Figure 3.1   Counterterrorism Policy Opinions

Figure 3.2   Only One Over-Time Trend Is Significant[a]


Source: Authors' calculations based on SAPA (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: NSA = National Security Agency; SAPA = Surveys of American Policy Attitudes.
[a] Significant trend (airport security) indicated by triangles.

Figure 3.3   A Closer Look at Airport Security Opinions[a]

Source: Authors' calculations based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

[a] Significant trends indicated by open triangles.

Figure 3.4 A Closer Look at Patriot Act Opinions[a]

Source: Authors' calculations based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

[a] Significant trend (Patriot Act) indicated by triangles.

Figure 3.5   A Closer Look at Torture Opinions[a]

[a] Significant trend (torture) indicated by triangles.

Table 3.1   Wording of Surveys of American Policy Attitudes Policy-Attitude Baseline Items

National Security Agency surveillance
"Do you think that the federal government should monitor telephone conversations between American citizens in the United States and suspected terrorists living in other countries?"

Military Commissions Act
"As you may know, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act in 2006, creating a separate set of courts and prisons in which individuals classified by the government as "enemy combatants" can be held indefinitely. Supporters of the Military Commissions Act say it gives the government the power to protect our country from terrorist attacks. Critics of the Military Commissions Act say it denies individuals their legal rights. What do you think?"

Patriot Act
"As you may know, shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a law called the Patriot Act was passed which makes it easier for the federal government to access phone and email records. What do you think? Do you support or oppose the Patriot Act?"

Assassination
"In recent years, the U.S. government has sometimes targeted individuals suspected of being al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders for assassination. Do you [approve/disapprove] of targeting for assassination individuals suspected of being al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders?"

Rights violation
"As you may know, in 2009, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] arrested a number of terrorism suspects, including several American citizens, who were plotting attacks in Illinois, New York, and North Carolina [The government should take all steps necessary to prevent additional acts of terrorism in the United States even if it means foreign nationals' individual rights and liberties might be violated/Even if it means foreign nationals' individual rights and liberties might be violated, the government should take all steps necessary to prevent additional acts of terrorism in the United States.]."

Detentions
"Next, please tell me if you would favor or oppose each of the following as a means of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States. How about—Detaining someone who is not a U.S. citizen indefinitely if that person is suspected of belonging to a radical Muslim organization?"

Airport security
"How about—Requiring Muslims, including those who are U.S. citizens, to undergo special, more intensive security checks before boarding airplanes in the United States?"

Ethnic profiling
"How about—Allowing law enforcement to bring in for questioning people of certain ethnic backgrounds if these groups are thought to be more likely to engage in terrorist activities?"

Table 3.1 (continued)

Waterboarding

"In recent years, the government sometimes used a technique known as waterboarding on terrorist suspects in an effort to gain information about threats to the United States. Do you [approve or disapprove] of the use of waterboarding on terrorist suspects?"

Torture

"Do you agree or disagree that government authorities should have the right to torture a suspect who is American if they think it will help prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in the United States?"

Source: Authors' compilation.

Table 3.2 Tests for Over-Time Trends[a]

	Linear Change	~ Linear Change
2007-2009-2010 items		
Patriot Act	$F(1) < .01; p > F > .99$	$F(2) = 1.48; p > F = .23$
Detentions	$F(1) = 2.07; p > F = .15$	$F(2) = 1.18; > F = .31$
Airport security	**$F(1) = 11.81; p > F < .01$**	**$F(2) = 7.17; p > F < .01$**
Ethnic profiling	$F(1) = 1.42; p > F = .23$	$F(2) = .82; p > F = .44$
2007–2009 items		
Military Commissions Act	$t(1) = -1.62; p > F > .11$	$t(1) = 1.62; p > F > .11$
NSA surveillance	$t(1) = .52; p > F > .60$	$t(1) = .52; p > F > .60$
2009–2010 items		
Rights violation	$t(1) = 1.78; p > F > .08$	$t(1) = 1.78; p > F > .08$
Torture	$t(1) = -.59; p > F > .56$	$t(1) = -.59; p > F > .56$
Waterboarding	$t(1) = .00; p > F = 1.00$	$t(1) = .00; p > F = 1.00$

Source: Authors' calculations based on SAPA (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: NSA = National Security Agency; SAPA = Surveys of American Policy Attitudes.
[a]Bolded entry indicates significance at the .05 level.

Table 3.3   Additional Tests for Group-Specific Trends[a]

	Democrat/ Republican	Liberal/ Conservative	College-Educated/ Non-College-Educated	White/ Nonwhite	Christian/ Non-Christian
Linear change					
Patriot Act	$p = .14/.55$	$p = \mathbf{.04}/.72$	$p = .23/.33$	$p = .68/.32$	$p = .65/.15$
Detentions	$p = .36/.11$	$p = .81/.46$	$p = .82/.37$	$p = .33/.11$	$p = .14/.62$
Airport security	$p = \mathbf{.03}/.38$	$p = \mathbf{.04}/.60$	$p = \mathbf{.00}/.18$	$p = \mathbf{.00}/.36$	$p = \mathbf{.01}/.11$
Ethnic profiling	$p = \mathbf{.02}/.56$	$p = .32/.22$	$p = .72/.59$	$p = .33/.60$	$p = .71/.07$
Military Commissions Act	$p = .89/.53$	$p = .82/.84$	$p = .50/.58$	$p = .20/.50$	$p = .45/.05$
NSA surveillance	$p = .80/.83$	$p = .66/.08$	$p = .59/.13$	$p = .62/.80$	$p = .80/.52$
Rights violation	$p = .43/.70$	$p = .63/.58$	$p = .69/\mathbf{.01}$	$p = .27/.41$	$p = \mathbf{.03}/.57$
Torture	$p = .56/.45$	$p = .99/\mathbf{.00}$	$p = .69/.28$	$p = .79/.22$	$p = .62/\mathbf{.00}$
Waterboarding	$p = .70/.68$	$p = .52/.99$	$p = .72/.67$	$p = .79/.57$	$p = .81/.89$
~Linear change					
Patriot Act	$p = .10/.30$	$p = .08/.58$	$p = .22/.62$	$p = .28/.32$	$p = .43/.09$
Detentions	$p = .46/.28$	$p = .82/.29$	$p = .82/.24$	$p = .53/.27$	$p = .12/.36$
Airport security	$p = .08/.05$	$p = .05/.58$	$p = \mathbf{.01}/.31$	$p = \mathbf{.00}/.44$	$p = \mathbf{.01}/.21$
Ethnic profiling	$p = .06/.59$	$p = .59/.15$	$p = .85/.42$	$p = .61/.74$	$p = .80/.20$

Source: Authors' calculations based on SAPA (Brooks and Manza, various years).

*Note:* NSA = National Security Agency; SAPA = Surveys of American Policy Attitudes.

[a]Entries are probabilities associated with F-tests for items available in three years (Patriot Act, detentions, airport security, ethnic profiling) or *t*-tests for items available in only two years (Military Commissions Act, NSA surveillance, rights violation, torture, and waterboarding).

Table 3A.1 Response Rates

	2009	2010
Interview		
Completed interviews	1542	1216
Partial completions	17	9
Total interviews	1559	1225
Refusal	4436	4450
Break-off (refused after starting interview)	146	131
Respondent never available	969	1122
Telephone answering device (message confirms housing unit)	141	525
Respondent away for the duration of the survey	20	4
Physically or mentally unable/incompetent or deceased	38	36
Language	169	143
Miscellaneous	7	0
Total eligible, non-interviews	5925	6411
Unknown eligibility, non-interview		
Always busy	121	102
No answer	1820	1467
Telephone answering device (unknown if housing unit)	1788	2147
Call barrier	2	6
Technical phone problems (line/circuit problems)	855	1996
Respondent not found	111	0
Total unknown eligibility, non-interviews	4697	5718
Not eligible		
Fax/data line	1014	757
Nonworking/disconnected number	3495	4363
Temporary nonworking/disconnected number	54	186
Number change	70	50
Cell phone	13	13
Call forwarded	22	42
Business, government office, other organization	615	932
Institution	27	11
Group quarters	7	18
Seasonal home	31	12
Not eligible—no adult household members	11	132
Total not eligible	62	6517
Total sample	17602	19871

Source: Authors' calculations based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

**Figure 4.1   The Power of Threat Priming**

Airport Security experiment [F = 11.10, *df* = 2]*

Source: Authors' estimates based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
*Indicates significance at *p* < .05.

Figure 4.2   Education Effects in the Airport Security Experiment[a]

[a] Predicted effects of education in the hypothetical threat condition are not significant.

Figure 4.3   National Identity and the Rights Violation Experiment

Initial estimates [$F_{nat.\,id}$ = 19.99, df = 1; F_{threat} = 11.25, df = 1]*

Source: Authors' calculations based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: nat. id = national identity.
*Indicates significance at p < .05.

Figure 4.4 Education in the Rights Violation Experiment[a]

Source: Authors' estimates based on analysis of Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
[a] Predicted effects of education in the no-threat conditions are not significant.

Figure 4.5   Lessons from the Torture Experiments

Torture a suspect, 2009 [*t* = 1.53]

Torture a suspect, 2010 [F = .52, *df* = 2]

Source: Authors' estimates based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

Table 4.1 SAPA Item Wordings and Experiments

Airport security
  How about—"Requiring individuals who traveled to countries in the Middle
  East, including those who are U.S. citizens, to undergo special, more
  intensive security checks before boarding airplanes in the United States?"
  Experimental condition 1: Control group item prefaced by, "As you may
  know, in 2009, government authorities arrested a terrorism suspect after he
  tried to set off a bomb on a plane bound for Detroit."
  Experimental condition 2: Control group item prefaced by, "What if the
  government was responding to a terrorist act that had just taken place?"

Rights violation [+ experiments]
  "[The government should take all steps necessary to prevent additional acts
  of terrorism in the United States even if it means foreign nationals' individu-
  al rights and liberties might be violated/Even if it means foreign nationals'
  individual rights and liberties might be violated, the government should
  take all steps necessary to prevent additional acts of terrorism in the United
  States.]"[a]
  Experimental condition 1: *foreign nationals'* changed to *Americans'*
  Experimental condition 2: Control group item prefaced by, "As you may
  know, in 2009, the FBI arrested a number of terrorism suspects, including
  several American citizens, who were plotting attacks in Illinois, New York,
  and North Carolina."
  Experimental condition 3: Control group item prefaced by, "As you may
  know, in 2009, the FBI arrested a number of terrorism suspects, including
  several American citizens, who were plotting attacks in Illinois, New York,
  and North Carolina." And *foreign nationals'* changed to *Americans'*

Torture 2009 [+ experiment]
  "Do you agree or disagree that government authorities should have the right
  to torture a suspect if they think it will help prevent a terrorist attack from
  taking place in the United States?"
  Experimental condition 1: *suspect* changed to *suspect who is American*

Torture 2010 [+ experiments]
  "Do you agree or disagree that government authorities should have the right
  to torture a suspect who is an American citizen if they think it will help
  prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in the United States?"
  Experimental condition 1: *American citizen* changed to *American citizen of
  Middle Eastern background*
  Experimental condition 2: Control group item prefaced by, "As you may
  know, in 2009, the FBI arrested a number of terrorism suspects, including
  several American citizens, who were plotting attacks in Illinois, New York,
  and North Carolina."

Source: Authors' compilation.
Note: SAPA = Surveys of American Policy Attitudes; FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation.
[a]Order of presentation of phrases in brackets is randomized.

Table 4.2 Do Experimental Treatments Have the Same Effects?[a]

	× Threat Perception	× Authoritarianism	× Partisanship	× Education	× Religion	× Race
Airport security	F(2) = .65	F(2) = .49	F(2) =1.47	F(1) = 6.86	F(2) = .16	F(2) = 1.10
	p = .52	p = .61	p = .23	p = .01	p = .86	p = .33
$\beta_{\text{2009 threats}}$ (SE)	.01 (.04)	<.01 (.01)	−.02 (.01)	<.02 (.01)	−.03 (.06)	.02 (.07)
$\beta_{\text{hypothetical}}$ (SE)	−.03 (.03)	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	**.03 (.01)**	−.03 (.06)	−.08 (.07)
Rights violation	F(3) = .32	F(3) = .45	F(3) = .81	F(1) = 5.66	F(3) = .45	F(3) = 1.65
	p = .82	p = .72	p = .49	p = .00	p = .72	p = .18
$\beta_{\text{Amer.+threat}}$ (SE)	−.03 (.04)	.01 (.01)	−.02 (.02)	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.07)	−.13 (.09)
$\beta_{\text{for.+~threat}}$ (SE)	<.03 (.04)	−.01 (.01)	−.02 (.02)	**.03 (.01)**	.04 (.07)	.05 (.09)
$\beta_{\text{Amer.+~threat}}$ (SE)	−.01 (.04)	<.01 (.01)	−.02 (.02)	**.02 (.01)**	−.07 (.07)	−.07 (.08)
Torture, 2009	F(1) = .21	—	F(1) = .24	F(1) = .12	F(1) = .14	F(1) = .40
	p = .65	—	p = .62	p = .73	p = .71	p = .53
β_{American} (SE)	.02 (.04)	—	−.01 (.01)	<−.01 (.01)	.03 (.07)	−.08 (.12)
Torture, 2010	F(2) = .53	F(2) = 1.53	F(2) = .21	F(2) = 2.49	F(2) = .10	F(2) = .65
	p = .59	p = .22	p = .81	p = .08	p = .90	p = .52
$\beta_{\text{ME back.}}$ (SE)	.03 (.04)	<.02 (.01)	.01 (.01)	<−.02 (.01)	.03 (.07)	.09 (.08)
$\beta_{\text{2009 threats}}$ (SE)	−.01 (.04)	<.02 (.01)	<.01 (.01)	<−.02 (.01)	<−.01 (.07)	.05 (.08)

Source: Authors' estimates based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: Amer. = American; for. = foreign national; ME back. = Middle Eastern background.
[a]Bold coefficient indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 4.3   Comparative Magnitude of Factors Behind Airport Security

|	Effect	|Effect|
Education, control/threat-priming conditions	−.30	.30
Hypothetical threat priming (education = 20)	.28	.28
Threat perceptions	.18	.18
Hypothetical threat priming (education = 14.52)	.14	.14
Authoritarianism	.13	.13
Threat priming	.11	.11
Hypothetical threat priming (education = 5)	−.10	.10
Partisanship	.06	.06
Education, hypothetical threat-priming condition	.00	.00

Source: Authors' estimates based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

Table 4.4 Comparative Magnitude of Factors Behind Rights Violation

|	Effect	|Effect|
Threat priming (foreign condition)	.56	.56
Threat priming (American condition)	.48	.48
Education, threat conditions	−.45	.45
Partisanship	.24	.24
Threat perception	.24	.24
Authoritarianism	.13	.13
American versus foreign (threat-priming condition)	−.08	.08
Education, foreign/~threat condition	.00	.00
Education, American/~threat condition	.00	.00
American versus foreign (~threat-priming condition)	.00	.00

Source: Authors' estimates based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

Figure 5.1   Affect Toward Insider and Outsider Groups

Source: Authors' calculations based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

Figure 5.2   Does National Identity Matter for Outsider Groups?

Middle Eastern group affect experiment [$t = -4.87$]*

Feeling Thermometer Score

80

70

60

50

55
Control group: people from the Middle East

61
Plus who are U.S. citizens

*Indicates significance at $p < .05$

Figure 5.3 Does National Identity Matter for Insider Groups?

Christian affect experiment, initial estimates [*t* = 5.99]*

Feeling Thermometer Score

Control group:
Christians — 72

Plus who are not
U.S. citizens — 63

Figure 5.4   Magnitude of National Identity Effects: Affect Toward Christians

----- across range of religion covariate,
    [authoritarianism = low]
——— across range of religion covariate,
    [authoritarianism = high]

----- across range of authoritarianism
    covariate, [respondent ~ Christian]
——— across range of authoritarianism
    covariate, [respondent = Christian]

Figure 5.5   Does Transnational Ethnicity Matter?

Military commissions experiment, initial estimates
[$F_{nat.\ id} = 29.56,$* $df = 1$; $F_{ME} = .80$, $df = 1$]

Criminal vs. Military Courts

.79 — Foreign nationals

.60 — American citizens

.64 — Plus of Middle Eastern background

Source: Authors' calculations based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
*Note:* nat. id = national identity; ME = Middle Eastern.
*Indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 5.1 SAPA Item Wordings and Experiments[a]

Domestic group affect

"I'd like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of a group and I'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward that group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward that group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold for the group. How about blacks . . . whites?"

Transnational group affect

"How about Muslims . . . foreign nationals . . . U.S. citizens?"

Middle East group affect [+ experiment]

"How about people from the Middle East?"

Experimental condition: "people from the Middle East" changed to "people from the Middle East who are U.S. citizens"

Christian group affect [+ experiment]

"How about Christians?"

Experimental condition: "Christians" changed to "Christians who are not U.S. citizens"

Military commissions [+ experiments]

"As you may know, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act in 2006, creating a separate set of courts and prisons in which individuals classified by the government as 'enemy combatants' can be held indefinitely. What do you think – [should the government move American citizens who are terrorism suspects to special military prisons and rely on military courts?/ Or should the government move American citizens who are terrorism suspects to regular prisons and rely on regular criminal courts?]"

Experimental condition 1: "American citizens" changed to "foreign nationals"

Experimental condition 2: "American citizens" changed to "American citizens of Middle Eastern background"

Source: Authors' compliation based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

[a]Order of presentation of "people from the Middle East" and "Christians" is randomized on the feeling thermometer; for "Military commissions," order of presentation of the response options in brackets is randomized.

Table 5.2 Experimental Treatments and Interactions[a]

	x Threat Perception	x Authoritarianism	x Partisanship	x Education	x Religion	x Race
Middle East affect	$F(1) = 2.10$	$F(1) = 2.06$	$F(1) = .23$	$F(1) = .24$	$F(1) = .41$	$F(1) = .56$
	$p = .15$	$p = .15$	$p = .63$	$p = .62$	$p = .52$	$p = .46$
$\beta_{\text{U.S. citizens}}$ (SE)	2.28 (1.58)	.78 (.55)	.28 (.59)	.24 (.49)	1.76 (2.76)	−2.49 (3.34)
Christian affect	$F(1) = 7.67^b$	$F(1) = 26.47$	$F(1) = 1.92$	$F(1) = 9.93^b$	$F(1) = 11.65$	$F(1) = .17$
	$p = .01$	$p = .00$	$p = .17$	$p = .00$	$p = .00$	$p = .68$
$\beta_{\sim\text{U.S. citizens}}$ (SE)	−5.17 (1.87)	**−3.22** (.63)	−.97 (.70)	−10.97 (3.21)	**−.03** (.06)	−1.68 (4.07)
Military commissions	$F(2) = .22$	$F(2) = 4.75^c$	$F(2) = 1.88$	$F(1) = 5.09$	$F(2) = .69$	$F(2) = .25$
	$p = .80$	$p = .01$	$p = .15$	$p = .01$	$p = .50$	$p = .78$
β_{foreign} (SE)	<−.01 (.04)	<−.02 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	−.01 (.07)	.04 (.09)
$\beta_{\text{M.E. backgr.}}$ (SE)	−.06 (.04)	<.03 (.01)	<−.01 (.02)	**−.03** (.01)	.07 (.08)	−.02 (.09)

Source: Authors' estimates based on analysis of Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: ME backgr. = Middle Eastern background.
[a]Bolded entry indicates significance at $p < .05$.
[b]When threat and education interactions are estimated in a model with the authoritarianism and religion interactions, the threat and education interactions are not significant ($\beta_{\sim\text{U.S. citizens} \times \text{threat}} = -2.71$, SE = 1.90, $p = .15$; $\beta_{\sim\text{U.S. citizens} \times \text{education}} = 1.03$, SE = .62, $p = .10$).
[c]When the authoritarianism interactions are estimated in a model with the education interaction, the coefficient is not significant ($\beta_{\text{foreign} \times \text{authoritarianism}} = -.02$, SE >.01, $p = .16$; $\beta_{\text{ME backgr.} \times \text{authoritarianism}} = .01$, SE = .02, $p = .34$).

Table 5.3   Comparative Magnitude of Factors Behind Middle East Group Affect

|	Effect	|Effect|
Education	15.30	15.30
Authoritarianism	–7.27	7.27
"U.S. citizen" condition	6.25	6.25
Partisanship	–4.56	4.56

Source: Authors' estimates based on analysis of Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

Table 5.4 Comparative Magnitude of Factors Behind Military Commissions Support

	Effect	| Effect |
"Middle Eastern" condition, education = 5	.36	.36
Education, "Middle Eastern" condition	−.30	.30
Threat perception	.30	.30
Partisanship	.18	.18
"Foreign" condition	.16	.16
Education, "American/foreign" condition	.15	.15
"Middle Eastern" condition, education = 20	−.09	.09

Source: Authors' estimates based on analysis of Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

**Figure 6.1 Policy Feedback and the NSA Surveillance Experiment**

Initial estimates [F = 22.86, $df = 2$]*

.16 — Control group: Americans
.38 — 2008 FISA Act
.32 — Middle Eastern

(y-axis: Monitor phone, banking, email — 0.00 to 1.00)

Source: Authors' calculations based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: NSA = National Security Agency; FISA Act = Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act.
*Indicates significance at $p < .05$

**Figure 6.2 Policy Feedback in Greater Detail[a]**

NSA Surveillance experiment [frame × perception]

· · · · · 2008 FISA Act
-------- Middle Eastern
——— American citizens

(y-axis: Monitor phone, banking, email — 0.00 to 0.75; x-axis: Threat perception — Low to High)

Source: Authors' estimates based on analysis of Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: NSA = National Security Agency; FISA Act = Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act.
[a] Effect of threat perception in the "American citizens" condition is not significant ($\beta = .02$, SE = .03).

Figure 6.3 The Waterboarding Experiment

Source: Authors' estimates based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

Figure 6.4   The Health Spending Experiment

Source: Authors' estimates based on wSurveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).

*Spending preferences differ across control and feedback conditions: $\chi^2(2) = 23.49$, $p = .00$.

Table 6.1 Feedback and Interaction Effects[a]

	× Threat Perception	× Authoritarianism	× Partisanship	× Education	× Religion	× Race
NSA surveillance	F(2) = 3.84	F(2) = 2.62	F(2) = .42	F(2) = 2.47	F(2) = .81	F(2) = .01
	p = .02	p = .07	p = .66	p = .09	p = .45	p = .99
$\beta_{\text{FISA Act}}$ (SE)	**.09** (.04)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.01)	.04 (.07)	<.01 (.09)
$\beta_{\text{ME backgr.}}$ (SE)	**.11** (.04)	.03 (.01)[b]	.01 (.02)	<−.02 (.01)	.09 (.07)	<.02 (.07)
Waterboarding	F(1) = 1.51	F(1) = 1.57	F(1) = .29	F(1) = .46	F(1) = 1.97	F(1) = .11
	p = .22	p = .21	p = .59	p = .50	p = .16	p = .74
$\beta_{\text{Pres. Obama}}$ (SE)	.05 (.04)	<−.02 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	<.02 (.01)	−.10 (.07)	.03 (.09)

Source: Authors' estimates based on analysis of Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
Note: NSA = National Security Agency; FISA Act = Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act; ME backgr. = Middle Eastern background.
[a]Bolded entry indicates significance at $p < .05$.
[b]Interaction not significant ($\beta_{\text{ME backgr.}} < .03$, SE = .01, $p = .05$) when estimated in model with interactions involving threat perceptions.

Table 6.2 Feedback and Interaction Effects[a]

	× Economic Evaluations	× Partisanship	× Education	× Religion	× Race
Health spending	$\chi^2(2) = 1.72$ $p = .42$	$\chi^2(2) = 3.27$ $p = .19$	$\chi^2(2) = 1.93$ $p = .38$	$\chi^2(2) = 1.52$ $p = .47$	$\chi^2(2) = 1.96$ $p = .38$

Source: Authors' estimates based on Surveys of American Policy Attitudes (Brooks and Manza, various years).
[a]Bolded entry indicates significance at $p < .05$.