Introduction

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From the beginning, Americans have held disparate views on the role religion should play in public life. On the one hand, many colonial governments were established under biblical covenants, where God was called upon to witness the creation of the governing body, whose aim was to further Christianity as well as to establish the common good (Lutz 1988).[1] This vision of America as the new Israel, one with the mission to redeem, not only its own people, but perhaps also—serving as a model—the rest of humanity, is an enduring Puritan legacy.[2] On the other hand, the country's founding document, the U.S. Constitution, is secular, completely lacking in references to the Deity. And rather than establish a state church as existed in much of Europe, the First Amendment, at least according to some observers, establishes a "wall of separation between church and state"—a phrase first used by Thomas Jefferson in his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. Jefferson, during his presidency, also discontinued Washington's and Adams's practice of declaring national days of prayer and fasting.

Two hundred years later, Americans remain divided over whether religious belief and practices should be publicly embraced or a private matter best left to the individual conscience. People often hold internally inconsistent views, welcoming the efforts of religious leaders to promote causes we support, but denouncing their actions on behalf of policies we abhor. Public opinion polls also find that more than two-thirds of respondents characterize the United States as a Christian nation but only one-third believe that the Bible rather than the will of the American people should determine the country's law (Pew Research Center 2006, 5). Taken together, these survey results suggest that though Americans revere the nation's Christian heritage, most are not willing to allow any particular biblical "truth" to override the collective wisdom of the American people. Yet that one of every three Americans would favor biblically based law cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

There is an inherent tension between the idea that the United States is a Christian nation and a pluralist democracy that includes people of all faiths, as well as those with no religious beliefs. Finding a balance between these two can be challenging. Consider, for example, the ways that Pastor Rick Warren's invocation at the Barack Obama's inauguration tried to satisfy these competing imperatives. First, simply by giving the invocation, Warren reaffirmed the nation's religious heritage. There is no intrinsic reason why a government transition needs to be marked by prayer, yet it has always been done. This particular invocation, however, broke new ground. In five short minutes, Warren managed to evoke all three of the world's great monotheistic religions, starting with the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One" from Jewish prayer and then moving on to praise God as the "compassionate and merciful," language drawn from the Koran and regularly recited during Muslim prayers. Yet ultimately, by praying Jesus's name and concluding with the Lord's Prayer, Warren left himself open to the criticism that the invocation was too Christian.

The title to this volume, *Evangelicals and Democracy in America: Religion and Politics*, the second of the series, was chosen because evangelicals have been at the forefront of American democracy. In fact, some would argue that our democratic freedoms, as enshrined in the nation's founding documents, are a reflection of evangelical Christianity's assertion of inviolable individual rights. But is it possible for a Christian nation to maintain a democratic public sphere that encourages dialogue and respect across diverse religious and political boundaries? These chapters focus on political topics: religious conservatives and partisan politics, the mobilizing rhetoric of evangelicals, and the cycles and evolution of the evangelical movement. What are the causes and consequences of their political mobilization? In what ways have evangelicals strengthened pluralist democracy in the United States? What challenges, if any, do they pose to democratic practices in a diverse polity?

The companion first volume, *Evangelicals and Democracy in America: Religion and Society*, examines the sources of evangelicals' growing prominence and activism in American society, the relations between evangelicals and other groups in American society, and the influence of evangelicals on America's social institutions. Over the past thirty years, evangelicals have entered the halls of power and nearly every sphere of American life has been touched by their mobilization. What has their impact been on public education? How has the media responded to pressures to clean up the content of their programs? These are just a few of the questions explored in volume 1.

We believe that there are compelling reasons to focus on evangelicals.[3] First, American history and development cannot be understood separately from the influence of evangelical Protestantism. Not only

have their beliefs, most notably the idea that the United States has a covenant with God, shaped the nation's identity, evangelicals have also been at the forefront of nearly all movements for social change, both on the Left and on the Right. We argue that the Christian Right is simply the most recent manifestation of the evangelical impulse for social change.

Second, the Christian Right's emergence as a major political force within the Republican Party has fundamentally altered the political landscape. Not only have large numbers of white evangelicals shifted their political allegiance from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, many have also become party activists. That a similar movement has not occurred among doctrinally conservative members of the historically African American churches is a reminder of the continuing salience of race in the American polity. As Clyde Wilcox notes in the concluding chapter of this volume, it would have been inconceivable three decades ago for major party presidential candidates to be denouncing evolution in a primary debate.[4] Yet today they all feel they must clearly establish their religious bona fides.

Third, the Christian Right has transformed the nation's political discourse, particularly with respect to moral values. They have been very successful in defining a particular group of traditional and pro-family values as synonymous with moral values more generally and in bringing a set of specific policy issues to the forefront while ignoring others. Moreover, how and why has Christian identity come to be associated with supporting a narrow set of issues? Why has the phrase *moral values* come to conjure up images of protesters outside abortion clinics and opponents of gay marriage rather than of taking steps to decrease one's carbon footprint? Why does poverty, which is mentioned more than 2,000 times in the Bible, have less political salience among evangelicals than homosexuality, which is mentioned only a couple times?

Yet because only about one in four Americans identify as evangelicals, evangelicals need to work cooperatively with like-minded groups in the pursuing their political aims. John Green uses the term *traditionalist alliance* to describe this broader coalition of religious traditionalists (see volume 1, chapter 4). Although the core of the traditionalist alliance is evangelical, most notably Baptist, it also encompasses other conservative Protestant denominations—Missouri and Wisconsin Synod Lutherans, Presbyterian Churches of America, holiness churches, and Pentecostals—as well as traditionalist elements within mainline Protestant denominations, conservative Catholics, Mormons, and conservative Jews. In this volume, we consider the role of evangelicals in building the traditionalist alliance as well as the difficulties inherent in maintaining such a diverse political coalition. We also consider their relations with groups outside this alliance.

The Privileged Position of Evangelical Protestants amidst Religious Diversity

Any celebration of a common Christian heritage must be juxtaposed against the religious diversity that has characterized the nation since its inception. There are several early and interrelated causes for the diversity. First, the country was settled by people with different religious backgrounds. Moreover, the dispersal of colonial settlements across a large geographical area provided opportunities for disparate patterns of belief to become established. Given this history, it is not surprising that the Founding Fathers enshrined religious liberty in the First Amendment to the Constitution, thereby creating the conditions for religious diversity to flourish in the long term.

Geographical patterns of religious belief in colonial America were clear. Although the Dutch established Reform congregations and the Swedes established Lutheran congregations in their colonies, the predominant religious influences were English, with the biggest split between the Puritans in New England and Anglicans in the South. The New England Calvinists tended to view themselves as New Hebrews with a mission to create a new Zion. At least in part because of their ties with the Church of England, the Anglicans developed a less distinctly American character, which reduced their impact after the Revolutionary War. The mid-Atlantic region was primarily Calvinist, of which the less strict Presbyterians were the most numerous. Baptists, Mennonites, and even Quakers were also accepted in the region. The Catholic Church established early roots in colonial America as well.

By the early eighteenth century, the establishment churches had become staid and overly formal, leaving the populace largely disconnected from their faith. The Great Awakenings of the 1720s through the 1740s, a series of jeremiad-oriented revivals, were populist expressions of a pent-up desire to regain the religious purity and fervor of the early settlers (Morone 2003, 40).[5] End Time speculation was rampant, with many revivalist ministers preaching that the Millennium foretold by John in Revelations was approaching and that the Kingdom of God was eminent (Boyer 1992, 70). As the colonists moved closer toward revolution and separation from England, revivalist preachers, such as Jonathan Edwards, speculated that America might become the center of Christ's kingdom during his thousand-year rule (Boyer 1992, 72).[6]

The Great Awakenings transformed the religious landscape, giving rise to new denominations, most notably Methodists, and greatly increasing the influence of Baptists, and lessening that of the Congregationalists, the old establishment denomination in New England. The rapidly growing sects were clearly evangelical with salvation based on one's personal relationship with God. For example, in 1740 there were

only three Baptist congregations in Connecticut and eleven in Massachusetts, but thirty years later thirty-six in the former and thirty in the latter, and thirty years later still, by the turn into the nineteenth century, 312 across all of New England (Morone 2003, 110).

The Second Great Awakening, another series of revivals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, accelerated the trend toward diversity and made evangelicals the dominant force in the religious landscape.[7] By 1800, that landscape had become even more fragmented, with the Baptists, Congregationalists, Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians comprising the largest denominations. It was during this period that the Mormon prophet, Joseph Smith, received his revelations from the angel Moroni in the infamous burned-over district of western New York.[8] Smaller denominations included German Reformed, Dutch Reformed, Quaker, Moravian, and Mennonite, as well as Roman Catholic churches (Handy 1984, 25).

As evident from this accounting, the dominant ethos was Protestant. Moreover, the two great periods of revivalism gave the nation a strongly evangelical flavor. The historian Mark Noll estimated that evangelical Protestant denominations accounted for 85 percent of all U.S. churches in 1860 (2002, 170). Although the evangelical spirit as manifested in the First and Second Great Awakenings was a direct offshoot of New England Puritanism, it contradicted basic Calvinist doctrines. Arminianism, the belief that salvation is made possible by Christ's suffering and salvation is available to all who accept Jesus as their personal savior, supplanted the Calvinist belief in predestination.

According to Robert Handy, the religious mainstream in the nineteenth century was comprised of large and medium-sized evangelical Protestant denominations[9] and an evangelical wing of Episcopalians; nearly all of whom shared the dream that "some day the civilization of the country would be fully Christian" (1984, ix–x). Unlike their counterparts today, most Protestants then were postmillennialists, who believed that the Second Coming would only occur after society was fully Christianized.[10] Much of the popular support in antebellum America for Manifest Destiny, the belief that the United States destined to stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, was derived from evangelicals, who believed it would help spread the gospel throughout the world. Again, America was to serve as a "light of the world," a redeemer nation.[11]

During the Civil War, both sides believed they were fighting for a Christian America. Northern clergy stressed the evils of slavery and the need for national redemption,[12] and Southern ministers held that slavery was in keeping with God's plan for humanity and benefited both master and slave. Although few former Confederates recanted their beliefs about slavery, they did accept their loss on the battlefield as being

divinely mandated.[13] In the postbellum era, white Northerners and white Southerners both returned to the mission of creating a Christian civilization, both domestically and globally. Presbyterians, Lutherans, Episcopalians, Baptists, and Methodists were deeply engaged in missionary work by the end of the century (see Ammerman, volume 1, chapter 2).

During the early part of the twentieth century, nearly all evangelical denominations underwent fundamentalist-modernist conflicts (Marsden 1980). The modernists tried to reconcile biblical truths with scientific developments, such as evolution, and fundamentalists emphasized a literal reading of the Bible. Following the 1925 Scopes trial, many theologically conservative evangelicals largely withdrew from the public sphere,[14] but others tried to find a way to reach an accommodation with modern society. The former became identified as fundamentalists, and the latter as neo-evangelicals. All of these splits, as well as a pervasive sense that traditional religious beliefs and practices could not address the changing needs of modern society, led some to argue that the era of Protestant hegemony ended during the 1930s, though the nation's elite was still overwhelming Protestant (Handy 1984).[15] What followed was an era during which the cultural forms of Protestant Christianity continued to be invoked, but increasingly the United States was increasingly characterized by the tripart framing of Protestant, Catholic, and Jew.

During the 1960s and 1970s, all forms of evangelical Protestantism experienced an upsurge in membership. The political and cultural turmoil of the period left many people searching for answers that the mainline churches seemed unable to provide. Evangelical churches, with their emphasis on biblical inerrancy and the importance of personal morality, provided many with the clear guidance they sought. During this period, the distinctions between fundamentalists and neo-evangelicals became less important. Many also were attracted to the more enthusiastic and experiential forms of religious expression characteristic of Pentecostalism and charismatic worship, which resulted in their becoming a bigger part of the evangelical Protestant mix (Watson 1999, 14–16).

To a large extent, the liberal-conservative divide that occurred 100 years ago continues to shape contemporary divisions among Protestants. Although some denominations, such as Southern Baptists and Assemblies of God, are overwhelmingly conservative, many mainline denominations also have conservative elements, albeit in smaller numbers. One of the major differences, which has become increasingly important, is that many liberal Protestants have begun to question whether salvation requires the acceptance of Jesus Christ as one's personal savior. In other words, can a Hindu or a Muslim lead a godly life? Moreover, what role, if any, should non-Christians occupy in American public life? This

shift moves liberal Protestants even further away from their more conservative evangelical brethren.

The level of religious diversity in the United States skyrocketed after the 1965 Immigration and Nationalization Act eliminated the European bias in the immigration system, resulting in "radical pluralism as the cardinal mark of religion in America" (Cherry 1998, 8).[16] The religious map of the United States, which used to encompass three variants (Protestant, Catholic, and Jew), now is comprised of eight: Catholics, Jews, other world religions,[17] mainline Protestants, African American churches, white conservative Protestants, homegrown American religions and finally, the nones, who do not "find any religious tradition to their liking" (see volume 1, chapter 2). Although the far fewer Americans identify themselves as nonreligious, the most recent Pew survey found that the percentage of respondents indicating no religious affiliation (16 percent) is significantly higher than it was a few decades earlier (2008, 19). Probably no image conveys the shift in the nation's public religious landscape as much as the image of Siraj Wahaj, a Muslim imam, giving the opening prayer in the U.S. House of Representatives on June 25, 1991 (Eck 2001, 31).[18]

Evangelicals as an Embattled Group

A few months after Imam Wahaj's prayer, the tension between an explicitly Christian national identity and pluralism erupted at a meeting of the Republican Governors Association, when Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice stated unequivocally, "the United States is a Christian nation." When rebuked by South Carolina Governor Carroll Campbell, who said that the nation's value base comes from its Judeo-Christian heritage, Fordice reiterated his view that the United States is a Christian nation. When pressed to include Judeo as part of the nation's foundation, Fordice responded, "If I wanted to do that I would have done that" (Richard Berke, "With a Crackle, Religion Enters G.O.P. Meeting," *New York Times*, November 18, 1992). In 2004, the Texas Republican Party followed suit, adopting a convention plank that declared the "United States of America is a Christian nation" (Cathy Young, "GOP's 'Christian Nation,'" *Boston Globe*, July 12, 2004) and in 2006 a Missouri House Committee approved a "Christian nation" resolution as well (Bennet Kelley, "The Christian Nation Movement and the Alabama Ban," *Huffington Post*, April 18, 2006). In the 2008 presidential campaign, John McCain reignited the controversy by stating that "the Constitution established the United States of America as a Christian nation," but later issued a clarification stating that it was founded on "Judeo-Christian values."[19]

The acrimonious exchanges over whether the United States is an explicitly Christian nation are not simply an outgrowth of the changing religious demographics, but are at least as much a reflection of evangelical Protestant concerns that they are an embattled group. Evangelicals became increasingly aware of a cultural disjuncture with the rest of society during the 1960s and early 1970s. Handy considered the early 1960s to be the point where even the "Protestant quasi-establishment" became a "thing of the past" (1984, 194). The Supreme Court's 1962 Engel v. Vitale ruling, which held that a New York State Board of Regents approved prayer could not be given in public schools because it constituted an establishment of religion, was the first of a series of court decisions that undercut traditional religious prerogatives.[20] Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, most notably Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which legalized abortion, helped solidify evangelicals' sense of being under attack

The 1976 election of a born-again Christian, Jimmy Carter, raised hopes that the country was going to regain its moral footing. However, when "one of their own" consistently took positions diametrically opposed to those held by most evangelicals—such as abortion, school prayer, busing, gay rights, and the Equal Rights Amendment—it generated enormous anger. The proverbial straw that broke the camel's back was the Carter administration's support for an Internal Revenue Service policy that threatened to remove the tax exempt charitable status of Bob Jones University, which allowed unmarried African Americans to enroll, but refused admission to those who advocated interracial marriage or dating.[21] Ralph Reed wrote that evangelicals considered the attack on Bob Jones University to be "nothing less than a declaration of war on their schools, their churches and their children" (1996, 105; for more on the impact of Supreme Court decisions on mobilizing rank and file evangelicals to become political active in conservative political organizations and the Republican Party, see volume 1, chapter 11, and chapter 11, this volume).

The Politicization of Evangelical Discontent

In the 1960s and 1970s, evangelicals came to believe that their way of life was under direct attack and channeled their discontent into the Christian Right and through that into the Republican Party.[22] Matthew Moen described the contemporary Christian Right as going through four developmental stages (1994, 1996). During the first, from 1978 to 1984, the movement experienced tremendous growth, in terms of both the numbers of individual identifying with the movement and the creation of influential organizations, such as the Christian Voice and the Moral Majority.[23] Movement leaders forged close ties with the Republican Party

during the 1980 election. President Ronald Reagan's speech to a meeting of one of these new groups, the Religious Roundtable, was heralded by Ralph Reed as the "coming out party" for religious conservatives (1996, 112).[24] The strident rhetoric that helped mobilize the evangelical base, however, alienated many other people.

In the second stage, in 1985 and 1986, the movement was forced to retrench as the direct mail donor base grew weary of the constant appeals. Nearly all groups lowered their public profile and some actually ceased operating. Although the Moral Majority did not shut down its operations until 1988, it had ceased to be a significant political force by the mid-1980s. Its harsh rhetoric made it unpopular even among its core target group, white evangelicals (Jelen 1999, 165). At this juncture, many observers predicted that the movement would wither away.

In the third stage, from 1987 to 1995, the movement got a new burst of energy with Pat Robertson's 1988 presidential campaign, which mobilized many Pentecostals. The primary characteristic of the period, however, was its emphasis on institution building. The leadership reassessed their sources of funding, established links with other religiously conservative elements (conservative Catholics, Mormons, and conservative Jews), embraced rights-based rhetoric rather than explicitly Christian jeremiads, and intensified their grassroots political activism. The Christian Coalition, established in 1989, is known for its very sophisticated get-out-the-vote operation. Its voting guides have been distributed to millions of churchgoers.[25]

Beginning in 1995, the movement entered into fourth stage of working even more closely with the Republican Party, which had built of a well-organized network of supporters affiliated with evangelical churches. These efforts paid off in 2000 and 2004, when white evangelicals gave Bush 68 percent and 78 percent of their votes. In the 2004 election, evangelical Christians comprised more than one-third of all Bush votes (Pew Research Center 2004). Leaders have become more willing to compromise on social issues and emphasize returning political authority to the states, where they expect to have a greater ability to enact their reform agenda.

Challenge for a Democratic Polity

Arguably, there has never been another point in American history at which the level of interest in the interplay between religion and politics has been greater than it is today. The growth of the Christian Right over the past thirty years has reignited academic interest in the interplay between religion and democratic politics. Although the extremist rhetoric of some Christian Right figures generates tremendous media attention, these comments cannot be taken as representing the views of evangeli-

cals as a group. According to a recent public opinion poll, only 11 percent of respondents identify with the "religious right political movement," and even more significant, only one in five self-identified white evangelicals consider themselves part of it (Pew Research Center 2006, 10).

Rather than viewing the high level of religiosity as likely to dissipate as the country follows the modernization path forged by European countries, scholars have come to realize that secularization is not necessarily a concomitant of the modernization process.[26] According to the most recent Pew survey, 56 percent of Americans say that religion is very important in their lives, and another 26 percent indicate that it is at least somewhat important (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008, 22). But it is also worth noting that the number of Americans identifying as secular has increased, though their proportion of the population remains quite small. Interestingly, this may become more significant in the future in that younger Americans are more likely to indicate they are not affiliated with any religious tradition (2008, 29).

The increasing significance of religious conservatives in the Republican Party is unprecedented in the American context. Unlike European countries, which have long had political parties whose social base is a particular religion, the major parties in the United States have been an aggregation of diverse social interests. Although definitely an exaggeration, the heightened role of the Christian Right led Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) to claim that "this Republican Party of Lincoln has become a party of theocracy" (Adam Nagourney, "G.O.P. Right is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention," *New York Times*, March 23, 2005).

Yet it is not simply Republicans who are trying to mobilize evangelicals. The Democratic Party, which Nixon labeled the party of acid, amnesty, and abortion, has sought to overcome its so-called God gap by reaching out to evangelicals. The extent of the party problem was evident in a recent survey (Pew Research Center 2006), which showed that only 26 percent of respondents believed that the Democratic Party is friendly to religion. From the beginning of the 2008 presidential campaign, Democrats aggressively courted the evangelical electorate. Throughout the primary, Hillary Clinton spoke about the importance of prayer in her life. In both the primary season and then during the general election, Obama spoke about his faith a forum organized by Rick Warren at his Saddleback Church in Orange County, California. Campaign operatives handed out a twelve-page booklet chronicling Obama's "Christian journey" to the 2,200 people attending the event (Shailagh Murray and Perry Bacon Jr., "Key Constituency is at Play at Candidates' Faith Forum," *New York Times*, August 17, 2008, A01).

Overview of Chapters

To develop as broad a perspective as possible on these topics, we assembled a group of leading scholars from different academic disciplines. As might be expected in a volume written by scholars trained in sociology, political science, religion, psychology, and history, the methods range from aggregate data analysis to archival research to close textual analysis. The various analytical lenses provide insights and raise questions that might be overlooked in an edited volume that reflects the issues and approaches predominate in a single discipline. As is evident in what follows, the authors do not always agree, but we think that is part of what makes this volume an intriguing exercise.

This volume is divided into three sections. Part I covers Christian conservatives and partisan politics, part II is titled Discourses of Mobilization and Public Reason, and part III discusses the cycles and evolution of a movement. Although each section focuses on different elements that are important in terms of understanding the impact of evangelicals on democracy in the United States, there are obvious connections between the sections. For example, if one wants to understand the current position of evangelicals in the Republican Party, it is useful to not only understand voting and party identification trends covered in part I, but also the types of appeals that have been most successful, which are covered in part II, and how those appeals play out in different contexts, which is covered in part III.

The chapters in part I bring different analytical lens to bear on questions related to party identification and voting patterns. The authors focus on evangelical Protestants but recognize that they are most fruitfully understood in comparison with other groups. Because no nation exists in a vacuum, we begin with a chapter that places the United States within a comparative politics framework. Subsequent chapters consider the extent to which partisanship is a function of the interaction between religious identification and other factors, most notably race and class. They also delve into the meaning of the term *values*, a concept that has gained prominence in recent elections.

In chapter 1, Pippa Norris reconsiders the question of American exceptionalism, not with respect to the absence of socialism, but in terms of an American religiosity gap. As noted earlier, the United States has a much higher proportion of religious believers than any other country at a comparable level of economic development. Although this appears to be prima facie evidence of American exceptionalism, Norris provides cross-national data to show that the American case is more mixed.

A key question is whether recent increases in self-identified secular Americans is an indication that the United States is simply a laggard in

following the European countries. Norris suggests several possible reasons why religion has greater salience in the United States than in comparable nations.

In chapter 2, Michael Hout and Andrew Greeley use time series data to examine trends in voting and party identification. As expected, they find a trend toward Republican Party identification and voting among nearly all religious groups. Their data, however, indicate that the relationship is mediated by the continuing salience of race and a widening class cleavage among evangelicals. In other words, conservative Protestants are far from the monolithic bloc presented in many popular accounts. Hout and Greeley found no evidence that the Christian Right persuades low- and moderate-income evangelicals into voting against their economic interests.

Although the term values is regularly invoked as an explanation for particular patterns of partisanship and voting, its meaning is generally left vague. In chapter 3, Wayne Baker and Connie Boudens make a major contribution to our understanding of the term by mapping out the conceptual elements it encompasses and how the different configurations can result in systematic differences in party identification and voting. Like Hout and Greeley, Baker and Boudens find that race often trumps values in determining partisanship.

Chapter 4 explores the paradox of why white evangelical Protestants, many of whom hold moderate to liberal views on a wide range of issues, have become a key constituency of the Republican Party. Steven Brint and Seth Abrutyn argue that the explanation lies in the Republican Party's successful construction of a system of moral values politics. They treat moral values politics as an organizational and rhetorical structure that links the white evangelical social base, local social movement activists, leaders of national Christian Right organizations, and the national Republican Party. This party-movement-church electoral system highlights issues of cultural difference from secular elites and downplays areas where the white evangelical base supports positions closer to those favored by the Democratic Party. Brint and Abrutyn argue that three primary commitments—religiosity, gender role traditionalism, and moral absolutism—underlie white evangelical support for the Republican Party.

The chapters in part II focus on the mobilizing rhetoric and ideological frameworks that Christian Right leaders have used to activate their base and reach out to other members of the traditionalist alliance. Again, we begin with an historical chapter that helps provide a context for understanding contemporary events. The other two chapters in this section directly address the question of whether democracy is enhanced or threatened by this movement, and reach rather different conclusions.

In chapter 5, Rhys Williams provides an overview of how evangeli-

cals going back to the early Calvinist settlers have divided "the social and moral world into Manichean dualisms." Not only does Williams show how this creation of sharp boundaries between us and them has been a consistent theme across time, he also argues that it is an essential element of the evangelical subculture. He shows that the primary objects of moral concern have shifted over time from Quakers to immigrant Catholics and Jews to Communists and now to atheists, agnostics, and secular elites. Immigration, international politics, and the politics of lifestyle have all played into the history of constructing these groups as moral others. Although the process is a potent way to mobilize the faithful, Williams posits that it may undercut democratic practices, because those defined as moral others are also often considered less than fully American or even un-American.

Julie Ingersoll argues in chapter 6 that Reconstructionism, a small Calvinist offshoot, has played an extremely important role in creating the underlying metaphor of the contemporary Christian Right. Reconstructionists are called that because they advocate reconstructing society to bring it into accordance with Old Testament law. Although self-identified Reconstructionists are relatively few in number, Ingersoll uses close textual analysis of core writings by Rousas John Rushdoony to argue that their themes have become an integral part of the more mainstream discourse of conservative Protestants. Ingersoll shows that Rushdoony first articulated many of the Christian Right attacks on contemporary culture, as well as the idea of the traditional family as a bulwark for cultural renewal. In this highly provocative essay, Ingersoll makes a strong argument that Reconstructionists should not simply be dismissed as a fringe group.

In chapter 7, recognizing that the Christian Right has become an "increasingly powerful voice in American democracy," Nathaniel Klemp and Stephen Macedo nonetheless argue that it largely adheres to the norms of public reason. By this they mean that the Christian Right activists and leaders attempt to appeal to a broader audience by marshalling reason and evidence that supports their position. The authors draw on a broad range of original documents as well as on interviews with Christian Right leaders and activists and their political opponents.

Klemp and Macedo find evidence that leaders rely on a two-tiered rhetorical strategy that uses one type of rhetorical argument among adherents and a very different type among the broader public. Klemp and Macedo conclude that, over time, major Christian Right leaders have come to embrace something akin to public reason, as might be expected by any group seeking to pursue its ends in a pluralist democracy.

The chapters in part III provide new ways of thinking about the development of the Christian Right as a political movement. Each conceptualizes evangelical Protestant cycles of political activism in starkly dif-

ferent terms. Here too we open with a historical chapter that puts contemporary developments in a broader context, leaving subsequent chapters to highlight disparate aspects of the modern Christian Right's relationships with other sectors of the population. A clear subtext in each chapter, however, is the question of whether the political mobilization of evangelicals is a boon or bane to democracy.

In chapter 8, the historian Peter Dobkin Hall traces the roots of the Christian Right's involvement in public life back to the antebellum era. He draws on archival materials to show that early nineteenth-century churches faced disestablishment from any ties to state governments and were "forced to compete for adherents in the religious marketplace" (chapter 8, this volume, 250). He argues that these fundamental facts established the parameters within which religious bodies have struggled to find successful strategies of engagement in the public sphere.

Hall analyzes the tension between sectarianism and ecumenicalism among evangelicals, focusing on three episodes of pan-Protestant mobilization: the leadership of Lyman Beecher in the 1840s, of Dwight Moody in the early 1900s, and of the neo-evangelicals of the 1980s and 1990s. Hall finds that every time evangelicals have developed a reform-oriented social movement, they have shown a propensity to fragment on the shoals of sectarianism. Although the current movement has shown more staying power, reaching out to conservative Catholics, Mormons, and Jews, Hall suggests that this incarnation also may shatter.

In chapter 9, Kimberly Conger also explores evangelical political cycles, but limits herself to the past several decades. She argues that the relationship between the Christian Right and state Republican parties can be explained in terms of cycles of conflict and accommodation, primarily driven by how important the movement is to the achievement of the party's electoral aims. The electoral imperative will make working with Christian Right activists more or less attractive to state party leaders, depending on the policy context and the makeup of internal party coalitions.

Conger draws on data from two national surveys and interviews with more than 100 party leaders, activists, commentators, and political observers. In states where the party was weak and needed the grassroots activists and funds that the movement could provide, leaders were open to integrating Christian Right activists into the organization. But in states where the party was strong, leaders were much more likely to rebuff overtures. Changes in the policy context, however, can lead to shifts in the cycle. Case studies from a cross-section of states—Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Missouri—provide a feel for the actual give-and-take that occurs as state Republican parties and Christian Right activists learn to work together.

The construction of boundaries also figures prominently in Michael Lindsay's chapter 10. Lindsay argues that elastic orthodoxy—a concept he defines as the ability of evangelicals to hold firm to a set of core beliefs while being flexible enough that they can ally with people who do not share all of their convictions—is a key strength of the contemporary Christian Right. According to Lindsay, the elasticity of these boundaries allows the contemporary movement to overcome, at least for a time, the sectarianism that Hall identified as undermining previous periods of ecumenicalism, but without undermining the strength of their identity as evangelicals.

Lindsay conducted interviews with evangelical leaders from government, the media, religion, business, higher education, and the social sector. Because politics entails building relations with others, Lindsay asked his respondents questions designed to uncover how they identified members of their own subculture, allies from outside that subculture, and opponents. He discovered that identifying a devil was key to unifying religiously disparate groups, but that on a practical level the bases of support for the traditionalist alliance varied depending on the groups involved.

In chapter 11, which concludes this volume, Clyde Wilcox uses metaphors to encapsulate three alternative frameworks—two conventional, albeit competing, narratives and a radically different narrative—for understanding the relationship between the Christian Right and the Republican Party. The first conventional account describes the Christian Right as a "barbarian army invading the citadel of the Republican Party politics, overrunning moderates and taking control." Among Christian Right activists, the invading army is doing God's will in redeeming America through the Republican Party. Their opponents, however, tend to envision the invading army in jack boots. The second conventional narrative uses the metaphor of seduction. In this story, the Christian Right is a creation of the Republican Party and evangelical voters are seduced into supporting the Republican Party, but get little in recompense. In this narrative, the Republican Party is the driving force behind the creation of the nexus of Christian Right organizations, which serve simply as a mechanism for partisan mobilization.

Wilcox finds each narrative lacking and proposes an alternative narrative derived from evolutionary biology. He argues that the metaphor of coevolution more fully captures the relationship. By thinking of the GOP and Christian Right as "overlapping subspecies with diverse population characteristics," Wilcox is able to trace how the relationship has changed each of the parties over time. He discovers that, as in nature, some members are advantaged and others are disadvantaged through the interaction. Wilcox concludes by showing how the coevolution of the Christian Right and the GOP has affected the Democratic Party's

ecological niche. We believe that the dynamism inherent in this metaphor is an appropriate way to end the volume.

We believe that the two volumes in this series realize our hope for a deeper, more balanced, and better integrated portrait of the evangelical movement and the traditionalist alliance than has so far been available.[27] The volumes combine a sophisticated view of religious doctrines and organizations with a sharp sense of the distinctiveness of the American context, and an awareness of the dependence of religious actors on well supported secular institutions and the broader political coalitions in their environment.

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Notes

1. Puritan leader John Winthrop evoked this sentiment in his depiction of their settlement: "We shall be as a city on a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us" (Winthrop 1603/1931, 294–95).
2. See, for example, the Jonathan Edwards sermon "The Latter-Day Glory is Probably to Begin in America," where he prophesizes that "God has made as it were two world here below, two great habitable continents, far separated one from the other: The latter is as it were now but newly created; it has been, till of late, wholly the possession of Satan, the church of God having never been in it, as it has been in the other continent, from the beginning of the world. This new world is probably now discovered, that the new and most glorious state of God's church on earth might commence there; that God might in it begin a new world in a spiritual respect, when he creates the new heavens and new earth" (1830/1998, 55).
3. There is some ambiguity about the meaning of the term *evangelical* because often times it is used without being defined. In this context, we use the term to refer to a specific subset of Protestants who share a distinctive set of beliefs, experiences and practices. Lyman Kellstedt and Corwin Smidt distinguished evangelicals from other Protestants on the basis of four core beliefs: the Bible is the literal word of God; salvation is possible only through personal acceptance of Jesus as savior; personal experience of Jesus as savior often occurs through the born-again experience, an intense event of spiritual renewal marking their life from that point on; and the obligation to witness one's beliefs to others (1991).
4. Moreover, in 2008, the Republicans nominated, as their vice presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, who supports the teaching of creation science in the public schools.

5. David Gutterman explained that American history has been punctuated by these periods of religious enthusiasm, that he labels the "great jeremiad," where religious leaders in prophetic mode call upon the nation to repent of its sins and warn that it is on the verge of incurring the Almighty's wrath, while offering hope if the people return to righteousness (2005, 9).
6. Although concerned with repentance, most of the preaching also emphasized that America was especially loved by God and would prosper during the thousand years following Satan's being cast into the bottomless pit. This era would be capped by Christ's return. An alternative and much smaller vein of apocalyptic thought held that humanity had to suffer through a millennium period of darkness and travail, although some posited that the righteous may be saved prior to the final conflagration (Boyer 1992, 75).
7. Peter Dobkin Hall's chapter in this volume includes an in-depth discussion of the impact of Lyman Beecher, one of the great populist preachers of the Second Great Awakening, on mid-nineteenth-century America (see chapter 8).
8. The covenant theme is particularly strong in Mormon theology, which holds that America is the new promised land and that Christopher Columbus's discovery of the New World was divinely inspired.
9. The Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians were the largest evangelical Protestant denominations in the nineteenth century. The medium and smaller denominations, which shared the vision of a Christian America, included Congregationalists, Disciples of Christ, and United Brethren (Handy 1984, ix).
10. Most Protestants today are pre- rather than postmillennialists. Rather than believing that Christ's resurrection ushered in the Kingdom of God, premillennialists believe that life on Earth will get worse until Christ's Second Coming, when He establishes the Kingdom of God on Earth. There are many positions about what exactly will occur before Christ's return. Some evangelicals believe there will be the Rapture, where believers are saved just before the worst events on Earth, and others that all must endure the worst while waiting.
11. African Americans developed a strong counternarrative that identifies blacks as the chosen people—a people held in bondage just as the ancient Jews were held in bondage during their sojourn in Egypt. Rather than being a city of a hill, America in this narrative is the oppressor (Gutterman 2005; Moses 1998, 131).
12. In his second inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln suggested that the nation's suffering during the Civil War is penance for the sin of slavery, and that it might continue until "every drop of blood drawn with the last shall be paid another drawn with the sword so still it must be said that the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous" (http://www2.scholastic.com/browse/article.jsp/id=4692).
13. For more on the biblical justifications for slavery and the ways that Southern whites tried to find a biblical explanation for their defeat in the Civil War, see Stephen Haynes (2002).
14. Even though the Scopes court upheld Tennessee's antievolution law, many

evangelicals felt that the best way to protect their way of life and practice their faith was to withdraw from the public sphere. Because most of them had adopted the more pessimistic premillennialist view that there was little that could be done to prevent massive suffering during the time of tribulation, believers needed to focus on individual redemption (Boyer 1992, 104–5).

15. Digby Baltzell in his 1964 study of intersecting business and political power relations in the United States still identifies the nation's elite as overwhelmingly Protestant.
16. The Pluralism Project at Harvard University has identified listings for 5,000 worship centers for non-Judeo-Christian religious traditions (Eck cited in chapter 2, volume 1).
17. According to the American Religious Identification Survey, the number of Muslims in the United States doubled between 1990 and 2001, from 527,000 to 1,104,000. Buddhists increased during the same period from 401,000 to 1,082,000, and Hindus from 227,000 to 766,000 (Kosmin, Mayer, and Keysar 2001).
18. However, when the opening invocation in 2001 was offered by a Hindu priest, the action was denounced by the Family Research Council as "one more indication that our nation is drifting from its Judeo-Christian roots" (Koff, cited in Eck 2001, 25).
19. Alexander Mooney, Sareena Dalla, and Scott Anderson, "Groups Criticize McCain for Calling U.S. 'Christian Nation,'" *CNN Politics*, October 1, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/01/mccain.christian.nation/index.html.
20. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The requirement that Pennsylvania schools read ten Bible verses a day was ruled invalid the following year in Abington Township School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Because the Bible verses generally were taken from Protestant rather than Catholic translations, this decision was applauded by some faith groups, but those who were displaced saw it as a secular attack on the Christian character of the nation.
21. Bob Jones University contested the removal of their tax exempt status, but in 1974 the Supreme Court ruled that to receive tax exempt status an institution "must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy" (Bob Jones University v. United States 416 U.S. 725).
22. It would be misreading history to characterize any period as devoid of evangelical political activism. However, there was a definite diminution of efforts in the aftermath of the Scopes trial, when many evangelicals were convinced they should put their energies into creating their own parallel institutions rather than contest in the public arena. Fundamentalists created their own Bible-centered schools and colleges, Bible summer camps, Bible study groups, and Christian radio programming. At the same time, neo-evangelicals continued to be publicly engaged. Both the founding of the National Association of Evangelicals in 1942 and the Billy Graham revivals of the 1940s and 1950s were expressions of an outwardly looking populist orientation among evangelical Protestants. Throughout the cold

war era, evangelical leaders, such as Billy James Hargis and Carl McIntyre, were active in anti-Communist crusades, but they had only limited success in mobilizing their base.

23. In early 1979, several West Coast antigay, antipornography and pro-family groups merged to create Christian Voice, the first national Christian Right organization. By the mid-1980s, Christian Voice had a mailing list of 150,000 people and claimed to have support from thirty-seven denominations; the most important being independent Baptist, Bible, and Assembly of God churches. The Moral Majority, which was founded in mid-1979, drew its support from independent Baptist churches and small fundamentalist sects, predominantly in the South and Southwest. Within a couple years, the Moral Majority claimed to have a membership of 300,000 (Moore 1999, 211).
24. The membership of the Religious Roundtable is primarily comprised of Southern Baptist, Presbyterian, and Methodist ministers. The organization tries to educate its members about moral and family issues. They also run workshops to teach ministers how to mobilize their membership to support conservative causes (Moore 1999, 212).
25. By the mid-1990s, the Christian Coalition had a membership of 1,700,000 and had become the most influential Christian Right group (Moore 1999, 212).
26. Starting with Max Weber (1930), scholars have posited that economic modernization leads to secularization (see, for example, Swatos and Christiano 2001). The basic argument is that economic development requires a more highly educated workforce, which in turns leads to a greater belief in science and rational explanations for phenomena, all of which undercuts support for a religious world view. More recent research identifies possible reasons—most notably high levels of insecurity—that explain why countries such as the United States and Austria have not followed the dominant pattern of secularization (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004; chapter 1, this volume).
27. Supplemental materials available at: https://www.russellsage.org/publications/evangelicalTimelines.

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