Figure 2.1 Mexico: Level of Democracy and the Size of Legislative Budgets, 1989 to 1999



Sources: Hernández Valdez (2000); Beer (2003).
Notes: N = 20, correlation coefficient rho = .45.

Figure 2.2 Mexico: Level of Democracy and Legislative Bill Generation



Sources: Hernández Valdez (2000); Beer (2003).
Notes: N = 17, correlation coefficient rho = .42.

Figure 2.3 Map of Mexico

Source: Generated by the authors using ArcGIS 8.0.

Table 2.1 Party Alternation in the Mexican States, 1989 to 2003

State	Year of First Gubernatorial Alternation	Number of Gubernatorial Alternations	Year PRI First Lost Majority in State Legislature
Baja California	1989	1	1989
Guanajuato	1991	1	1997
Chihuahua	1992	2	1992
Jalisco	1995	1	1995
Nuevo León	1997	2	1997
Querétaro	1997	1	1997
Aguascalientes	1998	1	1995
Zacatecas	1998	1	1998
Baja California Sur	1999	1	1999
Tlaxcala	1999	1	2001
Nayarit	1999	1	1999
Chiapas	2000	1	never
Morelos	2000	1	1997
Michoacán	2001	1	2001[a]
Yucatán	2001	1	2001
San Luis Potosí	2003	1	2003[b]
México	none	0	1996
Sonora	none	0	1997
Guerrero	none	0	2002[c]
Tabasco	none	0	2003
Coahuila	none	0	never[d]
Colima	none	0	never[e]
Campeche	none	0	never
Durango	none	0	never
Hidalgo	none	0	never
Oaxaca	none	0	never
Puebla	none	0	never
Quintana Roo	none	0	never
Sinaloa	none	0	never
Tamaulipas	none	0	never
Veracruz	none	0	never

Sources: Banamex (2001); Lujambio (2000); Keesing's Record of World Events (various).
[a]The PRI held 50 percent of the seats in the 1989 to 1992 legislature, then regained a clear majority until 2001.
[b]The PRI lost a majority in 2003 but retains a plurality.
[c]The PRI lost a majority in 2002 but retains a plurality.
[d]The PRI held 50 percent of the seats in the 1997 to 1999 legislature, then regained a clear majority until 2002.
[e]The PRI held 50 percent of the seats in the 1997 to 2000 legislature, but maintained a clear majority after that.

Table 2.2 Mexico: Indicators of State-Level Democracy and Legislative Independence

State	Comparative Index of Local Democracy (CILD)	Legislative Budget (Pesos per Capita)	Percent of Bills Proposed by State Legislators
Baja California Sur	1.33	10.77	13
Nuevo León	1.21		55
Querétaro	1.20		
Baja California	1.15	5.26	
Aguascalientes	1.01	5.85	
Zacatecas	0.89		
Guanajuato	0.81		38
Chihuahua	0.73	3.54	
Jalisco	0.59	1.62	47
Tlaxcala	0.58	6.30	12
Durango	0.48	6.33	
Colima	0.44	5.93	39
Yucatán	0.29	2.88	
Coahuila	0.24		
Sonora	0.19	4.47	50
Sinaloa	0.09	2.74	45
Nayarit	–0.04	5.10	13
Morelos	–0.09	6.09	55
Campeche	–0.10	10.07	
San Luis Potosí	–0.10	3.30	25
Quintana Roo	–0.10		5
Tamaulipas	–0.10		49
Hidalgo	–0.29	1.99	15
Michoacán	–0.40		15
Mexico	–0.41	3.08	
Tabasco	–0.69		
Veracruz	–0.99		
Puebla	–1.14		11
Guerrero	–1.51	0.71	6
Oaxaca	–1.87	2.85	
Chiapas	–3.27	3.18	

Sources: CILD indicator from Hernández Valdez (2000, 120, table 3); legislative data from Beer (2003); population data from INEGI (2000).
Notes: CILD: Comparative Index of Local Democracy (principal components index), 1989–1999.
Budget: 1996 legislative budget divided by 2000 population, except Jalisco and Chiapas use 1995 budget data.
Empty cells are missing data.

Table 2.3 Mexico: Winning Party in Municipal Elections in Baja California, 1986 to 2004

	Ensenada	Mexicali	Tecate	Tijuana	Playas de Rosarito[a]
1986	PAN	PRI	PRI	PRI	—
1989	PAN	PRI	PRI	PAN	—
1992	PAN	PRI	PAN	PAN	—
1995	PRI	PAN	PRI	PAN	—
1998	PRI	PAN	PRI	PAN	PAN
2001	PAN	PAN	PRI	PAN	PAN
2004	PAN	PAN	PRI[b]	PRI	PAN

Sources: Banamex (2001); Keesing's Record of World Events (various).
[a]Playas de Rosarito was created in 1995 and held its first elections in 1998.
[b]In a coalition (PRI-PEBC-PT-PVEM).

Table 2.4 Mexico: Elections in Chihuahua, 1992 to 2004

Year	Type of Election	Party				Total
		PAN	PRI	PRD	Others	
1992	Governor	**51.2%**	44.3%	1.4%	3.1%	100.0% (756,292)
1994	President	28.3	**60.4**	6.2	5.1	100.0 (1,089,006)
1994	Federal deputies	27.5	**58.0**	5.7	8.8	100.0 (1,114,877)
1995	State deputies	40.1	**47.5**	6.2	6.2	100.0 (822,919)
1997	Federal deputies	41.2	**42.1**	10.3	6.3	100.0 (889,826)
1998	State deputies	41.9	**47.4**	7.3	3.5	100.0 (979,954)
1998	Governor	42.2	**50.3**	5.5	2.0	100.0 (988,199)
2000	Federal deputies	**47.1**	41.2	7.4	4.3	100.0 (1,119,844)
2000	President	**48.7**	40.9	6.8	3.6	100.0 (1,128,099)
2001	State deputies	41.4	**46.0**	5.1	7.5	100.0 (867,647)
2003	Federal deputies	37.5	**47.4**	6.2	8.9	100.0 (757,095)
2004[a]	State deputies	44.0	**53.2**	—	2.8	100.0 (988,674)
2004[a]	Governor	41.4	**56.5**	—	2.1	100.0 (993,511)

Sources: Banamex (2001); *Instituto Estatal Electoral de Chihuahua*, data accessed at http://www.ieechihuahua.org.mx on April 1, 2005.
Notes: Winning party's vote proportion noted in boldface; total votes cast in parentheses.
[a]In 2004 state elections the six registered parties formed two coalitions, PAN-PRD-PC and PRI-PT-PVEM.

Figure 3.1 Argentina: Provinces by Gross Provincial Product and Population



Source: INDEC (2001).
Note: GPP measured in thousands of Argentine pesos per capita; population is from the 2001 census.

Figure 3.2 Argentina: Political Behaviors by Region



Source: Authors' compilations.

Figure 3.3 Map of Argentina

Source: Generated by the authors using ArcGIS 8.0.

Table 3.1 Argentina: Provinces by Economic Competitiveness and Human Development

Provinces	Economic Competitiveness	Human Development
City of Buenos Aires	Urban service economy	High
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Santa Fe	Large diversified economic structure	Intermediate
Chubut, Neuquén, Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego	Productive structure based on intensive use of nonrenewable resources	Intermediate
Entre Ríos, La Pampa, Río Negro, Salta, Tucumán	Intermediate development based on agriculture	Low and intermediate
Jujuy, Misiones, San Juan	Intermediate development with severe rigidities	Low
Corrientes, Chaco, Formosa, La Rioja, Santiago del Estero	Backward productive and business environment	Low

Source: UNDP (2002).
Note: The provinces of San Luis and Catamarca were not classified by UNDP.

Table 3.2 Argentina: Provincial Public Employees per Thousand Residents, 1987 to 2000

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	t-statistic	p-value
GPP per cap, 000s	0.003	0.007	0.49	0.623
Population (log)	–31.79	5.23	–6.08	0.000
Malapportionment index	2.408	3.953	0.61	0.543
Constant	477.428	67.442	7.08	0.000

Sources: INDEC (2001); authors' compilations.
Notes:
Pooled Time-Series, Fixed-Effects Model, 23 Provinces, 227 Annual Observations
GPP per cap is gross provincial product per capita, in thousands of 1993 pesos.
Population (log) is the natural log of each province's population, interpolated from 1991 and 2001 censuses.
Malapportionment index scores higher the greater the province's overrepresentation in parliament. We are grateful to David Samuels for providing this information.
F(3,201) = 23.19
Prob > F = 0.0000

Table 3.3 Argentina: Spending on Personnel as Proportion of Municipal Budgets, 1995 and 1999

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	t-statistic	p-value
Buenos Aires	–11.095	1.705	–6.51	0.000
Córdoba	–13.606	1.650	–8.25	0.000
Chubut	–17.208	2.387	–7.21	0.000
La Pampa	–12.071	2.124	–5.68	0.000
Santa Fe	–13.949	1.485	–9.39	0.000
1995	1.555	0.652	2.39	0.017
Peronist	–0.235	1.141	–0.21	0.837
Radical	–0.420	1.149	–0.37	0.715
Margin of victory (lag)	–0.021	0.017	–1.22	0.221
Casa B	–0.057	0.034	–1.70	0.089
Poverty NBI	–0.421	1.149	–0.37	0.715
Total expenditures	–0.0003	0.0004	–0.71	0.477
Population (log)	1.531	0.266	5.769	0.000
Constant	45.081	3.558	12.67	0.000

Sources: INDEC (2001); authors' compilations.
Notes:
1,414 observations.
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Chubut, La Pampa, and Santa Fe are dummy variables indicating the location of each municipality (data were taken from Misiones as well; this is the base category).
1995 is a dummy for observations for that year (as opposed to 1999).
Peronist is a dummy for municipalities in which the incumbent mayor was a Peronist, Radical for ones in which the incumbent was a Radical.
Margin of victory is the difference in the vote share between the winner and second-place challenger in the previous municipal elections.
Casa B is the proportion of the city or town's population that lived in substandard housing, from the 1991 census.
NBI is the proportion of the population with "unsatisfied basic needs," a measure of poverty.
Total expenditures were expenditures per capita by the municipality.
Population is the natural log of the population of the municipality, according to the 2001 census.

Table 3.4 Argentina: Peronist and Radical Mayors, 1991 and 1995, by Region

	Peronist Mayors		Radical Mayors	
	1991	1995	1991	1995
Buenos Aires	62% (78)	67% (91)	33% (41)	27% (37)
Córdoba	27% (65)	43% (139)	67% (161)	50% (162)
Santa Fe	60% (180)	53% (173)	40% (119)	47% (156)
Average metropolitan	48% (323)	51% (403)	48% (321)	45% (355)
La Pampa	62% (49)	56% (44)	29% (23)	28% (22)
Misiones	55% (41)	62% (37)	45% (34)	38% (23)
Chubut	38% (10)	38% (10)	38% (10)	38% (10)
Catamarca		50% (17)		50% (17)
Average peripheral	56% (100)	54% (108)	37% (67)	36% (72)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are absolute numbers of mayors from given party in given province.

Table 3.5 Absolute Change in Peronist Vote Share, in 1995 to 1991 Elections

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	t-statistic	p-value
Buenos Aires	5.980	1.800	3.321	0.001
Córdoba	5.301	1.619	3.274	0.001
La Pampa	3.753	1.804	2.080	0.038
PJ	1.990	0.946	2.103	0.036
Lagged PJ vote	–0.147	0.035	–4.219	0.000
Casa B	0.092	0.028	3.254	0.001
NBI	0.051	0.011	4.696	0.000
Constant	5.979	2.446	2.445	0.015

Sources: INDEC (2001); authors' compilations.
Notes:
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and La Pampa are province dummies indicating municipalities located in the corresponding province.
PJ is a dummy for municipalities in which the incumbent mayor at the time of the 1995 election was a Peronist.
Lagged PJ vote is the Peronist vote share in the 1991 election.
Casa B is the percentage of low-quality dwellings in the municipality, as measured in the 1991 census.
NBI is the percentage of residents living under the poverty line.
F(7, 455) = 9.21
Probability > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1241

Figure 4.1 Argentina: Simulated Expected Probabilities of Answer, Governments Provide Good Services When They Are Monitored, by Region



Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Clarify simulations, see note 6. Figure reports 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 4.2 Mexico: Personal Trust in Politicians, by State



Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Clarify simulations. All other independent variables are held at their sample medians.

Figure 4.3 Mexico: State-Level Democracy and Clean Elections



Sources: Hernández Valdez (2000); Lawson and colleagues (2002).
Notes: N = 31, correlation coefficient rho = .40.

Figure 4.4 Argentina: Probability of Response, "No Officeholders Are Trustworthy," by Region



Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Clarify simulations. All other independent variables are held at their sample medians.

Figure 4.5 Mexico: Proceduralist Responses, by State



Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Clarify simulations, holding other independent variables at their sample median values.

Figure 4.6 Argentina: Simulated Expected Probabilities of Responses on Justifiability of Evading Taxes, by Region



Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Clarify simulations. All other independent variables are held at their sample means.

Figure 4.7 Argentina: Simulated Expected Probabilities of Responses on Justifiability of Avoiding Military Service, by Region



Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Clarify simulations, holding other explanatory variables at their sample means.

Table 4.1 Argentina: Responses to Questions About Political Trust by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Services					
When governments provide good services to the people, is this because					
They are under the watch of the courts, congress, or the press	65%	56%	48%	40%	52%
	(311)	(268)	(232)	(192)	(1003)
They are good, committed people	30%	40%	40%	53%	41%
	(142)	(192)	(194)	(256)	(784)
No answer	6%	4%	11%	7%	7%
	(27)	(20)	(54)	(32)	(133)
Efficient					
When governments function efficiently, is this because					
They know if they don't, people won't vote for them in the next election	71%	75%	68%	67%	70%
	(340)	(362)	(326)	(321)	(1349)
The people governing are good, committed people	24%	22%	26%	29%	25%
	(116)	(106)	(125)	(140)	(487)
No answer	5%	3%	6%	4%	4%
	(24)	(12)	(29)	(19)	(84)
Attention					
When politicians really pay attention to people like you, is this because					
They want to be reelected	85%	80%	78%	78%	81%
	(410)	(386)	(375)	(375)	(1546)
They really care	11%	17%	16%	18%	16%
	(55)	(83)	(76)	(87)	(301)
No answer	3%	2%	6%	4%	4%
	(15)	(11)	(29)	(18)	(73)

Trustpol					
Of the people who hold public office, how many are trustworthy without being watched?					
All or a majority	2%	6%	10%	9%	7%
	(11)	(29)	(50)	(45)	(135)
A minority	59%	59%	47%	68%	58%
	(284)	(281)	(224)	(325)	(1114)
None	38%	35%	37%	20%	32%
	(183)	(166)	(177)	(96)	(622)
No answer	0.4%	1%	6%	3%	3%
	(2)	(4)	(29)	(14)	(49)
Bribe					
When a politician takes a bribe, how likely is it that he'll get caught?					
Very likely	24%	33%	22%	30%	27%
	(115)	(156)	(107)	(142)	(520)
Not likely	55%	47%	43%	41%	46%
	(262)	(227)	(205)	(195)	(889)
Impossible (nada probable)	20%	19%	33%	24%	24%
	(97)	(93)	(160)	(115)	(465)
No answer	1%	1%	2%	6%	2%
	(6)	(4)	(8)	(28)	(46)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.2 Mexico: Responses to Questions About Political Trust, by State

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Services					
Some governments provide good services to the people, others do not. In your opinion, for those that provide good services, why do they do it?					
Because they are under the watch of the courts, congress, or the press	57% (227)	47% (189)	44% (174)	40% (158)	47% (748)
Because they are honorable people	30% (121)	40% (158)	30% (120)	40% (157)	35% (556)
No answer	13% (52)	13% (51)	27% (106)	21% (85)	18% (294)
Efficient					
When municipal governments function efficiently, is this because					
They know if they don't work hard the people won't vote for them	63% (253)	50% (200)	45% (180)	49% (197)	52% (830)
The people governing are committed people	28% (113)	39% (155)	30% (118)	28% (112)	31% (498)
No answer	9% (34)	11% (43)	26% (102)	23% (91)	17% (270)
Attention					
When politicians really pay attention to people like you, is this because					
They want to be reelected	73% (290)	71% (282)	49% (195)	62% (247)	63% (1014)

They really care	19%	23%	36%	19%	24%
	(76)	(92)	(144)	(76)	(388)
No answer	9%	6%	15%	19%	12%
	(34)	(24)	(61)	(77)	(196)
Trustpol					
Of the people who hold public office, how many are trustworthy without being watched?					
All or the majority	20%	29%	37%	36%	31%
	(80)	(116)	(149)	(143)	(488)
A minority	60%	47%	27%	37%	43%
	(238)	(189)	(108)	(148)	(683)
None	17%	17%	20%	15%	17%
	(68)	(66)	(81)	(60)	(275)
No answer	4%	7%	16%	12%	10%
	(14)	(27)	(62)	(49)	(152)
Bribe					
When a politician takes a bribe, how likely is it that he'll get caught?					
Very likely	20%	19%	26%	25%	23%
	(79)	(77)	(105)	(100)	(361)
Not likely	52%	37%	43%	47%	45%
	(206)	(149)	(171)	(189)	(715)
Impossible (nada probable)	23%	38%	18%	22%	25%
	(91)	(152)	(71)	(86)	(400)
No answer	6%	5%	13%	6%	8%
	(24)	(20)	(53)	(25)	(122)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.3 Argentina: Responses to Questions About Voting, by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Handout					
Do people in your neighborhood support the [locally most important party] because					
It gave out favors during the campaign	10% (46)	36% (171)	28% (136)	40% (191)	28% (544)
It has the best program	67% (323)	49% (234)	52% (248)	43% (205)	53% (1010)
No answer	23% (111)	16% (75)	20% (96)	18% (84)	19% (366)
Favor					
Do people support this party because					
It has done them some favor	16% (77)	45% (215)	36% (175)	35% (166)	33% (663)
It is concerned for everyone	52% (250)	42% (200)	43% (204)	45% (217)	45% (871)
No answer	32% (153)	14% (65)	21% (101)	20% (97)	22% (416)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.4 Mexico: Responses to Questions About Voting, by State

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Handout					
Thinking about the most important political party in this area, would you say that people support it because					
It gave out things during the campaign	17% (66)	34% (134)	36% (144)	21% (85)	27% (429)
It has a better program	53% (211)	50% (200)	39% (157)	45% (181)	47% (749)
No answer	31% (123)	16% (64)	25% (99)	34% (134)	26% (420)
Favor					
Do people support the party because					
It has done them a favor	20% (78)	33% (130)	29% (114)	36% (143)	29% (465)
It is concerned for people	47% (188)	56% (222)	51% (203)	36% (145)	47% (758)
No answer	34% (134)	12% (46)	21% (83)	28% (112)	23% (375)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.5 Argentina: Responses to Questions About Clientelism, by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Patron					
In recent years, have you turned to [most important local political person] to resolve some problem?					
Yes	5%	9%	13%	20%	12%
	(23)	(44)	(64)	(95)	(226)
No	94%	90%	86%	80%	88%
	(352)	(280)	(150)	(222)	(1004)
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
	(4)	(4)	(2)	(3)	(13)
Know party					
Do you know a representative of a political party in your neighborhood?					
Yes	14%	36%	30%	37%	29%
	(66)	(175)	(144)	(179)	(564)
No	86%	63%	68%	61%	69%
	(412)	(301)	(325)	(292)	(1330)
No answer	0.5%	1%	2%	2%	1%
	(2)	(4)	(11)	(9)	(26)
Party help					
In recent years, have you turned to the representative of a political party for help with a problem?					
Yes	5%	10%	8%	13%	9%
	(23)	(46)	(38)	(62)	(169)

(*Table continues on p. 102.*)

Table 4.5 *Continued*

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
No	94% (453)	90% (430)	90% (430)	85% (408)	90% (1721)
No answer	1% (4)	1% (4)	3% (12)	2% (10)	2% (30)
Job					
If the head of your family lost his/her job and the family needed help, would you turn to the representative of a political party?					
Yes	24% (117)	37% (177)	40% (191)	41% (198)	36% (683)
No	74% (354)	62% (297)	55% (262)	54% (260)	61% (1173)
No answer	2% (9)	1% (6)	6% (27)	5% (22)	3% (64)
Party give					
During the campaign, did a candidate or party distribute things to people?					
Yes	40% (194)	36% (173)	47% (224)	52% (248)	44% (839)
No	52% (250)	60% (288)	48% (230)	39% (189)	50% (957)
No answer	8% (36)	4% (19)	5% (26)	9% (43)	6% (124)

Gift					
Did you receive something from a party or candidate?					
Yes	4%	5%	10%	9%	7%
	(20)	(26)	(50)	(45)	(141)
No	94%	94%	88%	90%	92%
	(453)	(450)	(423)	(432)	(1758)
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
	(7)	(4)	(7)	(3)	(21)
Influence					
Did receiving this good influence your vote?					
Yes	0.2%	1%	3%	2%	2%
	(1)	(3)	(14)	(10)	(28)
No	3%	7%	11%	10%	7%
	(12)	(33)	(51)	(47)	(143)
Didn't receive anything or no answer	97%	92%	86%	88%	91%
	(467)	(444)	(415)	(423)	(1749)

Source: Authors' compilations.

Notes: Patron and Party Help were follow-up questions; respondents were first asked whether they knew the most important local politician and a party representative (respectively), and those who answered "yes" were then asked if they had gone to this person for help. Here we include those who reported no knowledge of the politician or party representative as having said "no" to the follow-up questions. Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.6 Mexico: Responses to Questions About Clientelism, by State

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Patron					
In recent years, have you turned to [most important local political person] to resolve some problem?					
Yes	7%	11%	9%	8%	8%
	(26)	(44)	(34)	(30)	(134)
No	93%	89%	90%	91%	90%
	(181)	(214)	(129)	(119)	(643)
No answer	1%	0%	2%	2%	12%
	(4)	(1)	(7)	(6)	(18)
Know party					
Do you know a representative of a political party in your neighborhood?					
Yes	17%	26%	23%	27%	23%
	(69)	(102)	(93)	(107)	(371)
No	81%	72%	70%	67%	73%
	(322)	(287)	(281)	(269)	(1159)
No answer	2%	2%	7%	6%	4%
	(9)	(9)	(26)	(24)	(68)
Party help					
In recent years, have you turned to the representative of a political party for help with a problem?					
Yes	5%	8%	9%	8%	8%
	(20)	(31)	(37)	(32)	(120)
No	92%	89%	83%	84%	87%
	(368)	(356)	(332)	(335)	(1391)
No answer	3%	3%	8%	8%	5%
	(12)	(11)	(31)	(33)	(87)
Job					
If the head of your family lost his/her job and the family needed help, would you turn to the representative of a political party?					
Yes	17%	45%	28%	21%	28%
	(68)	(180)	(113)	(82)	(443)
No	73%	49%	56%	67%	61%
	(292)	(196)	(223)	(267)	(978)
No answer	10%	6%	16%	13%	11%
	(40)	(22)	(64)	(51)	(177)

Party give					
During the campaign, did a candidate or party distribute things to people?					
Yes	22%	25%	30%	26%	26%
	(87)	(101)	(120)	(102)	(410)
No	65%	62%	47%	52%	56%
	(260)	(245)	(188)	(207)	(900)
No answer	13%	13%	23%	23%	18%
	(53)	(52)	(92)	(91)	(288)
Gift					
Did you receive something from a party or candidate?					
Yes	9%	14%	15%	19%	14%
	(37)	(56)	(60)	(75)	(228)
No	85%	83%	72%	69%	77%
	(338)	(329)	(288)	(274)	(1229)
No answer	6%	3%	13%	13%	9%
	(25)	(13)	(52)	(51)	(141)
Does obligate					
Do families that receive help from the representative of a political party feel obligated to vote for that party?					
Yes	33%	38%	38%	39%	37%
	(133)	(153)	(150)	(154)	(590)
No	63%	60%	52%	50%	56%
	(252)	(239)	(207)	(198)	(896)
No answer	4%	2%	11%	12%	7%
	(15)	(6)	(43)	(48)	(112)
Should obligate					
Should families that receive help from the representative of a political party feel obligated to vote for that party?					
Yes	11%	22%	19%	21%	18%
	(44)	(88)	(77)	(84)	(293)
No	86%	74%	67%	60%	72%
	(342)	(294)	(269)	(239)	(1144)
No answer	4%	4%	14%	19%	10%
	(14)	(16)	(54)	(77)	(161)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.7 Mexico: Responses to Questions About Proceduralism, by State

	Percentage Saying "Never Justified"				
	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Question: Is it always, sometimes, or never justified . . .					
To avoid paying taxes that one owes (Taxes)	65%	52%	33%	33%	45%
	(258)	(206)	(131)	(130)	(725)
If many people didn't pay taxes, is it justified? Percentage answering "no" (Taxes Many)	88%	68%	56%	60%	68%
	(351)	(272)	(222)	(238)	(1083)
To claim public goods or services that one does not deserve (Claim)	52%	53%	36%	34%	43%
	(208)	(210)	(142)	(135)	(695)
If many people claim goods or services they don't deserve, is it justified? Percentage answering "no" (Claim Many)	75%	62%	62%	57%	64%
	(301)	(245)	(247)	(228)	(1021)
To avoid military service (Military)	61%	56%	37%	34%	47%
	(242)	(224)	(147)	(135)	(748)
To avoid service if many others avoided it (Military Many)	84%	66%	64%	60%	68%
	(337)	(261)	(255)	(238)	(1091)
To buy stolen goods (Stolen)	72%	67%	56%	50%	61%
	(286)	(268)	(224)	(201)	(979)
For a functionary to accept a bribe (Corrupt)	88%	69%	58%	56%	68%
	(351)	(274)	(233)	(224)	(1082)
To not pay the fare for public transportation (Fare)	67%	62%	53%	40%	56%
	(268)	(246)	(212)	(161)	(887)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.8 Argentina: Responses to Questions About Proceduralism, by Region

	Percentage Saying "Never Justified"				
	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Question: Is it always, sometimes, or never justified . . .					
To avoid paying taxes that one owes (Taxes)	40%	41%	48%	49%	45%
	(191)	(199)	(231)	(236)	(857)
If many people didn't pay taxes (and knowing that this would reduce services), is it justified (percentage "no") (Taxes Many)	75%	75%	70%	75%	74%
	(359)	(362)	(338)	(360)	(1419)
To claim public goods or services that one does not deserve (Claim)	73%	72%	67%	63%	69%
	(349)	(345)	(321)	(304)	(1319)
If many people claim goods or services they don't deserve, is it justified? (percentage "no") (Claim Many)	88%	83%	79%	73%	81%
	(423)	(399)	(380)	(352)	(1554)
To avoid military service (Military)	14%	13%	15%	18%	15%
	(68)	(64)	(74)	(85)	(291)
If many people avoided military service, was it justified? (percentage "no") (Military Many)	75%	86%	70%	81%	78%
	(359)	(411)	(338)	(387)	(1495)
To buy stolen goods (Stolen)	87%	87%	86%	80%	85%
	(418)	(416)	(412)	(386)	(1632)
For a functionary to accept a bribe (Corrupt)	97%	98%	94%	94%	96%
	(466)	(468)	(449)	(451)	(1834)
To not pay admission to a public event (Admission)	75%	86%	74%	77%	78%
	(358)	(415)	(356)	(371)	(1500)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 4.9 Argentina: Prevalence of Contingent Consent, Law-Flouting, and Law-Abiding Postures, by Region

Compared to Mar del Plata:	Taxation	Gate-Crashing	Military Service
Buenos Aires	No difference	More law-abiding	More law-flouting
Córdoba	Less contingent consent	No difference	No difference
Misiones	Less contingent consent	More law-abiding	More law-abiding

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes:
Taxation: "Do you believe that not paying taxes is always, sometimes, or never justified?"
Gate-crashing: "Do you believe that not paying admission to a public event is always, sometimes, or never justified?"
Military service: "Until recently obligatory military service existed. Do you believe that not complying with military service in that era was always, sometimes, or never justified?"

Appendix

Table 4A.1 Argentina: Models of Institutional Trust Responses

Dependent Variable	(1) Service	(2) Efficient	(3) Attention	(4) Trustpol	(5) Bribe
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Income	–0.057	0.005	–0.105	**0.097**	0.005
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.054)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Education	0.041	–0.073	–0.060	0.016	–0.042
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Housing	–0.006	–0.065	0.018	–0.082	0.067
	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.068)	(0.074)
Gender	**–0.318**	–0.014	–0.062	0.095	**0.189**
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.119)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Age	**–0.013**	**–0.017**	–0.006	0.004	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Peronist supporter	**–0.230**	0.049	**–0.420**	**0.520**	**0.357**
	(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.150)	(0.128)	(0.108)
Radical supporter	–0.058	–0.036	0.045	**0.360**	0.180
	(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.226)	(0.159)	(0.102)
Interpersonal trust				**0.544**	
				(0.088)	
Bribe				**0.346**	
				(0.075)	
Log population	0.006	0.040	0.031	**–0.123**	–0.059
	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.034)
Buenos Aires	**–0.408**	0.081	**–0.438**	–0.014	0.143
	(0.184)	(0.190)	(0.214)	(0.166)	(0.142)
Córdoba	**–0.618**	–0.115	–0.313	–0.113	**–0.546**
	(0.187)	(0.224)	(0.255)	(0.199)	(0.176)
Misiones	**–1.080**	–0.384	**–0.517**	**0.495**	–0.192
	(0.229)	(0.222)	(0.247)	(0.190)	(0.199)

Table 4A.1 *Continued*

Dependent Variable	(1) Service	(2) Efficient	(3) Attention	(4) Trustpol	(5) Bribe
Constant	**1.605**	**1.881**	**2.664**		
	(0.528)	(0.697)	(0.742)		
Cut 1				0.337	**–1.715**
				(0.606)	(0.553)
Cut 2				**3.838**	0.402
				(0.623)	(0.555)
Cut 3				**5.102**	
				(0.656)	

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.
We coded answers to Services, Efficient, and Attention questions as dummy variables for "institutional-trust" answers. For example, if a person answered "when municipal governments are efficient, this is because otherwise people won't vote for them in the next election," we scored this person 1 on the dummy variable Efficient. We then estimated logit regression models of these institutional-trust answers.
These and all subsequent regressions draw on five datasets with imputed values for missing data. To generate the imputed datasets we used the Amelia program described in King et al. (2001) and implemented in Honaker et al. (2001).
We report robust standard errors designed to account for the possibility of correlated errors, due to the clustered sample design of the survey.
Explanation of variables:
Service: Dummy for response, "Governments provide good services when they're under the watch of the courts, congress, and the press."
Efficient: Dummy for response, "When municipal governments are efficient, this is because they know otherwise people won't vote for them."
Attention: Dummy for response, "When politicians pay attention to people like me, this is because they want to be reelected."
Trustpol: "Thinking about people who hold public office, how many of them do you think are trustworthy (confiables) and will behave well without being watched? (1) None, (2) a minority, (3) a majority, or (4) all."
Bribe: "When a politician takes a bribe, is it not at all likely (scored 1), somewhat likely (2), or very likely (3) that he'll get caught."
Income: Self-reported by respondent, 9-level scale of family income.
Education: 9-level scale, from no formal education to university.
Housing: Assessed by interviewer, 5-level scale (1 = poorest quality, 5 = highest quality), based on assessment of building materials, flooring, and presence or absence of consumer durables.
Gender: male = 0, female = 1.
Peronist supporter: coded 1 for respondents who said, independent of how they voted, that they liked the Peronist Party more than others, 0 otherwise.
Radical supporter: coded 1 for respondents who said, independent of how they voted, that they liked the Radical Party more than others, 0 otherwise.
Interpersonal trust: responses no one (coded 1), a minority (2), or a majority (3) of people can be trusted.
Log population: natural log of the number of inhabitants, according to 2001 census, residing in the municipality where the respondent lived.
Buenos Aires: Dummy variable for respondents who live in Buenos Aires.
Córdoba: Dummy variable for respondents who live in Córdoba.
Misiones: Dummy variable for respondents who live in Misiones.

Table 4A.2 Mexico: Models of Institutional Trust Responses

Dependent Variable	(1) Services	(2) Efficient	(3) Attention	(4) Trustpol	(5) Bribe
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Income	0.076	0.028	0.119	0.075	0.047
	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Education	–0.018	–0.023	–0.058	–0.001	**–0.116**
	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Class	–0.092	**–0.349**	**–0.558**	**0.249**	**0.494**
	(0.091)	(0.129)	(0.124)	(0.096)	(0.091)
Gender	–0.120	–0.135	–0.180	0.097	–0.060
	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.093)
Age	0.040	–0.064	–0.043	0.071	**–0.105**
	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.040)
PRI supporter	**–0.412**	**–0.450**	**–0.945**	**0.518**	**0.535**
	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.222)	(0.148)	(0.151)
PAN supporter	–0.038	–0.290	**–0.671**	**0.344**	**0.543**
	(0.186)	(0.177)	(0.205)	(0.154)	(0.159)
PRD supporter	–0.208	0.405	–0.171	0.281	**0.484**
	(0.263)	(0.276)	(0.297)	(0.265)	(0.199)
Interpersonal trust				**0.618**	
				(0.080)	
Bribe				**0.365**	
				(0.088)	
Rural	–0.150	0.094	0.046	–0.003	0.047
	(0.102)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.096)	(0.121)
Chihuahua	–0.298	**–0.466**	–0.111	0.228	**–0.524**
	(0.214)	(0.206)	(0.228)	(0.152)	(0.228)
Michoacán	–0.171	**–0.500**	**–1.098**	**0.626**	**0.406**
	(0.199)	(0.204)	(0.251)	(0.210)	(0.206)
Puebla	**–0.457**	–0.195	–0.097	**0.493**	0.226
	(0.205)	(0.188)	(0.258)	(0.176)	(0.240)
Constant	**0.881**	**1.607**	**2.869**		
	(0.416)	(0.441)	(0.462)		
Cut 1				**1.928**	–0.203
				(0.418)	(0.366)
Cut 2				**4.234**	**2.035**
				(0.446)	(0.372)
Cut 3				**6.170**	
				(0.472)	

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (see 4A.1). Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,598.
In each model, the dependent variable is coded 1 for the response that invokes accountability mechanisms, and 0 otherwise. The models draw on five datasets with imputed values for missing data; see note to Table 4A.1.
Explanation of variables: For Service, Efficient, and Attention, see note to Table 4A.1.

Table 4A.2 *Continued*

Income: self-reported family income on a six-point scale.
Education: self-reported level of education on a six-point scale.
Class: self-reported social class, 1 = lower, 2 = middle, 3 = upper.
Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female.
Age: self-reported age, on a five-point scale.
Rural: surveyor's coding of whether the neighborhood was urban (0), mixed (1), or rural (2).
PRI supporter, PAN supporter, and PRD supporter are dummy variables for people who report supporting each respective party. Chihuahua, Michoacán, and Puebla are dummy variables for people living in each state, respectively.

Table 4A.3 Models of Institutional Responses to Questions About Voting

Argentina (N = 1,920)			Mexico (N = 1,598)		
Dependent Variable	(1) Handout	(2) Favor	Dependent Variable	(3) Handout	(4) Favor
Model	Logit	Logit	Model	Logit	Logit
Income	–0.056	–0.051	Income	–0.064	0.084
	(0.038)	(0.040)		(0.065)	(0.057)
Education	0.039	0.017	Education	–0.016	**0.143**
	(0.041)	(0.034)		(0.062)	(0.060)
Housing	–0.009	0.059	Class	0.202	–0.200
	(0.102)	(0.086)		(0.106)	(0.113)
Gender	0.013	0.032	Gender	0.131	–0.094
	(0.107)	(0.102)		(0.107)	(0.115)
Age	–0.001	**–0.014**	Age	–0.023	0.075
	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.045)	(0.047)
Peronist	**–0.557**	**–0.782**	PRI supporter	–0.118	**–0.769**
	(0.156)	(0.149)		(0.202)	(0.199)
Radical	**–0.671**	–0.122	PAN supporter	–0.313	**–0.758**
	(0.186)	(0.177)		(0.179)	(0.214)
			PRD supporter	0.325	–0.612
				(0.225)	(0.318)
Log population	–0.030	**0.122**	Rural	**–0.260**	–0.157
	(0.041)	(0.043)		(0.102)	(0.124)
Buenos Aires	**1.387**	**1.239**	Chihuahua	**0.458**	0.299
	(0.216)	(0.195)		(0.228)	(0.197)
Córdoba	**1.100**	**1.124**	Michoacán	**0.637**	0.152
	(0.257)	(0.197)		(0.220)	(0.222)
Misiones	**1.746**	**1.343**	Puebla	0.263	**0.588**
	(0.258)	(0.237)		(0.191)	(0.206)
Constant	–0.975	**–1.908**	Constant	–0.562	–0.391
	(0.595)	(0.623)		(0.427)	(0.384)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$.
Handout: coded 1 for "it gave out favors during the campaign," 0 for "it has the best program."
Favor: coded 1 for "it has done them some favor," 0 for "it is concerned for everyone."

Table 4A.4 Argentina: Regression Models of Responses to Questions About Clientelism

Dependent Variable	(1) Job	(2) Party Give	(3) Gift	(4) Influence	(5) Does Obligate
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit	Logit
Income	–0.068	–0.002	**–0.211**	**–0.206**	0.028
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.036)
Education	**–0.198**	0.015	**–0.179**	**–0.220**	0.031
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.031)
Housing	–0.151	**0.180**	**–0.297**	**–0.358**	0.037
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.083)
Gender	**0.209**	–0.076	–0.091	0.118	–0.011
	(0.099)	(0.089)	(0.170)	(0.160)	(0.087)
Age	**–0.022**	–0.006	**–0.014**	**–0.017**	**0.009**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Peronist	**0.715**	–0.077	**0.875**	**0.782**	**–0.296**
	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.213)	(0.208)	(0.113)
Radical	0.149	–0.033	–0.190	0.167	0.039
	(0.169)	(0.173)	(0.361)	(0.304)	(0.153)
Log population	–0.007	**–0.252**	–0.071	–0.055	**0.081**
	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.032)
Buenos Aires	0.326	**–0.416**	–0.194	0.562	0.217
	(0.177)	(0.195)	(0.359)	(0.380)	(0.182)
Córdoba	**0.543**	–0.229	0.495	**1.224**	–0.217
	(0.203)	(0.244)	(0.343)	(0.436)	(0.176)
Misiones	0.113	0.029	–0.281	0.369	**–0.490**
	(0.226)	(0.237)	(0.388)	(0.462)	(0.210)
Received goods					**–0.564**
					(0.208)
Constant	**1.395**	**2.818**	0.782		**–1.371**
	(0.534)	(0.727)	(0.873)		(0.517)
Cut 1				–0.498	
				(1.050)	
Cut 2				1.501	
				(1.006)	

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.
Job: coded 1 if respondent would go to party representative for help with a job.
Party Give: coded 1 if the respondent reported that parties "distributed things" during the campaign.
Gift: coded 1 if the respondent reported receiving something personally.

Table 4A.5 Argentina: Model of Responses to Question, "How Many Politicians Can You Trust Without Their Being Monitored"

Dependent Variable	(1) Trustpol
Model	Ordered logit
Income	**0.116**
	(0.033)
Education	0.035
	(0.028)
Housing	–0.079
	(0.068)
Gender	0.078
	(0.095)
Age	0.005
	(0.004)
Peronist	**0.566**
	(0.126)
Radical	**0.404**
	(0.154)
Log population	**–0.127**
	(0.035)
Buenos Aires	0.049
	(0.165)
Córdoba	–0.216
	(0.194)
Misiones	**0.428**
	(0.187)
Clientelist influence	**0.384**
	(0.168)
Cut 1	–0.829
	(0.586)
Cut 2	**2.581**
	(0.599)
Cut 3	**3.833**
	(0.632)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.

Table 4A.6 Mexico: Models of Responses to Clientelism Questions

Dependent Variable	(1) Know Party	(2) Party Help	(3) Job	(4) Party Give	(5) Gift	(6) Does Obligate	(7) Should Obligate
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Income	0.059	0.031	–0.110	–0.036	–0.122	–0.082	–0.069
	(0.074)	(0.121)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Education	–0.062	–0.015	0.043	0.105	0.126	0.079	–0.059
	(0.081)	(0.148)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.058)	(0.062)
Class	**0.415**	**0.834**	**0.434**	0.011	0.172	0.175	**0.339**
	(0.111)	(0.171)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.154)	(0.107)	(0.124)
Gender	–0.109	0.210	–0.163	–0.055	–0.126	0.078	0.156
	(0.122)	(0.195)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.165)	(0.123)	(0.129)
Age	0.027	0.132	0.063	–0.007	0.072	0.034	0.019
	(0.048)	(0.084)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.043)	(0.057)
PRI supporter	**0.884**	**1.122**	**0.727**	0.175	**0.499**	**0.404**	0.260
	(0.193)	(0.374)	(0.204)	(0.183)	(0.254)	(0.198)	(0.220)
PAN supporter	**0.412**	**0.806**	**0.743**	0.024	0.400	0.296	0.208
	(0.210)	(0.366)	(0.220)	(0.190)	(0.277)	(0.200)	(0.203)
PRD supporter	0.314	0.663	–0.180	**–0.805**	–0.716	0.499	**0.610**
	(0.290)	(0.474)	(0.304)	(0.294)	(0.390)	(0.271)	(0.294)
Rural	–0.041	0.059	0.041	–0.204	–0.117	0.052	0.159
	(0.138)	(0.202)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.160)	(0.115)	(0.108)
Chihuahua	0.402	0.362	**1.256**	0.175	0.401	0.128	**0.765**
	(0.234)	(0.351)	(0.254)	(0.242)	(0.285)	(0.214)	(0.259)
Michoacán	**0.548**	**0.841**	**0.942**	**0.672**	**0.762**	0.254	**0.680**
	(0.275)	(0.383)	(0.245)	(0.237)	(0.307)	(0.220)	(0.263)
Puebla	**0.614**	0.605	0.271	0.328	**0.821**	0.287	**0.915**
	(0.240)	(0.383)	(0.278)	(0.243)	(0.336)	(0.188)	(0.235)
Received goods						**0.551**	**0.829**
						(0.166)	(0.194)
Constant	**–2.714**	**–5.852**	**–2.682**	**–1.051**	**–2.808**	**–1.474**	**–2.944**
	(0.479)	(0.725)	(0.531)	(0.363)	(0.574)	(0.395)	(0.504)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,598.
The dependent variables are coded 1 for affirmative answers that suggest personalism and clientelism, and 0 for negative answers.

Table 4A.7 Mexico: Models of Proceduralism Responses

Dependent Variable	(1) Taxes	(2) Claim	(3) Military	(4) Stolen	(5) Corrupt	(6) Fare
Model	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Income	0.056	0.070	0.085	**0.208**	**0.204**	**0.185**
	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.074)
Education	0.026	–0.019	–0.013	–0.069	–0.064	–0.101
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.057)
Class	**–0.294**	**–0.247**	**–0.367**	**–0.582**	**–0.860**	**–0.543**
	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.127)
Gender	–0.031	0.110	–0.048	–0.056	0.062	0.060
	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.100)	(0.114)	(0.103)
Age	0.072	0.004	0.021	–0.038	0.016	0.084
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)
PRI supporter	**–0.326**	**–0.342**	–0.237	–0.069	**–0.443**	–0.124
	(0.161)	(0.149)	(0.170)	(0.175)	(0.216)	(0.180)
PAN supporter	–0.217	**–0.287**	–0.189	–0.209	–0.338	–0.173
	(0.158)	(0.137)	(0.153)	(0.179)	(0.226)	(0.191)
PRD supporter	–0.118	–0.205	–0.157	0.122	–0.264	–0.034
	(0.221)	(0.219)	(0.248)	(0.236)	(0.280)	(0.231)
Rural	0.018	0.103	–0.001	–0.025	–0.050	–0.019
	(0.107)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.143)	(0.170)	(0.143)
Chihuahua	**–0.433**	0.133	–0.173	–0.065	**–0.967**	–0.127
	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.196)	(0.257)	(0.282)	(0.252)
Michoacán	**–1.058**	**–0.469**	**–0.753**	**–0.642**	**–1.520**	–0.420
	(0.208)	(0.213)	(0.186)	(0.285)	(0.294)	(0.273)
Puebla	**–1.121**	**–0.572**	**–0.902**	**–0.853**	**–1.745**	**–0.914**
	(0.198)	(0.210)	(0.191)	(0.264)	(0.273)	(0.232)
Cut 1	**–2.921**	**–2.359**	**–2.958**	**–4.209**	**–5.228**	**–3.537**
	(0.451)	(0.421)	(0.383)	(0.545)	(0.591)	(0.522)
Cut 2	**–0.895**	–0.442	**–1.110**	**–1.975**	**–3.423**	**–1.432**
	(0.435)	(0.429)	(0.376)	(0.579)	(0.597)	(0.523)

Source: Authors' compilations.

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,598.

Each dependent variable is coded on a 3-point ordinal scale according to whether the person responded that a violation was "always," "sometimes," or "never" justified. Thus, increasing values on the dependent variables indicate greater proceduralism.

Table 4A.8 Argentina: Models of Proceduralism Responses

Dependent Variable	(1) Taxes	(2) Claim	(3) Military	(4) Stolen	(5) Corrupt	(6) Admission
Model	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Income	**0.089**	**0.110**	–0.031	0.083	0.041	0.049
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.092)	(0.046)
Education	0.017	0.050	0.039	0.019	0.113	0.013
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.078)	(0.041)
Housing	–0.034	0.017	**0.198**	0.001	**0.382**	0.033
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.076)	(0.098)	(0.181)	(0.104)
Gender	–0.043	–0.003	0.148	**0.512**	0.110	0.084
	(0.092)	(0.109)	(0.090)	(0.135)	(0.249)	(0.108)
Age	**0.015**	**0.018**	**–0.012**	**0.043**	**0.034**	**0.027**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Peronist supporter	–0.172	**–0.369**	–0.131	–0.293	–0.512	–0.227
	(0.121)	(0.132)	(0.120)	(0.174)	(0.330)	(0.131)
Radical supporter	0.130	–0.281	–0.144	–0.071	–0.128	0.333
	(0.168)	(0.158)	(0.162)	(0.223)	(0.442)	(0.227)
Log population	**–0.071**	**–0.117**	0.022	–0.072	0.000	–0.018
	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.050)
Buenos Aires	0.056	0.033	–0.240	0.057	0.429	**0.921**
	(0.174)	(0.188)	(0.150)	(0.246)	(0.471)	(0.215)
Córdoba	0.205	–0.295	–0.002	0.157	–0.385	0.162
	(0.204)	(0.190)	(0.173)	(0.285)	(0.427)	(0.221)
Misiones	0.354	–0.269	0.170	–0.176	–0.003	0.429
	(0.231)	(0.204)	(0.238)	(0.270)	(0.474)	(0.251)
Cut 1	**–2.115**	**–2.856**	0.404	**–2.337**	–1.784	**–2.108**
	(0.530)	0.636	(0.681)	(0.753)	(1.149)	(0.749)
Cut 2	20.474	–1.079	**2.019**	–0.431	–0.412	0.281
	(0.530)	(0.639)	(0.686)	(0.755)	(1.170)	(0.698)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.

Table 4A.9 Argentina: Multinomial Logit Models of Responses on Taxes, Gate-Crashing, and Military Service

Dependent Variable	(1) Is It Justified to Evade Taxes? (Compared with "Sometimes")		(2) To Enter an Event Without Paying? (Compared with "Sometimes")		(3) To Avoid [Compulsory] Military Service? (Compared with "Sometimes")	
	Always	Never	Always	Never	Always	Never
Income	–0.091	0.075	0.080	0.063	0.017	–0.031
	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.127)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.051)
Education	–0.073	–0.007	–0.101	–0.001	**–0.071**	–0.046
	(0.060)	(0.032)	(0.113)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.048)
Housing	–0.227	–0.111	–0.270	–0.012	–0.163	0.096
	(0.134)	(0.091)	(0.241)	(0.104)	(0.085)	(0.129)
Gender	**–0.489**	**–0.201**	0.091	0.111	**–0.282**	–0.212
	(0.171)	(0.098)	(0.313)	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.158)
Age	–0.000	**0.016**	–0.014	**0.026**	**0.014**	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Peronist supporter	0.159	–0.130	0.130	–0.214	0.171	0.049
	(0.228)	(0.126)	(0.354)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.188)
Radical supporter	0.111	0.172	0.208	0.354	0.178	0.034
	(0.269)	(0.177)	(0.593)	(0.222)	(0.181)	(0.226)
Log population	**0.190**	–0.013	–0.077	–0.028	0.019	0.077
	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.097)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.080)
Buenos Aires	0.177	0.127	–0.139	**0.915**	**0.368**	0.208
	(0.315)	(0.194)	(0.598)	(0.222)	(0.167)	(0.239)
Córdoba	**0.681**	**0.480**	0.101	0.180	0.219	0.392
	(0.296)	(0.223)	(0.564)	(0.226)	(0.204)	(0.289)
Misiones	**0.720**	**0.631**	0.625	**0.557**	0.200	**0.686**
	(0.349)	(0.239)	(0.502)	(0.256)	(0.240)	(0.350)
Constant	**–2.929**	–0.757	–0.164	0.100	0.187	–1.887
	(0.901)	(0.593)	(1.431)	(0.686)	(0.619)	(1.136)

Source: Authors' compilations.

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.

The coefficients relate the probabilities of "always" and "never" responses to the baseline category of "sometimes," conditional on values of the independent variables. When both "always" and "never" responses are statistically significant and carry the same sign, this indicates that a change in the explanatory variable either increases or decreases the probability of a person being a contingent consenter, relative to being either a law flouter or a law abider.

Figure 5.1 Argentina: Simulated Expected Effect of Civic Participation on Institutional Trust



Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Simulated expected percentages of response, "governments provide good services when they are under the watch of the courts, congress, or the press." *Clarify* simulations, holding other explanatory variables at their sample means. "None" means lowest score on Belong and Comprob variables; "High" means highest score on each.

Figure 5.2 Simulated Expected Probability of an Institutional Explanation for Why Governments Provide Good Services, by Income and Region



Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Clarify simulation. We hold education level, quality of housing, and size of respondent's municipality at the sample median.

Figure 5.3 Mexico: Simulated Expected Vote Share for PRI



Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Low and high literacy and wealth, and small and large populations, refer to the 10th and 90th percentile scores in the sample for those two variables. *Clarify* simulations draw on Table 5.9 Model 2, and hold all other explanatory variables at their sample means.

Figure 5.4 Argentina: Simulated Expected Probability of Believing Neighbors Support Parties Because of Clientelist Inducements, by Region and Poverty Rate (NBI)



Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Clarify simulations. We hold household income, education level, quality of housing, and size of respondent's municipality at the sample median.

Table 5.1 Argentina: Responses to Questions About Participation, by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Meet					
During the past twelve months, did you attend a meeting about a problem in your community or school?					
Yes	16%	19%	20%	21%	20%
	(76)	(91)	(95)	(391)	(391)
No	83%	80%	79%	73%	79%
	(400)	(382)	(377)	(350)	(1509)
No answer	1%	2%	2%	0.2%	1%
	(4)	(7)	(8)	(1)	(20)
Belong					
How many organizations do you belong to?					
None	75%	81%	71%	77%	76%
	(358)	(387)	(339)	(371)	(1455)
One	19%	14%	22%	17%	18%
	(92)	(66)	(103)	(79)	(340)
Two to three	5%	4%	7%	6%	6%
	(25)	(21)	(31)	(28)	(105)
More than three	1%	1%	1%	0.4%	1%
	(5)	(6)	(6)	(2)	(19)
No answer	0%	0%	0.2%	0%	0.1%
	(0)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(1)

(*Table continues on p. 132.*)

Table 5.1 *Continued*

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Time					
During the past twelve months, how much time did you dedicate to these organizations?					
One day	7%	8%	4%	3%	6%
	(9)	(8)	(6)	(3)	(26)
One week	19%	9%	11%	7%	12%
	(23)	(9)	(16)	(8)	(56)
Two to three weeks	14%	10%	20%	23%	17%
	(17)	(10)	(28)	(25)	(80)
One to two months	15%	13%	15%	10%	13%
	(19)	(12)	(21)	(11)	(63)
Three or more months	38%	55%	47%	54%	48%
	(47)	(53)	(67)	(59)	(226)
No answer	7%	4%	4%	3%	5%
	(9)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(21)
Comprob					
During the past twelve months, have you collaborated with a nonrelative to solve a problem that your community faces?					
Yes	36%	40%	45%	51%	43%
	(171)	(194)	(215)	(244)	(824)
No	64%	59%	55%	47%	56%
	(306)	(283)	(262)	(227)	(1078)
No answer	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%
	(3)	(3)	(3)	(9)	(124)

Workprob					
During the past twelve months, have you collaborated with someone from work to solve a common problem?					
Yes	34%	36%	42%	29%	35%
	(164)	(171)	(202)	(141)	(678)
No	65%	62%	54%	70%	63%
	(312)	(298)	(261)	(336)	(1207)
No answer	1%	2%	4%	1%	2%
	(4)	(11)	(17)	(3)	(35)
Religion					
How many times per month do you attend mass or other religious services?					
None	53%	58%	47%	24%	45%
	(255)	(277)	(224)	(115)	(871)
One or two	29%	27%	31%	42%	32%
	(140)	(128)	(150)	(199)	(617)
Three or four	7%	8%	13%	17%	11%
	(32)	(37)	(61)	(82)	(212)
More than four	10%	8%	9%	17%	11%
	(47)	(38)	(42)	(82)	(207)
No answer	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%
	(6)	(0)	(3)	(4)	(13)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 5.2 Mexico: Responses to Questions About Participation, by Region

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Meet					
During the last twelve months, have you attended an assembly or meeting about a problem in your community or school?					
Yes	15%	31%	26%	22%	23%
	(60)	(122)	(105)	(86)	(373)
No	81%	65%	64%	73%	71%
	(324)	(259)	(257)	(290)	(1130)
No answer	4%	4%	10%	6%	6%
	(16)	(17)	(38)	(24)	(95)
Belong					
At this moment, to how many organizations do you belong?					
None	85%	82%	73%	79%	80%
	(340)	(326)	(293)	(315)	(1274)
One	11%	14%	15%	11%	13%
	(44)	(54)	(61)	(43)	(202)
Two	2%	3%	4%	2%	2%
	(6)	(11)	(14)	(8)	(39)
Three or more	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
	(4)	(2)	(7)	(2)	(15)
No answer	2%	1%	6%	8%	4%
	(6)	(5)	(25)	(32)	(68)

Time					
During the last twelve months, about how many hours per week on average have you dedicated to activities of these organizations?					
One to two	45%	42%	36%	27%	36%
	(27)	(30)	(37)	(23)	(117)
Three to five	13%	31%	17%	29%	23%
	(8)	(22)	(18)	(25)	(73)
Six to eight	18%	11%	7%	0%	8%
	(11)	(8)	(8)	(0)	(27)
More than eight	12%	11%	15%	5%	11%
	(7)	(8)	(16)	(4)	(35)
No answer	12%	6%	26%	39%	22%
	(7)	(4)	(28)	(33)	(72)
Comprob					
During the last twelve months, have you collaborated with other people who are not your relatives to try to resolve some problem in your community?					
Yes	25%	29%	25%	21%	25%
	(100)	(116)	(100)	(85)	(401)
No	73%	66%	69%	71%	70%
	(292)	(263)	(274)	(284)	(1113)
No answer	2%	5%	7%	8%	5%
	(8)	(19)	(26)	(31)	(84)

(*Table continues on p. 136.*)

Table 5.2 *Continued*

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Workprob					
Other than work duties, during the past twelve months have you collaborated with people you work with to try to resolve a common problem?					
Yes	28%	27%	24%	29%	27%
	(111)	(109)	(97)	(117)	(434)
No	71%	67%	68%	62%	67%
	(284)	(268)	(271)	(248)	(1071)
No answer	1%	5%	8%	9%	6%
	(5)	(21)	(32)	(35)	(93)
Religion					
About how many times per month do you attend mass or another religious service?					
None	33%	25%	18%	19%	23%
	(130)	(100)	(71)	(74)	(375)
One to two	37%	42%	38%	37%	38%
	(146)	(166)	(151)	(146)	(609)
Three to four	18%	26%	32%	29%	26%
	(71)	(103)	(127)	(115)	(416)
More than four	13%	7%	13%	13%	11%
	(53)	(27)	(50)	(51)	(181)
No answer	0%	1%	0%	4%	1%
	(0)	(2)	(1)	(14)	(17)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Total number of responses in parentheses.
"Belong" was asked as a follow-up to a question that listed several associations and civic organizations, asking the respondent if she belonged to any of these.

Table 5.3 Argentina: Responses to Questions About Interpersonal Trust, by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Neighbor					
If you go away on a trip, do you have a neighbor whom you could trust to care for your house?					
Yes	75%	80%	75%	68%	75%
	(360)	(383)	(359)	(328)	(1430)
No	25%	20%	24%	30%	25%
	(113)	(97)	(117)	(146)	(473)
No answer	2%	0%	1%	1%	1%
	(7)	(0)	(4)	(6)	(17)
Advantage					
Do you believe most people would take advantage of you if they had the chance?					
Yes	55%	53%	50%	57%	54%
	(263)	(254)	(241)	(272)	(1030)
No	42%	45%	45%	37%	42%
	(203)	(215)	(214)	(178)	(810)
No answer	3%	2%	5%	6%	4%
	(14)	(11)	(25)	(30)	(80)
Trust					
Which is closest to your way of thinking?					
You can trust a majority of people	20%	26%	23%	18%	22%
	(96)	(123)	(111)	(84)	(414)
You can only trust a minority	61%	61%	56%	59%	59%
	(294)	(291)	(271)	(284)	(1140)
I don't trust anyone	18%	13%	20%	22%	18%
	(87)	(64)	(95)	(105)	(351)
No answer	1%	0.4%	1%	2%	1%
	(3)	(2)	(3)	(7)	(15)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 5.4 Mexico: Responses to Questions About Interpersonal Trust, by State

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Neighbor					
If you were to go away on a trip, do you have a neighbor whom you could trust to care for your house?					
Yes	54%	55%	42%	43%	49%
	(216)	(220)	(166)	(173)	(775)
No	41%	41%	43%	44%	42%
	(165)	(162)	(170)	(177)	(674)
No answer	5%	4%	16%	13%	9%
	(19)	(16)	(64)	(50)	(149)
Advantage					
Do you believe most people would take advantage of you if they had the chance?					
Yes	45%	53%	39%	36%	43%
	(180)	(210)	(157)	(142)	(689)
No	43%	42%	41%	44%	42%
	(171)	(167)	(164)	(176)	(678)
No answer	12%	5%	20%	21%	14%
	(49)	(21)	(79)	(82)	(231)
Trust					
Which is closest to your way of thinking?					
You can trust a majority of people	24%	29%	24%	30%	27%
	(94)	(115)	(96)	(119)	(424)
You can only trust a minority	48%	54%	35%	38%	43%
	(193)	(213)	(139)	(150)	(695)
I don't trust anyone	24%	13%	24%	21%	21%
	(94)	(52)	(97)	(85)	(328)
No answer	5%	5%	17%	12%	9%
	(19)	(18)	(68)	(46)	(151)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Total number of responses in parentheses.

Table 5.5 Argentina: The Impact of Social Capital on Political Trust

Dependent Variable	(1) Services	(2) Efficient	(3) Trustpol
Model	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit
Income	–0.043	0.018	**0.099**
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Education	0.069	–0.048	0.011
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Housing	0.004	–0.050	–0.100
	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.069)
Gender	**–0.350**	–0.037	0.102
	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.094)
Age	**–0.012**	**–0.016**	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Peronist	–0.204	0.068	**0.585**
	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.125)
Radical	–0.053	–0.046	**0.402**
	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.155)
Log population	0.000	0.033	**–0.125**
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.036)
Buenos Aires	**–0.404**	0.101	0.055
	(0.183)	(0.187)	(0.161)
Córdoba	**–0.594**	–0.080	–0.201
	(0.185)	(0.221)	(0.192)
Misiones	**–1.029**	–0.298	**0.389**
	(0.180)	(0.221)	(0.183)
Belong	**–0.230**	–0.129	**0.191**
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.092)
Comprob	**–0.275**	**–0.411**	0.171
	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.115)
Constant	**1.610**	**1.917**	
	(0.538)	(0.700)	
Cut 1			**–1.368**
			(0.568)
Cut 2			**2.044**
			(0.579)
Cut 3			**3.294**
			(0.621)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.

Table 5.6 Mexico: The Impact of Social Capital on Political Trust

Dependent Variable	(1) Services	(2) Efficient	(3) Trustpol
Model	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit
Income	0.073	0.031	0.059
	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Education	–0.015	0.042	0.001
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.052)
Class	–0.064	**–0.297**	**0.288**
	(0.090)	(0.128)	(0.098)
Gender	–0.122	–0.155	0.053
	(0.122)	(0.118)	(0.104)
Age	0.045	–0.055	0.055
	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.035)
PRI supporter	**–0.390**	**–0.406**	**0.562**
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.148)
PAN supporter	–0.020	–0.258	**0.469**
	(0.189)	(0.179)	(0.158)
PRD supporter	–0.217	0.397	0.414
	(0.265)	(0.279)	(0.250)
Rural	–0.154	0.100	–0.006
	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.097)
Chihuahua	–0.282	**–0.432**	0.226
	(0.215)	(0.201)	(0.152)
Michoacán	–0.166	**–0.455**	**0.659**
	(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.224)
Puebla	**–0.467**	–0.201	**0.577**
	(0.203)	(0.185)	(0.188)
Belong	0.061	–0.188	–0.081
	(0.114)	(0.124)	(0.115)
Comprob	**–0.367**	**–0.540**	**0.642**
	(0.144)	(0.129)	(0.123)
Constant	**0.898**	**1.581**	
	(0.415)	(0.441)	
Cut 1			0.211
			(0.389)
Cut 2			**2.423**
			(0.406)
Cut 3			**4.302**
			(0.421)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,598.

Table 5.7 Argentina: Self-Reported Family Income, by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones
Low income	27%	33%	34%	57%
Middle income	59	51	53	39
High income	14	16	12	5
Total	101%	100%	99%	101%

Source: Authors' compilation.
Notes: Low: up to 300 pesos per month.
Middle: 301 to 1,000 pesos per month.
High: More than 1,001 pesos per month.
Columns do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 5.8 Argentina: Effect of Municipal Economic Development on Clientelism

Dependent Variable	(1) Favor
Model	Logit
Income	–0.046
	(0.041)
Education	0.013
	(0.034)
Housing	0.081
	(0.087)
Gender	0.019
	(0.102)
Age	**–0.014**
	(0.004)
Peronist	**–0.823**
	(0.153)
Radical	–0.139
	(0.173)
Log population	0.086
	(0.043)
Municipal expenditures per capita	**–0.002**
	(0.001)
Buenos Aires	0.909
	(0.214)
Córdoba	**0.996**
	(0.203)
Misiones	**0.732**
	(0.300)
Constant	–0.578
	(0.741)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.
Favor: dummy for response, "people support the most important party in this neighborhood because it does favors for people."

Table 5.9 Causes of Municipal-Level Democratization in Mexico

Dependent Variable	(1) PRI Vote Share	(2) PRI Vote Share	(3) Alternation	(4) Alternation
Model	Log-Odds OLS	Log-Odds OLS	Logit	Logit
Turnout (average 1990s)	**–1.662** (0.218)	**–1.520** (0.243)	**3.709** (0.481)	**5.029** (0.597)
Poverty rate (1990)	**0.984** (0.297)	0.503 (0.325)	**–2.949** (0.642)	**–2.549** (0.777)
Literacy rate (1990)	–0.241 (0.276)	**–1.014** (0.334)	–0.234 (0.588)	**2.343** (0.781)
Log population (1990)	**–0.300** (0.024)	**–0.283** (0.027)	**0.346** (0.053)	**0.482** (0.067)
Population growth (percentage, 1990 to 2000)	–0.171 (0.116)	**–0.455** (0.123)	0.106 (0.245)	**1.011** (0.305)
Indigenous population (1990)	0.167 (0.112)	0.040 (0.129)	–0.454 (0.241)	–0.007 (0.300)
PRONASOL (total per capita, in thousands)	**0.111** (0.024)	**0.082** (0.025)	**–0.313** (0.076)	**–0.211** (0.083)
State dummy variables[a]	(excluded)	(included)	(excluded)	(included)
Constant	**4.216** (0.378)	**4.990** (0.571)	**–4.046** (0.830)	**–9.012** (1.273)
N	1953	1953	1953	1953
R-squared	0.172	0.250		
Percentage correctly predicted			65.8	68.6

Sources: Authors' analysis based on Banamex (2001); INEGI (2000).
Notes: Bold coefficients significant at $p < .05$; standard errors in parentheses.
[a]Model 2 includes a dummy variable for each state, save one. Model 4 includes the same dummy variables, except that three were dropped because of perfect collinearity with the dependent variable. Coefficients were not reported simply for presentational reasons.
PRI vote share: The vote share for the PRI in municipal elections, averaged for every election held in the 1990s.
Alternation: Dummy indicating whether the municipality had ever had party alternation in the mayor's office prior to the year 2000.
Turnout: average participation rate in municipal election held between 1990 and 1999.
Poverty rate: percentage of economically active population earning less than the official minimum wage, 1990.
Literacy rate: percentage of adult population literate, 1990.
Population: Natural log of the total municipal population, 1990.
Population growth: percentage increase in total municipal population, 1990 to 2000.
Indigenous: percentage of municipal population that speaks an indigenous language, 1990.
PRONASOL: Total PRONASOL spending per capita in the municipality, 1989 to 1994.

Table 5.10 Mexico: Opposition to Law-Breaking

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Class					
Lower	66.5%	73.7%	58.0%	51.0%	62.0%
Middle	70.5	73.8	56.0	48.2	63.0
Upper	76.7	30.2	26.2	32.2	39.0
Total	69.7%	66.7%	53.7%	47.3%	

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Each cell reports the percentage of valid responses stating that breaking a rule or law was "never justified," averaged across the six primary questions presented in table 4.7.

Table 5.11 Argentina: Models of Beliefs that Neighbors Supported Party Because of Campaign Handouts

Dependent Variable	(1) Handout	(2) Handout	(3) Handout	(4) Handout	(5) Handout
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Income	–0.056	–0.050	–0.042	–0.051	–0.049
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.037)
Education	0.039	0.034	0.036	0.035	0.034
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Housing	–0.009	–0.007	–0.001	0.013	0.011
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.004)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Gender	0.013	0.021	0.029	–0.001	0.004
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.105)
Age	–0.001	–0.001	–0.001	–0.001	–0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Peronist	**–0.557**	**–0.563**	**–0.583**	**–0.597**	**–0.594**
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Radical	**–0.671**	**–0.705**	**–0.690**	**–0.695**	**–0.705**
	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.185)
Log population	–0.030	0.008	–0.007	–0.065	–0.047
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.053)
Buenos Aires	**1.387**	**1.319**	**1.233**	**1.067**	**1.080**
	(0.216)	(0.220)	(0.227)	(0.268)	(0.271)
Córdoba	**1.100**	**1.127**	**1.115**	**0.972**	**0.997**
	(0.257)	(0.255)	(0.256)	(0.270)	(0.271)
Misiones	**1.746**	**1.428**	**1.305**	**1.163**	**1.117**
	(0.258)	(0.318)	(0.315)	(0.380)	(0.381)
Casa B		0.014			0.005
		(0.008)			(0.009)
NBI			**0.045**		
			(0.017)		
Municipal expenditures per capita				**–0.002**	–0.002
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	–0.975	**–1.582**	**–1.858**	0.296	–0.080
	(0.595)	(0.645)	(0.645)	(0.798)	(1.041)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920. For variable definitions see tables 4A.1 and 5A.10.

Appendix

Table 5A.1 Argentina: Model of Church Attendance

Dependent Variable	(1) Religion
Model	Ordered logit
Income	–0.014
	(0.034)
Education	–0.038
	(0.029)
Housing	0.037
	(0.072)
Gender	**0.646**
	(0.092)
Age	**0.020**
	(0.003)
Peronist	0.005
	(0.120)
Radical	0.056
	(0.135)
Log population	0.026
	(0.037)
Buenos Aires	–0.144
	(0.152)
Córdoba	**0.393**
	(0.160)
Misiones	**1.271**
	(0.174)
Cut 1	**1.558**
	(0.538)

(*Table continues on p. 166.*)

Table 5A.1 *Continued*

Dependent Variable	(1) Religion
Cut 2	**3.161**
	(0.545)
Cut 3	**4.059**
	(0.556)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.

Table 5A.2 Mexico: Models of Civic Participation

Dependent Variable	(1) Meet	(2) Comprob	(3) Belong
Model	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit
Income	0.097	–0.027	0.116
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.074)
Education	0.066	0.085	**0.241**
	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Class	**0.501**	**0.434**	0.222
	(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.122)
Gender	0.164	–0.072	**–0.295**
	(0.133)	(0.120)	(0.135)
Age	**0.100**	0.077	0.043
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.058)
PRI supporter	**0.896**	**0.384**	0.210
	(0.239)	(0.187)	(0.230)
PAN supporter	**0.809**	0.277	0.222
	(0.238)	(0.193)	(0.225)
PRD supporter	**0.798**	–0.146	0.032
	(0.325)	(0.289)	(0.385)
Rural	0.025	–0.024	0.102
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.123)
Chihuahua	**0.946**	0.276	0.369
	(0.246)	(0.231)	(0.265)
Michoacán	**0.943**	0.201	**0.777**
	(0.286)	(0.245)	(0.250)
Puebla	**0.542**	–0.091	0.236
	(0.266)	(0.229)	(0.285)
Constant	**–4.180**	**–2.394**	
	(0.563)	(0.502)	
Cut 1			**3.339**
			(0.535)
Cut 2			**5.481**
			(0.557)
Cut 3			**6.809**
			(0.596)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: See table 5.2 for a description of the dependent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,598.

Table 5A.3 Argentina: Models of Interpersonal Trust

Dependent Variable	(1) Neighbor	(2) Advantage	(3) Trust
Model	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit
Income	**0.115**	**0.085**	**0.071**
	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Education	–0.044	**0.054**	**0.088**
	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Housing	**0.172**	0.100	**–0.193**
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.080)
Gender	**–0.262**	0.106	**–0.217**
	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.092)
Age	–0.001	**0.012**	**0.007**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Peronist	0.038	0.041	**0.337**
	(0.138)	(0.121)	(0.119)
Radical	0.094	0.212	0.194
	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.144)
Log population	**–0.084**	–0.038	–0.000
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.042)
Buenos Aires	0.211	0.139	0.296
	(0.209)	(0.142)	(0.159)
Córdoba	–0.188	0.084	–0.090
	(0.206)	(0.177)	(0.218)
Misiones	**–0.442**	–0.007	–0.365
	(0.225)	(0.202)	(0.232)
Belong	0.188	0.105	**0.301**
	(0.113)	(0.086)	(0.073)
Comprob	**0.545**	0.048	**0.434**
	(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.126)
Constant	**1.381**	**–1.380**	
	(0.556)	(0.538)	
Cut 1			–0.825
			(0.613)
Cut 2			**2.086**
			(0.595)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.
Neighbor: Dummy for response, "I would leave my home in the care of a neighbor."
Advantage: Dummy for response, "The majority of people would not take advantage of you if they could."

Table 5A.4 Mexico: Models of Interpersonal Trust

Dependent Variable	(1) Neighbor	(2) Advantage	(3) Trust
Model	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit
Income	–0.037	**–0.200**	**–0.133**
	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.045)
Education	**0.210**	0.080	0.086
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.050)
Class	**0.205**	–0.074	0.165
	(0.101)	(0.113)	(0.094)
Gender	**–0.253**	–0.018	–0.128
	(0.113)	(0.128)	(0.102)
Age	0.026	0.000	0.042
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)
PRI supporter	0.343	0.081	0.133
	(0.179)	(0.173)	(0.186)
PAN supporter	**0.394**	–0.006	**0.419**
	(0.183)	(0.167)	(0.147)
PRD supporter	–0.136	0.393	0.329
	(0.224)	(0.272)	(0.213)
Rural	0.100	0.177	–0.050
	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.099)
Chihuahua	0.052	–0.243	**0.403**
	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.155)
Michoacán	–0.210	–0.138	0.014
	(0.200)	(0.207)	(0.227)
Puebla	–0.260	0.179	0.238
	(0.180)	(0.214)	(0.185)
Belong	0.154	–0.144	0.187
	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.106)
Comprob	**0.288**	0.014	**0.348**
	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.156)
Constant	**–1.090**	–0.065	
	(0.350)	(0.384)	
Cut 1			–0.612
			(0.403)
Cut 2			**1.575**
			(0.400)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,598.

Table 5A.5 Argentina: (Non-) Impact of Social Capital on Compliance

Dependent Variable	(1) Handout	(2) Favor	(3) Taxes	(4) Claim	(5) Military	(6) Stolen	(7) Corrupt	(8) Admission
Model	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Income	–0.057	–0.052	**0.090**	**0.110**	–0.031	0.084	0.041	0.049
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.091)	(0.047)
Education	0.036	0.019	0.023	0.046	0.039	0.007	0.112	0.019
	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.080)	(0.041)
Housing	–0.008	0.058	–0.036	0.019	**0.198**	0.004	**0.382**	0.033
	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.076)	(0.099)	(0.181)	(0.104)
Gender	0.016	0.030	–0.047	0.000	0.148	**0.523**	0.110	0.079
	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.093)	(0.109)	(0.090)	(0.134)	(0.247)	(0.109)
Age	–0.001	**–0.014**	**0.015**	**0.018**	**–0.012**	**0.042**	**0.034**	**0.028**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Peronist supporter	**–0.562**	**–0.778**	–0.164	**–0.376**	–0.130	–0.315	–0.513	–0.217
	(0.156)	(0.148)	(0.121)	(0.132)	(0.120)	(0.175)	(0.330)	(0.131)
Radical supporter	**–0.672**	–0.121	0.132	–0.285	–0.143	–0.081	–0.128	0.338
	(0.187)	(0.177)	(0.168)	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.223)	(0.440)	(0.227)
Log Pop	–0.028	**0.120**	**–0.075**	**–0.115**	0.022	–0.063	0.000	–0.023
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.049)
Buenos Aires	**1.385**	**1.241**	0.059	–0.037	–0.239	0.044	0.428	**0.928**
	(0.216)	(0.195)	(0.173)	(0.187)	(0.150)	(0.246)	(0.469)	(0.216)
Córdoba	**1.101**	**1.124**	0.204	–0.295	–0.002	0.153	–0.385	0.163
	(0.258)	(0.196)	(0.204)	(0.191)	(0.174)	(0.284)	(0.427)	(0.222)
Misiones	**1.741**	**1.347**	0.365	–0.278	0.171	–0.211	–0.003	0.445
	(0.257)	(0.237)	(0.230)	(0.204)	(0.240)	(0.268)	(0.474)	(0.252)
Meet	0.097	–0.084	–0.173	0.140	–0.016	**0.489**	0.006	–0.221
	(0.131)	(0.138)	(0.108)	(0.127)	(0.116)	(0.181)	(0.282)	(0.146)
Constant	–1.005	**–1.880**						
	(0.593)	(0.625)						
Cut 1			**–2.171**	**–2.811**	0.400	**–2.200**	–1.783	**–2.176**
			(0.531)	(0.641)	(0.677)	(0.752)	(1.151)	(0.746)
Cut 2			0.421	–1.033	**2.014**	–0.289	–0.411	0.215
			(0.529)	(0.644)	(0.682)	(0.753)	(1.172)	(0.694)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.

Table 5A.6 Mexico: (Non-) Impact of Social Capital on Compliance

Dependent Variable	(1) Handout	(2) Favor	(3) Taxes	(4) Claim	(5) Military	(6) Stolen	(7) Corrupt	(8) Fare
Model	Logit	Logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Income	–0.069	0.087	0.062	0.080	0.090	**0.214**	**0.213**	**0.192**
	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.073)
Education	–0.018	**0.146**	0.029	–0.017	–0.011	–0.065	–0.060	–0.097
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.060)
Class	0.179	–0.184	**–0.273**	**–0.204**	**–0.349**	**–0.559**	**–0.821**	**–0.513**
	(0.106)	(0.116)	(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.125)
Gender	0.125	–0.089	–0.026	0.126	–0.045	–0.050	0.066	0.069
	(0.108)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.100)	(0.115)	(0.103)
Age	–0.028	0.079	0.076	0.011	0.025	–0.033	0.024	0.090
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)
PRI supporter	–0.153	**–0.745**	–0.290	–0.284	–0.208	–0.033	–0.388	–0.072
	(0.205)	(0.199)	(0.162)	(0.145)	(0.167)	(0.171)	(0.213)	(0.179)
PAN supporter	–0.343	**–0.738**	–0.186	–0.238	–0.164	–0.177	–0.290	–0.131
	(0.180)	(0.212)	(0.156)	(0.135)	(0.154)	(0.177)	(0.222)	(0.186)
PRD supporter	0.297	–0.591	–0.087	–0.155	–0.136	0.152	–0.220	0.010
	(0.229)	(0.316)	(0.222)	(0.214)	(0.248)	(0.233)	(0.281)	(0.235)
Rural	**–0.261**	–0.157	0.019	0.104	–0.001	–0.025	0.053	–0.018
	(0.101)	(0.123)	(0.107)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.143)	(0.170)	(0.145)
Chihuahua	0.421	0.326	–0.394	0.216	–0.137	–0.016	**–0.896**	–0.066
	(0.226)	(0.199)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.195)	(0.259)	(0.279)	(0.254)
Michoacán	**0.600**	0.180	**–1.021**	–0.398	**–0.718**	**–0.601**	**–1.457**	–0.370
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.183)	(0.279)	(0.284)	(0.261)
Puebla	0.245	**0.604**	**–1.101**	**–0.537**	**–0.883**	**–0.832**	**–1.718**	**–0.886**
	(0.192)	(0.208)	(0.198)	(0.210)	(0.191)	(0.263)	(0.272)	(0.232)
Meet	0.237	–0.180	–0.238	**–0.461**	–0.215	–0.266	**–0.369**	**–0.357**
	(0.154)	(0.151)	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.162)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.169)
Constant	–0.499	–0.438						
	(0.423)	(0.384)						
Cut 1			**–2.860**	**–2.261**	**–2.910**	**–4.142**	**–5.117**	**–3.457**
			(0.448)	(0.416)	(0.378)	(0.536)	(0.576)	(0.518)
Cut 2			–0.829	–0.329	**–1.058**	**–1.904**	**–3.304**	**–1.345**
			(0.430)	(0.421)	(0.370)	(0.567)	(0.579)	(0.515)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,598.

Table 5A.7 Mexico: Effect of Municipal Economic Development on Institutional Trust

Dependent Variable	(1) Attention	(2) Attention	(3) Favor	(4) Favor
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Income	0.125	0.114	0.086	0.078
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Education	–0.062	–0.066	**0.137**	**0.136**
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Class	**–0.563**	**–0.554**	–0.206	–0.192
	(0.122)	(0.125)	(0.114)	(0.112)
Gender	–0.185	–0.189	–0.098	–0.100
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Age	–0.050	–0.046	0.075	0.073
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.047)
PRI supporter	**–0.939**	**–0.946**	**–0.773**	**–0.766**
	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.200)	(0.200)
PAN supporter	**–0.660**	**–0.677**	**–0.764**	**–0.759**
	(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.216)	(0.215)
PRD supporter	–0.172	–0.176	–0.611	–0.617
	(0.298)	(0.297)	(0.319)	(0.318)
Rural	0.043	0.128	–0.112	–0.089
	(0.132)	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.132)
Chihuahua	–0.120	–0.057	0.298	0.337
	(0.242)	(0.234)	(0.200)	(0.199)
Michoacán	**–1.125**	**–0.916**	0.240	0.301
	(0.406)	(0.284)	(0.300)	(0.250)
Puebla	–0.128	0.144	**0.684**	**0.775**
	(0.386)	(0.309)	(0.285)	(0.260)
Municipal own revenue	–0.000		0.001	
	(0.002)		(0.001)	
Municipal poverty rate		–1.780		–1.463
		(1.273)		(1.143)
Constant	**2.936**	**2.858**	–0.565	–0.407
	(0.666)	(0.463)	(0.501)	(0.386)
N	1588	1598	1588	1598

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$.
Favor: dummy for response, "people support the most important party in this neighborhood because it is concerned for everyone" (rather than because it does favors for people).
Attention: dummy for response, "when politicians pay attention to people like me, it is because they want to be reelected."

Table 5A.8 Mexico: Effect of Municipal Economic Development on Proceduralism

Dependent Variable	(1) Taxes	(2) Taxes	(3) Claim	(4) Claim	(5) Fare	(6) Fare
Model	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Income	0.062	0.076	0.082	0.085	**0.188**	**0.206**
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Education	0.032	0.028	–0.009	–0.012	–0.097	–0.094
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Class	**–0.300**	**–0.271**	**–0.256**	**–0.221**	**–0.547**	**–0.526**
	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.127)	(0.120)
Gender	0.027	–0.039	0.118	0.125	0.064	0.052
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.104)
Age	0.074	0.077	0.009	0.008	0.085	0.087
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.051)
PRI supporter	**–0.334**	**–0.352**	**–0.351**	**–0.376**	–0.127	–0.156
	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.147)	(0.149)	(0.180)	(0.179)
PAN supporter	–0.217	–0.217	**–0.285**	**–0.301**	–0.173	–0.182
	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.191)	(0.188)
PRD supporter	–0.119	–0.129	–0.200	–0.218	–0.033	0.031
	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.232)	(0.230)
Rural	–0.043	–0.107	0.000	–0.021	–0.050	–0.182
	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.162)	(0.150)
Chihuahua	**–0.473**	**–0.510**	0.064	0.053	–0.147	–0.217
	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.260)	(0.255)
Michoacán	**–1.196**	**–1.560**	**–0.721**	**–0.990**	–0.495	**–1.093**
	(0.255)	(0.306)	(0.237)	(0.356)	(0.338)	(0.347)
Puebla	**–1.294**	**–1.640**	**–0.882**	**–1.101**	**–1.007**	**–1.607**
	(0.261)	(0.307)	(0.275)	(0.336)	(0.306)	(0.318)
Municipal poverty rate	1.319		2.428		0.712	
	(1.216)		(1.298)		(1.652)	
Municipal own revenue		**–0.004**		**–0.004**		**–0.005**
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Cut 1	**–2.943**	**–3.737**	**–2.376**	**–3.179**	**–3.544**	**–4.653**
	(0.455)	(0.585)	(0.421)	(0.572)	(0.522)	(0.632)
Cut 2	**–0.915**	**–1.693**	–0.451	**–1.251**	**–1.437**	**–2.524**
	(0.437)	(0.567)	(0.427)	(0.574)	(0.522)	(0.626)
N	1598	1588	1598	1588	1598	1588

Source: Authors' compilations.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$.

Table 5A.9 Mexico: Self-Reported Social Class and Family Income, by State

	Baja California	Chihuahua	Michoacán	Puebla	Total
Social class					
Lower	28%	36%	41%	37%	35%
	(111)	(142)	(163)	(147)	(563)
Middle	64%	45%	42%	50%	50%
	(254)	(180)	(166)	(200)	(800)
Upper	6%	12%	9%	7%	9%
	(25)	(49)	(37)	(29)	(140)
No answer	3%	7%	9%	6%	6%
	(10)	(27)	(34)	(24)	(95)
Family monthly income					
Low	33%	36%	36%	33%	34%
	(131)	(145)	(144)	(130)	(550)
Middle	41%	38%	23%	40%	36%
	(164)	(153)	(93)	(158)	(568)
High	18%	5%	5%	5%	8%
	(69)	(21)	(20)	(21)	(131)
No answer	9%	20%	36%	23%	22%
	(36)	(79)	(143)	(91)	(349)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Total number of responses in parentheses.
Low income: 0 to 2,400 pesos per month.
Middle income: 2,401 to 8,000 pesos per month.
High income: 8,001 or more pesos per month.

Table 5A.10 Argentina: Average Municipal Poverty Rates, by Region (in Percentage)

Province	Casa B	NBI
Mar del Plata	6.4	10.9
Buenos Aires	13.4	14.8
Córdoba	8.8	11.4
Misiones	36.5	22.7

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Casa B: Percentage of households in the respondent's municipality with one of the following indicators of inadequate housing: No running water; no toilet facilities with sewage connection; dirt floors.
NBI: Percentage of households in the respondent's municipality with one of the following indicators of poverty: three or more inhabitants per room; precarious house not owned by residents; no indoor toilet facilities or toilets not connected to sewage system; one school-age child who does not attend school; households with four or more persons per employed member and in which the head of household has two years or less of schooling. See INDEC, Situación y Evolución Social (Sintesis N°4).

Table 5A.11 Argentina: (Non-) Impact of Poverty on Institutional Trust

Dependent Variable	(1) Service
Model	Logit
Income	–0.052
	(0.043)
Education	0.037
	(0.036)
Housing	–0.006
	(0.077)
Gender	**–0.313**
	(0.103)
Age	**–0.013**
	(0.004)
Peronist	**–0.234**
	(0.117)
Radical	–0.082
	(0.142)
Log population	0.041
	(0.038)
Buenos Aires	**–0.470**
	(0.189)
Córdoba	**–0.595**
	(0.186)
Misiones	**–1.387**
	(0.303)
Casa B	0.013
	(0.007)
Constant	1.054
	(0.570)

Source: Authors' compilations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Boldface indicates coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. N = 1,920.

Table 6.1 Argentina: Interpersonal Trust and the Democratic Culture of Skepticism

	Level of Interpersonal Trust	
	Low	High
Institutional trust		
Percentage who say government provides good services when it is monitored (Services)	58	53
Percentage who say governments are efficient because they want to be reelected (Efficient)	77	70
Percentage who say "no" politicians can be trusted if they are not monitored (Trustpol)	51	29
Clientelism		
Percentage who know local party representative (Know Party)	24	36
Percentage who would go to a party rep. for employment help (Job)	35	37
Percentage who received handouts during the campaign (Gift)	9	8
Proceduralism		
Percentage saying it is "never justified" to avoid paying taxes one owes (Taxes)	44	47
Percentage saying it is "never justified" to claim undeserved services (Claim)	68	71
Percentage saying it is "never justified" to not pay admission to a public event (Admission)	80	81

Source: Authors' compilations.

Table 6.2 Mexico: Interpersonal Trust and the Democratic Culture of Skepticism

	Level of Interpersonal Trust	
	Low	High
Institutional trust		
Percentage who say government provides good services when it is monitored (Services)	63	51
Percentage who say governments are efficient because they want to be reelected (Efficient)	74	52
Percentage who say "no" politicians can be trusted if they are not monitored (Trustpol)	33	11
Clientelism		
Percentage who know local party representative (Know Party)	21	26
Percentage who would go to a party rep. for employment help (Job)	27	33
Percentage who received handouts during the campaign (Gift)	17	15
Proceduralism		
Percentage saying it is "never justified" to avoid paying taxes one owes (Taxes)	46	49
Percentage saying it is "never justified" to claim undeserved services (Claim)	47	49
Percentage saying it is "never justified" to avoid paying a public transportation fare (Fare)	64	61

Source: Authors' compilations.

of politics in our more democratic regions, even if that personalizing was less pronounced than in our less democratic ones. We were surprised by the evident importance of the force of personality of Ernesto Ruffo, Baja California's first PAN governor, and of Patricio Martínez, the PRI leader who won Chihuahua back for the PRI after a period of opposition control. We also learned a valuable lesson about personality, trust, and democracy from leaders such as Elio Aprile, the Argentine mayor. More people in his region (than in the others we studied) believed that, when politicians are trustworthy, it is simply because they want to win more votes or because they fear reprisals. But Mayor Aprile still knew that, at key moments, his constituents would be swayed not by appeals to institutions or interests but by his personal reputation. When he first ran for office, and had no political record to appeal to, he courted voters by projecting an image of honesty. When he sought a popular mandate for a major development project, he