Table 1.1 Subjects Who Chose an Ingroup Allocator

Mutual Knowledge Condition (Study 3)		Unilateral Knowledge Condition (Study 4)	
Economics Allocator	Nursing Allocator	Economics Allocator	Nursing Allocator
.94 (15/16)	.80 (12/15)	.62 (10/16)	.57 (8/14)

Source: Authors' compilation.

Table 1.2 **Proportion of Endowment Psychology Participants Expected to Receive from Allocator, Regardless of Choice**

	Mutual Knowledge		Unilateral Knowledge	
	Economics	Nursing	Economics	Nursing
Ingroup	.31 (.18)	.36 (.15)	.32 (.17)	.45 (.08)
Outgroup	.41 (.13)	.43 (.08)	.36 (.20)	.41 (.09)

Source: Authors' compilation.
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Figure 2.1 Public Information Box with Nonanonymous Offerer

Source: Author-provided screenshots.
Notes: Player 2, the offerer, is "seen" by all players. Images are for illustration purposes only and are not the images of actual subjects.

Figure 2.2 Public Information Box with Anonymous Offerer



Source: Author-provided screenshots.
Notes: Player 2, the offerer, is anonymous. Images are for illustration purposes only and are not the images of our subjects.

Table 2.1 Discrimination Rates in Dictator Game

	Benchmark Coethnicity	Benchmark Coregion	Subjective Coethnicity	Subjective Coregion
Effect of in-group membership when offerer is anonymous	–0.03 (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)	0.08 (0.15)	0.08 (0.14)
Effect of in-group membership when offerer is seen	0.12* (0.07)	0.14*** (0.06)	0.28** (0.13)	0.24*** (0.11)
Difference	0.15 (0.12)	0.08 (0.09)	0.19 (0.21)	0.16 (0.18)
Observations	628	962	310	432

Source: Authors' calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, calculated using weighted OLS regression with weights to account for different assignment probabilities across groups. Disturbance terms are clustered for each player across all of his or her games. Cells in first two rows report average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) using exact matching to average over treatment effects obtained for offerers for each ethnic or regional group. Cells in third row report interaction terms from an OLS regression with weights to take account of different assignment probabilities for different groups.
*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.

Table 2.2 Within-Group Clustering of Policy Preferences

I	Ethnicity		Region	
	ANOVA *F*-test (*p*)	Kruskal-Wallis x^2 test (with Ties) (*p*)	ANOVA *F*-test (*p*)	Kruskal-Wallis x^2 test (with Ties) (*p*)
II				
First priority for public goods provision				
Drainage	0.25	0.25	0.91	0.91
Garbage collection	0.70	0.69	0.39	0.39
Security	0.67	0.66	0.25	0.25
III				
How public goods are to be provided				
Preference for fee-based garbage collection, over free but lower quality provision	0.88	0.66	0.51	0.72
It's better not to have to pay anything or to volunteer for patrols, even if that means security is low	0.35	0.23	0.73	0.80
It's better to have well-maintained drainage channels, even if we have to make contributions of money or labor	0.41	0.22	0.44	0.48

Source: Authors' calculations.
Notes: Analysis is limited to ten largest groups.

Table 2.3 Receivers' Expectations in Dictator Game

Marginal Effect	Dictator Game (Back End) (p)	n
Benchmark coethnicity	.12	385
	(.11)	
Benchmark coregion	.07	684
	(.04)*	
Subjective coethnicity	.21	385
	(.15)	
Subjective coregion	.15	675
	(.06)**	

Source: Authors' calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, calculated using weighted OLS regression with weights to account for different assignment probabilities across groups. Disturbance terms are clustered for each player across all of his or her games. Cells report average treatment effects on treated (ATT) using exact matching to average over treatment effects obtained for offerers for each ethnic or regional group.

Table 2.4 Partner Selection in Lockbox Game

Case	Share of Players Selecting Ingroup Members: Ethnicity (*N*)	Share of Players Selecting Ingroup Members: Region (*N*)	Expected Share Given Random Selection
One coethnic, one noncoethnic	0.55 (11)	0.53 (19)	0.50
One coethnic, two noncoethnics	0.39 (8)	0.33 (12)	0.33
Two coethnics, one noncoethnic	0.6 (5)	0.67 (6)	0.67

Source: Authors' calculations.

Figure 3.1 Orma Trust, $N = 37$



Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Player 1 offers.

Figure 3.2 Orma Trustworthiness, $N = 30$



Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Player 2 percentage return.

Figure 3.3 Ghana Trust, $N = 25$



Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Player 1 offers.

Figure 3.4 Ghana Trustworthiness, $N = 25$



Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Player 2 percentage return.

Table 3.1 Orma Trust and Network Centrality (Indegree), Player 1 Offers

Variable Divided by SD	Model 1	Model 2
Age	–0.760	
	(3.296)	
Education	15.650†	15.401*
	(8.090)	(7.505)
Household wealth	2.966	
	(3.952)	
Income	–6.851***	–6.193***
	(1.831)	(1.620)
Centrality: ln indegree	6.136†	6.078*
Sign. = one-tailed test	(4.773)	(3.066)
Constant	35.265***	33.697***
	(7.856)	(4.378)
Observations	37	37
R^2	.372***	.366***
Model significance	.001	.001

Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p = 0.001$, **$p = 0.01$, *$p = 0.05$, †$p = 0.1$

Table 3.2 Orma Trust and Network Centrality (Betweenness), Player 1 Offers

Variable Divided by SD	Model 1	Model 2
Age	2.167	
	(2.106)	
Education	18.589*	17.077*
	(7.523)	(7.275)
Household wealth	3.555	
	(4.424)	
Income	–6.042***	–4.839**
	(1.521)	(1.792)
Centrality: ln betweenness	1.103	1.793†
Sign. = one-tailed test	(1.532)	(1.400)
Constant	26.217*	29.017**
	(10.142)	(9.294)
Observations	37	37
R^2	.341***	.320**
Model significance	.001	.004

Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p = 0.001$, **$p = 0.01$ *$p = 0.05$ †$p = 0.1$

Table 3.3 Ghana Trust and Network Centrality (Betweenness), Player 1 Offers

Variable Divided by SD	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	0.559		
	(6.015)		
Female	−14.480		
	(11.496)		
Education	0.091		
	(3.112)		
Household wealth	5.018		
	(9.120)		
Income	3.673		
	(2.849)		
Centrality: betweenness	2.066*	2.538**	
Sign. in one-tailed test	(1.218)	(0.791)	
Centrality: ln betweenness			10.356*
Sign. in one-tailed test			(5.403)
Constant	35.285†	33.848***	32.237***
	(20.508)	(5.839)	(6.700)
Observations	25	25	25
R^2	.300**	.201**	.154†
Model significance	.002	.004	.068

Source: Author's calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p = 0.001$, **$p = 0.01$, *$p = 0.05$, †$p = 0.1$

Table 3.4 Orma Trustworthiness and Network Centrality (Indegree), Player 2 Returns

Variable Divided by SD	Model 1	Model 2
Age	–5.011	
	(9.318)	
Education	–4.272)	
	(9.039)	
Household wealth	27.975	
	(18.300)	
Income	–7.702	–8.811**
	(4.628)	(3.033)
Centrality: ln indegree	24.365**	21.461***
Sign. = one-tailed test	(9.017)	(6.268)
Constant	86.028**	81.825***
	(25.774)	(8.794)
Observations	30	30
R^2	.367**	.271**
Model significance	.012	.006

Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p = 0.001$, **$p = 0.01$, *$p = 0.05$, †$p = 0.10$

Table 3.5 Orma Trustworthiness and Network Centrality (Betweenness), Player 2 Returns

Variable Divided by SD	Model 1	Model 2
Age	4.314	
	(8.288)	
Education	–5.728	
	(9.083)	
Household wealth	18.485	
	(17.007)	
Income	–2.611	–5.636†
	(3.227)	(2.906)
Centrality: ln betweenness	9.561*	9.134***
Sign. = one-tailed test	(4.431)	(3.829)
Constant	33.401	53.526**
	(28.137)	(20.527)
Observations	30	30
R^2	.319*	.201†
Model significance	.015	.068

Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p = 0.001$, **$p = 0.01$, *$p = 0.05$, †$p = 0.10$

Figure 4.1 Two-Person Trust Game Decisions and Descriptive Statistics



Two-Person Investment Game Type X and Type Y – N = 34				
	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Tokens X sent	5.65	3.83	0	10
\$ Y returned	6.65	6.43	0	20
\$ X earned	11.00	5.08	0	20
\$ Y earned	20.29	9.09	0	40

Source: Authors' adaptation from Cox et al. (2009, 964).

Figure 4.2 **VCM Group Allocations—MPCR = 0.30, $N = 10$ Versus MPCR = 0.75**



Source: Authors' adaptation from Noussair and Walker (1999, 56).

Figure 4.3 **VCM Group Allocations—MPCR = 0.30, $N = 10$ Versus $N = 100$**



Source: Authors' adaptation from Noussair and Walker (1999, 56).

Figure 4.4 **VCM Group Allocations—MPCR = 0.30, $N = 10$ Versus MPCR = 0.03, $N = 40$**



Source: Authors' adaptation from Noussair and Walker (1999, 56).

Figure 7.1 Scatterplot of Trust in Chicago Communities over Time (N = 77)



Source: Authors' compilation based on PHDCN Community Survey (1995, 2002).

Figure 7.2 Geographic Distribution of 1995 Neighborhood Trust



Source: Authors' compilation based on NCDB (GeoLytics 2003) and PHDCN Community Survey (1995, 2002.)

Figure 7.3 Structural Cluster Configuration of Chicago Communities ($N = 77$), Overall Trust and Change in Trust, 1995 to 2002

(A)



(B)

	Low Trust Cluster IV	Med-Low Trust Cluster I	Med-High Trust Cluster II	High Trust Cluster III
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Indices internal to the cluster analysis				
Residents overall trust 2002	–1.553 (.37) ***	-.543 (.23) ***	.442 (.29) ***	1.478 (.31) ***
Change in trust in neighbors 1995 to 2002	–.215 (.32) *	.098 (.45)	.130 (.30) *	.142 (.24)
Exogenous indices				
Percentage residents below poverty 1970	26.391 (8.93) ***	14.996 (11.58) **	9.422 (6.55) *	5.295 (3.64) **
Change in percentage poor 1970 to 2000	12.729 (6.58) **	9.733 (6.27) **	5.156 (5.71) **	.750 (3.28) **

Source: Authors' compilation based on NCDB (GeoLytics 2003) and PHDCN Community Survey (1995, 2002).

Notes: (A) The shaded circles represent communities. Spatial location of communities relative to each other is based on multidimensional scaling (MDS). The shading and the loops around communities represent the corresponding cluster assignment based on a hierarchical cluster analysis (squared Euclidean distance, Ward method)

(B) Standard deviations in parentheses next to group means. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 7.4 Decentralized and Centralized Leadership Networks



Source: Authors' calculations based on PHDCN Key Informant Network Study (1995; Sampson 1995)
Notes: N = 2,813 leaders, 47 communities. Degree of connectedness reflects the degree of centralization. Dots are key informants, and the thickness of the connecting ties represents the number of the same alters (if any) that two informants have nominated. Hence respondents are connected through alters.

Table 7.1 Correlations Among Trust Dimensions

	Residents' Trust			Leaders' Trust			Institutional Trust					
	General	Neighbor	Police	General	Resident	Working	LawEnf	ComOrg	Church	School	Politics	Busins
Residents' general trust	1.000											
Residents' trust in neighbors	.680	1.000										
Residents' trust in police	.683	.740	1.000									
Leaders' general trust	.595	.581	.412	1.000								
Leaders' trust in residents	.441	.741	.738	.440	1.000							
Leaders' working trust	.769	.493	.400	.512	.186	1.000						
Trust in law enforcement	.618	.762	.696	.395	.717	.371	1.000					
Trust in community organizations	.082	.025	.265	.026	.248	.131	.143	1.000				
Trust in churches	−.095	.155	.020	.005	.219	−.135	.235	.023	1.000			
Trust in schools	−.044	.173	.089	−.115	−.030	−.140	.168	.091	.380	1.000		
Trust in politicians	.228	.355	.304	.265	.338	.076	.544	.297	.319	.460	1.000	
Trust in business organizations	.018	.243	.415	−.090	.379	−.051	.376	.328	.364	.227	.383	1.000
Collective efficacy (residents' reports)	.453	.811	.636	.326	.616	.168	.450	.134	.132	.226	.260	.062
Collective efficacy (leaders' reports)	.516	.783	.738	.562	.869	.315	.715	.288	.131	.053	.454	.260

Source: Authors' compilation based on PHDCN Community Survey and Key Informant Studies 2002 (Sampson 2002).

Table 7.2 Maximum Likelihood Spatial Regression of Residents' Overall Trust and Change in Trust in Neighbors

	Residents' Overall Trust 2002		Change in Trust in Neighbors 1995 to 2002	
	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std. Err
Constant	1.135	(.538)**	3.407	(.710)***
Percentage residents in poverty 1970	−.037	(.007)***	−.013	(.005)**
Change in percentage poor 1970 to 2000	−.067	(.010)***	−.029	(.008)***
Percentage residential stability	−.002	(.007)	.003	(.005)
Change percentage stability 1970 to 2000	−.002	(.008)	.004	(.005)
Racial diversity 1970	−.515	(.512)	−.383	(.295)
Change in diversity 1970 to 2000	.049	(.339)	.066	(.199)
1995 trust in neighbors			−.893	(.188)***
Spatial lag	.333	(.104)***	.060	(.147)
R^2	.735		.308	
N	77		77	

Source: Authors' compilation of NCDB (GeoLytics 2003) and PHDCN Community and Key Informant Surveys (1995, 2002; Sampson 1995, 2002).
***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$

Table 7.3 Maximum Likelihood Spatial Regression of Residents' Collective Efficacy and Change in Collective Efficacy

	Collective Efficacy 2002		Change in Collective Efficacy 1995 to 2002	
	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std. Err
Constant	1.776	(.386)***	2.383	(.484)***
Percentage residents in poverty 1970	−.004	(.002)**	−.005	(.002)**
Change in percentage poor 1970 to 2000	−.013	(.003)***	−.012	(.004)***
Percentage residential stability	.009	(.002)***	.010	(.002)***
Change percentage stability 1970 to 2000	.008	(.002)***	−.001	(.002)
Racial diversity 1970	−.105	(.136)	−.149	(.143)
Change in racial diversity 1970 to 2000	.082	(.091)	.081	(.096)
1995 collective efficacy			−.856	(.152)
Spatial lag	.330	(.117)***	.037	(.145)
R^2	.611		.371	
N	77		77	

Source: Authors' compilation based on NCDB (GeoLytics 2003) and PHDCN Community and Key Informant Surveys (1995, 2002; Sampson 1995, 2002).
***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$

Table 7.4 Regressions of Trust Dimensions in 2002 Among Key Informant Leaders: $N = 30$ Chicago Communities

	Leaders' General Trust		Leaders' Trust in Residents		Leaders' Working Trust		Trust in Law Enforcement	
	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std. Err
Constant	2.138	(.59)***	2.356	(.46)***	.874	(.25)***	1.834	(.34)***
Residents' trust in neighbors 1995	.084	(.16)	.451	(.12)***	–.159	(.07)**	.226	(.09)**
Percentage residents in poverty 1970	–.002	(.00)	–.010	(.00)**	–.004	(.00)**	–.007	(.00)**
Change in percentage poor 1970 to 2000	–.004	(.01)	.000	(.01)	–.008	(.00)***	–.006	(.00)*
Centralization of leader network 1995	1.246	(1.38)	–1.052	(1.08)	1.301	(.59)**	–.476	(.78)
Change in centralization of leader network 1995 to 2002	2.036	(1.77)	–1.635	(1.39)	2.423	(.76)***	1.813	(1.01)*
R^2		.263		.745		.494		.756

Source: Authors' compilation based on NCDB 1970–2000 (GeoLytics 2003) and PHDCN Key Informant Panel Survey (1995, 2002; Sampson 1995, 2002).
***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, *$p < .10$

Table 9.1 Descriptive Statistics

1. Loan Characteristics (Values in 1840)

Characteristic	All Markets	Without Paris
Average loan size (francs)	3,860	1,847
Median loan size (francs)	—	500
Average loan duration (years)	4.62	4.68

2. Variables and Measures of Trust and Social Capital

Variable Name	Description/Units	Mean	SD
Dependent variables (values in selected periods)			
Per capita stock of loans in 1740	livres	54.00	110.22
Per capita stock of loans in 1780	livres	70.03	159.90
Per capita stock of loans in 1807	francs	53.09	82.76
Per capita stock of loans in 1899	francs	270.69	294.68
Social capital measures			
Oath scale	Index of fraction of priests taking oath of loyalty to the revolutionary constitution in 1791, with higher score on 1-to-6 scale meaning more priests took the oath	3.29	1.52
Intermediate score	Dummy variable equaling 1 if score on 1-to-6 oath scale was 2, 3, or 4; variable equals 0 otherwise.	0.59	0.49
Turnout 1849	Vote turnout in 1849 (percentage eligible voters)	70.59	8.32
Resist draft: self-mutilate	Local draftees (per 1,000 recruits) exempted 1820–1830 for loss of a finger, presumably due to self-mutilation. Because it could be zero, what was entered in the regressions was the logarithm of this variable plus 0.01.	1.10	0.88

(*Table continues on p. 258.*)

Table 9.1 Descriptive Statistics (*continued*)

2. Variables and Measures of Trust and Social Capital

Variable Name	Description/Units	Mean	SD
Resist draft: fail to report	Local draftees (per 1,000 recruits) who failed to report in 1820–1830. Because it could be zero, what entered the regressions was the logarithm of this variable plus 0.01.	6.13	12.59
Verdicts (value in 1840)	Verdicts against defendants in civil and criminal trials (per 100 inhabitants)	0.85	0.61
Verdicts (value in 1865)	Verdicts against defendants in civil and criminal trials (per 100 inhabitants)	0.67	0.23
Verdicts (value in 1899)	Verdicts against defendants in civil and criminal trials (per 100 inhabitants)	0.83	0.83
Trust measures			
Annuity share 1740	Share of perpetual annuities in total stock 1740	0.72	0.27
Annuity share 1780	Share of perpetual annuities in total stock 1780	0.50	0.31
Other variables (value in selected periods)			
City population (in 1840)	Population of city where registration office located	19,853	85,734
Banks (number in 1840)	Number of banks; because it could be zero, what was entered in the regressions was the logarithm of this variable plus 1.	4.46	21.06
Wealth (value in 1840)	Property tax per 1,000 people (francs)	4.69	1.35
Voters	Number of men eligible to vote in 1840	213.00	1,113.22
Illiteracy	Percentage of draftees who are illiterate, 1820 to 1830	49.82	19.62

Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix.
Notes: For detailed description of the variables, see text and appendix. Table shows per capita stock of loans for 1740, 1780, 1807, and 1899. Values for other variables are shown for the first and last dates they are available only. Monetary amounts in 1740 and 1780 were in livres, which equaled 0.989 francs, the currency unit created during the French Revolution. To get a sense of the value of the value of the amounts involved, in 1740 an unskilled day laborer earned 1 livre a day in Paris; in 1840, his wages had climbed to roughly 2.4 francs a day; and by 1899, they were nearly 5 francs a day. We did not compute median loan sizes for all markets including Paris because of the different sampling strategy used with the Paris records. The average loan duration is calculated weighting durations by loan sizes.

Table 9.2 Hypotheses and Expected Signs of Regression Coefficients

If Trust Is Related to Social Capital	
Measure of Social Capital	Expected Sign of Coefficient
Intermediate score	Negative
Oath scale	Negative
Turnout in 1849	Positive
Resist draft: self-mutilate	Negative
Resist draft: fail to report	Negative
Verdicts	Negative
If Trust Is Persistent	
Measure of Trust	Expected Sign of Coefficient
Annuity share 1740	Positive
Annuity share 1780	Positive

Source: Authors' model and argument made in text.

Table 9.3 Test of Both Hypotheses: Selected Coefficients from Panel Regressions, 1840 to 1899

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
City population	0.38	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.39	0.37	0.06
	4.99	4.82	4.85	4.91	5.34	5.05	0.28
Banks	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.13	–0.12
	1.71	1.73	1.77	1.82	1.84	1.57	–0.98
Wealth	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.11
	1.82	1.73	1.63	1.63	1.52	1.70	0.89
Social capital measure	intermediate score	oath scale	turnout 1849	resist draft: self-mutilate	resist draft: fail to report	verdicts	verdicts
Social capital coefficient	–0.13	–0.11	0.36	0.06	–0.06	0.14	0.22
	–1.04	–1.05	0.74	1.81	–2.33	1.26	1.40
N	290	290	294	299	302	302	302
Specification of effects	random	random	random	random	random	random	fixed
Fraction of variance due to effects	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.66

Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix.
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita stock of outstanding loans, and the explanatory variables are all logarithms, except for *intermediate score,* which is a dummy variable equal to 1 in markets that had intermediate scores on the oath taking scale. See table 9.1 and the text for details. *Banks* and *city population* are lagged. The regression also included dummy variables for the different cross sections to capture changes in the interest rate and other time varying effects. Coefficient estimates are on the top of each cell, *T*-statistics are below.

Table 9.4 Test of Both Hypotheses: Selected Coefficients from Panel Regressions, 1740 to 1899

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
City population	0.55 12.28	0.55 12.19	0.55 12.65	0.54 12.63	0.55 13.04	0.53 12.46	0.54 12.46
Social capital measure	intermediate score	oath scale	turnout 1849	resist draft: self-mutilate	resist draft: fail to report	verdicts in 1840	verdicts in 1865
Social capital coefficient	–0.02 –0.15	–0.06 –0.67	0.13 0.31	0.03 0.88	–0.04 –1.75	0.10 1.20	0.05 0.35
N	498	498	505	513	518	518	518
Specification of effects	random	random	random	random	random	random	random
Fraction of variance due to effects	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.30	0.30

Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix.
Notes: Because the variable *verdicts* is not available before 1840, regression 6 was run using its value in 1840 for the entire panel; regression 7 did the same, using value in 1865. The other explanatory variables and the dependent variable are as in table 9.3, except that *banks* and *wealth* are omitted. Coefficient estimates are on the top of each cell, *T*-statistics are below.

Table 9.5 Is Trust Related to Social Capital? Selected Cross-Sectional Regression Coefficients

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Year of Cross Section	1865	1865	1865	1865	1865	1865	1865	1840
Variable								
City population	0.27	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.33
	1.66	1.64	1.48	1.65	1.53	1.61	1.65	2.10
Banks	–0.08	–0.09	–0.06	–0.06	–0.07	–0.08	–0.08	–0.01
	–0.59	–0.64	–0.43	–0.38	–0.49	–0.57	–0.57	–0.07
Wealth	0.38	0.41	0.37	0.36	0.35	0.34	0.35	–0.01
	1.39	1.40	1.30	1.23	1.26	1.23	1.29	–0.04
Voters	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.21	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.19
	1.83	1.72	1.81	1.51	1.84	2.03	1.88	1.40
Illiteracy	–0.34	–0.36	–0.34	–0.31	–0.34	–0.30	–0.39	–0.51
	–1.67	–1.71	–1.62	–1.45	–1.65	–1.48	–1.84	–2.26
Social capital measure	none	intermediate score	oath scale	turnout 1849	resist draft: self-mutilate	resist draft: fail to report	verdicts in 1840	resist draft: fail to report
Social capital coefficient		–0.05	–0.19	0.13	0.06	–0.05	–0.13	–0.07
		–0.28	–1.26	0.19	1.24	–1.26	–0.94	–1.76
N	90	86	86	87	89	90	90	91
R^2	0.46	0.45	0.46	0.45	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47

Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix.
Notes: There are two new explanatory variables in some of the cross-sectional regressions. The first is *illiteracy*, the logarithm of the illiteracy rate among local military recruits, as measured in the years 1820 through 1830. The second is *voters*, the fraction of tax payers in 1840 who were wealthy enough to meet the property requirements for voting; it is a measure of inequality, since it rises as the distribution of wealth becomes more unequal. Both of these new variables enter the regressions as logarithms. For further details about the two new variables, see table 9.1. The dependent variable in the regressions and all the other explanatory variables are as in table 9.3, with lagged values (from the previous cross section) of *banks* and *city population*. Regression also included a constant term. Coefficient estimates are on the top of each cell, *T*-statistics are below.

Table 9.6 Is Trust Persistent? Selected Coefficients from Panel Regressions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Panel	1740 to 1899	1740 to 1899	1840 to 1899	1840 to 1899	1840 to 1899	1840 to 1899	1780 to 1899	1807 to 1899
Variable								
City population	0.005	0.54	0.03	0.36	0.34	0.36	0.50	0.51
	0.03	12.83	0.16	5.03	4.70	5.09	12.00	12.01
Banks			–0.12	0.15	0.13	0.14		
			–0.97	1.76	1.58	1.66		
Wealth			0.10	0.19	0.15	0.18		
			0.79	1.75	1.40	1.71		
Trust measure	none	none	none	none	annuity share 1740	annuity share 1780	annuity share 1740	annuity share 1780
Coefficient of trust measure	0.82	0.58	0.78	0.54	3.93	3.17	4.27	3.22
N	518	518	302	302	299	299	514	407
Specification of effects	fixed	random	fixed	random	random	random	random	random
Fraction of variance due to effects	0.63	0.30	0.67	0.32	0.28	0.29	0.26	0.29

Source: Authors' compilation based on sources described in the appendix.
Notes: Annuity share 1740 and 1780 are not entered as logarithms. All the variables are logarithms and are the same as in tables 9.3 and 9.4. Banks and city populations are lagged. Regression also included dummy variables for the different cross sections to capture changes in interest rate and other time-varying effects. Coefficient estimates are on the top of each cell, *T*-statistics are below.

Figure 10.1 Trust in Courts and Judges



Source: Author's calculations, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).
Note: DK = don't know; VL = very low; SL = somewhat low; U = undecided if low or high; SH = somewhat high; VH = very high.

Figure 10.2 **Change in Predicted Probability of High Trust as Key Variables Move from Maximum to Minimum**



Source: Author's calculations, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).

Table 10.1 Survey Questions and Responses

Questions	Frequency (%)	Coded
"How much confidence do you have in local courts? Would you say that your trust in local courts is very high, somewhat high, undecided if high or low, somewhat low, or very low?"		
Very high	5.5	4
Somewhat high	37.8	3
Undecided if high or low	29.3	2
Somewhat low	18.9	1
Very low	6.5	0
Don't know	1.7	—
"How much confidence do you have in judges? Would you say that your trust in local courts is very high, somewhat high, undecided if high or low, somewhat low, or very low?"		
Very high	6.5	4
Somewhat high	38.8	3
Undecided if high or low	29.0	2
Somewhat low	17.3	1
Very low	6.9	0
Don't know	1.3	—
"How do you feel about the performance of [name], the president of the Philippines? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, undecided if satisfied or not, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?"		
Very satisfied	8.9	4
Somewhat satisfied	36.5	3
Undecided if satisfied or not	16.5	2
Somewhat dissatisfied	21.6	1
Very dissatisfied	16.1	0
Don't know	0.1	—
"Whether rich or poor, people who have cases in court receive equal treatment. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, are undecided if you agree or disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?"		
Strongly agree	4.5	4
Somewhat agree	22.0	3
Undecided if agree or disagree	19.8	2
Somewhat disagree	23.0	1
Strongly disagree	19.7	0
Don't know	0.7	—
"How much corruption do you think is there in our judiciary? None, a little, somewhat much, or very much?"		
None	19.2	3
A little	17.9	2
Somewhat much	34.8	1
Very much	27.2	0
Don't know	0.7	—

Source: Author's compilation, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).

Table 10.2 Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Trust in local courts	1179	2.172	1.021	0	4
Trust in judges	1184	2.209	1.034	0	4
Satisfaction with president	1198	.501	.315	0	1
Equality of treatment	1190	.536	.281	0	1
Judicial corruption	1191	.568	.356	0	1
Age	1200	42.3	15.6	18	88
Class	1200	1.986	.628	1	4
Gender (male = 1)	1200	.500	.500	0	1
Religious affiliation (Muslim = 1)	1200	.017	.129	0	1

Source: Author's calculations, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).

Table 10.3 Respondents' Demographic Characteristics by Court Experience

Variable	No Experience	Experience
Mean age	41.5	44.8
Percentage male	47.0	58.9
Percentage Muslim	2.4	—
Class (percentage of sample)		
Upper (AB)	2.8	3.0
Middle (C)	9.5	12.8
Poor (D)	69.6	68.1
Destitute (E)	18.0	15.9

Source: Author's calculations, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).

Table 10.4 Trust in Local Courts and Judges, Ordered Probit Estimates, Full Samples

	Local Courts	Judges
Experience	.095	.126
	(.218)	(.216)
Satisfaction with president	.608**	.588**
	(.117)	(.117)
Experience × satisfaction with president	−.315*	−.436**
	(.230)	(.229)
Equality of treatment	.234**	.369**
	(.108)	(.108)
Experience × equality of treatment	.512**	.428**
	(.218)	(.218)
Corruption	−.205**	−.235**
	(.102)	(.101)
Experience × corruption	−.299*	−.263
	(.219)	(.217)
Controls		
Class	−.066*	−.056
	(.050)	(.049)
Age	−.001	−.003*
	(.002)	(.002)
Gender (male = 1)	−.085*	.010
	(.062)	(.062)
Religious affiliation (Muslim = 1)	.256	−.070
	(.243)	(.237)
N	1,165	1,168
Likelihood ratio $x^2(11)$	83.60	89.79
Prob > x^2	.000	.000

Source: Author's compilation, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; cut-points not shown for ease of presentation.
*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, one-tailed test

Table 10.5 Trust in Local Courts and Judges, Ordered Probit Estimates, No Undecided Respondents

	Local Courts	Judges
Experience	.108	.267
	(.266)	(.278)
Satisfaction with president	.778**	.789**
	(.142)	(.142)
Experience × satisfaction with president	−.425*	−.727**
	(.283)	(.285)
Equality of treatment	.208*	.360**
	(.134)	(.133)
Experience × equality of treatment	.727**	.610**
	(.264)	(.267)
Corruption	−.284**	−.308**
	(.126)	(.126)
Experience × corruption	−.362*	−.412*
	(.271)	(.282)
Controls		
Class	−.096*	−.091*
	(.064)	(.064)
Age	−.001	−.001
	(.002)	(.002)
Gender (male = 1)	−.114*	−.001
	(.078)	(.077)
Religious affiliation (Muslim = 1)	.546*	−.053
	(.335)	(.282)
N	817	825
Likelihood ratio $x^2(11)$	90.30	93.57
Prob > x^2	.000	.000

Source: Author's calculations, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; cut-points not shown for ease of presentation.
*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, one-tailed test

Table 10.6 Trust in Local Courts and Judges by Experience, Ordered Probit Estimates, Split Samples

	Without Experience		With Experience	
	Local Courts	Judges	Local Courts	Judges
Satisfaction with president	.622**	.589**	.220	.136
	(.118)	(.118)	(.199)	(.199)
Equality of treatment	.243**	.368**	.773**	.801**
	(.109)	(.108)	(.193)	(.194)
Corruption	−.203**	−.242**	−.505**	−.510**
	(.102)	(.102)	(.195)	(.194)
Controls				
Class	−.020	−.047	−.224**	−.092
	(.057)	(.057)	(.100)	(.098)
Age	−.003*	−.003*	.008**	−.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.004)	(.004)
Gender (male = 1)	−.049	.048	−.223**	−.110
	(.072)	(.071)	(.128)	(.127)
Religious affiliation (Muslim = 1)	.252	−.073		
	(.244)	(.237)		
N	879	880	286	288
Likelihood ratio $x^2(10)$	5.00	54.42	38.81	31.93
Prob > x^2	.000	.000	.000	.000

Source: Author's calculations, based on Social Weather Survey (Social Weather Stations 1999).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; cut-points not shown for ease of presentation.
*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, one-tailed test

Figure 11.1 Sample Institutional Trust Question

P34ST. (Show card 07). Please, look at this card and tell me, how much trust (*confianza*) do you have in each one of these groups/institutions (READ EACH ONE OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND ASK) Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), little (3), or no (4) trust (confianza) in… (MARK A RESPONSE FOR EACH ONE) (ROTATE)

	A Lot	Some	Little	None	DK	NR
P34STA. Large Businesses.....1		2	3	4	8	0
P34STB. The Judiciary.....1		2	3	4	8	0
P34STC. The President.....1		2	3	4	8	0
P34STD. Political Parties.....1		2	3	4	8	0
P34STE. Newspapers 1		2	3	4	8	0
P34STF. The National Congress/ Parliament.....1		2	3	4	8	0
P34STG. The Stock Exchange...1		2	3	4	8	0
P34STH. Municipalities.....1		2	3	4	8	0

P34ST. **(MOSTRAR TARJETA 07)** Por favor, mire esta tarjeta y dígame, ¿cuánta confianza tiene en cada uno de estos grupos/instituciones? **(LEA CADA UNA DE LAS INSTITUCIONES Y PREGUNTE)** ¿Diría que tiene mucha (1), algo (2), poca (3), o ninguna (4) confianza en....? **(MARQUE UNA RESPUESTA PARA CADA UNA) (ROTAR)**

	MUCHO	ALGO	POCO	NINGUNA	NS	NR
P34STA. Grandes Empresas.....	1	2	3	4	8	0
P34STB. El Poder Judicial.....	1	2	3	4	8	0
P34STC. Presidente.....	1	2	3	4	8	0
P34STD. Los partidos políticos...	1	2	3	4	8	0
P34STE. Diarios.....	1	2	3	4	8	0
P34STF. El Congreso Nacional/ Parlamento	1	2	3	4	8	0
P34STG. Bolsa de comercio.....	1	2	3	4	8	0
P34STH. Municipalidades.....	1	2	3	4	8	0

Source: Authors' translation of Latinobarometer 2004 Questionnaire.
Notes: DK = Don't know
NR = No response

Figure 11.2 Corruption and Trust in Congress



Source: Authors' compilation based on data from Latinobarometer and Transparency International datasets.
Note: See note 9 for country codes.

Figure 11.3 Corruption and Trust in the President



Source: Authors' compilation based on data from Latinobarometer and Transparency International datasets.
Note: See note 9 for country codes.

Figure 11.4 Corruption and Trust in Public Administration



Source: Authors' compilation based on data from Latinobarometer and Transparency International datasets.
Note: See note 9 for country codes.

Figure 11.5 Corruption and Trust in Government



Source: Authors' compilation based on data from Latinobarometer and Transparency International datasets.
Note: See note 9 for country codes.

Figure 11.6 Regional Levels of Institutional Trust, Mexico and Argentina



Source: Authors' compilation based on survey data reported in Cleary and Stokes (2006).

Table 11.1 Almond and Verba: Social Trust and Distrust

Percentage Who Agree That	United States	United Kingdom	Germany	Italy	Mexico
Statements of distrust					
"No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it."	38	45	72	61	78
"If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you."	68	75	81	73	94
Statements of trust					
"Most people can be trusted."	55	49	19	7	30
"Most people are more inclined to help others than to think of themselves first."	31	28	15	5	15
"Human nature is fundamentally cooperative."	80	84	58	55	82
Total number of respondents	970	963	955	995	1,007

Source: Almond and Verba 1963, 213, table IX.2.

Table 11.2 Interpersonal Trust and Civic Participation in Mexico and Argentina

	Mexico			Argentina		
	No Trust	(100.0) Trust	(1,155.0) Total	No Trust	(100.0) Trust	(1,900.0) Total
Does belong (one or more)	157	86	243	329	133	462
	(15.8)	(21.1)	(17.4)	(22.1)	(32.3)	(24.3)
	(64.6)	(35.4)	(100.0)	(71.2)	(28.8)	(100.0)
Does not belong	834	321	1,155	1,159	279	1,438
	(84.2)	(78.9)	(82.6)	(77.9)	(67.7)	(75.7)
	(72.2)	(27.8)	(100.0)	(80.6)	(19.4)	(100.0)
Total	991	407	1,398	1,488	412	1,900
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)
	(70.9)	(29.1)	(100.0)	(78.3)	(21.7)	(100.0)

Source: Authors' compilation based on Cleary and Stokes (2006).
Note: Each cell lists the number of responses, followed by the column percentage and the row percentage.

Table 11.3 Interpersonal Trust and Political Participation in Four Latin American Countries

	No Trust	Trust	Total
Does participate	1,198	325	1,523
(one or more	(31.5)	(40.7)	(33.1)
activities)	(78.7)	(21.3)	(100.0)
No participation	2,604	473	3,077
	(68.5)	(59.3)	(66.9)
	(84.6)	(15.4)	(100.0)
Total	3,802	798	4,600
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)
	(82.7)	(17.3)	(100.0)

Source: Authors' compilation based on Klesner (2007, 12), based on data from World Values Survey.

Notes: Data are pooled responses from four Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru). Each cell lists the estimated number of responses (calculated from the bottom panel of table 2 in Klesner 2007, 12), followed by the column percentage and the row percentage. The *N* reported in each cell is calculated from the cell percentages offered by Klesner, and might be slightly inaccurate due to rounding.

Table 11.4 Partisanship and Trust in Congress in Venezuela

	1995 to 1998			2000 to 2005		
	Right	Left	Total	Right	Left	Total
No trust	1,479	857	2,336	1,352	875	2,227
	74.3%	79.2%	76.0%	67.3%	58.3%	63.5%
Trust	513	225	738	658	625	1,283
	25.8%	20.8%	24.0%	32.8%	41.7%	36.6%
Total	1,992	1,082	3,074	2,010	1,500	3,510
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Authors' compilation based on data from Latinobarometer.