



Figure 1.1 Net Spending Support for Different Programs, by Income Level




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1973–2008).

Figure 1.2 Net Support for Welfare Spending, by Income Level, 1973 to 2008




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1973–2008).

Figure 1.3 Tax Preferences, by Income Level, 1976 to 2008




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1973–2008).

Figure 1.4 Stimson's Policy Mood, by Income Level, 1956 to 2006




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1972–2008), American National Election Studies (Sapiro, Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies 2004), and the iPoll Databank (Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, various years).

Figure 1.5 Stimson's Policy Mood, by Education Level, 1956 to 2006




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1972–2008), American National Election Studies (Sapiro, Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies 2004), and the iPoll Databank (Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, various years).

Figure 1.6 Stimson's Policy Mood, by Party Identification, 1956 to 2006




Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1972–2008), American National Election Studies (Sapiro, Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies 2004), and the iPoll Databank (Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, various years).

Figure 1.7 Kellstedt's Racial Policy Liberalism, by Race, 1962 to 2006



Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1972–2008), American National Election Studies (Sapiro, Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies 2004), and the iPoll Databank (Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, various years).


Figure 2.1 Predicting Ideology and Partisanship as a Function of Demographics Versus Thermometer Scores



Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 1975–2004 National Election Studies (Sapiro, Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies 2004).


Note: Ideology-d and PID-d reflect values based on demographic variables. Ideology-t and PID-t reflect values based on thermometer scores.

Figure 2.2 Perceptions of Candidate and Party Ideology, by Ethnic-Racial Group




Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 linked data, as discussed in the text.

Figure 2.3 Opinions on the Role of Government, by Ethnic-Racial Group




Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 linked data, as discussed in the text.

Figure 2.4 Opinions on Government Aid to Minorities, by Ethnic-Racial Group




Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 linked data, as discussed in the text.

Figure 2.A1 NES 2004 Survey Party ID Differences, by Thermometer Matching Versus Demographics Matching



Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (Romer et al. 2006) and the 2004 National Election Study (Center for Political Studies 2004).

Figure 2.A2 NES 2004 Survey Liberal-Conservative 7-Point Scale Differences, by Thermometer Matching Versus Demographics Matching



Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (Romer et al. 2006) and the 2004 National Election Study (Center for Political Studies 2004).

Table 2.1 **Distribution of Demographic Indicators in the Linked, Annenberg, and NES Data**

	Linked	Annenberg	NES
Gender (percent)			
Male	44.8	44.7	46.7
Female	55.2	55.3	53.3
Education (percent)			
Eight grade or less	2.5	2.0	3.1
Grades 9 to 11	4.8	5.3	6.0
High school diploma	30.5	25.6	29.3
Some college	23.5	17.7	21.8
Two-year college	9.3	7.9	9.9
Bachelor's degree	17.8	20.0	18.4
Advanced	11.5	14.4	11.5
Race-ethnicity (percent)			
Black	13.9	8.0	9.9
Asian	2.0	1.5	1.6
White	74.0	83.3	78.0
Latino	5.6	7.5	6.7
Age (mean)	48.0	48.0	47.3
N	61,980	81,422	1,212

Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (Romer et al. 2006) and the 2004 National Election Study (NES) (Center for Political Studies 2004).

Table 2.2

Comparing the Linking Procedure with Demographic Matching

Political Variable	Linking Procedure		Matching Procedure (Age, Education, Gender)	
	Percent Correctly Classified	Number of Exact Matches	Percent Correctly Classified	Number of Exact Matches
Vote choice				
Kerry	90	117	52	33
Bush	97	128	53	63
Party ID				
Democrats	42	80	26	26
Independents	27	8	16	8
Republicans	41	65	30	16
Ideology				
Liberal	31	16	22	4
Moderate	35	30	31	32
Conservative	44	39	31	22

Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (Romer et al. 2006) and the 2004 National Election Study (Center for Political Studies 2004).

Table 2.3 Group Thermometer Evaluations, by Ethnic-Racial Group

<i>R</i> 's Race	Group Thermometer Scores Toward . . .						N	
	Latinos Linked	NES	Blacks Linked	NES	Whites Linked	NES	Linked	NES
Latino	82.9 (14.0)	82.7 (15.5)	74.2 (20.1)	75.8 (18.7)	70.7 (19.6)	74.2 (18.3)	2814	66
Black	67.1 (17.5)	68.8 (18.2)	88.5 (14.7)	87.0 (15.5)	71.7 (23.0)	72.3 (20.0)	6971	154
White	66.6 (19.1)	66.6 (19.3)	68.9 (18.8)	69.2 (18.4)	74.3 (19.2)	73.8 (19.2)	39736	763

Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (Romer et al. 2006) and the 2004 National Election Study (Center for Political Studies 2004).

Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.

Table 2.4 Mean Responses to 7-Point Issue Scales, Linked Versus NES Data

	Government Spending		Defense Spending		Government Jobs		Government Aid to Blacks	
	Linked	NES	Linked	NES	Linked	NES	Linked	NES
Race								
Latino	4.52	4.57	4.58	4.49	4.13	4.28	4.29	4.28
Black	5.41	5.25	4.42	4.30	3.15	3.31	3.13	3.31
White	4.38	4.36	4.76	4.65	4.45	4.82	4.88	4.82
Gender								
Men	4.26	4.32	4.84	4.74	4.49	4.61	4.70	4.61
Women	4.75	4.69	4.53	4.41	4.00	4.48	4.47	4.48
Vote choice								
Bush	3.89	3.71	5.30	5.19	5.06	5.17	5.34	5.30
Kerry	5.15	5.07	4.03	3.89	3.38	3.49	3.77	3.88
N	53,232	1,060	53,877	1,061	56,384	1,103	54,459	1,073

Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (Romer et al. 2006) and the 2004 National Election Study (Center for Political Studies 2004).

Environment vs. Jobs		Women's Role		Government vs. Private Health Insurance		Government Aid to Latinos		U.S. Intervention	
Linked	NES	Linked	NES	Linked	NES	Linked	NES	Linked	NES
3.73	3.82	1.54	1.53	3.58	3.42	3.61	3.68	3.86	3.65
3.66	3.71	1.65	2.01	2.82	3.31	3.76	3.84	2.99	3.19
3.54	3.58	2.00	1.93	3.79	3.78	4.91	4.92	3.98	3.93
3.50	3.52	1.94	1.96	3.79	3.79	4.75	4.71	4.15	3.98
3.59	3.66	1.90	1.88	3.46	3.54	4.60	4.62	3.47	3.55
4.03	4.04	2.22	2.17	4.35	4.41	5.20	5.15	4.72	4.67
2.98	3.02	1.60	1.72	2.88	3.06	3.97	4.17	2.79	2.81
51,536	1,019	59,117	1,157	56,160	1,112	48,290	937	53,013	1041

Table 2.5 **Distribution of Linked, Annenberg, and NES Data on a
Common Issue Question**

	Approve of the way the president is handling the economy (percent approving)		
	Linked	NES	Annenberg
Race			
Latino	36.5	35.8	43.9
Black	10.7	12.8	13.7
White	50.4	47.3	48.6
Gender			
Men	44.3	43.1	48.5
Women	41.5	38.1	42.0
Aggregate	42.8	40.4	44.9
N	61,948	1,121	84,122


Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (Romer et al. 2006) and the 2004 National Election Study (Center for Political Studies 2004).

Table 2.6 Opinions on Social Welfare Issues, by Ethnic-Racial Group

	Whites	Blacks	Latinos	Asians
Federal spending on welfare programs				
Increase	19.7	26.0	27.1	14.6
Keep the same	46.7	42.0	36.4	62.5
Decrease	33.7	31.9	36.1	22.9
Cut out entirely	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0
Investing social security in the stock market				
Favor	46.7	30.5	45.9	32.9
Neither favor nor oppose	26.2	41.5	42.8	28.4
Oppose	26.8	26.3	11.3	35.5
Government should give parents in low-income families money to help pay for their children to attend a private or religious school instead of their local public school				
Favor	28.0	33.7	42.0	11.3
Neither favor nor oppose	2.2	2.5	4.7	5.7
Oppose	68.8	62.9	52.2	83.0
N	40,808	7,036	2,814	853


Source: Authors' compilation, based on the 2004 linked data, as discussed in the text.

Figure 3.1 Theoretical Expectations of Income and Education in Shaping Response to Elite Polarization



Source: Figure generated by authors.


Figure 3.2 Expected Impact of Issue Variables on Partisanship



Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974–2006).

Note: All predictors have been scaled to a range of 0 to 1. Lines represent the expected impact on partisanship of moving from the most conservative possible position to the most liberal on each issue dimension.


Figure 3.3 Expected Impact of Issue Variables on Partisanship, by Education Level



Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974–2006).

Note: All predictors are scaled to a range of 0 to 1.


Figure 3.4 Expected Impact of Issue Variables on Partisanship, by Income Level



Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974–2006).

Note: All predictors are scaled to a range of 0 to 1.


Figure 3.5 Expected Impact of Issue Variables on Scope-of-Government Preferences Among High- and Low-Income Cohorts, by Education



Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974-2006).

Note: All predictors are scaled to a range of 0 to 1.

Figure 3.6 Expected Impact of Issue Variables on Cultural Preferences Among High- and Low-Income Cohorts, by Education



Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974–2006).

Note: All predictors are scaled to a range of 0 to 1.

Table 3.1 Context-Dependent Predictors of Partisanship, 1974–2006

	Baseline Impact	Variable * Polarization
Economic/scope-of-government liberalism	1.31 * (.16)	1.76 * (.33)
Cultural-issue liberalism	-.09 (.09)	.78 * (.18)
Real income (tens of thousands)	-.61 * (.09)	-.17 (.16)
Ideological self-identification (7-point scale)	1.56 * (.13)	1.99 * (.26)
Urban	.07 (.05)	-.02 (.12)
Rural	-.11 (.06)	-.24 (.14)
Catholic	.67 * (.05)	-.60 * (.11)
Jewish	1.14 * (.13)	-.44 (.33)
Religious fundamentalist	.28 * (.06)	-.46 * (.12)
Black	1.06 * (.07)	.28 * (.14)
Female	-.10 * .04	.26 * (.09)
Southern white	-.07 (.06)	-.05 (.12)
Polarization (in DW-NOMINATE scores)	-.70 * (.32)	
R ²	.20	
N	15,341	

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974–2006).

Note: Table entries are OLS coefficients (cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses). All predictors have been scaled to a range 0 to 1. Baseline impact taken when polarization is at the lowest level.

* $p < .05$, two-tailed tests

Table 3.2 Baseline and Context-Dependent Effect of Policy Preference Variables, by Income and Education

	Low Education	High Education	Low Income	Middle Income	High Income
Scope-of-government issues (Baseline)	1.15 * (.19)	1.41 * (.27)	.69 * (.30)	1.53 * (.27)	1.58 * (.28)
Scope-of-government issues (Context effect)	.84 * (.43)	2.24 * (.49)	1.13 * (.61)	1.51 * (.56)	2.28 * (.56)
Cultural issues (Baseline)	.35 * (.11)	.09 (.14)	-.15 (.17)	-.57 * (.15)	-.00 (.15)
Cultural issues (Context effect)	1.00 * (.22)	.33 (.26)	.57 * (.30)	1.24 * (.30)	.66 * (.30)
R ² (full model)	.12	.30	.12	.17	.26
N	10,627	6,242	5,147	5,264	4,958

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974–2006).

Note: Table entries are OLS coefficients (cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses). All predictors scaled to a range of 0 to 1. All other variables included in table 3.3 models are included in these models, but not shown in this table.

* $p < .05$, one-tailed tests

Table 3.3 Baseline and Context-Dependent Effect of Policy Preference Variables, by Education Level Within Income


	Low Income		Middle Income		High Income	
	Low Education	High Education	Low Education	High Education	Low Education	High Education
Scope-of-government issues (baseline)	.94 *	.45	.95 *	2.40 *	1.37 *	1.64 *
	(.34)	(.63)	(.33)	(.48)	(.40)	(.41)
Scope-of-government issues (context effect)	.16	3.90 *	1.72 *	.68	2.46 *	2.16 *
	(.73)	(1.17)	(.76)	(.88)	(.91)	(.74)
Cultural issues (baseline)	-.12	.04	-.58 *	-.20	.20	.36
	(.21)	(.35)	(.19)	(.26)	(.22)	(.21)
Cultural issues (context effect)	.56	.73	1.40 *	.46	1.19 *	.07
	(.38)	(.64)	(.41)	(.46)	(.47)	(.39)
R ² (full model)	.10	.21	.12	.30	.16	.36
N	3,937	1,196	3,420	1,836	2,236	2,716

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 1974–2006).

Note: Table entries are OLS coefficients (cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses). All predictors scaled to a range of 0 to 1. Demographic control variables included in these models, but not shown in this table.

* $p < .05$, one-tailed tests


Figure 4.1 State-Level Variation in Presidential Election Results, 1972 to 2008



Source: Authors' compilation based on publicly available electoral data.


Figure 4.2

Declining Scope of Competition in Presidential Elections, 1972 to 2008




Source: Authors' figure based on publicly available electoral data.

Figure 4.3 Potential State-Level Patterns Behind Rising Party Identification–Vote Association




Source: Figure generated by authors.

Figure 4.4 Relationship Between Party Identification and Presidential Vote Across States



Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Figure 4.5 Intercept Variation Across States




Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Note: From random effects model predicting presidential vote index from PID.


Figure 4.6

Variation Across States on Presidential Index, and Percent of that Variation Explained by Party Identification (PID)




Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Figure 4.7 Perceived Ideological Differences Between the Parties Across States and Time




Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).
Note: The thick line reflects the nine states with no trend in the link between PID and presidential vote. The thin line reflects the remaining states.

Figure 4.8 Partisan Divide on the Cultural-Issues Index over Time




Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Figure 4.9 Percentage Cross-Pressured on Cultural Issues




Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Figure 4.10 Effect of Party Identification Among Liberals and Conservatives on Cultural Issues



Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Figure 4.11 Effect of Cultural Issues on Party Loyalty in Presidential Elections, 1972 to 2008



Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Table 4.1 National Election Studies (NES) Sample Sizes Within States Over Time

State	NES ID no.	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008
Alabama	41	27	31	29	53	55	48	44	63	64	22
Arizona	61	34	28	8			63	65	13		42
Arkansas	42	105	95	22	60	53	33	24	34	30	
California	71	225	189	144	262	214	243	140	191	138	287
Colorado	62	30	23	34	37	37	40	38	37	27	99
Connecticut	1	55	30	27	47	38	33	14	17	10	30
Delaware	11			7					2		20
Florida	43	77	78	76	78	57	97	90	92	48	173
Georgia	44	90	54	40	92	93	139	81	34	10	78
Idaho	63								5		
Illinois	21	130	124	75	64	59	83	46	56	35	29
Indiana	22	41	27	52	49	41	88	87	38	47	55
Iowa	31	70	70	11	52	44	33	24	28	22	
Kansas	32			8	66	54	59	11	14		28
Kentucky	51	67	53	23					16		
Louisiana	45	64	50	24			24	20	52	46	83
Maine	2	42	49	13					4		
Maryland	52	56	50	26	47	43	54	32	35	34	
Massachusetts	3	93	81	42	30	37	70	38	60	57	22
Michigan	23	110	90	73	147	114	134	97	72	59	114
Minnesota	33	61	50	32	54	57	78	53	63	47	25
Mississippi	46	44	26	19				1	4		63
Missouri	34	76	67	31	32	32	42	36	22	19	
Montana	64								1		

Nebraska	35	44	30	21			18	22	2		
Nevada	65							2	5		31
New Hampshire	4				39	31	36	18	20	13	
New Jersey	12	104	83	59	58	51	83	56	42	36	23
New Mexico	66							17	3		64
New York	13	168	113	121	189	156	176	87	115	86	123
North Carolina	47	125	98	37	65	71	51	24	23		65
North Dakota	36								7		39
Ohio	24	172	127	97	97	98	79	38	73	33	85
Oklahoma	53	23	20	31				4	10		36
Oregon	72	41	59	23	59	50	44	37	36	26	27
Pennsylvania	14	157	135	77	54	55	76	47	52	16	36
Rhode Island	5								2		20
South Carolina	48	25	19	16				1	13		69
South Dakota	37	38	38					1	6		
Tennessee	54	28	34	33	102	124	88	49	42	22	77
Texas	49	75	55	127	153	143	186	136	137	84	365
Utah	67	30	32	25				11	39	32	
Vermont	6								1		
Virginia	40	45	36	48	48	49	115	123	91	78	34
Washington	73	52	45	28	34	42	44	32	49	40	23
West Virginia	56	45	30	13	52	30	38	12	4		
Wisconsin	25	26	23	29	59	65	56	43	69	52	21
Wyoming	68			13	78	47	34	11	5		

Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (2010).

Note: Boldface indicates states included in this analysis.

Appendix 5.A Descriptions of Groups Observed and Municipalities in Which They Met

Municipality Description	Group Type	Municipality Population (2000)	Median Household Income, in Dollars (1999)
Central hamlet	Daily morning coffee klatch, local gas station (men)	500	38,000
Northern tourist loation	Weekly breakfast group, local restaurant (women, primarily retired)	500	32,000
North western hamlet	Weekly morning coffee klatch, local church (mixed gender, primarily retirees)	500	35,000
North central village	Group of library volunteers at local library (mixed gender, retirees); also, daily coffee klatch of male local leaders meeting in the local municipal building	500	34,000
North eastern resort village	Group of congregants after a Saturday evening service at Immanuel Lutheran Church (mixed gender)	1,000	41,000
North western village	Daily morning coffee klatch, local gas station (men)	1,000	32,000
Northern American Indian reservation	Group of family members, during a Friday fish fry at a local gas station-restaurant (mixed gender)	1,000	35,000
South central village	Daily morning coffee klatch, local gas station (mixed gender, working and retired)	1,500	31,000
North central village	Daily breakfast group, local diner (men)	2,000	38,000
South central village	Women's weekly morning coffee klatch at local diner; also, group of male professionals, construction workers, and retirees meeting later there	3,000	43,000
Central western village	Two daily morning coffee klatches, one at a local gas station, the other at a local diner (men)	3,000	30,000
Central eastern village	Kiwanis meeting (mixed gender, primarily retirees); also daily morning coffee klatch of male retirees at local fast-food restaurant	3,000	45,000
Western Minneapolis suburb	Daily morning coffee klatch, local diner (male local-business owners, lawyers, retirees)	9,000	51,000

South eastern city on northern edge of Milwaukee metropolitan area	Daily morning coffee klatch, local diner (men)	10,000	54,000
South central city	Middle-aged man and woman taking a midmorning break at a local café	10,000	36,000
Central city	Daily morning coffee klatch, local café (middle-aged professionals, mixed gender)	38,000	37,000
East central city	Daily morning coffee klatch, local gas station (retired men)	42,000	41,000
Milwaukee suburb, west of the city	Group of teachers and administrators at local high school (mixed gender); daily lunch group of middle-aged men; mixed-gender breakfast group of retirees	47,000	55,000
Western city	Daily morning coffee klatch, local café (middle-aged professionals, retirees, mixed gender)	52,000	31,000
South eastern city	Weekly breakfast group, local diner (mixed gender, retirees, and currently employed)	82,000	37,000
North eastern city	Daily breakfast group, local diner (men)	100,000	39,000
Madison	Middle-aged female professionals' book club; also, daily morning coffee klatch of male retirees at bakery; female resident volunteers in food pantry in low-income neighborhood	200,000	42,000
North Milwaukee neighborhood	AIDS/HIV activism group meeting after services in a Baptist church (mixed gender)	600,000	32,000
South Milwaukee neighborhood	Group of Mexican immigrants, waiting at a pro bono health clinic (mixed gender)	600,000	32,000

Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: Population and income figures have been rounded to preserve the anonymity of the groups observed.

Table 6.1 Impact of Public Opinion Data on Domestic or Foreign Policy Positions (Domain Effect Model)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Presidential Policy Positions	
	Domestic Policy	Foreign Policy
Public's Ideological Identification	-.07 (1.08)	3.39** (1.55)
Public's Policy Opinions	1.13** (.14)	-.16 (.21)
Presidential Policy Positions, $t-1$.73** (.02)	.76** (.02)
Constant	.44 (.65)	-1.13 (.93)
R^2	.68	.58
N	1,339	716

Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: OLS coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$, one-tailed test.

Table 6.2 Impact of Policy Preferences of Independents on Domestic Policy Positions

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Presidential Policy Positions on Domestic Policy
Public's Ideological Identification	-.14 (1.18)
Public's Policy Opinions	.68** (.23)
Policy Opinions of Independents	1.60** (.22)
Presidential Policy Positions, $t-1$.56** (.03)
Constant	.49 (.71)
R^2	.74
N	847

Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: OLS coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$, one-tailed test.

Table 6.3 **Impact of Policy Preferences of High-Income Americans on Economic Policy Positions**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Social Security Reform, Taxes, and Government Spending
Public's Ideological Identification	-.45 (1.58)
Public's Policy Opinions	.70** (.38)
Policy Opinions of Higher Income Americans	4.06** (.85)
Presidential Policy Positions, $t-1$.50** (.07)
Constant	-.79 (1.06)
R^2	.84
N	173

Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: OLS coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$, one-tailed test.

Table 6.4 Impact of the Policy Preferences of Baptists and Catholics on Social-Conservative Policy Positions

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Family Values and Crime
Public's Ideological Identification	-.10 (.53)
Public's Policy Opinions	-.24 (.20)
Policy Opinions of Baptists	1.38* (.85)
Policy Opinions of Catholics	-.27 (.70)
Presidential Policy Positions, $t-1$	-.11 (.10)
Constant	4.78**
R^2	.07
N	104

Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: OLS coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$, one-tailed test.

Table 6.5 Impact of Policy Preferences of Republicans on Defense-Spending Policy Positions


Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Increased Defense Spending
Public's Ideological Identification	3.31* (2.11)
Public's Policy Opinions	-.32 (.43)
Policy Opinions of Republicans	5.00** (1.74)
Policy Opinions of Independents	-3.88** (1.51)
Policy Opinions of Democrats	-2.06* (1.29)
Presidential Policy Positions, $t-1$	-.03 (.10)
Constant	3.15** (1.57)
R^2	.15
N	90

Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: OLS coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$, one-tailed test.


Figure 7.1 Comparison of Partisan Gap Versus Income Gap in Policy Liberalism



Source: Authors' compilation based on the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006).

Note: Bars represent the absolute value of the difference in liberalism scores for Democrats versus Republicans (partisan gap) and those with the lowest (less than \$10,000) and highest (more than \$150,000) incomes (income gap).


Figure 7.2 Income-Opinion Relationship Across Poor and Wealthy States



Source: Authors' compilation based on the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006).

Notes: Lines represent the predicted policy liberalism for each income group, ranging from less than \$10,000 (very left) to more than \$150,000 (very right), estimated from multilevel models in which the intercept is estimated as a function of average state income and the slope is estimated as a function of both individual-level income (at level 1) and state-level income (as a cross-level interaction). Solid line presents predicted means for a poor state, such as West Virginia, which is two standard deviations below the mean state income (from Annenberg data), while the line with dots presents predicted means for wealthier states, such as Maryland, whose average state wealth is two standard deviations above the mean.

Figure 7.3 States' Economic Policy Responsiveness to Different Income Groups




Source: Authors' compilation based on the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006), as well as the policy measure presented in table 7.3.

Notes: N = 48 states in panel A, N = 24 poor states and 24 wealthy states in panel B. Bars represent the coefficient for each group's policy liberalism—in panel A, from model 5 (no controls) and model 6 (controlling for state wealth), and in panel B, from model 7 (poor states) and model 8 (rich states) controlling for state wealth.

* $p < .05$, + $p < .10$

Figure 7.4 States' Social Policy Responsiveness to Different Income Groups



Source: Authors' compilation based on the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006), as well as the policy measure presented in table 7.3.

Notes: N = 48 states in panel A, N = 24 poor states and 24 wealthy states in panel B. Bars represent the coefficient for each group's policy liberalism—in panel A, from model 5 (no controls) and model 6 (controlling for state wealth), and in panel B, from model 7 (poor states) and model 8 (rich states) controlling for state wealth.

* $p < .05$, + = $p < .10$

Table 7.3 Policy Indicators Used to Estimate States' Economic and Social Policy Liberalism

	Data Source	Year	Mean	SD	Range		Factor Loading	Eigenvalue	Proportion of Variance
Economic policy indicators									
Eligibility for SCHIP, percent of FPL	(1)	2006	229	62	140	400	.54		
Capital gains tax rate	(2)	2003	4.78	2.86	.00	9.35	.45		
Corporate income tax rate	(2)	2003	6.56	2.65	.00	9.999	.61		
Minimum wage	(3)	2006	5.68	\$0.83	\$5.15	\$7.63	.54		
Per pupil expenditures in K-12	(4)	2006	9,075	\$2,016	\$5,437	\$14,884	.67		
Income eligibility for TANF/welfare	(5)	2006	751	\$307	\$269	\$1,590	.22		
Health insurance mandates index	(3)	2006	.45	.11	.21	.68	.34		
Economic policy score			.00	.86	-1.57	2.15		1.77	.76
Social policy indicators									
Gun control index	(3)	2006	-.5	2.92	-2.50	8.77	.40		
Abortion index	(3)	2006	.10	1.85	-3.53	3.08	-.73		
Has death penalty	(3)	2006	.79	.41	.00	1.00	-.25		
No discrimination for sexual orientation	(6)	2008	.38	.49	.00	1.00	.79		
Requires (2) or allows (1) school prayer	(7)	2008	.98	.76	.00	2.00	-.34		
Social policy score			.00	.86	-1.05	1.48		1.49	.90

Source: Authors' compilation of data from Kaiser Family Foundation (2006); Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2003); Soren, Muedini, and Ruger (2008); Education Week (2008); Urban Institute (2006); Human Rights Watch (2008); and Education Commission of the States (2008)

Note: N = 48.

Table 7.4 Income Differences in Ideology Versus Policy Liberalism Scores

	2000 Annenberg Survey				2004 Annenberg Survey			
	N	Self-ID Liberalism	Economic Policy Liberalism	Social Policy Liberalism	N	Self-ID Liberalism	Economic Policy Liberalism	Social Policy Liberalism
Less than \$10K	3,958	0.09	0.31	-0.19	3,728	0.05	0.17	-0.06
\$10K to \$15K	3,924	0.09	0.25	-0.17	3,939	0.02	0.16	-0.12
\$15K to \$25K	7,434	0.03	0.17	-0.10	7,515	0.01	0.11	-0.09
\$25K to \$35K	8,676	0.02	0.10	-0.05	8,948	0.00	0.07	-0.06
\$35K to \$50K	11,216	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	12,560	-0.03	0.03	-0.04
\$50K to \$75K	11,275	-0.03	-0.11	0.03	14,432	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01
\$75K to \$100K	6,277	0.00	-0.19	0.13	9,605	-0.02	-0.09	0.07
\$100K to \$150K	4,018	0.02	-0.22	0.21	7,138	0.00	-0.15	0.12
More than \$150K	2,488	0.00	-0.30	0.27	4,817	0.00	-0.16	0.20
<i>F</i>		8.94	217.26	107.33		4.90	91.60	66.14

Source: Authors' calculations from the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006).

Notes: All three measures of liberalism are standardized scores with $M = 0$ and $SD = 1$.

Table 7.5 Economic Policy Responsiveness to Different Income Groups

	All States		Poor	Rich	All States		Poor	Rich
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Economic policy liberalism (2000)								
Opinion: average	5.62**	4.49**	3.22**	5.62**				
	(.78)	(.80)	(1.05)	(1.20)				
State wealth		.79**	.88	1.19*		4.26	-1.74	8.94
		(.26)	(.56)	(.53)		(3.09)	(3.36)	(7.09)
Opinion: low					1.62	.51	1.39	5.09
					(1.90)	(2.05)	(2.17)	(5.31)
Opinion: middle					6.98**	8.78**	7.77*	7.44
					(2.12)	(2.47)	(3.14)	(5.04)
Opinion: high					6.36**	4.43+	9.59**	1.64
					(2.21)	(2.60)	(3.25)	(5.70)
Percent low income					-2.84	11.61	-19.69	26.31
					(4.02)	(11.20)	(14.20)	(24.20)
Percent high income					.70	-8.35	-6.29	-16.37
					(4.11)	(7.72)	(8.98)	(18.00)
Constant	.12	-3.88**	-4.30	-6.10*	1.44	-23.32	18.60	-51.22
	(.09)	(1.30)	(2.67)	(2.79)	(2.49)	(18.10)	(20.90)	(40.50)
Observations	48	48	24	24	48	48	24	24
R^2	.53	.61	.36	.67	.65	.67	.66	.69

Economic policy liberalism (2004)								
Opinion: average	6.17**	4.81**	3.23*	6.24**				
	(.94)	(.96)	(1.24)	(1.44)				
State wealth		.83	.81	1.28*		4.86+	1.93	7.96
		(.27)	(.59)	(.54)		(2.44)	(2.74)	(6.70)
Opinion: low					-3.84	-4.65	-2.68	-3.18
					(3.23)	(3.14)	(3.30)	(8.19)
Opinion: middle					8.86**	8.88**	8.40*	10.36
					(3.10)	(3.00)	(3.04)	(8.35)
Opinion: high					7.82**	8.60**	7.49+	6.84
					(2.80)	(2.73)	(4.09)	(5.96)
Percent low income					1.54	17.73	-4.71	33.66
					(4.18)	(9.07)	(11.70)	(22.30)
Percent high income					4.87	-5.45	-15.53	-7.13
					(4.04)	(6.48)	(9.11)	(16.80)
Constant	.06	-4.15**	-4.03	-6.64*	-1.29	-29.43*	-3.94	-50.79
	(.09)	(1.36)	(2.81)	(2.87)	(2.51)	(14.30)	(16.90)	(38.10)
Observations	48	48	24	24	48	48	24	24
R^2	.49	.58	.30	.64	.63	.67	.52	.72

Source: Authors' compilation based on analysis of the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006), as well as the policy measure presented in table 7.3.

Notes: N = 48 states, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Coefficients from OLS regression models. Group opinion measures are weighted for the proportion of each group within each state.

Table 7.6 Social Policy Responsiveness to Different Income Groups

	All States		Poor	Rich	All States		Poor	Rich
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Economic policy liberalism (2000)								
Opinion: average	3.09**	3.51**	3.47**	3.79**				
	(.39)	(.55)	(.80)	(.79)				
State wealth		-.36	-1.05	.21		-2.40	-1.21	2.45
		(.33)	(.73)	(.51)		(2.67)	(3.23)	(7.73)
Opinion: low					.78	0.75	-2.12	11.56
					(2.42)	(2.43)	(2.98)	(5.89)
Opinion: middle					4.26+	4.57*	5.52	-.59
					(2.20)	(2.23)	(3.49)	(4.28)
Opinion: high					6.32+	6.34+	8.33	-.38
					(3.68)	(3.69)	(7.46)	(5.19)
Percent low income					.49	-7.25	-7.73	6.88
					(5.16)	(10.10)	(14.20)	(27.50)
Percent high income					-2.21	2.82	-6.34	-1.82
					(5.13)	(7.60)	(12.60)	(16.50)
Constant	.09	1.93	5.23	-1.15	.20	14.02	10.17	-14.37
	(.08)	(1.70)	(3.51)	(2.66)	(3.03)	(15.70)	(19.70)	(45.40)
Observations	48	48	24	24	48	48	24	24
R^2	.58	.59	.48	.61	.61	.62	.59	.65

(Table continues on p. 214.)

Table 7.6 (Continued)

	All States		Poor	Rich	All States		Poor	Rich
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Economic policy liberalism (2004)								
Opinion: average	3.49**	3.92**	4.37*	3.79**				
	(.42)	(.59)	(.85)	(.88)				
State wealth		-.34	-.76	.34		-.11	1.06	-.07
		(.32)	(.64)	(.53)		(2.46)	(2.94)	(6.08)
Opinion: low					5.61+	5.61+	.89	10.62+
					(2.90)	(2.93)	(4.41)	(5.78)
Opinion: middle					-3.20	-3.20	2.50	-10.03
					(3.30)	(3.35)	(5.00)	(5.94)
Opinion: high					13.01**	13.03**	12.80*	17.44*
					(3.93)	(4.00)	(5.97)	(6.51)
Percent low income					.13	-.24	5.58	-6.98
					(4.12)	(9.16)	(13.00)	(20.60)
Percent high income					-3.70	-3.48	-7.83	-7.76
					(4.06)	(6.47)	(10.20)	(15.60)
Constant	.08	1.78	3.90	-1.87	.73	1.37	-5.84	4.55
	(.08)	(1.64)	(3.10)	(2.78)	(2.44)	(14.50)	(18.40)	(34.70)
Observations	48	48	24	24	48	48	24	24
R ²	.60	.61	.56	.56	.66	.66	.62	.69

Source: Authors' compilation based on analysis of the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006), as well as the policy measure presented in table 7.3.

Notes: N = 48 states, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Coefficients from OLS regression models. Group opinion measures are weighted for the proportion of each group within each state.

** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$

Table 7.7 **Summary of Findings**

	More Balanced Responsiveness	More Skewed Responsiveness
Smaller income differences	Economic policymaking in rich states	Social policymaking in poor states
Larger income differences	Social policymaking in rich states	Economic policymaking in poor states

Source: Authors' compilation.

Table 7.1 Policy Issue Items Used to Generate Economic and Social Liberalism Scales

	Raw N	Range		Liberal Position (pre-impul)		F
				Less Than \$10,000	More Than \$150,000	
Economic policy liberalism (2000)						
Inheritance tax should be cut (Q113a & Q113b)	18,292	0	1	63%	75%	14.79
Should spend on health care for uninsured (Q111b)	55,549	0	3	80	61	100.93
Should spend on Medicare (Q111g)	24,501	0	3	81	57	60.09
Favor universal health care for children (Q91d)	29,084	0	1	91	76	54.29
Should spend on Medicaid (Q111h)	24,317	0	3	73	47	67.93
Should reduce income differences (Q136e)	23,758	0	1	69	26	156.76
Should spend on aid to mothers with young children (Q111e)	24,055	0	3	66	43	46.54
Social policy liberalism (2000)						
Favor restricting abortion (Q91b & Q38c)	54,876	0	1	58	78	84.93
Should ban abortion (Q136b)	24,010	0	1	66	88	68.07

Economic policy liberalism (2004)						
Favor eliminating estate tax (Q48 & Q74 & Q75)	13,637	0	1	65	70	3.14
Favor spending more on health insurance (Q38)	19,662	0	3	86	65	48.92
Favor health insurance for children (Q62 & Q77)	19,569	0	1	92	75	36.31
Favor health insurance for workers (Q63 & Q78)	18,650	0	1	83	65	41.81
Favor assistance to schools (Q22)	28,317	0	3	79	67	21.98
Should reduce income differences (Q22)	35,149	0	3	48	27	110.58
Social policy liberalism (2004)						
Favor banning all abortions (Q20)	56,919	0	3	42	60	101.22
Favor banning all late-term abortions (Q25 & Q26)	22,040	0	3	38	38	4.77
Favor stem cell funding (Q65 & Q66 & Q83 & Q84)	16,076	0	1	67	77	8.88
Favor marriage ammendment (Q17)	55,717	0	3	43	45	18.10
Favor allowing same sex marriage (Q656 & Q657)	17,052	0	3	18	27	37.28
Favor gun control	31,281	0	3	69	62	13.57

Source: Authors' calculations from the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006).

Note: Descriptive statistics from datasets prior to imputing for missing values. Income-group responses indicate the percent of each income group selecting the most liberal response option for each item. *F* statistics drawn from one-way ANOVA tests across all nine income categories. *F* statistics for each question are significant at $p < .05$

Table 7.2 Economic and Social Policy Liberalism

	Individual Level					State Level				
	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
All respondents										
Economic (2000)	59,266	0.00	1.00	-5.03	1.86	48	-0.02	0.11	-0.23	0.22
Economic (2004)	72,682	0.00	1.00	-5.70	2.77	48	-0.01	0.10	-0.26	0.21
Social (2000)	59,266	0.00	1.00	-2.05	1.33	48	-0.03	0.21	-0.43	0.44
Social (2004)	72,682	0.00	1.00	-2.99	2.31	48	-0.02	0.19	-0.43	0.40
Low income: less than \$35,000										
Economic (2000)	23,992	0.18	0.89	-5.03	1.79	48	0.15	0.13	-0.17	0.42
Economic (2004)	24,130	0.11	0.90	-5.41	2.60	48	0.11	0.09	-0.10	0.25
Social (2000)	23,992	-0.11	1.00	-2.03	1.27	48	-0.10	0.19	-0.47	0.36
Social (2004)	24,130	-0.08	0.99	-2.93	2.31	48	-0.07	0.15	-0.36	0.21
Middle income										
Economic (2000)	22,491	-0.07	1.03	-5.03	1.71	48	-0.10	0.14	-0.51	0.25
Economic (2004)	26,992	0.00	1.00	-5.70	2.77	48	-0.02	0.12	-0.30	0.21
Social (2000)	22,491	0.01	1.01	-2.03	1.28	48	-0.03	0.25	-0.45	0.50
Social (2004)	26,992	-0.02	1.01	-2.99	2.16	48	-0.03	0.20	-0.43	0.43
High income: more than \$75,000										
Economic (2000)	12,783	-0.22	1.10	-5.03	1.86	48	-0.25	0.18	-0.72	0.16
Economic (2004)	21,560	-0.12	1.08	-5.59	2.38	48	-0.14	0.18	-0.60	0.30
Social (2000)	12,783	0.19	0.95	-2.05	1.33	48	0.11	0.22	-0.27	0.49
Social (2004)	21,560	0.12	0.99	-2.78	2.22	48	0.03	0.25	-0.60	0.61

Source: Authors' calculations from the 2000 and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (Romer et al. 2006).

Table 8.1 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Mean State Ideologies, 101st to 103rd Congresses

	Mean Ideology = -1 to +1 Scale	Mean Ideology = 1 to 7 Scale
Mean ideology for voting-age population	1.41*** (0.24)	0.47*** (0.08)
Republican senator	0.95*** (0.04)	0.95*** (0.04)
Intercepts	Congress-specific	Congress-specific
Standard error of regression	0.226	0.226
Adjusted R^2	.82	.82
N	303	303

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Miller et al. (1993).
Note: Dependent variables in both regressions are senator-specific W-nominatees. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by senator in parentheses.

Table 8.2 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Income-Specific Ideologies, 101st to 103rd Congresses

	Bartels Mean Ideology = -1 to +1 Scale	Replication, Mean Ideology = -1 to +1 Scale	Replication, Mean Ideology = 1 to 7 Scale
Wgt. low-income ideology ($\bar{X}_L P_L$)	-0.33 (0.44)	-0.67 (0.41)	0.50*** (0.09)
Wgt. middle-income ideology ($\bar{X}_M P_M$)	2.66*** (0.60)	2.52*** (0.53)	0.43*** (0.13)
Wgt. high-income ideology ($\bar{X}_H P_H$)	4.15*** (0.85)	4.91*** (0.72)	0.50*** (0.14)
Republican senator dummy	0.95*** (0.04)	0.92*** (0.04)	0.96*** (0.04)
Intercepts	Congress- specific	Congress- specific	Congress- specific
Standard error of regression	0.207	0.205	.0223
Adjusted R^2	.85	.85	.83
N	303	303	303

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Miller et al. (1993).
Note: Dependent variables in all regressions are senator-specific W-nominatees. Wgt. low-income ideology, wgt. middle-income ideology, and wgt. high-income ideology are the raw mean ideologies for the respective income groups times the proportion of that group. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by senator in parentheses.

Table 8.3 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Income-Specific Ideologies, 101st to 103rd Congresses

	Replication, Mean Ideology = -1 to +1 Scale	Replication, Mean Ideology = 1 to 7 Scale
Wgt. low-income ideology ($\bar{X}_L P_L$)	-1.06** (0.39)	-0.35** (0.13)
Wgt. middle-income ideology ($\bar{X}_M P_M$)	2.26*** (0.56)	0.75*** (0.19)
Wgt. high-income ideology ($\bar{X}_H P_H$)	4.58*** (0.75)	1.52*** (0.25)
Republican senator dummy	0.92*** (0.04)	0.92*** (0.04)
Proportion low-income (P_L)	0.75 (0.39)	5.18*** (1.03)
Proportion high-income (P_H)	0.14 (0.35)	-2.97* (1.35)
Intercepts	Congress-specific	Congress-specific
Standard error of regression	0.202	0.202
Adjusted R^2	.86	.86
N	303	303

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Miller et al. (1993).
Note: Replicated results with proportions added. Dependent variables in both regressions are senator-specific W-nominatees. Wgt. low-income ideology, wgt. middle-income ideology, and wgt. high-income ideology are the raw mean ideologies for the respective groups times the proportion of that group. Proportion low-income and proportion high-income denotes the proportions entered separately. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by senator in parentheses.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Table 8.4 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Income-Specific Ideologies, Defined Statewise, 101st to 103rd Congresses

	Mean ideology = -1 to +1 scale	Mean ideology = 1 to 7 scale
Low-income ideology (\bar{X}_L)	-0.21 (0.17)	-0.07 (0.06)
Middle-income ideology (\bar{X}_M)	0.57* (0.26)	0.19* (0.10)
High-income ideology (\bar{X}_H)	1.24*** (0.22)	0.41*** (0.07)
Republican senator dummy	0.94*** (0.04)	0.94*** (0.04)
Intercepts	Congress-specific	Congress-specific
Standard error of regression	0.214	0.214
Adjusted R^2	.84	.84
N	303	303

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Miller et al. (1993).
Note: Dependent variables in both regressions are senator-specific W-nominatees. Low-income ideology, middle-income ideology, and high-income ideology are the mean ideologies for each group where the group is defined statewise (one-third in each state), not nationally. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by senator in parentheses.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Table 8.5 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Mean State Ideologies, 106th to 108th Congresses (Annenberg Study Data)

Mean ideology for voting-age population (-1 to +1 scale)	1.99*** (.35)
Republican senator	1.31*** (.04)
Intercepts	Congress-specific
Standard error of regression	.196
Adjusted R^2	.93
N	291

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Romer et al. (2006).
Note: Dependent variables are both senator-specific W -nominates. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by senator in parentheses.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Table 8.6 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Income-Specific Ideologies, 106th to 108th Congresses, Defined Nationally (Annenberg Study Data)

	Mean Ideology = -1 to +1 Scale
Wgt. low-income ideology ($\bar{X}_L P_L$)	1.02 (1.14)
Wgt. middle-income ideology ($\bar{X}_M P_M$)	2.06 (1.99)
Wgt. high-income ideology ($\bar{X}_H P_H$)	3.72* (1.57)
Republican senator dummy	1.30*** (.05)
Proportion low-income (P_L)	.02 (.79)
Proportion high-income (P_H)	-.56 (.82)
Intercepts	Congress-specific
Standard error of regression	.194
Adjusted R^2	.93
N	291

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Romer et al. (2006).
Note: Dependent variables are senator-specific W -nominates. Wgt. low-income ideology, wgt. middle-income ideology, and wgt. high-income ideology are the raw mean ideologies for the respective income groups times the proportion of that group. The groups are defined nationally. Proportion low-income and proportion high-income denotes the proportions entered separately. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors clustered by senator in parentheses.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Table 8.7 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Income-Specific Ideologies, 106th to 108th Congresses, Defined Statewise (Annenberg Study Data)

	Mean Ideology = -1 to +1 Scale	- Mean Ideology = -1 to +1 Scale EIVREG
Low-income ideology (\bar{X}_L)	.59 (.41)	1.16 (0.76)
Middle-income ideology (\bar{X}_M)	.04 (.62)	-.95 (.96)
High-income ideology (\bar{X}_H)	1.14* (.50)	1.58* (.71)
Republican senator dummy	1.31*** (.04)	1.30*** (.04)
Intercepts	Congress-specific	Congress-specific
Standard error of regression	.196	.193
Adjusted R^2	.93	.93
N	291	291

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Romer et al. (2006).
Note: Dependent variables are senator-specific W-nominatees. Low-income ideology, middle-income ideology, and high-income ideology are the mean ideologies for each group where the group is defined state-wise (one-third in each state), not nationally. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by senator in column 1. Because the Eivreg procedure in STATA does not allow for clustering, we also estimated the model in column 2 with only one observation per senator/cluster. That is, the dataset was collapsed at the individual senator level to preclude statistical dependence due to senators holding office in multiple sessions. This did not alter the results substantively.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Table 8.8 Predicting Senate Roll-Call Ideology from Income-Specific Ideologies, Defined Nationally (2004 Exit Poll Data)

	1st Dimension of DW- Nominates	2nd Dimension of DW- Nominates	Composite Measure
Wgt. low-income ideology ($\bar{X}_L P_L$)	2.32* (.99)	4.03 (2.08)	2.77** (1.02)
Wgt. middle-income ideology ($\bar{X}_M P_M$)	1.61* (.62)	1.07 (1.31)	1.47* (.65)
Wgt. high-income ideology ($\bar{X}_H P_H$)	-.47 (.61)	1.59 (1.29)	.06 (.64)
Republican senator dummy	.79*** (.04)	-.55*** (.07)	.44*** (.04)
Proportion low-income (\bar{P}_L)	.22 (.63)	1.04 (1.33)	.43 (.66)
Proportion high-income (\bar{P}_H)	.40 (.50)	-.43 (1.06)	.18 (.52)
Intercept	-.68* (.30)	-.08 (.64)	.35 (.71)
Standard error of regression	.150	.307	.155
Adjusted R ²	.90	.45	.82
N	101	101	101

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (2007) and Edison Mitofsky Research (2004).

Note: Dependent variables are different versions of senator-specific DW-nominates. The composite measure is .74 times the 1st dimension score plus .26 times the 2nd dimension score. Wgt. low-income ideology, wgt. middle-income ideology, and wgt. high-income ideology are the raw mean ideologies for the respective income groups times the proportion of that group. The groups are defined nationally. Proportion low-income and proportion high-income denotes the proportions entered separately. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Table 8.9 Influence of General Opinion on Three Versions of DW-Nominates (2004 Exit Poll Data)

	1st Dimension of DW- Nominates	2nd Dimension of DW- Nominates	Composite Measure
Mean ideology	.79*** (.14)	2.36*** (.32)	1.33*** (.16)
Republican senator dummy	.78*** (.03)	-.51*** (.07)	.42*** (.04)
Intercept	-.46*** (.02)	-.08 (.05)	-.39*** (.03)
Standard error of regression	.153	.318	.155
Adjusted R^2	.90	.41	.81
N	101	101	101

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (2007) and Edison Mitofsky Research (2004).

Note: Dependent variables are different versions of senator-specific DW-nominates. The composite measure is .74 times the 1st-dimension score plus .26 times 2nd-dimension score. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Table 8.10 Predicting Roll-Call Ideology from Ideology of State Income Groups, Defined Statewise (2004 Exit Poll Data)

	1st Dimension of DW- Nominates	2nd Dimension of DW- Nominates	Composite Measure
Low-income ideology	1.00 (.86)	-1.23 (1.79)	.45 (.89)
Middle-income ideology	1.70 (1.04)	2.34 (2.17)	1.86 (1.08)
High-income ideology	.40 (.76)	4.78** (1.59)	1.54 (.79)
Republican senator dummy	.77*** (.04)	-.60*** (.07)	.41*** (.04)
Intercept	-.50*** (.03)	-.12* (.06)	-.40*** (.03)
Standard error of regression	.149	.312	.155
Adjusted R^2	.90	.44	.81
N	101	101	101

Source: Authors' compilation based on Poole and Rosenthal (2007) and Edison Mitofsky Research (2004).

Note: Dependent variables are different versions of senator-specific DW-nominates. The composite measure is .74 times the 1st-dimension score plus .26 times the 2nd-dimension score. Low-income ideology, middle-income ideology, and high-income ideology are the ideologies of voters in the state's lowest, middle, and highest third of family income respectively. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < .001$, ** $.001 < p < .01$, * $.01 < p < .05$

Appendix

Table 8.A1 Descriptive Statistics for NES Senate Study (–1 to +1 Scale)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
W-nominate 1st dimension	–.19	.54	–1	.99	303
Low-income ideology	.14	.11	–.09	.33	303
Middle-income ideology	.15	.09	–.03	.37	303
High-income ideology	.13	.09	–.10	.32	303
Overall mean ideology	.14	.07	.03	.31	303
Republican senator	.44	.50	0	1	303

Source: Authors' compilation based on Miller et al. (1993) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997).

Note: Income groups are defined nationally.

Table 8.A2 Correlation Matrix for NES Senate Study (–1 to +1 Scale)

	WN	LII	MII	HIO	OMI	RS
W-nominate 1st dimension (WN)	—					
Low-income ideology (LII)	.01	—				
Middle-income ideology (MII)	.17	.31	—			
High-income ideology (HIO)	.31	.30	.33	—		
Overall mean ideology (OMI)	.23	.71	.78	.69	—	
Republican senator (RS)	.89	–.04	.00	.09	.04	—

Source: Authors' compilation based on Miller et al. (1993) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997).

Note: The coefficients are the pair-wise correlations. Income groups are defined nationally.

Table 8.A3 Descriptive Statistics for the Annenberg 2000 and 2004 (–1 to +1 Scale)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
W-nominate 1st dimension	–.02	.73	–1	1	291
Low-income ideology	.06	.06	–.06	.16	291
Middle-income ideology	.10	.06	–.02	.22	291
High-income ideology	.12	.08	–.06	.33	291
Overall mean ideology	.10	.06	–.03	.19	291
Republican senator	.52	.50	0	1	291

Source: Authors' compilation based on Romer et al. (2006) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997).

Note: Income groups are defined nationally.

Table 8.A4 Correlation Matrix for the Annenberg, 2000 and 2004 (-1 to +1 Scale)

	WN	LII	MII	HIO	OMI	RS
W-nominate 1st dimension (WN)	—					
Low-income ideology (LII)	.33	—				
Middle-income ideology (MII)	.42	.63	—			
High-income ideology (HIO)	.50	.69	.85	—		
Overall mean ideology (OMI)	.48	.81	.93	.95	—	
Republican senator (RS)	.95	.22	.30	.37	.35	—

Source: Authors' compilation based on Romer et al. (2006) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997).

Note: The coefficients are the pair-wise correlations. Income groups are defined nationally.

Table 8.A5 Descriptive Statistics for Exit Poll Data (-1 to +1 Scale)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	N
DW-nominate 1st dimension	.02	.46	-.60	.48	101
Low-income ideology	.06	.11	-.16	.28	101
Middle-income ideology	.15	.12	-.18	.34	101
High-income ideology	.20	.15	-.09	.49	101
Overall mean ideology	.14	.12	-.12	.34	101
Republican senator	.48	.50	0	1	101

Source: Authors' compilation based on Edison Mitofsky Research (2004) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997).



Table 8.A6 Correlation Matrix for the Exit Poll Data

	WN	LII	MII	HIO	OMI	RS
DW-nominate 1st dimension (WN)	—					
Low-income ideology (LII)	.48	—				
Middle-income ideology (MII)	.65	.75	—			
High-income ideology (HIO)	.64	.80	.90	—		
Overall mean ideology (OMI)	.65	.86	.96	.96	—	
Republican senator (RS)	.93	.35	.51	.51	.52	—

Source: Authors' compilation based on Edison Mitofsky Research (2004) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997).


Note: The coefficients are the pair-wise correlations.

Figure 9.1 Preference-Policy Link When Preferences Across Income Groups Diverge




Source: Author's calculations. Predicted probabilities based on the logistic regressions reported in row 3 of table 9.1.

Figure 9.2 Strength of Preference-Policy Link When Preferences Diverge from Income Percentiles



Source: Author's calculations based on the logistic regressions reported in appendix table 9.A2.

Figure 9.3 Decline in Preference-Policy Link as Preferences Across Income Groups Diverge



Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Based on logistic regressions reported in table 9.2 and appendix table 9.A4. Y-axis represents the strength of the preference-policy link. X-axis represents preference divergence across income groups. See note to appendix table 9.A4 for details.

Table 9.1 Strength of the Preference-Policy Link by Size of Preference Gap Across Income Percentiles

Size of Preference	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Gap between income percentiles				
Less than 5 points	.56 (.09) ***	.55 (.09) ***	.49 (.07) ***	.52 (.07) ***
Between 5 and 10 points	.42 (.11) ***	.53 (.11) ***	.36 (.10) ***	.54 (.12) ***
Greater than 10 points	.09 (.09)	.54 (.10) ***	.13 (.14)	.58 (.19) ***
All policy questions	.34 (.05) ***	.53 (.06) ***	.41 (.05) ***	.53 (.06) ***

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Table shows regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from 16 bivariate logistic analyses. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and coded 0 if it did not. The predictors are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income percentile favoring the proposed policy change. N = 1779 for all policy questions (in the bottom row) and from 322 to 936 for analyses in the first three rows. See appendix table 9.A1 for full results.

*** $p < .001$

Table 9.2 Decline in Preference-Policy Link as Preferences Across Income Groups Diverge

	N	Income Percentile					
		10th		50th		90th	
Foreign policy	428	-.62 **	(.22)	-.42 *	(.22)	-.06	(.21)
Social welfare	399	-.26 *	(.14)	-.13	(.14)	-.03	(.16)
Economic and tax policy	389	-.43 *	(.24)	-.45 *	(.23)	-.16	(.24)
Religious values issues	161	-.79 *	(.38)	-.46 +	(.33)	-.27	(.34)
Four domains combined	1,377	-.28 ***	(.09)	-.19 *	(.09)	-.02	(.09)

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Shows interaction coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from fifteen logistic analyses. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and coded 0 if it did not. Predictors are policy preferences at a given income level, preference divergence across income levels, and the interaction of the two. Policy preference is measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Preference divergence is measured by the log of the mean absolute difference between the 10th and 50th income percentiles and the 50th and 90th income percentiles. Negative signs reflect a decline in the strength of the preference-policy link for a given income level as the preference gap across income levels grows. Full regression results in appendix table 9.A4. + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 9.3 Policy Preferences on Foreign Policy and National Security, by Income Percentile

	Income Percentiles			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th-10th)
Foreign military engagements				
Invade Afghanistan	+4	+4	+5	+1
Invade Iraq	+2	+2	+1	-1
Use air power against Serbia	0	0	0	0
Send U.S. ground troops to Serbia	-3	-2	-2	+1
U.S. troops in international peace-keeping force in Bosnia	-1	0	0	+1
Send U.S. troops to Haiti	-1	-2	-2	-1
Give military aid to El Salvador or Sandinistas	-3	-2	-2	+1
Nuclear weapons				
Negotiate a nuclear freeze with U.S.S.R.	+4	+4	+4	0
Build the MX missile	-3	-1	+1	+4
Build a missile defense system	+3	+4	+4	+1
War on terrorism				
Restrict Americans' freedom of speech	-1	-2	-4	-3
Relax legal protections (e.g., habeas corpus)	+3	+4	+5	+2
Monitor Americans' phone calls, etc.	+1	0	0	-1
Torture known terrorists	0	0	-1	-1
Attack nations that harbor terrorists	+3	+4	+5	+2
Foreign economic policy				
Development aid generally	0	+1	+2	+2
Development aid to former Soviet Union	-2	0	+2	+4
GATT, NAFTA, free trade	-1	0	+1	+2
Mexico loan guarantees	-4	-4	-3	+1

Source: Author's calculations.

Legend:

between 45% and 55% 0
over 55% or under 45% +/- 1
over 60% or under 40% +/- 2
over 65% or under 35% +/- 3
over 75% or under 25% +/- 4
over 85% or under 15% +/- 5

Table 9.4 Policy Preferences on Religious–Moral Values Issues, by Income Percentile

	Income Percentiles			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th–10th)
Abortion and birth control				
Approve RU-486	-1	0	+2	+3
Constitutional ban on abortion	-2	-3	-4	-2
Federal funding for abortions	-2	-2	0	+2
Ban partial-birth abortion procedure	+2	+2	+1	-1
Require biological father’s consent or notification for abortion	+3	+3	0	-3
Require parental consent for birth control assistance for teens	0	0	-2	-2
Gay rights				
Gays, extend legal protection	+1	+3	+3	+2
Gay marriage	-2	-2	-1	+1
Gay civil unions	-1	0	0	+1
Gays in the military	0	0	+1	+1
Recreational drugs and teen smoking				
Strengthen fight against drugs and teenage smoking	+4	+4	+4	0
Legalize marijuana for medical use with doctor’s prescription	+4	+4	+4	0
Legalize marijuana for personal use	-3	-3	-3	0
Encourage mandatory drug testing in workplace	+4	+3	+3	-1
Misc. moral-religion issues				
Constitutional amendment to permit school prayer	+4	+3	+1	-3
Stem cell research: source unspecified	+1	+1	+3	+2
From discarded embryos	0	+1	+3	+3
From newly created embryos	-2	-1	+1	+3
Mandatory AIDS testing of all citizens (mid-1980s)	+3	+2	0	-3
G.W. Bush’s faith-based initiative	+3	+3	+2	-1
Strengthen TV rating system or time restrictions; require V-chip	+4	+5	+4	0

Source: Author’s calculations.

Legend:

- between 45% and 55% 0
- over 55% or under 45% +/- 1
- over 60% or under 40% +/- 2
- over 65% or under 35% +/- 3
- over 75% or under 25% +/- 4
- over 85% or under 15% +/- 5

Table 9.5 Policy Preferences on Economic Issues, by Income Percentile

	Income Percentiles			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th–10th)
Income taxes				
Cut personal income tax (across the board)	+3	+3	+3	0
Cut income tax rates for low and/or middle income earners	+4	+4	+3	-1
Raise income tax rates to reduce the deficit (1980s)	-3	-3	-3	0
Raise taxes on very high income earners	+4	+4	+3	-1
Cut top marginal tax rate	0	+1	+2	+2
Flat tax	-1	0	+1	+2
Other taxes				
Support a federal sales or consumption tax	-2	-2	-2	0
Cut capital gains taxes	0	+1	+3	+3
Cut/eliminate inheritance tax	+1	+2	+3	+2
Raise gas/energy taxes	-2	-1	0	+2
Other economic issues				
Unpaid family leave law	+3	+3	+3	0
Reform corporate accounting rules (post-Enron)	+3	+3	+3	0
Raise minimum wage	+5	+4	+3	-2
Extend/increase unemployment benefits	+2	+1	-1	-3
Increase gov't regulation of oil/gas industry	+1	+1	-2	-3
Increase misc. corporate regulation	+3	+2	+1	-2

Source: Author's calculations.

Legend:

between 45% and 55%	0
over 55% or under 45%	+/- 1
over 60% or under 40%	+/- 2
over 65% or under 35%	+/- 3
over 75% or under 25%	+/- 4
over 85% or under 15%	+/- 5

Table 9.6 Policy Preferences on Social Welfare Issues, by Income Percentile

	Income Percentiles			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th–10th)
Welfare reform				
Work requirements	+4	+4	+3	-1
Job training for welfare recipients	+5	+5	+5	0
Child care for welfare recipients who work	+5	+5	+5	0
Time limits	+1	+3	+3	+2
No extra money for extra kids	0	0	+1	+1
Cut total spending on welfare	+1	+3	+4	+3
Health care				
Tax funded national health care	+3	+3	+1	-2
Employer mandates	+4	+3	+2	-2
Clinton Plan	+3	+2	+1	-2
Medical savings accounts	-3	-2	0	+3
Social Security reform				
Gov't invest Soc. Sec. money in stocks	-3	-2	0	+3
Individuals control own stock accounts	0	+2	+3	+3
Change Soc. Sec. rules to discourage early retirement	-2	0	+1	+3
Medicare reform				
Encourage recipients to move to HMOs	-1	+1	+1	+2
Raise premiums/deductibles for Medicare beneficiaries	-3	-1	0	+3
Cut overall Medicare spending	-4	-3	-2	+2
Add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare	+5	+5	+4	-1
Education				
Federal grants and loans to college students	+4	+4	+4	0
School vouchers	-1	0	+1	+2
Other social welfare issues				
Federal unpaid family-leave law	+3	+3	+3	0
Cut public works spending (mass transit, highways, sewage)	-2	0	+1	+3

Source: Author's calculations.

Legend:

between 45% and 55%	0
over 55% or under 45%	+/- 1
over 60% or under 40%	+/- 2
over 65% or under 35%	+/- 3
over 75% or under 25%	+/- 4
over 85% or under 15%	+/- 5

Appendix

Table 9.A1 Policy Preference as a Predictor of Policy Outcome, by Income Percentile

Size of Preference Gap	10th Versus 90th Income Percentiles		50th Versus 90th Income Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Less than 5 points				
Logit coefficient	.56 (.09)	.55 (.09)	.49 (.07)	.52 (.07)
Intercept	-1.02 (.11)	-1.03 (.11)	-.94 (.08)	-.96 (.08)
N	600	600	936	936
Log likelihood	715	714	1,136	1,130
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 42$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 43$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 58$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 64$ $p = .001$
Between 5 and 10 points				
Logit coefficient	.42 (.11)	.53 (.11)	.36 (.10)	.54 (.12)
Intercept	-.94 (.11)	-1.00 (.12)	-.81 (.10)	-.87 (.10)
N	456	456	521	521
Log likelihood	549	538	648	638
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 17$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 28$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 13$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 23$ $p = .001$
Greater than 10 points				
Logit coefficient	.09 (.09)	.54 (.10)	.13 (.14)	.58 (.19)
Intercept	-.69 (.08)	-.83 (.09)	-.90 (.12)	-.98 (.13)
N	723	723	322	322
Log likelihood	922	892	388	379
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 1$ $p = .15$	$\chi^2(1) = 31$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 1$ $p = .18$	$\chi^2(1) = 10$ $p = .001$
All policy questions				
Logit coefficient	.34 (.05)	.53 (.06)	.41 (.05)	.53 (.06)
Intercept	-.83 (.05)	-.94 (.06)	-.88 (.05)	-.94 (.06)
N	1,779	1,779	1,779	1,779
Log likelihood	2,200	2,142	2,175	2,142
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 45$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 102$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 70$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 102$ $p = .001$

Source: Author's calculation.

Note: Shows full results for table 9.1 and figure 9.1. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 9.A2 Policy Preference as a Predictor of Policy Outcome, by Income Percentile When Preferences Across Income Groups Differ

	10th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge		30th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge		50th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge		70th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge	
	10th	90th	30th	90th	50th	90th	70th	90th
Logit coefficient (standard error)	.09 (.09)	.54 *** (.10)	.01 (.11)	.47 *** (.14)	.13 (.14)	.58 ** (.19)	.21 (.22)	.58 * (.30)
Intercept	-.69	-.83	-.84	-.93	-.90	-.98	-.95	-1.00
N	723	723	481	481	322	322	165	165
-2 Log likelihood	922	892	589	577	388	379	196	193
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 1.1$ $p = .15$	$\chi^2(1) = 31$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 0.0$ $p = .47$	$\chi^2(1) = 12$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 0.8$ $p = .18$	$\chi^2(1) = 10$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 0.9$ $p = .17$	$\chi^2(1) = 3.9$ $p = .03$

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Shows full results for figure 9.2. Results above are from four pairs of logistic regressions in which the sample of survey questions is restricted to those for which preferences between the specified income percentiles differ by at least 10 percentage points. To provide enough number of policy questions with divergent preferences, however, the analysis of the 70th v-ersus the 90th income percentiles includes questions on which preferences differ by at least 8 percentage points.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 9.A3 Policy Preference as a Predictor of Policy Outcome, by Policy Domain

	Foreign Policy/ National Security	Social Welfare	Economic Policy	Religious Issues
Logit coefficient (standard error)	.59 (.12)	.51 (.12)	.66 (.13)	.93 (.26)
Intercept	.12	-1.50	-.84	-1.61
N	428	399	389	161
Log likelihood	562	403	482	161
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 28$ $p = < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 20$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 27$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 15$ $p < .001$

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. The dependent variable is policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and coded 0 if it did not. The predictors are the logits of the percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change.

Table 9.A4 Interaction of Preference-Policy Link and Preference Gap across Income Levels

	Income Percentile					
	10th		50th		90th	
Foreign policy (N = 428)						
Income group's preference	-1.51 *	(.65)	-.76	(.66)	.59	(.66)
Preference gap across income groups	.03	(.18)	.04	(.18)	.01	(.18)
Interaction	-.62 **	(.22)	-.42 *	(.22)	-.06	(.21)
Constant	.18	(.54)	.22	(.54)	.12	(.55)
Likelihood ratio χ^2 (3)	21.7, $p < .001$		30.7, $p < .001$		48.1, $p < .001$	
Social welfare (N = 399)						
Income group's preference	-.41	(.45)	.08	(.47)	.52	(.54)
Preference gap across income groups	.27	(.22)	.22	(.22)	.14	(.22)
Interaction	-.26 *	(.14)	-.13	(.14)	-.03	(.16)
Constant	-.67	(.61)	-.88 +	(.64)	-1.18 *	(.65)
Likelihood ratio χ^2 (3)	17.5, $p < .001$		22, $p < .001$		23.2, $p < .001$	
Economic policy (N = 389)						
Income group's preference	-.74	(.69)	-.75	(.66)	.36	(.72)
Preference gap across income groups	.09	(.21)	.10	(.22)	.01	(.21)
Interaction	-.43 *	(.24)	-.45*	(.23)	-.16	(.24)
Constant	-.48	(.60)	-.55	(.64)	-.87 +	(.63)
Likelihood ratio χ^2 (3)	21.7, $p < .001$		27.2, $p < .001$		42.3, $p < .001$	
Religious issues (N = 161)						
Income group's preference	-1.70 +	(1.16)	-.61	(1.06)	.22	(1.09)
Preference gap across income groups	.53	(.44)	.34	(.40)	.30	(.41)
Interaction	-.79 *	(.38)	-.46 +	(.33)	-.27	(.34)
Constant	-.01	(1.26)	-.58	(1.15)	-.77	(1.19)
Likelihood ratio χ^2 (3)	16.3, $p < .001$		15.8, $p < .001$		19.7, $p < .001$	
Four domains combined (N = 1,377)						
Income group's preference	-.52 *	(.28)	-.16	(.27)	.54 *	(.30)
Preference gap across income groups	.10	(.10)	.07	(.10)	.02	(.10)
Interaction	-.28***	(.09)	-.19 *	(.09)	-.02	(.09)
Constant	-.40	(.29)	-.50	(.29)	-.70	(.30)
Likelihood ratio χ^2 (3)	46.4, $p < .001$		61.5, $p < .001$		90.8, $p < .001$	

Source: Author's calculations.

Notes: Shows full logistic regression results for table 9.2 and figure 9.3. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) indicating the interaction of policy preference at each income level with preference divergence across income levels. Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Divergence measured by the log of the mean absolute difference between the 10th and 50th and the 50th and 90th income percentiles.

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 9.A5 Interaction of Preference-Policy Link and Preference Gap across Income Levels for Social Welfare Issues


	Income Percentile					
	10th		50th		90th	
Interest group allies (N = 184)						
Income group's preference	.28	(.64)	.82	(.66)	1.54	(.88)
Preference gap across income groups	.49	(.33)	.39	(.32)	.27	(.32)
Interaction	-.08	(.20)	.08	(.19)	.25	(.24)
Constant	-.11	(.91)	-.43	(.90)	-.85	(.90)
Likelihood ratio χ^2 (3)	11.1, $p < .01$		12.9, $p < .005$		13.1, $p < .004$	
No interest group allies (N = 215)						
Income group's preference	-1.44 *	(.77)	-.82	(.79)	-.15	(.79)
Preference gap across income groups	.24	(.31)	.26	(.34)	.12	(.33)
Interaction	-.53 *	(.23)	-.39 *	(.24)	-.22	(.23)
Constant	-.60	(.89)	-.67	(1.00)	-1.17	(.98)
Likelihood ratio χ^2 (3)	9.8, $p < .02$		11.7, $p < .009$		12.0, $p < .008$	

Source: Author's compilation.

Note: The top half of the table shows analyses of policy questions on which interest groups align more closely with the preferences of less affluent Americans (Social Security, Medicare, school vouchers, and public works); the bottom half shows all other policy questions in the social welfare domain. The table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) indicating the interaction of policy preference at each income level with preference divergence across income levels. Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Divergence measured by the log of the mean absolute difference between the 10th and 50th and the 50th and 90th income percentiles.


* $p < .05$ (one-tailed tests)

Figure 10.1 Time-Series Roots of Unequal Representation



Source: Authors' figure.

Figure 10.2 Spending Preferences for Different Programs, by Income Level



Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsdsen 1973–2008).

Table 10.1 ANOVA Results, U.S. Spending Preferences by Year and Income Level, 1973 to 2008

	Year	Group
Defense	91.3	.4
Welfare	38.8	54.8
Health	74.4	3.9
Education	80.9	5
Environment	72.8	3.7
Crime	52.9	2.4
Mean	68.5	11.7

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsdsen 1973–2008).

Note: Table shows the percent of total variance in preferences across time and groups explained by year and group dummy variables.

Table 10.3 **Public Responsiveness, by Income Level, 1973 to 2008**

	Low	Middle	High
Defense	-.243**	-.274**	-.290**
Welfare	-.659**	-.692**	-.615**
Health	-.045	-.122	-.178*
Education	-.200	-.310**	-.269**
Environment	-1.677**	-2.208**	-2.456**
Crime	-.542**	-.542**	-.414**

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsdsen 1973–2008).

Note: Table values are OLS coefficients.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$

Table 10.4 Policy Representation, All Income Subgroups Included, 1973 to 2008 (Billions of 2002 Dollars)

	Defense	Welfare	Health	Education	Environment	Crime	Mean
Low income	-.524 (.455)	.052 (.214)	.277* (.156)	-.181 (.254)	-.061 (.048)	.232 (.143)	-.034
Middle income	.257 (.589)	.436* (.246)	.087 (.199)	.387 (.339)	-.015 (.067)	-.386 (.261)	.128
High income	.848 (.509)	-.135 (.192)	.170 (.189)	-.081 (.274)	.110** (.052)	.207 (.164)	.187

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsdsen 1973–2008).

Note: Table values are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$

Table 10.5 Policy Representation by Income Group, 1973 to 2008 (Billions of 2002 Dollars)

	Low	Middle	High
Defense	.803**	.773**	.694**
Welfare	.248*	.331**	.176*
Health	.493**	.453**	.448**
Education	.094	.166	.118**
Environment	.021	.049	.059
Crime	.124	.020	.069

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsdsen 1973–2008).

Note: Table values are OLS coefficients.


* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$

Table 10.6 Net Effects of Responsiveness and Representation, by Income Group, 1973 to 2008

	Low	Middle	High
Defense	-.195	-.212	-.202
Welfare	-.164	-.229	-.108
Health	-.022	-.055	-.080
Education	-.019	-.051	-.032
Environment	-.035	-.109	-.146
Crime	-.067	-.011	-.028
Mean	-.084	-.111	-.099

Source: Authors' compilation based on the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, and Marsdsen 1973–2008).


Figure 11.1 Three Possible Models of Responsiveness




Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: Democratic members of Congress (MCs) shown as D; Republican shown as R.


Panel A. Speaker Joe Cannon's House (1906)




Panel B. Speaker Sam Rayburn's House (1956)



Panel C. Speaker Nancy Pelosi's House (2006)




Source: Authors' compilation. Presidential vote data from Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001); NOMINATE data from Poole (n.d., <http://voteview.com>).




Source: Authors' compilation. Presidential vote data from Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001); NOMINATE data from Poole (n.d., <http://voteview.com>).

Figure 11.4 The Mixed Model of Political Representation




Source: Authors' compilation.

Figure 11.5 Effect of Party and District Partisanship on MC's Roll-Call Votes




Source: Authors' compilation. Presidential vote data from Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001); NOMINATE data from Poole (n.d., <http://voteview.com>).

Figure 11.6 Trends in Public Opinion on Taxes




Source: Authors' compilation based on Gallup (2010).

Figure 11.7 Trends in Public Opinion on Social Security Spending




Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the National Election Studies (NES, various years).

Figure 11.8 **Trimming Extreme Values from Pelosi's House**




Source: Authors' compilation. Presidential vote data from Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001); NOMINATE data from Poole (n.d., <http://voteview.com>).

Figure 12.1 Preferences for Spending Between Categories of Spending by Income Groups



Source: Author's compilation based on 2008 General Social Surveys (Davis and Smith, various years).

Figure 12.2 A Hypothetical Vision on How Biased Response Cross-Sectionally Might Combine with Perfect Response Longitudinally to Produce Actual Representative Outcomes



Source: Author's compilation based on General Social Surveys (Davis and Smith, various years) and on Ura and Ellis (2008).

Table 12.1 Selected Important GSS 2008 Opinion Items, by Income Level

Income	Party Identification (Republican)	Self-Identification (Conservative)	New Deal Scale (Conservative)	Abortion (Pro-Choice)	Redistribution (Oppose)
Low	.37	.49	.41	.58	.43
Medium	.43	.53	.48	.62	.52
High	.52	.53	.55	.70	.62
R^2	.029	.004	.057	.018	.062

Source: Author's compilation based on 2008 General Social Surveys (Davis and Smith, various years).

Note: R^2 in each case is from a regression with the three-category income variable independent.

All variables are rescaled to have minima and maxima of 0 and 1.