ADMINISTRATION OF RELIEF ABROAD

A Series of Occasional Papers

AMERICAN AID TO GERMANY
1918-1925

By Sidney Brooks

Together with THE LONG MILE BEYOND BERLIN

By Shelby M. Harrison

Edited by Donald S. Howard

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION
FOREWORD

This pamphlet is the fourth of a projected series of Occasional Papers, under the editorship of Donald S. Howard, assistant director of the Charity Organization Department. It is intended to offer those interested in planning or administering relief abroad a digest of pertinent material prepared under auspices other than our own and not readily available. Some of the texts included in this series have never been published, some are out of print; since they are inaccessible to many readers, it has not been felt necessary to designate the exact pages quoted.

Restrictions upon the use of paper in the present emergency make it necessary sharply to limit the length of these Occasional Papers. The material has therefore been cut severely. Except for certain headings and subheadings, and insertions enclosed in brackets, the wording of the text is that of the original author. Only omissions within paragraphs are shown by dots. In order to give a consecutive, though curt-tailed account, the order of the paragraphs has sometimes been re-arranged.

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Joanna C. Colcord, Director
Charity Organization Department

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AMERICAN AID TO GERMANY, 1918–1925

By October 1918, seeing that Germany was soon to be beaten, Mr. [Herbert] Hoover laid the food situation before President Wilson. Plans were then perfected for the organization necessary to rush supplies to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as . . . supplies the Allies might need.

One month later the war’s end came. The military truce in the forest of Compiègne was followed by the first international armistice negotiated between the Allies and Germany at Treves on November 11, 1918, providing, among other stipulations:

**Article 26 — Maintenance of the Blockade by the Allied and Associated Powers in its present form, German merchant ships found at sea liable to capture.** The Allies and United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent that this shall be found necessary.

Four days before, on November 7, 1918, President Wilson had asked Mr. Hoover to undertake an extension of Belgian and other reconstruction and relief work upon conclusion of an armistice which then seemed imminent. On November 11th, the day after the Armistice, the President directed Mr. Hoover, as United States Food Administrator, to proceed at once to Europe to determine what action was required from the United States and what extensions of American organization were necessary to carry out the work of the participation of the United States Government in this matter, and to take necessary steps in temporary relief.

On December 20th Mr. Hoover called the attention of the Peace Conference to the desperate food situation in Germany and advocated definite statement of a food policy which would permit measures of relief. This was the first step in extending relief to ex-enemy as well as to allied and liberated countries. Before many days passed it required ten rooms to hold Mr. Hoover and the then forming American Relief Administration in the headquarters of the American Peace Delegation. . . . Continuing discussions in Paris between Mr. Hoover and Allied representatives resulted, in about a month’s time, in formation of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief. At the first meeting of the Council, January 11th, Mr. Hoover was appointed Allied Director of Relief. As complications grew, this body was later formed into the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

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CONDITIONS INSIDE GERMANY AT THE WAR'S END

About this time arrived in Paris from Berlin a neutral relief worker of standing. His report of observations during the preceding two years in Germany fits as a key not only to the mental processes of German delegates but also to those of their enemies at Washington, London, and Paris. Thus he reported: "... A small amount of food ought to be sent to Germany without conditions if it is hoped to maintain order there, otherwise circumstances growing from lack of food will be fertile for the doctrines... of the Spartacus group who will let hell loose if not curbed. There is a frightful current of agitation under an apparently peaceful situation. Vice is on the increase to such an extent that one cannot cross the Tiergarten after dark without danger of attack. Germany has broken to pieces. The Allies have her at their mercy."

Concerning the food situation of the German people, official and confidential German Government reports prepared by experts came into the hands of the Allies. The manner of their acquisition, and the fact that they had apparently been kept secret from the German people did not open suspicions of being exaggerated propaganda.

They described reduction of bread rations by one-half after six months of war, rapidly reduced meat supplies to one-seventh of normal, of fats to one-third, and almost complete disappearance of sugar, eggs, potatoes, and milk. Bulky, non-varying, unappetizing food, a monotony unbroken, brought insidious destructive effect on the people. Press censorship kept the German people in the dark both as to the more extreme shortage impending and as to the rapidly growing manifestations of general health debilitation. During war years about 800,000 more civilians died than normally, mainly from causes depending in some way from lack of food.

The people were not informed of the observation of German physicians; weakness and lassitude, increasing manifestations of mental inferiority, indolence, lost initiative, nervousness. Nor were reports published of general prolapse of genitalia among women, increase of cases of intestinal intussusception, lung affictions growing with abnormal rapidity into tuberculosis, reactivation of old cured cases. "We are helpless in the whole domain of dieting the sick as we are in the fight against tuberculosis," read one governmental report; "decades must pass before the traces of this fateful period will pass."

The actual food situation of Germany is seen in three... reports of outsiders who investigated the situation in Germany; — an English nutritional expert, a Swedish nutritional expert, and an American nutritional expert.

1 Ernest H. Starling, M.D., B.S., C.M.G., F.R.S., was for many years professor of physiology at University College, London; served in the British Army during the war; latterly as scientific adviser, Ministry of Food, and British Delegate, Allied Food Commission. He is the author of numerous scientific works on nutritional and physiological subjects. [Footnotes 2 and 3 appear on p. 5.]
[Professor Starling reported in part:]

In the first two years of the war... some food was still to be obtained through neutral countries.

In the year 1917–18... the total food available after meeting the needs of the army, if equally divided among the civilian population would have given 2,440 calories per head, which is equal to 3,000 calories per average man. But... the farmers defy all measures taken to obtain delivery of food. We must therefore allow to the average man only 2,500 calories and 2,000 calories for the rest of his family.

The total amount of food which could be assigned on ration cards during the rest of the war did not exceed 1,500 to 1,600 calories per head. The food, moreover, was seriously deficient as regards quality. As regards fat, 70 grams per man per day has been accepted as the necessary minimum. The ration contained only 15 to 20 grams per day. A diet thus restricted in quality signifies slow starvation.

A large number of the population have lost since 1916 from 15 to 25% of their original weight, it is evident that their condition must be seriously affected. In the presence of shortage of food the woman gives her share in order to supplement that of the children or the husband, so that her nutritive condition tends to be worse than that of the rest of the family.

The war in its later stages was known as a “war of attrition.” The people of the allied nations suffered, yes, and greatly, but the extreme of attrition was borne by the people of Germany and of the east European countries. Therein lay America’s duty, recognized by Congress, to bring her resources to fill the food vacuum of Central Europe — partially Germany but most particularly the fringe of small new countries that lay between Germany and a Russia crumbling down in ruin.

With the New Year, 1919, each day brought to Paris more and more reports pessimistic as to whether any responsible group might even retain enough control to guide or represent Germany.

Lost spirit, lost pride, lost patriotism, with impotent resentment at having been deceived by their rulers, formed the dull gray of German sentiment. The smaller but far more vivid splashes were the radical red.

The search for the remedy of these troubles always came back to food. Mr. Hoover presented the situation to President Wilson: [in part]

Paris, 19 December 1918

I am strongly impressed that some immediate action needs to be taken with regard to internal conditions in Germany.

In order to visualize to you somewhat the problem, if we say that the normal

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1. J. E. Johannesson, M.D., professor of physiology at the Carolinian Institute in Stockholm, an expert in the science of nutrition, the author of prominent scientific works, and during World War I the Swedish Government’s expert on food problems. He made two extended investigations of the food situation in Germany.
2. Alonzo E. Taylor, M.D., former professor of pathology and physiological chemistry, University of California and University of Pennsylvania; member of War Trade Board as food expert during America’s participation in the war; director, Food Research Institute, Stanford University; author of numerous scientific and nutritional publications.
consumption of the German people, without restraint, is 100, the German Empire within its old boundaries must possess today somewhere about 60% of this quantity. If there is distribution and control, the population can probably go through without starvation on something like 80% of normal, and therefore the problem is to find 20% by way of imports. If there is an extension of the Bolshevist movement or extension of the separatist movement, so far as food is concerned, we shall have some localities consuming 100% of their local supplies and feeding any surplus to animals. The problem will be unsolvable by way of the available supplies in the world for import because the total consumption under such conditions would run a great deal more than 80% and all this aside from the almost impossible complication of dealing with distribution in the hands of such highly incompetent agencies as Bolshevist committees.

It would appear to me, therefore, that some announcement with regard to the food policies in Germany is critically necessary, and at once... Doctor Alonzo E. Taylor, American investigator in Germany, had on February 11th telegraphed his recommendations for Germany’s minimum food supply to Mr. Hoover in Paris. He recommended 320,000 tons of flour, or equivalent, and 100,000 tons of mixed pork products monthly for six months; 10,000 tons of condensed milk, and 10,000 tons of vegetable oils monthly for four months. Also that Germany should be allowed to trade in her stores of wares then stored in Scandinavia. Germany should have the right to trade in the North Sea. He calculated that these measures should raise the average rations in Germany to 2,450 calories per person per day, or just about the minimum standard necessary to maintain the average individual over the starvation line.

We do not need endlessly to quote statistics of food shortage and undernourishment and its bearing on events in Germany and on conference relations with German representatives. The first government's continuation in power depended on the food situation. It had promised the people both bread and peace. It had to redeem the promise if further revolt were to be avoided.

The food to be brought into Germany by Americans before the signing of peace did not mean an increase in rations but only that the amount of nutrition hitherto available could be maintained. The program represented compromise between nutrition needs, raw material, transport, and finances, and was approved by leading nutrition experts. For their information the American investigators had gone discreetly to scientific men and professors, rather than to officials. Being intellectuals, these experts, not afflicted by blind patriotic fears, gave definitely clear statements of true facts.

The Blockade, the First Hurdle

When Foch, Marshal of France, and Wemyss, First Lord of the British Admiralty, sat in the railway car near Compiègne in November 1918 dictating conditions of the Armistice to Germany through Herr Erzberger, it was their intention to enforce German good faith by the maintenance of a controlling blockade of Germany's intercourse with the rest of the world.
Marshal Foch probably recalled many occasions in military history when, in an armistice, subsequent events had justified a suspicion of an enemy’s intentions in a delay solicited mainly for purposes of gaining time to recoup shortages.

Erzberger’s insistence on the dangers of starving Germany brought the ... assurance in the Armistice blockade clause that the Allies and the United States contemplated the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice as should be found necessary. If this recognized the need of feeding Germany but did not answer the other question of recovery of many peoples from war, it was hardly to be laid at Foch’s door.

Marshal Foch and other allied military leaders patently considered that ending a war required complete annihilation of the enemy’s power to menace. Therefore, continuation of the blockade appeared necessary. Yet when the Allies, upon the initiative of America, decided that Central and Eastern Europe must be fed as a first step in recovery, and it came to coordinating the blockade with relief and reconstruction, the complexities that ensued at once showed such coordination to be impossible.

France subordinated everything to military necessity. Perhaps it was not sufficiently realized in official French circles that no country could pay a substantial reparation except through production and trade. And for this, movement of materials is essential. Nor did it appear to be seen in France that the continuance of the blockade hit French industrial recovery a fearful blow. French thinkers would not admit that destruction of enterprise and prevention of recovery in enemy countries would have any effect on French recovery, and that the blockade meant over-high prices to be paid for goods by citizens of her republic.

Hoover fought the blockade from the first, starting into action on the first of January 1919 in his memorandum submitted to the President in which he brought out that raising of the blockade was far more important to the economic recovery of all Europe than its maintenance was in naval or military values.

German Hopes for American Aid

For some extraordinary reason the German people seemed to feel sure that the position taken by America would be favorable to them. Whether these hopes came from the historical precedents of the financial recompense America granted to Mexico and Spain after defeating them, or whether it was an appeal to the benevolent spirit of the American people is not apparent.

American public sentiment toward Germany in 1919 had by no means cooled from the acts that forced them into war and kept them there until but three months back. No American administration of whichever political party
that advocated loans to Germany then, even had it wished to make such proposals, could have received anything but defeat at the hands of the American Congress and loud disapproval by the American people.

This did not prevent America from wishing to give the new German Republic every practicable facility to start a new life for the people in Germany, nor did it slacken American efforts to give such aid as it could, consistent with its faith to war pledges.

**Transport and Finance Problems to be Surmounted**

*Transportation.* Delegates of the Allies . . . met delegates of Germany . . . February 6, 1919, for discussion of the question of ships for transporting food.

Then and there arrangements were made to supply Germany with the preliminary quantity of foods most urgently needed: 250,000 cases of condensed milk and approximately 30,000 tons of pork products, total value $125,000,000 gold marks, or about $50,000,000. For these Germany was to pay $100,000,000 marks in gold and $25,000,000 marks in Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavian currency. The supplies were to be furnished from British stocks of American origin, for which the U.S. Food Administration coincidently arranged replacement orders on America for practically the entire amount. As rapidly as shipping arrangements could be made the foods were delivered by the British to Germany through Rotterdam.

At the same time the German delegates stated their monthly needs from March to August were 400,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of fats and meat, to which the Allies replied that the request would be considered provided satisfactory financial arrangements were made by the German representatives.

The German delegates intimated they expected to obtain additional neutral credits for foodstuffs but seemed unwilling or unable to give indication of the amount save that they had compiled a list of goods ready for export amounting to some $300,000,000 gold marks in value. They appeared to cherish some hope that they might be supplied by the Allies with credits for foods.

As the meeting progressed it became increasingly evident that the shortage of food in Germany was accentuated by and itself accentuated difficulties of transport and production. Lack of coal, in holding up the railways, further upset distribution of food. Miners on short rations, particularly as regards fats, produced about one-third the quantity of coal per man as compared with normal production. The German delegates expressed grave anxiety lest the short supply of food and raw material, further retarding return to normal industrial conditions, might . . . at any moment drive industrial workers into a class revolution.
At the time of the Armistice all indications pointed to a surplus of allied shipping.

Instead of a surplus of ships an acute shortage shortly became apparent. Hardly any allied shipping body foresaw at the time of the Armistice the necessity of immediate transport of immense quantities of food supplies to the blockaded countries of Central Europe. Then, too, [there] was immediate need of ships to transport homeward-bound troops to America, South Africa and Australia, urgently demanded by public opinion in those countries. Besides these two major necessitous employments of shipping, other unanticipated factors appeared, bringing delays to the turn-around of ships and removing a number from carrying service. Among these were the labor troubles that came immediately with the withdrawal of the patriotic urge, causing port congestion in nearly every ex-combatant country. The threat of a general strike in England, involving coal miners, dock and transport workers made it necessary to double-bunker ships for round trips, greatly cutting down cargo space. Sudden and immense need for repairs which had been put off during the war, removed many vessels from service. Because dislocation of railways left docks congested, and because of shortened labor hours and slackened work, the loading capacity of ships was reduced by over 30 per cent of normal. That is, transport of a given quantity of supplies required one-third additional ship tonnage.

Because all these problems were interrelated, the German delegates much desired the Allies to treat questions of food and raw material, of finance and transport, as a whole. Obviously, they stated, if reparation or indemnity was to be obtained German industry must be restarted. To restart required food and raw material.

Financial Difficulties. Conditions . . . necessitated that Germany pay for the food, as well as help transport it. The Allies could hardly be expected to make further sacrifices in donating free food to their enemy if that enemy could possibly pay for it. America was ready to supply the food and needed the use of ships for its transport. Germany showed no intention of delivering the ships.

Feeding of the population in occupied areas was arranged for under the various allied commanders, the Germans being permitted to secure credits in Holland to pay for these, by which Holland forged one more link in the long chain of her invaluable neutral services between Germany and the Allies.

Temporary deliveries out of the way, the larger problem of supply of Germany to the harvest of 1919 came up for settlement, an undertaking of large magnitude involving deliveries of $35,000,000 a month for over five months.

Mr. Hoover . . . proposed the possibility of Germany opening credits in South America. This, however, appeared not popular with either the French or the British, particularly the French, as the blockade struggle indicated. As
one minor obstruction a fear was expressed that the presence of German emissaries in South America could bring dangerous results through possible secret political activities.

Eventually, when approval for some sort of half arrangement in this direction was secured . . . the Germans attempted the measure, but the results were of no appreciable magnitude until too late for the supplies to reach Germany before the 1919 harvest.

Coincidently came up for consideration the plan of allowing Germany to finance her food imports through northern neutrals.

Under this plan, Germany could pay for her food, as she was trying to do, for instance, by buying food in Sweden against coal exchange deliveries in the following year; by the delivery of cotton in payment of part of the debt to Switzerland, thereby opening chance of new credits in that country.

Running foul of the blockade, this plan of financing Germany's food also came into conflict with the provision of the Armistice which prohibited export of gold or securities. The blockade not yet released by the Allies, the plan failed except for some comparatively small permits being given for cash purchases in Holland and Denmark.

If Germany was to be fed, and if she was not to be allowed to trade, or was to have no loans from the Associated Governments, then presumably she would have to buy her food with tangible resources. Therefore, there remained but the payment for the food with Germany's liquid assets, such as foreign securities, neutral currency, and gold marks.

As the blockade was not raised the plan eventually went into effect, in spite of objections from France. Part of the payments under this plan were to be made by crediting to the food account charges for hire of the ships which the Germans were to turn over for the transport of food.

The Allies' financial policy being finally settled among themselves, their representatives and those of Germany assembled on March 13th in the Hotel Astoria, Brussels. So far the German Government in spite of constant and energetic efforts, had not succeeded in modifying the allied stipulations for the turning over of the German merchant marine.

_Purposes Behind Hoover Proposals_. Part of the record [of the Brussels meeting] is a memorandum of Mr. Hoover's bearing the date March 21, 1919:

_Why We Are Feeding Germany_

From the point of view of my Western upbringing, I would say at once, because we do not kick a man in the stomach after we have licked him.

From the point of view of an economist, I would say that it is because there are seventy millions of people who must either produce or die, that their production is essential to the world's future and that they cannot produce unless they are fed.

From the point of view of a governor, I would say it is because famine breeds anarchy, anarchy is infectious, the infection of such a cesspool will jeopardize France and Great Britain, which will yet spread to the United States.
From the point of view of a reconstructionist, I would say that unless the German people can have food, can maintain order and stable government and get back to production, there is no hope of their paying the damage they owe to the world.

From the point of view of a humanitarian, I would say that we have not been fighting with women and children and we are not beginning now.

From the point of view of our Secretary of War, I would say that I wish to return the American soldiers home, and that it is a good bargain to give food for passenger steamers on which our boys may arrive home four months earlier than will otherwise be the case.

From the point of view of the American Treasurer, I would say that this is a good bargain because it saves the United States enormous expenditures in Europe in the support of idle men and allows these men to return to productivity in the United States.

From the point of view of a negotiator of the Armistice, I would say that we are in honor bound to fulfill the implied terms of the Armistice that Germany shall have food.

Let us not befog our minds with the idea that we are feeding Germany out of charity. She is paying for her food. All that we have done for Germany is to lift the blockade to a degree that allows her to import food from any markets that she wishes, and in the initial state, in order to effect the above, we are allowing her to purchase emergency supplies from stocks in Europe, at full prices.

Taking it by and large, our face is forward, not backward on history. We and our children must live with these seventy millions of Germans. No matter how deeply we may feel at the present moment, our vision must stretch over the next hundred years, and we must write now into history such acts as will stand creditably in the minds of our grandchildren.

The Deadlock Broken. The S.S. Fairmon with 6283 tons of flour arrived at Rotterdam on January 4th [1919]. There it was. Some or all could have gone to Germany. Not so taken, the cargo was allocated to Finland. On the same day arrived at Rotterdam the West Shore. On the next day the Ossinecke. Their cargoes were allocated to Holland... Up to March 25th, when the first delivery to Germany was actually made, an average of one shipload of food arrived at Rotterdam every four days, parts of each of their cargoes available to Germany had Germany complied with her shipping agreement.

It may now begin to be apparent why there must have been keen suspense for the Americans on their way to the Brussels meeting, where it was to develop whether the Germans would agree to the only conditions under which the Allies would agree that America could turn over this food to them. Back of it all loomed the portentous question of what turn affairs would take if people in Germany were not fed.

Admiral Wemyss opened the meeting by reading a statement previously prepared, calling upon the Germans to say categorically whether or not they abided by the terms of the Armistice. The German spokesman replied with a curt "Yes!"

At last, on April 21st [1919], the pressure of the force continually applied, brought final permission for Germany to import foods on her own account.
Thus came to a close the first and worst stage of this hard struggle, upon the results of which rested:

Elimination of the biggest obstacle in feeding war weary, half starved peoples in the Baltic countries, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Roumania and the Balkans;
Relief of intolerable food shortages in Germany;
Relief of all but intolerable food conditions to the people of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland;
Saving American food producers from loss of perishable foods, releasing these foods for shipment to Europe where needed;
Aid in smoothing out financial difficulties in feeding Germany;
Helping get 60,000,000 mobilized men in Europe back to productive labor.

But the blockade had not yet been lifted. It still remained in force. Only some of its regulations were eased. Against the will of Italy Hoover secured the opening of the Adriatic and the liberation of Turkey from blockade. Trading in foods though permitted was still hampered by a maze of intricate regulations and stifling restrictions.

Not until April 28th did the Council of Four give its decision. The decision was that although appreciative of the importance of removal of these restrictions it would be preferable to take no action at that time. The Covenant of the League of Nations had been approved on this day by the Peace Conference. The time for presentation of the Treaty was near. It was not known if the Germans would sign.

The blockade was never completely withdrawn until Germany formally accepted the Treaty of Peace.

As German military forces withdrew at the Armistice or later from frontiers formerly occupied in the Baltic States, Poland, Roumania, and Serbia, these countries, left stripped of food supplies, of course were entitled to first consideration in the allocation of such aid as lay within the Allies’ power to extend. With world surpluses just enough to fill Europe’s absolute minimum nutritional needs, the Brussels agreement had to limit the food allowed to Germany to 300,000 tons of cereals and 70,000 tons of fats per month.

*Food Shipments to Germany Begin.* The execution of the agreed plan was administered in Paris by Mr. Hoover as Allied Director of Relief, and was carried out by the United States Grain Corporation, the American Relief Administration and the British Ministry of Food. For the first time in history it fell to the duty of one group of men to calculate the food resources of the world, to secure the surpluses, and with them to feed a score of nations.

Had not the financial responsibility been previously assumed by Mr. Hoover and the food bought and shipped by the United States Food Administration probably two months more would have elapsed before regular deliveries could have been made. The large financial risk had been taken. The food was afloat. By the time of the Brussels Conference the American Relief Administration had sixty-five ships of food sailing the Atlantic Ocean, Medi-
terranian, Black, and Baltic Seas, bound for seventeen different European ports. The turning over of German ships added 121 vessels to the allied fleet, thirty-two of which entered service of the American Relief. These were despatched to the United States from French ports bearing American troops, to return with food cargoes.

While the first German steamers were starting homeward with the troops, an American steamer, the S.S. Carnifex, bearing 6,627 tons of white flour, put into Hamburg on March 25th, the first cargo delivered to Germany by the United States.

Usually, little cause for disagreement came up when principals dealt with each other. Von Braun's principal effort was to supervise selection and careful inspection of the foods delivered, while W. L. Brown [A.R.A. representative], whose past experience with Germans in Belgium stood him in good stead, remained adamant in not permitting von Braun to secure this opening for bickerings over details. Mr. Brown had his instructions from Mr. Hoover, which read: "I would like to again repeat that in dealing with the Germans we are not trying to sell our food; that we are sacrificing relief programs in selling them anything, and we don't propose to haggle over any job of this kind. . . ."

An enterprise of such proportions could not attempt to supply always the exact commodities desired by the German delegates, and they were required to accept cargoes as they came without regard as to whether it exactly suited their desires at the moment. As far as possible, however, without jeopardizing the welfare of other countries, the German program was carried out in accord with the German wishes.

Money Troubles to the Fore Again. To the Supreme Council Mr. Hoover wrote [in part] on May 1st that even if Germany completed May deliveries of gold (which was in doubt):

There is likely to be a serious deficit. The German delegates show great unwillingness to hand over further sums of gold. They pointed out also that the continuing depreciation of the mark, involving as it did a corresponding reduction in the prestige of the government with whom the Allies were hoping to make peace, was probably not in the interests of the Allies and certainly not in the general interest of Europe.

Even if the immediate difficulties of finding gold to pay for May deliveries were overcome, it is obvious that food supplies for June, July and August cannot be provided on these lines. It is necessary to start at once shipments of fats and cereals from South America if there is to be any hope of providing the low ration which has already been agreed by the Allies to be the very minimum that Germany should have.

Whatever the political situation may be in June and July, it is obviously undesirable that the Allied Governments should not be in position to put food into Germany in those months if they want to do so. To avoid this, authority should

1 Edler von Braun, Privy State Councillor, Under-Secretary of State, and Food Minister of the German Republic.
be given at once for incurring the contingent liabilities involved by ordering food forward.

The Supreme Economic Council assumed no such responsibility, leaving Hoover to assume it himself, or not, as he saw fit.

It appears, though, that Germany did desire the program completed. Further communications led to definite promises of early payment, which finally came forth on May 21st. Two more payments followed, closing the program and the account on June 11th.

In all, foods of a total over 618,000 tons of flour, grains, fats, and so forth were delivered to Germany through the American Relief Administration, including those of the Commission for Relief of Belgium, the total German payments for same being 1,055,000,000 gold marks, or roundly about $250,000,000. About 25,000,000 gold marks of this were derived from sales of foreign securities from which the Germans had hoped to realize a ten-fold amount.

*Ultimate Distribution of Cost of 1919 Program.* Of the United States deliveries in 1919 approximately 20 per cent were sold for cash, 77 per cent on credit, and 2.2 per cent given as charity. The charitable donation largely for child feeding amounted to about $19,300,000 given by the U.S. Government and American charitable organizations. Of the deliveries from the British Empire, administered by Sir William Goode, British Director of Relief, about 65 per cent were sold for cash, 32 per cent on credit, and 3 per cent, or about $3,500,000 given as charity. Counting the stringent food situation affecting every class of person in the United Kingdom their share represented real self-denial. American charitable organizations acting independently during this period contributed relief to the value of possibly $80,000,000, bringing America’s charity contribution during the nine months in 1919 to over $100,000,000.

**Breadth and Complexity of the Undertaking**

To carry out efficiently these arrangements the Director General of Relief had to take over temporary control of railroads of central and southern Europe; establish and control some 10,000 miles of telegraph and telephone lines; arrange barge shipments on the Danube, Elbe, and Vistula; initiate exchange of food commodities between central and southern European States; arrange shipment of certain U.S. Army stocks in France; ship and distribute considerable quantities of American Red Cross clothing; establish and administer a temporary exchange system between America and Europe by which Americans were enabled to send some $7,000,000 to relatives in impoverished countries [including Germany]; assist in the importation of raw materials; and in general take charge of restorative machinery as yet not functioning under the new governments.
Even in the midst of all the preoccupations of feeding Europe and negotiating a peace the far more complicated problems of post-war reconstruction had to come in for consideration.

CHILD-FEEDING PROGRAM ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the war, not including Germany, there were estimated to be over 2,000,000 war orphans. Hundreds of thousands more were refugees from Russia or other waifs astray in the general chaos of these territories that had been shut off from food supplies for over four years.

Under governmental supervision and with a Congressional appropriation of $100,000,000, the American Relief Administration came into being at the Armistice to furnish moral support and food supplies so these children could be brought back to normal condition.

When Congress in 1919 appropriated $100,000,000 for European relief an amendment was offered and secured by Senator Lodge restricting ex-enemy countries from use of these funds. Because of this express restriction the funds were not applicable to Germany.

The American Society of Friends definitely identified itself with measures to aid Germany . . . in July 1919, by sending a committee of investigation to Germany composed of Jane Addams, Dr. Alice Hamilton, Carolena M. Wood, from America, with Marion C. Fox, Joan M. Fry, J. Thompson Elliott, Max Bellows, from England. Dr. Aletta Jacobs, a prominent Dutch physician, was asked as a neutral to make observations on health conditions. The committee reported alarming conditions of malnutrition among young children, particularly in the larger cities. Rickets, tuberculosis, and other diseases threatened to deprive a whole generation of German children of the fair chance which is the common right of every child.

In their statement of aims the Friends declared: "The German people are not only hungry, but discouraged and in despair. They are without any aim or moral stimulant. They need friends. . . . The Society of Friends can best fulfill these needs. The peace testimony of Friends means not merely conscientious objection to war, it means an alternative to war—overcoming evil with good, hate with love. . . ."

At first the Friends' work in Germany was confined to helping families whose male members were still interned in England and the United States, and in getting relief supplies to hospitals. In this earlier work the Friends accompanied every gift with the message: "To those who suffer in Germany with a message of good will from the American Society of Friends (Quakers), who for 350 years, and also all through this great war, have believed that
those who were called enemies were really friends separated by a great misunderstanding."

Basis of Agreement with European Children’s Fund and European Relief Council. In November 1919, after the re-formation of the A.R.A. from an official into a private organization, Mr. Hoover procured assistance in finance which made it possible for the Friends to extend their energies to the . . . important work of mass feeding of undernourished children and mothers throughout Germany in the same way that these were being cared for by the American Relief Administration in other countries. Mr. Hoover’s proposal is quoted [in part] in the following letter to the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia:

Friend Jones:
I beg to confirm the understanding with regard to our arrangement that you should further expand your organization of relief work for under-nourished children in Germany. As I explained to you, the European Children’s Fund,2 under my direction, is at present engaged in the special feeding of some three million under-nourished children in various parts of Europe and there has been placed in the hands of this fund certain moneys for extension of this work to Germany.

The food situation in all parts of Europe affects child life more than any other

3 Editor’s note: Of the organization of the European Children’s Fund Frank M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland have written:

“The [U.S.] Grain Corporation had no desire to make any profit out of . . . relief operations but it felt it would be seriously remiss in the trust which had been imposed upon it if it did not use the ordinary business methods of protecting the integrity of its capital. Fortunately, the Grain Corporation experienced no serious losses in these operations, and as a result, the 1919 relief work was completed with a fair surplus over and above all expenditures. Inasmuch as this work had been undertaken for purely humanitarian reasons, it was felt that it would be entirely unjust for the Grain Corporation, and hence the United States Government, to retain this surplus . . .

“A survey of the European food situation late in the summer of 1919 convinced Mr. Hoover that there would be serious suffering in many countries during the coming year. On the other hand, it was obviously desirable that further governmental or official relief should be withdrawn after the arrival of the 1919 harvest. This harvest would be sufficient to feed these countries for several months, during which time, if placed on their own responsibility, they should be able to make their own arrangements for further supplies. However, certain classes of these populations, and particularly the children, were likely to suffer because of the lack of sufficient quantity, and especially the proper kind, of food. After consulting with the representatives of the several governments to which relief had been supplied, as well as with President Wilson, it was determined that the best way in which this surplus from the 1919 operations could be returned to these countries would be in the form of further food relief for the children. . . . At the express request of these governments, and at the direction of the President, Mr. Hoover organized the American Relief Administration European Children’s Fund, incorporated under the laws of Delaware, as a charitable institution which continued to feed the undernourished children of these countries for another three years. The surplus above cost of operation on the 1919 European relief operations of the Grain Corporation was turned over to this new organization. This formed the nucleus of the fund for later child-feeding operations in Europe. This fund was greatly increased by charitable contribution in the United States and by contributions from European governments and elsewhere.” — American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period. Stanford University Press, Stanford University, Calif., 1937, p. 42.
element in that community, because the destruction of cattle and the shortage of cattle-feed will continue the milk famine over this coming winter with great severity. Despite the suffering and losses imposed upon the American people through the old German Government, I do not believe for a moment that the real American would have any other wish than to see any possible service done in protection of child life wherever it is in danger. We have never fought with women and children.

I particularly turn to you, because I am anxious that efforts of this kind should not become the subject of political propaganda. The undoubted probity, ability and American character of the Quakers for generations will prevent any such use being made of your service, and for this reason I propose that the funds at my disposal should be devoted exclusively to your support.

It is my understanding that your actual distribution in Germany is done through local German charitable societies already engaged in such work and will be supervised by Quaker delegates from the United States. I wish to express my appreciation of the wisdom of this basis of organization.

HERBERT HOOVER

This work the Friends gladly undertook upon the understanding “that in addition to being a mere feeding operation it might also be a real message of good will and encouragement from Americans to the German people in their time of sore trial.”

There could be nothing in such a reservation not wholly acceptable. By the agreement made it became the duty of the American Relief Administration to make all purchases for the program, ship the supplies and unload them at Hamburg, loading the commodities into cars billed to the points designated by the Quakers. All details of organizing child-feeding kitchens in Germany and their administration were to be carried out by the Quakers.

The need in all Central Europe as well as Germany was seen to be acute. The American Relief Administration soon found it had insufficient funds for the program already laid out for the winter of 1919-1920. The needs appeared so great that Mr. Hoover decided to appeal to the American public for funds. For this appeal the European Relief Council was founded, the member organizations being, American Friends Service Committee, American Red Cross, American Relief Administration, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Joint Distribution Committee for Jewish War Sufferers, Knights of Columbus, National Catholic Welfare Council, Young Men’s Christian Association, and the Young Women’s Christian Association. Herbert Hoover was elected chairman, Franklin K. Lane, treasurer.

It had been estimated in September 1920 that a total of 3,500,000 ill, waif, undernourished or orphan children in Central and Eastern Europe would depend upon the various distributing societies for support until the harvest of 1921. To care for these it was considered $33,000,000 would be required, $10,000,000 of which was needed for medical service and supplies, and $23,000,000 for food and clothing.

The original calculations made in September were based upon the prices
of commodities, services and transportation then obtaining, but with the considerable fall in prices of food, clothing and transportation, it was considered that sufficient funds were in sight by the end of February 1921 to meet the needs, and the national appeal was closed in order not needlessly to encroach upon the many other charitable burdens of the American public. The total exceeded $29,000,000.

In the campaign the American Friends Service Committee secured subscriptions of about $861,000 largely from Americans of German descent. The additional sums needed for German and Austrian child feeding were met by the American Relief Administration from funds allocated [to it] by the Council. . . . The amount allocated by the A.R.A. for German and Austrian child relief from funds collected in the European Relief Council drive and from other donations finally reached a total over $13,600,000.

There were those in America who objected to the inclusion of Germany in the European relief campaign.

Selecting Those to be Aided. In including Germany in the campaign for funds Mr. Hoover’s expressed view was that German children bore no relationship to the war, that America had not been fighting women and children, that shortage of commodities in Germany of the type on which child life can be maintained brought the greatest possible disaster on the children of the poor, that America had those commodities in surplus, that there is a large community in the United States sympathetic to their support, and “that in the long run from a national point of view if we wish to recreate good will not only abroad but also contribute something to heal chasms between our own people, we were not justified in excluding these children from such national effort.”

The first task of the Friends Mission when it arrived in Germany was to obtain classification, based upon medical examination, of all needy German children from 2 to 14 years of age. Children were divided in this grouping in four categories: first, those in normal condition; second, undernourished, but not sufficiently to endanger future health; third, children suffering such serious and prolonged undernourishment as to endanger their future, unless relief were given at once; and fourth, children diseased by rickets, tuberculosis, serious anaemia, etc., as a direct result of malnutrition.

Leading child specialists of Germany formed into a medical advisory council for the Quakers for regulating admission of children to the feeding centers. In each locality committees of physicians determined the individual children and mothers who were to be fed, solely on the basis of their condition of undernourishment, making no distinction on account of politics, religion or social position. In general, babies were not fed, because distinctly German organizations had been able to arrange for their supply. The Quakers, however, undertook feeding of a certain number of infants not otherwise cared
for. Catholic and Protestant, Jew and Gentile, in America and Germany, alike supported the effort in which race, nationality and religion played no part in a purely humanitarian work. Likewise, the only consideration for admission of children to the kitchens was the state of undernourishment of the child. If a child’s condition was undernourished, he was fed. If not, he was not fed, irrespective of the family’s situation.

At the end of the first month of operations 300,000 children were on the feeding lists. At the end of the first six months of operations 700,000 children were being fed in 3,392 feeding centers in 88 cities and districts throughout Germany. Up to the time of the harvest of 1921 the numbers fed reached their high point when 1,026,656 were on the feeding lists. During the whole period of this feeding up to a total of about 253,000,000 meals were served. Throughout the operation of the Mission, approximately 90% of the meals were given to school children, 5½% to children from 2 to 6 years of age, 2% to older children from 14 to 17 years, and 2½% to nursing and expectant mothers. The Mission worked in close co-operation with the Deutscher Zentralausschuss für die Auslandshilfe, a committee headed by Dr. Bose of the German Food Ministry and representing all welfare organizations receiving foreign relief in Germany. The food allotment for the various cities and districts was made in consultation with this committee and by independent investigation.

An interesting technical development of the work was the opportunity it gave for testing on a large scale various scientific measurements of the effects of undernutrition upon the human system and the development of a dependable method of determining the general state of health of a child by a means of physical measurements. After a general meeting of a commission of the German Medical Society, leading child specialists attending decided upon the so-called “Rohrer Index” method of examination. This method, similarly to the Pelidissi system evolved in Austria at about the same time, is based on the relation of a child’s weight to his height. The physicians decided that as a mechanical means the system could not be infallible, recommending that perhaps 70% of the children would be correctly selected by its means, and that the other 30% should be selected upon the basis of ordinary medical examination. Each child was therefore given both Rohrer and regular medical examination.

Administrative Set-up. Operations in Germany were directed from the headquarters of the [Friends] Mission at Berlin, and the transportation office at Hamburg. Germany was divided into administrative districts, each in charge of an American with one or more assistants. As supervisor for each district it was considered the best policy to induce some strong business executive to come over to Germany and devote a period of time to the work. In each locality committees composed of public spirited persons carried through
the local measures of the work in accordance with the wishes of the American donors, solely for the benefit of the most undernourished children in the community. The Friends repeatedly found occasion to express their warm appreciation not only for the technically excellent work of these committees, but of their understanding of the social and spiritual basis underlying the humanitarian effort.

The food allocated to the various districts in Germany necessarily varied in accordance with the supplies available and with the fluctuating needs of the districts, as well as with the possibilities of organization of child feeding centers. The greatest need was found in the most densely populated areas around Berlin and Essen. In the Dresden, Hamburg and Leipzig districts the need came next, whereas in Frankfort, Munich and Cologne fewer children had to be cared for by the Quakers. In larger cities the food was cooked in a few large central kitchens and distributed in huge thermos kettles to the various feeding centers. Two great kitchens in Berlin cooked for 35,000 and 25,000 respectively. A large central kitchen in Essen cooked for 20,000. In more remote centers the food was prepared in smaller kitchens and served on the spot.

Costs of unloading, storing, insuring and transporting the food from Hamburg to point of distribution were borne by the German Government and by local committees. Costs of storing, cooking and distributing in each city were borne by the municipality or local committee. These costs were partially defrayed by the salvage of food sacks, cans and containers in which the food had been shipped, and by a charge of from twenty-five to forty pfennigs per meal, an amount being settled by the local committee to provide for miscellaneous local expense. As these charges represented a value of from one-fourth to four-tenths of a cent, it will be seen that they were down to a strict minimum. These parents too poor to afford even such minimum charges were always provided for by separate funds maintained for the purpose. No child was ever turned away on account of inability to pay even this small sum.

Such an operation, linking principles of business organization . . . with philanthropy, could only be carried out through co-operation of thousands of Germans who earnestly performed their part in cooking and distributing the food, and inspection and control of kitchens and feeding centers. Many of the 40,000 men and women co-operating in this work were volunteers who gave their services without pay. Their share was large. Without their devoted services the work could not have been a success.

The German Government also co-operated in the work of the American feeding in numerous ways. Primarily, of course, customs duties on food products were waived. Free transportation and express service for all shipments were furnished by the railways; flour and sugar necessary for the continuation of the feeding from September 1920 until September 1922, were
given by the Government, which also appropriated the sum of 13,000,000 marks in June 1920 for the work of the Deutscher Zentralausschuss für die Auslandshilfe, a large part of which was used in connection with the work of the Quakers.

By giving the Mission preferential housing facilities, telephone service, and furnishing free transportation to its members on German railways and in many other ways did the German Government show courtesy and material assistance to the small band of Quaker workers.

Conditions in Early 1921. In the first part of 1921 when the question came up as to how much longer it would be necessary to carry on American charity in Germany, Mr. Ellis Loring Dresel, American Commissioner to Germany, sent the following report to the State Department:

Berlin, January 7, 1921.—By personal observation and thoroughly reliable reports I am convinced that a large portion of the children in all the large cities in Germany are seriously underfed, and that a continuation of the American relief is essential to save their life and preserve the health of an entire generation. This applies not only to the children of the very poor and of the working classes, but also to the children of officials of fixed salaries, and I know of one cabinet member who is constantly worried over his inability to obtain a sufficient supply of milk for his own child. From motives of common decency I am constrained to give presents of flour and milk to children of employees of the Commission, even though they are receiving more than normal wages. No other charity is so well known in Germany nor creates such a deep feeling of gratitude to America. To discontinue this relief would undoubtedly increase social unrest. To see his children underfed and suffering would turn the most self-respecting and patient workman to communism.

Members of the Quaker Mission in Germany soon after cabled to Mr. Hoover:

The territory that we now cover includes most German cities of 10,000 and over, also smaller towns in congested industrial districts in the Ruhr, Saxony, Upper Silesia, of a total population of 29,000,000 of which we estimate 4,700,000 are school children. Medical examinations by index method now proceeding indicate that at least 20% of these children or about 1,000,000 are seriously undernourished, requiring feeding. In addition we estimate 800,000 children from 2 to 6, apprentices and mothers in the same condition of which we believe we can reach 275,000. . . . We are anxiously awaiting authority and assurance of supply of foodstuffs to feed need indicated. . . .

A few months later, after conducting a survey of German conditions, it was the opinion of members of the Quaker Mission that feeding should continue for another year. There appeared to be no improvement in the general situation in sight in any way. “Generally speaking,” said Mr. Alfred G. Scattergood in his report, “food and living conditions seem easier than before, and nearly everything can be purchased by the comparatively small number of people with money, but the purchasing power of the population is too low to make possible the maintenance of anywhere near an adequate standard of
living. . . .” Although world food prices had gone down a little, and the removal of German Government internal control of foodstuffs of everything but flour, bread and sugar caused less discontent, Mr. Scattergood reported that “There is, no doubt, still remaining, as a result of the war and of pre-war conditions, more than average undernourishment and malnutrition amongst children. In other words, the emergency to which we came to minister, so far as we could, has not yet passed.”

Naturally such a state of affairs carried in its train other added forms of demoralization. Some, like bureaucratic corruption, were entirely new to a country long a model of exact official discipline. Others, like alcoholism, gambling, loose social morality, the unpleasant false gayety of night life, prostitution, had been present before but now increased by leaps and bounds, encouraged by extravagant spending of paper money that so rapidly decreased in value that it must be spent as fast as received. The ranks of the unemployed furnished those who turned to such means of making their living. War demoralization and the pessimism of what the morrow would bring furnished those who turned to these distractions with a “let us be merry for tomorrow we die.”

**Bringing the Program to a Close.** By the end of 1921 the gradual withdrawal from European child feeding of the American Relief Administration made it necessary for the Friends to take into their own hands provision of funds to carry on [as projected] the further feeding of children. . . . As they had insufficient resources for their program it was decided to make further effort to secure contributions directly from the American public. With this object a group of Americans of German extraction organized and undertook to provide funds to carry on the further feeding of an average of 500,000 children a day for a period of ten months. This, with the funds turned over by the American Relief Administration, along with cash which the Friends had in hand, enabled the Friends to feed at the expected rate until September, 1922. The committee had by July 1922 raised approximately $1,500,000.

In September 1922 a thorough survey of food conditions in Germany indicated that the country had at least reached a stage where further mass child feeding by America seemed no longer demanded. The Society of Friends made their arrangements to withdraw.

The work had been so organized that German local organizations and municipalities, although they were cramped by lack of sufficient resource, were able to carry on in a measure the care of their own poverty-stricken children. Members of the Quaker Mission to Germany, who were practically all volunteer workers, and who had temporarily given up their regular vocations at home, were permitted to return to America and take up again the thread of their personal lives and work.

Upon withdrawing from Germany in July 1922 the Friends arranged with
the Deutscher Zentralausschuss to take charge of the feeding work and continue it with the support of contributions from America for an indefinite length of time. Americans of German descent were appealed to, to continue to support the work, which, to an extent, they have done, the contributions being administered by the German organization under the inspection of a Quaker member delegated to duty in Berlin for that purpose.

But again in late 1923 recurring reports of the conditions of children in Germany brought the sympathies of a number of Americans, who, under the leadership of Major General Henry T. Allen, late Commander of the American Army of Occupation in Germany, took up the collection of funds for feeding more than 1,000,000 children in Germany through the 1923-24 harvest year.

On General Allen’s American Committee for Relief of German Children were over one hundred persons, many bearing names of note in financial, educational, industrial and political circles in America.

The purchasing of supplies and the supervision of the relief work in Germany were in charge of the American Friends Service Committee. Actual distribution was carried out by the same German Central Committee for Foreign Relief as had previously co-operated with the Friends’ work.

Succeeding in raising over $4,300,000 in America for this relief, the committee was able to carry through feeding of 1,000,000 children to the end of 1924, arranging a program for the feeding of several hundred thousands during the winter of 1924-25.

Doing their share of German relief work was also the German-American Central Relief Committee and the so-called Quarter Collections made by German-American women, as well as those of the New York Staats-Zeitung and other German-American newspapers.

Benefits Resulting from Program. Everyone knows what happens to the physical organism and to the outlook on life when a hungry person is fed. . . . The children were hungry. They were fed. By consequent improvement of muscular and physical force their resistance to disease naturally increased, as did the ability of mothers to nurse their babies, after a short period of feeding. The feeding was undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the fight against tuberculosis. Marked improvement in the mental tone of the children after a few weeks was noted throughout by teachers as the children emerged from indifference to eager attention and interest in their school work.

What may be called an incidental aid, but not an inconsiderable one, was the part played by the indirect benefit which came to Hamburg, Germany’s largest port, through the activities of its staff in receiving and reshipping large quantities of regularly arriving relief supplies for Central Europe, Germany, and later, for Russia. The great amount of tonnage shipped through Hamburg by the A.R.A., the large number of personnel employed for the han-
dling of commodities, contributed measurably to the economic relief not only of Hamburg, but through its employment and activity to the rest of Germany.

What the Friends themselves see as the more profound effects of their sincere attempts to substitute something in the place of hostility we can best understand in their own expression made by Mr. Harold Evans, one of the fifteen original members of the Friends’ Mission:

Its permanent value depends not merely on the number of children fed or on the group who carry it on, but on the extent that it cuts at the root of the world’s ills, which most of us will probably agree are due to mental and spiritual diseases, even more than to physical causes.

Many relief agencies have ministered splendidly to the physical needs of Europe, and in so doing have done much to restore broken spirits. Friends . . . are striving to feed not only hungering bodies with bread, but also hungering souls with faith and hope and love. They are trying to show that the dynamic of real life is the creative, not the possessive, instinct.

Failing, or pending, the efforts to raise the blockade Americans successfully set up machinery for supplying food to Germany, and supplied that food in time to meet desperate need after the Armistice. By no terms of its delivery and by no exigence of America or the Allies did Germany suffer any loss except that she had to pay for the food as she would have to have done anyway.

**Clothing Distribution by the Friends**

Besides the main work of child feeding, the Quaker Mission also distributed clothing and material for clothing. During 1920 and 1921 more than 1,405 bales of clothing were distributed, the value of which reached approximately $287,000. The German-American Campaign Committee contributed an additional sum of $100,000 for purchase and distribution in Germany of new children’s clothing. Thanks to the high purchasing value of the dollar then, this sum enabled the Quakers to buy from German textile mills 300,000 union suits, 300,000 pairs of stockings, and 60,000 meters of flannel. As in the case of the foods, clothing gifts were distributed according to a systematic plan through the agency of the German Central Committee and the co-operation of local welfare organizations.

**A.R.A. Food-Draft System**

Coincidently with the main Quaker feeding, the A.R.A. organized the food-draft system for European relief—a new idea in the transmission of products from one country to another. . . . Briefly, it provided the means

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2 The A.R.A. food-draft program later carried out in Russia is described in detail in H. H. Fisher’s *The Famine in Soviet Russia. Excerpts from this report constitute one of the Occasional Papers on the Administration of Relief Abroad*, being published by the Russell Sage Foundation.
and the machinery by which relatives and friends of Germans would pay a sum of money in America, receive a food draft which they would send by mail to the person they desired to aid, this person receiving a package of food upon presentation at an A.R.A. delivery station in Germany.

Many of the millions in the United States having family affiliations in Europe were desirous of giving direct personal assistance to those relatives and friends. Some were attempting this by transmission of money, which was of little value to the beneficiaries in purchasing foods on markets where food supplies were practically non-existent. Others sent packages of food through the then irregular and inadequate means of transportation, in some cases paying as much for postage and extra freight as the food itself was worth. Even then many of these packages never arrived at their destinations, and those which did frequently suffered from breakage or robbery in transit.

By the finance of the supplies necessary, by the unified management of a vast mass of details by one organization, by the actual transport of wholesome American foods in large lots, and their quantity assortment into individual packages, this plan bridged the gap created by the fall of European monetary standards and all the arrestation of normal food trade which war effects entailed. By this plan complete safety of delivery was assured, the food bought at producers’ prices, and extremely low freight rates for shipments in large quantities obtained. Delivery was made as quickly as the individual drafts could be transmitted by mail. As part of the system of warehouses set up throughout the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a main warehouse was established at Hamburg and district delivery stations in Germany at Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfort, Dresden, Munich, Stuttgart and Leipzig.

At first, whether because of the novelty of the scheme and a fear in the minds of German governmental officials that its privileges might be misused, or whether because certain German Government bureaus conceived it an infringement on their prerogatives, officials objected to independent American control of the delivery of these American packages. Mr. Alan G. Goldsmith, who had been sent to Germany to organize the work, found himself delayed by dawdling along from one bureau to another for several weeks, obstacles being continually put in his path because of the apparent desire of these officials to handle package distribution themselves.

In the meanwhile the S.S. Cripple Creek was on her way across the Atlantic with the first shipload of package supplies. It was essential that the Americans retain control of distribution of the packages for which they were accountable. The A.R.A. did not wish to bear the cost of unloading supplies at Hamburg until that control was assured. Therefore, the day the ship was about to arrive Mr. Goldsmith was obliged to deliver an ultimatum through Dr. Albert of the Foreign Office, who acted as intermediary, that if the Americans were not to have that control they would simply have to send the
ship on to Danzig for distribution of food drafts in Poland. At 2 the next morning these not unjustifiable conditions were acceded to and the agreement signed. Dr. Albert’s co-operation and aid as intermediary in this and many other matters was of great assistance. He was in a rather difficult position, being placed between the Americans on one side, and apparently inexperienced superiors and the large army of hide-bound minor officials on the other.

In the old days in Germany the leaders of the state knew very well what they were doing and how to accomplish their policies. Under them they had a vast army of bureaucrats who had naught to do but obey instructions and, as such, formed an extremely efficient machine. However, when the revolution came, Americans observed that higher officials were no longer those with a definite plan or with power behind them, or with experience in government. They were mostly men who had worked up from trades to leaders in the labor movement. Outside of their labor union activities, they had no administrative training. When they took the higher government offices new leaders were often weak and undecided and not particularly effective in supplying the necessary impetus to the huge bureaucratic machine which kept on running under them as of old.

[Finally, however,] the German Government issued the following statement [quoted here only in part]:

In view of misunderstanding apparently existing among certain American circles as to the new relief undertaking organized in Germany at the instance of Mr. Herbert Hoover, the German Government wishes to emphasize that it gratefully welcomes all efforts inspired by unselfish charity which tend to alleviate the great hardship and dire suffering prevailing in this country. It heartily endorses, therefore, the plan originated by Mr. Hoover, commonly called the American Relief Administration Warehouses, destined to operate throughout Central Europe under the direction of the American Relief Administration.

Moreover, it has granted to all foodstuffs to be imported by that organization into Germany not only full freedom from all import duties and taxes, but also special transportation privileges and facilities.

The German Government further gratefully acknowledges the most valuable assistance which is rendered to the relief of suffering German children by the American Society of Friends (Quakers) who, under Mr. Hoover’s direction, have sent a special mission for that purpose to this country.

The contents of the food packages were carefully standardized by food experts to contain the maximum nutrient value consistent with bulk and price. Drafts were sold for four different types of packages at two prices, $10 and $50. When U.S. food prices went down in late 1920, additional amounts were added to the packages. Availing themselves of the facilities offered by the food-draft scheme donors in America contributed food parcels to Europe valued at over five and a half million dollars. Nearly 147,000 such packages were delivered to Germany reaching the value of over $2,000,000.

It was not intended that this operation should be conducted for profit, but
safety demanded that a sufficiently protective allowance be made for fluctuating food prices, administrative expense, transportation, port charges, insurance, etc. This phase demanded careful consideration for, due to the number of co-operating banks in America, it would be impossible for them to keep track of frequent revisions of price. The packages of food for which the drafts were cashed had to be simple and unvarying in content, and the price had to remain unchanged for over a year. From previous experience of the Belgian Relief Commission and the American Relief Administration it was possible to arrive at a fairly definite overhead charge to cover expenses and risks involved, but it was not possible to provide against the fluctuating costs of commodities except by the protection of an additional margin to meet any unexpected increases in food prices. Such a nominal margin was accordingly set up, it being definitely stated that any surplus or profit remaining should be turned into general expenses of the child-feeding operations.

Even including this protective margin the difference between the food value purchased by the individual under this plan and the retail market prices of the foods contained in the packages, obtainable anywhere in the world, made it necessary to institute the most stringent precautions to avoid the purchase of food drafts by individuals for speculative purposes. Particular care was also taken to assure a high standard of quality of the foods included in the packages. Certain shipments of old American war bacon sent into Germany from British Army stocks in 1919 had created a low opinion in Germany of the quality of American products as did the quantities of bacon in bad condition delivered to Germany under credit arrangements made by certain private American concerns in 1920. The wide sale of this meat, marked "American bacon," in Germany threatened for a time to defeat the food-draft plan in that country. Every food package had to be an international token of America's good faith. Every purchase of food was consequently subjected to severe and uncompromising inspection. The slightest suspicion of ocean voyage deterioration in quality was also enough to subject whole shipments to condemnation and sale as damaged goods.

Owing to the gradual improvement of food conditions in Germany and Eastern Europe the emergency for which this food-draft plan had been designed was deemed to have passed with the coming of the 1921 harvest. The sale of drafts was accordingly discontinued on April 30th, and the last packages delivered on July 30, 1921.

CONCLUSION

If the account of ... contacts between America and Germany since the war will contribute to better understanding between Germany and America, then that will be a hoped-for justification for the efforts of those Americans
who have tried to help in reconstruction. The writer finds the interpretation of the spirit of the American people toward Germany in Herbert Hoover’s words: “There is a country of sixty million people with whom the world has to live and whose economic co-operation is necessary to give life to the rest of the world. There is no other task open except to try to live and cooperate wholeheartedly with them.”

THE LONG MILE BEYOND BERLIN

The day the bugles blow their glorious “Cease firing” will be no signal to a long holiday for us. We shall celebrate—who could deny us that?—but immediately, without loss of an unnecessary hour, we must begin the march up that long mile beyond Berlin.

First, we shall need to help feed the starving among our allies, the captive nations, and then the people in enemy countries. Then come crowding all the other problems of longer-range relief and reconstruction—clothing, medicine and health care, housing, control of lawless elements, social reorganization, participation in plans to make the impoverished peoples once more productive and self-supporting. This is the largest task in mass relief and far-flung reconstruction the world has yet seen. This is the long mile beyond Berlin that the United Nations must travel without faltering, or all the miles to Berlin may prove an empty victory.

If we in the United States have the resolution and the wisdom to travel this long mile, even though we are tired from the war and would far rather rest and relax, then in the process we shall solve many of our own problems. To accomplish these vast tasks we shall probably need all the enormous manpower which will be released from the armed forces and the war industries estimated at not less than 30,000,000 persons in the United States. We shall be completing and solidifying the social gains we have won. We shall be well on the way toward a world neighborhood working in such co-operation that future wars may be impossible, or at least less probable.

If we fail to travel this extra mile, if we slip into the careless relaxation of the 1918 armistice, all our victories and all our bloodshed may prove as fruitless as those of the last war. The social gains we have made will slide from our grasp. Even our new plant capacity, which was to bring us material abundance, may all be absorbed in war production for the armed fortress we shall have to become and remain.

1 Excerpts from an address by Shelby M. Harrison, General Director, Russell Sage Foundation, before the New York Academy of Public Education on November 19, 1942.