current state of knowledge on Asian American gender attitudes.

Gender and Sexual Politics in the United States

In American political discourse, attitudes about the social, economic, and reproductive rights of women and sexual minorities are often represented as discrete poles in a culture war that divides the public into two opposing moral camps. Cultural traditionalists, often religious conservatives, aim to restrict access to abortion (and sometimes contraception), enact policies to preserve gendered divisions of family labor, and restrict marriage to heterosexual unions. Those in the other camp are expected to oppose all of these things (Hunter 1991; Hochschild 2002; Hartman 2015).[1] Transgender rights have recently emerged as a new front in this symbolic culture war (Castle 2019).

Social research points to a messier, less binary distribution of American public opinion than this culture war narrative would suggest (Evans 2002; Johnson 2017; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014). Two forms of ideological complexity are particularly relevant. First, evidence is growing that gender ideology varies along multiple independent dimensions rather than moving along a single traditional-to-liberal axis (Knight and Brinton 2017; Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; Pepin and Cotter 2018; Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2019). Knowing where someone stands on abortion, for example, does not necessarily tell us what they think about affirmative action, gay marriage, or transgender rights.[2] Similarly, the factors predicting support for civil liberties of lesbians, gays, and trans-

1. In a fiery speech to the 1992 Republic National Convention, for example, Patrick Buchanan invoked culture war imagery in describing the "radical feminism" of the Clintons as "abortion on demand, a litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual rights, discrimination against religious schools, [and] women in combat units."

2. Research suggests that attitudes about abortion tap into a diverse array of orientations related to individual autonomy, sexual morality, and the humanity of the fetus (Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Jelen 2015; Luker 1984), and that support for affirmative action may be undermined by individualistic and meritocratic ideology (Baunach 2002; Bobo 1998; Kane and Whipkey 2009; Konrad and Hartmann 2001).

gender people are distinct from those predicting moral approval of homosexuality, granting informal privileges to gays and lesbians, and expanded use of gendered public spaces (Loftus 2001; Doan, Loehr and Miller 2014; Jones et al. 2018).[3]

We allow for this multidimensional structure of attitudes about gender and sexuality by exploring variability separately on four historically contentious gender-policy issues: affirmative action for women, abortion rights, legal protection of sexual and gender minorities, and transgender bathroom access.

A second form of complexity pertains to the distinctive gender beliefs that grow out of group-specific experiences and immigration histories. Ethnoracial variability in gender and sexual politics may be attributable, for example, to group differences in political, religious, educational, and generational composition. College-educated persons generally hold more liberal gender views, and religious fundamentalists and political conservatives more traditional ones, although these relationships vary according to the specific attitudinal tenet at issue.[4] Group differences in the timing of immigration may also contribute to attitudinal differences across ethnic groups. A tug-of-war is common between acculturation and the preservation of ethnic authenticity, but immigrants' attitudes tend to become more similar to natives' as generations pass (Tuan 1998; Min 2001; Alba and Nee 2003; Röder and Mühlau 2014; Su, Richardson, and Wang 2010; Apgar and McManus 2019). Ethnic differences in gender and sexual politics may also reflect different cultural understandings of what it means to be a man or a woman. Research has shown that people's support for rights claims that are seen to benefit women and sexual minorities increases with the salience of women's gender identities and decreases with the salience of men's gender identities (Cameron and Lalonde 2001; Bosson and Michniewicz 2013; Wood and Eagly 2015). The ethnic and racial contours of these effects have not yet been explored systematically.

Given the diverse array of ancestral countries and cultures it represents, the pan-Asian American population is likely to be especially variable in gender-policy attitudes. We allow for this ethnic heterogeneity by comparing policy positions across ten Asian heritage groups, with and without controls for the social, cultural, and demographic factors discussed.

What Do We Know About Asian American Gender-Policy Attitudes?

Most survey-based studies of American attitudes about gender and sexuality have allowed for comparisons only across major racial groups, especially whites, blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. These comparisons have yielded some evidence of Asian traditionalism, but it is weak. For example, one analysis of late twentieth-century survey data shows a slightly less pronounced historical trend toward gender liberalism among Asians than among other American groups, perhaps reflecting the stronger representation of recent immigrants in the Asian population (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011). More recent life-history interviews suggest a greater propensity for Asian than black, white, or Latinx college students to endorse traditional forms of masculinity or femininity that conform to parental expectations (Risman 2018), but these differences cannot be generalized because of the small number of Asians interviewed (25).

Asian Americans' positions on specific policy items have been examined only recently. On affirmative action, Karthick Ramakrishnan and Janelle Wong (2018) find substantial Asian support except among Chinese Americans, whose opposition has increased since 2012 in conjunction with growing controversies about race-conscious college admissions policies. Asian American attitudes about affirmative action ap-

3. Debates about access to gendered spaces such as public bathrooms are about not only transgender rights, but also biology- versus identity-based understandings of gender (Westbrook and Schilt 2014; Schilt and Westbrook 2015).

4. On the determinants of attitudes about gender and sexuality in the United States, see Kane 2000; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Sherkat et al. 2011; Norton and Herek 2013; Chatillon, Charles, and Bradley 2018.

pear to be influenced by the wording of survey questions, with stronger support when Asians or women are mentioned as potential beneficiaries (Wong, Lee, and Tran 2018; Lee and Tran 2019).

In regard to abortion rights, a 2008 survey showed substantial attitudinal heterogeneity across six Asian groups, with Japanese, Chinese, and Indian Americans expressing greater support than Korean, Filipina/o, and Vietnamese Americans (Wu and Ida 2018). Stronger opposition to abortion among religious Christians accounted for much of this inter-Asian difference, although Asian American evangelicals tend to be less conservative than their white evangelical counterparts on many policy issues (Wong 2018).

Analyses of racial differences in Americans' attitudes toward homosexuality and gay marriage have mostly involved comparisons of blacks, whites, and others. "Others" have shown greater conservatism than whites in some analyses and no difference from whites in others (Loftus 2001; Lewis 2003; Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek 2010; Baunach 2012). Qualitative studies have reported some instances of Asian parents shunning nonnormative children (Chou 2012), but the prevalence of these practices is unknown, as is their association with specific policy positions.

Most studies on attitudes on transgender people have not covered Asian Americans (Flores 2015; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Jones et al. 2018; Norton and Herek 2013). The best available evidence comes from Janelle Wong's analysis of NAAS data, which shows majority support for transgender bathroom access among Asian Americans but substantial variability depending on ethnic group and religiosity (2017).

The aims of this study are to evaluate evidence of pan-Asian traditionalism, to provide a richer description of the ethnic contours of Asian American gender and sexual politics, and to identify the social, cultural, and demographic factors that influence Asian-American positions on specific policy questions. Specif-

ically, we will apply NAAS survey data from 2016 to address four questions: (1) Do pan-Asian Americans express more traditional attitudes related to gender and sexual politics than do other major racial groups in the United States? (2) How do attitudes related to gender and sexual politics differ across Asian American ethnic groups? (3) What social, cultural, and demographic characteristics influence the gender and sexual politics of Asian American? (4) Do these predictors vary across policy domains?

DATA AND METHODS

Data are drawn from the 2016 post-election wave of the National Asian American Survey, which oversamples Asians of diverse ancestries. NAAS respondents were asked about their views on four contested policy issues. Two items concern the rights of women (to legal abortion and affirmative action), and two concern the rights of sexual and gender minorities (to legal protections, and access to public bathrooms corresponding to their gender identities).

We consider attitudinal variation across four major U.S. racial groups (Asian, white, black, and Latinx) and then across ten Asian ethnic groups (Bangladeshi, Cambodian, Chinese, Filipina/o, Hmong, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Pakistani, and Vietnamese).[5] Ethnoracial groups were defined using information on racial identities of all respondents and ethnic identities of Asian respondents. Persons identifying as Native Hawaiian, Samoan, Fijian, or multiracial were dropped because of their small numbers. Because the NAAS intentionally oversamples Asians, especially those from groups with smaller U.S.-based populations, we apply person weights so that our statistical results are representative of the U.S. population.[6]

Measuring Attitudes About Gender and Sexuality

Survey researchers commonly measure and compare gender attitudes by constructing unidimensional scales that range from traditional

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5. Exploratory analyses showed that a more parsimonious grouping into East Asians, Southeast Asians and South Asians did not capture the complexity of attitudinal differences.

6. Weights approximate the U.S. population on the following dimensions: race-ethnicity, state, nativity, gender, and education.

to egalitarian. We do not. Recent comparative studies, as well as our analysis of the current data, suggest that different tenets of gender ideology often follow independent causal logics that are obscured when survey items are aggregated into a unitary measure (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; Pepin and Cotter 2018). Disaggregated analyses of seemingly related attitudinal items have indeed revealed distinct belief structures (Baunach 2002; Loftus 2001; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Jones et al. 2018).

This study considers support for four policy items, two related to the rights of women, and two related to the rights of gender and sexual minorities. All are measured as dichotomies (0/1), as follows:

Support for affirmative action for women: "Are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of women?" A 1 on this measure indicates the respondent's reported support for preferential hiring and promotion.

Support for abortion rights: "Which comes closest to your views on abortion?" Two sets of response categories were administered, each to half of the sample. The first set (version A) offers four choices: abortion should always be legal; legal most of the time; legal only in cases of rape or incest; legal to protect the life of the mother and illegal in all other cases. The second (version B) asks respondents to choose the specific circumstances under which abortion should be legal: abortion should not be legal under any circumstances, even if the mother's life is in danger; only be legal in certain circumstances, such as when a woman's health is endangered or when pregnancy results from rape or incest; legal during the first three months of pregnancy, no matter the reason; and legal under any circumstance. Respondents who chose response 1 or 2 on version A or 3 or 4 on version B are classified as supportive of abortion rights given that

legal most of the time and legal during the first three months of pregnancy, no matter what the reason, most closely represent the American status quo, even in the most restrictive states. A dummy indicator is included in all regression models to capture mean differences in support between the two question versions. We carry out supplementary analyses, described further on, to assess the sensitivity of observed relationships to question wording.

Support for legal protection of sexual and gender minorities. This item was also administered in two versions, each to half the sample: "Do you favor or oppose legal protections against discrimination against gay, lesbian and transgender people" (version A), and "Do you favor or oppose legal protections against discrimination against gays and lesbians (version B)?" Responses were originally coded on a 1–5 ordinal scale ranging from strongly favor to strongly oppose, 3 corresponding to neither favor nor oppose. Those favoring or strongly favoring protections for either gay, lesbian, and transgender people or gays and lesbians are classified as supporters on this measure. Again, we include a dummy indicator to capture mean differences in support between the two question versions, and we carry out supplementary analyses to assess the sensitivity of regression results to question wording.

Support for transgender bathroom access: "Do you favor or oppose allowing transgender people—that is, people who identify themselves as the sex or gender different from the one they were born as—to use the bathrooms of their identified gender?" Responses were coded on a 5-point ordinal scale ranging from strong opposition (1) to strong support (5), with those who report favoring or strongly favoring this policy classified as supporters on our measure.[7]

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7. Very similar results were obtained in ordinal logit models that retained the original 5-point scales of the two items related to rights of gender and sexual minorities (not shown). One difference is that the negative effect of religious fundamentalism on transgender bathroom access becomes statistically significant in the ordinal model. In the interest of simplicity, we opted to apply the same binary modeling approach to all four policy items.

Regression Analyses and Independent Variables

To assess racial and ethnic variability in gender policy support independent of compositional differences in social, cultural, and demographic traits, we carry out separate logistic regression analyses for each of the four gender policy positions. We compute these models first for the full sample with fixed effects for race, and then for the Asian subsample with fixed effects for ethnicity.

Religious affiliation is measured using two survey items: "What is your religion?" and (for Christians only) "Do you consider yourself a fundamentalist or evangelical Christian, a born again Christian, or Charismatic?" Respondents are grouped into seven categories: Catholic, fundamentalist Christian, mainline Protestant (reference), Buddhist, Muslim, other religion, and agnostic/atheist. Mainline Protestants are defined as non-evangelical, non-Catholic Christians. In addition to denominational affiliation, we consider respondent's religiosity, measured by the annual frequency of service attendance.[8]

We assess effects of political allegiances by comparing Republicans and Democrats with Independents (reference category). Educational attainment is measured with a binary variable that identifies persons with at least a bachelor's degree. Regression models also include standard measures of age, employment status, household income, and marital status.[9] Generational status (first, second or third-plus generation) is measured by combining information on respondent's nativity (foreign born or not) and parents' nativity (whether at least one parent was foreign born). We also include a binary indicator of respondent's citizenship status.

Our models also explore interactive effects of respondents' gender and the relative salience of their gender identities. Gender is measured as a binary variable (woman=1), and gender-identity salience is measured as the reported importance of being a man or woman (1–4 scale) relative to the importance of other group-based identities (race, nationality, religion).[10] We use a relative measure of identity salience because identities are multiple and effects on attitudes should depend on the centrality of identity as a woman or man, relative to other group-based memberships. Sensitivity tests that substituted an absolute measure showed the same general patterns, though effects were somewhat weaker. Interacting this identity score with gender allows us to assess effects of gender-identity salience separately for men and women. Scores were mean-centered, so main gender effects can be interpreted as the effect of being a woman (relative to a man) for respondents with average gender-identity salience scores.

The appendix shows descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables for the full sample broken down by race (table A1), and for the Asian sample broken down by ethnicity (table A2).

RESULTS

To address our first research question, pertaining to stereotypes of Asian traditionality, we compare levels of support for each gender-policy item across four major racial categories. To address the second and third, we explore

8. We use the NAAS's original ordinal scale to approximate annual frequency as follows: Attendance more than once a week is coded as 78 visits per year (an average of 1.5 visits per week); once a week is coded as 52; once or twice a month as 12; a few times a year as 3; and seldom as 1. Persons responding never or reporting no religion (including agnostics and atheists) are coded 0.

9. Age is measured in years; employment status distinguishes employed from non-employed persons (0/1); and married persons (reference category) are distinguished from previously married (widowed, divorced, or separated) and never-married persons. Household income is measured as the natural log of the midpoints of class categories on a 10-point ordinal scale.

10. The survey asks, "How important is being [gender][race][nationality] to your identity?" and "How important is your religion to your identity?" Responses are coded on a 1–4 scale, from extremely important to not at all important. To measure the relative salience of gender identity, we calculated the ratio of the gender response to the sum of responses to all four identity items (gender+race+religion+nationality).

Figure 1. Support for Policies Related to Gender and Sexuality, by Race

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Note: Brackets show 95 percent confidence intervals. Values in panel A are unadjusted proportions reporting support; values in panel B are predicted support levels for persons with average scores on variables included in the regression models.

attitudinal differences within the Asian American population.

Racial Differences in Gender and Sexual Politics

Panel A of figure 1 shows mean scores for the four gender-policy items, broken down by major racial group: Asian, white, black, and Latinx. On each policy position, the proportion of each group reporting agreement is displayed above the respective bar, and the brackets show 95% confidence intervals. Nonoverlapping confidence intervals indicate statistically significant differences on the respective indicator. Results provide no support for stereotypes of Asian gender-traditionality. Asian Americans' responses are statistically different from whites' on one of the four policy measures—gender-based affirmative action—but Asians report more rather than less agreement than whites

(51 percent versus 37 percent) on this item. Racial differences are much less pronounced on the other three items, except that support for abortion rights is weaker among Latinxs than other respondents. Contrary to popular beliefs, blacks are not significantly less likely than whites to express support for the rights of sexual minorities.

Gender and sexual politics differ little between Asians and non-Asians in the aggregate, but it is possible that an underlying culture of Asian traditionalism is obscured by compositional differences between racial groups—for example, higher levels of educational attainment or lower levels of religious fundamentalism among Asian than non-Asian Americans (see table A1). This possibility is assessed in panel B of figure 1, which compares predicted agreement levels by race for hypothetical persons with average scores on the explanatory

variables.[11] Results are again wholly inconsistent with stereotypes of pan-Asian traditionality. With these adjustments, none of the predicted policy positions of Asian Americans differ from those of the white majority. The only statistically significant difference with Asians is found in the strong support for gender-based affirmative action reported by black Americans.[12] Consistent with previous evidence of multidimensionality, none of the major racial groups shows levels of agreement that are consistently high or consistently low across all four policy domains.

In sum, Asian Americans' attitudes toward gender and sexual politics differ little in the aggregate from those of white, black, and Latinx Americans, even controlling for a wide range of social and cultural traits. This similarity across major racial groups likely obscures important differences within the pan-Asian American population, however. We interrogate those differences next.

Asian American Heterogeneity in Gender and Sexual Politics

To address our second and third research questions, we focus on a subsample of Asian Americans from ten ethnic groups. We first explore patterns of ethnic variation in gender and sexual politics and then compare causal dynamics across the four policy domains.

Figure 2 shows policy positions for the pan-Asian subsample broken down by ethnic group. The first panel again shows raw group averages, meaning that values are unadjusted for group differences in sociodemographic composition. The bars, as well as the statistically significant F statistics found for each policy item, indicate substantial variability across Asian ethnic groups. We briefly summarize these differences.

Affirmative action for women generally finds more support among Asian groups that experience greater economic precarity in the United States (Bangladeshi, Cambodian, Hmong, Viet-

namese). Chinese Americans report relatively little support, which is not surprising given their recent activism against race-based affirmative action in higher education (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018). Disaggregation of men's and women's responses (see figure A1) reveals significant gender gaps within some ethnic groups, with stronger support for affirmative action among Cambodian, Filipina, and Vietnamese women than among their male counterparts.

Consistent with previous research (Wu and Ida 2018), we find least support for *abortion rights* among groups with strong Catholic cultural heritages (Filipino/a) and among Vietnamese Americans, about 30 percent of whom identify as Catholic (see table A2). Cambodian and Hmong Americans also report relatively low levels of support for legal abortion.

Turning to *protection of sexual and gender minorities*, we find strongest agreement among Indian and Japanese and weakest support among Cambodian, Hmong, and Korean American respondents. Support for *transgender bathroom access* is weaker than support for the general protection of sexual and gender minorities, and Asian views are again wide ranging, with Japanese, Bangladeshi, and Indian Americans most favorable, and Cambodian, Chinese, and Hmong Americans most opposed (see also Wong 2017).

Groups' relative agreement levels vary across the four gender-policy domains. Chinese Americans, for example, are among the least supportive of affirmative action and transgender bathroom access, but in the middle of the pack on the other two items. In other words, attitudinal profiles of Asian ethnic (and racial) groups tend to be indicator-specific rather than generically traditional or progressive.

To what extent can the observed ethnic heterogeneity in policy positions be attributed to group differences in religious, social, or generational composition? To address this question, we again calculated adjusted probabilities of

11. These adjusted values are computed using coefficients from regression models that include all of the social, cultural, and demographic variables listed in table A1, an interaction between gender and gender-identity salience, and dummy indicators distinguishing the four major racial categories.

12. This difference is not surprising given a history of race-based affirmative action policies aimed at addressing anti-black discrimination in the United States.

Figure 2. Support for Policies Related to Gender and Sexuality, by Asian Ethnicity

(A) Unadjusted   (B) Adjusted

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Note: Brackets show 95 percent confidence intervals. Values in panel A are unadjusted proportions reporting support; values in panel B are predicted support levels for persons with average scores on variables included in the regression models. The F-statistics in the upper right corner of each graph provide a measure of unexplained variability across ethnic groups.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

agreement, conditional on similarity in religion, politics, education, nativity, and other traits. Comparing these values in panel B of figure 2 to the unadjusted values in panel A tells us how much ethnic variability in attitudes is explained by group differences in sociodemographic characteristics. Visual comparison indicates modest reductions in intra-Asian heterogeneity, most notably with respect to abortion rights, where some of the shorter bars (Vietnamese and Filipina/o) become taller and some of the taller bars (Chinese, Indian, Japanese) become shorter. These adjustments are partly attributable to group differences in socioeconomic status and religiosity (see table A2).

Reductions in the F statistics between panels A and B confirm an attenuation of ethnic variability when demographically and socially similar persons are compared. Significant differences remain on all four policy items. This residual variation is most pronounced with respect to abortion rights and least pronounced with respect to affirmative action. Unexplained ethnic differences in attitudes toward abortion are likely influenced by distinctive histories of abortion law in countries of ancestry; views on gender-based affirmative action may be less tied to respondents' ethnic identity because this policy is more directly rooted in the American response to systemic racism.

What Predicts Gender Policy Positions of Asian Americans?

Question 3 interrogates the sociocultural determinants of Asian American gender politics and the variability of sociocultural effects across gender-policy domains. This information can be found in table 1, which shows coefficients from four logistic regression models. Results reveal attitudinal effects of politics, religiosity, and immigrant generation that are generally consistent with culture war arguments in the sense that nonreligious, Democratic Party–affiliated, and college-educated persons tend to report more liberal views. Inconsistent with culture war accounts, however, effects differ across these hot-button policy items. Democratic political affinity is unrelated to views on affirmative action, for example, and frequency of religious service attendance is unrelated to views on both protection of sexual minorities and affirmative action. Other than a generally liberalizing effect of agnosticism, we find no differences among major religious traditions in the Asian American sample. Although religious fundamentalism is generally associated with conservative social policy positions, recent research has pointed to more liberal views among Asian American than among white American evangelicals (Wong 2018). This analysis of Asian Americans' gender-policy beliefs in fact shows no significant differences between fundamentalist Christians and their mainline counterparts.[13]

Multigenerational U.S. residency, youth, and college education are positively associated with Asian American support of all policies but affirmative action. This finding is consistent with previous national studies, which suggest that socioeconomic elites are more likely to espouse classically liberal values that define equality in formal procedural terms rather than as efforts to redress historical group-based wrongs (Bobo 1998; Baunach 2002; Kane and Whipkey 2009; Konrad and Hartmann 2001). The positive relationship of age with the affirmative action item

and its negative relationship with the other items likely reflect generational differences—both in the frequency of exposure to openly gay, lesbian, and transgender people, and in understandings of race-based affirmative action, which had more broad-based, bipartisan support during the early years of the civil rights struggle than after the conservative backlash of the 1980s. Net of age, never-married Asians express stronger support for women's rights than their married counterparts do, but do not differ significantly in their support for policies benefiting gender and sexual minorities.

Policy positions of Asian American men and women also depend on the salience of their gender identities (relative to their racial, religious, or national identities). Among men, a strong masculine identity is associated with significantly less support for protection of sexual minorities and transgender bathroom access. Women, by contrast, are more likely to support women's rights claims if they identify more strongly with their gender group.[14] This interaction is depicted in figure 3, where we can see a clear positive relationship of gender-identity salience with women's support for abortion and affirmative action and a clear negative relationship with men's support for rights of sexual and gender minorities. Further disaggregation (not shown) reveals that the negative effects of masculine identity are especially strong among Japanese, Korean, and Indian, and Pakistani men.

Table 1 reveals no significant effect of question wording on pan-Asian responses to the survey items on abortion rights and protection of sexual minorities. We explore possible ethnic differences in wording effects by running separate regression models for versions A and B of the two split-survey items. Regression coefficients suggest more support for abortion rights under question version B than A for some Asian ethnic groups, especially Cambodian, and Vietnamese, although t-tests show that none of the ethnic coefficients differs significantly across

13. Separate regression analyses by ethnicity (available on request) show a traditionalizing effect of Christian fundamentalism on attitudes toward gender and sexual minorities among Chinese and Korean Americans, however.

14. Conditional on an average level of gender-identity salience, we find no significant differences between Asian men and Asian women on any policy measure but affirmative action (see also figure A1).

Table 1. Logit Models Predicting Support for Policies Related to Gender and Sexuality

	Affirmative Action for Women	Abortion Rights	Sexual-Gender Minority Protection	Transgender Bathroom Access
Political affinity (Independent = 0)				
Democrat	0.002	0.647***	0.429*	0.753***
	(0.170)	(0.182)	(0.173)	(0.184)
Republican	−0.206	0.241	−0.0348	0.101
	(0.186)	(0.206)	(0.175)	(0.206)
Religion (other Christian = 0)				
Catholic	−0.443	−0.317	0.493	0.246
	(0.239)	(0.252)	(0.262)	(0.254)
Fundamentalist Christian	−0.321	−0.193	−0.0168	−0.266
	(0.226)	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.237)
Buddhist	−0.120	0.400	0.531	0.315
	(0.286)	(0.267)	(0.283)	(0.262)
Muslim	−1.008	−0.453	−0.667	0.123
	(0.629)	(0.730)	(1.103)	(0.785)
Other religion	0.061	0.636	0.762	0.0681
	(0.365)	(0.353)	(0.414)	(0.373)
Agnostic-atheist	−0.347	0.492*	0.704**	0.482*
	(0.251)	(0.244)	(0.265)	(0.244)
Religious attendance per year	0.002	−0.014***	−0.005	−0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Immigrant generation (second = 0)				
First	−0.263	−0.547**	−0.626**	−0.709***
	(0.186)	(0.189)	(0.204)	(0.194)
Third and higher	−0.383	−0.161	−0.360	−0.0662
	(0.289)	(0.268)	(0.331)	(0.265)
U.S. citizen	0.212	0.448	−0.009	−0.386
	(0.249)	(0.284)	(0.236)	(0.228)
Woman	0.340**	−0.057	0.049	0.032
	(0.123)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.130)
Gender-identity salience, man	−0.182	1.113	−2.957**	−3.305**
	(1.031)	(1.181)	(1.033)	(1.148)
Gender-identity salience, woman	3.269**	3.172**	−0.170	1.644
	(1.127)	(1.225)	(1.341)	(1.241)
Employed	0.170	0.071	−0.026	−0.090
	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.158)	(0.178)
College degree	−0.259	0.321*	0.471**	0.398**
	(0.138)	(0.156)	(0.144)	(0.148)
Family income, ln	−0.393***	0.217**	0.131	−0.106
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.074)
Marital status (married = 0)				
Never married	0.460*	0.627**	0.487	0.153
	(0.198)	(0.238)	(0.252)	(0.210)
Previously married	0.013	0.230	−0.004	0.184
	(0.185)	(0.205)	(0.196)	(0.198)

Table 1. (*continued*)

	Affirmative Action for Women	Abortion Rights	Sexual-Gender Minority Protection	Transgender Bathroom Access
Age, years	0.010*	−0.011*	−0.019**	−0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Abortion QA (= 1)		−0.112		
		(0.130)		
Sexual min QA (= 1)			0.002	
			(0.127)	
Constant	2.489**	−0.050	1.904	1.767
	(0.846)	(0.970)	(1.275)	(0.917)
Observations	2,910	3,040	3,026	2,950

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Note: Data are from the 2016 NAAS post-election survey, weighted to represent the U.S. Asian population. Values are weighted coefficients (standard errors). Models include fixed effects for ten Asian ethnic groups (not shown).
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities of Policy Support

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Note: Lines show the predicted probability of reporting support (or strong support) on the respective policy item. Prediction models include indicators of ethnic group membership and all covariates listed in table A2. Brackets show 95 percent confidence intervals.

models—on either policy item (table A3). Table A3 reveals only one statistically significant difference in coefficients: the negative effect of a highly salient masculine identity on support for protection of sexual minorities holds only under administration of question version A, which includes transgender persons in the class of potentially protected persons. The direction of this difference is consistent with evidence that attitudes are more negative toward transgender than gay and lesbian Americans (Lewis et al. 2017) and suggests that bias against transgender people is particularly strong among people with highly masculine gender identities (see also Bosson and Michniewicz 2013; Hall and LaFrance 2012). Such wording effects are potentially important because they mean that the level and causal dynamics of public support for policy initiatives can be influenced by their cognitive and moral framing.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to widespread stereotypes, results of this study provide no evidence that Asian Americans hold more traditional attitudes about gender and sexuality than members of other major racial groups in the United States. This is true even controlling for a wide range of social, cultural, and demographic variables, including religiosity, political party affiliation, education, and gender-identity salience. Exposure to racial stereotypes, and to racial discrimination in general, likely sensitizes Asian Americans to the structural and cultural disadvantages that subordinate social groups, including women and sexual minorities, face (Chua and Fujino 1999; Kibria 1990; Min 2001; Espiritu 2008; Lu and Wong 2013; Okamoto 2014; Fujiwara and Roshanravan 2018). It is possible that firsthand experience with bigotry and structural disadvantage, combined with Asian women's relatively high occupational status in the United States, moderates effects of any gender-traditional cultural heritages on Asian Americans' gender and sexual politics.

Although these analyses do not support stereotypes of pan-Asian American gender traditionalism, they do reveal substantial variability across Asian ethnic groups that is obscured by popular generalizations about Asians and Asian Americans. Regression analyses link

some of this heterogeneity to group differences in social and cultural traits, including religiosity, politics, nativity, age, and education. Our models, though, leave unexplained substantial differences across Asian American groups, some of which may be attributable to unmeasured particularities of heritage cultures. Ongoing influences of ancestry countries on attitudes, employment patterns, and many aspects of family life are well documented (Leaper and Valin 1996; Read 2003; George 2005; Fernández and Fogli 2009; Röder and Mühlau 2014; Frank and Hou 2015; Finseraas and Kotsadam 2017). Future research should explore in greater depth how positions on specific gender-policy issues map onto different histories of immigrant reception within the United States and distinctive gender regimes in ancestral countries.

In addition to heterogeneity of attitudes, our results reveal heterogeneity in the sociodemographic processes generating these attitudes—in at least two senses. First, the relative positions of racial and ethnic groups covary only weakly. Consistent with previous evidence of multidimensionality in American gender attitudes, we find no clear racial or ethnic gradients of traditionalism (or progressivism) that cut across the four policy domains considered. For example, Cambodian Americans report relatively strong support for affirmative action but relatively weak support on protection of sexual minorities, and Chinese Americans are among the strongest supporters of abortion rights and among the weakest supporters of transgender bathroom access. Second, the sociocultural characteristics most central to the culture war narrative (religion, politics, nativity) show variable effects across gender policy domains. Our regression results indicate, for example, that religiosity (service attendance) is associated with opposition to abortion rights, but not opposition to affirmative action, among Asians.

We also find distinctive effects of feminine and masculine identities on Asian American attitudes that warrant further study. Our findings on gender-identity salience align with those from national studies linking a strong feminine identity to support for gender-related rights claims (Burn, Aboud, and Moyles 2000; Cameron and Lalonde 2001; Becker and Wagner

2009) and linking a strong masculine identity to binary understandings of gender and disapproval of homosexuality and transgender people (Bosson and Michniewicz 2013; Hall and LaFrance 2012; Wood and Eagly 2015; Norton and Herek 2013). They also support an intersectional conceptualization of Asian American attitudes and stereotypes (Tinkler et al. 2020). More research is needed on how effects of gender-identity salience vary across Asian ethnicities, immigrant generations, and religious traditions.

Overall, results provide little evidence of an across-the-board cultural divide between consistent gender liberals and consistent gender conservatives—neither between Asian and non–Asian Americans, nor within the Asian American population. Asian Americans who are secular, Democratic, college educated, and women tend to report more liberal positions, but effects still vary across policy domains. Affirmative action for women is especially distinctive in its causal dynamics, perhaps because of its particular legacy as a remedy for anti-black discrimination. This study provides further evidence that different gender policy positions are shaped by independent, historically specific causal logics.

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

	Asian (N = 3,167)	White (N = 296)	Black (N = 308)	Latinx (N = 826)	Total (N = 4,597)
Affirmative action for women	0.514	0.366	0.712	0.592	0.542
Abortion rights	0.49	0.514	0.468	0.389	0.448
Sexual/gender minority protection	0.665	0.736	0.696	0.641	0.626
Transgender bathroom access	0.442	0.435	0.372	0.383	0.406
Political affinity					
Democrat	0.496	0.467	0.743	0.595	0.52
Republican	0.308	0.410	0.170	0.242	0.352
Independent	0.196	0.122	0.087	0.163	0.128
Religion					
Mainline Protestant	0.090	0.272	0.261	0.062	0.23
Catholic	0.183	0.174	0.067	0.463	0.206
Fundamentalist Christian	0.148	0.279	0.522	0.298	0.304
Buddhist	0.124	0.002	0.009	0.003	0.008
Muslim	0.047	0.002	0.007	0.000	0.004
Other	0.165	0.036	0.027	0.001	0.036
Agnostic/atheist	0.243	0.235	0.106	0.173	0.211
Religion attendance per year	23.836	21.232	29.778	26.346	23.125
	(28.300)	(27.853)	(29.453)	(28.269)	(28.254)
Immigrant generation					
First	0.775	0.019	0.069	0.459	0.128
Second	0.186	0.076	0.115	0.333	0.125
Third and higher	0.039	0.905	0.816	0.208	0.747
U.S. citizen	0.915	0.996	0.985	0.796	0.96
Woman	0.515	0.511	0.560	0.483	0.513
Gender-identity salience	0.252	0.241	0.252	0.251	0.244
	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.085)
Employed	0.587	0.488	0.467	0.617	0.510
	(0.492)	(0.502)	(0.500)	(0.487)	(0.501)
College	0.613	0.488	0.298	0.261	0.437
Family income in $1,000	87.072	84.976	57.971	52.010	76.887
	(76.460)	(72.544)	(62.981)	(50.747)	(70.000)
Marital status					
Married	0.604	0.637	0.364	0.486	0.581
Never married	0.296	0.213	0.391	0.344	0.257
Previously married	0.101	0.150	0.245	0.170	0.162
Age	52.242	53.935	54.418	46.581	52.779
	(20.688)	(20.184)	(20.895)	(20.174)	(20.440)

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

	Bangladeshi (N = 183)	Cambodian (N = 295)	Chinese (N = 260)	Filipino (N = 407)	Hmong (N = 255)	Indian (N = 355)	Japanese (N = 401)	Korean (N = 426)	Pakistani (N = 199)	Vietnamese (N = 406)	Total (N = 3,167)
Affirmative action for women	0.663	0.698	0.371	0.561	0.645	0.496	0.422	0.536	0.496	0.636	0.514
Abortion rights	0.584	0.342	0.628	0.337	0.422	0.623	0.679	0.467	0.497	0.242	0.49
Sexual-gender minority protection	0.728	0.463	0.672	0.68	0.511	0.764	0.751	0.509	0.627	0.624	0.665
Transgender bathroom access	0.537	0.29	0.335	0.409	0.369	0.527	0.638	0.427	0.472	0.439	0.442
Political affinity											
Democrat	0.581	0.356	0.379	0.549	0.5	0.515	0.586	0.621	0.583	0.382	0.496
Republican	0.311	0.204	0.264	0.319	0.184	0.331	0.306	0.303	0.271	0.355	0.308
Independent	0.108	0.44	0.357	0.133	0.316	0.155	0.108	0.076	0.146	0.263	0.196
Religion											
Mainline Protestant	0.001	0.049	0.096	0.087	0.123	0.028	0.197	0.235	0.018	0.006	0.090
Catholic	0	0.008	0.022	0.612	0.016	0.015	0.046	0.079	0	0.298	0.183
Fundamentalist Christian	0	0.053	0.105	0.191	0.19	0.015	0.153	0.454	0.003	0.096	0.148
Buddhist	0.006	0.766	0.181	0.002	0.029	0.003	0.241	0.017	0	0.433	0.124
Muslim	0.907	0	0	0	0	0.096	0	0	0.865	0	0.047
Other	0.021	0.015	0.001	0.015	0.473	0.696	0.021	0	0.033	0	0.165
Agnostic–atheist	0.065	0.109	0.595	0.092	0.17	0.147	0.342	0.214	0.081	0.167	0.243
Religion attendance-year	28.073	15.923	8.984	34.450	16.792	21.212	14.852	37.828	32.097	24.483	23.836
	(31.346)	(20.813)	(19.626)	(28.288)	(25.449)	(26.124)	(23.734)	(32.529)	(29.506)	(27.824)	(28.300)

Table A2. (continued)

	Bangladeshi (N = 183)	Cambodian (N = 295)	Chinese (N = 260)	Filipino (N = 407)	Hmong (N = 255)	Indian (N = 355)	Japanese (N = 401)	Korean (N = 426)	Pakistani (N = 199)	Vietnamese (N = 406)	Total (N = 3,167)
Immigrant generation											
First	0.907	0.731	0.731	0.774	0.581	0.852	0.43	0.811	0.82	0.848	0.775
Second	0.091	0.269	0.232	0.182	0.412	0.143	0.22	0.182	0.178	0.152	0.186
Third and higher	0.002	0	0.037	0.044	0.007	0.004	0.35	0.007	0.003	0	0.039
U.S. citizen	0.993	0.938	0.918	0.93	0.965	0.894	0.816	0.941	0.915	0.937	0.915
Woman	0.511	0.56	0.475	0.573	0.49	0.476	0.583	0.569	0.444	0.466	0.515
Gender-identity salience	0.245	0.250	0.260	0.252	0.266	0.256	0.258	0.252	0.252	0.226	0.252
	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.094)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.081)
Employed	0.64	0.5	0.617	0.524	0.689	0.693	0.442	0.573	0.66	0.546	0.587
											(0.492)
College	0.504	0.25	0.572	0.595	0.258	0.769	0.615	0.673	0.694	0.454	0.613
Family income in $1,000s	72.148	47.571	74.995	83.436	52.073	125.985	90.326	81.890	109.642	55.674	87.072
	(78.390)	(55.754)	(68.248)	(72.851)	(45.326)	(85.305)	(78.709)	(72.681)	(85.121)	(53.068)	(76.460)
Marital status											
Married	0.692	0.601	0.618	0.587	0.452	0.603	0.516	0.598	0.74	0.655	0.604
Never married	0.282	0.269	0.307	0.259	0.503	0.366	0.194	0.287	0.208	0.278	0.296
Previously married	0.027	0.13	0.075	0.154	0.044	0.031	0.29	0.115	0.051	0.067	0.101
Age	40.774	48.395	51.551	57.372	36.316	44.627	63.863	54.512	46.053	53.840	52.242
	(14.703)	(18.172)	(21.031)	(20.778)	(14.739)	(18.304)	(19.406)	(21.326)	(18.155)	(19.182)	(20.688)

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.

Note: Values are means and standard deviations. Data are from the 2016 NAAS post-election wave, weighted to represent the respective U.S. population group. Sample sizes are unweighted.

Figure A1. Support for Policies Related to Gender and Sexuality

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.

Note: Bars show the unadjusted proportions reporting support (or strong support); brackets show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Table A3. Support for Split Sample Survey Items Among Asians, by Question Wording

	Abortion Rights		Sexual-Gender Minority Protection	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
Asian ethnicity (Bangladesh = 0)				
Cambodian	−2.354**	−1.043	−2.196	−2.190
	(0.885)	(0.922)	(1.139)	(1.208)
Chinese	−0.508	−0.445	−1.676	−0.942
	(0.787)	(0.901)	(1.050)	(1.161)
Filipino	−1.385	−0.852	−1.141	−0.681
	(0.816)	(0.877)	(1.053)	(1.161)
Hmong	−1.992*	−1.563	−2.533*	−2.380*
	(0.773)	(0.888)	(1.008)	(1.175)
Indian	−0.993	−0.469	−1.596	−0.617
	(0.700)	(0.814)	(0.947)	(1.158)
Japanese	−0.117	−0.234	−1.096	−0.372
	(0.814)	(0.917)	(1.073)	(1.175)
Korean	−0.601	−0.588	−1.895	−1.459
	(0.769)	(0.883)	(1.036)	(1.159)
Pakistani	−0.502	−0.242	−0.715	−0.219
	(0.506)	(0.400)	(0.641)	(0.403)
Vietnamese	−2.513**	−1.523	−1.681	−0.942
	(0.823)	(0.894)	(1.061)	(1.179)
Political affinity (Independent = 0)				
Democrat	0.588*	0.655**	0.348	0.531*
	(0.270)	(0.246)	(0.238)	(0.246)
Republican	0.311	0.153	0.0435	−0.102
	(0.310)	(0.279)	(0.261)	(0.239)
Religion (other Christian = 0)				
Catholic	−0.582	−0.149	0.275	0.637
	(0.395)	(0.333)	(0.408)	(0.353)
Fundamentalist Christian	−0.333	−0.099	−0.397	0.277
	(0.354)	(0.329)	(0.377)	(0.318)
Buddhist	0.308	0.499	0.439	0.750*
	(0.424)	(0.348)	(0.446)	(0.365)
Muslim	−0.045	−0.830	−1.195	−0.534
	(0.701)	(0.896)	(0.992)	(1.209)
Other religion	0.680	0.508	0.652	0.821
	(0.491)	(0.500)	(0.567)	(0.562)
Agnostic-atheist	0.056	0.899**	0.370	1.124**
	(0.364)	(0.338)	(0.401)	(0.355)
Religious attendance per year	−0.017***	−0.012**	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Immigrant generation (second = 0)				
First	−0.595*	−0.472	−0.778*	−0.524
	(0.255)	(0.261)	(0.312)	(0.280)
Third and higher	−0.377	0.0371	0.109	−0.578
	(0.392)	(0.338)	(0.623)	(0.349)

Table A3. (*continued*)

	Abortion Rights		Sexual-Gender Minority Protection	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
U.S. citizen	0.662	0.098	0.027	0.089
	(0.416)	(0.361)	(0.305)	(0.355)
Woman	0.021	−0.077	−0.001	0.081
	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.186)	(0.183)
Gender-identity salience, man	2.080	−0.374	**−5.307*****	**−0.397**
	(1.668)	(1.557)	**(1.511)**	**(1.396)**
Gender-identity salience, woman	2.571	3.718*	−0.680	0.162
	(1.791)	(1.640)	(2.148)	(1.695)
Employed	0.037	0.100	−0.030	−0.008
	(0.206)	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.223)
Family income, ln	0.274**	0.177	0.154	0.117
	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.104)	(0.115)
College degree	0.576**	0.0920	0.563**	0.390
	(0.212)	(0.226)	(0.199)	(0.211)
Marital status (married = 0)				
Never married	1.139***	0.227	0.494	0.458
	(0.344)	(0.324)	(0.330)	(0.364)
Previously married	0.376	0.122	0.150	−0.168
	(0.302)	(0.282)	(0.273)	(0.269)
Age, in years	−0.002	−0.019*	−0.026***	−0.013
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	−0.973	0.643	2.943*	1.108
	(1.167)	(1.220)	(1.365)	(1.527)
Observations	1,541	1,499	1,516	1,510

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Note: Version (A) of abortion rights offers the following four choices: abortion should always be legal; legal most of the time; legal only in cases of rape, incest; legal to protect the life of the mother and illegal in all other cases. Version (B) asks respondents to choose the specific circumstances under which abortion should be legal: abortion should not be legal under any circumstances, even if the mother's life is in danger; only be legal in certain circumstances, such as when a woman's health is endangered or when pregnancy results from rape or incest; legal during the first three months of pregnancy, no matter what the reason; and legal under any circumstance. For protection of sexual and gender minorities, the two versions are "Do you favor or oppose legal protections against discrimination against gay, lesbian, and transgender people?" (version A), and "Do you favor or oppose legal protections against discrimination against gays and lesbians (version B)?" Bolded are coefficients that are statistically different across models. Data are from the NAAS 2016 post-election wave, weighted to represent the U.S. Asian population.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

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Asian American Perspectives on Immigration Policy

VAN C. TRAN AND NATASHA K. WARIKOO

Despite the rapid growth in both documented and undocumented Asian Americans, their attitudes toward immigration policy are not well understood. Drawing on data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey, this article examines both interracial and intra-Asian differences in views toward immigration. Relative to other racial groups, Asians are as likely to support legal migration, but less likely to support undocumented migration. We document significant diversity among Asians. As labor migrants, Filipinos support a congressional increase in annual work visas. As economic migrants, Chinese and Indians support an increase in annual family visas. As refugees, Vietnamese are least supportive of pro-immigration policy. These findings contribute to research on policy support by systematically including Asian Americans in this debate and by revealing their diverse policy perspectives.

Keywords: Asian Americans, immigration policy, visa policies, undocumented immigrants, in-group and out-group attitudes

Immigration is back on the political agenda. Immigration policies have sparked intense public debate, increasing immigration restrictions being a hallmark of the Trump administration. Citing public health concerns and economic crisis during the coronavirus pandemic, immigration has virtually come to a halt since March 2020. This restriction is part of a long-term goal by the Trump administration to curtail all forms of immigration. From the Muslim ban and the Mexican border wall to the drastic reductions of annual refugee quotas and visas for skilled immigrant workers, immigration policy is a key political issue having ramifications for the lives of millions of immigrants in the United States. Although immigration policy is most likely to affect Latinx Americans, Asians Americans—the most rapidly growing racial group in the United States—are an increasingly important constituency.[1] Still, public opinion

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1. We adopt the gender-neutral term Latinxs and Latinx Americans to refer to the U.S. Hispanic population. We use Asians, Asian Americans, and U.S. Asians interchangeably to refer to the U.S. Asian population.

research has yet to focus on racial attitudes and policy support among U.S. Asians, including their views on immigration policy.

Asians are not only the fastest growing racial group, they are also the fastest growing segment in the U.S. electorate (Budiman 2020). In 2018, the Asian population was 22.6 million, accounting for 6.9 percent of the total U.S. population. In 2009, Asians surpassed Latinxs in the number of immigrant arrivals each year (Pew Research Center 2012). In 2013, China and India overtook Mexico as the top sending countries of new immigrants to the United States (Jensen 2015). As Asian immigration has grown, so has the estimated undocumented Asian population, which tripled from half a million to 1.7 million from 2000 to 2015. By 2015, one in seven Asian immigrants was undocumented, accounting for 15.7 percent of the total undocumented population in the United States (Ramakrishnan and Shah 2017). Given these trends, immigration policy has a direct impact on U.S. Asians. At the same time, their views are heterogeneous because Asians are internally diverse in national origin, social class, and political ideology—both within and across Asian ethnic groups (Lee, Ramakrishnan and Wong 2018).

Public opinion research on Asians trails their growing presence. Previous research has mostly focused on Whites' immigration attitudes and—more recently—the perspectives of Latinxs, for whom immigration policy historically had the most substantial impact (Fussell 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Where do U.S. Asians stand on immigration policy? As the most educated and highest-income racial group, Asians might align closely with Whites, who generally express weaker support for immigration than Blacks and Latinxs. As a minority group with the highest proportions of foreign-born population (67 percent), Asians might express more support for pro-immigration policy than other racial groups—including Latinxs—given research showing that foreign-born Latinxs express more support for pro-immigration policy compared to U.S.-born respondents (Ramakrishnan and Shah 2017; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand 2010).

This article addresses the lack of research on Asians' immigration attitudes. We leverage data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS)—a large, nationally representative survey of Asian Americans. Because the experiences and attitudes of Asians are not typically reflected in national surveys and polls, our analyses make a unique contribution to prior work on immigration attitudes. Specifically, we examine three immigration policies—two related to legal migration and one to undocumented migration. The first two measure support for an increase of visas for work and family reunification; the last measures support for a path to naturalization for undocumented immigrants.

This article answers three key questions. First, how do Asian Americans' attitudes toward immigration policy compare with those of Whites, Blacks, and Latinxs? Given the recent increase in the number of undocumented U.S. Asians and the high proportion of foreign-born Asians, we hypothesize that Asians' views on a path to citizenship will converge with those of Latinxs, which are more favorable relative to Whites and Blacks (Fussell 2014). Because the long wait for visas from some countries has contributed to the spike in undocumented migration over the last decades (Massey and Penn 2012), we further hypothesize that Asians—like Latinxs—will be more likely than Blacks and Whites to support annual increases of work visas and family visas, which together would raise the annual ceiling on legal migration into the United States.

Second, how does policy support vary by national origin among Asians? The inclusion of ten Asian ethnic groups in the 2016 NAAS enables us to compare across groups. We hypothesize that Asian ethnic groups with a higher share of undocumented and foreign-born population and those with a higher percentage of Democrat-identified adults will be more likely to support these policies. Further, we hypothesize that the degree to which a group makes use of a specific policy or has viable alternative options toward legalization will be associated with support for specific immigration policies.

Third, which factors drive support for these policies? Drawing on prior research, we examine the roles of acculturation and identity, per-

ceived economic security, intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups. In addition, we ask how well theories that originated from Whites and Latinxs' immigration attitudes predict policy support among U.S. Asians. This is because standard predictors of political participation and policy views fare poorly when applied to other non-Black and non-White groups (Kasinitz et. al 2008; Tran 2017).

Contrary to our expectations, we find that Asians are as likely as other groups to support an increase in work or family visas, but Asians are least likely to support a path to citizenship for the undocumented. Among Asians, diversity across ethnic groups is significant. As labor migrants, Filipinos are most supportive of a congressional increase in annual work visas. As economic migrants, Chinese and Indians are most supportive of increase in annual family visas. As refugees, Vietnamese are least supportive of pro-immigration policy. On a path to citizenship, Filipinos are most supportive, in large part because of their higher level of daily contacts with Latinxs. Specifically, we point to pathways of entry, socioeconomic diversity, party identification, alternative avenues to legalization, and the size of the undocumented population as key drivers of divergent policy views among Asians.

Diverse political identities make U.S. Asians an important constituency courted by both political parties in both local and national elections. In the 2016 NAAS, 47 percent self-identify as Democrats, 27 percent as Republicans, and 26 percent as Independents. These statistics mask significant variations within the Asian population by national origin: Chinese and Vietnamese are more likely to identify as Independents and Indians and Filipinos as Democrats. Yet we know little about political and policy views among Asians—even on basic issues related to immigration—nor what shapes their views. Understanding Asian American perspectives on immigration policy can provide insights for immigration advocacy, political organizing, as well as voter mobilization and, more broadly, for how Asian Americans will influence party politics and group mobilization in the United States.

DRIVERS OF SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY

Despite the rhetoric in the media, most Americans strongly support immigration and immigrants, including the undocumented. A majority of Americans believe that immigrants strengthen American society, with support being higher among younger cohorts (Jones 2019). For example, 70 percent of Americans believe legal immigration should increase or remain at its current level (Pew Research Center 2018). A majority oppose the curtailment of family reunification visas, and more than 80 percent support a legal pathway to citizenship for residents who came to the United States as children (Newport 2018). Despite this broad support, important racial differences in attitudes toward immigration are apparent. We highlight scholarship on attitudes toward immigration policy mostly among Whites and Latinxs, and then consider the implications for Asian Americans.

Research on attitudes toward immigration finds that many demographic characteristics—younger, more educated, Hispanic, foreign born, and low income—are associated with greater support for immigrants and pro-immigration policy (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Research to date has often assumed a relationship between economic self-interest and immigration attitudes, emphasizing the roles of labor market competition, perceived economic threat, and perceived fiscal burden on U.S. society as potential negative drivers of immigration support. However, only modest relationships have been found between individual economic self-interest and immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2104). Beyond self-interest, a "cosmopolitan perspective"—associated with high levels of education, professional labor-market status, and experiences living abroad—has been shown to be associated with more positive attitudes toward immigration (Haubert and Fussell 2006).

Social psychological factors, including perceived cultural threat and intergroup contact, also matter. Research based on the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954)—that greater contact with out-group members of equal status with common goals and a collaborative spirit in institutional settings will be associated with more

support for immigration—has been inconclusive to date. On the one hand, Whites living in close proximity to Asians express more positive attitudes on immigration than those who do not (Ayers et al. 2009; Ha 2010; Hood and Morris 1997). On the other hand, research on the association between contact with Latinxs and immigration attitudes is more mixed. Some findings are consistent with the contact hypothesis (Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 2000; Taylor and Schroeder 2010) whereas others show a relationship between proximity to Latinxs and weaker support for immigration (Ayers et al. 2009; Ha 2010). Overall, more contact with Latinxs tends to decrease Whites' prejudice toward and perceived threat from Latinxs (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Fussell 2014). In turn, negative stereotypes and feelings of social distance from Latinxs are associated with less support for immigration, above and beyond beliefs about personal economic conditions (Ayers et al. 2009; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Lee and Ottati 2002).

Research has framed immigration as an out-group issue for Whites and as an in-group issue for Latinxs, especially on undocumented immigration. Relative to Whites, Latinxs not only routinely rate immigration as a much more important policy issue (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011), but also express more support for pro-immigrant policies than Whites (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Given the high percentage of foreign-born Latinxs, support for immigration policy is implicitly portrayed as in-group support because immigration policy has an outsized impact on Latinxs—the country's largest racial minority group.

At the same time, differences among Latinxs are significant. In general, foreign-born Latinxs express more support for pro-immigration policy than their U.S.-born counterparts (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011; de la Garza 1998; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand 2010; Sanchez 2006). Among the immigrant generation, naturalization may further dampen support for immigration policy. For example, Aida Just and Christopher Anderson (2015) find that naturalized citizens in Europe express less support for pro-immigration

policy than noncitizen immigrants. Acculturation and identity also matter. For example, the strength of in-group identity shapes the extent to which identity-based political messages and coethnic representation resonate with individuals (Schildkraut 2013; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016). Attachment to Spanish, strong ethnic identity, and lower levels of acculturation are strongly associated with support for immigration among Latinxs (Branton 2007; Knoll 2012; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand 2010). In contrast, cultural assimilation is associated with higher nativism (Knoll 2012) and with lower support for immigration policy (Branton 2007). Because Latinxs view immigration policy as an in-group issue, strong in-group identity bolsters support for immigration whereas acculturation and assimilation dampen it.

ASIAN AMERICANS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY

Media images of immigration tend to portray it as a Latinx issue (Chavez 2008). We know that media narratives about immigration shape attitudes (Abrajano and Singh 2009). Changes in the attention paid to immigration and the type of narratives expressed also correspond to changes in individual attitudes (Burns and Gimpel 2000). In turn, these narratives may shape support for immigration policy among Asians, through their constructed perceptions of in-group benefits versus out-group commonality. Similar to Whites, Asians may perceive immigration policies, especially those targeting undocumented immigrants, as an out-group policy issue more relevant to Latinxs than to their own group experiences, even if a higher percentage of Asians are immigrants than of Latinxs. Beyond media images, U.S. Asians are more assimilated than Latinxs, reporting higher levels of socioeconomic attainment, higher rates of intermarriage, and lower rates of language retention (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Bialik 2017). Asian immigrants are also half as likely to be undocumented as Latinxs. In 2015, only 7.4 percent of Asians (1.5 million) relative to 14.9 percent of Latinxs (8.4 million) were undocumented.[2] Asians will thus report

2. Authors' calculations based on statistics from Flores (2017), Lopez Ruiz, and Patten (2017), and Passel and Cohn (2017).

lower levels of immigration policy support than Latinxs.

On the other hand, work visas are particularly important to Asian immigration. Overall, 25 percent of residency permits granted to Asian immigrants are based on work visas, versus only 16 percent for all immigrants (Zong and Batalova 2016). As a result, Asians may be more supportive of increasing work visas than Latinxs, especially if Asians view this policy issue as an in-group one. Similarly, Asians may be more supportive of increasing family visas, given the importance of family reunification as a policy mechanism for their entry into the United States (Tran, Guo, and Huang 2020). Moreover, Asians have the highest proportions of foreign-born population and a low percentage of naturalized citizens relative to other race groups in the United States. As a result, Asians are likely to express stronger support for immigration policy, given the disproportionate impacts of such policy on their own group.

INTRA-ASIAN DIVERSITY IN POLICY SUPPORT

Given the diversity among Asians, do U.S. Asians hold a common policy position or are differences among them significant by ethnicity? What accounts for differences in Asian Americans' policy attitudes? Four theoretically important factors underlie ethnic differences among Asians: social class, legal and alternative pathways of entry, the size and proportion of the undocumented population, and party identification. To illustrate this diversity, we focus on the four largest Asian ethnic groups—Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese. Altogether, they accounted for 74 percent of the Asian population and 69 percent of the Asian undocumented population in the United States in 2015 (Tran, Lee, and Huang 2019; Ramakrishnan and Shah 2017). These four groups are broadly representative of the Asian ethnic communities, especially of many smaller Asian ethnic groups.

China and India are the two largest countries in the world by population size, generating significant pressures for international migration. As economic migrants, Chinese and Indian immigrants are quite similar. First, both are hyperselected and highly educated (Tran, Lee, and Huang 2019). Second, they are also the two most educated U.S. ethnic groups. As of 2015, 72 percent of Indians and 54 percent of Chinese in the United States were college educated, versus only 29 percent of Vietnamese (Lopez, Ruiz, and Patten 2017). Relatedly, Indians have the highest median household income ($100,000) among Asians (Tran, Lee, and Huang 2019).

On pathways of entry, China (32.5 percent) and India (17.3 percent) accounted for half of the 1,079,000 international students studying in the United States in 2017. By contrast, Vietnam accounted for only 2.1 percent and the Philippines less than 1 percent in 2017 (Zong and Batalova 2018a). Moreover, India (71.7 percent) and China (13 percent) together accounted for 85 percent of H-1B petitions for skilled workers in specialized occupations that received approvals in 2019 (USCIS 2020).[3] Therefore, we expect Chinese and Indians to report more support for an increase in work and family visas. In addition, China is the largest sending country of asylum seekers in the United States, and the origin point of the largest number of both asylum seekers and individuals granted asylum in recent years (8,101 and 6,905, respectively, in 2018), which may lead to the perception among Chinese that asylum is a viable alternative to U.S. residency (Mossaad 2018).

On legal status, India and China accounted for more than half of the total undocumented Asian population in 2017—the highest shares among all Asian groups (Ramakrishnan and Shah 2017). Specifically, the proportions of undocumented immigrants among Vietnamese and Filipinos are smallest (6.2 percent), relative to 7.8 percent among Chinese, and 11.5 percent among Indians. As a result, we expect Chinese and Indians to be more supportive of a path to naturalization than other Asians and Vietnamese to be the least supportive.

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3. An H-1B temporary worker is admitted to the United States to perform services in a "specialty occupation" which is defined as "an occupation that requires: (a) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and (b) attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in the specific specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States" (USCIS 2020, 2).

On political ideology, Chinese and Indians differ significantly in their primary leanings. Chinese are more conservative, the highest proportion being Republican (33 percent) and the second highest share being Independent (41.8 percent). By contrast, Indians are more likely to be Democrat (46.4 percent) and less likely to be Republican (23.2 percent).[4] Given their conservatism, Chinese should be less supportive of a path to citizenship than Indians.

As labor migrants, Filipinos for the most part secure lawful permanent resident status through family reunification (Zong and Batalova 2018b). In 2019, the Philippines ranked second—only after Mexico—on the immigrant waiting list for both family-sponsored and employment-based visas (U.S. Department of State 2019).[5] As further evidence of their concentration as a labor migrant group, Filipinos made up less than 1 percent of U.S. international students in 2017 (Zong and Batalova 2018a) and less than 1 percent of H-1B visa holders in 2019 (USCIS 2020). Politically, Filipinos are most likely to be Democrat (52.8 percent) and least likely to be Republican (23.2 percent). As a result, Filipinos should report high levels of support for pro-immigration policy, especially for an increase in family reunification visas.

As a refugee group, Vietnamese were resettled in the United States and report the lowest amount of human capital among these four groups (Zhou and Bankston 1999; Tran, Lee, and Huang 2019). Given their pathway of entry and modest background, Vietnamese accounted for less than 0.3 percent of all H-1B visa holders in 2019 and are least likely to benefit from a work visa increase. However, they should be as likely as the other groups to support family visa increase given the importance of the family reunification program (Tran, Guo, and Huang 2020). Vietnamese also report the lowest proportion of undocumented population (9 percent), so a path to naturalization may feel less urgent. Politically, the majority of Vietnamese identify as Independent (54.3 percent) and

are least likely to be Democrat (21.9 percent). Relative to Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos, we expect Vietnamese to be the least supportive of increasing work visas and a path to naturalization, but as supportive as other groups toward an annual increase in family visas.

The remaining Asian ethnic groups are more similar to one or another of these groups. Koreans and Japanese—two highly educated and politically liberal East Asian groups—are more similar to Indians. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis—two large labor migrant groups—are similar to Filipinos, and hence we expect their policy views to resemble those among Filipinos. Finally, the other refugee groups—Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong—are most similar to Vietnamese, and hence their views should converge with those of Vietnamese.

DATA AND METHODS

The 2016 NAAS is a national telephone survey conducted between November 10, 2016, and March 2, 2017. The survey included adult Asian respondents from ten ethnic groups (4,393) and four non-Asian groups: Hispanics/Latinxs (1126); non-Hispanic Whites (408); non-Hispanic Blacks (401); and Pacific Islanders (120). We include Pacific Islanders in all the multivariate analyses, but do not discuss them in detail. A full description of 2016 NAAS is available in the introduction to this volume (see Lee and Ramakrishnan 2021), and in articles that have already analyzed it (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018; Lee and Tran 2019).

Dependent Variables

To capture attitudes toward immigration, the dependent variables are ordinal measures of support for policies on work visas, family visas, and a path to citizenship for the undocumented. Specifically, the survey asks how much respondents agree or disagree with the following three statements: Congress needs to increase the number of work visas it issues every year; Congress needs to increase the number of family visas it issues every year; and undocu-

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4. Authors' calculation.

5. Filipinos rank higher than both China and India on the waitlist, despite the fact that China and India both reported populations of 1.39 and 1.35 billion people in 2018—thirteen times larger than the Filipino population of 106.7 million.

mented or illegal immigrants should be allowed to have an opportunity to eventually become U.S. citizens. The response categories are on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The three policies capture both sides of immigration debates, on legal migration—visa policies—and on illegal migration—legal path to citizenship. For this article, we include respondents with a valid response to these three questions and exclude those with don't know or refused responses. These missing responses accounted for about 9 percent of the sample for the measures of visa policies and about 4 percent of the sample for the survey measure for a path to naturalization.

Independent Variables

Beyond race and Asian ethnicity, the independent variables include five sets of variables that research has shown to have some predictive power for support for immigration policy: demographic characteristics, acculturation and identity, perceived economic security, intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups.

First, we adjust for demographic characteristics: immigrant generation, age, gender, proportion of life in the United States, political party identification, socioeconomic status (education and income), and geographic region. For immigrants, we calculate "the proportion of life in the United States" by dividing length of residency in the United States by age. For nonmigrants whose entire life has been in the United States, we assign the value of 1. Thus, the values for this variable range between 0 and 1 (Tran, Guo, and Huang 2020). Because one-third of our sample lived in California at the time of the survey, we control for geographic region using a dummy indicating those who live in this state.

Second, we adjust for acculturation and identity using two survey measures on identity.[6] We measure the strength of racial identity by using a 4-point scale on how important racial identity is to respondents, from not at all important (1) to extremely important (4). Similarly, we measure the strength of American

identity by using a 4-point scale on how important American identity is to respondents, from not at all important (1) to extremely important (4).

Third, we adjust for perceived economic security using three survey measures on union membership, current financial situation, and future financial outlook. Specifically, the question on current financial situation asks: "How about your own financial situation? So far as you and your family are concerned, how worried are you about your current financial situation?" The response categories are on a 5-point scale from extremely worried (1) to not at all worried (5). We also measure future financial outlook by using a 5-point scale on how respondents perceive their and their family's financial situation in a year's time from the survey point, from much worse (1) to much better (5).

Fourth, we adjust for intergroup contact using four measures of personal contact respondents report in their daily life with each of the four racial groups. These measures are on a 4-point scale on how much contact they have with Whites, Blacks, Latinxs, or Asians, from no contact at all (1) to a lot of contact (4).

Finally, we adjust for respondents' perceived commonality with other racial groups on four dimensions—a common race, a common culture, common economic interests, and common political interests, using four separate questions that ask what, if anything, different races in the United States share with one another. The response categories are dichotomous for each of these four measures, yes indicating agreement to perceived commonality in each of the dimensions among racial groups (for descriptive statistics and for the full list of independent variables, see table A1).

Modeling Strategies

The analyses proceed in three stages. First, we describe the bivariate results for each of the three dependent variables by race and by Asian ethnicity. Second, we use ordinal logistic regressions to examine racial differences in support for the three policies while controlling for demographics, importance of identity, per-

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6. One measure of acculturation is immigrant generation, but we treat it as a demographic control in this analysis.

ceived economic security, daily intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups. Third, we examine policy support among Asian respondents to probe intra-Asian diversity, using ethnic origin as our key independent variable.

Because the dependent variable is ordinal, we use ordinal logistic regressions with robust standard errors and report the proportional odds ratios for ease of interpretation. The multivariate models for measuring differences by race and by ethnic origin (among Asians) are as follows:

$$\Pr(Y_j = i) = \Pr(k_{i-1} < \beta_1 R_{1j} + \beta_2 D_{2j} + \beta_3 I_{3j} \le k_i), \quad (1)$$

$$\Pr(Y_j = i) = \Pr(k_{i-1} < \beta_1 E_{1j} + \beta_2 D_{2j} + \beta_3 I_{3j} \le k_i), \quad (2)$$

where $\Pr(Y_j = i)$ denotes the log odds of the probability of respondent j reporting support for a particular immigration policy (Y) at an ordinal level i. R_j and E_j denote the racial (R) and ethnic (E) background (among Asians) for respondent j, the key independent variables of interest. D_j is a vector of demographic control variables for respondent j. I_j is a vector of control variables on the importance of identity, perceived economic security, intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups for respondent j. And k is the number of categories within the ordinal dependent variable ($k = 5$). Equation (1) examines racial differences in support for the overall sample, whereas equation (2) examines ethnic differences in support among Asians.

For each of the dependent variables, we estimate two models. The first controls only for race or Asian ethnicity, along with immigrant generation to establish the baseline differences. The second controls for the demographic variables and introduces the following sets of variables: importance of identity, perceived economic security, intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups. All bivariate and multivariate analyses adjust for the stratified survey design using appropriate final weights in the 2016 NAAS. To facilitate the interpretation of our findings, we use post-regression estimates of predicted probabilities to illustrate selected patterns in racial and ethnic differences in levels of sup-

port, holding other covariates constant at the mean level.

RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY

We begin by describing racial differences in the average support for immigration policy. Figure 1 presents the bivariate results by race and by policy. On visa policies, the mean levels of support for work or family visas are lowest among Whites and Asians and highest among Latinxs. Overall, the level of support is virtually identical for family visas and work visas for all groups. On a legal path to citizenship, Asians report the lowest support (3.4) and Latinxs report the highest (4.5). For all three policies, support is slightly higher for a legal path to citizenship than for annual visa increases for all groups, with the exception of Asians, for whom the mean levels of support for all three policies is almost identical (3.4 to 3.5 of 5).

Table 1 presents results from ordinal logistic regressions on racial differences in support for the three policies. To begin, models 1 and 2 present results from ordinal logistic regressions on an annual work visa increase as the dependent variable. Controlling for race and immigrant generation, model 1 shows that Latinxs are 1.9 times more likely than Whites to support this policy. On immigrant generation, third-plus-generation individuals are twice as supportive of a work visa increase than the first generation. In model 2, the differences by race and generation are no longer significant once we control for other covariates. Among demographic variables, age, length of time in the United States, education, and political party are significant predictors of support, younger, recently arrived (among immigrants), and less-educated respondents reporting more support.

Model 2 also introduces the full set of covariates: the strength of racial and of American identity, perceived economic security, intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups as predictors of support. Respondents with a more positive future financial outlook report lower levels of support; those with frequent daily contact with Latinxs report higher levels of support. However, daily contact with non-Hispanic groups as well as

Figure 1. Mean Level of Support for Selected Immigration Policies

Source: Authors' compilation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Notes: Mean values are based on the weighted sample. Whiskers are 95 percent confidence interval.

perceived commonality in race, culture, economic, and political interest are not significant.

Models 3 and 4 present results from ordinal logistic regressions on a family visa increase. Controlling for race and immigrant generation in model 3, Latinxs are 1.7 times more likely than Whites to support this policy. By contrast, immigrants are only half as likely than those born in the United States to support an annual family visa increase. In model 4, differences by race and by immigrant generation are no longer significant. Controlling for the full set of covariates, age, proportion of life in the United States, and education are negative, significant predictors of support. Political party identification matters, Democrats being twice as likely as Republicans and Independents to support family visa policies. Finally, future financial outlook, daily contact with Latinxs, and perceived commonality in culture with other groups significantly predict support.

Model 5 shows that Latinxs are 1.7 times more likely than Whites to support a path to citizenship for the undocumented, but Asians are only a third as likely as Whites to do so. This finding is puzzling in light of the increasing population of undocumented Asians. Moreover, Asians are also least supportive of a path to citizenship among all racial groups. In model

6, the Latinx-White difference is no longer significant, but the Asian-White gap persists. Asians are four times less likely than Whites to support a path to naturalization for the undocumented. In addition, being younger or female is associated with higher support of such a policy. More strikingly, the strength of racial identity is positively associated with support only in this regression model. Those with a stronger sense of racial identity are more likely to support a path to naturalization. This lends support for our initial hypotheses that those who consider this policy measure as an in-group issue (strongly identified with their racial group) will be more likely to support it.

Among the other independent variables, we observe the same pattern as in previous models. Those who report a more optimistic financial future are significantly less likely to support a path to citizenship. By contrast, those with more daily contact with Latinxs are 1.3 times more likely to do so. Finally, those who believe that different races in the United States have a cultural commonality are twice as likely to report support for the policy.

In sum, race and immigrant generation show no major differences in regard to support for family or work visa increases. However, Asians are significantly less likely than all other

Table 1. Ordinal Logistic Regressions on Racial Differences in Support for Immigration Policies

	Work Visas Model 1 Odds Ratios	Work Visas Model 2 Odds Ratios	Family Visas Model 3 Odds Ratios	Family Visas Model 4 Odds Ratios	Path to Citizenship Model 5 Odds Ratios	Path to Citizenship Model 6 Odds Ratios
Asian vs. White	0.664	0.645	0.621	0.595	0.305***	0.242***
	(0.165)	(0.185)	(0.158)	(0.186)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Black vs. White	1.478	0.975	1.344	0.998	1.427	1.290
	(0.297)	(0.256)	(0.272)	(0.266)	(0.289)	(0.418)
Latinx vs. White	1.903**	1.339	1.733*	1.343	1.714*	1.405
	(0.438)	(0.368)	(0.421)	(0.440)	(0.365)	(0.430)
NHPI vs. White	0.822	0.757	0.711	0.744	0.567*	0.453*
	(0.200)	(0.248)	(0.174)	(0.230)	(0.138)	(0.153)
Second vs. first	0.697	1.377	0.576*	1.061	1.276	2.004
	(0.168)	(0.565)	(0.145)	(0.459)	(0.322)	(0.903)
Third+ vs. first	0.485**	1.222	0.525*	1.374	0.616	1.106
	(0.129)	(0.527)	(0.139)	(0.632)	(0.155)	(0.490)
Age		0.982***		0.940*		0.978***
		(0.005)		(0.028)		(0.005)
Female		1.395		1.273		1.728**
		(0.246)		(0.233)		(0.326)
Proportion of life in the United States		0.171*		0.120**		0.254
		(0.123)		(0.086)		(0.192)
High school degree		0.313**		0.462*		0.808
		(0.111)		(0.173)		(0.307)
College degree		0.327**		0.479		0.786
		(0.126)		(0.196)		(0.326)
Graduate degree		0.576		0.805		0.816
		(0.242)		(0.347)		(0.363)
Republican vs. Democrat		0.679		0.548**		0.772
		(0.135)		(0.113)		(0.167)
Independent vs. Democrat		0.625		0.533**		0.484**
		(0.156)		(0.126)		(0.130)
Living in California		0.764		0.772		1.026
		(0.158)		(0.150)		(0.216)
Strength of racial ID		1.037		1.003		1.318*
		(0.161)		(0.134)		(0.178)
Strength of American ID		0.926		1.014		1.177
		(0.132)		(0.124)		(0.139)
Union membership		0.899		0.919		1.030
		(0.162)		(0.186)		(0.183)
Current financial situation		0.950		0.941		0.953
		(0.071)		(0.072)		(0.081)
Future financial outlook		0.755**		0.796*		0.669***
		(0.069)		(0.085)		(0.069)
Contact with Whites		0.852		0.934		0.923
		(0.127)		(0.143)		(0.131)
Contact with Blacks		0.970		0.979		0.889
		(0.115)		(0.116)		(0.122)

(*continued*)

Table 1. (*continued*)

	Work Visas Model 1 Odds Ratios	Work Visas Model 2 Odds Ratios	Family Visas Model 3 Odds Ratios	Family Visas Model 4 Odds Ratios	Path to Citizenship Model 5 Odds Ratios	Path to Citizenship Model 6 Odds Ratios
Contact with Asians		1.067		1.079		1.126
		(0.094)		(0.117)		(0.129)
Contact with Latinxs		1.327**		1.361**		1.310*
		(0.138)		(0.149)		(0.149)
Commonality in race		0.911		0.869		0.809
		(0.193)		(0.205)		(0.186)
Commonality in culture		1.467		1.708*		1.913**
		(0.325)		(0.390)		(0.457)
Common economic interest		0.899		1.074		1.031
		(0.188)		(0.217)		(0.229)
Common political interest		0.981		0.706		0.731
		(0.210)		(0.150)		(0.176)
/ cut 1	0.122***	0.002***	0.105***	0.001***	0.087***	0.011***
	(0.034)	(0.003)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.012)
/ cut 2	0.273***	0.006***	0.250***	0.003***	0.137***	0.018***
	(0.076)	(0.007)	(0.068)	(0.004)	(0.037)	(0.020)
/ cut 3	0.493**	0.011***	0.401***	0.005***	0.186***	0.026***
	(0.135)	(0.014)	(0.109)	(0.007)	(0.050)	(0.027)
/ cut 4	1.337	0.034**	1.134	0.017**	0.653	0.104*
	(0.366)	(0.043)	(0.307)	(0.024)	(0.165)	(0.112)
N	5,225	5,225	5,195	5,195	5,453	5,453

Source: Authors' compilation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference group for education is "less than high school." Models 2, 4, and 6 also controlled for respondents' income (results not shown, but available upon request). NHPI = Native Hawaiian–Pacific Islander.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

groups to support a path to naturalization. Among demographic variables, age is the most consistent predictor of support, older respondents reporting less support. Among the other independent variables, future financial outlook, daily contact with Latinxs, and perceived cultural commonality with other racial groups are consistent and significant predictors of support. That respondents who perceive a more positive future financial outlook are less supportive, and that daily contact with Latinxs (the largest immigrant group) and perceived cultural commonality are associated with more support of these policies suggests that cultural rather than economic factors are the main drivers of attitudes on immigration. That neither measure of current economic security—union membership or current financial situation—is significant in predicting policy support is further evidence for this interpretation. This is also consistent with prior work on the perceived cultural threat as predictive of immigration attitudes (Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Fussell 2014).

Predicted Probabilities by Race and Age
Because the dependent variables in table 1 are ordinal, predicted probabilities by race provide an intuitive way to interpret the magnitude of the difference in support. For parsimony, we calculate predicted probabilities based on three

logistic regression models in which the three dependent variables were recoded into three dichotomous variables: strongly disagree or disagree, or neither disagree nor disagree (0); and agree or strongly agree (1). Otherwise, the models are identical to those reported in table 1, including the full set of control variables.

Because policy support declines with age, we visualize this relationship by calculating predicted probabilities by race for respondents age twenty to seventy.

The upper chart in figure 2 further confirms the relative ranking in support for work visa policy by race, Latinxs evincing the strongest support. Holding other covariates constant at the mean level, Blacks and Whites virtually overlap in their support for a work visa increase. By contrast, Asians are the least likely to express strong support for this policy. Regardless of race, however, there is a slight downward slope in all four predicted lines. Older respondents report lower levels of support compared to younger ones. For example, the predicted probability of support for increasing annual work visas for a twenty-year-old Asian respondent is 0.61, whereas the predicted probability for a seventy-year-old Latinx respondent is about 0.59. In other words, twenty-year-old Asians are about as likely as seventy-year-old Latinxs to support this policy. Among Asians, the predicted probabilities drop by about 50 percent from 0.61 for twenty-year-old Asians to 0.39 for seventy-year-old Asians—the lowest level among the four racial groups.

The middle chart in figure 2 presents a similar pattern: predicted probabilities for support of family visa increase is highest among Latinxs, almost identical among Blacks and Whites, and lowest among Asians. To be sure, the confidence intervals overlap across the four racial groups, suggesting that these differences are not statistically significant at every age. Moreover, the downward slope is slightly steeper, indicating larger differences across age groups. Among twenty-year-old respondents, the predicted probabilities of support range from 0.75 to 0.85 for Whites, Blacks, and Latinxs, indicating rather high support. Among Asian respondents, predicted probability is slightly lower for twenty-year-old Asians (0.7) and lowest for seventy-year-old Asians (0.4).

The lower chart shows clear differences in support by race for a path to naturalization. On the one hand, support for a path to naturalization is universally high among Blacks and Latinxs, at approximately 0.9 on a scale of 0 to 1. This support is only slightly lower among Whites, at approximately 0.8, suggesting that the overwhelming majority of respondents support the policy. Moreover, this support is virtually invariant by age for Whites, Blacks, and Latinxs. Asians are the exception: they are least likely to indicate support for this policy. Such support declines slightly from younger to older Asian respondents. In sum, the highlight in figure 2 is the significant lower level of support among Asian respondents relative to other racial groups.

ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY AMONG ASIANS

We now turn to ethnic differences in support for these policies among Asian respondents to unpack intra-Asian heterogeneity. The main independent variable for this set of analyses is the respondents' Asian ethnicity.

Figure 3 presents the bivariate results by Asian ethnic origin. Overall, variation is significant across the ten ethnic groups. On work visa increase, Vietnamese and Koreans report the lowest levels of mean support (3) and Hmong the highest (4). On family visa increase, support is also lowest among Vietnamese (2.2) and Koreans (3) and highest among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (4). On a path to citizenship for the undocumented, mean level of support is lowest among Vietnamese (3) and highest among Hmong (4.4).

Because Vietnamese consistently show the lowest level of support in all three policies, we choose Vietnamese as our reference group in the multivariate analyses that follow. This low level of support is likely due, in part, to Vietnamese being a refugee group. As a result, the question of work visas and family visas may be less pressing for Vietnamese. Similarly, they are least likely to be undocumented and are least likely to be affected by a path to naturalization.

Table 2 presents multivariate results from ordinal logistic regressions on the three policies. For parsimony, we present only the results for Asian ethnic origin and immigrant genera-

Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities in Support for Selected Immigration Policies

Increase Number of Annual Work Visas

Increase Number of Annual Family Visas

Path to Citizenship for Undocumented Immigrants

Source: Authors' compilation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Notes: Predicted probabilities are based on the logistic regression on each policy preference, with the full set of covariates held constant at the mean value. For parsimony, each dependent variable was re-coded into a dichotomy and we only graph the values for the four largest racial groups.

**Figure 3.** Mean Level of Support for Selected Immigration Policies

Source: Authors' compilation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Notes: Mean values are based on the weighted sample. Whiskers are 95 percent confidence interval.

tion. However, the five sets of covariate controls are identical to those we introduced to account for the racial differences in support in table 1. For each policy, we fit two models. The first controls for Asian ethnic origin and immigrant generation. The second adds controls for demographic characteristics, importance of identity, perceived economic security, intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups (see equation 2).

Models 1 and 2 present results from ordinal logistic regressions on a work visa increase as the dependent variable. Controlling for Asian ethnic origin and immigrant generation, model 1 shows that Asian ethnic groups other than Koreans are 1.5 to 3.5 times more likely than Vietnamese to support this policy. The support gap is smallest among Chinese (1.5) and largest among Hmong (3.5). In model 2 these support gaps are attenuated, with the exception of Chinese, but the gaps remain persistently significant. On immigrant generation, model 1 shows the second generation to be 1.3 times more likely than the first generation to support the policy, but this difference becomes insignifi-

cant after controlling for the full set of covariates in model 2.

Model 3 presents results from ordinal logistic regressions on an increase in family visas. Asian ethnic groups other than the Vietnamese are significantly more likely to support this policy. In model 4, these differences not only persist but also remain substantial across groups. For example, Pakistanis are 14.7 times more likely and Koreans are 3.5 times more likely than Vietnamese to support a family visa increase. Comparing models 3 and 4, these findings suggest that demographic controls, along with other drivers of policy support, are not the key factors underlying ethnic differences in policy support among Asians. In model 3, second-generation respondents are 1.4 times more likely than the first generation to support a family visa increase. However, this difference is explained away by other covariates in model 4.

On a path to naturalization, models 5 and 6 show that Chinese, Vietnamese, and Koreans are least supportive of such a policy. By contrast, other Asian ethnic groups report higher support than the Vietnamese. For example,

Table 2. Ordinal Logistic Regressions on Ethnic Differences in Support for Policies (Asians Only)

	Work Visas Model 1 Odds Ratios	Work Visas Model 2 Odds Ratios	Family Visas Model 3 Odds Ratios	Family Visas Model 4 Odds Ratios	Path to Citizenship Model 5 Odds Ratios	Path to Citizenship Model 6 Odds Ratios
Chinese	1.554*	1.736*	8.561***	10.456***	1.050	1.399
	(0.291)	(0.387)	(1.756)	(2.618)	(0.210)	(0.339)
Indian	1.846**	1.759*	10.149***	10.371***	1.824**	1.636*
	(0.430)	(0.454)	(2.402)	(2.795)	(0.403)	(0.401)
Filipino	2.396***	2.801***	8.253***	9.367***	2.308***	2.441***
	(0.444)	(0.556)	(1.696)	(2.153)	(0.477)	(0.519)
Korean	0.939	1.007	3.245***	3.540***	1.126	1.140
	(0.171)	(0.205)	(0.634)	(0.793)	(0.214)	(0.235)
Japanese	1.632*	2.269***	4.841***	6.941***	1.711*	2.277**
	(0.310)	(0.510)	(1.084)	(1.768)	(0.406)	(0.586)
Pakistani	2.832***	2.612***	14.440***	14.670***	3.791***	3.418***
	(0.628)	(0.661)	(3.388)	(4.076)	(0.956)	(0.923)
Bangladeshi	2.450***	2.239**	12.750***	12.532***	4.066***	3.481***
	(0.624)	(0.605)	(3.174)	(3.591)	(1.076)	(0.945)
Cambodian	2.344***	2.114***	7.709***	7.226***	2.469***	1.970*
	(0.494)	(0.473)	(1.760)	(1.778)	(0.623)	(0.525)
Hmong	3.531***	2.890***	8.980***	8.030***	5.790***	5.398***
	(0.783)	(0.770)	(2.395)	(2.476)	(1.671)	(1.771)
Second	1.300*	0.887	1.413*	1.250	2.711***	1.325
	(0.162)	(0.183)	(0.221)	(0.300)	(0.426)	(0.248)
Third and higher	1.189	0.910	1.363	1.363	2.543***	1.564
	(0.190)	(0.205)	(0.354)	(0.422)	(0.631)	(0.433)
/ cut 1	0.258***	0.153**	0.814	0.323	0.364***	0.135**
	(0.041)	(0.102)	(0.129)	(0.261)	(0.063)	(0.095)
/ cut 2	0.706*	0.434	2.349***	0.951	0.802	0.308
	(0.109)	(0.289)	(0.384)	(0.773)	(0.135)	(0.214)
/ cut 3	1.449*	0.925	5.134***	2.129	1.308	0.519
	(0.226)	(0.614)	(0.872)	(1.736)	(0.220)	(0.358)
/ cut 4	4.738***	3.231	17.481***	7.626*	4.266***	1.832
	(0.782)	(2.158)	(3.187)	(6.225)	(0.747)	(1.266)
N	3,518	3,518	3,508	3,508	3,661	3,661

Source: Authors' compilation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference group for Asian ethnic origin is Vietnamese. Each model further controlled for the full list of relevant covariates in the corresponding model in table 1 (results not shown, but available upon request).
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Hmong are 5.4 times more likely and Indians are 1.6 times more likely to support the policy. These findings point to significant variation in the level of support among different Asian ethnic groups. These differences cannot be accounted for by the demographic characteristics, strength of racial or American identity, actual or perceived economic security, daily intergroup contact, and perceived commonality with other racial groups.

On immigrant generation, second- and higher-generation respondents are 2.5 to 2.7 times more likely than the first generation to support a path to citizenship for the undocumented, but this difference is no longer significant after controlling for other covariates in model 6.

Predicted Probabilities by Asian Ethnicity and Age

Because the outcome variables in table 2 are ordinal, predicted probabilities by ethnicity provide an intuitive way to interpret the magnitude of the difference in support. For parsimony, we calculate predicted probabilities based on three logistic regression models in which the three dependent variables were recoded into three dichotomous variables: strongly disagree or disagree, or neither disagree nor disagree (0); and agree or strongly agree (1). Otherwise, the models are identical to those reported in table 2, including the full set of control variables.

Figure 4 graphs the predicted probabilities for the three policy questions. To render the graphs more legible, we focus only on the four largest Asian ethnic groups—Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese. The upper chart shows that Filipinos, Indians, and Chinese report high levels of support for increasing work visas, holding other covariates constant at the mean level. By contrast, Vietnamese are the least likely to support increase in work visas. The four predicted lines show a downward slope, older respondents from the four groups generally reporting lower levels of support than younger respondents. For example, the predicted probability of support for a twenty-year-old Vietnamese respondent is 0.5, similar to that for seventy-year-old Chinese and Indian respondents. In other words, twenty-year-old Vietnamese are about as likely as seventy-year-old Chinese or Indian respondents to support work visa increase.

The middle chart presents a different pattern for family visas. The predicted probabilities for support of an increase in family visa is equally high among Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos, as we would expect. However, Vietnamese report significantly less support for this policy at every age group, and the support gap

is large. For example, the predicted probability of support for a twenty-year-old Vietnamese respondent is only 0.3, versus 0.75 among the other three groups. In other words, young respondents from Vietnamese background are less than half as likely as similarly aged respondents from the other ethnic groups to support a family visa increase. At the other end of the age spectrum, the gap is even larger. Among seventy-year-old Vietnamese respondents, the predicted level of support is only 0.2, about one-third of the predicted level for the other three groups (0.6).

The lower chart shows that Indians and Filipinos report the highest level of support for a path to naturalization for the undocumented, as predicted by their liberal political identities and higher percentage of undocumented (in the case of Indians). Chinese and Vietnamese support for a path to naturalization is lowest. At every age level, Filipinos are the most likely to support this policy and Vietnamese the least likely. For example, the probability of support for a twenty-year-old Vietnamese respondent is 0.6, about the same as for a seventy-year-old Filipino respondent. Overall, support for this policy is lowest among seventy-year-old Vietnamese (0.35).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In summary, U.S. Asians report the lowest level of support for pro-immigration policies. Although we hypothesized that Asians would express more support for pro-immigration policies than Whites and Blacks, we find no such evidence. In fact, Asians express less support for a path to citizenship than Whites and Blacks do (and similar support for increasing work and family visas). This finding is puzzling in light of the growing number of Asian immigrants in the United States. As the racial group with the highest proportion of foreign born, Asians face significant wait time for immigrant and non-immigrant visas. Moreover, the sizable undocumented population among Asians makes their lower support relative to Whites and Blacks particularly puzzling. For example, the number of undocumented Asians in the United States increased by a factor of 3.5 from 2000 to 2015, making Asians the fastest growing group among the undocumented. Growth rates

Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities in Support for Selected Immigration Policies

Source: Authors' compilation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Notes: Predicted probabilities are based on the logistic regression on each policy preference, with the full set of covariates held constant at the mean value. For parsimony, each dependent variable was re-coded into a dichotomy and we only graph the values for the four largest Asian groups.

are lower for other sending regions of the world (Ramakrishnan and Shah 2017).

Perceptions of immigration policy as an in-group versus out-group policy may explain Asian American perspectives. General public perceptions of illegality are still more likely to be associated with Mexican than Chinese or Indian immigrants (Flores and Schachter 2018). One reason is media portrayals of undocumented immigrants as Latinx (Chavez 2008), which have been shown to be associated with attitudes toward immigration (Timberlake and Williams 2012). Moreover, Latinxs accounted for more than 75 percent of the total undocumented population in 2015 and Asians for 12.5 percent (Passell and Cohn 2017). Thus U.S. Asian perspectives of group interest may be driven by the social construction of undocumented identity as "a Latino issue" rather than personal experiences with other undocumented Asians within their own community. Perhaps related to these differences, Asians are also significantly less likely to apply to DACA than Latinxs. Whereas 68 percent of DACA-eligible Mexicans applied to the program, 24 percent of Koreans, 15 percent of Filipinos, 13 percent of Indians, 3 percent of Chinese, and 1 percent of Vietnamese among the DACA-eligible population from each group applied (Migration Policy Institute 2018).

Other factors may also shape Asians' lower levels of support for a pathway to citizenship compared to Latinxs. Noncitizen Asians report being less likely to fear deportation compared to noncitizen Latinxs (7 versus 24 percent), underscoring the intersectionality of race and legal status (Shah and Wong 2019). Moreover, Asians in the United States are also less connected to undocumented immigrants who have experienced detention or deportation than Latinxs. Just 11 percent of noncitizen Asians report knowing someone who has been detained or deported, versus 40 percent of their Latinx counterparts (Shah and Wong 2019). Given these differences, Asians may feel that a pathway to citizenship is less urgent for their group than for Latinxs, despite large and growing numbers of undocumented Asians.

Still, Asians' lower support for a path to naturalization relative to Blacks is especially surprising given research on Black racial atti-tudes. Blacks sometimes express concerns that immigrants may take jobs away from U.S. citizens and directly compete with Blacks in the labor market (Rosentiel and Doherty 2006). Further, if individuals expressed policy preferences in line with their group interest, we would expect Asians to report higher support than Blacks. At the same time, our findings are in line with research showing that Blacks generally express more support for immigration than Whites. This support is driven by symbolic politics, Blacks viewing immigrants as fellow "minorities," and such support resonating with Blacks' generally liberal views (Brader et al. 2010).

Asians' lower support for a path to naturalization relative to Whites' is more puzzling. This counterintuitive finding highlights the need to systematically examine racial attitudes and public opinions among Asians, given the exclusive focus on Whites' and Latinxs' perspectives in prior work. Although the initial Latinx-White gap in support for these policies is explained once the model adjusts for the full set of observable covariates (see table 1), the initial Asian-White gap in support for a path to citizenship remains significant (model 6). This persistently lower support for a path to citizenship suggests that our models do not fully predict attitudes among Asians, even though it fares very well in explaining support for the same set of policies among Latinxs. Put differently, these models have yet to fully capture other cultural, demographic, economic, or social factors that underline support for immigration policy among Asians. Qualitative research can provide further theoretical insights into the key drivers of Asian policy perspectives.

Moreover, that Asians are as supportive of policies more associated with immigrants—family visas and work visas—as Whites and Blacks is also puzzling. Indeed, 55 percent of Asian immigrants gain permanent residency through family reunification, and one in four gain legal residency through work visas (Zong and Batalova 2016). Despite these common pathways to permanent residency, our findings suggest that Asians may also perceive these policies as issues associated with Latinxs, but not with Asians. Relative to Latinxs, for example, Asians are less supportive of both visa pol-

icies.[7] That is, Asians may view immigration policies generally as out-group issues related to Latinxs, regardless of how the specific policies might affect their families or ethnic communities.

We find that age, generation, political identity, and contact with Latinxs play important roles in attitudes toward immigration policy. Younger respondents are more likely to support all three immigration policies than their older counterparts. Unlike previous studies, however, strength of in-group identity does not play a significant role for legal visa policies, except for support of a path to naturalization. Controlling for factors previously found to be associated with immigration-related policy support, including the importance of identity, immigrant generation, or economic outlook, does not explain Asians' low support for a path to naturalization.

One important implication of these findings is that advocates for the undocumented can shore up support among Asians for undocumented residents by spreading greater awareness of how undocumented status affects Asians. Historically, Asian American advocacy organizations have gained power by building racial solidarity across Asian ethnic groups (Okamoto 2014). Our findings suggest those coalitions have not translated into broad support for policies that affect other Asian ethnic groups. On family reunification, Asians face the same long wait times (many years) as Latinxs, given the current backlogs for family reunification, especially for those from Mexico, the Philippines, India, and China—the top four countries with waiting list registrants (U.S. Department of State 2019). Despite these waitlists, Asians may see other avenues for migration, such as H-1B work visas and F1 student visas, as more readily accessible, especially relative to Latinxs. Moreover, Asians' pathways of entry, socioeconomic diversity, alternative avenues to legalization, the size of the undocumented population, and party identification all explain differences in support across Asian ethnic groups, which is a key point.

The diversity and heterogeneity across Asian ethnic origins illustrate the importance of dis-

aggregating Asian American experiences and perspectives by ethnicity. Although ethnicity has been the primary approach to making sense of intra-Asian diversity, some scholars have argued that ethnoracial origin need not be adopted as the a priori unit of analysis (Brubaker 2004; Drouhot and Garip 2021, this issue; Wimmer 2015). We view these approaches as not mutually exclusive and our decision to focus on ethnicity in this analysis is theoretically anticipated. As a policy domain, immigration policy not only has significant impacts on recent immigrants and their families, but also is responsive to the demand for emigration from the sending countries in Asia. Given our focus on Asian Americans' perspectives on immigration, we would expect differences by ethnicity due to each group's pathways of entry, socioeconomic diversity, alternative avenues to legalization, the size of the undocumented population, and party identification.

We illustrate this centrality of ethnicity in our analyses of differences among the four largest Asian ethnic groups—Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese. By pointing to their diversity, we highlight how Asian American perspectives on immigration policies vary across these groups as a result of the history, community, and complexity of migration flows from sending countries. Our comparison of the four largest Asian ethnic groups provides a useful heuristic for understanding other Asian groups. As economic migrants with high levels of selectivity, Koreans and Japanese should be similar to Chinese and Indians in their support for work and family visa policies. Given their Democratic majority, Koreans and Japanese are more likely to support a path to naturalization because they are more similar to Indians (more liberal) than to Chinese (more conservative). As labor migrant groups, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis should resemble Filipinos in their policy views and report strong support for these pro-immigration policies. In fact, Bangladeshis, Filipinos, and Pakistanis are also strikingly similar in their educational profiles (about half report having a college degree) and political affinity (just over half identify as Democrats). As refugee groups, Cambodians and Hmong

should be more similar to Vietnamese. However, both are much more disadvantaged in socioeconomic status—higher poverty and unemployment rates as well as lower proportions of college graduates—and thus should be more supportive of these three policies than Vietnamese.

Looking ahead, we hope our work will generate interest in research on Asian Americans' policy perspectives beyond immigration. For example, future research can examine the conditions under which Asians' policy attitudes might converge or diverge by Asian ethnicity. We also need to better understand how intra-Asian diversity and heterogeneity vary across a broader set of immigration policies and across policy domains (see, for example, Lee and Tran 2019). Moreover, research shows how advocacy and mobilization can not only increase political participation, but also build panethnic and pan-immigrant identities, which may shape Asian American understanding of immigration policy as an in-group versus out-group issue (Pantoja, Menjivar, and Magana 2008). We could not examine these processes in this article, but future research can probe the roles of policy framing, advocacy work, and immigrant organizations in shaping both collective actions toward immigration policy and individual attitudes toward immigration among Asian Americans.

As Asians' share of the American population increases, Asians will also become a more powerful political constituency. As the outcome of the 2020 presidential election made clear, Asians and Latinxs are central to the electoral success from both major parties, especially in swing states where the margins of victory are razor-thin such as Arizona or Nevada. While the majority of U.S. Asians lean Democrat, significant numbers support the Republican policy agenda. Given the diversity among Asians, a better understanding of how they develop their views on immigration policies is essential to assessing their potential impact on U.S. politics more generally. A broader range of public narratives about Asians that encapsulate their diverse experiences of immigration (such as undocumented status) as they relate to different Asian communities will enable Asians to understand how immigration policies directly affect their fellow Asian Americans (Lee and Ramakrishnan 2021; Okamoto 2014). Addressing that diversity while building panethnic coalitions among Asian Americans will be critical to developing political power that can affect policy change (Okamoto 2014; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).

Table A1. Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Independent Variables	White	Asian	Black	Latinx	NHPI
First generation	3.9	79.1	10.5	49.8	25.0
Second generation	8.5	17.1	12.8	30.9	23.8
Third and higher generation	87.7	3.8	76.6	18.9	51.2
Age*	54.2	50.4	50.6	45.6	47.5
Proportion of life in the United States* (%)	98.8	62.0	92.5	79.8	90.1
Female	51.0	53.7	52.6	49.5	45.4
Less than high school	7.3	13.9	15.5	33.0	15.6
High school degree	45.7	27.7	52.7	43.2	52.2
College degree	30.6	36.8	18.2	17.3	17.7
Graduate degree	16.5	21.6	13.7	6.2	14.6
Income, less than $20K	9.4	16.4	18.3	24.0	11.7
Income, $20K–$50K	20.9	19.5	35.3	28.4	18.2
Income, $50K–$75K	19.9	13.4	12.7	14.1	16.0
Income, $75K–$100K	15.4	10.1	6.6	7.7	21.0
Income, $100K–$125K	7.7	7.7	6.0	2.6	14.6
Income, $125K–$250K	6.4	10.4	3.8	4.1	8.9
Income, more than $250K	6.1	4.8	4.0	1.4	2.4
Income, missing	14.3	17.7	13.4	17.3	7.3
Democrats	55.4	41.2	68.7	54.4	37.4
Independents	8.4	31.3	7.4	23.4	23.9
Republicans	36.3	27.5	23.9	21.8	38.8
California resident	8.2	34.5	5.3	27.8	29.5
Importance of racial identity* (1–4)	1.6	2.4	3.0	2.8	2.8
Importance of American identity* (1–4)	3.3	2.5	1.9	2.1	2.2
Union membership	2.0	6.4	4.7	8.3	17.5
Current financial situation* (1–5)	3.8	3.8	3.3	3.4	3.6
Future financial outlook* (1–5)	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2
Contact with Whites* (1–4)	3.7	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.5
Contact with Blacks* (1–4)	2.9	2.6	3.7	2.5	3.0
Contact with Asians* (1–4)	2.5	3.4	2.4	2.2	3.4
Contact with Latinxs* (1–4)	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.6	3.1
Commonality in race	58.0	52.0	78.9	68.7	64.2
Commonality in culture	34.6	61.0	71.9	77.0	81.5
Commonality in economic interest	35.0	58.5	65.5	66.1	62.9
Commonality in political interest	19.2	41.1	56.5	46.9	52.7
N	393	4,205	378	1,074	116

Source: Authors' compilation based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2018.
Notes: Figures for dichotomous or categorical variables are percentages. Figures for continuous or ordinal variables (denoted with *) are mean values. Figures are based on the weighted sample.

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PART IV

Discrimination: Intergroup Commonality and Housing Affordability

Perceived Discrimination and Intergroup Commonality Among Asian Americans

TIFFANY J. HUANG

Group dynamics are central to understanding race in America. Research reveals that Blacks and Latinos who report discrimination are more likely to feel interracial political commonality and intragroup linked fate. However, these findings may not extrapolate to Asian Americans, a heterogeneous group with a recent immigration history. This study examines whether type and context of perceived discrimination influence this relationship for Asian Americans. I find that interpersonal discrimination is associated with political commonality with Hispanics, whereas jobs discrimination is associated with political commonality with Blacks. Both are associated with intraracial and intraethnic linked fate. Neither housing discrimination nor police mistreatment predicts political commonality or linked fate. These findings suggest that promoting solidarity across and within racial groups requires acknowledging the differential impacts of perceived discrimination.

Keywords: perceived discrimination, intergroup relations, political commonality, linked fate, Asian Americans

Between 1965 and 2015, the Asian American population grew from 1.2 percent of the U.S. population to 6.4 percent. Demographers project continued growth, with Asian Americans making up 10 percent of the U.S. population by 2060 (Pew Research Center 2015). Although the Black-White boundary remains the most salient color line in the United States, the growth of post-1965 immigrant groups, including Asian Americans, raises questions about how these groups will relate to each other and to U.S.-born Blacks and Whites in the decades ahead.

Understanding these group dynamics is central to understanding race in America. Individuals identify as members of groups but are also ascribed membership in groups by others (McClain et al. 2009). Group membership is associated with value connotations that pave the way for conflict, competition, and cooperation among groups (Tajfel 1982). Research in this area originally focused on examining White ra-

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cial attitudes, before expanding to include racial minority group attitudes toward both Whites and each other (Oliver and Wong 2003). This literature includes studies on *intergroup* dynamics, examining relationships between ingroups and outgroups. For example, one body of research examines whether Latinos feel commonality with Blacks on dimensions including political interest and socioeconomic status (Jones-Correa 2011). It also includes work on *intragroup* dynamics, examining how individuals relate to being members of groups themselves.[1] For example, the concept of linked fate proposes that as a result of historical and current discrimination, African Americans view their individual fates as tied to the larger group's (Dawson 1994). Social and contextual factors such as intergroup contact and perceived competition influence these dynamics. Reported discrimination has also been associated with feelings of commonality and linked fate for Blacks and Latinos. Social psychologists theorize that experiences of discrimination can evoke the perception of a common identity with groups who would otherwise be considered outgroups, and thus promote feelings of solidarity across racial groups. Likewise, political scientists have suggested that experiences of discrimination may increase perceptions of shared status with other members of one's group, thus promoting feelings of linked fate. These attitudes may in turn predict political behavior, such as cross-racial coalition-building.

However, the racialization of Asian Americans in the United States differs from that of Black and Latino Americans, and may therefore affect the extent to which these concepts of commonality apply to them. Nearly three-quarters of U.S. Asian adults are foreign born (Lopez, Ruiz, and Patten 2017), and consequently lack the collective history and memory of discrimination that Black Americans hold. This, in turn, may affect how Asian Americans view themselves in relation to other racial minority groups. The panethnic Asian American category also encompasses significant linguis-

tic, national-origin, and socioeconomic heterogeneity, which may affect the extent to which Asian Americans view their fates as linked.

Consequently, research on feelings of intergroup and intragroup commonality among Asian Americans has yielded inconclusive results. This study therefore examines the relationship between reported experiences of discrimination and Asian Americans' feelings of commonality toward Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites, as well as their feelings of linked fate with other Asians. I posit that understanding this relationship requires adding nuance to the measurement of reported discrimination. I therefore capitalize on the 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS), which is unique in that it both contains multiple measures of perceived discrimination and allows us to examine both intergroup commonality and intra-Asian linked fate.

In this article, I first review the two concepts of commonality that will be central to this study: intergroup political commonality and intragroup linked fate. Prior research suggests that examining variation in experiences of discrimination could elucidate the relationship between perceived discrimination and feelings of commonality for Asian Americans. I then present multivariate analyses from the 2016 NAAS, which show that the type and context of reported discrimination predict Asian American respondents' feelings of interracial political commonality, as well as their perceptions of intra-Asian linked fate. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for our understanding of linked fate and group consciousness.

INTERGROUP COMMONALITY: INTERRACIAL POLITICAL COMMONALITY

Political scientists have posited that self-interest alone is not enough to sustain political coalitions across racial minority groups. Instead, a sense of shared values and perceived commonality are needed to promote commit-

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1. I use intergroup when referring to feelings toward racial outgroups, and intragroup when referring to feelings toward others within a racial ingroup. For the latter, I use intragroup when referring generally to this phenomenon, and intra-Asian when discussing the empirical case of Asian Americans' feelings of linked fate toward other Asian Americans and toward Asian coethnics.

ment to a heterogeneous group (Kaufmann 2003). Researchers have thus examined the extent to which different racial and ethnic groups perceive commonalities among each other. For example, the 1999 *Washington Post*/Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey on Latinos asked, "How much do [respondent's group] have in common with African Americans?" The more recent 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) included a more specific question on political commonality, asking respondents to consider "things like government services and employment, political power, and representation."

Analyses of these surveys found that predictors of greater feelings of commonality with Black Americans included pan-Latino group consciousness, English ability, being U.S. born, and being a born-again Christian (Jones-Correa 2011; Kaufmann 2003; Sanchez 2008). Contextual factors such as intergroup contact, geographic proximity to large-scale collective actions (such as protest marches), and receiving messages from elites about intergroup relations also affected Latinos' feeling of commonality with Blacks (Jones-Correa 2011; Jones-Correa, Wallace, and Zepeda-Millán 2016; Wallsten and Nteta 2011). On the other hand, feelings of commonality can also be influenced by perceived competition. Building on Herbert Blumer's (1958) group position theory, which argues that intergroup hostility arises from beliefs about where different racial groups ought to stand in the racial hierarchy, one analysis of the 2006 LNS found that U.S.-born Latinos who felt economically threatened were less likely to perceive commonality with Blacks (Wilkinson 2014). National origin may also play a role, with two analyses finding that Mexican Latinos were less likely to perceive political commonality with Blacks, compared to non-Mexican groups, including Cubans, Dominicans, and Ecuadorans, though the authors do not offer theoretical explanations for these findings (Jones-Correa 2011; Kaufmann 2003).[2]

Relative to research on Black-Latino dynamics, research on Asian Americans' perceptions

of intergroup commonality is more nascent. However, social scientists have argued that Asian Americans are uniquely positioned as a racial minority group in the United States. Nearly three-quarters of Asian adults in the United States are foreign born, compared to about half of Latino adults and just under 10 percent of Black adults (Anderson and Lopez 2018; Flores, López, and Radford 2017; Lopez, Ruiz, and Patten 2017). The recency of most Asian immigration means that the group lacks the strong collective memory of discrimination and racism that Black Americans hold (Chou and Feagin 2015). Blacks are also more likely to live in hyper-segregated neighborhoods; Asian Americans may therefore lack the opportunity to develop feelings of commonality through intergroup contact (Kim and Lee 2001). Theoretically, some view Asian Americans as racially triangulated within the U.S. racial hierarchy: Whites valorize them as "superior" relative to the subordinate group (Blacks) but ostracize them as "foreign" (Kim 1999). An alternate theoretical prediction is that some Asian Americans will become "honorary Whites," with its attendant racial privileges, while others will become part of a subordinated "collective Black" (Bonilla-Silva 2004). Critics of the model minority myth, which stereotypes Asian Americans as hardworking and high-achieving, argue that it perpetuates anti-Black racism and is intended to drive a wedge between racial minority groups (Poon et al. 2016). As a consequence of this unique positionality, Asian Americans' feelings of commonality toward other racial groups may differ from those of Blacks and Latinos.

The 2008 NAAS was the first nationally representative survey to take up the task of examining Asian Americans' perceptions of intergroup commonality. NAAS replicated the LNS political commonality question, framing it in terms of government services and employment, political power, and representation. In 2008, 47 percent of Asian respondents reported feeling "a lot" or "some" in common with Whites, 38 percent with Latinos, and 34 percent

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2. Karen Kaufmann (2003) rejects the possibility that national origin is a proxy for racial identity given that her analysis controls for racial identification.

with African Americans.[3] Similar to earlier findings that pan-Latino group consciousness predicted Latinos' feelings of commonality with Blacks (Kaufmann 2003), intra-Asian group consciousness and intra-Asian linked fate predicted foreign-born respondents' feelings of commonality with Blacks, though analyses excluded U.S.-born respondents because sample sizes were too small (Nicholson, Carter, and Restar 2018). As with the pan-Latino group, Asian Americans appear to vary in their feelings of intergroup commonality by national-origin group, with Korean respondents in the 2008 NAAS reporting the highest levels of political commonality with African Americans and with Latinos, and Vietnamese respondents reporting the lowest (Wong et al. 2011). In general, however, research investigating the determinants of Asian Americans' feelings of interracial political commonality remains scant, compared to the body of literature on Latino-Black relations.

INTRAGROUP COMMONALITY: INTRARACIAL AND INTRAETHNIC LINKED FATE

In addition to political commonality across racial groups, research has explored the extent to which people feel commonality within racial groups. "Linked fate" was first conceptualized by political scientist Michael Dawson to explain why African Americans tended to be politically homogeneous. Dawson argued that experiences of discrimination and racism led African Americans to feel that what happened to them individually was strongly linked to what happened to the group as a whole, a notion he termed the "black utility heuristic" (1994).

Researchers have since applied this concept to other groups, including Latino Americans, Asian Americans, Muslim Americans, and non-Hispanic White Americans. One recent review of the literature found that across surveys, at least half of respondents across racial groups experienced linked fate with their own group, though the proportion tended to be higher among Black Americans (Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016). Recent data are consistent with

these findings; in a 2019 Pew Research survey of Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White Americans, more than 60 percent of all four groups reported "a lot" or "some" racial linked fate, though White respondents were the least likely to report "a lot" of linked fate with other Whites (Cox 2019).

However, scholars have questioned whether linked fate can be extrapolated to non-Black groups (Sanchez and Vargas 2016). As Paula McClain and her colleagues (2009) point out, attempts to apply the concept of linked fate to panethnic groups like Latino and Asian Americans should consider that panethnic identities may not be constructed in the same way as Black American identity. Moreover, even if linked fate does apply to these groups, there may be within-group heterogeneity based on national origin. For example, within the pan-Latino group, Puerto Ricans have been found to report lower levels of linked fate than Central and South Americans (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). The Asian American label likewise encompasses significant heterogeneity in national origin, as well as in language, citizenship status, and culture, which may affect the extent to which Asian Americans feel intragroup commonality.

Again, the body of research on Asian Americans' sense of linked fate is less robust than for other racial groups. Nevertheless, prior work demonstrates that Asian Americans do feel linked fate both with their own ethnic-origin groups, as well as with Asian Americans as a whole. Both the 2000 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) and the 2008 NAAS asked linked fate questions. In the 2000 PNAAPS, 49 percent of respondents reported feeling any amount of linked fate with other Asians, and 55 percent reported feeling any amount of linked fate with coethnics (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). In the 2008 NAAS, similar proportions reported linked fate: 44 percent for linked fate with other Asians, and 50 percent for linked fate with coethnics. National-origin differences again appear, with Korean respondents being the most likely to report linked fate with other Asians and with

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3. Author's calculations.

coethnics, and Filipino and Vietnamese respondents the least likely (Wong et al. 2011).

DISCRIMINATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF INTERGROUP COMMONALITY

The literature reviewed to this point suggests that social and contextual factors influence people's sense of intergroup commonality and within-group linked fate. A significant body of work also suggests that experiences of discrimination are linked to positive relations among racial and ethnic minority groups. The common ingroup identity model posits that ingroups develop favorable attitudes toward outgroups when they think of themselves as part of a common, superordinate identity rather than as distinct groups (Gaertner et al. 1993; Jones-Correa et al. 2016; Kaufmann 2003). Experimental work has found that the status of "disadvantaged racial minority," primed by reading information about discrimination against one's racial group, can indeed serve as the basis of common identity with other racial groups (Craig and Richeson 2012; Richeson and Craig 2011). On the other hand, perceived discrimination can lead instead to the derogation of outgroups as a way to protecting one's own social identity (Craig and Richeson 2016). This is particularly likely when discrimination occurs across dimensions of identity; for example, discrimination based on race can lead to derogation of outgroups based on gender (Craig and Richeson 2016). However, recent experimental work suggests that highlighting perceived similarities between groups, even across identity dimensions, can mediate this effect (Cortland et al. 2017).

Outside of experimental settings, however, groups vary in the degree to which historical experiences of discrimination and racism are salient. Research has found that for Asian Americans, experiences of discrimination were only weakly correlated with feelings of commonality with non-Asian groups (White, Black, Latino) (Wong et al. 2011)[4]. Furthermore, analyses of the 2008 NAAS found that personal experiences of discrimination did not appear to predict foreign-born respondents' feelings of

commonality with African Americans (Nicholson, Carter, and Restar 2018), nor did they predict Asian Americans' feelings of commonality with Latino or White Americans (Lu 2018).

However, further analyses suggest a path forward: when discrimination was divided into employment- and non-employment-related experiences, Fan Lu (2018) finds that Asians who reported employment-related discrimination perceived lower levels of commonality with Latinos and Whites, whereas those who reported non-employment-related discrimination perceived higher levels of commonality with Latinos and Whites. The author theorizes that the employment setting influenced whether respondents attributed discrimination to racial prejudice, as opposed to other forms of prejudice; whether they perceived that Latinos also experienced discrimination; and whether they perceived the perpetrator of discrimination to be a racial nonminority (Whites). These conditions set the stage for whether discrimination was a precursor to feelings of commonality. This study therefore takes seriously the role of context in evaluating whether reported discrimination is associated with commonality, and moves a step further by also disaggregating non-employment-related experiences.

DISCRIMINATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF INTRAGROUP LINKED FATE

Shared and historical experiences of discrimination were critical to Michael Dawson's original conception of linked fate among African Americans (1994). As with the common ingroup identity model, perceptions of shared status—such as having experienced discrimination on the basis of one's identity—can affect within-group feelings of group consciousness (Austin, Middleton, and Yon 2012; Dawson 1994; Sanchez 2008; Sanchez and Vargas 2016).

However, for groups like Latino Americans and Asian Americans, within-group heterogeneity could affect this relationship. Both Latino and Asian Americans are panethnic groups originating from large and diverse sets of countries. Substantial proportions of both groups are recent arrivals to the United States, and

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4. Janelle Wong and her colleagues (2011) collapse the five types of discrimination in the 2008 NAAS into what they call "experiences of discrimination."

phenotypic variation could affect people's experiences and perceptions of discrimination (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Accordingly, Gabriel Sanchez and Natalie Masuoka analyzed the 2006 LNS to investigate whether these factors changed what "linked fate" meant for Latino Americans. They found that whereas prior research linked the Black utility heuristic to experiences of discrimination, a "Brown-utility heuristic" did not depend on discrimination. Instead, economic marginalization (measured by income) and degree of acculturation (measured by Spanish language and immigrant generation) were key factors in predicting linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). However, using the more recent 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-election Survey (CMPS), they found that both perceived and actual discrimination did predict linked fate for Latino American respondents. They speculated that their disparate findings could result from demographic and sociopolitical changes over the ten years between surveys, suggesting that linked fate is a dynamic concept (Sanchez, Masuoka, and Abrams 2019).

Among Asian Americans, experiences of discrimination have been associated with panethnic identification, particularly for the middle class (Masuoka 2006; Okamoto and Mora 2014). Analyses of the 2008 NAAS found that a number of demographic characteristics were associated with linked fate and reports of discrimination, though these were not analyzed in a multivariate model (Wong et al. 2011). In contrast, Indian immigrants' experiences of discrimination have been found to discourage panethnic identification, though linked fate was not examined (Schachter 2014). These findings may simply be the result of using different measures, though scholars have suggested that qualitative variation in history and context across national-origin groups may also contribute to differences in intergroup relations and in intragroup solidarity. Overall, however, little work has examined whether the association between discrimination and linked fate holds for Asian Americans, especially for intraethnic linked fate.

As with intergroup commonality, nuances in the measurement of discrimination may affect its association with intragroup linked fate. Lu and Bradford Jones (2019) differentiate between experiential discrimination (whether individuals themselves have experienced discrimination) and beliefs about discrimination (whether individuals perceive that their group or other groups are targets of discrimination). The logic behind this distinction is that individuals may not experience discrimination themselves, but they may be aware of and find discrimination against other members of their group to be problematic. Using the 2016 CMPS, Lu and Jones find that experiential discrimination is related to perceptions of linked fate for Asian, Black, Latino, and White respondents, and beliefs about discrimination are related to perceptions of linked fate for all groups except Whites.

Taken together, then, the literature suggests that understanding the link between discrimination and feelings of commonality and linked fate requires attention to the type and context of discrimination. Experiences of discrimination can range from verbal and interactional microaggressions to biased behavior to physical violence; discrimination can also occur in various settings, such as the labor market, education, and housing. However, with some exceptions (notably Lu 2018), many of the studies that examine discrimination and commonality conceptualize discrimination as a single item. For example, Harvey Nicholson, Scott Carter, and Arjee Restar's model summed five discrimination questions to create a single 5-point variable (2018). In contrast, I examine how the type of discrimination matters for whether these experiences are associated with feelings of political commonality or linked fate. This study is therefore unique in examining commonality as it relates to four broad domains of discrimination: interpersonal, the labor market, the housing market, and police mistreatment.

DATA AND METHODS

To examine the relationship between discrimination and commonality for Asian Americans, I use data from the 2016 post-election National Asian American Survey (NAAS). The survey was administered via telephone, in twelve languages, from November 2016 through February 2017 to a national sample of Asian American adults age eighteen and older, as well as to smaller groups of Black, Latino, and White re-

spondents. Respondents were recruited from Catalist, which provides registered voter and commercial vendor lists; ethnic groups were sampled using name, listed race, and tract-level ethnic concentration (Ramakrishnan et al. 2017). This analysis draws on the subsample with all Asian American respondents (n = 4,362). They represent the six largest Asian ethnic groups, as well as four South and Southeast Asian groups. Table 1 reports sample sizes for the ten ethnic groups and a summary of demographic statistics.

Dependent Variables

The key dependent variables in this study measure feelings of commonality: *political commonality* with Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites, as well as *linked fate* with other Asians and with members of one's ethnic-origin group. The political commonality questions were asked on a 4-point scale ranging from "nothing at all" to "a lot." Linked fate was asked in two parts: a yes/no question, with those responding yes receiving a follow-up question for "a lot," "some," or "not very much." For parsimony, all are coded as a series of dichotomous variables. On political commonality, those who responded "a lot" or "some" are compared with those who responded "little" or "no." On linked fate, those who responded "yes, a lot" or "yes, some" are compared with those who responded either "yes, not very much" or "no."

Independent Variables

The key independent variables are types of discrimination. *Interpersonal discrimination* is a dichotomous variable that combines seven measures (Cronbach's alpha 0.75), which ask whether the respondent has received poorer service than other people at restaurants or stores, whether people have acted as though the respondent does not speak English, whether people act afraid of the respondent, whether people act as though the respondent is dishonest, whether the respondent has been called names or insulted, whether the respon-

dent has been threatened or harassed, and whether the respondent has ever moved into a neighborhood where neighbors made life difficult for them or their family. *Labor-market discrimination* is a dichotomous variable that combines three measures (Cronbach's alpha 0.63): whether the respondent has been unfairly denied a promotion, unfairly fired from a job, and unfairly not hired for a job.[5] *Housing market discrimination* is a dichotomous variable for whether respondents have ever been discriminated against by a landlord or realtor. *Police mistreatment* is a dichotomous variable for whether respondents have ever been unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically threatened, or abused by the police. In additional models, I include two dichotomous items that ask whether respondents feel they or someone they know has been passed over for a job offer or a government contract (*employment*), or for admissions to a selective college or university (*college admissions*) as a result of affirmative action policies. These items provide another avenue through which respondents could feel that their racial identity constitutes a disadvantage.

I use multivariate logistic regressions to model the association between respondents' reported experiences of discrimination and feelings of commonality. These analyses include demographic variables that have previously been associated with feelings of intergroup commonality and intragroup linked fate. In one analysis of the 2008 NAAS, *age* (mean-centered in the regression) was negatively correlated with intergroup commonality and intra-Asian linked fate (Wong et al. 2011). *Gender* (with male as the reference group in the regression) was correlated with linked fate, with female respondents more likely to report coethnic linked fate. Higher levels of *education* (in this analysis, a categorical variable with less than high school as the reference group) were associated with greater intra-Asian linked fate and intergroup commonality. U.S.-born respondents were slightly more likely than foreign-

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5. I also conducted a separate analysis using interpersonal discrimination as a 0–7 scale and job discrimination as a 0–3 scale (available on request). Results are substantively similar, except where noted in the results later on. I therefore use the binary variables for ease of comparison with housing discrimination and police mistreatment.

Table 1. Sample Characteristics, Asian American Respondents

Mean age (standard deviation)	53.9 years (19.13)
Female	53.0 percent
Household income	
Mean (standard deviation)	$75,740 (68,926)
Median	$62,500
Education	
Less than high school	17.8 percent
High school	28.8 percent
College degree	32.9 percent
Graduate degree	20.6 percent
Generational status	
First generation	74.7 percent
Second generation	18.2 percent
Third or higher generation	7.1 percent
Party	
Democratic	46.1 percent
Republican	26.5 percent
Independent	27.4 percent
Contact [min = 1, max = 4], mean (standard deviation)	
Asians	3.32 (0.89)
Blacks	2.54 (1.02)
Hispanics	2.68 (1.06)
Whites	3.12 (1.00)
National origin group (n)	
Chinese	474
Indian	500
Vietnamese	501
Korean	498
Filipino	498
Japanese	500
Pakistani	320
Bangladeshi	320
Hmong	351
Cambodian	400

Source: Author's calculations based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2017.
Notes: Age is calculated using respondents' provided birth years. For respondents who instead provided an age category, the category maximum was used in order to later estimate time in the United States based on year of migration. The exception is the open-ended age category (65 and older); for this category, I used the median of all other 65+ respondents who provided a birth year. *Income* is calculated using midpoints for the provided categories, with the exception of the highest open-ended category ($250,000), which is calculated using the category minimum.

born respondents to report intra-Asian linked fate and intergroup political commonality, so I include *generational status* (a categorical variable with first generation as the reference group). *Income* (logged and mean-centered) has been associated with perceptions of Black-Latino conflict (Jones-Correa 2011), and may therefore also influence feelings of commonality. *Political party* (a categorical variable with Democrat as the reference group) has been correlated with Latinos' perceptions of commonality with African Americans (Sanchez 2008). Because intergroup contact has been associated with less intergroup prejudice (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005), I include respondents' reported amount of *contact* with Asians, Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics (a lot, some, a little, or none) as control variables for corresponding outcomes. Finally, because previous work has found differences by *national origin*, I include it as a categorical variable, with Chinese, the largest Asian-origin group in the United States, as the reference group.

Finally, in the descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses, I remove observations with missing values. Given the large number of deleted observations, the main analyses do not use survey weights provided with the NAAS data set. However, I present sensitivity analyses later in the results that both impute missing values and use survey weights.

RESULTS

In this section, I first report descriptive statistics on the dependent variable—perceived group commonality—and then on the primary independent variables, types of discrimination. I then examine the relationship between reported discrimination and commonality (that is, political commonality and linked fate) using multivariate analysis.

Figure 1 shows that more than half of total respondents feel "some" or "a lot" of political commonality with Black Americans (50.7 percent), Hispanic Americans (55.6 percent), and White Americans (56.1 percent).[6] In addition, consistent with research on linked fate (Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016), the majority of

respondents report feeling "some" or "a lot" of linked fate both with other Asian Americans, and with others within their ethnic group. A slightly higher proportion feels intraethnic linked fate (56.1 percent) than intraracial linked fate (52.5 percent), a difference that is statistically significant.

Figure 1 also shows commonality outcomes by national-origin group. Notably, in this bivariate breakdown, Bangladeshi and Hmong respondents are the most likely to report political commonality with Blacks and with Hispanics, and Vietnamese and Japanese respondents are the most likely to report political commonality with Whites. In contrast, Chinese and Cambodian respondents are the least likely to report political commonality with all three groups. In terms of linked fate, Korean and Hmong respondents are the most likely to report both intra-Asian and intraethnic linked fate, and Filipino and Cambodian respondents the least likely.

Table 2 shows the proportions of total respondents who report each type of discrimination, as well as of those who feel intergroup political commonality with each non-Asian group, and who feel linked fate. Among all respondents, the majority (56.3 percent) report none of the seven types of *interpersonal discrimination*; the remainder report at least one. In terms of *job discrimination*, fewer than one-quarter (23.2 percent) report any of the three types included. Just over 10 percent of respondents report *mistreatment by police*; only 5.3 percent report experiencing *housing discrimination*. In terms of respondents who feel that they or someone they know has been passed over as a result of affirmative action policies, 6.5 percent report this for *employment*, and 9.7 percent report this for *college admissions*.

Interracial Political Commonality

I use multivariate logistic models to test whether the type of discrimination predicts feelings of political commonality with Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites. Table 3 shows two sets of models. The first set (models 1–3) includes the full set of demographic controls and types

6. T-tests show that the proportions for "some" or "a lot" in common with Whites and Hispanics are not significantly different, but both are significantly greater than for Blacks.

Figure 1. Asian American Respondents' Feelings of Commonality and Linked Fate

Source: Author's calculations based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2017.

Table 2. Proportion of Respondents Reporting Experiences of Discrimination

| | Percentage Among Those Reporting | | | | | |
| | Political Commonality with | | | Linked Fate with | | |
Types of Discrimination	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites	Other Asians	Coethnics	All
Interpersonal discrimination	48.3	48.7	46.2	51.6	51.1	43.7
Job discrimination	28.0	27.1	25.9	27.9	28.0	23.2
Housing discrimination	6.1	5.6	5.7	6.2	6.4	5.3
Mistreatment by police	13.4	13.1	12.0	13.2	12.9	10.6
Passed over for employment due to affirmative action	7.6	8.0	7.4	6.8	6.9	6.5
Passed over for college due to affirmative action	9.7	10.8	11.0	11.3	11.0	9.7

Source: Author's calculations based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2017.

of discrimination. The second set (models 4–6) also includes the two items on being passed over for employment or for college admissions. Coefficients in the table are log-odds, where significant positive coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of feeling commonality with others. To ease interpretation, I describe findings as odds ratios (exp(β)); reported findings are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, unless otherwise noted.

First, in examining the most relevant controls, generational status predicts feelings of commonality with all three groups; third-plus generation respondents have the highest odds of reporting political commonality, followed by second-generation respondents.[7] Relative to being a Democrat, being a Republican or an Independent is associated with decreased odds of feeling political commonality with Blacks (models 1 and 4) and with Hispanics (model 2, though not significant in model 5), and being Republican is associated with increased odds of feeling political commonality with Whites (models 3 and 6). Consistent with intergroup contact theory, contact with the relevant group is significantly associated with feelings of political commonality in all six models, with the largest effect sizes for contact with Blacks.

Next, turning to the key discrimination variables in the first set of models, we see that for respondents who report *interpersonal discrimination*, the odds of feeling political commonality with Hispanics are 24 percent higher than for those who do not (model 2). In contrast, the association with political commonality with Blacks is significant only at the $p < .10$ level (model 2), and there is no significant association with political commonality with Whites (model 3). For those reporting *job discrimination*, the odds of reporting political commonality with Blacks are 25 percent higher than for those who do not (model 1), whereas there is no significant association for commonality with Hispanics (model 2) or Whites (model 3).

When the items on being passed over for college admissions and employment are included, job discrimination remains associated with commonality with Blacks (model 4). Moreover, for those reporting being or knowing someone who was passed over for *employment* due to affirmative action, the odds are 40 percent higher for reporting political commonality with Blacks ($p < .10$) than for those who do not. Strikingly, the odds of reporting political commonality with Blacks are 26 percent less for those who

7. In addition, I tested whether, for foreign-born respondents, time in the United States (measured in years) had an effect. A simple regression model measuring the effect of time in the United States was not statistically significant, nor was the inclusion of the interaction of time in the United States for foreign-born respondents in a full model. For parsimony, I have therefore excluded time in the United States from the models presented here.

Table 3. Asian Americans' Perceptions of Intergroup Political Commonality, Log-Odds

	Political Commonality with					
	Blacks Model 1	Hispanics Model 2	Whites Model 3	Blacks Model 4	Hispanics Model 5	Whites Model 6
Age	−0.006**	−0.007***	0.009***	−0.006**	−0.008***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	−0.079	−0.101	−0.187**	−0.089	−0.112	−0.143
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.089)
Income	−0.079*	−0.035	0.043	−0.083	−0.032	0.051
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Education						
High school	0.016	0.051	−0.216	0.045	0.125	−0.202
	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.174)
College	0.193	0.173	0.011	0.140	0.201	−0.021
	(0.155)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.183)
Graduate	0.232	0.195	0.074	0.261	0.162	0.037
	(0.174)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.204)
Generation						
Second	0.358***	0.518***	0.322***	0.356***	0.496***	0.258**
	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.123)
Third plus	0.526***	0.822***	0.907***	0.452**	0.681***	0.797***
	(0.188)	(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.208)	(0.215)	(0.220)
Political party						
Republican	−0.265***	−0.189**	0.211**	−0.235**	−0.126	0.263***
	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.102)
Independent	−0.377***	−0.426***	−0.091	−0.418***	−0.420***	−0.101
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.121)
National origin						
Indian	0.323*	0.263	0.619***	0.173	0.285	0.602***
	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.178)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.205)
Vietnamese	0.514***	0.611***	0.954***	0.192	0.360*	0.863***
	(0.176)	(0.179)	(0.177)	(0.202)	(0.206)	(0.204)
Korean	0.135	0.193	0.147	−0.048	0.141	0.123
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.168)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.190)
Filipino	0.380**	0.645***	0.405**	0.251	0.577***	0.415**
	(0.177)	(0.180)	(0.174)	(0.203)	(0.206)	(0.200)
Japanese	0.064	−0.042	0.342*	0.012	0.071	0.454**
	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.201)	(0.228)	(0.231)	(0.229)
Pakistani	0.449**	0.484**	0.493**	0.333	0.314	0.501**
	(0.197)	(0.199)	(0.196)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.225)
Bangladeshi	0.733***	0.521**	0.482***	0.636***	0.614**	0.489**
	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.201)	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.230)
Hmong	0.704***	0.857***	0.618***	0.530**	0.750***	0.560**
	(0.210)	(0.217)	(0.206)	(0.242)	(0.249)	(0.238)
Cambodian	−0.065	−0.082	−0.287	−0.300	−0.132	−0.515**
	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)

(*continued*)

Table 3. (*continued*)

	Political Commonality with					
	Blacks Model 1	Hispanics Model 2	Whites Model 3	Blacks Model 4	Hispanics Model 5	Whites Model 6
Contact with						
Blacks	0.219*** (0.041)			0.239*** (0.046)		
Hispanics		0.201*** (0.041)			0.192*** (0.046)	
Whites			0.192*** (0.047)			0.219*** (0.054)
Discrimination						
Interpersonal	0.147* (0.081)	0.214*** (0.083)	0.117 (0.082)	0.169* (0.092)	0.216** (0.092)	0.112 (0.092)
Jobs	0.224** (0.095)	0.107 (0.097)	0.042 (0.098)	0.291*** (0.106)	0.140 (0.107)	0.039 (0.107)
Housing	−0.014 (0.166)	−0.297* (0.167)	−0.059 (0.167)	−0.118 (0.185)	−0.295 (0.186)	−0.102 (0.185)
Police	0.075 (0.126)	0.177 (0.131)	0.003 (0.127)	0.098 (0.140)	0.184 (0.144)	−0.040 (0.140)
Passed over in						
College admissions				−0.304* (0.158)	−0.039 (0.159)	0.087 (0.159)
Employment				0.338* (0.195)	0.249 (0.196)	0.044 (0.194)
Constant	−1.024*** (0.216)	−0.912*** (0.219)	−0.874*** (0.228)	−0.979*** (0.251)	−0.973*** (0.253)	−0.982*** (0.262)
N	3,055	3,028	3,060	2,444	2,432	2,445

Source: Author's calculations based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2017.
Notes: Age is mean-centered, calculated as described in table 1. *Income* is logged and mean-centered, calculated as described in table 1. Reference group for *education* is less than high school. Reference group for *generation* is first generation. Reference group for *political party* is Democrat. Reference group for *national origin* is Chinese. Parentheses are standard errors.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

report being or knowing someone passed over in *college admissions* ($p < .10$). These findings suggest that for Asian Americans, perceiving job discrimination may predict solidarity with Blacks, whereas feeling disadvantaged by affirmative action in college admissions may be associated with a sense of competition.

In model 5, the association between inter-personal discrimination and feelings of political commonality with Hispanics remains positive and significant.[8] Strikingly, experiences of *housing discrimination* are also negatively associated with political commonality with Hispanics ($p < .10$, model 2). *Police mistreatment* is not associated with political commonality with any groups. However, the propor-

8. This finding was no longer significant when interpersonal discrimination was coded as a 0–7 variable rather than a yes-no variable (results available on request); all other findings for intergroup commonality remained the same.

tions of respondents reporting either housing discrimination or police mistreatment are relatively small; these findings are therefore less conclusive.

Finally, with respect to national origin, relative to the Chinese reference group, some groups appear to be more inclined toward feelings of commonality overall; both Bangladeshi and Hmong respondents are more likely to report feelings of commonality toward Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites, compared to Chinese respondents. In contrast, Indian respondents are more likely to express feelings of commonality only toward Whites, relative to Chinese respondents, whereas the difference in feelings of commonality for Korean respondents relative to Chinese respondents is not statistically significant.

Intraracial and Intraethnic Linked Fate
Table 4 shows the results of multivariate logistic regressions predicting linked fate with other Asians, as well as linked fate with coethnics. As with the intergroup commonality models, the first set (models 1 and 2) includes demographic controls and discrimination variables; the second set (models 3 and 4) additionally includes the items on feeling passed over for college admissions or employment because of affirmative action.

First, in examining the most relevant control variables, whereas generational status predicted feelings of commonality with Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, it is not a statistically significant predictor for linked fate. The odds of reporting intraethnic linked fate are lower for Republicans than for Democrats (models 2 and 4); similarly, the odds of reporting either intraracial or intraethnic linked fate are lower for Independents than for Democrats (all models). Consistent with the patterns for commonality with Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics, contact with Asians predicts linked fate both with coethnics and with other Asians.

Looking next at discrimination, the odds of feeling linked fate with both Asians and coethnics are higher for those who report experiencing *interpersonal discrimination* and for those who report experiencing *job discrimination* versus those who do not, in all four models. For those reporting experiencing *interpersonal discrimination*, the odds of reporting linked fate with Asians are 58 percent higher (model 1), and the odds of reporting linked fate with coethnics are 60 percent higher (model 2) than for those who do not. For those reporting experiencing job discrimination, the odds of reporting linked fate with Asians are 29 percent higher (model 1) and the odds of reporting linked fate with coethnics are 37 percent higher (model 2), compared to those who do not.[9] In contrast, *housing discrimination* does not predict either intraracial or intraethnic linked fate. *Police mistreatment* also does not predict linked fate, except in model 4, where it increases the odds of reporting coethnic linked fate by 32 percent. Again, however, the overall proportions of respondents reporting housing discrimination or police treatment are relatively small.

Next, including the two variables on being passed over in college admissions and employment, model 3 shows that being or knowing someone who was passed over in college admissions because of affirmative action *positively* predicts linked fate with other Asians. This contrasts with the previous finding that it *negatively* predicts commonality with Blacks. This finding supports the idea that Asian Americans may view college admissions as an area where they face a disadvantage that other racial minority groups do not. In contrast, being or knowing someone who was passed over for employment because of affirmative action does not predict linked fate with either Asians or other coethnics (models 3 and 4).

Finally, with respect to national origin, the odds of reporting both Asian and coethnic linked fate are greater for Korean and Hmong respondents than for Chinese respondents, and the odds of reporting coethnic linked fate are smaller for Filipino respondents than for Chinese respondents. In contrast, other national-origin groups had no difference relative to Chinese respondents.

9. The coefficient for job discrimination was no longer statistically significant for either Asian or coethnic linked fate when measured as a 0–3 scale instead of a binary variable, suggesting that while type of discrimination matters in this instance, how much of this type may not.

Table 4. Asian Americans' Perceptions of Linked Fate, Log-Odds

	Linked Fate with			
	Asians Model 1	Coethnics Model 2	Asians Model 3	Coethnics Model 4
Generation				
Second	0.178	0.053	0.196	−0.009
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.126)	(0.125)
Third or higher	0.050	0.092	0.028	0.066
	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.207)	(0.205)
Political party				
Republican	−0.121	−0.201**	−0.171*	−0.245**
	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Independent	−0.229**	−0.311***	−0.255**	−0.356***
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.118)	(0.117)
National origin				
Indian	−0.017	−0.042	−0.080	−0.196
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.203)	(0.202)
Vietnamese	0.151	0.047	−0.047	−0.290
	(0.162)	(0.160)	(0.193)	(0.191)
Korean	0.782***	0.507***	0.866***	0.523***
	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.193)	(0.191)
Filipino	−0.263	−0.622***	−0.284	−0.668***
	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.197)	(0.196)
Japanese	0.034	−0.165	0.082	−0.145
	(0.194)	(0.192)	(0.226)	(0.222)
Pakistani	−0.220	−0.271	−0.196	−0.311
	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.222)	(0.221)
Bangladeshi	0.048	−0.038	0.039	−0.098
	(0.198)	(0.197)	(0.230)	(0.229)
Hmong	1.024***	1.148***	1.013***	0.906***
	(0.207)	(0.213)	(0.239)	(0.244)
Cambodian	−0.147	−0.167	−0.179	−0.397
	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.219)	(0.215)
Contact with Asians	0.227***	0.133***	0.196***	0.126**
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.051)

Sensitivity Analyses

I conducted multiple sensitivity analyses to determine whether findings hold when key variables are conceptualized differently. First, I consider the possibility that—contrary to this article's theoretical prediction that the type of discrimination matters—any experience of discrimination, regardless of type, matters. I test this possibility with two specifications: first, with perceived discrimination as a dichotomous variable, with those responding "yes" to

any of the twelve measures coded as 1 and those responding "no" to all twelve measures coded as 0; second, with perceived discrimination as a 0–12 scale, summing "yes" responses to all twelve measures.

Indeed, for those who respond "yes" to any of the discrimination variables, the odds of reporting political commonality with Blacks and Hispanics, as well as linked fate with Asians and with coethnics, are higher than for those who report "no" to all twelve; there is no asso-

Table 4. (*continued*)

| | Linked Fate with | | | |
	Asians Model 1	Coethnics Model 2	Asians Model 3	Coethnics Model 4
Discrimination				
Interpersonal	0.458***	0.467***	0.528***	0.501***
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(.091)	(0.090)
Jobs	0.252***	0.315***	0.281***	0.308***
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Housing	−0.039	0.121	−0.228	−0.065
	(0.164)	(0.169)	(0.183)	(0.186)
Police	0.149	0.178	0.228	0.280**
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.140)	(0.141)
Passed over in				
College admissions			0.374**	0.257
			(0.162)	(0.160)
Employment			−0.269	−0.141
			(0.191)	(0.190)
Constant	−1.054***	−0.437	−1.131***	−0.288
	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.291)	(0.287)
N	3,253	3,298	2,578	2,611

Source: Author's calculations based on Ramakrishnan et al. 2017.
Notes: Models include age, gender, education, and income. Reference group for *generation* is first-generation. Reference group for *political party* is Democrat. Reference group for *national origin* is Chinese. Parentheses are standard errors.
*$p < .1$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

ciation with political commonality with Whites. When coding discrimination as a 0–12 count, the odds of reporting political commonality with Blacks, as well as linked fate with Asians and with coethnics, are higher for those who report more types of discrimination than for those who report fewer types; there is no association with political commonality with Hispanics or Whites (results available on request). However, these results do not negate either the theoretical or the empirical assertion of this article, which is that the type of discrimination affects whether reported experiences are associated with intergroup commonality and intragroup linked fate. In fact, comparing Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) scores across the three specifications (as dichotomous, as a 0–12 scale, and as four types) suggests that the last specification is slightly more parsimonious than the others.

Second, the data set includes significant portions of missing data for the outcome variables of interest. These proportions range from 8.3 percent missing (intraethnic linked fate) to 15.9 percent missing (political commonality with Hispanics). The analyses presented remove observations with missing values; due to the large number of deleted observations, I do not use NAAS's provided survey weights. However, to check whether doing so affects the results, I also analyze the data while imputing missing values using predictive mean matching and including survey weights. When doing so, statistical significance does change for some predictors. In general, however, overall patterns in the data remain similar.[10]

10. For a comparison of results with and without imputed values, see appendix A (available online at https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/7/2/180/tab-supplemental).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Overall, these findings suggest that for Asian American respondents, the type of discrimination experienced is relevant for feelings of political commonality with non-Asian groups and for feelings of linked fate with other Asians and with coethnics. Most research measures discrimination as a single variable—whether the respondent experienced it. In contrast, I capitalize on the multiple types and contexts of discrimination included in NAAS. In doing so, I find that interpersonal discrimination is a key predictor of feelings of commonality with Hispanic Americans, and labor-market discrimination is a key predictor of feelings of commonality with Black Americans. Housing discrimination and police mistreatment have no effect, and none of the four types predicts feelings of commonality with White Americans. Both labor-market and interpersonal discrimination predict intraracial and intraethnic linked fate.

My findings add empirical evidence on the Asian American case to the body of literature on intergroup relations, which has most frequently focused on White-non-White relations and Black-Latino relations. Because Asian Americans have a very different history of immigration, incorporation, and racialization in the United States, as compared to Black and Latino Americans, some have questioned the extent to which they may form meaningful alliances with other racial groups. However, the 2016 NAAS shows that significant portions of the Asian American sample—more than 50 percent—feel some or a lot in common politically with members of other racial groups. Likewise, this study also sheds light on whether the concept of linked fate can be extrapolated to non-Black groups. Because linked fate as originally conceptualized rested on shared experiences of discrimination, examining this relationship can clarify how linked fate operates—if at all—for Asian Americans. Consistent with the literature, I find that significant portions of the Asian American NAAS sample report feelings of linked fate both with Asians and with their coethnics, and that it is associated with experiences of discrimination. Nevertheless, heterogeneity is evident among the respondents who report feeling political commonality and linked fate, wherein those who report certain types of experiences of discrimination are also more likely to report feelings of commonality.

These findings can be interpreted through the lens of the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner et al. 1993): if Asian Americans view experiences of discrimination as something they have in common with another racial group, they may feel more warmly toward that group. In this case, job discrimination is positively associated with feelings of commonality with Black Americans, and interpersonal discrimination with Hispanics. Items in the interpersonal discrimination measure include people acting as though the respondent does not speak English and being threatened or harassed; Asian Americans who report these experiences could be perceiving commonality with Hispanics based on their common background as immigrant-origin groups. In contrast, respondents could be viewing perceived negative effects of affirmative action in college admissions as unique to Asian Americans, therefore highlighting a lack of commonality with other groups. Likewise, because relatively few respondents report housing discrimination or police mistreatment, they may not perceive these as experiences they have in common either with other racial minority groups or with other Asians or coethnics. In the case of police mistreatment, this particular form of discrimination is widely associated with the experiences of Black Americans, such that the few Asian respondents who report police mistreatment—defined in NAAS as being "unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically threatened, or abused"—may not view their experiences as tied to the larger entrenched issue of police brutality in the Black community.

On the other hand, NAAS does not ask respondents about the perceived source of discrimination, which complicates these findings. If perceived discrimination stems from negative interactions with Whites, Asian respondents may be more likely to perceive political commonality with Black and Hispanic Americans. However, if Asian respondents have positive interactions with Whites—which, according to Maureen Craig and Jennifer Richeson's (2016) model of stigma-based solidarity, could reduce solidarity—and instead perceive dis-

crimination as stemming from interactions with Black and Hispanic Americans, they may be less likely to feel political commonality with these groups. Residential and occupational segregation could affect respondents' levels of contact and sense of competition with members of other racial and ethnic groups, and therefore influence this relationship. In the multivariate models, I include contact with each respective group as controls (for example, the amount of daily contact with Black or African Americans is a control in the model examining political commonality with Black Americans). In each case, intergroup contact is positively and significantly associated with feelings of political commonality. Contact therefore does not appear to increase racial or ethnic conflict. Future iterations of the NAAS could ask respondents to specify the source of perceived discrimination.

One limitation of the survey data is that I cannot assess causality. Relatedly, because the NAAS relies on self-reports of discrimination, respondents' experiences are subject to interpretation and therefore to possible overreporting or underreporting. Thus, one possible interpretation is that respondents who feel more commonality with other racial minority groups are more likely to report discrimination. For example, as Vincent Reina and Claudia Aiken report in this issue (2021), Asians, like Latinos, face discrimination in finding housing and in accessing mortgages. However, Asian respondents in the NAAS are much less likely to report housing discrimination than Latino respondents. This could be a reflection of reality—that is, Asian Americans could be less likely to experience housing discrimination—but could also reflect differences in whether respondents interpret and therefore report certain experiences as discrimination. Nevertheless, experimental work suggests that discrimination may be causally related to feelings of solidarity (Craig and Richeson 2016); indeed, a survey experiment embedded within the 2016 NAAS reveals that Asian American respondents are more likely to support affirmative action in employment for Blacks when they are framed as victims of discrimination alongside Blacks (Lee and Tran 2019). Future work can assess whether there is also a causal relationship when evaluating dif-

ferent types of discrimination. If indeed the relationship is causal, this study suggests that promoting intergroup and intragroup solidarity requires attention to these nuances. Acknowledging that experiences of discrimination are not equivalent in their impacts, across both types of discrimination and the affected groups, could influence organizers who seek to promote cross-racial coalitions.

To be sure, although the commonality measures used in this study relate to group identification and membership, neither provides information about respondents' political behavior. Positive attitudes in themselves do not guarantee the formation of stable, interminority coalitions, though they may be a necessary precursor. Research about African Americans has historically found that group consciousness predicted political behavior for this group, but more recent research has been mixed (McClain et al. 2009). In fact, Claudine Gay, Jennifer Hochschild, and Ariel White (2016) argue that the linked fate measure does not appear to predict political activity and therefore may not be the most accurate measure of group solidarity. In the 2008 NAAS, feelings of interracial commonality and of linked fate do appear to be associated with some politically engaged behaviors and greater political participation (Wong et al. 2011). Future research can elucidate the relationship between experiences of different types of discrimination, intergroup attitudes, and political mobilization for Asian Americans.

Finally, this study paves the way for future research on heterogeneity in how inter- and intragroup commonality operates within the Asian American umbrella. As Tomás Jiménez, Corey Fields, and Ariela Schachter (2015) note in their call for greater attention to intragroup diversity, heterogeneity within the pan-Asian group, including nativity, language, and socioeconomic status, may affect intergroup outcomes. Indeed, I found differences across Asian national-origin groups in predicting commonality outcomes. However, these differences persist even when controlling for several of the demographic factors that contribute to intra-Asian diversity, including education, income, and generational status. As Barry Chiswick and Paul Miller (2001) point out, dichotomous national-

origin variables may be a catch-all for "what we do not know." Consequently, other means of disaggregating Asian Americans—such as what Lucas Drouhot and Filiz Garip propose (2021, this issue)—may be more revelatory in understanding Asian American heterogeneity. Future research can assess whether qualitative differences in either the historical or contemporary experiences of national-origin groups affect their attitudes toward others, whether other factors not measured here contribute to the national-origin differences seen in these models, or whether other methods of decomposing the panethnic group are more appropriate. As the Asian American population continues to grow and diversify, these dynamics, too, will increase in importance.

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Fair Housing: Asian and Latino/a Experiences, Perceptions, and Strategies

VINCENT REINA AND CLAUDIA AIKEN

This article uses the National Asian American Survey to explore issues of housing access and discrimination among Asians and Latino/as, and particularly how identity and heterogeneity within these two groups can lead to their underrepresentation in housing programs. Then, using Philadelphia as a case study, we draw on administrative data, interviews, and focus groups to show that both Asians and Latino/as are underrepresented due to a range of linguistic, cultural, and structural barriers. These findings highlight the complexity of affirmatively furthering fair housing for America's increasingly diverse population.

In the past two decades, America's urban counties have shifted from a majority White to a majority non-White population (Parker et al. 2018). Asians and Latino/as are the fastest growing racial and ethnic minorities in metropolitan areas; their numbers have grown by 27 percent and 19 percent, respectively, since 2010 (Frey 2019). Jennifer Lee and Karthik Ramakrishnan (2021, this issue) find that in the case of Asians, a shift in national origins toward South and Southeast Asian has also resulted in "unprecedented diversity within the U.S. Asian population." Latino/a diversity in the United States is also increasing as earlier cohorts of Puerto Rican and Mexican migrants are joined by growing shares of residents from El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and other Latin American nations (Flores 2017). The diversification of Asian and Latino/a Americans has critical implications for ensuring fair access to decent housing.

This analysis draws on data from the National Asian American Survey (NAAS) to explore the growing heterogeneity in housing access and needs, and perceptions of discrimination, among Asians and Latino/as. It suggests four hypotheses about how diversification of identities and its implications for perceptions around government, discrimination, and housing might affect participation in government housing programs. We test these hypotheses through a case study of Philadelphia,

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which is home to growing and diversifying Asian and Latino/a minorities. An analysis of aggregated administrative data from HUD, the City of Philadelphia, and the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) shows that although many newcomers to Philadelphia are income-eligible for housing assistance, the racial and ethnic composition of households receiving housing assistance (such as rental vouchers, repair grants, and publicly subsidized units) has not reflected these demographic changes. Finally, we use interviews with local service providers and other stakeholders, as well as focus groups with residents, to analyze inter- and intragroup differences in the experience and perception of barriers to housing assistance and how this diversity has shaped each community's participation in housing programs.

Philadelphia is a particularly useful case study for two reasons. First, it has experienced recent growth in both Asian and Latino/a diversity. Two decades ago, more than 85 percent of the population of Philadelphia identified as being either non-Hispanic White or Black.[1] Since then, the Latino/a population has nearly doubled and the Asian community has grown by half. Both groups have diversified internally, in regard not only to national origin but also to language, socioeconomic status, and immigration status. Second, Philadelphia recently engaged in a citywide conversation about fair housing. It was one of forty-nine cities to submit an Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH) pursuant to a 2015 mandate by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which has since been repealed by the Trump administration. The AFH affords us a window into the perceptions of discrimination and attitudes toward government among Asian and Latino/a residents, which have critical implications for their participation in housing assistance programs.

Discrimination in housing markets is illegal. The Fair Housing Act, passed in 1968 and amended in 1988, forbids discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, national origin, disability, and familial status in the sale and rental of housing, in mortgage lending, and in the provision of housing assistance. Furthermore, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act strictly prohibits discrimination in any program or activity that receives federal assistance from HUD. However, more than fifty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, equal access to housing opportunities remains a distant goal for many American cities. Contemporary research shows that despite antidiscriminatory lending regulations, racial and ethnic minorities continue to face discrimination in the housing market that cannot be explained by their incomes, credit scores, or other qualifications (Turner et al. 2013). Beyond the private market, minorities continue to face unequal access to housing resources provided by governments, including subsidies, programs, and planning efforts (Husock 2017; City of Savannah 2017). These issues were brought to the forefront of cities' agendas in 2015 when HUD released a new rule requiring municipalities to "affirmatively further fair housing." Municipalities were for the first time given an enforceable obligation not only to prevent housing discrimination, but to overcome the barriers to housing opportunity that are the legacy of systemic disadvantage among racial, ethnic, and other groups.

The Philadelphia AFH included a detailed evaluation of local fair housing issues and a set of strategies to address them. The city partnered with the Philadelphia Housing Authority to jointly map housing conditions across the city, survey more than five thousand residents about their experiences and perceptions, hold five focus groups with residents and three other meetings with PHA tenants, and repeatedly invite stakeholders to share their ideas and concerns (City of Philadelphia 2016). One of the most important findings was the concern among Philadelphia's Asian and Latino/a populations that they were disproportionately less likely to benefit from local and federal housing subsidy programs. The plan that was produced suggested but did not conclusively identify why Asian and Latino/a residents are underrepresented in government housing assistance pro-

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1. The first year in which the combined non-Hispanic White and Black population dropped below 80 percent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey five-year estimates, is 2010. In 2009, 41.91 percent of Philadelphians were non-Hispanic Black and 39.73 percent were non-Hispanic White (2017).

grams. The answer is crucial to understanding which strategies may be most successful in providing assistance to Asian and Latino/a residents who struggle to access, maintain, or afford housing.

By combining an analysis of NAAS data with a quantitative and qualitative case study of Philadelphia, we find that Asian and Latino/a residents are indeed underrepresented in most housing programs, and that this lack of representation is a function of complex linguistic, cultural, structural, and legal barriers. Although it would be easy to lay the blame on local authorities, implementing meaningful fair housing policies often exceeds the capacity and resources of both local government agencies and of the community organizations with which they partner, and is further thwarted by a lack of federal investment in this capacity.

LITERATURE

Studies show that Latino/as and Asian Americans across the United States face significant challenges in accessing affordable and adequate housing. Some of these challenges stem from poverty; both Latino/as and Asians are more likely to live in poverty than non-Hispanic Whites.[2] We know that the lowest-income households tend to have the highest housing costs relative to their incomes and experience high rates of eviction and housing insecurity (Lew 2016). Immigrants face special disadvantages in the housing market as well. Their limited English proficiency or ignorance of their rights as tenants exposes them to exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous landlords. Refugees are especially vulnerable; as a result, they tend to remain in rental housing for long periods—often their entire lives (Carter and Vitiello 2011). Legal status also plays an important role in the housing challenges of immigrants. Elizabeth McConnell finds that unauthorized Latino/a immigrants "experience persistent and unexplained disadvantages" in terms of housing cost burdens and that "this 'penalty' for unauthorized Latino/a immigrants persists even after controlling for indicators of immi-

grant assimilation, such as duration of U.S. residence" (2013, 186).

Poverty and immigration can explain some of the disadvantages that Latino/as and Asians face in the housing market, but not all. Some are the result of historic and continuing discrimination. Both Asians and Latino/as are told about and shown fewer housing units than White homeseekers who are identical in every respect other than race or ethnicity (Turner et al. 2013). Such steering mechanisms segregate Latino/a and Asian households into poor-quality housing and low-opportunity neighborhoods. For example, John Betancur (1996) describes how, when Mexicans first moved to Chicago, landlords and realtors steered them to the poorest areas; by creating these clusters of artificial scarcity, landlords were then able to charge higher rents. In some cases, local governments have reinforced the segregation of Latino/a and Asian households through the selective enforcement of zoning ordinances and building codes, and by adhering to restrictive definitions of what constitutes a family that can legally occupy a single-family home (Bender 2010). Both populations also face discrimination in mortgage lending. Asians as a group are more likely than non-Hispanic Whites to be denied a mortgage, even controlling for credit scores and other factors; in addition, certain Asian subgroups, such as Taiwanese, Hmong, and Koreans, have especially high mortgage denial rates, and others, such as Bangladeshi, Indonesians, and Cambodians, pay especially high prices (Courchane, Darolia, and Gailey 2015). Latino/as, too, have disproportionately high mortgage denial rates and are significantly more likely than non-Hispanic Whites to be given high-cost loans (Faber 2018). Moreover, Latino/as as well as some Asian groups have been targeted by predatory lenders for subprime loans, contributing to higher mortgage default and foreclosure rates following the housing crisis of 2007 (Reid et al. 2017; Anacker 2019).

The challenges that confront Latino/as and Asians in accessing housing are not confined to the private market. They extend to the very

2. In 2018, 12 percent of Asians and 21 percent of Latino/as had incomes below the federal poverty threshold, versus 10 percent of non-Hispanic Whites (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).

government programs designed to remedy the private market's failure to provide affordable, adequate housing. At the national level, both Asian and Latino/a Americans participate in housing assistance programs at disproportionately low rates. American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) files from 2018 show that 12 percent of Asian Americans as a whole live below the poverty line, with shares being higher among some subgroups such as Cambodians (16 percent). About 21 percent of Latino/as are impoverished, and rates are still higher among groups such as Puerto Ricans and Guatemalans (23 and 27 percent, respectively). As many as 37 percent of Asians and 45 percent of Latino/as are housing cost burdened, meaning that they pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing costs. Yet Asians make up only 4 percent of households assisted by HUD programs; the share is even lower among specific programs, such as public housing and housing choice vouchers (3 percent each). Latino/as are better represented at 19 percent of all HUD-assisted households but underserved by specific programs, including Project-Based Section 8 and Section 202/PRAC, where they make up 16 and 15 percent of households, respectively (HUD 2019a).

In cities across America, Latino/as and Asians are less likely to receive housing assistance from public sources than similar non-Hispanic Whites (Husock 2017; City of Savannah 2017). Sometimes the barriers to program participation are explicit, such as rules that require proof of legal immigration. HUD currently reduces assistance to households based on the number of household members who are unauthorized immigrants; a rule proposed by the Trump administration would prohibit giving any federal housing assistance to such "mixed families" (HUD 2019b). This rule would clearly disadvantage Latino/a households. Program rules that favor the construction or subsidy of one- to two-bedroom units disadvantage both Asians and Latino/as, who are more likely to live with extended or multigenerational families (Zonta 2016; Cohn and Passel 2018).

In other cases, housing authorities have discriminated against Latino/a and Asian residents by omission: they fail to site subsidized housing in neighborhoods where Latino/as and Asians live, do not address language barriers, or do not market their programs to Latino/a and Asian communities (Alvarez 1996; Troche-Rodriguez 2009). Latino/a activists have successfully sued local and federal housing assistance providers for discrimination on multiple occasions. In 1995, a coalition of housing advocates called Latinos United won additional housing vouchers and voucher counseling for Latino/a residents in the settlement of a class action lawsuit against the Chicago Housing Authority and HUD for discriminatory site selection and program administration (Alvarez 1996). More recently, HUD settled a case against the Housing Authority of the City of Hazleton on behalf of six Latino/a families who had been denied limited English-proficiency services (Pennsylvania Legal Aid 2015). Asian Americans, perhaps because they are more divided than Latino/as by class and language, have not made the same demands for fair housing assistance. In 1990s-era San Francisco, where Asians were overwhelmingly segregated into two of twenty-four public housing projects, the Asian Law Caucus initiated a series of lawsuits to force integration and improve housing conditions (Ancheta 2006). Examples of Asian recipients of local and federal housing assistance organizing for better conditions are numerous. However, we are unable to discover any instances of Asian individuals or organizations suing the government for fair access to housing assistance programs.

Perceptions of government, attitudes of accepting government assistance, and awareness of government discrimination may also play a role in inequitable Asian and Latino/a participation in housing programs. The literature on this topic, however, is slight. The historian Charlotte Brooks (2009, 92) recounts how in 1930s San Francisco, Chinese Americans were torn between fears that their communities would become dependent on public assistance made available through the New Deal and hopes that government intervention could play a positive role in Chinatown. It is unclear how these attitudes have evolved or how they differ among Asian subgroups. Studies of present-day underuse of external assistance among Asian

Americans often cite the "collectivistic" or self-reliant orientation of Asian American cultures (Chen, Jo, and Donnell 2004; Crystal 1989). The NAAS, which includes questions related to perceptions of government and discrimination, can help substantiate or contest these claims—particularly when combined with rich local interview data.

METHODS

We use weighted data from the 2008 NAAS and from the pre- and post-election 2016 NAAS to understand Asians' and Latino/as' experience with housing assistance. These data, combined with existing literature, frame four hypotheses about why these two groups are underrepresented in housing assistance programs and what might explain the difference between them. The hypotheses are then highlighted in our case study of Philadelphia. Combining national and local analyses enables us to use broad, national findings to frame the more granular analysis required to fully understand issues of housing discrimination and use of government services. This is an important application of surveys like NAAS and highlights the necessity of studying housing within the context of a broader set of public policy issues.

For the Philadelphia study, we offer a brief overview of how the city's Asian and Latino/a communities have grown and diversified over time and how this has affected their housing needs before exploring the extent to which Asians and Latino/a residents of Philadelphia are currently underrepresented in government housing assistance programs. We analyze aggregated administrative data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the City of Philadelphia, and the PHA to ascertain housing program participation rates by race and ethnicity and compare them to the levels of need among Asian and Latino/a Philadelphians according to census data.[3] Use rates are constructed by dividing the number of Asian and Latino/a participants in a given program by the total number of participants for whom race or ethnicity is known; rates of need are constructed by dividing the number of Asian and Latino/a Philadelphians living below the federal poverty line by the total number of impoverished Philadelphians.[4] We use a paired t-test of means to ascertain whether the need for and use of assistance are statistically similar or different. We also use correspondence and interviews with city and housing authority officials to describe what policies and practices govern local government housing outreach to Asian and Latino/a residents.

We complement this descriptive analysis with twenty-two interviews with twenty-five stakeholders and four focus groups with thirty-three residents meant to test our hypotheses about why Asians and Latino/as are underrepresented in government housing assistance programs in Philadelphia (see tables 1 and 2). We interviewed persons who occupy leadership positions in housing-related nonprofit organizations that specifically serve Latino/a or Asian communities, are fair housing advocates or housing service providers, or are leaders in

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3. Administrative data include HUD's publicly available *Picture of Subsidized Households* for the years from 2014 through 2017; the City of Philadelphia's Division of Housing and Community Development Quarterly Production Reports for the same period, which were shared with us by division staff; 2018 program usage data from the City of Philadelphia's Office of Homeless Services (OHS) and the Department of Behavioral Health and Intellectual Disability Services, which were shared with us by OHS staff; and the Philadelphia Housing Authority's 2017 Moving to Work Annual Report, which is publicly available.

4. In this analysis, we use poverty as a proxy for government housing program eligibility. In reality, the eligibility criteria are more complex. Most determine eligibility based on a family's income as a share of area median income, which is set by HUD for each county or metropolitan area. Assistance is often limited to families at or below 60 or 80 percent of area median income (AMI) and prioritized to those at or below 30 percent of AMI. In Philadelphia, families of four meet this criterion if they earned no more than $27,050 in 2019. Meanwhile, the poverty threshold for a family of four is still lower at $26,370. Thus, if the share of the impoverished who are Asian outweighs the share of housing program participants who are Asian, it is almost certain that Asian Americans are underserved by these programs.

Table 1. Interviews and Correspondence, 2019–2020

Organization or Community Type	Interviewees or Correspondents
Asian-serving nonprofits	7
Asian community leaders	4
Latino/a-serving nonprofits	3
Latino/a community leaders	2
Fair housing and housing service organizations	9
Government agencies	7

Source: Authors' calculations.

Table 2. Focus Groups, 2019–2020

Community	Number of Participants
Latino/a	8
Latino/a	12
Asian	4
Asian	9

Source: Authors' calculations.

Asian or Latino/a communities.[5] Interviewees answered questions about barriers their constituents face to access affordable housing and housing assistance and how they cope with these barriers. Four focus groups—two in Spanish, one in Mandarin, and one in English—were conducted with Asian and Latino/a Philadelphians representing a broad cross section of ethnicities, national origins, ages, and socioeconomic characteristics; we used these to identify community perceptions of barriers to housing assistance.[6]

NATIONAL ANALYSIS

The National Asian American Survey data reveal several important realities that help us under-

stand why Asians, and by extension Latino/as, continue to be underrepresented in housing assistance programs. First, diversity within the Asian American population nationally is considerable. Some of the larger subgroups include those of Chinese (23 percent of all Asian Americans, according to census data), Vietnamese (10 percent), or Cambodian origin (1.5 percent). These three groups differ significantly in terms of age, household income, educational attainment, tenure, household composition, and English proficiency. Combined, weighted pre- and post-election 2016 NAAS data show that Chinese Americans tend to be older than Vietnamese or Cambodian Americans and at least twice as likely to have a household income

5. An initial cohort of interviewees was identified because of their participation in Philadelphia's affirmatively furthering fair housing process. Then snowball sampling was used to identify additional interviewees, since organizations offering housing services are often aware of one another. Interviews were primarily in person and typically lasted thirty to forty-five minutes. Interviews were semi-structured, and interviewees were encouraged to expand on responses that were particularly interesting or surprising. Interviews were audio recorded and later analyzed thematically.

6. Focus group participants were recruited by housing service providers among their constituents or by community leaders with strong ties to a particular community. Focus group participants were each compensated with a $10 gift card. The authors facilitated these focus groups with the assistance of Spanish- and Mandarin-speaking translators. Some questions were posed to the group at large with discussion encouraged; in other cases, when it was desirable to determine the share of participants who shared a certain perception or experience, participants were each asked to either respond individually or "pass." The sessions, which lasted an hour each, were audio recorded and later analyzed thematically.

above $125,000. More than half of Chinese Americans have received a college degree, versus 39 percent of Vietnamese and only 23 percent of Cambodian Americans. Cambodian Americans, more than half of whom have a household income below $50,000, are much more likely than the average Asian American to rent their home (50 percent versus 36 percent). According to the 2016 post-election NAAS, Cambodian Americans are more likely than Chinese or Vietnamese Americans to live alone or in a multigenerational household. Approximately 68 percent speak only a little English or none at all, versus 56 percent of Vietnamese and 50 percent of Chinese Americans (Ramakrishnan et al. 2018, 2017).[7]

This internal diversity suggests a first hypothesis as to why Asian Americans might be underrepresented in housing assistance programs: relatively high incomes and rates of homeownership for Asians as a whole disguise the level of need among subgroups and individuals. This could result in housing assistance being targeted to racial or ethnic groups that are more uniformly disadvantaged. As Lucas Drouhot and Filiz Garip (2021, this issue) point out, it is routine in statistical analysis to aggregate individuals into racial and ethnic groups, which obscures within-group socioeconomic diversity and leads to misguided conclusions. Such a hypothesis would not seem to apply to Latino/as, however. As a group, they are less likely to own their homes, more likely to have household incomes below $50,000, much less likely to have received college degrees, and much less likely to speak English proficiently than either the average Asian American or the average NAAS respondent. But if the diversity among Asians is any indication, diversity is likely among Latino/a subgroups as well.[8] Internal diversity could plausibly lead to underrepresentation in housing programs for other reasons, including the difficulty of distributing aid to persons who speak a wide variety of languages or dialects, or have varied immigration statuses or social norms.

The 2008 NAAS allows us to look at change in key sociodemographic indicators for Asian Americans over time. Based on weighted survey results, more Asian Americans were renting their homes in 2016 than in 2008 (by an increase of 6 percentage points). The share of Asian Americans with household incomes under $50,000 greatly increased, from 25 percent to 44 percent. Meanwhile, the share earning a college degree decreased by 11 percentage points. The share reporting that they speak no or little English remained constant at about 52 percent. At the same time, census data show that the three largest Asian national-origin groups (Asian Indian, Chinese, and Filipino) made up a slowly declining share of all Asians, whereas smaller subgroups such as Bangladeshi, Bhutanese, and Burmese Americans grew. These shifts lead to our second hypothesis for underrepresentation, namely, that the Asian American population's diversity has increased, and its need and eligibility for housing assistance has grown, even as the availability of housing assistance has decreased. This could easily be the case for Latino/as well, though the 2008 NAAS includes only Asian respondents (Ramakrishnan et al. 2012).

7. The NAAS, despite its relatively small sample size, tracks fairly closely with the Public Use Microsample of American Community Survey data (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). According to 2018 PUMS results, 13 percent of Chinese Americans are age sixty-five or older, versus 11 percent of Vietnamese and 8 percent of Cambodian Americans. Chinese Americans' average household income is above $110,000, against $88,455 and $76,468 for Vietnamese and Cambodian Americans, respectively. In line with NAAS data, PUMS data show that Cambodian American households are more likely to rent (at 46 percent) than Vietnamese or Chinese ones (34 and 37 percent of whom are renters). Cambodian American households are likely to be large (averaging 3.4 persons) and multigenerational (70 percent of households).

8. Data in the 2014–2018 ACS PUMS support this conclusion. Guatemalans, who are twice as likely as Mexicans to be noncitizens, have higher rates of poverty, are more likely to be renters, and are much more likely to belong to a multigenerational or multifamily household than either Puerto Ricans or Mexicans. The average Guatemalan American household's income is only $57,610, versus $65,056 for the average Latino/a household. Still, the diversity among Latino/a subgroups is less pronounced; for example, the spread in average income among major Latino/a subgroups is a fifth that of major Asian subgroups.

Table 3. Perceptions of Discrimination and Government, 2016

Question	All Americans	Asians	Chinese	Vietnamese	Cambodians	Latino/as
In the average month, do you receive poorer service than other people at restaurants or stores?	23	21	21	15	16	23
In the average month, do people act as if you don't speak English?	16	28	27	24	19	39
In the average month, do people act as if they are afraid of you?	14	8	6	4	7	18
In the average month, do people act as if they think you are dishonest?	17	8	6	5	8	24
Do you think you have ever been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or rent you a house or apartment?	9	5	3	3	7	10
Have you ever moved into a neighborhood where neighbors made life difficult for you or your family?	15	9	7	9	14	18
Agree or agree strongly that "public officials don't care much what people like me think"	67	81	78	87	67	65

Source: Ramakrishnan et al. 2017.
Note: Numbers in percentages.

Perhaps most interestingly, the NAAS includes a series of questions about perceptions of discrimination (in the 2016 post-election wave) and of government (in the 2016 pre-election wave) (see table 3). Asian respondents were unlikely to report that they had ever been "unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or rent [them] a house or apartment" (5 percent) or that people had treated them as if they thought they were frightening or dishonest (8 percent each). They were much more likely to report that, in the average month, they had received poorer service than other customers at restaurants and stores (21 percent) or that people had acted as if the respondent did not speak English (28 percent). Asian subgroups certainly show variation, with Cambodian Americans more likely than others to have reported discrimination at the hands of a landlord, a realtor, or their neighbors. But even Cambodians were far less likely to feel discriminated against than Latino/as, 10 percent of

whom reported that they had been unfairly prevented from buying or renting a home, 18 percent of whom had been discriminated against by neighbors, and 39 percent of whom had been treated as if they did not speak English in the average month.

These results suggest several possibilities. First is that both Asians and Latino/as experience less direct housing discrimination than they do bureaucratic discrimination—that is, poorer service—but that the latter nevertheless leads them to be underserved by housing assistance programs, which violates fair housing principles. Second, it suggests that Latino/a Americans either experience more discrimination than Asian Americans, including even disadvantaged subgroups like Cambodian Americans, or that they are more likely to perceive such discrimination. If the former is true, we might expect Latino/as to be even less represented in housing assistance programs than Asians. If the latter is, Latino/as might also be more likely than Asians to mount concerted

education or advocacy efforts, potentially enabling them to win greater representation in housing assistance programs than they otherwise would. A NAAS pre-election question asked respondents to evaluate whether "public officials don't care much what people like me think." Asian Americans overwhelmingly agreed or strongly agreed with this statement (81 percent); two-thirds (65 percent) of Latino/a Americans did. These feelings toward government might translate into a low rate of government program use for both groups, but a slightly higher rate for Latino/a residents than Asians.

The NAAS is an evolving tool. In 2008, it included no other races or ethnicities than Asians. By 2016, it had added White, Latino/a, and Black respondents, allowing for comparison across race and ethnicity. The sample size has also grown over time, from 5,159 respondents in 2008 to 11,235 in 2016. Finally, the capacity to group respondents by ancestry and national origin has become more sophisticated. But NAAS does not yet allow for much geographic granularity, which makes it challenging to explore the nuanced, hyperlocal relationship between racial diversity and housing needs and perceptions. By using a local case study, however, we can test hypotheses suggested at a national level and delve more deeply into the nuanced barriers to housing assistance that Asian and Latino/a Americans face.

ASIAN AND LATINO/A COMMUNITIES IN PHILADELPHIA

Any attempt to understand the underrepresentation of Asians and Latino/as in Philadelphia's housing programs must first acknowledge the enormous diversity among these groups as well as the long history of discrimination against Asians and Latino/a Philadelphians in provision of housing resources. Philadelphia's Asian population has grown much more diverse over time. The founders of Philadelphia's Chinatown were Cantonese-speaking Chinese from Guangdong province (Lee 1994). They have been joined by waves of ethnically Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Viet-

nam, as well as of wealthier Fujianese immigrants (Lee 1994). Koreans also arrived in large numbers beginning in the 1980s, most moving directly to the suburbs (Lee 1994). An important share of Asian newcomers (about 12 percent) have arrived as refugees; the Philadelphia metro resettled a total of 18,100 refugees between 1990 and 1999 (Singer and Wilson 2006). The first wave of refugees to Philadelphia were Vietnamese, who were resettled in West and South Philadelphia beginning in the 1970s. They were followed by Cambodians and Laotians (Vitiello and Acolin 2017). More recently, Bhutanese and Burmese refugees have arrived and begun to form their own networks of associations (McWilliams and Bonet 2015). According to the 2014–2018 ACS estimates, Philadelphians with Chinese origins now make up one-third of Asians in the city, the other two-thirds divided principally between Indians (20 percent), Vietnamese (13 percent), Cambodians (8 percent), Koreans (6 percent), and Filipinos (5 percent).[9]

Housing experiences differ sharply along lines of national origin and class. For instance, many of Philadelphia's Cantonese families have moved out of Chinatown and into middle-class suburbs, joining both professional-class Koreans and Indians and the wealthier Chinese immigrants who settle in the suburbs directly. Those who remain behind in Chinatown tend to be poorer and—as low-income renters in a neighborhood with rapidly appreciating land values—have housing experiences that are "sensibly different from those of Chinatown immigrants in the suburbs" (Vitiello and Acolin 2017, 199). The Philadelphia Chinatown Development Corporation (PCDC), founded in 1969, has developed more than 225 units of both subsidized and market-rate housing in Chinatown in an effort to anchor the Chinese community and prevent displacement (Vitiello 2014; Greco 2016). But ever-higher land prices have stalled housing production in recent years, and PCDC has adapted to serve an increasingly geographically scattered constituency (Vitiello and Acolin 2017). This situation is far from unique to Philadelphia; most Asian

9. Pakistani, Indonesian, Bangladeshi, Japanese, Laotian, Taiwanese, Thai, Burmese, and Bhutanese Americans each make up less than 3 percent of Philadelphia's Asian population (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).

Americans now live in the suburbs and they in fact make up the "fastest growing of all racial minority groups in the U.S. suburbs today" (Lung-Amam 2017, 5).

Meanwhile, the Southeast Asian community, whose original members arrived as refugees, continues to face challenges of poverty and economic exclusion rooted in the resettlement experience. Tram Nguyen (2001) writes that when Philadelphia was designated as a resettlement area in the 1980s, "almost overnight, hundreds of Vietnamese and Cambodians moved into the inner-city neighborhood of West Philly. . . . Agencies that got paid per capita for resettling refugees set up arrangements with slumlords to house as many families as quickly as possible." Having fled their home countries without wealth or preparation, and then having been resettled in neighborhoods where they are "culturally and linguistically isolated," Southeast Asians in Philadelphia have not enjoyed the same upward mobility as other Asian immigrants (G. Nguyen et al. 2011). Although some Vietnamese families have succeeded in moving to middle-class suburbs, Cambodians have "largely remained in poverty in the inner city, mostly in South and Southwest Philadelphia" (Vitiello and Acolin 2017, 201). Unfortunately, the latest cohorts of Southeast Asian refugees, displaced from their home countries of Burma and Bhutan by ethnic cleansing, face much the same challenges. Indeed, because of federal funding cuts, Philadelphia resettlement agencies are now even more restricted in the housing and case management services they provide (McWilliams and Bonet 2015).

Philadelphia's Latino/a community is predominantly Puerto Rican (60 percent), but it increasingly includes Dominicans (12 percent), Mexicans (8 percent), and Central (7 percent) and South Americans (6 percent) as well.[10] Puerto Ricans were the first to arrive en masse, beginning in the late 1940s. Carmen Whalen (2001) recounts how redlining and other discriminatory practices compressed Puerto Ricans into neighborhoods buffering Black North

Philadelphia from White working-class Kensington. These neighborhoods have been characterized by high levels of renter-ship, poor access to transportation, and low levels of investment and access to credit (Whalen 2001, 225–26). But concentration (combined with systematic deprivation) may also have helped the Puerto Rican community to form the network of high-capacity community development and social service nonprofits it has today; organizations such as Associaciòn Puertorriqueños en Marcha (APM), Nueva Esperanza, Congreso, and Concilio have developed hundreds of affordable housing units and offer a wide array of housing counseling, financial literacy, and other services (Axelrod et al. 2018).

The largest recent increase in the foreign-born population has been among Mexicans. Although "scarcely a presence prior to 1990," Mexicans grew to number six thousand by 2000 and doubled to twelve thousand by 2005 (Singer et al. 2008; Stern, Seifert, and Vitiello 2008). Mexicans did not join the Puerto Rican community as Dominicans and Jamaicans have done; instead, they formed a distinct community in South Philadelphia, which is more convenient to the Center City restaurant industry as well as to the manufacturing and distribution hubs near the Philadelphia International Airport, and in South Jersey (Singer et al. 2008). South Philadelphia also had the advantage of a cheap, under-the-table rental market. But as rents in the neighborhood increase, Mexican immigrants are increasingly displaced to areas in North Philadelphia and Upper Darby.[11]

In Philadelphia, questions of fair access to housing assistance for Asians and Latino/as are long-standing. In the 1950s, as the first waves of Puerto Ricans arrived in Philadelphia, they competed with Blacks for the limited housing options available in predominantly Black neighborhoods (Ribeiro 2013). Later waves of Asian and Latino/a immigrants have arrived in Philadelphia too late to access many housing assistance resources. Federal funding for housing authorities has plummeted since

10. Cubans once made up a larger share of Latino/a Philadelphians, but now make up only 2 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).

11. Carlos Pascual-Sanchez, personal interview, September 6, 2019, Puentes de Salud.

the 1980s, when President Reagan cut HUD's budget authority by more than 70 percent. PHA's waitlists for public housing and vouchers are closed indefinitely; they last opened briefly in 2013 and 2010, respectively. HUD's Community Development Block Grant, which supports a wide range of municipal activities including affordable housing construction, assistance, and rehab, has seen repeated funding cuts as well; the program now provides less than half the funding it did in 1995 (Theodos, Stacy, and Ho 2017). Despite shrinking resources and increasing need, PHA and the city made some efforts to expand housing assistance to Asian and Latino/a communities during this period. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, the city worked with PCDC to finance affordable housing for Chinatown residents (HUD 1999).

HOUSING NEEDS IN PHILADELPHIA'S ASIAN AND LATINO/A COMMUNITIES

According to U.S. Census Bureau estimates, approximately 112,600 Asians live in Philadelphia today, about 7 percent of the total city population (2017). This is a dramatic increase over 1980, when the official count was below twenty thousand (1 percent of the population). Philadelphia's Latino/a population is larger than the Asian minority and has grown significantly in the last forty years—from about sixty-four thousand (less than 4 percent of the population) to nearly 222,000 (14 percent). We should note that the accuracy of these figures is open to question. Researchers believe that in the 1980s and 1990s, the census undercounted both Asians and Latino/as. Asian ethnic organizations conducting their own population counts have arrived at much higher combined estimates (Lee 1994). Similarly, the Latino/a community assessed its real population in 1990 to be greater than 120,000, whereas the decennial census put it at only around eighty-nine thousand (Goode and Schneider 1994).

As of 2018, roughly 7 percent of Philadelphians living below the federal poverty line were Asian—which is the same as the Asian share of the overall population of Philadelphia. This statistic obscures higher levels of poverty among some Asian ethnic groups. ACS PUMS estimates from 2014 to 2018 suggest that al-

though 24 percent of Asian Philadelphians are in poverty, the share is closer to 27 percent for Chinese residents. Southeast Asian groups, possibly even more impoverished, are too small a sample to yield accurate poverty measures. Meanwhile, we know that Latino/a Philadelphians as a whole are disproportionately poor; they make up only 15 percent of the population for whom poverty status is known but 22 percent of those living below the federal poverty line. These rates mean that Latino/a Philadelphians as well as members of some Asian groups are less able to afford adequate housing than the average Philadelphian.

Beyond poverty, census surveys suggest other symptoms of housing challenges. Asians are equally likely to be renters, at 48 percent, and Latino/as are more likely to rent, at 58 percent, than Philadelphians overall. Thomas Carter and Domenic Vitiello report that immigrants who are "stuck" in the rental market are more vulnerable to discrimination and housing insecurity (2011). Both Asian and Latino/a households are twice as likely as the average Philadelphia household to have more than one occupant per room, at 8 percent and 5 percent of households, respectively. This can be partially attributed to the propensity for forming larger and multigenerational households, around 50 percent of Latino/a and Asian households in Philadelphia being multigenerational, versus 38 percent of households overall. However, it may also indicate that households double up to afford their housing. The classic measure of housing affordability is housing cost burden: the ratio of a household's monthly housing costs to its income. PUMS data suggest that more than a quarter (27 percent) of Asian households and more than one-third (36 percent) of Latino/a households in Philadelphia are severely housing cost burdened, meaning that they devote more than half of their income to housing costs. These are very similar to the city's overall rate of severe housing cost burden (27 percent). But Latino/a households, as well as some Asian households (Cambodians and Vietnamese, in particular) tend to occupy units with rents and ownership costs well below average, despite their larger family sizes, indicating that they may be trading quality for affordability.

Table 4. Housing Assistance Programs: Average Annual Usage Rates (2014–2017) Versus Poverty Population (2013–2017)

Program	Units Served	Percentage Asian Users	Significantly Under-represented	Percentage Latino/a Users	Significantly Under-represented
Housing counseling	11,582	2.2	*	17.7	*
Settlement grants	208	2.2	*	38.5	
Heater hotline	4,013	0.1	*	9.7	*
Basic systems repair	1,052	0.7	*	11.5	*
Adaptive modifications	96	1.6	*	11	*
Weatherization assistance	667	0	*	2.6	*

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Division of Housing and Community Development Quarterly Production Reports, 2014–2017; U.S. Census Bureau 2017.

*$p < .01$

HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN PHILADELPHIA

Both Asians and Latino/as are underrepresented in most of Philadelphia's housing programs relative to their share of the poverty population (7 percent and 22 percent, respectively). Running a simple t-test, we find that Asians who are income-eligible to receive housing assistance are significantly underrepresented ($p < .01$) in all of the major housing assistance programs offered by the City of Philadelphia (see table 4). The highest degree of underrepresentation occurs in the Weatherization Assistance Program, which provides free home energy efficiency improvements to low-income homeowners and renters: it did not serve a single Asian household between 2014 and 2017. Asians are also significantly underrepresented in the PHA's two largest housing programs: conventional public housing and the housing choice voucher program (see table 5). Despite proportional representation in two smaller programs (the Section 202 program for senior housing and the Project-Based Section 8 program), only 3 percent of the more than forty-two thousand HUD-subsidized households in the city are Asian, but more twice that in the poverty population are. Further, as of 2017, only 2 percent of those on the waitlists for pub-

lic housing or housing vouchers in Philadelphia were Asian (PHA 2017).

Income-eligible Latino/a Philadelphians, for their part, are significantly underrepresented in all city-operated housing programs except the Settlement Assistance Grants Program (a program that provides up to $500 in down payment and closing cost assistance to new, low-income homebuyers). Like Asians, they are most underrepresented in the Weatherization Assistance Program, which serves almost exclusively African American households (see table 4). Latino/a households are also underrepresented in PHA housing programs. Only 6 percent of all HUD-subsidized households are Latino/a. Fewer than 2 percent of public housing residents report Spanish as their primary language, and as of 2016, only eighteen of Philadelphia's nearly nineteen thousand housing choice voucher recipients spoke Spanish at home.[12] Furthermore, only 9 percent of the current waitlisted applicants for public housing and housing vouchers identify as Latino/a (PHA 2017) (see table 5). One gateway to receiving housing services in Philadelphia is admission to an emergency shelter. Because the receipt of shelter services often gives a household priority for housing vouchers and other aid, underrepresentation

12. Kyle Flood, personal correspondence, October 28, 2019, Philadelphia Housing Authority; Dan Urevick-Ackelsberg, letter to Kelvin Jeremiah and Frederick S. Purnell Sr., in "Assessment of Fair Housing," City of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Housing Authority, October 4, 2016, E137–E139, https://www.phila.gov/media/20190502115754/afh-2016-for-web.pdf (accessed November 12, 2020).

Table 5. Housing Authority Programs: Average Annual Usage Rates (2014–2017) Versus Poverty Population (2013–2017)

Program	Households Served	Percentage Asian Users	Significantly Under-represented	Percentage Latino/a Users	Significantly Under-represented
All HUD programs	42,418	3	*	6	*
Public housing	12,597	0.75	*	5.3	*
Housing choice vouchers	17,880	1	*	5.8	*
Project-based Section 8	8,919	10.3		7	*
Section 202	2,268	7		7.8	*
Section 811	284	0	*	4.8	*

Source: HUD 2017; U.S. Census Bureau 2017.

*p < .01

Table 6. Homeless Programs: Usage Rates (2018) Versus Poverty Population (2014–2017)

Program	Households Served	Percentage Latino/a Users	Significantly Underrepresented
Emergency shelter or transitional housing	13,052	1,183	*
Homeless outreach services	8,348	864	*

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Culhane et al. 2019; U.S. Census Bureau 2017.

*p < .01

in shelter services can have a snowball effect (see table 6).

Philadelphia's housing service providers are increasingly aware of the underrepresentation of Asians and Latino/as. In the past few years, both PHA and the two city departments that provide housing services to the public—the Department of Planning and Development (DPD) and the Office of Homeless Services (OHS)—have adopted new language access policies that call for bilingual staff, translation of key documents, and access to a translation hotline (PHA 2014; DPD 2016). PHA has partnered with community development corporations to expand its subsidized stock into predominantly Latino/a and Asian neighborhoods.[13] The city responds to the issue of unequal geographic access to municipal services through its network of neighborhood advisory councils (NACs). NACs are community-based organizations that apply to receive city block grant funds in exchange for educating residents about what city programs are available, and which they may be eligible for. They also compile and maintain information about neighborhood conditions and engage residents in public planning efforts. As of 2019, twenty-one NACs were listed on the city's website, including two primarily Latino/a-serving organizations (APM and HACE) and two Asian-serving ones (PCDC and the Greater Philadelphia Asian Social Service Center). The Office of Homeless Services has also recently hired three "mobile intake assessors." This step is designed to address the fact that, although Philadelphia's homeless shelters are concentrated in Center City, the homeless population is geographically dispersed. Two of the three mobile intake assessors speak Spanish (none, as yet, are Mandarin speaking but they do have access to a call center to assist with translation), and are able to provide homelessness prevention, counseling, and referral services remotely.[14]

13. Flood, personal correspondence.

14. Liz Hersch, director, Office of Homeless Services, interview, September 26, 2019, Philadelphia.

Table 7. Barriers to Accessing Affordable and Adequate Housing

Barrier	Percentage of Interviewees Who Mentioned It		
	Asian Organizations and Community Leaders	Latino/a Organizations and Community Leaders	Fair Housing or Housing Service Organizations
Shortage of affordable units in community	50	60	60
Low incomes	20	40	40
Large household sizes	10	40	0
Limited English proficiency	50	20	20
Lack of financial literacy	40	0	40
Lack of basic literacy	30	20	0
Poor credit or no credit	50	60	40
Immigration status	10	20	20

Source: Authors' calculations.

FOUR HYPOTHESES TO EXPLAIN UNDERREPRESENTATION

Our interviews and focus groups confirm that both Asian and Latino/a Philadelphians feel that it is difficult to find decent and affordable housing. The most commonly cited explanations among both groups are a shortage of low-cost housing in their neighborhoods, combined with persistently low incomes, language barriers, a lack of financial literacy, and difficulty building credit (see table 7). Mexicans, Guatemalans, and other Central Americans, as well as some Asian residents, also highlighted the importance of immigration status. Directly related to these barriers, some Asians and Latino/as described exploitation at the hands of landlords, lenders, and realtors.

Markedly missing from their accounts, however, were any efforts to access public housing resources. In fact, only three interviewees mentioned this strategy. "I don't know of any [Cambodian, Vietnamese, or Filipino] family that contacted PHA," one interviewee said. Indonesian focus group participants were able to think of only one Indonesian family that had accessed Section 8 housing but were unable to describe how the process worked or what the subsidy covered. A Salvadoran focus group participant told the story of how he had once received information about city housing programs along with his water bill, but assumed it was a scam. Elderly Chinese focus group par-

ticipants had, in four cases, accessed Section 202 housing for seniors, but were unaware that it was subsidized by the government. In general, focus group participants were often unaware that housing counseling, grants and loans, and subsidized housing exist—let alone how to access them. In this section, we explore the four hypotheses suggested by our NAAS analysis for why Asians and Latino/as access housing programs at such low rates, despite their need and eligibility.

INTERNAL DIVERSITY

The first hypotheses suggested by our analyses of NAAS data and existing literature was that relatively high average income, English proficiency, and homeownership for a race or ethnicity as a whole, or for a dominant subgroup, might disguise the level of need among subgroups and thus lead them to be overlooked when governments conduct outreach or distribute aid. Alternatively, internal diversity might simply increase the structural difficulty of providing assistance. We found some evidence for both of these scenarios in Philadelphia.

Seven interviewees in both Asian- and Latino/a-serving organizations directly attributed underrepresentation to the government's failure to recognize the diversity among Asian and Latino/a Philadelphians. "The casting of Asians as a 'model minority' does a huge disservice to the diversity in the Asian commu-

nity," one interviewee said. The interviewee explained that when all Asians are grouped together, their high average income obscures the fact that some subgroups experience levels of poverty similar to those of other disadvantaged minorities in Philadelphia. Thus fewer resources are targeted to Asians as a whole. The extreme diversity within Philadelphia's Asian population, as well as the way its various subgroups are parceled out across the city, can also make it difficult for Asian-serving organizations to receive city funding. For example, interviewees representing one Asian-serving organizations said that despite the fact that their organization serves an income-eligible population, it has been unable to win a city contract to provide housing counseling services, because its headquarters are located within Center City census tracts that are relatively wealthy—not least because of a recent influx of wealthier Chinese to the area.

High internal diversity also created structural barriers. Language barriers were one of the most popular explanations for underrepresentation, cited by nineteen interviewees. Two interviewees added that linguistic diversity among Asian residents, who speak many languages in a wide variety of dialects, further complicates matters. Even a local community development corporation that serves Asians complained of difficulty hiring staff who can assist such a linguistically diverse constituency. Thus it is no surprise that the city and PHA, though making important strides in hiring Spanish-speaking staff and translating program materials into Spanish, continue to struggle to provide language access for Asian residents. Although anyone has the right to request translation services under the city and PHA's language access plans, three interviewees had concerns about the efficacy of these services and consistency in compliance.

Internal diversity is also problematic because of the current system for distributing housing aid. In Philadelphia, local networks of nonprofits and community-based organizations are crucial gatekeepers for city and housing authority programs; one city official told us that their department relies heavily on nonprofits to conduct outreach and to provide counseling and referrals. As a result, communities lack-

ing a well-developed nonprofit network will face much greater difficulty accessing public resources. Another city official noted that their agency also recruits nonprofits to provide housing counseling services and to advertise its programs. Limited public resources mean that the city's nonprofit partners must have high internal capacity; other than the opportunity to give their constituents access to city programs, nonprofits receive very little compensation and no operating support, according to one interviewee. High internal diversity and friction between racial and ethnic subgroups leave many communities too fractioned to achieve this kind of capacity.

According to multiple interviews, Philadelphia's comparatively large and well-established Puerto Rican community has a strong network of nonprofits that both develop affordable housing and provide housing resources; to some extent, this network has benefited more recent Latino/a arrivals from Mexico and Central America. In contrast, six interviewees and three focus group participants said that Philadelphia's Asian communities have no strong nonprofit network, especially in the arena of housing services. These interviewees noted that housing is a technical field, and nonprofits must acquire substantial expertise to have an impact. One interviewee claimed that Asian nonprofits have had difficulty doing so for two reasons: first, high turnover in some predominantly Asian neighborhoods; and, second, the diversity among Asian communities. "In South Philadelphia, Cambodians say that as some Asians have done better economically, they've moved out to the suburbs, taking cultural institutions with them," noted one interviewee. In addition, this interviewee felt that "each Asian group tends to stick to its own particular organization. . . . This creates silos and inefficiencies, although a few organizations are trying to break this down." Even among Asian residents of the same national origin, lines are drawn by income and religious affiliation. "The majority of Indonesian community members in South Philly are from Java, so they are ethnic Chinese and Christian, even though most Indonesians overall are Muslim," one focus group participant explained. "There are ten churches and one mosque in South Philly. This abso-

lutely factors into our networks. . . . There is a great deal of tension. There are definitely gaps in who knows what, in access to resources within the community because of religious divisions." Three interviewees confirmed a lack of cooperation among Asian minorities and community organizations.

CHANGE OVER TIME

Another of our hypotheses for underrepresentation is that the Asian and Latino/a American populations have become more diverse, and their need and eligibility for housing assistance has therefore grown, even as the availability of housing assistance has decreased. Interviews and focus groups made it quite clear that this is indeed the case.

The Asian and Latino/a newcomers to Philadelphia are disadvantaged in a variety of ways. One has to do with literacy. In contrast to older Puerto Rican migrants, "Mexican and Central American immigrants are from small, rural towns. Many can barely read. Spanish is already their second language," one interviewee remarked. According to three Asian interviewees, illiteracy is also barrier among some Asian subgroups. One interviewee, a leader in the Indonesian community, highlighted the importance of literacy when contrasting Indonesian Philadelphians to newcomer groups such as the Burmese and Bhutanese. "Indonesians were literate; they were able to become landowners and landlords," which gave them an important economic advantage.

Another disadvantage, especially in the case of Latino/as, is immigration status. Many Asian newcomers to Philadelphia are refugees and therefore have a path to citizenship. This is not the case for Latino/a newcomers, and immigration status arose as a key impediment to accessing housing assistance for this group in interviews and focus groups. Currently, each member of a household applying for either public housing or housing vouchers from PHA must undergo citizenship screening. The household must pay higher rent if it includes "ineligible non-citizens." In May of this year, HUD proposed a new rule that would forbid public housing authorities providing any assistance to undocumented residents at all (HUD 2019b). Impediments to accessing PHA re-

sources based on immigration status are real. In contrast, the City of Philadelphia does not verify citizenship for any of its housing programs. But undocumented Asian and Latino/a residents may simply assume that resources are closed to them. "Given my immigration status, and as a renter, I doubt there would be any formal assistance for me," one Latino/a focus group participant told us. Fear is also widespread that accessing public aid will have consequences, including deportation, as noted in several of the interviews and focus groups. These fears were heightened under the Trump administration, and especially as word spread of the new "public charge" rule, which would bar some immigrants from attaining permanent residency if they were judged likely to become dependent on government aid (but which, due to court challenges, was not enacted until February 2020) (USCIS 2019). "One of the reasons people don't want to apply [for housing assistance] is the atmosphere we live in now. . . . There's a specific threat that your green card will be taken away if you're found to receive assistance," said one Guatemalan focus group participant. "There are rumors that families are being affected by this change now." Though immigration status came up more frequently in Latino/a focus groups, five interviewees cited it as a barrier for Asians, as well. One interviewee suggested that Asians may even be less willing than Latino/as to reveal their documentation status and more likely to become nonresponsive for fear of legal consequences.

As newcomers arrive, it is not always possible for them to take advantage of existing ethnic enclaves. As Chinatown became more crowded and land values appreciated, lower-income Asian immigrants settled in southwest Philadelphia. One city official said that the Division of Housing and Community Development would be eager to have a greater presence in this area—but no funds are available to establish this presence without decreasing funds to an important existing initiative. The difficulty of providing services increases when the newer enclaves have not yet formed effective channels to receive and distribute municipal resources. For example, OHS relies heavily on nonprofit organizations to provide outreach. Until recently, OHS's partner organization in

Table 8. Perceptions of Discrimination

	Percentage of Interviewees Who Mentioned It		
Form	Asian Organizations and Community Leaders	Latino/a Organizations and Community Leaders	Fair Housing or Housing Service Organizations
Insufficient or inappropriate outreach	60	40	60
Failure to build affordable housing in Asian/Latino/a communities	40	20	20

Source: Authors' calculations.

the Latino/a community—Congreso—did not have the capacity to handle walk-in applicants for homeless services; thus Latino/a residents could still only access services by first processing through the downtown shelter system. One city official noted that Asians face still greater difficulties because they are more dispersed than Latino/a Philadelphians and have not yet developed a nonprofit social services network on a level with the Latino/a one.

PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION

Our third hypothesis for underrepresentation is that Asians in particular are unlikely to perceive discrimination against them. We did in fact find that focus group participants did not see barriers to accessing housing resources as evidence of racial or ethnic discrimination on the part of the City or Housing Authority; however, this was equally true for Asian and Latino/a focus group participants. Stakeholder interviewees confirmed that this was more due to a lack of understanding of what constitutes discrimination than the absence of discrimination. According to one interviewee, "the [Chinese] community narrative focuses on there being a shortage of housing that is affordable and close to Center City. People don't know what discrimination is, and they don't know how to seek protection. It's hard to recruit them to fair housing workshops because they just don't recognize the issue." Similarly, another interviewee said that Indonesian Philadelphians do not see themselves as the victims of discrimination; "they just chalk negative outcomes up to language barriers." Two interviewees serving Latino/a communities also observed

that discrimination against their constituents had become more subtle over time, making it harder to recognize and combat.

Asian and Latino/a stakeholders perceived two main forms of discrimination (see table 8). By far the most commonly cited was inadequate or inappropriate outreach to Asian and Latino/a residents on the parts of the city and PHA. Eleven interviewees criticized the city and PHA for failing to advertise existing programs specifically to Asian and Latino/a communities. "I have not seen any type of outreach regarding Section 8 or other programs in the immigrant community," said one interviewee. The representative of an Asian-serving organization gave the example of the city's settlement grant, which is a form of down payment assistance given to new, low-income homebuyers: "To be awarded a settlement grant, you have to go through a housing counseling program. None of the agencies that have been selected by the city as housing counseling agencies have bilingual Chinese staff." As a result, fewer Chinese residents know about the program, and if they do, they must access it using a translator. Interviewees also said that when government agencies do conduct outreach in Asian and Latino/a communities, they do so in culturally insensitive ways. "The city fails to build trust before having events in the Indonesian community. Or it puts the burden on community leaders to conduct outreach for them, without giving them enough time, or any pay."

Six interviewees perceived discrimination in the siting of subsidized housing, as well. "Historically, PHA housing has been severely underrepresented in Latino/a neighborhoods; [the

Housing Authority] failed to build up a concentration there. . . . There's currently lots of recrimination about that; it's why Esperanza received a grant from the PHA to develop its own low-income housing—it's an ongoing conversation," one said. Multiple interviewees in Asian-serving organizations described a pressing, unmet need for subsidized senior housing in their communities. "Senior housing is a huge and growing problem for Asian elders. There is no senior housing within the Cambodian/Laotian community, and outside the community there is no senior housing available that is culturally and linguistically appropriate." Chinatown has only one subsidized senior housing project—On Lok House—and, according to an interviewee, it currently has a waiting list at least ten years long. The same interviewee said that in the two subsidized developments for seniors nearest to Chinatown, at least a third of tenants are limited-English-proficient Chinese and waiting lists are five and eight years long, respectively. Although we cannot confirm whether that is the case, the perception of a lack of options and insurmountable waiting lists was consistent across interviews and focus groups.

PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

Finally, we hypothesized that both groups have limited trust in public officials, but that Latino/a residents have slightly more trust, which translates into higher program participation. Distrust of the government was a popular subject that came up twelve times, in two-thirds of Asian-serving stakeholder interviews, one-third of Latino/a-serving stakeholder interviews, and one Asian focus group. "Immigrant communities distrust 'free money' and government aid. They fear scams, eviction, even deportation. This leads to an unwillingness to report landlords' housing violations and to apply for assistance," said one interviewee. In the case of refugees, distrust of government was rooted not in a lack of representation but in past trauma. An interviewee noted that "In their home countries of Vietnam and Cambodia, [Asian Philadelphians] would have been afraid to ask for housing resources, or they would use networks that they no longer have

once immigrating here." Distrust is sometimes accompanied by shame; for example, one interviewee said that Muslim Asians "are supposed to turn to their Imam instead of utilizing government resources," and failure to do so results in communal shame. One interviewee suggested that Asians also fear being branded as needy and avoid accessing public benefits for that reason. Focus groups suggested that Guatemalans, too, tend to uphold community self-reliance rather than look for outside help. In some cases, the assistance itself takes a form that is not culturally suited to Asian and Latino/a residents. Three Asian and one Latino/a stakeholders commented that resources that are predicated on homelessness are difficult for their constituents to access because Asians and Latino/as tend to double up with relatives rather than live on the street. The same interviewees added that both groups may perceive available subsidized housing options as unsuitable, either because they cannot accommodate large or nontraditional families or because they are disconnected from familiar and comfortable environments.

Both Asian and Latino/a residents lack familiarity with Philadelphia's complex public assistance system, a barrier that was cited in seven interviews and all four focus groups. The application processes, especially for federal housing programs administered by the PHA, involve multiple steps and copious amounts of paperwork, and sometimes result in nothing more than a spot on a long waitlist—which erodes trust in government. As one focus group participant noted, "In Indonesia, everything is easy. People just pay an agency to arrange things for them. It's not a bribe—there's just a service for everything. It's the same thing in the Chinese community. But in America, you have to do it yourself, engage with the program yourself. . . . It's difficult for Asians. We need someone in the middle between us and the government." But an even more fundamental challenge, according to eight interviewees and five focus group participants, is that Asian and Latino/a residents are unaware that public housing programs exist. "If people knew where to go, then yeah, they would access [home repair assistance], but they don't, so they end up doing it themselves," one focus group partici-

Table 9. Barriers to Accessing Public Housing Assistance

	Percentage of Interviewees Who Mentioned It		
Barrier	Asian Organizations and Community Leaders	Latino/a Organizations and Community Leaders	Fair Housing or Housing Service Organizations
Limited English proficiency	100	80	100
Complexity of housing assistance systems or lack of literacy in navigating public systems	30	40	40
Digital literacy	0	20	40
Immigration status	10	0	40
Distrust of government	70	40	60
Culture of community self-reliance	10	20	20
Culturally inappropriate assistance	30	20	0
Underdeveloped nonprofit network	50	0	20

Source: Authors' calculations.

pant said. Asian focus group participants and interviewees especially identified "a lack of education and awareness . . . around what resources exist [as well as] how to apply."

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our analysis shows that Asian and Latino/a Philadelphians are underrepresented relative to their share of the income-eligible households in almost every housing program offered by either the city or the Housing Authority. One reason is that many of these resources have already been allocated to highly impoverished populations who have resided in the city for longer. However, other factors associated with the growing heterogeneity of Asians and Latino/as in Philadelphia, including language barriers, financial and digital illiteracy, and cultural barriers, play an important role. Our research suggests that Asian and Latino/a residents do not perceive that the city and PHA are actively discriminating against them; nevertheless, the interviews and focus groups show signs of distrust and feelings that the city could be doing more to ensure equal access to services.

Our analysis highlights that Asian and Latino/a communities in Philadelphia face many of the same barriers to accessing housing resources (see table 9). Yet differences are important as well. Philadelphia's Asian population, though smaller than its Latino/a one, is even more internally diverse; it comprises a wider range of languages, national origins, religions, and socioeconomic backgrounds. This diversity has created additional challenges for the fair distribution of housing resources. First, the city and PHA rely heavily on a translation hotline to assist Asians due to their linguistic diversity and a lack of local partners with staff who can speak all of these languages. Dialect varies among Latino/as, the majority of whom speak Spanish, which has allowed for services provided in Spanish to reach a larger share of the population. Second, unlike Latino/as, Asian Philadelphians have not succeeded in building a nonprofit network with housing expertise. Some stakeholders have attributed this to the difficulty of cooperating across Asians' many linguistic, religious, and ethnic divides. Because the city relies on nonprofits to distribute and advertise resources, this lack represents a barrier to both private and public housing resources. Finally, the diversity of incomes and educational backgrounds among Philadelphia's Asians disguise their need for housing resources. Even though many Asian Philadelphians are eligible for housing assistance, the model minority stereotype affects program usage.

Both interviewees and focus group participants had ideas for how the city can improve

access to housing programs. Many suggested that the city, if it continues to use a decentralized model that relies on nonprofits to conduct outreach and administer some services, should carefully assess these nonprofits' capacity and provide them with enough resources to build and sustain their capacity. As one interviewee noted, "Cultural institutions offer some of the best resources and have a deep understanding of local conditions." Another interviewee expressed a similar sentiment, stating that "city programs are not culturally or linguistically appropriate; in order to really help Cambodians and other Asian immigrant groups, community- and faith-based organizations have to be given more city resources." This could mean partnering with arts, service, or cultural organizations that may not traditionally focus on housing but work with ethnic groups that are currently underserved. However, as one city official noted, the government must go through a formal request for proposals process to partner with organizations. The city cannot select organizations that do not meet certain capacity standards; neither can it force organizations to apply. This latter point is particularly salient given that one interviewee noted that their organization is reluctant to broaden its scope because of capacity limitations and politics around local resources and turf. However, another interviewee signaled that though their organization recognizes these challenges, it is also planning to enter the housing space and to do so in a sensitive and informed way.

Others felt that the city and PHA should focus on improving language access by boosting the number of bilingual staff and providing websites and seminars tailored to Asian and Latino/a communities. These solutions require additional resources, which are scarce, considering that most federal funding streams are remaining constant or declining. Allocating additional funding for outreach efforts may come at the cost of other existing efforts, possibly reducing the number of households served. This also raises a question of access versus scale: in an effort to increase staff or invest in nonprofits to serve one ethnic group that represents a small share of the city's overall population, the city may sacrifice the ability to increase out-

reach or services to another group that represents a much larger share. One potential solution would be a strategy to increase resources across all of the city's programs. In other words, rather than each individual agency hiring people who speak Cambodian, city agencies could collectively fund an outreach office that has the capacity to advertise programs, provide referrals, and conduct program intake in a broad range of languages. This approach may not work well in the case of a mobile homeless outreach program, but it could work for other programs.

Our findings have important implications not only for Philadelphia, but also for the United States as a whole. As mentioned earlier, America's urban counties have recently shifted to a majority non-White population (Parker et al. 2018). Cities must seek ways to serve their diversifying constituencies to ensure fair access to housing resources for all in the face of very limited resources to do so. This research shows the complexity of this endeavor, but points to some potential solutions that require breaking down silos across service organizations and government agencies. Ultimately our findings point to an urgent need for a national conversation about, and a plan to address, the complex and overlapping fair housing challenges that Asians and Latino/as face.

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