Introduction

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In the thirty years since the rise of the Christian Right, evangelicals have been at the center of a revived religious presence in America’s political life and social institutions. Their wealth and influence have expanded dramatically, and they have reentered the halls of power. Other religious conservatives—notably Catholics and Mormons but also some mainline Protestants—have been drawn into the political and cultural alliance they lead. Nearly every sphere of American life has been touched by the mobilization of religious conservatives. We explore the causes and consequences of these developments.1

This volume focuses on social topics: the sources of evangelicals’ identity and growing prominence in American society, the relations between evangelicals and other groups in American society, and the influence of evangelicals on America’s social institutions. A companion volume focuses on political topics: religious conservatives and partisan politics, the mobilizing rhetoric of evangelicals, and the cycles and evolution of the movement as a force in American political life.

In this introduction to volume 1, we sketch the historical events that led to the reemergence and shaped the character of the evangelical movement in public life. We also define the groups in which the volumes are interested—evangelicals and the “traditionalist alliance”—because the first of these terms has been used in different ways and the second requires careful specification. We situate the volume in the context of the existing literature, and we discuss the topics and themes that give the chapters in the volume coherence as a whole.
Historical Contexts

The impress of activist Protestantism has rarely been absent in American history. Even before the Puritans set foot on the shores of America, John Winthrop evoked religious imagery in his depiction of their settlement: “We shall be a city on a hill; the eyes of all people are upon us” (Winthrop 1630/1931, 294–95). This vision of America as the new Israel, one with the mission to redeem its own people while providing a model for the rest of humanity, is an enduring legacy of America’s Puritan forebears. Much of American history can be read through a biblical lens: the nation is especially blessed, but also continually challenged to fulfill its destiny.

Yet the history of Protestantism in the United States is also marked by divisions and cycles, periods of inward-looking subcultural concerns alternating with periods of outward-looking activism. A great gulf exists between the exclusive colonial Puritan establishment of the seventeenth century and the populist evangelicalism of the Second Great Awakening of 1790–1840. The Second Awakening virtually abandoned the stricter aspects of Calvinism, in particular the doctrines of predestination and innate human depravity, and established belief in the possibility of universal salvation through personal faith and devotional service. Where traditional Calvinism had taught that election into heaven depended on the arbitrary will of a severe God, the evangelical Protestants of the Second Great Awakening preached that the regeneration and salvation of the soul depended on the individual’s inner faith. Reconciliation with God still required living a morally good life, but salvation had been effectively democratized.

Although the precepts of strict morality persisted as a cultural idiom among churchgoing Protestants, the outward-looking engagement with society fostered by mass revivals and the Arminian doctrine of salvation proved to be something new, dynamic, and unpredictable in American culture. We can see the offshoots of this outward-looking Protestantism in the enthusiasm of antebellum Northerners for voluntary associations of all types, in their support for common schools to teach both literacy and Protestant virtues, and in their advocacy of morality-infused social reform efforts, such as prison reform, reform of child labor laws, the abolition of slavery, and the Temperance movement. As the historian Daniel Walker Howe observed, “We remember [the evangelical movement’s] morality as strict, and indeed it was. . . . But even its most primitive severity was redemptive in purpose. . . . [T]he converse of Victorian discipline was the proper development of human faculties. Education and self-improvement went along with discipline” (2007, 126).

This period of revivalism and social reform gave the nation a strongly evangelical flavor. The historian Mark Noll estimated that evangelical
Protestant denominations accounted for 85 percent of all U.S. churches in 1860 (2002, 170). The religious mainstream in the nineteenth century was comprised of large and medium-sized evangelical denominations and an evangelical wing of Episcopalians; nearly all of whom shared the dream that “some day the civilization of the country would be fully Christian” (Handy 1984, ix–x). Unlike today, most evangelical Protestants were post-millennialists, who believed that the Second Coming would only occur after society was fully Christianized.

During the Civil War, both Northerners and Southerners believed they were fighting for a Christian America. Northern clergy stressed the evils of slavery and the need for national redemption even as Southern ministers held that slavery was in keeping with God’s plan for humanity and benefited both master and slave (Harlow 2007; Haynes 2002). Although few former Confederates recanted their beliefs about slavery, many accepted their loss on the battlefield as divinely mandated (Harlow 2007; Haynes 2002). In the postbellum era, both Northerners and Southerners returned to the mission of creating a Christian civilization—domestically and globally. Presbyterians, Lutherans, Episcopalians, Baptists, and Methodists all were deeply engaged in missionary work by the end of the nineteenth century.

A second gulf emerged during the early part of the twentieth century, when nearly all evangelical denominations were gripped by conflicts between modernists and fundamentalists (Marsden 2006, chaps. 16–21). The modernists tried to reconcile biblical truths with scientific developments, notably, Darwinian evolution, and conservatives emphasized a literal reading of the Bible. Long-standing tensions over the priority of social reform versus individual soul-saving fused onto this basic fault line. What we now refer to as the division between mainline and evangelical Protestants derives from this early-twentieth-century split, with today’s liberal mainline Protestants descending from the modernists and today’s conservative evangelicals descending from the fundamentalists. Of course, neither of the two camps was monolithic. Theologically conservative churches were divided by how much (or, more often, how little) of Darwin, internationalism, social reformism, and academic biblical scholarship they thought it permissible to accept.

Following the 1925 Scopes Monkey Trial, many theologically conservative Protestants withdrew from the public sphere. They retained their identification as fundamentalists and concentrated on creating and maintaining Bible-centered schools and colleges, Bible summer camps, Bible study groups, Christian radio programming, and strong local church communities. Others tried to accommodate to modern life. These people eventually emerged under the label neo-evangelicals. Both the founding of the National Association of Evangelicals in 1942 and the Billy Graham revivals of the 1940s and 1950s gave new life to the Second
Great Awakening’s vision of an outward-looking, populist, and theologically conservative Protestantism.

Nevertheless, during the half century between 1925 and 1975, liberal historians and social commentators took it for granted that the era of Protestant cultural hegemony had ended with the Scopes trial and that cultural authority had definitively passed to science and secular institutions (see, for example, Cox 1965; Hofstadter 1955; Hodgson 1976; Leuchtenberg 1958; Parrington 1939). The nation’s social and political elite was still overwhelmingly Protestant (Baltzell 1964), but few members of this elite saw religion as capable of addressing the problems of modern society. During this period, the so-called secular revolution dramatically reduced the numbers and influence of evangelical Protestants in the culture-producing institutions of higher education, science, publishing, and the arts (Smith 2003). Following the triumph of World War II, which seemed to validate the American creed of pluralistic tolerance, President-elect Dwight Eisenhower spoke of the “Judeo-Christian concept”—not Protestantism—as the “deeply religious faith” on which “our sense of government is founded” (quoted in Silk 1988). Urban, middle-class Americans who set the tone for the rest of society pointed to three important religious groups in American life—Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—not one (Herberg 1960). Religion was regarded by most as a private practice, not a public cause (Herberg, 73–74).

During the 1960s and 1970s, the cultural ground shifted again. The political and cultural upheavals of the period left many theologically conservative Protestants feeling besieged. In particular, the feminist and gay rights movements growing out of the 1960s threatened cornerstones of belief among fundamentalists and evangelicals: the centrality of men as community and family leaders and the strict biblical morality promulgated by theologically conservative churches. Mainline Protestant clergy often seemed to be at the forefront of countercultural protest (Hadden 1969), and only the theologically conservative evangelical congregations gave traditional religious answers to the challenges posed by the progressive movements of the day. Social resentments between progressives and religious conservatives sometimes boiled over. Grassroots protests broke out in West Virginia against literature textbooks used in the public schools and in Dade County, Florida, against a proposed gay rights ordinance (Wald 2003, 205–7). An organized protest against the Equal Rights Amendment also spread through states with large theologically conservative Protestant denominations (Wald 2003).

During the 1960s and 1970s, all forms of evangelical Protestantism experienced an upsurge in membership (Chaves 2004, 33; Hout, Greeley, and Wilde 2001), and Christian broadcast media helped to create a sense of common religious concerns crossing denominational lines. The distinctions between fundamentalists and neo-evangelicals grew less im-
portant, and religious groups, such as the Pentecostals and charismatics, whose members expressed their faith with greater emotion, became a more important part of the evangelical mix. Sensing a potential political windfall in the making, President Richard Nixon and the national Republican Party began to cultivate ties with theologically conservative Protestant church leaders and wealthy evangelicals (Martin 1996, 98).

However, as Rogers Smith shows in chapter 11, neither grassroots protests nor GOP networking precipitated the birth of the Christian Right; instead, the movement owes its origins to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and court actions that seemed to threaten the tax-exempt status of Christian broadcasters and Christian private schools and universities. These were the triggering events that led to the mobilization of conservative Protestant ministers. Promoted and in some cases funded by national conservative movement activists, Christian Right organizations, such as the National Christian Action Coalition (founded in 1977), the Christian Voice (1978), the Moral Majority (1979), Concerned Women for America (1979), the Religious Roundtable (1979), the American Coalition for Traditional Values (1980), and the Family Research Council (1983), all formed in the wake of disappointments and anger with the IRS and the courts during the Carter administration.

As they focused on issues with appeal in evangelical communities, these organizations created a public identity and narrative for evangelicals to impel political action. Like other forms of identity politics, those of the Right emphasized the valuable qualities and central importance of a group unfairly marginalized by the dominant powers in society. But here the dominant powers were secular and progressive, not the conservative white males who figured so prominently in the identity politics of the Left. Social movement leaders heightened the salience of religious identities by focusing on the centrality of church communities and the threats to religious values posed by secular elites. Statements by Jerry Falwell before the 1980 election captured this emphasis: “We’re not trying to jam our moral philosophy down the throats of others. We are simply trying to keep others from jamming their amoral philosophy down our throats” (quoted in William Greider, “Would Jesus Join the Moral Majority?” Washington Post, October 13, 1980, D1). In a separate statement from this period, Falwell called for a response: “The day of the silent church is passed.... Preachers, you need as never before to preach on the issues, no matter what they say or what they write about you” (quoted in Doug Willis, “Pastor Says God Opposes ERA,” Associated Press, October 30, 1980).

Social movement leaders also developed a narrative about the perils facing American society and the role evangelicals could play in opposing these perils. This narrative drew on the long-standing theme in fundamentalist and evangelical discourse about the need to assert godly
values to overcome a world in moral decline. This theme was given new energy by evangelicals’ sense of a world turned upside down by sexual experimentation, gender equity, and an aggressive secularism that gave no quarter to religious sensibilities. A branch of the movement focusing on opposition to “secular elites” grew out of the organizing work of the Religious Roundtable and the Moral Majority, and a “pro-family” branch grew out of the Eagle Forum’s organizing against the Equal Rights Amendment (Hudson 2008, 3–12, 62–65).

Early leaders began to speak not only of the need for spiritual renewal and the approaching end of times, but also of what believers could do to return morality to a society badly in need of it. As Nancy Ammerman writes in chapter 2 of this volume, “Evangelicals have never stopped believing that spiritual salvation is the key to long-lasting change, but did become convinced that they might lose the ability to preach that gospel and preserve their way of life if they did not also act politically.” The sense of fighting an immoral power with only the force of divine favor and moral justice on one’s side has, of course, deep roots in Christianity, and has regularly given rise to powerful movements for social change.

**Evangelicals and the “Traditionalist Alliance”**

The term *evangelical* can be confusing, because evangelicals have been defined in many ways. A basic difference between today’s evangelical and mainline Protestants was captured by the sociologist Stephen Warner (1988). The contemporary two-party system of Protestantism is, he argued, based primarily on different understandings of Jesus. Mainline Protestants think mainly in terms of a “moral teacher who told disciples that they could best honor him by helping those in need,” whereas evangelicals conceive of “one who offers (personal) salvation to anyone who confesses his name” (33–34). The mainline traditions are critical of selfishness and understand religious duty as sharing abundance. They rarely consider the Bible as the literal word of God but instead as containing important truths, together with ancient myths and legends. By contrast, evangelicals are much less interested in helping the needy than in saving souls. Their view of social reform tends to focus on the correction of individual moral failings. Moreover, evangelicals attribute religious authority to the Bible alone and accept it as the literal word of God. With these contrasts in mind, Lyman Kellstedt and Corwin Smidt defined four core beliefs of evangelicals as follows: the Bible is the literal word of God; salvation is possible only through personal acceptance of Jesus as savior; personal acceptance of Jesus as savior often occurs through the born-again experience, an intense event of spiritual
renewal marking their life from that point on; and the obligation to witness one’s beliefs to others.

Evangelicals can also be defined denominationally and by self-identification. Denominational definitions are appealing to social scientists, because social scientists are not in complete agreement about the core beliefs of evangelicals (see, for example, Greeley and Hout 2006, chap. 2), and most social surveys do not ask questions about all core beliefs of evangelicals. Moreover, the overlap between holding the core beliefs of evangelicals and affiliating with an evangelical denomination or religious tradition is considerable. The major evangelical religious traditions are the Baptist, the Pentecostal-Holiness, the Reformed-Confessional, and the Anabaptist. To these it is important to add evangelicals who worship at nondenominational churches or churches where denomination is de-emphasized. Some of these are large mega-churches with celebrity pastors, such as T. D. Jakes’s Potter House Church in Dallas, Joel Osteen’s Lakewood Church in Houston, and Rick Warren’s Saddleback Church in Orange County, California. The Southern Baptists, claiming more than 16 million members in 42,000 churches (Southern Baptist Convention 2008), are in many ways the center of evangelical Protestantism in the United States. Smaller evangelical denominations include the Assemblies of God, the Missouri and Wisconsin Synod Lutherans, the Mennonites, the Nazarenes, and the Seventh-Day Adventists. Some branches of Methodism and Presbyterianism are also evangelical in orientation (see Steensland et al. 2000).

Definitions based on core beliefs yield the largest estimates of white evangelicals, more than 30 percent of the adult population in the United States, and self-identifications the smallest, usually less than 20 percent. Estimates based on denomination yield figures in between, around 25 percent (see Kellstedt and Smidt 1991; Wald 2003, 162–63). In the press, the most common estimates are based on denomination. Thus the proportion of white evangelicals in the U.S. adult population is commonly estimated at slightly more than 25 percent.

Readers may wonder why African American evangelicals are not treated at length in these pages. Many African Americans hold the same core beliefs as white evangelicals, as do many Latino and many Asian American Protestants. Moreover, black evangelicals are nearly as conservative as white on some moral-values issues, such as gay marriage (Loftus 2001). We focus on whites because blacks, despite their social conservatism, have few ties to white evangelicals or other white religious conservatives. Some tensions date from the days of racial segregation in the South; white evangelicals played either a complicit or active role in maintaining the institutions of Jim Crow. Although white evangelicals have made efforts to repent for the racial injustices of the past
and to reach across racial lines, the success of these efforts remains in doubt, as Paul Lichterman and his colleagues show in chapter 6. Many remaining differences, of course, are based on the divergent political paths white and black evangelicals have taken. The latter are firmly anchored in the Democratic Party and embrace a political agenda focusing on increased equality and social justice. In this respect, African American Protestants, whether evangelical or not, are closer to mainline Protestant attitudes about helping the poor and sharing abundance. African Americans see the state as an ally, because of its antidiscrimination laws and programs to aid the poor. White evangelicals, by contrast, tend to see government programs as an inadequate and often wasteful substitute for individuals’ commitment to living a well-directed and self-disciplined life.

White evangelicals have been at the center of the movement to restore traditional moral values, but they are not the only group involved in this project. Several chapters in this volume therefore branch out from the white evangelical core of the movement to talk about other white religious conservatives as well. The term traditionalist alliance is borrowed from the work of John Green and the composition of the alliance, as well as the commonalities and tensions within it, are analyzed in chapter 4 of this volume, which Green has written. The traditionalist alliance is defined by religious belief and practice, and includes the most religious members of several faith traditions: Mormons who are regular churchgoers (approximately 2 percent of the population), Catholics who are regular churchgoers (approximately 4.5 percent), mainline Protestants who are regular churchgoers (approximately 4.5 percent), and church-going evangelical Protestants (12.5 percent). It makes sense, we believe, to include evangelical Protestants who are not regular churchgoers (nearly 11 percent) as part of the alliance as well, because, like the other members, they are conservative on moral-values issues and a dependable part of the Republican Party coalition. Including them, more than 33 percent of the U.S. adult population is, nominally, a member of this traditionalist alliance. In 2004, these were the people who tended to say that moral values were very important in their voting decision, and they made up 60 percent of all voters for George W. Bush (see chapter 4, this volume).

The term traditionalist is used advisedly. Religious conservatives are not always traditional, even in matters of theology. In the born-again experience, evangelicals go through a life-changing event that leads many of them to reject their earlier religious upbringing. Pentecostals are especially open to life-changing events, however conservative or traditionalist they may be in theology. Moreover, religious conservatives accept many aspect of modernity—from the technology that helps knit their communities together to the consumerism so evident in the church-
shopping experience. Even so, the term traditionalist seems preferable to possible alternatives. Traditionalist is not coterminous with traditional. The former is a self-conscious defense of tradition—an ideological outlook, not a set of unchanging practices—as well as a way of seeing self and community. Practices involved in asserting the defense of tradition can, ironically, involve abandonment of certain tenets of the tradition one seeks to defend. Assertive involvement in public life is, for example, one practice that stands at odds with religious traditions that once emphasized personal salvation over societal reform.

From a historical perspective, the creation of a working alliance among religious traditionalists is a great departure from earlier ethnoreligious patterns in American life. Throughout the nineteenth century, Protestants and Catholics were often at bitter odds. Protestants were suspicious of the dependence of Catholics on papal authority rather than that of the Bible. They found the easy forgiveness of the Catholic Church to foster indolent habits. Catholics, for their part, often resented the haughtiness and condescension of Protestant America. They also distrusted the extreme individualism of Protestant culture, which clashed with the more communitarian norms of Catholic ethnic neighborhoods. Differences in ethnicity and social status created a sense among Catholics that they were outsiders to the mainstream of American culture. Theological orientations were also a factor; for Catholics, God’s kingdom was not of this world, and no human programs of conversion or social reform could usher in the millennium (Kleppner 1979).

If anything, fiercer tensions existed between Protestants and Mormons because of the “heretical” principles and practices of Mormonism, including polygamy and the proclamation of Joseph Smith as a prophet of God. These were and remain large barriers to overcome.

Sociologists became aware of the possibility of an alliance in the making more than two decades ago, when Robert Wuthnow published his pioneering study The Restructuring of American Religion (1988). In Wuthnow’s view, old divisions between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews were breaking down and new divisions based on levels of religiosity within faith communities were taking their place. The new structure built on interfaith contacts that had developed in the postwar period and shared concerns about the diminished role of religion as a moral guide. In a society marked by higher levels of education and secular culture-producing institutions, religious conservatives from all traditions felt imperiled by those within their own communities who had weaker attachments to faith and stronger attachments to nonreligious sources of moral guidance. Shortly after the publication of Wuthnow’s book, another sociologist, James Davison Hunter, published another influential study, Culture Wars, arguing that a cultural divide was growing between people who believed in transcendental, typically religious, sources of
moral authority, and others who embraced progressive ideals and human interactions as the primary sources of moral authority (1992).

The restructuring both Wuthnow and Hunter predicted has not come to pass—at least not completely. Faith traditions continue to matter. The proportion of Catholics and mainline Protestants who identify as religious right or take conservative positions on moral-values issues are much smaller than the proportion of evangelicals who do so. Part of this has to do with the lower proportion of very religious people in these faith traditions. Mainline Protestants, in particular, have drifted leftward in recent years, and Catholics continue to be hesitant about allying with evangelicals. Some old biases against Catholics remain in white evangelical communities, including assertions that Catholics do not think for themselves and that the rosary is a superstition (Greeley and Hout 2006, chap. 12). Such views are particularly common among Pentecostals (Greeley and Hout 2006). Historical tensions between evangelicals and Mormons also have not been overcome in spite of Mormon strongly allied views on moral-values issues and partisan identification.

The most recent indicator is the sharp backlash among evangelicals against the presidential bid of the Mormon former governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney. The continuation of the traditionalist alliance as a major force in American society and politics consequently remains an open question. Historically, alliances among religious conservatives have been relatively short-lived in American society, and, as Peter Dobkin Hall shows in chapter 8 of volume 2, frequently subject to dissolution along sectarian lines.

One important reason to expect continued cultural divisions between social conservatives and the less religious is that social conservatives are joined, in large measure, through their opposition to a common foe: secular people or, more pointedly, secular humanists. Seculars, consequently, stand as an important, if background, presence in the volume. They have become the defining moral other for members of the traditionalist alliance. For religious conservatives, they are guilty of a fundamental fault: they believe in the moral authority of humanity, not of God (for a discussion of secular elites as moral other, see Rhys Williams, volume 2, chapter 5).

Religious conservatives are undoubtedly right that seculars’ influence on culture-producing industries belies their small numbers in the population. At the heart of the identity politics of religious conservatives, therefore, lies the story of a real, if often exaggerated, conflict in American society. Even so, the culture war idea has been more useful as a mobilization tool than as a depiction of social reality. The number of people who claim no religious affiliation is growing, to be sure, but still falls at around 15 percent of the population. Moreover, in the United States, few of these people are entirely without religious belief. About
nine out of ten Americans, for example, say that they believe in God and eight out of ten say that they pray. Estimates for the proportion of atheists in the United States run between 3 and 7 percent (Zuckerman 2005).

**Background to the Volume**

To consider the topics of conservative religion and social identity, intergroup relations, and religiously motivated change in secular social institutions, we assembled a group of leading scholars from several academic disciplines. As might be expected in a volume that includes chapters written by scholars trained in sociology, political science, history, and religious studies, the methods used range from aggregate data analysis and ethnographic research to archival research and close textual analysis. Our motivation for bringing this distinguished group together was to address weaknesses in the existing literature and to build, if we could, a more comprehensive and fully integrated understanding of the interplay between religious conservatives and American society.

In our view, the most important weakness of the popular literature has been its polemical character. Much of the public discussion of theologically conservative Protestants has been closely tied to dramatic images of conflict. Mass mailings from groups, such as the Traditional Values Coalition and Concerned Women of America, rally supporters by raising the specter of control of the policy agenda by secular humanists who, they allege, support the degradation of American culture, hedonistic lifestyles, and a range of irreligious and anti-American values from advocacy of abortion and homosexuality to atheism and pacifism. Similarly, liberal groups have demonized Christian conservatives as an army on the march whose theocratic leaders are intent on dismantling barriers to the separation of church and state. Vivid images of powerful extremists have proven an effective part of the machinery used to raise donations for political campaigns, and they have seeped into that of other milieus where strong narratives and epic confrontations matter greatly—namely, daily journalism. Culture wars issues are much more popular in the press than discussion of the many issues on which Americans see eye to eye. According to Lexis-Nexis, for example, stories on culture wars issues, such as abortion and gay marriage, have outnumbered stories on interfaith dialogues by a factor of ten in recent years.

Less polemical journalistic commentators, though they lower the volume of the rhetoric somewhat, do not always provide a clear understanding of the motivations of conservative Protestants and values voters. For example, in his best-selling book *What’s the Matter with Kansas*, the liberal social critic Thomas Frank advanced an interpretation of the Christian Right that rests ultimately on economic class conflict (2004). For Frank, the Republican Party, with the help of allied Christian conser-
reative leaders, has been able to direct resentments arising from economic insecurity into the cultural arena. White working- and middle-class anger has been directed toward culturally alien secular elites rather than where, according to Frank, the anger should be directed—against the economic polities of the Republican Party. Frank fails to take seriously the possibility that religious beliefs can be a decisive motivation for social and political action in their own right.

A vibrant scholarly literature now exists on evangelicals, religious conservatives, and American democracy (in social science, see, for example, Ammerman 2005; Chaves 2004; Greeley and Hout 2006; Green et al. 1996; Layman 2001; Leege et al. 2002; Lindsay 2007; Marsden 2006; Smith 1998, 2000; Wolfe 2003). Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the scholarly literature has failed to surmount three limitations. The first is that much of the most widely cited literature is now dated. The second is that the literature has neglected some key questions, or has not addressed these questions fully. The third is that the literature has tended to develop in piecemeal, relatively unconnected to a broad, balanced, and well-integrated view of evangelicals and their place in American society and politics.

Work on evangelicals and the Christian Right has not always kept up with the evolution of the movement or its ties to other religious groups in American society. Social mobility, including higher levels of education, has encouraged many more evangelicals to feel a sense of belonging in the upper reaches of American society. The movement has accordingly evolved in important ways. Its elastic orthodoxy, to use Michael Lindsay’s phrase (2007), allows it to engage with members of other faith traditions while maintaining core positions on social issues. As evangelicals have moved into the halls of power, culture war imagery has faded; the language of moral rectitude has given way to the language of expanded rights and freedoms (Moen 1995). Evangelicals are adapting to new issues, too; many now include environmental and poverty issues as moral-values issues, without necessarily abandoning their earlier commitments to fighting abortion and gay marriage. Encouraged by an increasingly moderate National Association of Evangelicals, younger evangelicals have been particularly interested in exploring these new directions.

Important gaps also exist in the literature. Social scientists have, as yet, failed to investigate as completely as they might how the distinctive cultural capital and mobilization strategies of evangelicals have contributed to their advance. These issues are addressed in part I of this volume. Relations between evangelicals and other religious groups remains inadequately investigated as well, hindered by stereotypes of the culture wars alliance of the orthodox, of evangelicalism as racism by another name, and of mainline Protestants as a disappearing liberal voice.
in society. Part II of this volume challenges these stereotypes and illuminate the complexities of relations among evangelicals and their putative friends and foes.

Perhaps the most important gap in the literature, however, has been the failure of social scientists to consider the interaction between evangelicals and America’s nonreligious social institutions: the family, education, mass media, and the law. Evangelicals have been active in efforts to reshape social institutions, both through the creation of separate subcultural institutions and through their efforts to influence the culture and structure of mainstream institutions. To what extent have they succeeded? Very few assessments exist of the consequences of these efforts, or, just as important, of the accommodations religious conservatives have made to secular social institutions. The chapters in part III of this volume go a long way toward bridging this gap.

We believe the two volumes in this series realize our hope for a deeper, more balanced, and better integrated portrait of the evangelical movement and the traditionalist alliance than has so far been available. The volumes combine a sophisticated view of religious doctrines and organizations with a sharp sense of the distinctiveness of the American context, and an awareness of the dependence of religious actors on well-supported secular institutions and the broader political coalitions in their environment.

The authors suggest that there is something very different about the role conservative religion plays in American society from the one it has played elsewhere. In the United States, theologically conservative Protestantism has often served to stimulate, rather than to prevent, social activism—and structurally similar moralistic styles are characteristic of “traditionalist” and “progressive” activists alike, however different the policies they advocate. While religiosity has been an important influence on cultural understandings of middle-class respectability in American society, it has not stopped the progress of equality for groups whose self-presentation fits within the broad confines set by the norms of middle-class respectability. Though struggles for equality have often taken decades, social activists seeking equality for marginalized groups have gained acceptance by presenting themselves as non-violent, conformity-seeking aspirants to middle class status. This is one important reason why the most right-wing elements of the traditionalist alliance have not prevented egalitarian social change. Another has to do with the countermobilizations of progressives they have encouraged. Another—and perhaps most important of all—is that secular social institutions and culture-producing industries have much firmer foundations in the United States than political progressives themselves sometimes credit.

This leads us to the other term in the title of this volume—democracy in America. Indeed, the great work of the same name by Alexis de Toc-
queville is an explicit reference point in many of the chapters. Following de Tocqueville, we define democracy not only as active citizen participation in political life, but also as egalitarian social relations. De Tocqueville considered the latter the great distinction of American society in the nineteenth century. For him, equality of conditions was the master key that unlocked many of the mysteries of America’s character: the active participation of its citizens in public affairs, the efflorescence of voluntary organizations of all types, as well as the informal manners of its inhabitants and the grandiose themes of its writers and rhetoricians. Religion for de Tocqueville played an important role in the background. It served as a restraint against the potential for social conflict inherent in the liberties Americans had and have:

Nature and circumstances have made the inhabitants of the United States bold, as is sufficiently attested by the enterprising spirit with which they seek for fortune. If the mind of the Americans were free from all hindrances, they would shortly become the most daring innovators and the most persistent disputants in the world. But the revolutionists of America are obliged to profess an ostensible respect for Christian morality and equity, which does not permit them to violate wantonly the laws that oppose their designs. . . . Hitherto no one in the United States has dared to advance the maxim that everything is permissible for the interests of society, an impious adage which seems to have been invented in an age of freedom to shelter all future tyrants. Thus, while the law permits the Americans to do what they please, religion prevents them from conceiving, and forbids them to commit, what is rash or unjust. (1835/1961, 362)

The concerns of the authors in this volume are in the tradition of de Tocqueville, but the conclusions they reach differ from those of de Tocqueville on several counts. These authors see the spirit of equality itself as a product not only of the similar economic circumstances shared by Americans, but also of the religious beliefs that were becoming dominant in American society at the time of de Tocqueville’s study. The emotional pietism and Arminian views of salvation of the Second Great Awakening created a spirit of equality, perhaps to a greater degree than the widespread distribution of small property holdings that de Tocqueville emphasized. They also observe that de Tocqueville missed the extent to which evangelical religion was a primary generator of the voluntary associations he correctly saw as a distinctive feature of American society.

Nor are the authors inclined to interpret conservative religion as simply a check on the passions liberty allows. Although the strict morality of theologically conservative Protestantism has created many inhibitions and prohibitions throughout American history, the outward-looking reformism of evangelical Protestantism in the antebellum North stimu-
lated, rather than restrained, the moral passions. The entrepreneurism fostered by the capitalist marketplace was mirrored by the organizational dynamism of evangelical Protestantism to which it was so often wedded. These cultural emphases continue to be influential sources of populist optimism and, indirectly, of the expectation of social and economic opportunity.

Some of the authors in this volume continue to see conservative religion as an important restraint in an otherwise liberal and pleasure-seeking society, but most emphasize that case law and norms of public reason are far more important restraints today. Indeed, according to most of the authors, the secular revolution of the early twentieth century effectively reduced conservative religion to the role of another interest in society, albeit an interest strongly associated with norms of middle-class respectability. This reduction of the role of religion has led to a number of changes that de Tocqueville could not have foreseen. In the context of a far more pluralistic society than the one de Tocqueville knew, the mobilization of traditional religion leads to the countermobilization of the forces it opposes. The moralistic style, subcultural communalism, and media savvy it favors is, not surprisingly, mirrored in the moralistic style, subcultural communalism, and media savvy of its foes.

For the authors, the political involvement of evangelicals and other religious conservatives has strengthened participatory democracy in the United States by bringing new voices into the public arena, but it has simultaneously exacerbated tensions and divisions in a diverse population—abetted, of course, by ambitious politicians and a conflict-loving mass media. Under these changed conditions, conservative religion is perhaps less a support to egalitarian social relations than an impediment to the equality of women, gays, and lower-income citizens. Yet it has not proven to be an insurmountable barrier to the counter-mobilizations it stimulates and the secularism of America’s social institutions. The authors also observe that the network-building properties de Tocqueville attributed to voluntary associations may be limited in the theologically conservative churches today. These limitations derive from the failures of churches to practice sufficiently sophisticated “bridging” interactions (to use Robert Putnam’s phrase) across class and racial lines and by the tendency of evangelicals to adopt the sloganeering discourse of modern media-based politics, rather than serious, if sometimes painful, dialogues about social differences. As John Evans observes in chapter 7, mainline Protestants provide an instructive counterexample because they tend to avoid the media glare while pursuing consensus moral causes, such as poverty reduction and medical improvements in the developing world.

Because conservative religion has become a powerful and contested
interest in American society, some of the authors in volume 2 suggest
that the social and moral reforms favored by evangelicals will flourish
only if the movement becomes less wedded to achieving its ends
through partisan means. All agree that partisanship has not as yet
yielded many of the policy changes that evangelicals hoped to see. In-
deed, the authors see the policy influence of religious conservatives
as severely circumscribed, due to the strong currents of egalitarianism
and liberal consumerism in American society, and to the restraining in-
fluence of secular institutions and nonreligious public-good norms of
political discourse. American society is first of all an arena of pluralistic
competition, legal authority, and a consumer marketplace. Religious
conservatives are shaped by these realities more than they have been
able to shape them. Consequently, as they have entered the political
mainstream, religious conservatives have found it necessary to appeal
for change on nonreligious grounds using secular political philosophies
and social science research as tools.

Overview of the Chapters

These, then, are the major concerns and perspectives that unite the work
in this volume. But each of the chapters also provides new research and
insights on the specific topics it covers. We therefore conclude with a
brief overview of the chapters, showing their relation to one another.

The first set of issues, discussed in part I, address why evangelicals
returned to the public arena in the 1970s and have remained so promi-
nent in American society and politics over the last thirty years. Earlier
scholars described the rise of a politicized evangelical movement as the
“politics of lifestyle concern” or the “politics of cultural defense” (see,
for example, Guth 1983). This research showed how the movement
gained force as a response to potential regulatory challenges to evangel-
icals’ school and broadcast institutions, as well as the threats repre-
sented by the various countercultural movements of the 1960s. How-
ever, the continued prominence of the movement, during periods of
social turmoil and relative social quiet alike, requires explanation.

The chapters in part I provide new ways of thinking about this issue.
In chapter 1, Robert Wuthnow analyzes the cultural capital of evangeli-
cals—the set of beliefs and practices that not only form the central com-
ponents of an identity, but also represent a type of currency that can be
used to activate social networks and help evangelicals achieve their
aims. Unlike those who see cultural capital as the marker of upper-class
taste in the arts, Wuthnow’s broadened understanding of the concept
makes it usable as a way to understand both the status conflict among
subcultural forms of cultural capital and the ways that cultural capital
can serve as an engine of collective mobility.
In chapter 2, Nancy Ammerman emphasizes the improved social standing of evangelicals and, more important, the power of the narrative they have devised to create a permanent campaign against secular and liberal agents of moral decline:

This is a movement that gained momentum as it learned to tell a new story about what is wrong with American culture and what they must do about it. In the 1970s, leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson began speaking not just of the approaching End Times, but also of what believers can do in the meantime ‘while He tarries’. . . . Evangelicals have never stopped believing that spiritual salvation is the key to long-lasting change, but they became convinced that they might lose the ability to preach that gospel and preserve their way of life if they did not also act politically. They came to see their own families as endangered and the privileged place of America in the world at risk.

Ammerman also situates white evangelicals in the variegated religious landscape of twenty-first century America and emphasizes the extent to which they represent a minority voice in a religiously diverse society.

In chapter 3, Philip Gorski provides an important interpretation of the resurgence of evangelicals by looking at conservative Protestantism in the United States in comparative perspective. For Gorski, the recurring prominence and activism of evangelicals in the United States is a function of characteristics that have made evangelicalism in the United States distinctive. In Gorski’s telling, these characteristics include the early disestablishment of a state church; the early linking of Protestantism to American nationalism through the idea that America is God’s chosen instrument of civilization; extreme pluralism in religious competition attributable in large part to mass immigration; development of an evangelical subculture in reaction to modernist movement in the mainline Protestant churches; a history of frontier revivals and overseas missions that kept evangelical beliefs in wide circulation and served as training grounds for leaders; and, most recently, the ongoing partisan mobilization of evangelicals by the Republican Party and its allied organizations.

Wuthnow’s focus on cultural capital and Ammerman’s focus on narrative add up to a new perspective on the identity politics of the Right. Like the identity politics of the Left, evangelicals have found ways to highlight the salience of the characteristics they share as a community, and have found a unifying narrative to justify continuous struggle against ostensibly powerful foes. Gorski’s historical institutionalism broadens these interpretations to show the underlying conditions that made the resurgence of evangelicals’ identity politics possible—and indeed likely—given the right precipitating conditions.
The second set of issues, addressed in part II, concerns the relationship between evangelicals and their interlocutors. Rethinking these relations has become necessary because much of the early work on evangelical intergroup relations is now dated. It is no longer a foregone conclusion that evangelicals can make common cause with other religious conservatives. Nor are once-popular arguments that evangelicalism is racism by another name plausible any longer in light of the many evangelical race-bridging efforts. Similarly, it no longer seems reasonable to attribute the quiescence of mainline Protestants, once the dominant religious voice in the United States, to tensions between liberal ministers and their more conservative congregations, because mainline Protestants themselves have become increasingly liberal on these issues (Manza and Brooks 1997).

In chapter 4, John Green provides a new assessment of relations within the traditionalist alliance. Although he finds impressive sources of attachment among members of the alliance—including religiosity, similar positions on social issues, and traditions of civic engagement—he also finds sources of disunity. These sources include ecumenical orthodoxy and divergent views on issues outside the moral-values domain. Moreover, the current attachment to the alliance of evangelicals who are irregular churchgoers may decline in the future, if the restructuring trends that Wuthnow found for other religious groups begin to influence the evangelical community. Green’s analysis raises important questions about the long-term durability of the alliance.

Evangelicals and other members of the traditionalist alliance have defined themselves, in large measure, by their opponents: feminists and gays, as well as secular elites. In chapter 5, Jennifer Merolla, Jean Reith Schroedel, and Scott Waller assess the impact of evangelical strength on the opportunities of women and gays. Controlling for a variety of economic and demographic covariates, they show that states in which evangelicals make up a large proportion of the population are significantly less likely to elect women and gays to political office. However, the proportion of women and gays who hold elected office has grown over time even in states where evangelicals do make up a large proportion of the population. The chapter suggests that American society’s movement toward equality is difficult to turn back, even in states where religious traditionalism is most prevalent.

Evangelicals have been far more open to race-bridging than they have been to accepting women’s and gay rights. The shift of evangelicals away from the racist past is evident in the Southern Baptist Convention’s repudiation of its role in perpetuating segregation and of such interracial evangelical groups as Promise Keepers. Survey data, too, shows that people committed to religion for its intrinsic value are least likely to hold prejudiced views of African Americans (Wald 2003, 185).
In chapter 6, Paul Lichterman, Prudence Carter, and Michèle Lamont provide the most comprehensive account available of evangelicals’ race-bridging efforts. The results of their study are discomfiting. Evangelicals base race-bridging efforts on a Christ-centered approach in which everyone is considered equal in the eyes of Jesus. Lichterman and his colleagues find that this approach often fails to address frankly the unequal social circumstances of whites and blacks, leaving both sides feeling uncomfortable with one another in spite of their sincere efforts to achieve greater racial harmony.

Democracy depends on the active engagement of all important interests in society. For this reason, democratic theorists generally applaud the increased civic engagement of evangelicals and other religious conservatives (see, for example, Gutmann 1998; Putnam 2000; Shields 2007). However, in the face of highly mobilized interests, democracy sometimes also depends on the strength of countervailing powers. Mainline Protestants were once the most important voice on moral-values issues in the United States, but today they represent for some observers the missing counterweight. In chapter 7, John Evans takes up the mystery of the disappearing mainline Protestant public voice. Evans concludes that the declining numbers of mainline Protestants are only part of the explanation. Other parts are the tendency of mainliners to move toward supporting consensus issues, such as improving health care in the developing world, and their lack of interest in stirring the pot on the contentious culture war issues that attract media attention. Mainline Protestants are active on values issues, but not on the issues that excite evangelicals, progressive secular people, and the media.

In the popular press, a common reading has been that evangelicals and other religious conservatives are highly united and, thanks to their numbers and political influence, can drown out more liberal voices on moral-values issues. The chapters in part II present a more complex picture. In these chapters, we see important cracks in the traditionalist alliance. We see evangelicals reaching out across racial lines, but not always succeeding on the human level. We also see the slow but steady advance in the representation of women and gays, even in states dominated by evangelicals, and another continent of moral-values issues in which moderate and liberal voices continue to play an important role outside the media glare.

Evangelicals and their religious allies have attempted to transform American institutions in a direction that creates more space for traditional family and religious values. The chapters in part III suggest that, with the partial exception of the family, America’s secular social institutions have exercised much more influence on evangelicals than evangelicals have on them. The dominant theme of the chapters is accommodation to mainstream secular institutions and norms of public discourse,
and the inability of evangelicals to effect change except as a part of broader political coalitions.

In chapter 8, Bradford Wilcox discusses evangelicals’ advocacy of the traditional family as a response to the decline of marriage and the increase in family instability during the 1960s and 1970s. The conservative Protestant family is distinctive; men are the heads of families, though discussion is the norm, and children are raised with both discipline and affection. Wilcox shows that some elements of this model have been more successful than others. Evangelical fathers, for example, are, according to some indicators, more involved in their children’s lives than fathers from other religious traditions. However, divorce rates remain high among evangelicals and little evidence exists that evangelical families have been able to control teenage sexuality any better than families with other religious traditions. In the policy domain, evangelicals have been at the head of experiments to deepen marriage commitments and to educate others on the benefits of marriage, as well as of efforts to control teen sexuality through such means as abstinence education and virginity pledges. Although many of these policy interventions have failed to show positive results, evangelicals have succeeded in helping change the discourse about marriage and family, but have done so only with the help of secular social scientists who have called attention to the effects of single parenthood on children’s well-being.

As we move from the family to schooling, we find evangelicals considerably more accommodating to secular norms. In chapter 9, David Sikkink shows that among evangelicals only the “spirit-filled” groups (Pentecostals and charismatics) tend to be adamantly opposed to the public system. Evangelical parents have often encouraged schools in their communities to allow for the teaching of religious traditions, alternatives to evolutionary theory, and school prayer. But even here evangelicals are far from united in their policy preferences, and partly for this reason have experienced limited success influencing the curriculum and practices of the public schools. Sikkink’s chapter also looks inside private Protestant schools and finds that they closely resemble the organization and curriculum offered in public schools. Students have opportunities to study about democracy and pluralism, to participate in student government, and to discuss public affairs. They also volunteer more often than students in public schools. Only in reading about public affairs do they seem to fall below students in other sectors.

Accommodation is perhaps even higher in relations between religious conservatives and the mass media. In chapter 10, Gabriel Rossman shows that most conservative Christians stick with the popular media in spite of their expressed objections to salacious content. Although most voice efforts, such as filings with the Federal Communications Commission to protest indecency, are unsuccessful, Rossman
shows that some campaigns to put pressure on advertisers have scored at least limited successes. Rossman also charts the growth of alternative Christian media and notes the extraordinary mobilizing tool that Christian broadcasting has become, capable of generating hundreds of thousands of telephone calls against bills that popular broadcasters oppose. Although evangelical Protestant media has grown with the movement, its market share is but a small fraction of the mainstream media. Rossman concludes that conservative Christians have established themselves as a viable market niche in an industry committed both to a mass market and to product differentiation. Christian media also sometimes serve, to borrow a phrase from major league baseball, as a farm system for the mainstream media; talented performers can prove themselves in the niche market before crossing over to the mass market.

Law is another institutional arena in which religious conservatives have achieved only limited success. In chapter 11, Rogers Smith shows that though religious conservatives have won important changes in prevailing constitutional doctrines governing state-church and state-society relations, the changes have been far less than activists have hoped for. In cases involving the religious establishment clause of the First Amendment, they have had most success when they have argued for equal treatment of religious and secular groups. In cases involving the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment, their greatest success has come when they have joined religious claims to broader free speech claims. Smith shows that the political challenge of defining positions that can win the support of broader coalitions of citizens means that religion is unlikely ever to receive special recognition, protection, or privileges in U.S. constitutional law.

Taken together, these chapters show that secular norms dominate public institutions and constrain the reforms desired by religious conservatives. The deference of American society to academic scholarship and constitutional language severely limits the extent to which religious conservatives have been able to transform the schools or the courts. This work also shows that the freedoms offered by liberal culture frequently override the restraints advocated by Christian morality. Teenage sex and divorce are as common among evangelicals as in any other group, and the enticements of the popular media apparently only a little less appealing. Evangelicals and religious conservatives are an important interest group in American society, but they are embedded within a secular state and liberal culture that, to reverse de Tocqueville, greatly limits their influence. These chapters indicate that religious conservatives have had the most influence when they are able to make common cause with broader coalitions of actors and to couch their arguments in secular terms.
Note

1. These volumes are the product of a conference held in New York in April 2007 at the Russell Sage Foundation. We are grateful to the Foundation, and particularly to Eric Wanner, for generous support of the conference. We would also like to thank the Center for Ideas and Society at the University of California, Riverside for providing funds to help with conference organizing. Seth Abrutyn played an important role in the success of the conference by creating the conference website and facilitating conference arrangements for participants.

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