

FOREWORD

This pamphlet is the sixth of a projected series of Occasional Papers, under the editorship of Donald S. Howard, assistant director of the Charity Organization Department. It is intended to offer those interested in planning or administering relief abroad a digest of pertinent material prepared under auspices other than our own and not readily available. Some of the texts included in this series have never been published, some are out of print; since they are inaccessible to many readers, it has not been felt necessary to designate the exact pages quoted.

Restrictions upon the use of paper in the present emergency make it necessary sharply to limit the length of these Occasional Papers. The material has therefore been cut severely. Except for certain headings and subheadings, and insertions enclosed in brackets, the wording of the text is that of the original author. Only omissions *within* paragraphs are shown by dots. In order to give a consecutive, though curtailed account, the order of the paragraphs has sometimes been rearranged.

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THE AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION IN RUSSIA¹

1921-1923

GETTING THE PROGRAM UNDER WAY

WHILE the Communists and others in America and Europe were raising the old cry *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*, much more important events were taking place in Riga where, on August 10, [1921] Walter Lyman Brown, assisted by C. J. C. Quinn, P. H. Carroll, and J. C. Miller (chiefs respectively of the A.R.A. missions to Poland, Germany, and the Baltic) [met] Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, to work out the terms of the agreement under which the A.R.A. was to carry on its operations in Russia. On his arrival in Riga Brown presented a draft agreement. . . . Litvinov immediately agreed to most of the articles in this draft. There was, however, one principle regarded by both parties in the negotiations as fundamental and affecting several articles in the drafted document which required discussion. This was the principle of freedom of action of the A.R.A. in Russia which affected the following matters: The right to form local committees for the distribution of relief in accordance with the practices of the A.R.A. in other countries; the number of Americans to be admitted to Russia and the restrictions on their movements there; the right of the Soviet authorities to search American premises and persons and to require the withdrawal of members of the organization accused of political activity; the areas in which the A.R.A. could deliver relief. . . . Litvinov took the position that Russia was in a state of disturbance and revolt; that there were no neutrals in the country; and that the creation of organizations outside the control of the Soviet Government might result in counter-revolutionary projects under the guise of relief committees. Brown, on the other hand, emphatically declared that the A.R.A. did not intend and would not tolerate on the part of its American representatives or its Russian committees, any political activity whatever; that its sole object was to save as many lives as possible; and Brown insisted that the basic conditions of freedom of action . . . must be adhered to if this purpose were to be effectively carried out.

¹Excerpts from *The Famine in Soviet Russia 1919-1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration*. By H. H. Fisher. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927. 609 pp. Reprinted with the permission of Professor Fisher, the author, and of the Stanford University Press, the present holder of the copyright.

Editor's note: During 1919 and 1920 several attempts made by the American Relief Administration to set up a plan for relief in Russia came to naught because of distrust of the proposals on the part of the Soviet authorities. Not until the outbreak of the great Russian famine of 1921 — the point at which this Occasional Paper picks up the story — were the Russian authorities and A.R.A. representatives able to get together and to iron out differences.

The A.R.A. must not be put in a position where its work could be used for political purposes by any party, either Communist or anti-Communist, or where its personnel could be selected by the Soviet Government through the process of elimination. The solution of this difficulty took time.

As time went on, tension increased. . . . Both parties in the conference realized that an agreement must be reached quickly, if it were to be reached at all. With this in mind the conference worked long and laboriously the night of August 17. Sufficient progress was made to enable the negotiators to make their final communications with their headquarters on the 18th. A short meeting on Friday the 19th settled the remaining points, and at 11:30 on the 20th, Brown and Litvinov signed the completed document in the presence of Latvian officials, newspaper men, and others. [The substance of this agreement was as follows:]

It is agreed between the American Relief Administration, an unofficial volunteer American charitable organization under the chairmanship of Mr. Herbert Hoover, hereinafter called the A.R.A., and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic hereinafter called the Soviet Authorities,

That the A.R.A. will extend such assistance to the Russian people as is within its power, subject to the acceptance and fulfillment of the following conditions on the part of the Soviet Authorities who hereby declare that there is need of this assistance on the part of the A.R.A.

The Soviet Authorities agree:

First: That the A.R.A. may bring into Russia such personnel as the A.R.A. finds necessary in the carrying out of its work and the Soviet Authorities guarantee them full liberty and protection while in Russia. Non-Americans and Americans who have been detained in Soviet Russia since 1917 will be admitted on approval by the Soviet Authorities.

Second: That they will, on demand of the A.R.A., immediately extend all facilities for the entry into and exit from Russia of the personnel mentioned in (1) and while such personnel are in Russia the Soviet Authorities shall accord them full liberty to come and go and move about Russia on official business and shall provide them with all necessary papers such as safe-conducts, laissez passer, et cetera, to facilitate their travel.

Third: That in securing Russian and other personnel the A.R.A. shall have complete freedom as to selection and the Soviet Authorities will, on request, assist the A.R.A. in securing same.

Fourth: That on delivery of the A.R.A. of its relief supplies at the Russian ports of Petrograd, Murmansk, Archangel, Novorossisk, or other Russian ports as mutually agreed upon, or the nearest practicable available ports in adjacent countries, decision to lie with the A.R.A., the Soviet Authorities will bear all further costs such as discharge, handling, loading and transportation to interior base points in the areas where the A.R.A. may operate. Should demurrage or storage occur at above ports mutually agreed upon as satisfactory such demurrage and storage is for the account of the Soviet Authorities. For purposes of this agreement the ports of Riga, Reval, Libau, Hango and Helsingfors are also considered satisfactory ports. Notice of at least five days will be given to Soviet representatives at respective ports in case the Soviet Authorities are expected to take c.i.f. delivery.

Fifth: That they will at their own expense supply the necessary storage at in-

terior base points mentioned in paragraph (4) and handling and transportation from same to all such other interior points as the A.R.A. may designate.

Sixth: That in all above storage and movement of relief supplies they will give the A.R.A. the same priority over all other traffic as the Soviet Authorities give their own relief supplies, and on demand of the A.R.A. will furnish adequate guards and convoys.

Seventh: That they will give free import re-export and guarantee freedom from requisition to all A.R.A. supplies of whatever nature. The A.R.A. will repay the Soviet Authorities for expenses incurred by them on re-exported supplies.

Eighth: That the relief supplies are intended for children and the sick, as designated by the A.R.A. in accordance with paragraph (24), and remain the property of the A.R.A. until actually consumed by these children and the sick, and are to be distributed in the name of the A.R.A.

Ninth: That no individual receiving A.R.A. rations shall be deprived of such local supplies as are given to the rest of the population.

Tenth: That they will guarantee and take every step to insure that relief supplies belonging to the A.R.A. will not go to the general adult population nor to the Army, Navy or Government employees but only to such persons as designated in paragraphs (8) and (24).

Eleventh: That Soviet Authorities undertake to reimburse the A.R.A. in dollars at c.i.f. cost or replace in kind any misused relief supplies.

Twelfth: That the A.R.A. shall be allowed to set up the necessary organizations for carrying out its relief work free from governmental or other interference. The Central and Local Soviet Authorities have the right of representation thereon.

Thirteenth: That the Soviet Authorities will provide:

- A. The necessary premises for kitchens, dispensaries and, in as far as possible, hospitals.
- B. The necessary fuel and, when available, cooking, distributing and feeding equipment for the same.
- C. The total cost of local relief administration, food preparation, distribution, etc., themselves or in conjunction with local authorities. Mode of payment to be arranged at later date.
- D. On demand of the A.R.A. such local medical personnel and assistance, satisfactory to the A.R.A., as are needed to efficiently administer its relief.
- E. Without cost railway, motor, water or other transportation for movement of relief supplies and of such personnel as may be necessary to efficiently control relief operations. The Soviet Authorities will for the duration of the A.R.A. operations assign to the A.R.A. for the sole use of its personnel, and transport free of cost, such railway carriages as the A.R.A. may reasonably request.

Fourteenth: In localities where the A.R.A. may be operating and where epidemics are raging, the A.R.A. shall be empowered by the Soviet Authorities to take such steps as may be necessary towards the improvement of sanitary conditions, protection of water supply, etc.

Fifteenth: That they will supply free of charge the necessary offices, garages, store-rooms, etc., for the transaction of the A.R.A. business and when available heat, light and water for same. Further that they will place at the disposal of the A.R.A. adequate residential quarters for the A.R.A. personnel in all localities where the A.R.A. may be operating. All such above premises to be free from seizure and requisition. Examination of above premises will not be made except with the knowledge and in presence of the chief of the A.R.A. operations in Russia or

his representative and except in case of flagrant delit when examiner will be held responsible in case examination unwarranted.

Sixteenth: That they will give to the A.R.A. complete freedom and priority without cost in the use of existing radio, telegraph, telephone, cable, post, and couriers in Russia and will provide the A.R.A., when available and subject to the consent of competent authorities, with private telegraph and telephone wires and maintenance free of cost.

Seventeenth: To accord the A.R.A. and its American representatives and its couriers the customary diplomatic privileges as to passing the frontiers.

Eighteenth: To supply the A.R.A. free of cost with the necessary gasoline and oil to operate its motor transportation and to transport such motor transportation by rail or otherwise as may be necessary.

Nineteenth: To furnish at the request of the competent A.R.A. Authorities all A.R.A. personnel, together with their impediments and supplies, free transportation in Russia.

Twentieth: To permit the A.R.A. to import and re-export free of duty and requisition such commissary, transport and office supplies as are necessary for its personnel and administration.

Twenty-first: That they will acquaint the Russian people with the aims and methods of the relief work of the A.R.A. in order to facilitate the rapid development of its efficiency and will assist and facilitate in supplying the American people with reliable and non-political information of the existing conditions and the progress of the relief work as an aid in developing financial support in America.

Twenty-second: That they will bear all expenses of the relief operation other than

A. Cost of relief supplies at port (See paragraph 4).

B. Direct expenses of American control and supervision of relief work in Russia with exceptions as above. In general they will give the A.R.A. all assistance in their power toward the carrying out of its humanitarian relief operations.

The A.R.A. agrees:

Twenty-third: Within the limits of its resources and facilities, to supply, as rapidly as suitable organization can be effected, food, clothing and medical relief to the sick and particularly to the children within the age limits as decided upon by the A.R.A.

Twenty-fourth: That its relief distribution will be to the children and sick without regard to race, religion or social or political status.

Twenty-fifth: That its personnel in Russia will confine themselves strictly to the ministrations of relief and will engage in no political or commercial activity whatever. In view of paragraph (1) and the freedom of American personnel in Russia from personal search, arrest and detention, any personnel contravening this will be withdrawn or discharged on the request of the Central Soviet Authorities. The Central Soviet Authorities will submit to the chief officer of the A.R.A. the reasons for this request and the evidence in their possession.

Twenty-sixth: That it will carry on its operations where it finds its relief can be administered most efficiently and to secure best results. Its principal object is to bring relief to the famine stricken areas of the Volga.

Twenty-seventh: That it will import no alcohol in its relief supplies and will permit customs inspection of its imported relief supplies at points to be mutually agreed upon.

The Soviet Authorities having previously agreed as the absolute sine qua non of any assistance on the part of the American people to release all Americans detained in Russia and to facilitate the departure from Russia of all Americans so desiring, the A.R.A. reserves to itself the right to suspend temporarily or terminate all of its relief work in Russia in case of failure on the part of the Soviet Authorities to fully comply with this primary condition or with any condition set forth in the above agreement. The Soviet Authorities equally reserve the right of cancelling this Agreement in case of non-fulfillment of any of the above clauses on the part of the A.R.A.

Made in Riga, August Twentieth, Nineteen hundred and Twenty-one.

On behalf of Council of Peoples Commissaries of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

(Signed) MAXIM LITVINOV,
Assistant Peoples Commissary for Foreign Affairs.
On behalf of the American Relief Administration.
(Signed) WALTER LYMAN BROWN,
Director for Europe.

The ink was scarcely dry on the Agreement when Brown gave the orders for the first movement from Riga, Danzig, and Hamburg, of food supplies and personnel to Russia. So prompt was this movement, that the advance party of the A.R.A. reached Moscow before the Soviet officials with whom they were to work had familiarized themselves with the terms of the Agreement.

In Moscow, the problem was not famine, as in the Volga villages, but rather undernourishment, so acute, however, that it amounted practically to starvation, among children whose parents, because of the economic disintegration of the city, were unemployed or earning too little to secure enough food to keep their children in strength, or even alive. There was, too, the additional problem of waifs and orphans from the streets, and refugees from the famine villages, whom, because of their great number, the local government was unable to feed.

CHILD-FEEDING PROGRAM

Relief . . . began in Petrograd with the opening of the first kitchen on September 7.

While workmen were cleaning and repairing the premises for the kitchens and the first truck loads of food were being delivered to city hospitals, as destitute as their patients, . . . [A.R.A. representative Bowden] inaugurated a great campaign for the examination of the entire child population. He mobilized 75 doctors and 150 nurses who gave medical examinations in all the quarters of the city. They used a system of measurement devised by Professor Dr. Clemens von Pirquet, the eminent pediatrician of Vienna University, who was an invaluable collaborator in the A.R.A. work in Austria. The Pirquet system was used in all A.R.A. missions in Western Europe and in

Russia, wherever possible.¹ Of the total of 160,000 children in Petrograd between the ages of three and fifteen, all but 10,000 presented themselves as candidates for the A.R.A. kitchens. The 150,000 were classified roughly into three groups: first, those seriously undernourished; second, the undernourished; and third, the normal. Children in the first group were accepted at kitchens as fast as they were opened, and periodically thereafter, other examinations were held to determine what proportion of those attending the kitchens had progressed far enough along the road to normal status to permit replacing them with others who had perforce been excluded.

Four days after the Petrograd youngsters had their first taste of A.R.A. food, the Moscow District opened its first and largest child-feeding station in the Hermitage, which before the revolution was a famous restaurant where wealthy Muscovites dined late and luxuriously, overeating and overdrinking to the accompaniment of gypsy music in accordance with the best traditions of that time. The Moscow District child-feeding organization suffered at first from the fact that it could find no one to take responsibility even in trivial matters, except Kamenev [Chairman of the Moscow Soviet], who was busy with his own affairs and more interested in the general organization of the A.R.A. than in the special local work. The liaison representatives whom he appointed at first were of little use and one of them succeeded in bringing the whole operation to a complete impasse. . . . As in Petrograd, the problem here was aid to the most seriously undernourished, who constituted about 40 per cent of the children examined, and of special help to the institutions overwhelmed by the flood of refugees, which grew steadily with the arrival of every train from the east.

Much experience under diverse conditions in many countries had demonstrated the soundness of the A.R.A. policy of administering relief under a few broad principles rather than under detailed, restrictive regulations. These broad principles were: First, relief to those who needed it most without regard to race, religion, or politics. Second, food must be consumed by the beneficiary at the feeding point, where it was prepared under A.R.A. direction and served.² Third, strict accounting for all food and funds in order to prevent waste or misuse.

¹ The Pirquet system is described in detail in *An Outline of the Pirquet System of Nutrition*, by Dr. Clemens Pirquet, Philadelphia, 1922. Also "Dr. Clemens Pirquet, Founder of the Nem and Pelidisi Systems, Explains Their Significance in Relation to Institutional and School Feeding," *A.R.A. Bulletin*, Ser. 2, XVIII, 33-38.

² This principle always met some objection from children's parents, but it was the only method by which the designated beneficiary could be assured of receiving the full value of the ration. Sir Benjamin Robertson, the Indian famine expert who visited Russia early in 1922, commenting on this feature of the A.R.A. work, said that it had been the policy in India for twenty-five years to insist that children receiving food consume it at the feeding points. The A.R.A. adult soup kitchens were conducted on the same principle, but the corn distribution to adults was handled otherwise. Corn was issued whole or in the form of grits to the peasant families on the basis of a funt (about one pound)

The method of organizing feeding operations . . . varied somewhat in each A.R.A. district, because of particular conditions in the different areas. In all cases, however, the first step was to secure from the gubernia officials such statistics as they had which would indicate the relative condition of the uyezds. On the basis of this information, the A.R.A. District Supervisors made a theoretical allocation, sending into the uyezds in the worst straits a larger number of rations in relation to the total population than to the uyezds reported as in less desperate need. The next step was to prepare the communities to receive the food, i.e., to have warehouses in which to store it, to have kitchens in which to prepare and serve it, and to have lists made of the most needy children to be the first fed. The Americans necessarily first organized the towns which, because of their geographical location, rail or water transportation facilities, and warehouses, would serve as regional bases for the surrounding villages.

The A.R.A. organizer set forth with a boat load or a train load of food, sufficient to supply the region he was to organize for three weeks or a month. Upon arrival at the sub-district base, he went through much the same process as had been followed in the gubernia capitals, but always found his difficulties greater as he went farther from these centers. Warehouses were fewer, capable personnel harder to find, transportation more primitive, equipment seemingly non-existent, and the condition of the people worse.

The organization of the sub-district headquarters having been completed, the American then set out by whatever means of transportation he could find for the villages, which had been warned of his coming and asked to have ready the information on which he could make his allocations.

In the larger towns general meetings were not held, for in these places authority was jealously exercised by the Communist Party, and the committees were appointed in conference with the Governmental officials. The A.R.A. was usually able to secure the kind of committee-men it desired by insisting on certain indispensable qualifications, and this insistence prevented the appointment of persons whose sole virtue might be membership in the Communist Party.

The village committees as a rule consisted of a local teacher and two or three others, one of whom at least was a member of the village soviet, who had the confidence of the community. Frequently the village kitchens were established in the school-houses, the teacher serving as the kitchen manager. Since many of the schools had closed by this time, the arrangement served other purposes than to keep the children alive. It kept the teacher, who had

per day per capita. The nature of this ration, the scale on which it was distributed, and the vast area involved made this the most effective method of procedure.

Editor's note: Methods quite different from those required by this second principle have sometimes been relied upon by various agencies, including the American Red Cross in its more recent operations such as those in Spain and France.

received no pay for months, from starving, and the children, who came to the school-house to eat, remained to learn their letters.

AID TO INSTITUTIONS

The A.R.A.'s policy of concentrating whenever possible on existing institutions, in distinction to open kitchens, in the winter of 1922-23, was an attempt, in agreement with the Soviet Government, to meet the changed conditions and a preparation for the A.R.A.'s inevitable withdrawal. . . . The principle of American control of American products was maintained, while the management of the institutions remained in the hands of the officials of state departments. The new policy approximated, as nearly as possible, that followed by the A.R.A. in the later days of its work in other countries. There national institutions, receiving state support, but independent of the government, and therefore out of politics, were set up to carry on work after the A.R.A. had gone, and were strengthened by advice and support.¹ An independent, non-political, child health organization was, of course, impossible in Russia, and so the aim here was to strengthen as many individual institutions as possible, so that they would be able to carry on with better standards than they had known during the days of famine and confusion.

Under the new plan, the districts set out to raise the standards of institutional management. A system of grading the institutions on the basis of what they were able to accomplish with the materials that were at their disposal had excellent results. The Americans did not, of course, attempt to pass on the methods of education, discipline, and the like, prescribed by the state departments. They concentrated on important externals. Cleanliness of the institutions, their kitchens, tables, sleeping quarters, baths, and so forth; the neatness of the children and attendants; the degree of compliance with the regulations of the A.R.A. as to accounting and the effective use of supplies; and the general degree of co-operation from all employees. [Edward G.] Sabine, the Supervisor of the Moscow District, graded the institutions from "C" to "A plus." He warned "C" institutions that failure to improve would mean the discontinuance of American help. "B" institutions were regarded as fair, and were coaxed to show signs of improvement. "A" and "A plus" institutions received preference in the distribution of supplementary supplies, and the managers of the "A plus" homes received a certificate from the District Supervisor. . . . Before long there was an appreciable improvement in

¹ The most successful of these national organizations established with the help of the A.R.A. were: In Austria, the "Amerikanisch-Oesterreichisches Kinderhilfswerk"; in Poland, the "Polsko-Amerykanski Komitet Pomocy Dzieciom"; in Czecho-Slovakia, the "Péceo Dite." The work of these organizations is described in many A.R.A. Bulletins, particularly the second series, numbers V, VII, XI, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXII, XXIV, XXVI, XXIX, XLIV. See also the published reports issued by the Czech, Austrian, and Polish Missions of the A.R.A.

institutional management wherever the American aid was given, and soon "the American classification" became an important factor, both to the personnel of the institutions and the higher authorities.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CORN

Once the movement got under way, the districts were warned that the corn [bought with money appropriated by the United States Congress] would come in an enormous flood, and so late in the year that the most strenuous efforts would be needed to distribute it before the spring break-up of the roads. . . . At Kazan, for example, the corn schedule called for the arrival of fifteen hundred cars within a short period. . . . The mere matter of unloading was a staggering problem to the local officials. The best they could do, they told Wahren, the District Supervisor, was to unload fifty cars a day. . . . Boyd, who was in charge of transportation in this district, set to work on his own account, mobilized a force of six hundred refugees, paid them with food, and succeeded in unloading at the rate of one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty cars per day.

The city of Orsk, in the Orenburg district on the very edge of Asia, was accessible by a doubtful railway, which . . . finally stopped in despair at the bank of the Ural river four miles away. There was no bridge across the river, and it appeared that the A.R.A. products must be put across on a decrepit ferry, which . . . accommodated only four two-horse carts at a time. As the program required the unloading of at least three freight cars a day into at least one hundred and fifty carts, something had to be done. . . . All the able-bodied, and even such half-starved people in the vicinity as were able to do manual work, were mobilized and fed by the A.R.A., and by a mighty effort a bridge of sorts was thrown across the river within a space of four days, in time to handle expeditiously the corn when it arrived.

The final stage of the journey of the corn to the consumers presented as many difficulties as did any of the intermediate steps. Russia has always had fewer draft animals than the country required, and the famine had disastrously reduced this inadequate number. Of the 33,000,000 horses of pre-war times only about 17,500,000 remained in 1921, with the most acute shortage in the hungry districts where at this moment horses were most badly needed. For those horses which did remain, there was no forage to keep them in strength or even alive. These remaining horses, moreover, were in the hands of the richer peasants and, except in the districts where feeding reached practically one hundred per cent of the population, it was these richer peasants who received the least benefit from relief. The use of their horses for hauling supplies, therefore, was not always easily secured, especially since the authorities had no funds with which to pay for them. This problem was, however, like the others not insuperable. In the worst districts,

the feeding came practically to include everyone, and even the owners of the horses were more than likely to need the food. The central government, also, through the A.R.A. and through the Nansen Mission, purchased oats, which were sent out to the districts, and used in payment for animal transportation. For the same purpose, the central government sent out funds to its representatives with the A.R.A. to meet such charges and, wherever the representatives were reasonably honest and interested in famine relief, those funds were used effectively for this purpose.

From Sviajsk, 3,225 horses and sledges carried the allotted 43,000 rations through the melting snow and across the rising floods, until the job was done, although in doing it, more than a dozen peasants were reported to have perished as they crossed the rising streams. Thus within ten days, with the employment of 7,300 men and horses, exclusive of the 12,000 persons who carried corn on their backs, over 100,000 poods, that is, over 1,800 tons, were distributed to villages far and wide in an area forced to rely almost entirely on the desperately heroic efforts of men and animals weakened by hunger.

In the Uralsk region of the Saratov District, there were not so many people to reach as in some other sections, but they were just as hungry and even less accessible. . . . There was a steady procession of people going to the cars for their corn, and coming away with it in bags on their backs. . . . Flour in the market dropped from eleven million roubles to four million a pood before evening.

In more fortunate areas, special trains went along the rickety railway lines, stopping at villages to which the peasants had been warned to come with their carts and their feeding lists. An American who supervised this, tells of one place where they mobilized twenty persons—all who could read and write in the town—and enrolled them as clerks to write and register orders. The local military force was called out to keep the people in line as they registered. . . . Each recipient of corn carried away a duplicate receipt bearing the inscription "free American corn." A change came over the whole community as the lines passed the car where the peasants received the corn and started in diverse directions towards their villages.

TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES

The part which the American relief program played in the revival of . . . Russian [railways] . . . has been attested to by many of those in a position to know . . . The corn turned over [to the railways] by agreement, plus that which was seized and distributed to the railwaymen, undoubtedly did prevent a series of labor troubles, particularly on the lines serving the famine areas, which might have had serious effects not only in the field of relief, costing many lives, but in politics as well. But of greater importance was the

steadily increasing pressure from the A.R.A., which forced the Communists to prune and cut away the choking, parasitic bureaucracy that strangled the system.

Moscow headquarters, however, though it might unravel administrative tangles, could not clear away the snow that blocked the tracks or find fuel for locomotives. Shipments from Moscow to Kazan, a distance of 490 miles, took nineteen days, and even then never arrived complete. In one instance eighteen of the original thirty-two cars were missing. An American started out from Kazan to round up the lost cars. He went to within five versts of Moscow, where he found the first of the missing. Proceeding along the line he gradually found the others, some side-tracked on account of hot boxes and forgotten, and others merely forgotten. Other districts suffered in the same way.

Over one . . . secondary line during two winter months six shipments were made. Three of these shipments, convoyed by an American, reached destination in three, two, and four days respectively. The other three, handled by the railroad officials without an American convoy, reached destination in *ten, thirty-one, and twenty-three* days.

DIFFICULTY OF WORKING WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

The most open and flagrant violation of the agreement with the A.R.A. came about when the Soviet officials faced the seemingly inevitable collapse of [the] whole transportation system. For more than a year the government had been increasingly delinquent in paying the wages due the railway employees.

In December (1921) Eiduk [Soviet official designated as liaison officer to work with the A.R.A.] had approached the A.R.A. with the proposal that railway employees be included in the famine relief program. As an inducement, he suggested that this would undoubtedly speed up transportation. The A.R.A., while seeing the truth of that suggestion, could not agree to the proposal, for it would simply mean less food and more deaths in the famine districts, as the government was able to feed the railway people. In February (1922), however, the government came back with a similar request. By that time it seemed possible that the situation might get out of the hands of the Soviet officials, and bring about wholesale suspension of railway activities. Therefore Haskell [Colonel William N. Haskell, A.R.A. Director in Russia] agreed that a small amount of corn be loaned to the government to feed the railway workers, on condition, however, that the amount loaned should, within a reasonable time, be replaced, and delivered in the famine area.

Suddenly, the whole situation changed. . . . Dr. Walker, in charge of the

A.R.A. work in Petrograd . . . wired that the local railway officials had been authorized by Comrade Pinous, of Eiduk's office, to take over the first forty cars which arrived in Petrograd from Reval, the contents to be unloaded into the Transportation Coöperative Society's warehouses. Had the A.R.A. authorized this? At about the same time, Shafroth was wiring from Samara that local officials, on authorization from Moscow, had seized thirty-four A.R.A. cars at Russaevka, and had detached sixty-one cars from the A.R.A. trains at Penza and Balashov for railway employees. At none of these points had Haskell authorized any deliveries. . . . There was every evidence of a deliberate violation of an agreement. But much more important than the principle involved was the fact that every diversion meant more deaths among the peasants of the famine districts.

Haskell ordered all deliveries to the railroads stopped. He protested, loudly, continuously, but without effect. . . . Meanwhile Eiduk, to show his interest in the matter, sent Pinous to investigate the reputed seizures. Pinous reached Petrograd and immediately told the railways to go on with the good work and take eleven more cars. To more protests the only answer was an order from the railways to unload at Petrograd, daily, forty-four A.R.A. cars, billed to the Volga famine regions. Then another order directed that fifty-two cars, billed by the A.R.A. to Kazan, go instead to Ribinsk for storage, and that all subsequent shipments from Reval port, regardless of A.R.A. orders, go to the same point. The object of these orders was to get empty cars, which could be returned to Reval through which the Soviets, as well as the A.R.A., were shipping supplies. The railways took a similar action at Koslov, before the A.R.A. had authorized any unloading at that point. Darragh, the A.R.A. controller there, protested to the limit of his vocabulary, and when he resisted the breaking of the American seals, was arrested by the Cheka.

Kamenev was still too busy with political matters to see Haskell. But Haskell had waited long enough. The hour had come for a showdown.

It was customary for the A.R.A. to send its important telegrams by courier to Riga and thence in code to London and New York. But the following telegram, addressed to Hoover, but in reality an ultimatum to the Communist Government, Haskell sent (April 10, 1922) *en clair* over the Soviet diplomatic wire. He said [in part]:

Acts of arbitrary interference and disrespect for our seals, plus the fact that although corn leaves ports rapidly it congests at junction points and does not arrive at Volga in sufficient quantities, leads me to seriously doubt the ability of Russian railways to deliver our program.

I can positively recommend that not another pound of relief supplies should be added to our existing program. I recommend that all pending shipments from America be stopped beyond actual present commitments until such time as I can advise how present difficulties are met here and whether a sincere effort to coöperate with us manifests itself.

This message had scarcely reached the wire, when Eiduk telephoned Haskell that Kamenev was anxious to see him the next day.

Kamenev regretted the incident and declared that, "In the name of the Soviet Government, I confirm that the Soviet Government has no right to requisition or to divert supplies sent by the A.R.A. The Soviet Government agrees not to violate these supplies, from their arrival at the ports to the time they get to consumers. They must arrive at destination with seals intact. In two days this statement will be confirmed by the highest power and will be published in all official papers."

The second point discussed was the repeated and continuous failure of the railways to deliver the number of cars they had promised. Confronted with the figures of actual car deliveries, Kamenev said: "There is a criminal thing here. . . ."

In the discussion of the present and future needs, as well as of the past performances, Haskell brought up the fact that in order to assist the seed program of the government, the A.R.A. had actually reduced its demands for empty cars below what was desired, but that as a result, the government had given practically all their cars to the seed movement, giving the A.R.A. too few cars to make the continuation of its first program possible. That program required that two thousand tons of food for adults arrive in the Volga valley every day. Since the railroads failed to deliver this amount, the program faltered, which in terms of lives meant that there was a margin of misery and death between the number the A.R.A. was prepared to feed and the number the transport situation permitted it to reach.

Kamenev said that to his regret he had absolutely no explanation of the failure of the railways to give the cars promised at that time.

In bringing this remarkable conference to a close, Haskell emphasized, again, the necessity of tangible results.

At the close of this meeting Haskell reported in full to Hoover. He sent the report over the open wire, as a reminder to the Soviet Government that promises and apologies were not enough to cause a withdrawal of his recommendation for a suspension of the relief program.

And so ended an episode which was the turning point in A.R.A. relations with the Soviet Government. Had Kamenev been less flexible, had the affair been left in the hands of Eiduk, or of a die-hard Communist, there would have come a disaster. Had the violation of agreements not been whole-heartedly repudiated, the suspension of the A.R.A. program would have continued, and the reasons therefor published. There would have followed bitter controversy, and perhaps the wholesale seizure of American relief supplies. At any rate, the heavy price would have been paid by the hungry millions who, soon, with the swift mounting of the American feeding, found security from starvation in the sacks of golden corn.

SPECIAL RELIEF MEASURES

Work Relief. The A.R.A. was in a splendid position to utilize the intelligence . . . and the physical power of the unemployed. The different A.R.A. districts employed all sorts of methods of procedure. In general, the first step was to win official permission for activities of this kind and to impress the officials with their importance. Often, it was unbelievably difficult to make the officials realize that a little energy devoted to a particular kind of improvement would do incalculable good. For example, in Samara, there was one of the most important laboratories in Russia for the manufacture of vaccines and serums, which in these days of epidemics were desperately needed. The laboratory had ceased to produce, because there was no forage for the animals needed for inoculation, there were no funds to pay the personnel, and there was general inertia. Dr. Foucar, the A.R.A. district physician, recognizing the tremendous value of such an institution in the fight against epidemics, began to hammer at the officials of the gubernia for such elementary necessities as fuel and water and forage. If the government would do this much for the institution, the A.R.A. promised to supply it with such laboratory equipment as it lacked, and to assist the personnel by gifts of food packages. Under constant pressure the Samara government finally succeeded in meeting its part of the bargain, and with the arrival of laboratory equipment, the Americans had the satisfaction of seeing this important medical institution back on its feet, performing a vital service. In some places, where official disapproval of the cleansing and disinfecting activities was most obstinate, the authorities allowed the Americans to pursue their absurd obsession up to a certain point. There they stood firm on their prejudices. For instance, in Orenburg, the cleanup gangs gathered the rubbish from the houses, yards, and wells, and made huge piles in the streets. Thereupon negotiations were begun with the government for the removal of these piles. But to no effect. The Orenburg officials thought but little of this house cleaning, regarding it as a new evidence of American madness, and so far as they were concerned were content to let the piles of refuse remain where they stood.

Refugees, chiefly, constituted the cleanup gangs. None of the severely undernourished or physically unfit was required to work, but to the able-bodied the injunction of St. Paul, "if any would not work, neither should he eat," was applied. The handling of these refugees raised many interesting problems. In Kazan, for example, the officials of the Tartar Republic, with whom the most cordial relations were always maintained, came to the A.R.A. with the information that there was an unprecedented increase in crime and that in the majority of cases those caught were first offenders. The crime wave they attributed to the famine, but they were in doubt as to the best way of combating it. At the suggestion of one of the A.R.A., the authorities organ-

ized a force of about twelve hundred able-bodied refugees, whom they divided into two groups, one to serve as sanitary police during the day, and the other as a special force of night watchmen. The city was divided into zones, and squads under appointed leaders were responsible for the sanitary conditions of delimited zones, or other squads for the maintenance of order and the prevention of crime. The plan worked out most successfully. The city was cleaned; crime diminished; and many refugees who otherwise would have been engaged in no more profitable occupation than sitting in the sun were usefully employed.

Out in the Ufa-Urals District, Colonel Bell persuaded the officials of the gubernias and republics with whom he had to deal, to allow him to organize city and village improvement committees. He placed energetic and capable Russians in charge and then started them off on a general campaign of doing things which the communities needed to have done. In the city of Zlatoust, the people had been talking for seventy years of the need of a drainage canal, which would save the city from a great loss of property, and even of life, during the spring floods. For seventy years they had not progressed beyond recognition of the desirability of the canal, but, in the midst of the greatest famine that Zlatoust had ever known, there came the A.R.A. improvement committee, which set energetically to work and within a short time had constructed a canal eight hundred meters long. . . . During the summer of 1922, these committees built 270 badly needed new bridges, and repaired 160 old ones. They constructed ninety-four new water cisterns for towns and villages, and repaired and restored to use a number of schools, all of which were accomplished by employing labor for food.

Food and Clothing Remittances. The first deliveries [of food remittances were] made on November 21 [1921] . . . The sale of remittances was discontinued in America on March 15, 1923, and in Europe on April 1. Remittance delivery stations in Russia closed on June 15, 1923. During this period the A.R.A. sold \$9,305,300 food remittances to individuals and food remittance supplies to other organizations in Russia which brought the total to \$13,680,193. Nearly 99 per cent were delivered. These deliveries represent *seventy-five thousand tons of foodstuffs*. The margin of profit from this transaction which went to swell the general relief funds was approximately \$3,600,000, a sum sufficient to feed 3,600,000 children for one month.

The Food Remittance system worked in this fashion: The buyer of the remittance in America, or elsewhere outside Russia, paid ten dollars to the A.R.A. The A.R.A. obligated itself to find the person in Russia whom the buyer designated as beneficiary, and to deliver to him a food package containing the following commodities, or their equivalent in food or caloric value: Flour—49 pounds; rice—25 pounds; tea—3 pounds; fats—10 pounds; sugar—10 pounds; preserved milk—20 one-pound cans. On re-

ceiving the package the beneficiary signed duplicate receipts, one of which was returned to the purchaser. In case the A.R.A. could not deliver the package in ninety days, it returned the ten dollars to the buyer. The food constituting the package, purchased in great quantities, cost the A.R.A. \$6.75. Transportation, insurance, and overhead cost about \$1.00, making a total cost of \$7.75. The margin of \$2.25, which of course varied in accordance with price fluctuations, constituted first, a margin of safety, and second, a margin of profit, which formed an important increment to the funds available for child-feeding. In addition to the individual packages there were "group sales," to groups in America and elsewhere for the benefit of groups or communities in Russia, to which the A.R.A. made deliveries. There were also "bulk sales," made chiefly to relief societies and similar organizations, to whose representatives in Russia the A.R.A. turned over the commodities in bulk for distribution. Such is the bare summary of an auxiliary department of the A.R.A. Looked at merely as a commercial operation it is a very considerable achievement under conditions of great difficulty. But as a relief operation, it is vastly more significant in what it accomplished as individual relief, supplementing the mass relief which absorbed the chief energies of the A.R.A. in Russia.

Various methods were used to discover the whereabouts of those who could not be found at the addresses given by the donors of the packages. Inspectors went out and made personal inquiries; the police lists were resorted to; the names of the missing were published in the newspapers and on placards; Young Pioneers (the equivalent of Boy Scouts in Russia) were employed to scour the town; and in the rural districts, A.R.A. committees carried on the search in the villages. Thanks to these measures the A.R.A. cancelled only 1.03 per cent of the 947,795 individual packages because of inability to find the consignee.

The desperate struggle for existence and the general insecurity of life broke down the moral concepts of many who had been scrupulously honest in their property relationships. Hence the fight against graft and fraud had to be relentlessly, continuously waged.

The Moscow delivery station, for example, discovered that the police in nearby villages were selling certificates of identity for the equivalent of fifty cents each. Corroborating evidence was therefore demanded, and the beneficiary was asked to give the name of the donor of the package. If he did not know, his identification papers received double scrutiny.

The Moscow packing room discovered another type of fraud, the substitution of sand for sugar, tin foil for tea. In Kharkov, a postal employee stole notification cards from the mail, and turned them over to a confederate who, with forged documents, collected the packages.

The A.R.A. required each beneficiary to sign a promise not to sell any part of his package, and from the walls of the delivery station glaring proclama-

tions threatened any one speculating in food packages with immediate arrest. These arrangements prevented trafficking in remittance commodities on a large scale, but they did not prevent occasional appearance of American white flour, tinned milk, sugar, and the like in the markets and stores. . . . There was no serious effort to stop this small trading, for both the A.R.A. and Soviet officials realized that it was inevitable and, in fact, was not an undesirable development. Many recipients of packages needed other materials as badly as food — articles of clothing, fuel, or if they were peasants, nails or salt. These they could obtain by bartering a few tins of milk, part of their sugar or flour. Where these American commodities appeared on the markets, the prices of local food products tended to fall, and thus others than those to whom the packages were consigned benefited by them.

From the beginning of the Russian campaign clothing had been recognized, after food and medicine, as the great problem of relief. During the winter of 1921-22, the A.R.A. had distributed large stocks of clothing to children, and there was an occasional distribution of used clothing. . . . Still, the clothing problem was far from being met. To have met it adequately, considering the need and relief funds available, would have been impossible; yet, it might be possible to do more. This thought led the directors of the A.R.A. to consider clothing remittances. . . . There was some objection from the Soviet Textile Trust, which feared competition and injury to the textile industry. But Russian officials . . . looked favorably on the scheme, and after wholly amicable but rather extended negotiations, Lander and Burland signed the Clothing Remittance Agreement on October 26, 1922.

The new agreement differed from the earlier one in two important particulars. 1. The A.R.A. was authorized to sell clothing packages to Soviet institutions and to individuals in Russia; 2. The A.R.A. agreed to pay a premium of one dollar to the Government on each package imported. This premium was to cover import duty and freight in Russia.

Clothing remittances offered many technical complications. The contents of the food package were acceptable to both sexes of all ages and all sizes. To succeed, the clothing package had to be adaptable. This ruled out all ready made garments, hats, shoes, and so forth, and hence the components of the package adopted were materials in the following amounts: Woolens, $4\frac{2}{3}$ yards; lining, 4 yards; muslin, 16 yards; flannelette, 8 yards. To these were added: Thread, 4 spools; buttons No. 1 — 8 pieces; buttons No. 2 — 16 pieces; buttons No. 3 — 24 pieces, none of which could be easily obtained in Russia. The materials, chosen for durability, were purchased in sufficient quantity for 80,000 packages. By buying in such great quantity the A.R.A. was able to sell for \$20.00 for delivery in Russia, with a small margin of profit and safety, a package which retailed in New York for not less than \$21.50. With freight and customs duty added, the package in Russia would have cost

\$27.50. Actually, the clothing package was worth from \$30.00 to \$40.00 in the Russian markets.

In introducing the new department, the Americans employed publicity methods certainly new, and doubtless startling, to the Russians. The movies, newspapers, placards, handbills, window displays, and circulars in the mails were all used. The impending liquidation of the whole relief work necessitated discontinuing sales on March 15 in America, and on April 1 in Europe, just as the operation was getting its stride. At that time sales had reached 42,675. Of the materials in bulk unsold, those in Russia were given to children's homes, and those en route were disposed of by sale.

Medical and Sanitation Programs. From November, 1921, to June, 1923 [the Medical Division of the A.R.A. Russian Unit] . . . furnished supplies to the following institutions: hospitals—5,764, with a bed capacity of 353,332; ambulatories and dispensaries—4,123, treating daily 247,087 patients; children's homes—4,760 containing 336,821 children; day nurseries—372 with a capacity of 25,259; schools and *internats*—165 serving 17,999 children; homes for the aged and invalids—248 with 59,237 inmates. Other unclassified institutions raised the total number assisted to 16,419, with a constant capacity of 1,039,735 inmates. Besides this, the Division carried on a campaign of disease prevention through city sanitation and the administering of some 8,000,000 inoculations and vaccinations.

These operations necessitated a vast importation of supplies, interesting in both variety and quantity. There were, for example, three hundred and seventy-seven varieties of medicines, fifteen varieties of disinfectants, eleven of vaccines, one hundred and thirty-three of laboratory supplies; six hundred and twenty-seven kinds of surgical instruments, hospital, and dental supplies; fifty-four kinds of clothing supplies; five varieties of supplies for water purification. As to quantities, of the medicines, the most important are: chloroform and ether—forty tons; boric acid—thirty-one tons; castor oil—fifty-seven tons; aspirin—fifteen tons; magnesium sulphate—seventy tons; petrolatum—one hundred tons. The imports included many other drugs in quantities of from ten thousand to fifty thousand bottles, and vaccines, especially tetra and smallpox, of which twelve million doses were distributed.

The sanitation campaigns called for great quantities of disinfectants such as two million four hundred thousand pounds of soap; eight hundred thousand pounds of sulphur; two hundred thousand pounds of creosol; two hundred thousand pounds of formaldehyde; one million pounds of chloride of lime; sixty thousand bottles of carbolic acid; fifty-five thousand bottles of corrosive sublimate.

These supplies reached the central medical warehouses in Moscow in nine hundred and sixty-five cars, and were reshipped in nine hundred and fifty-six cars to distribution points, whence they went by train, by boat, and by

wagon to the sixteen thousand institutions referred to above. The contributions which made this distribution possible came from the following sources:

The American Red Cross	\$3,629,831.34	(in cash and kind)
The United States Government	3,785,000.00	(in kind)
The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial	270,000.00	(in cash, to cover handling expenses)
	<hr/>	
	\$7,684,831.34	

With a medical famine . . . with the forces for combating disease so disorganized, with epidemics in full flood, Dr. Beeuwkes [Dr. Henry Beeuwkes, medical director of the A.R.A.] and his associates were in the position where anything they might do would serve an urgent need. But since both resources and energy were limited, they had to decide at what points and in what manner the help they could give might be most effectively applied, first, in checking the spread of disease, and second, in the treatment of the sick. Beeuwkes first applied to the Commissariat of Health for information and suggestion. . . . At no time did the Medical Division encounter any serious troubles of purely official origin. . . . But with the best of intentions, the health officials could not supply reliable information, which was, as Beeuwkes has observed, as scarce as medical supplies. This necessitated personal investigation by the Medical Division staff, which at first had to be limited, since distances were great, travel incredibly slow, and time extremely important.

Even personal investigations were seriously handicapped by administrative confusion and inefficiency. Beeuwkes illustrates this by his experience in Novorossisk. The head of the local health department gave him a list of the medical institutions of the city, which included five hospitals and several children's homes. This official, however, was able to take Beeuwkes to only two of the hospitals listed, for two had been closed and abandoned, while the other had mysteriously disappeared. Subsequently the Americans discovered the largest hospital in the city, of which there had been no sign on the health official's list. Such official information as existed, supplemented by . . . investigations . . . was sufficient as the basis for the first requisitions and for the making of two important decisions of policy.

The first of these related to methods of combating the vermin-borne diseases. . . . The plan first considered was a vast delousing campaign throughout the whole Volga region, for which a large number of disinfectors, bathing apparatus, and replacement clothing were to be imported. Investigation showed, however, that this would never do, since the existing delousing and bathing equipment was not being used, because of the inertia of officials, the lack of fuel, and even of water. Therefore, instead of disinfectors, the A.R.A.

imported and distributed large quantities of soap, sulphur, and similar disinfectants which could be employed by individual institutions.

The second decision related to treatment of the sick. It would have been possible for the A.R.A. to have established throughout the country a number of hospitals and other institutions completely equipped and under American management to serve as models and to provide free treatment to the limit of their capacity. This had become a familiar policy in postwar medical relief. In the Russia of 1921-22, it was obvious that models, as such, were useless, since the country was so destitute that no institution could hope to imitate them. Furthermore, the number of persons needing treatment was so vast and so scattered over a great territory that the supplies, if concentrated in model institutions, would be available to relatively few. The policy adopted was to distribute supplies as broadly as possible to existing institutions, and incidentally to use these supplies to bring about any such improvement in administration and equipment as the means at the disposal of health officials would permit.

On the basis of these decisions the Medical Division planned a campaign along the following lines:

First — For the prevention of disease:

- Cleanup, bathing, and inoculation campaigns.
- Distribution of disinfectants and disinfecting apparatus.
- Purification and repair of urban water supply systems.

Second — For the treatment of disease:

- Distribution of all essential supplies to as many as could be reached by existing hospitals, dispensaries, feldsher points, laboratories, children's homes, et cetera.
- The organization of new ambulatories and dispensaries where none existed, or where additional ones were needed.

Third — Supplementary to strictly medical relief and as a part of the major feeding operations:

- Food issues to patients and inmates of homes.
- Food and clothing relief to medical personnel (by the Food Remittance System).

Fourth — Distribution of medical literature to universities and other institutions.

By the spring of 1922, medical relief was reaching all of European Russia, except the sparsely populated regions of the north and the non-famine provinces of Central Russia. Later these central provinces were also supplied by the A.R.A. Sanitary Trains.

The famine regions obviously suffered most from disease and to them medical aid went side by side with food products, but there were other areas, where food was not desperately short, that were virtually bare of hospital equipment and medicine. To answer the appeals for aid that poured in from

the physicians of these non-famine territories, Dr. Beeuwkes secured the permission of the Soviet officials to send out a Sanitary Train. Sanitary Train No. 1, in charge of Dr. Ross, left Moscow August 3, 1922, with twenty-one car loads of supplies. With it went the Russian Red Cross Train No. 5, consisting of a dining car, kitchen car, two coaches, and a supply car for the soldier guards. Within a month the Sanitary Train traveled 2,000 miles, established bases of distribution in the cities of Tula, Orel, Kursk, Voronesh, Koslov, Tambov, and Ryazan, from which the supplies radiated to the towns and villages of the great areas of which these cities are the centers.

In the spring of 1923, the range of medical supply was again extended. During March, April, and May, Sanitary Train No. 2, piloted by Dr. Toole, again visited the seven cities already mentioned and, in addition, Kaluga and Briansk, all lying to the south of Moscow. Then "No. 2" swung north to Yaroslav, Kostroma, Vladimir, Ivanovo-Voznessensk, Tver, Rybinsk, and Rostov, with many stops at way stations, thus bringing American medical supplies to an area of 155,000 square miles with over 20,000,000 inhabitants, in addition to the famine areas of the east and south where the regular medical program was applied.

For the cleanup campaigns and the rehabilitation of urban water supply systems, the principal requirements were initiative, labor, and technical supervision. The first and the last the Americans provided; the labor was the contribution of able-bodied refugees who received American rations. The distribution by the Medical Division of a million pounds of chloride of lime to cities, and of large numbers of Lister bags to hospitals, insured an immediate effect in the water purification campaigns, which resulted in the decrease of typhoid and cholera. Bathing operations were designed primarily for the hygienic benefit of children attending A.R.A. kitchens. Thus the Moscow district provided free baths for all children attending the American kitchens. Odessa opened its campaign by giving a bath to 2,600 children, and disinfecting their clothing. Later the A.R.A. provided baths for other groups of the population.

Of special interest are the disinfecting stations established by the Medical Division at strategic points on the railways to prevent the spread of epidemics from Russia into the border states, and to keep new infection from crossing from Asiatic into European Russia. War refugees from the Baltic states were repatriated chiefly through the following points on the western borders: Sebesh, Minsk, Veliky-Luky, Vitebsk, Gomel, Bobrinsk, and Kiev. To these points the helpless people came in box cars which contained scant remnants of household possessions, and a mass of humanity, dressed in filthy rags, and bearing the germs of disease which ravaged the refugee ranks as the trains moved slowly westward. At the border all were held up, the dead and seriously ill were removed from the trains, and the rest were herded into

unsanitary camps to await the completion of their papers. At Minsk, the most active evacuation point, the health authorities estimated that eighty per cent of the refugees developed typhus, which naturally spread among the local population and was carried across the border into Poland. The A.R.A. imported six French disinfecting cameras, and put them in operation at these border points. At Minsk, where refugees had been herded in vacant lots or in dilapidated buildings, the Medical Division organized a completely equipped one hundred bed hospital and a dispensary at the Kozerova camp. This assistance in organization and equipment not only improved the lot of the refugees, but gave great aid to officials on both sides of the border. Subsequently, as the border refugee movement diminished, the disinfecting equipment at two of these stations was removed, one sent to Petrograd to care for refugees there, and the other to Samara.

At the Samara station, the A.R.A. organized and operated a dispensary for the examination and treatment of all refugees passing through that point. The records of that work are interesting:

Number of trains inspected	868
Patients removed from trains to dispensary	1,930
Patients removed from station to dispensary	2,427
Patients removed from dispensary to hospital	2,339
Dead bodies removed from trains and railroad stations	26
Total patients attended to	12,077
Prescriptions filled	75,000

Among the cases removed from trains and isolated, the following diseases predominated: malaria, typhus, influenza, diphtheria, scurvy, dysentery, syphilis, gonorrhoea, smallpox, and various skin diseases.

The culmination of the disease prevention work was the inoculation campaign, carried on throughout the greater part of Russia in the summer of 1922, and reinaugurated for children in the spring of 1923. For this campaign the Medical Division imported and distributed 7,000,000 cubic centimeters of tetra vaccine, 1,000,000 doses of mono vaccine and 3,500,000 doses of smallpox vaccine. As soon as the vaccines reached Moscow from the Pasteur Institute of Paris, special couriers rushed them to the District Physicians, who sent their "inoculation companies," previously organized, through the towns and villages of their districts. The totals of this campaign are impressive: Tetra inoculations 6,873,214; smallpox vaccinations 1,590,136. These figures do not include vaccinations and inoculations against smallpox and typhoid fever carried out with American supplies by Russian doctors, previous or subsequent to this A.R.A. campaign of the summer of 1922.

In respect to the treatment of disease, the work of the Medical Division was primarily the distribution of supplies to existing institutions. This re-

quired an investigation of the institutions in the areas to which the District Physicians were assigned, for, though the needs of all were inclusive, institutions of different types and in different localities had special requirements. This distribution naturally gave the Americans an opportunity to promote administrative efficiency by encouraging the able, by withholding supplies where they would be misused, and by bringing pressure to bear on officials to support institutions to the extent of their means. Beginning with thirty-six institutions in November 1921, practically all accessible institutions in the relief districts had received one or more issues of supplies by September 1922. At the end of the first year the A.R.A. had reached 12,383 institutions. By June, the number had reached the total, 16,419.

Besides helping the existing institutions, the A.R.A. found it possible to establish dispensaries giving free treatment, and pharmacies providing free medicines, to the thousands in need of these things but lacking the means to pay for them.

The A.R.A. medical program did not, of course, restore medical practice and health organization in Russia to its pre-war standard. It did, however, . . . stop the process of deterioration and save Russian institutions from being completely overwhelmed by the wave of disease that swept on its destructive course in the wake of war and famine.

Repatriation. [Under] the Riga Agreement, the Soviet Government agreed to permit American citizens in Russian territory to leave it if they wished to do so. . . . The A.R.A., of course, had nothing to do with the decisions relative to citizenship claims other than to instruct claimants how to proceed and to forward their papers. Its function was to assist American citizens who wished to leave Russia in every way possible in conformance to the understanding with the Soviet authorities. The work of repatriation was . . . [carried on by a Liaison Division] and was regulated in its detail by an executive memorandum of the New York office, dated October 11, 1921.

Russian . . . authorities . . . attempted to restrict the right of leaving Russia to native born American citizens. . . . The A.R.A. argued that the Soviet Government should permit the departure of all persons whose American citizenship had been established by the Government of the United States. After negotiations, the authorities acceded to the A.R.A. position, verbally agreeing to allow the departure from Russia of all persons whom the United States claimed as citizens, but reserving the right to claim as their nationals American citizens of Russian birth. This reservation was never applied to any of the A.R.A. cases, and throughout the whole period the Soviet Government observed strictly and fully all its obligations under this arrangement.

The actual work of the Division consisted in receiving and forwarding evidence of citizenship presented by claimants, in locating persons whose citizenship had been established in America, in following up cases with the vari-

ous government departments concerned, in securing visas from the Latvian Mission in Moscow, and in issuing funds to the repatriates in need of them, when authorized to do so after the deposit of funds had been made by relatives with the State Department or with the A.R.A.

Among the three hundred and seventy-six cases handled by the Division there was a great variety of situations involving all sorts and conditions of men, women, and children. A case which illustrates certain phases of the repatriation work, as well as the capacity of an organization that worked largely in terms of thousands and even millions of people to take every care in helping individuals, is the story of Dmitri. He was a boy of twelve, whose parents, going off to America in 1912, had left him in an Odessa orphanage. In 1922 Dmitri's parents asked the A.R.A. to find their boy and send him to them. At the Odessa orphanage there was no sign of Dmitri. He had, it appeared, like many others, been affected by the revolutionary spirit. At any rate he had broken with authority and left for parts unknown. Finding Dmitri, now at large in Russia, was like finding the needle in a haystack, for there were thousands of little boys like him, migrating with the seasons from town to town, begging and stealing rides on trains, living in cellars and abandoned buildings for all the world like little animals. Nevertheless, an advertisement for information as to the youngster's whereabouts brought the news that Dmitri had gone with his uncle Vladimir to Baltsky. After some difficulty the A.R.A. found Uncle Vladimir only to learn that Dmitri had gone on to Kiev with another uncle. Thereupon, the Kiev office of the A.R.A. took up the quest. A few days later Dmitri himself appeared at the Kiev office, ragged, hungry, and forlorn. The last of the uncles, it developed, had suddenly felt called upon to leave town, leaving Dmitri in the streets with no food and no money. Then Dmitri heard that the A.R.A. was looking for him and came to find out why. From then on it was rather like a fairy tale. He was clothed, fed and cared for until his papers were completed. Then, in company with the A.R.A. courier, Dmitri traveled to Riga, where he was put on the ship that took him to his parents in America.

Of particular importance was the aid given in locating the beneficiaries of American War Risk Insurance policies, parents of American soldiers killed in the war. There were other cases which grew out of the belief that the A.R.A. could and should undertake all sorts of private commissions. A doctor leaving Russia lost all his papers including his medical diploma. He asked the A.R.A. to get him a duplicate. A woman in Russia wished the A.R.A. to compel her husband in America to send for her.

The Liaison Division handled 376 repatriation cases representing 798 persons. Nearly every one of these cases was a long-drawn-out affair, involving searches by the A.R.A. District Supervisors, innumerable interviews with applicants and officials, the writing of many letters, the issue of traveling

funds,¹ and in one case the purchase of a whole outfit of clothing for a determined woman who refused to be repatriated until she was properly dressed for the part. During the period of the Liaison Division's operations, the Soviet Government changed its regulations governing the departure of persons from the country three times. This caused confusion and delay. But the greatest delays came from the applicants themselves, whose lives of darkness and misery had left them little capacity for dealing with papers such as the officials required. Without the personal aid of American and Russian representatives of the A.R.A. a large proportion of the cases would never have been successfully completed.

CONCLUSION

It is no part of our present business to attempt to evaluate this work. But one is perhaps justified in believing that this aid to a nation whose suffering has been preëminent in an age of suffering was the concrete and substantial expression of an ideal which Americans cherish. It has made for America a unique place in the hearts of millions of Russian people. As the agent of America in this enterprise, the A.R.A. worked hard, fought hard to overcome the obstacles, to conquer the opposition that stood in the way of its achievement. When its work was finished, it went home.

¹ Funds issued by the Liaison Division on authorization of the Department of State or the New York office of the A.R.A. amounted to \$24,461.23. These funds were issued, in accordance with an agreement with the Russian Government, in Soviet roubles.

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