Introduction

As Matthew Cleary and Susan Stokes have noted (2006), the Russell Sage Foundation Trust Project has produced three key innovations: the change in focus from trust to trustworthiness (Hardin 2002; Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005), the recognition that trust is only one of many potential sources of cooperative behavior (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005), and the reminder that in many strategic situations actors are better served by skepticism or a healthy level of distrust than trust (Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Cleary and Stokes 2006; Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005). The chapters in this volume develop these themes by exploring them in a wide array of settings, at very different levels of analysis, and with varied disciplinary lenses.

Theorists often assume that trust is critical to managing everyday affairs in politics, business, and social life. Some even go as far as declaring trust as necessary and good. But these claims, both empirical and normative, have not been fully put to the test in the social science of trust. Trust cannot be good in contexts in which it is not merited. To trust strangers, for example, is taking a risk that may end badly, as many of those who enter social or economic relationships mediated by the Internet can attest. And certainly we would not say in normative language that trust in such contexts is inherently of value. As Russell Hardin clearly argued, we might desire those we interact with to be trustworthy, and that might generally be good for society, but we can make no such general claim about trust (2002). The chapters included in part I of this volume develop this insight more fully by clarifying the conditions under which we find others to be trustworthy and on what bases. Part II treats trust as mediated by organizations and networks providing the context in which trust extends our
capacity to engage with one another over matters of substance. Part III moves up a level of analysis to spell out the institutional backing required for relations of trust and cooperation more generally. Here we also see the causal role of trust at the macro level addressed. There is a natural progression of the work reported in this volume, from interpersonal and intergroup relations to larger scale organizations, social networks, and institutions. At each level, the authors address key issues in the formation and role of trust in various social and cultural contexts.

Too much of the recent literature on trust treats trust as necessary for cooperation. The more nuanced understanding of trust advanced in the Russell Sage Foundation research program reveals the multiple sources of cooperation. It also provides an advance in understanding what sources are likely to matter under what conditions and with what sets of actors. By more adequately theorizing interpersonal trust, it is obvious that it is but one among many sources of cooperation. Moreover, it is neither always available nor always preferable as a basis for cooperation. In some circumstances, interpersonal trust may actually be an impediment.

Although the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital captures one aspect of when networks of trust and reciprocity produce exclusionary cooperation (Putnam 2000), it does not go far enough in revealing the dynamics of interaction and intergroup relations. Here the considerable advances in social psychology, particularly those derived from the experimental tradition of research represented in part I, provide clear evidence of the conditions under which relations of trust emerge between persons and members of groups distinguished by different status markers.

One of the major emphases of the Trust Project has been on situations in which ethnic, racial, or other markers facilitate certain kinds of trust relationships while inhibiting others and when they do not. For example, evidence of the trustworthiness of white police in black neighborhoods (Tyler and Huo 2002) or of middle-class government agents with working class clients (Peel 1998) may foster cooperation and ameliorate power relationships between street-level bureaucrats and those they are meant to serve (Lipsky 1980). In other instances, intraethnic relationships are themselves problematic. Often when immigrants are victimized it is by the conationals on whom the newer arrivals depend and whom they initially believed trustworthy (Nee and Sanders 2000). Sometimes the immigrants are simply calculating that the potential return is worth the risk of exploitation. Sometimes they have no choice given conditions in their home countries, but sometimes they are mistaken in their assessments of the trustworthiness of those with whom they are dealing.

Why is it that cultural markers sometimes are indicators of trustworthiness and facilitate cooperation, and what accounts for the abuse of these same markers to take advantage of others? The documentation of
variation is a first step, but we also need an explanation of why we should have different expectations in different contexts. The markers some once thought might be good bases for trusting relationships may be deceptive—at least under certain circumstances.

Cost-benefit calculations take us some distance. When there are great returns from deception and relatively little punishment for exploitative behavior, we expect more of it. But the cost-benefit calculation is not always straightforward. A strategic reason to cooperate may in fact stimulate the creation of institutions for monitoring and sanctioning. Historical research on long-distance medieval trade suggests that the Maghrebi traders developed a set of rules and procedures to govern their interactions with each other, and this enabled them to form beliefs about the credible trustworthiness of other traders (Greif 1994). The motivation for establishing such arrangements was the profitability of the trade. The effectiveness of these arrangements rested on a shared written language and the high likelihood of loss of status and friends, as well as income, in cases of betrayal.

Field experiments on trust relations, ethnic markers, and cooperation add even more context. It seems that it may be easier to locate a coethnic in a complex setting, and that they are also likely to be more cooperative given the existence of ingroup norms and sanctions (Habyarimana et al. 2009; see also chapter 2, this volume). Other field experiments suggest that the more economically developed a society, the more likely it is that individuals will cooperate (Barr 2004; Henrich et al. 2004). Thus it seems that when there is mutual advantage to cooperation and enforceable ingroup norms, cultural markers may well serve as bases of trustworthiness that facilitate cooperation. These findings are consistent with the increased emphasis on cooperation generated by the iterated and long-term relationships embodied in some communities and networks (Putnam 2000; Taylor 1987 [1976]).

It is not simply identity per se that matters. It is typically the norms and sanctions that accompany group membership that motivate cooperation (Cook and Hardin 2001) and the expectation of generalized exchange (chapter 1, this volume). Coethnics who exploit immigrants not only derive economic advantage from doing so, they have also come to belong to a different normative community or none whatsoever. Thus it would be a mistake to assume that those who share a cultural marker can always trust each other, and it is equally wrong to assume that those whose markers are different can never trust one another.

The Trust Project has focused considerable attention on sources of cooperation other than trust relations as well as developing better evidence concerning how trustworthiness is assessed especially in high-risk settings. Sophisticated models of signaling (Bacharach and Gambetta 2000), combined with empirical research to test these models (Gambetta and Hamill
suggest that individuals can cultivate a capacity to recognize who
is likely to be trustworthy, even when theft of property and loss of life are
the potential consequences of ill-chosen transactional partners. Of course,
the tendency to misread signals still exists, as does the possibility of mak-
ing tragic mistakes.

As history reminds us, however, institutions generally provide the best
defense against the untrustworthy. According to Margaret Levi, “good
defenses make good neighbors” (2000). The argument that trust is not the
only, let alone always the best, source of cooperative behavior has a long
intellectual history, dating back at least to the early work of David Hume
and James Madison. Both men emphasized the institutional bases of
reaching agreements and resolving disputes, and that the major source of
such institutions in complex societies is government.

State institutions encourage cooperation by providing third-party
enforcement to insure personal safety and the security of exchange. The
more government actors elicit confidence in the government’s capacity to
enforce the laws relatively fairly and without too great a cost, the more
likely they are to elicit cooperation and compliance with the state (Cook,
Hardin, and Levi 2005; Levi 1997; Tyler 1990). The more the state demonstra-
ates the reliability and neutrality of its institutions, the more it is able
to facilitate the establishment of personal trustworthiness by allowing indi-
viduals to begin relationships with relatively small risks as they learn about
each other, and by providing insurance against failed trust. Increased
civic engagement, improved economic growth, and widespread compli-
ance with government policies are among the possible consequences.

In an earlier volume, we offered an account of how, why, and when
state institutions produce cooperative behavior with positive outcomes
for the polity and society (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005, chapter 8). In the
process, we contradicted the de Tocqueville thesis, as revised by Putnam,
that civic association is the principal mechanism for promoting democ-
racy and better government generally. There is some empirical evidence
of a correlation between dense civic associational life and effective gov-
ernment, but not the clear causal link that de Tocqueville suggested or is
central to Putnam’s social capital argument. Our claim is that a respon-
sive, fair, competent, and benevolent state is a reliable and even trust-
worthy one and thus likely to successfully elicit compliance and consent
from citizens. It is in this sense that state effectiveness depends on the
acquiescence and confidence of citizens. As Cleary and Stokes argue in
chapter 11 of this volume, government is a key player in bringing this
result about, not just a beneficiary of existing trust within the polity.

Simultaneously, we argue for the liberal view advocating institution-
alized distrust of government (see also Braithwaite 1998; Hardin 2002;
Pettit 1998). Healthy skepticism keeps constituents alert and public officials
therefore responsive, but only if transparency is designed into state insti-
tutions so that wary citizens may be constructively vigilant. It is likely that widespread, deep distrust of government, going well beyond healthy skepticism, can undermine the state’s institutional arrangements and provoke a breakdown in general cooperativeness, as several chapters in the third part of this volume suggest.

Part I. Social Relations, Groups, and Trust

One of the major puzzles in the work on trust is how we determine who is trustworthy when there is little evidence on which to base such judgments and on the extent to which we trust those we assume trustworthy based on stereotypes or group-based assessments. In part I of this volume, social psychologists, anthropologists, economists, and political scientists working in different but related research traditions address these questions and begin to identify the conditions under which such judgments are group based or derive from institutional contexts that provide confidence in such assessments.

In chapter 1, Margaret Foddy and Toshio Yamagishi investigate the sources of group-based trust examining the argument that ingroup trust is high, even in the absence of personal contact, because of a belief in the superiority of the group to which one belongs. Hypothesized alternative sources of such an ingroup bias in trustworthiness assessments include the expectation of generalized exchange among group members (that is, the expectation that reciprocity norms apply within group boundaries thus the expectation of fair and favorable treatment is justified), and the simple expectation that people reciprocate the goodwill of their fellow group members (referred to as the ingroup) more than they will that of members of outgroups. In comparisons of these hypothesized effects, the results suggest that the primary mechanism supporting ingroup favoritism was a belief in and the expectation of generalized exchange and not simply an ingroup stereotype response.

In general, the findings reported in chapter 1 indicate that category-based judgments and the related ingroup biases that the participants in these studies demonstrate are more likely to derive from the social expectation of generalized exchange than from a purely cognitive stereotype about a relevant category of membership. These findings link to some of the evolutionary arguments that James Walker and Elinor Ostrom address in chapter 4, in which the possible bases of cooperation are examined more fully. As the authors conclude, whatever the basis for group-based trust, it has important implications for social relations. To the extent that group boundaries are broadly defined, trusting relations are more likely to be established that lead to cooperation even among those who do not initially know each other within the group. However, if such boundaries are narrowly drawn, within group trust can lead to selective exclusion
and potentially distrust of those on the outside. In this context, ingroup trust can produce greater fragmentation and even intergroup conflict especially when resources are scarce.

Building on the work related to stereotyping and cognitive categorization in chapter 2, James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein investigate the link between ethnic diversity and the provision of public goods. Using experimental games much like those in chapter 1, they demonstrate in field experiments (outside the laboratory) that category-based trust is weak, supporting the laboratory results reported in chapter 1. Drawing on economics and political science, Habyarimana and his colleagues identify a different set of mechanisms they consider likely to result in within group favoritism—the likelihood that trust is higher within homogeneous groups than across groups. They focus on contributions to a public good that benefited the group based on ethnic similarity. For Foddy and Yamagishi in chapter 1, the similarity was based on same department or university affiliation (a weaker source of group-based identity), rather than on similarity of ethnicity.

Habyarimana and his collaborators identify three general mechanisms through which trust and cooperation among coethnics might operate what Habyarimana and his colleagues termed other-regarding preferences, incentives, and competence. The investigators use distinct experimental games to isolate these mechanisms to see which ones accounted for cooperative behavior among members of different ethnic groups (from a random sample) in the urban neighborhoods of Mulago and Kyebando in Kampala, Uganda. The results suggest that ethnic-based ingroup favoritism in this context is not based on simple preference for positive relations with similar others or on task competence beliefs. Instead, it depends on norms of cooperation (and the relevant socially generated incentives) reinforced by group members, in much the way that Foddy and Yamagishi found in chapter 1 that expectations of generalized exchange operate to support cooperative behavior among ingroup members. In this context, successful trust-based collective action was derived from incentives and the ingroup norms that facilitated the sanctioning of noncontributors and thus reduced the likelihood of exploitation. The authors conclude on the positive note that their findings provide some hope that institutions that provide incentives for universal norms of trustworthiness might foster cross-group cooperation and potentially over time displace subgroup norms based on ethnicity and ingroup favoritism.

In chapter 3, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, and Jeffrey Johnson use experimental trust games in field experiments in Africa to investigate the links between the social network position of individuals and trust and trustworthiness controlling for the demographic characteristics of the participants. Although they find no consistent relationship between these sociodemographic variables such as age, gender, education, income, and
wealth on trust, they do find support for the hypothesized effect of centrality of social network position on trust and levels of trustworthiness.

In particular, Barr, Ensminger, and Johnson find in their urban Ghanaian study support for the hypothesis that those most central in the social network, measured in two ways, are more trusting. In their rural Kenyan study, they find support for this hypothesis and even stronger support for a positive correlation between network centrality and trustworthy behavior. The theoretical explanation they offer is based on Ronald Burt’s work on brokerage (1992, 2005). Brokers can use their centrality in a network, in particular their “betweenness,” to engage in strategic behavior as political entrepreneurs, which grants them access to trustworthy partners and to positions of power in the network, that is, to information that enables them to minimize risk. They are thus more likely to locate trustworthy partners and thus to engage in less risky transactions. Barr and her colleagues argue that more research on the role of social networks in facilitating trust and reinforcing trustworthiness in a variety of cultural contexts is required.

Chapter 4, by James Walker and Elinor Ostrom, concludes part I and provides a general overview of the experimental research on cooperation, trust, and the provision of public goods. Walker and Ostrom focus on the role of the social norm of reciprocity in the evolution of cooperation within groups, echoing themes in chapter 1 on generalized exchange as the primary motive behind ingroup favoritism and in chapter 2 on normative pressures within groups. Walker and Ostrom argue that the results of many laboratory experiments are corroborated by field experiments and support the role of reciprocity considerations. Their results are evidence that successful and sustainable cooperation must be built on a foundation of trust and reciprocity. Institutions that facilitate communication of information about the trustworthiness of others and that merit trust make cooperation possible and even efficient in many contexts.

Walker and Ostrom emphasize the key role of institutions in managing a wide range of problems of cooperation and collective action more reliably, and provide not only information but also assurance about the expected actions of others. In many situations, individuals must rely on norms of trust and reciprocity not only in repeated interaction situations but also in single transactions (one-shot settings) in which future interaction does not provide the opportunity for reciprocal cooperation. The authors lament the lack of a single formula for building environments in which cooperation can be sustained. They also lament that government or market-based attempts to create incentives for the efficient use of commonly held resources, under some conditions, hinder efforts to build trust and foster cooperation. In particular, asymmetric payoffs from cooperation, limited communication, incomplete group-level agreements, and the requirement for too much redistribution make cooperation at best fragile.
The findings discussed in part I of this volume provide the grounding for subsequent discussions in parts II and III on the specific social structures and institutional mechanisms that often emerge in a variety of contexts to produce cooperation in settings in which trust may fail.

**Part II. Networks, Organizations, and Trust**

Trust at the interpersonal level is often not enough to generate widespread cooperation in social settings, especially in communities and organizations. Other mechanisms can be brought to bear. In addition, at levels of analysis that involve larger social settings, even institutions, trust is often based on assessments of reliability, trustworthiness of the organization’s representatives or agents, or simply the confidence that these individuals and institutions will be fair and consistent.

In chapter 5, Henry Farrell builds on the conceptualization of trust as encapsulated interest that Hardin proposed (2002) and Cook, Hardin, and Levi expanded (2005). He suggests that network theory is a useful complement to the analysis of trust at both the interpersonal and the macro level. He emphasizes the need for constructing mid-level theories of trust, arguing that there is a gap in the conceptualization of trust that only the careful analysis of networks and institutions can fill. He claims that there is relatively little detailed theoretical work on how meso-level social structures shape the ways individuals do or do not trust each other. He demonstrates how these social structures can have substantial consequences for trusting relations.

Farrell’s work moves beyond the encapsulated interest model of trust suggesting that networks do not fully explain observed forms of trust and cooperation. What is missing, he argues, is the recognition that individuals need informal rules to govern a particular community on who may be trusted under which circumstances. He maintains that individuals often make category-based assessments when the information is embedded in institutions. Informal rules or norms are based not only on information derived from interpersonal relations (or direct experience with the organization, as Gabriella Montinola suggests in chapter 10), but also on longstanding practices often institutionalized in rules passed through networks that produce an independent effect on trust assessments. Empirical work on mid-range organizations and social settings is critical to this agenda.

Chapter 6 addresses physician-patient trust and provides some empirical evidence to support Farrell’s claim about the importance of investigating meso-level structures as they influence micro-level interactions and macro-level outcomes related to trust. Irena Stepanikova, Karen Cook, David Thom, Roderick Kramer, and Stephanie Mollborn report the findings of a study of physician-patient trust, highlighting the factors that increase or decrease trust in these relationships as it affects outcomes for
patients and work satisfaction for physicians. Results from interviews and focus groups in which trust was the central topic of discussion provide insights into the organizational and institutional factors that respondents cite as inhibiting or facilitating trust relations.

In particular, Stepanikova and her colleagues focus on the features of managed care practices that alter the nature of the trust relations between physicians and patients. An example is the role of perceived conflict of interest when physicians prescribe medicines or require tests performed in laboratories (or derived from companies) in which they have a financial interest. Among the strategies physicians use to build trust are to make medical decisions independent of insurance rules and financial concerns and to “team up” with patients in attitudinal opposition to managed care and insurance companies. Stepanikova and her colleagues conclude with an assessment of some of the consequences of high and low trust relations for the delivery of health care. In so doing, they present clear evidence that examining the role of trust in interpersonal relationships embedded in organizational settings can provide valuable insights into the actual mechanisms at work in such settings.

In chapter 7, Robert Sampson and Corina Graif further expand the notion that trust and its effects must also be examined at the network and organization level. Exploring the contextual properties of trust among institutional leaders and the residents of contemporary Chicago, the authors focus on social network ties and community-level processes, allowing the network data to serve as a proxy for social mechanisms between individuals connected by ties that have implications for communities. Sampson and Graif provide evidence to support Farrell’s claim that much is to be learned from filling in the gap between persons and institutions.

The data these investigators use are drawn from a two-wave panel of more than 1,000 positional leaders in Chicago sampled from six institutional domains—law, politics, business, community organizations, education, and religion—across a stratified sample of thirty communities. As part of this study, Sampson and Graif developed an instrument that allows the social networks that link community leaders in achieving community goals, along with leaders’ perceptions of the working trust characterizing these ties, to be assessed. In two independent studies of the same communities, the authors also assess multiple aspects of social cohesion, including resident trust in neighbors and institutions. Sampson and Graif find, disturbingly, that durable and increasing poverty has long lasting consequences, including lower neighborhood-level feelings of collective efficacy and higher levels of mistrust. The only ray of hope they provide is the belief that cohesive networks of community leaders may induce neighborhood social change for the better over time.

The chapters in part II provide the much-needed empirical support for multilevel analyses of the role of trust in society. In the final section of the
Part III. Institutions and Trust

A major reason for interest in trust is the presumption that it has consequences that affect the whole of society. Trust, embodied in social capital or in attitudes that induce cooperation, is said to improve the quality of law and order, the economy, and the government. Most of the research for this perspective uses survey data, and findings rely on a few correlations that then become part of the common understanding. Although much of this work offers a causal story, the key relationships remain untested. A major line of argument in the Russell Sage Foundation Trust Project is that institutions and social networks are what produce the essential forms of cooperation. The chapters in part III offer compelling additional evidence for the causal role of institutions that provide not only information but also incentives for transparency, monitoring, and enforcing rules and laws. The authors find that for societies, markets, and governments, trust may not be the leavening agent Kenneth Arrow suggested it is for organizations (1974).

One way to get at the direction of causation, that is, whether trusting relations improve institutions or institutions are the source of trust-like behaviors, is to consider the development and maintenance of credit. What determines to whom a lender will extend credit clearly has to do with lender confidence in the ability of borrowers to repay loans. This, on the face of it, seems a crucible issue of establishing trust and building trustworthiness. Both chapter 8, by Bruce Carruthers, and chapter 9, by Philip Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, consider credit institutions and financial markets over time, but do so with different methods and with somewhat different conclusions about the role that trust plays.

Carruthers details the historical transformation of borrowing and lending in the Anglo American commercial world. Evaluations of creditworthiness were once based on bilateral ties between individuals but now depend on multilateral ties. Reliance on informal social networks and qualitative knowledge concerning the reputation of individuals has given way to formal institutions and quantitative knowledge. The acquisition of information by the lender about the borrower remains key, but the sources of that information have changed radically.

The result is that bankers can now collect highly individualized data to form the basis for their assessments of creditworthiness. Such information makes it possible to lend to people outside their social networks, but it is also biased against those without the right kind of financial biographies. That rotating credit associations and other such mechanisms based
on social networks still exist suggests that impersonal institutions cannot fully replace more personalized social networks. Moreover, as Carruthers notes, “a striking (and somewhat ironic) historical change has been the extent to which credit now depends on a complex set of social, legal, and economic institutions whose own internal operations are mostly non-transparent.” Thus it should be no surprise to Carruthers that these institutions can provide insurance for greedy creditors who choose to make problematic loans, as the current housing crisis suggests. Although institutions are key to information that extends the capacity of lenders to offer credit, such institutions are not necessarily reliable or equitable. Improving the conditions for credit does not in itself improve the quality of financial markets.

Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal investigate more than a hundred French credit markets between 1740 and 1899. They combine history with an economic model to derive hypotheses about the relationship between social capital, trust, and the flourishing of financial markets. They then test their model statistically and hypothesize that social capital should increase trust and therefore the quality of financial markets. They find little evidence of this effect; however, economic variables explain the extent to which lenders trust borrowers as well or better than social capital does. Further, they discover that trust really matters only in situations characterized by widespread corruption, civil unrest, ethnic discrimination, or other circumstances in which formal institutions are weak. Institutions, not social capital or trust, are the major determinants of the quality of financial markets. Those that improve the quality of information, the same institutional role Carruthers emphasized, are essential. However, for Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, the ability to detect borrowers’ misbehavior is as important as the capacity to evaluate their creditworthiness initially. Also important are those institutions that promote savings and thus make individuals more creditworthy.

In chapter 10, Gabriella Montinola examines the courts in the Philippines and argues that citizens use information about local institutions when assessing the trustworthiness of the larger institutions, which they reflect (for example, government). She tests the hypothesis that the reform of local institutions may generate higher levels of trust even if other institutions are problematic, to use her phrasing. In this view, citizens’ assessments are actually data-driven and experience with the local institutions cements views on reliability, fairness, and consistency. Such experience grants citizens a basis for updating their assessments of the organizations and institutions they confront in their daily lives, in ways in which they may not confront national-level organizations. The alternative, Montinola argues, is the notion that generalized trustworthiness judgments transfer from one organization to the next and there is little experience-based updating of such assessments.
To evaluate these claims, Montinola uses survey data from citizens with and without court experience and compares their assessments of the trustworthiness of the courts. She argues that her findings are important for emerging democracies in which resources are constrained in such a way that reforms are limited and thus must be focused on those organizations that can be transformed to increase citizen compliance based on increased perceived legitimacy. Montinola’s work also has implications for the study of trust in specific government institutions. Do trustworthiness assessments transfer across institutions based on information derived from experience as reflected in some research, or are they simply reflections of generalized (and stable) tendencies to trust government at all levels? Montinola concludes that such research should be of great interest to organizations like USAIS and the World Bank, which are targeting their assistance to the reform of judicial systems on the hope that this strategy will strengthen the rule of law in emerging democracies.

In chapter 11, which concludes this volume, Matthew Cleary and Susan Stokes turn our attention from markets to government and, in particular, the role of trust in promoting democratic government. They review the survey evidence that links trust and the quality of democracy, especially in Latin America. Based on their own surveys, supplemented by in-depth qualitative research, they conclude that much of the research misinterprets the data. They recognize that correlations exist between low levels of trust and low levels of political participation and social cooperation, factors that contribute to the quality of democracy, but find trust to be a symptom, not a cause, of democratic performance. They argue that institutions that enhance monitoring of government and its accountability are also likely to enhance citizen responsiveness in the form of participation and social cooperation and, therefore, democratic quality. They conclude, in keeping with Hume and Madison, that healthy skepticism, not trust, is at the heart of the citizens’ relationship to government in a democracy.

It is our hope that this volume provides invaluable theoretical insights and stimulates further empirical research on the complexities and limits of the role of trust in society. The research program motivating this volume illuminates the contexts in which trust relations facilitate cooperation and when they do not. It reveals the importance of networks and institutions in making trusting relations possible, but also suggests when networks and institutions inhibit cooperation. The role government plays also appears to be more complicated than originally theorized. Yet there is no question that the capacity to govern is improved when the citizenry expresses basic confidence in the governing apparatus while maintaining a critical stance and willingness to protest particular policies and actions. Government illustrates but one instance of the effect of power relations on interpersonal interactions, networks, organizations, and institutions. This volume reveals how much power relations can create challenges for the creation
of trustworthiness and cooperation. The essays contribute to unraveling those challenges and to laying out a fruitful agenda for future research.

References

Whom Can We Trust?


