


FIGURE 2.1 / Estimated Effects of Minimum Wages on Distribution of Family Income-to-Needs, 1986 to 1995



Source: Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher 2005.

Note: The estimates are based on data taken from matched CPS March files for 1986 to 1995. See the text for explanation.

TABLE 2.1 / Estimated Effects of Minimum-Wage Increases on Proportions in Income-to-Needs Ranges

	Income-to-Needs Ranges							
	0 to 0.5 (1)	0.5 to 1 (2)	0 to 1, in Poverty (3)	1 to 1.5, Near-Poor (4)	0 to 1.5, Poor/ Near-Poor (5)	1.5 to 2 (6)	2 to 3 (7)	1.5 to 3 (8)
<i>Changes in proportions</i>								
No controls	0.0005 (0.0018)	0.0079*** (0.0025)	0.0083** (0.0035)	0.0046* (0.0027)	0.0130*** (0.0040)	-0.0049* (0.0028)	-0.0071** (0.0031)	-0.0120*** (0.0040)
Fixed state and year effects (proportional shifts)	0.0002 (0.0022)	0.0069** (0.0028)	0.0071* (0.0039)	0.0033 (0.0034)	0.0104** (0.0046)	-0.0072** (0.0033)	-0.0074** (0.0037)	-0.0146*** (0.0048)

Source: Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher 2005.

Notes: The data come from matched CPS March files, from 1986 to 1995. Estimates are constructed by integrating under the densities like those reported in figure 2.1. The total sample size for the analysis, including families with income-to-needs up to 6, is 196,270. Standard errors are bootstrapped, based on five hundred repetitions, with implied t-statistics asymptotically normally distributed.

* $p \leq .10$; ** $p \leq .05$; *** $p < .01$

TABLE 2.2 / Wages and Family Income-to-Needs

	Income-to-Needs Ranges				
	0 to 0.5 (1)	0.5 to 1 (2)	1 to 1.5 (3)	1.5 to 2 (4)	2 to 3 (5)
<i>A. Distributions of primary earners in family income-to-needs category by hourly earnings</i>					
Less than 90 percent of minimum	0.49	0.27	0.12	0.06	0.03
90 to 110 percent of minimum	0.17	0.18	0.12	0.05	0.02
110 to 200 percent of minimum	0.25	0.43	0.53	0.50	0.29
More than 200 percent of minimum	0.09	0.12	0.23	0.39	0.66
<i>B. Distributions of lowest earner in family in family income-to-needs category by hourly earnings</i>					
Less than 90 percent of minimum	0.57	0.52	0.41	0.34	0.25
90 to 110 percent of minimum	0.20	0.16	0.18	0.17	0.14
110 to 200 percent of minimum	0.17	0.26	0.32	0.40	0.45
More than 200 percent of minimum	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.16
<i>C. Distributions of workers by family income-to-needs</i>					
Less than 90 percent of minimum	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.18
90 to 110 percent of minimum	0.08	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.19
110 to 200 percent of minimum	0.03	0.08	0.12	0.14	0.23
More than 200 percent of minimum	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.16
N	2,979	5,980	8,852	10,741	24,420

Source: Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher 2005.

Notes: Income-to-needs categories and income measures are reported for year one for each family. Hourly earnings are calculated using annual wage and salary income / {(weeks worked last year) · (usual hours worked last year)}; this way the full March files, rather than only the ORG files, are utilized. In the first and second panels the columns sum to 1; in the third panel the rows sum to 1 but entries are not shown for income-to-needs greater than 3. The second panel is restricted to families with at least two earners.

TABLE 2.3 / Evidence on the Distributional Effects of Minimum Wages

Study	Data	Sample	Findings	Comments
Card and Krueger (1995)	March 1990 and 1992 CPS files	Workers, all families	Larger minimum-wage increases associated with poverty reductions, but never significant with controls for overall state employment or unemployment. Slightly stronger evidence of antipoverty effects for sample of workers only (but still often insignificant).	Conditioning on employment by studying workers masks potential adverse effects of minimum wages.
Burkhauser and Sabia (2007)	Update of Card and Krueger analysis, 1988 to 2003	Workers, all families	Larger minimum-wage increases associated with poverty reductions, but evidence never significant with state unemployment controls. Even for workers, estimated effects near zero and insignificant.	Specifications with state employment controls not included, although these entered more strongly in Card and Krueger's analysis.
Sabia (2006)	March CPS files, 1990 to 2005	Employed single mothers aged fifteen to fifty-five	No evidence of effects of minimum wages on poverty.	Burkhauser and Sabia (2007) extend analysis to all single female heads of household, with no significant evidence that minimum wages affect poverty.

(Table continues on p. 38.)

TABLE 2.3 / (Continued)

Study	Data	Sample	Findings	Comments
Gunderson and Ziliak (2004)	March CPS files, 1981 to 2000	All families, and sub-groups (female-headed households, married couples, white families, black families)	Mixed evidence: some estimates point to minimum wages reducing poverty; but for preferred specification (after-tax income, using squared poverty gap) estimated effect varies in sign and is never significant.	
Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006a)	March CPS files, 1981 to 1997	All families	For a wide variety of inequality measures (but not all), using after-tax income, minimum wages increase inequality. Evidence is strongest for inequality measures that place more weight on transfers at low end of income distribution. Using pre-tax income, minimum wages are always estimated to increase inequality.	No year effects included in specifications.

Source: Author's compilation based on studies cited in table.

TABLE 2.4 / Living-Wage Laws in the Eight Largest Cities, as of 2006

	Level (1)	Prevailing Minimum Wage (2)	Coverage (3)
New York	\$10	\$5.15	Service contractors
Los Angeles	\$9.39	\$6.75	Service contractors, financial-assistance recipients
Chicago	\$10	\$6.50	For-profit contractors in specific categories of workers
Philadelphia	150 percent of higher of federal or state minimum wage	\$5.15	Contractors; businesses with city leases, franchises, concessions; city employees
San Diego	\$10	\$6.75	Contractors, financial-assistance recipients
San Antonio	For 70 percent of employees in new jobs: \$11.14 for services involving durable goods and \$10.86 for services involving non-durable goods. Minimum for all workers is \$9.62.	\$5.15	Financial-assistance recipients (tax abatements)
Detroit	\$10	\$5.15	Service contractors, financial-assistance recipients
San Jose	\$12.27	\$6.75	Service contractors in specific categories, financial-assistance recipients

Source: Author's compilation based on data from the Living Wage Resource Center, available at: <http://www.livingwagecampaign.org/index.php?id=1958> (accessed November 11, 2006).

Notes: In most cases, the required wage level is higher if health insurance benefits are not provided. The living wage if such benefits are provided is reported. The prevailing minimum wage is the higher of the state or federal minimum.

TABLE 2.5 / Estimated Effects of Living-Wage Laws

Dependent Variable	Log Wages, Lowest Decile of Wage Distribution (Elasticity) (1)	Employment, Lowest Decile of Predicted Wage Distribution (2)	Probability that Family In- come Is Below Poverty Line (3)
<i>All living-wage laws</i>			
Log living wage, lagged twelve months	0.040	-0.053**	-0.035**
<i>Financial-assistance living- wage laws</i>			
Log living wage, lagged twelve months	0.067*	-0.076**	-0.024*
<i>Contractor-only living-wage laws</i>			
Log living wage, lagged twelve months	-0.006	-0.027	-0.038
N	46,374	116,466	142,421

Source: Adams and Neumark 2004.

Notes: The data on labor-market outcomes and other worker-related characteristics come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files (ORGs), from January 1996 through December 2002, and the CPS Annual Demographic Files (ADFs), from 1996 through 2002, for individuals or families residing in MSA's, in city-month cells with twenty-five or more observations. The data for the first two columns cover 1996 to 2002, and for the last column cover 1995 to 2001. The regressions include controls for city, year, month, minimum wages, and other individual-level controls in the wage and employment specifications, and controls for city, year, and minimum wages in the poverty specification. All specifications also allow differential linear time trends for cities passing or not passing living-wage laws, or passing different types of laws. The entries in the first row are from a specification with a single living-wage variable, and the entries in the second and third rows are from a specification interacting the living-wage variable with dummy variables for the type of living wage. The coefficients for the log wage equation are from log-log specifications, and hence are elasticities. The coefficients from the employment and poverty regressions measure the change in the share employed or poor in response to a one-unit increase in the log living wage (or a 100 percent increase). Reported standard errors are robust to nonindependence (and heteroscedasticity) within city cells.

* $p \leq .10$; ** $p \leq .05$

TABLE 2.6 / Linear Probability Estimates of Effects of School-to-Work Participation on College Attendance and Employment

	Some College		Employment	
	(1)	(2)	(1')	(2')
<i>A. Detailed control variables</i>				
Job shadowing	.015 (.026)	.037 (.023)	.006 (.025)	-.000 (.025)
Mentoring	.066* (.036)	.026 (.031)	-.035 (.033)	-.029 (.033)
Coop	-.019 (.028)	.007 (.026)	.079*** (.028)	.078*** (.028)
School enterprise	.112*** (.037)	.088*** (.033)	.025 (.037)	.016 (.037)
Tech prep	-.059** (.030)	-.042 (.030)	-.000 (.028)	-.007 (.028)
Internship or apprenticeship	.045 (.032)	.021 (.030)	.053* (.030)	.059* (.030)
Includes demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Includes controls for living arrangements and family structure, ASVAB, and school behaviors		Yes		Yes
<i>B. Expectations proxies</i>				
Job shadowing	.024 (.028)	.014 (.027)	.017 (.030)	.018 (.030)
Mentoring	.019 (.039)	-.008 (.038)	-.007 (.041)	.008 (.041)
Coop	.021 (.031)	.030 (.030)	.055* (.033)	.052 (.033)
School enterprise	.113*** (.040)	.104*** (.039)	-.025 (.048)	-.019 (.049)
Tech prep	-.046 (.038)	-.016 (.035)	.031 (.033)	.030 (.033)
Internship or apprenticeship	.012 (.036)	.016 (.035)	.052 (.037)	.052 (.037)
High school diploma by age twenty		.010 (.072)		.025 (.090)
Four-year degree by age thirty		.428*** (.035)		-.101** (.043)
Work over twenty hours per week at age thirty		.054 (.064)		.226*** (.079)

TABLE 2.6 / (Continued)

	Some College		Employment	
	(1)	(2)	(1')	(2')
<i>C. School fixed effects</i>				
Job shadowing	.035 (.027)	.063** (.030)	-.019 (.028)	-.026 (.035)
Mentoring	.018 (.034)	.048 (.039)	-.031 (.037)	-.057 (.047)
Coop	.004 (.031)	-.013 (.035)	.075** (.033)	.102*** (.037)
School enterprise	.091** (.038)	.133*** (.048)	-.002 (.047)	-.018 (.056)
Tech prep	-.070** (.036)	-.095** (.040)	.011 (.032)	.036 (.041)
Internship or apprenticeship	.038 (.036)	.055 (.041)	.116*** (.035)	.073* (.043)
Hausman test for excluding school fixed effects, <i>p</i> -value		.18		.24
School fixed effects included		Yes		Yes

Source: Author's compilation based on Neumark and Rothstein 2006.

Notes: School and work outcomes are measured as of the post-high school interview (1999 or 2000). The standard errors allow for general heteroscedasticity and nonindependence within schools. The sets of control variables are detailed in Neumark and Rothstein (2006). All of the specifications in panels B and C include the demographic, living arrangement or family structure, ASVAB, and school behavior variables that are included in columns 2 and 2' in panel A.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

TABLE 2.7 / Summary of Effects of School-to-Work Participation on the “Forgotten Half”

	Schooling-Related (1)	Work-Related (2)
Females		
<i>Skill increasing</i>		
Job shadowing		Idle:--
Mentoring		
Coop		Hours: +
School enterprise		
Internship or apprenticeship	Attended two-year college: ++	Earnings, uncond.: +++ Wage, uncond.: ++ Earnings, cond.: ++ Wage, cond.: ++
<i>Skill decreasing</i>		
Tech prep	Any college: -	
Internship or apprenticeship		Training: -
Males		
<i>Skill increasing</i>		
Job shadowing	Weeks in school: ++	Earnings, cond.: +
Mentoring	Any college: + Currently enrolled: + Attended four-year college: ++	
Coop	Any college: ++ Currently enrolled: +++ Attended two-year college: +	Idle: ---
School enterprise		Weeks working: + Weeks idle: --
Tech prep	Weeks in school: +	Weeks idle: -
Internship or apprenticeship	Attended two-year college: ++	Currently working: +++ Weeks idle: -
<i>Skill decreasing</i>		
Internship or apprenticeship	Attended four-year college: --	

Source: Neumark and Rothstein 2007.

Notes: The results shown are those for which the estimated effect was statistically significant at the ten percent level or better *only* for the forgotten half (or significant with the opposite sign for the forgotten half). The sign is as indicated, appearing three, two, or one times to indicate that the estimate for the indicated group is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. In all cases, effects that increase schooling, work, skills, or earnings are included in the rows labeled “skill increasing,” and vice versa.

TABLE 3.1 / Health Outcome Definitions

Measure	Definition
Obese	Body mass index ≥ 30
High triceps skinfold	Triceps skinfold ≥ 25 mm
High subscapular skinfold	Subscapular skinfold ≥ 27 mm
Low folate	Serum folate less than 7 nmol/L
Diabetes	Fasting glucose ≥ 125 mg/dL
High cholesterol	Serum cholesterol greater than 200 mg/dL
Low HDL	Serum HDL less than 35 mg/dL
High LDL	Serum LDL more than 130 mg/dL
Anemic (female)	Hemoglobin < 12 g/dL and hematocrit < 36 percent
Anemic (male)	Hemoglobin < 13 g/dL and hematocrit < 39 percent


Source: Authors' compilation based on data from Fauci et al. 2008.

TABLE 3.2 / Descriptive Statistics

	Whole Sample		Nonworkers		Workers	
	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.
Folate deficiency	.26	.44	.25	.43	.27	.44
Diabetes	.071	.26	.10	.30	.046	.21
High cholesterol	.44	.5	.46	.50	.42	.49
Low HDL	.11	.31	.12	.33	.10	.30
High LDL	.73	.44	.74	.44	.72	.45
High subscap. fold	.28	.45	.33	.47	.25	.43
High triceps fold	.28	.45	.33	.47	.23	.42
Anemic	.098	.30	.12	.32	.083	.28
Obese	.29	.45	.33	.47	.25	.43
No walking	.77	.42	.80	.40	.75	.44
No weightlifting	.90	.30	.93	.26	.88	.32
No jogging	.87	.33	.89	.31	.85	.35
No biking	.85	.35	.87	.34	.84	.36
No swimming	.94	.23	.96	.19	.93	.26
No other exercise	.48	.50	.54	.50	.44	.50
Phone family infrequently	.73	.44	.69	.46	.76	.43
Visit family infrequently	.28	.45	.28	.45	.29	.45
Never visit neighbor	.51	.50	.49	.50	.53	.50
Never go to church	.35	.48	.37	.48	.34	.47
Never go to clubs	.82	.38	.85	.35	.80	.40
Worker	.56	.50	0	0	1	0
Male	.46	.50	.36	.48	.53	.50
Age	43.4	11.3	46.5	12.2	41.9	10.6
Poverty-to-income ratio	1.1	.52	.93	.51	1.2	.50
Race: white	.19	.39	.17	.38	.20	.40
Race: black	.37	.48	.39	.49	.36	.48
Race: Hispanic	.39	.49	.37	.48	.4	.49
Race: other	.053	.23	.060	.24	.049	.21
Married or cohabiting	.54	.50	.46	.50	.59	.49
Education: < high school	.56	.50	.66	.47	.48	.50
Education: high school	.29	.46	.24	.43	.34	.47
Education: > high school	.15	.35	.10	.30	.18	.39
N	5,085		2,239		2,845	

Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.


FIGURE 3.1 / OLS Estimates of Effect of Work on Health



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

Note: The lines on the graph depict regression-adjusted estimates of the effect of working on each outcome. We adjust for race, education, family income, and age. The sample consists of poor individuals with a poverty-to-income ratio less than 2.


FIGURE 3.2 / OLS Estimates of Effect of Work on Physical Activity



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

Note: The lines on the graph depict regression-adjusted estimates of the effect of working on each outcome. We adjust for race, education, family income, and age. The sample consists of poor individuals with a poverty-income ratio less than two.


FIGURE 3.3 / OLS Estimates of Effect of Work on Social Contacts



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.


Note: The lines on the graph depict regression-adjusted estimates of the effect of working on each outcome. We adjust for race, education, family income, and age. The sample consists of poor individuals with a poverty-to-income ratio less than 2.

FIGURE 3.4 / Trends in Anthropometric Measures (Adjusted for Demographics)



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III, NHANES 1999 to 2000, and NHANES 2001 to 2002.


Note: The sample consists of poor individuals with a poverty-to-income ratio less than 2.



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III, NHANES 1999 to 2000, and NHANES 2001 to 2002.

Note: The sample consists of poor individuals with a poverty-to-income ratio less than 2.


FIGURE 3.6 / Other Health Trends (Adjusted for Demographics)



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III, NHANES 1999 to 2000, and NHANES 2001 to 2002.

Note: The sample consists of poor individuals with a poverty-to-income ratio less than 2.

FIGURE 3.7 / Trends in Physical Activity Measures (Adjusted for Demographics)



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III, NHANES 1999 to 2000, and NHANES 2001 to 2002.


Note: The sample consists of poor individuals with a poverty-to-income ratio less than 2.

TABLE 3.3 / Summary of Results

	Women		Men	
	Workers	Nonworkers	Workers	Nonworkers
Body mass index	up	up	up	up
Subscapular skinfold	down	down	flat	flat
Triceps skinfold	flat	flat	up (a bit)	up (a bit)
Diabetes	up	up	up	up
High cholesterol	up	flat or down	up	flat
Low HDL	flat	flat	up	up
High LDL	down	down	down	down
Anemia	down	down	flat	down
Folate deficiency	down	down	down	down
Walk or bike frequency	up	up	flat or up	up
Weightlifting	up	up	up	up


Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES, various years.

FIGURE 3.8 / SV Bounds: Effect of Work on Health (Females)




Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

FIGURE 3.9 / SV Bounds: Effect of Work on Health (Males)




Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

FIGURE 3.10 / SV Bounds: Effect of Work on Physical Activity (Females)




Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

FIGURE 3.11 / SV Bounds: Effect of Work on Physical Activity (Males)




Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

FIGURE 3.12 / SV Bounds: Effect of Work on Social Connectedness (Females)




Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

FIGURE 3.13 / SV Bounds: Effect of Work on Social Connectedness (Males)



Source: Authors' compilation based on the NHANES III.

FIGURE 4.1 / Summary of Program Impacts on Children’s School Achievement



Source: Authors’ compilation.

Notes: SSP-NB = SSP New Brunswick site; SSP-BC = SSP British Columbia site; SSP-PL = SSP Plus; NwsGrHCD = NEWWS Grand Rapids, Mich., site, human capital development group; NwsGrLFA = NEWWS Grand Rapids, Mich. site, labor-force attachment group; NwsRvLFA = NEWWS Riverside, Calif. site, labor-force attachment group; NwsRvHCD = NEWWS Riverside, Calif., site, human capital development group; NwsAtLFA = NEWWS Atlanta, Ga. site, labor force attachment group; NwsAtHCD = EWWS Atlanta, Ga. site, human capital development group; UrbMFIPFull = MFIP urban counties, full program group; UrbMFIPIncO = MFIP urban counties, income incentives only group; RuralMFIP = MFIP rural counties; CT = Connecticut’s Jobs First sites; FTP = Florida’s Family Transition Program sites; LA = Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence sites.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

TABLE 4.1 / Impacts on Developmental Outcomes of Children Age Two to Five at Time of Study Entry

Variables	All Programs	Earnings-Supplement Programs	Non-Earnings-Supplement Programs	P-Value of Differences Between Program Models
Achievement	0.05*** (0.02) [7; 18,667]	0.08*** (0.02) [4; 8,9411]	0.04 (0.03) [3;9,726]	ns
Total problem behavior				
Parent report	-0.01 (0.02) [6; 11,256]	-0.01 (0.03) [4; 5,843]	-0.02 (0.03) [2; 5,413]	ns
Teacher report	-0.04 (0.04) [3; 2,034]	-0.03 (0.08) [2; 653]	-0.04 (0.06) [1; 1,381]	ns
Externalizing behavior				
Parent report	-0.02 (0.02) [6; 11,273]	0.00 (0.03) [4; 5,851]	-0.04 (0.03) [2; 5,422]	ns
Teacher report	-0.06 (0.04) [3; 2,079]	-0.06 (0.08) [2; 652]	-0.06 (0.05) [1; 1,427]	ns

(Table continues on p. 127.)

TABLE 4.1 / (Continued)

Variables	All Programs	Earnings-Supplement Programs	Non-Earnings-Supplement Programs	P-Value of Differences Between Program Models
Internalizing behavior	0.00	0.01	-0.01	ns
Parent report	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
	[6; 11,259]	[4; 5,821]	[2; 5,438]	
Teacher report	-0.01	0.05	-0.05	ns
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	
	[3; 1,873]	[2; 649]	[1; 1,224]	
Total positive behavior				
Parent report	0.00	0.01	-0.01	ns
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
	[6; 11,251]	[4; 5,812]	[2; 5,439]	
Teacher report	0.06	0.11	0.03	ns
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	
	[3; 2,064]	[2; 653]	[1; 1,411]	
Parent report of child's health status	-0.01	0.05**	-0.06***	0.002***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
	[6; 11,294]	[4; 5,594]	[2; 5,700]	

Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of studies and total sample size are in brackets.


All samples consist of children age two to five at the point of random assignment.

Economic variables are measured over study follow-up; child achievement is measured at time of follow-up. Separate regression equations are conducted for earnings-supplement programs and non-earnings-supplement programs.

The regressions also include the following covariates measured at baseline: earnings in the prior year, earnings in the prior year squared, amount of time mother was on welfare, employed in prior year, mother had high school degree or equivalent, mother's marital status, number of children in the family, age of youngest child, mother's race or ethnicity, and whether parents' age was less than eighteen at the time of child's birth. Also included were the following additional covariates: study site flags (for example, NEWS—Atlanta, NEWS—Riverside, LA-GAIN, and so on), elapsed time between study entry and follow-up, and type of achievement report (for example, parent or test or teacher, when applicable).

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

FIGURE 4.2 / Conceptual Model: Possible Effects of Welfare and Employment Policies on Young Children’s Developmental Outcomes



Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: This is not intended to be a comprehensive model detailing all pathways between welfare and employment policies and outcomes for children. Direct, indirect, reciprocal, and moderating relations are not presented.

TABLE 4.2 / Impacts on Policy Targets, Mothers of Children Age Two to Five at Time of Study Entry

Variables	All Programs	Earnings-Supplement Programs	Non-Earnings-Supplement Programs	P-Value of Differences Between Program Models
Participation in adult education	0.02** (0.01) [6; 11,105]	-0.01 (0.01) [4; 7,352]	0.09*** (0.01) [2; 3,753]	0.000***
Employment (fraction of quarters worked per year)	0.07*** (0.01) [7; 12,537]	0.08*** (0.01) [4; 6,408]	0.06*** (0.01) [3; 6,129]	0.08*
Earnings (in \$1,000s of annual income)	0.57*** (0.09) [7; 12,537]	0.54*** (0.13) [4; 6,408]	0.56*** (0.12) [3; 6,129]	ns
Family income (in \$1,000s of annual income)	0.77*** (0.09) [7; 12,537]	1.29*** (0.13) [4; 6,408]	0.17 (0.12) [3; 6,129]	0.000***
Welfare income (in \$1,000s of annual income)	-0.27*** (0.05) [7; 12,537]	-0.16** (0.07) [4; 6,408]	-0.36*** (0.06) [3; 6,129]	0.039**

Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

Number of studies and total sample size are in brackets.

All samples consist of children age two to five at the point of random assignment.


Economic variables are measured over study follow-up; child achievement is measured at time of follow-up. Separate regression equations are conducted for earnings-supplement programs and non-earnings-supplement programs.

The regressions also include the following covariates measured at baseline: earnings in the prior year, earnings in the prior year squared, amount of time mother was on welfare, employed in prior year, mother had high school degree or equivalent, mother's marital status, number of children in the family, age of youngest child, mother's race or ethnicity, and whether parents' age was less than eighteen at the time of child's birth. Also included were the following additional covariates: study site flags (for example, NEWS—Atlanta, NEWS—Riverside, LA-GAIN, and so on), elapsed time between study entry and follow-up, and type of achievement report (for example, parent or test or teacher, when applicable).

Dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation to 2001 dollars.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

FIGURE 4.3 / Individual Study Achievement Means by Income Means



Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: A = Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP)—British Columbia (BC), experimental group

B = SSP—New Brunswick (NB), experimental group

C = Florida's Family Transition Program (FTP), experimental group

D = National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS)—Riverside, control group

E = NEWWS—Atlanta Human Capital Development (HCD), experimental group

F = NEWWS—Riverside Labor Force Attachment (LFA), experimental group

G = Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP)—Urban Full Program, experimental group

H = Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence (LA-GAIN), experimental group

I = NEWWS—Grand Rapids LFA, experimental group

J = SSP—Plus, experimental group

K = New Hope (NH), experimental group

L = Connecticut's Jobs First (CT), experimental group

M = MFIP—Rural, control group

N = NEWWS—Grand Rapids, control group

O = NEWWS—Atlanta LFA, experimental group

P = MFIP—Rural, experimental group

Q = MFIP—Urban, control group

R = CT, control group

S = NH, control group

T = NEWWS—Grand Rapids HCD, experimental group

U = LA-GAIN, control group

V = SSP—Plus, control group

W = NEWWS—Atlanta, control group

X = MFIP—Urban Incentives Only (IO), experimental group

Y = FTP, control group

Z = SSP—BC, control group

AA = SSP—NB, control group

BB = NEWWS—Riverside HCD, experimental group

TABLE 4.3 / Impacts on Family Mediators, Children, and Families of Children Age Two to Five at Time of Study Entry

Variables	All Programs	Earnings-Supplement Programs	Non-Earnings-Supplement Programs	P-Value of Differences Between Program Models
Only center-based care (percentage)	1.02 (0.84) [6; 8,399]	2.91*** (0.98) [4; 4,866]	-1.90 (1.47) [2; 3,533]	0.011**
Only home-based care (percentage)	2.64*** (0.97) [6; 8,485]	0.76 (1.36) [4; 4,903]	5.33*** (1.35) [2; 3,582]	0.024**
HOME cognitive stimulation	0.00 (0.03) [5; 5,834]	0.00 (0.04) [3; 2,276]	0.00 (0.03) [2; 3,558]	ns
Maternal parenting warmth	0.00 (0.02) [6; 7,566]	-0.01 (0.03) [4; 4,156]	0.03 (0.03) [2; 3,410]	ns
Maternal parenting harshness	0.01 (0.02) [4; 2,723]	0.00 (0.03) [3; 2,094]	0.07 (0.05) [1; 629]	ns
Maternal parenting aggravation	0.00 (0.02) [5; 8,151]	0.00 (0.04) [3; 2,471]	-0.01 (0.03) [2; 5,680]	ns
Mother at risk for depressive symptoms (percentage)	0.87 (0.95) [6; 11,445]	2.26* (1.36) [4; 5,893]	-0.45 (1.31) [2; 5,552]	ns
Married (percentage)	-0.39 (0.60) [7; 12,497]	-0.22 (0.85) [4; 6,399]	-0.60 (0.84) [3; 6,098]	ns
Married or cohabiting (percentage)	0.01 (0.76) [7 12,485]	0.04 (1.09) [4; 6,398]	-0.13 (1.07) [3; 6,087]	

Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of studies and total sample size are in brackets.


All samples consist of children age two to five at the point of random assignment.

Economic variables are measured over study follow-up; child achievement is measured at time of follow-up. Separate regression equations are conducted for earnings-supplement programs and non-earnings-supplement programs.

The regressions also include the following covariates measured at baseline: earnings in the prior year, earnings in the prior year squared, amount of time mother was on welfare, employed in prior year, mother had high school degree or equivalent, mother's marital status, number of children in the family, age of youngest child, mother's race or ethnicity, and whether parents' age was less than eighteen at the time of child's birth. Also included were the following additional covariates: study site flags (for example, NEWS—Atlanta, NEWS—Riverside, LA-GAIN, and so on), elapsed time between study entry and follow-up, and type of achievement report (for example, parent or test or teacher, when applicable).

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

FIGURE 4.4 / Model Illustrating Evidence on Direct and Mediating Relations Between Welfare and Employment Policies and Young Children's Academic Achievement



Source: Authors' compilation.

APPENDIX


Appendix TABLE 4A.1 / Descriptions of the Studies

Study	Sites	Key Policy Features Tested				When Study Began and Length of Follow-Up	Primary Source(s)
		Generous Earnings Supplements	Mandatory Employment Services	Time Limits	Expanded Child-Care Assistance		
Connecticut Jobs-First Evaluation	New Haven and Manchester, Connecticut	√	√	√		1996 36 months	Bloom et al. (2002)
Family Transition Program (FTP)	Escambia County, Florida		√	√	√	1994 48 months	Bloom et al. (2000)
Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP)	Seven counties in Minnesota	√	√		√	1994 36 months	Gennetian and Miller (2000)
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS)	Atlanta, Ga.; Grand Rapids, Mich.; Riverside, Calif.; and Portland, Ore.		√			1991 24 months 60 months	Hamilton et al. (2002) and McGroder et al. (2000)
New Hope Project	Milwaukee, Wis.	√			√	1994 24 months 60 months	Bos et al. (1999)
Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)	Los Angeles County		√			1996 24 months	Freedman et al. (2000)
Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP)	New Brunswick British Columbia	√				1992 36 months 54 months	Morris and Michalopoulos (2000)

Source: Authors' compilation.


Notes: All sites used a random-assignment design that consisted of one or more program group and a control group. The control group in each case was the traditional welfare system in place at the time of the study (typically, AFDC).

FIGURE 6.1 / Prisoners in State or Federal Prison per 100,000 U.S. Residents, 1925 to 2005



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

FIGURE 6.2 / Number of Jail Inmates per 100,000 U.S. Residents, 1980 to 2005



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

TABLE 6.1 / Estimates of the Proportion of Men Eighteen to Fifty-Five Engaged in a Productive Activity, Noninstitutionalized and Idle, and Institutionalized, by Race-Ethnicity

	1980	2000	Change, 2000 to 1980
Non-Hispanic white			
Employed or in school ^a	0.899	0.878	-0.021
Idle	0.093	0.109	0.016
Institutionalized	0.008	0.014	0.006
Non-Hispanic black			
Employed or in school ^a	0.758	0.673	-0.085
Idle	0.206	0.239	0.033
Institutionalized	0.037	0.089	0.052
Non-Hispanic Asian			
Employed or in school ^a	0.918	0.859	-0.059
Idle	0.079	0.135	0.056
Institutionalized	0.003	0.006	0.003
Hispanic			
Employed or in school ^a	0.845	0.744	-0.101
Idle	0.140	0.226	0.086
Institutionalized	0.014	0.030	0.016

Source: Author's compilation based on 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (Ruggles et al. 2008).

a. Includes men in the armed forces.

TABLE 6.2 / Estimates of the Proportion of Men Eighteen to Fifty-Five Engaged in a Productive Activity, Noninstitutionalized and Idle, and Institutionalized, by Race-Ethnicity and Education

	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic Asian		Hispanic	
	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000
Less than high school								
Employed or in school ^a	0.794	0.698	0.658	0.430	0.804	0.699	0.793	0.667
Idle	0.185	0.257	0.285	0.364	0.186	0.278	0.188	0.297
Institutionalized	0.021	0.045	0.057	0.206	0.010	0.023	0.020	0.036
High school graduate								
Employed or in school ^a	0.895	0.835	0.776	0.630	0.889	0.793	0.864	0.734
Idle	0.099	0.146	0.197	0.284	0.106	0.195	0.124	0.232
Institutionalized	0.006	0.019	0.027	0.087	0.005	0.012	0.011	0.035
Some college								
Employed or in school ^a	0.941	0.911	0.866	0.794	0.952	0.880	0.927	0.855
Idle	0.054	0.079	0.110	0.156	0.046	0.115	0.065	0.126
Institutionalized	0.005	0.009	0.024	0.050	0.002	0.005	0.007	0.019
College plus								
Employed or in school ^a	0.963	0.947	0.917	0.890	0.958	0.913	0.943	0.892
Idle	0.035	0.051	0.073	0.096	0.041	0.087	0.053	0.101
Institutionalized	0.002	0.002	0.011	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.007

Source: Author's compilation based on 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (Ruggles et al. 2008).

a. Includes men in the armed forces.

TABLE 6.3 / Estimates of the Proportion of Men Eighteen to Fifty-Five Engaged in a Productive Activity, Noninstitutionalized and Idle, and Institutionalized, by Race-Ethnicity, Age, and Education

Age and Status	Less than High School							
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic Asian		Hispanic	
	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000
Eighteen to twenty-five								
Employed or in school ^a	0.784	0.797	0.604	0.473	0.791	0.794	0.760	0.703
Idle	0.188	0.161	0.314	0.307	0.192	0.164	0.212	0.257
Institutionalized	0.028	0.041	0.081	0.221	0.017	0.043	0.028	0.039
Twenty-six to thirty-five								
Employed or in school ^a	0.783	0.683	0.634	0.343	0.783	0.655	0.807	0.672
Idle	0.186	0.249	0.281	0.336	0.207	0.311	0.170	0.289
Institutionalized	0.032	0.069	0.085	0.321	0.010	0.034	0.023	0.039
Thirty-six to forty-five								
Employed or in school ^a	0.823	0.666	0.726	0.423	0.845	0.685	0.824	0.645
Idle	0.161	0.286	0.240	0.387	0.150	0.301	0.165	0.318
Institutionalized	0.016	0.047	0.034	0.191	0.005	0.013	0.011	0.038

(Table continues on page 194.)


TABLE 6.3 / (Continued)

Age and Status	High School Graduates							
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic Asian		Hispanic	
	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000
Eighteen to twenty-five								
Employed or in school ^a	0.872	0.843	0.742	0.634	0.871	0.848	0.844	0.760
Idle	0.121	0.136	0.229	0.281	0.123	0.140	0.145	0.206
Institutionalized	0.007	0.021	0.029	0.084	0.007	0.012	0.012	0.034
Twenty-six to thirty-five								
Employed or in school ^a	0.900	0.845	0.780	0.624	0.888	0.769	0.874	0.726
Idle	0.093	0.131	0.184	0.259	0.104	0.213	0.111	0.231
Institutionalized	0.007	0.024	0.036	0.117	0.008	0.019	0.015	0.043
Thirty-six to forty-five								
Employed or in school ^a	0.926	0.845	0.827	0.635	0.913	0.785	0.898	0.725
Idle	0.069	0.137	0.156	0.280	0.085	0.208	0.094	0.244
Institutionalized	0.005	0.018	0.017	0.085	0.001	0.007	0.008	0.032

Source: Author's compilation based on 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (Ruggles et al. 2008).


a. Includes men in the armed forces.

FIGURE 6.3 / Scatter Plot of Change in the Ten-Year Changes in the Proportion Employed, in School, or in the Military Against the Ten-Year Change in the Proportion Institutionalized, 1980 to 2000




Source: Author's compilation based on 1980 and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (Ruggles et al. 2008).

FIGURE 6.4 / The Proportion of Employers Whose Most Recent Hire Was a Black Male by Their Self-Stated Willingness to Hire Ex-Offenders and by Their Practice of Checking Criminal Backgrounds When Screening Applicants




Source: Author's compilation based on Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2006.

FIGURE 6.5 / Average Annual Weeks Worked for Men Who Experience Incarceration and a Matched Comparison Group Relative to Year of First Incarceration




Source: Author's compilation based on National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (Ohio State University 2003).

FIGURE 6.6 / Average Annual Earnings Among Men Who Experience Incarceration and a Matched Comparison Sample Relative to First Year of Incarceration




Source: Author's compilation based on National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (OSU 2003).

FIGURE 6.7 / Percentage of Prison Admissions Due to the Return to Custody of Parole Violators Without a New Term




Source: Author's compilation based on the National Corrections Reporting Program (U.S. Department of Justice, various years).

FIGURE 6.8 / Percentage of Prison Admissions by Main Offense for New Commitment, 1984 to 2002




Source: Author's compilation based on the National Corrections Reporting Program (U.S. Department of Justice, various years).

FIGURE 6.9 / Percentage of Prison Admissions by Original Commitment Offense for Parole Violators, 1984 to 2002




Source: Author's compilation based on the National Corrections Reporting Program (U.S. Department of Justice, various years).

FIGURE 6.10 / Key Percentiles of the Age Distribution for Prisoner Admissions, 1984 to 2002



Source: Author's compilation based on the National Corrections Reporting Program (U.S. Department of Justice, various years).

FIGURE 6.11 / Distribution of Maximum Sentences, Assigning the Median Sentence for Each of Seventy Offense Categories Handed Down in 1984 to Each Admission in 1984 and Each Admission in 2002



Source: Author's compilation based on the National Corrections Reporting Program (U.S. Department of Justice, various years).


TABLE 6.4 / Effects of Crime Abatement on Reported Felony Offenses

	Effect on Crimes Reported to the Police	Effect on All Crimes Accounting for Underreporting
1978 to 1990		
Violent crime		
Murder	-0.038	-0.038
Rape	-0.200	-0.615
Robbery	-2.555	-4.467
Assault	0.262	0.474
Property crime		
Burglary	-6.769	-13.484
Larceny	-2.627	-6.553
Motor vehicle theft	-2.018	-2.564
Total	-13.945	-30.247
1991 to 2004		
Violent crime		
Murder	-0.006	-0.006
Rape	-0.021	-0.065
Robbery	-0.257	-0.449
Assault	-0.037	-0.067
Property crime		
Burglary	-0.514	-1.024
Larceny	-1.674	-6.087
Motor vehicle theft	-0.505	-0.642
Total	-4.182	-8.340

Source: Johnson and Raphael 2007.


Note: Figures are estimates of the crime-abating effect of a one-unit increase in the incarceration rate on the number of crimes per 100,000 residents. These estimates come from state-level panel data regressions that model the year-to-year change in crime rates as a function of the year-to-year change in state incarceration rates. The models are estimated using variation along the dynamic adjustment path of incarceration to underlying shocks to identify as an instrument for the interyear change in incarceration rates. See Johnson and Raphael (2007) for estimation details.

FIGURE 7.1a / All Persons, by Family Income as a Percentage of Poverty-Line Income, 1990 to 2005



Source: Authors' tabulations based on Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, various years.

FIGURE 7.1b / Persons in Single-Mother-Headed-Families, by Family Income as a Percentage of Poverty-Line Income, 1990 to 2005



Source: Authors' tabulations based on Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, various years.

TABLE 7.1 / Income Components for Families Headed by Single Mothers with Less than a High School Education

Year	Average Total Family Income ^a	Income Components (Percentages)			
		Family Public-Assistance Income	Own Earnings	Other Family Members' Earnings	Other Family Income
1990	\$22,022	10.3	44.9	28.2	16.5
1995	\$23,891	8.1	44.8	27.8	19.4
2000	\$27,002	2.4	52.7	28.1	16.8
2005	\$25,023	2.1	53.2	26.7	18.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on Current Population Survey data, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, various years.

a. All monetary values in real-year 2005 dollars, deflated using the BEA's PCE price deflator.

TABLE 7.2 / Trends in the Percent of Disconnected Single Mothers as Percentage of All Single-Mother-Family Heads Whose Family Income Is Below 200 Percent of the Official Poverty Line

				Using Definition 3			
Calendar Year	Definition 1 ^a	Definition 2 ^b	Definition 3 ^c	(1) Living With at Least One "Connected" Adult	(2) Living with Other Disconnected Adults	(3) Living Alone, Without Other Adults	Without Other Adult Income Help: Sum of (2) & (3) ^d
(1) Current Population Survey							
1990	9.9	14.1	12.4	5.0	1.0	6.4	7.4
1995	11.7	15.8	13.0	5.7	1.2	6.1	7.3
2000	14.6	18.6	16.2	6.6	1.6	8.0	9.6
2005	20.0	25.1	21.7	8.0	1.7	12.0	13.7
				Using Definition 3			
Calendar Year	Definition 1 ^e	Definition 2 ^f	Definition 3 ^g	(1) Living With at Least One "Connected" Adult	(2) Living with Other Disconnected Adults	(3) Living Alone, Without Other Adults	Without Other Adult Income Help: Sum of (2) & (3)
(2) Survey of Income and Program Participation							
1990	18.8	19.9	19.0	5.4	4.0	9.5	13.6
1996	17.0	18.8	16.4	5.4	2.3	8.7	11.0
2001	23.2	24.5	20.8	7.6	2.4	10.8	13.3
2003	24.9	26.3	23.3	8.7	3.1	11.5	14.6

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement; and Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1990, 1996, and 2001 panels.

a. Not in school, no earnings, no welfare receipt over past year.

b. Not in school, annual earnings ≤ \$2,000; annual welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

c. Not in school, annual earnings ≤ \$2,000; annual welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000; annual household SSI receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real-year 2005 dollars). This is the "standard definition" used in tables 7.3 to 7.7.

d. This is the "stricter definition" used in tables 7.3 to 7.7.

e. Not in school, no earnings, no welfare receipt over past month.

f. Not in school, 12 x monthly earnings ≤ \$2,000; 12 x monthly welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

g. Not in school, 12 x monthly earnings ≤ \$2,000; 12 x monthly welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000; 12 x monthly household SSI receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

TABLE 7.3 / Characteristics of All Single Mothers and Disconnected Single Mothers in 2005, by Definition of "Disconnected"

Characteristics	Disconnected Single Mothers		
	All Single Mothers with Family Income Below 200 Percent of Poverty Line	Standard Definition ^a	Stricter Definition ^b
Percentage living with parents	11.0	15.9	8.1
Percentage living with other relatives	6.0	7.4	2.9
Percentage living with an unrelated male	18.2	20.1	1.9
Percentage living with an unrelated female	2.3	2.3	0.5
Percentage living alone, no other adults	63.7	55.3	87.6
Average number of children	1.9	1.8	1.9
Average number of preschoolers	0.6	0.7	0.6
Average own earnings	\$9,802	\$200	\$196
Average earnings from other family members	\$2,437	\$3,933	\$702
Average family income	\$16,445	\$9,459	\$7,045
Percentage white or other, non-Hispanic	40.7	41.9	42.4
Percentage African American, non-Hispanic	33.2	29.0	35.2
Percentage Hispanic	21.1	23.8	17.9
Percentage with education less than high school	23.8	31.8	27.1
Percentage with education exactly high school	40.1	39.7	39.6
Percentage with education more than high school	36.1	28.4	33.3
Percentage listing "health problems" as reason for not working	17.4	25.7	31.6
Percentage poor	54.3	82.1	86.2
Percentage immigrants	9.9	12.7	9.6

Source: Authors' tabulations based on Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2006.

Note: All monetary values in real-year 2005 dollars, deflated using the BEA's PCE price deflator.

a. See definition 3 in table 7.2. This includes all single mothers in families whose total family income is below 200 percent of the official poverty line, who are not in school, and with annual earnings ≤ \$2,000, annual welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000 and annual SSI receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

b. Includes disconnected single mothers living without other adults or living with other disconnected adults.

TABLE 7.4 / Percentage of Disconnected Low-Income Single Mothers Reporting Various Barriers to Work

Barrier to Work	Percentage Experiencing Barrier		
	Of All Low-Income Single Mothers (1)	Of Those Who Report Any Period of Disconnectedness ^a (2)	Of Those Who Report Multiple Months of Disconnectedness (3)
<i>Reported at least once^b</i>			
Child in family age two or younger	21.8	17.9	20.3
Report not working due to pregnancy or childbirth	6.8	9.2	12.6
Report not working due to caring for children or others	27.7	41.4	55.9
Report not working due to chronic health condition or disability	9.5	12.1	16.2
Physical or mental work-limiting condition	24.3	23.0	29.7
<i>Reported in a one-time supplementary survey</i>			
Child in family with developmental disability	0.8	0.6	0.6
Child in family with physical or mental disability	1.8	2.4	3.1
Child in family with mental retardation	0.9	0.9	0.8
Child in family with other developmental disability	5.1	5.9	6.5
No observed barriers	42.8	25.7	17.0

Source: Authors' tabulation based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation panel 2001.

Note: Includes only individuals observed in all waves.

a. See definition 3 in table 7.2. This includes all single mothers in families whose total family income is below 200 percent of the official poverty line, who are not in school and have 12 x monthly earnings ≤ \$2,000; 12 x monthly welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000; 12 x monthly household SSI receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

b. For columns 2 and 3, these are barriers reported during a period of disconnectedness.

TABLE 7.5 / Percentage of Single Mothers (with Family Incomes Below 200 Percent of the Poverty Line) By Length of Time Disconnected

Length of Time	Standard Definition ^b		Stricter Definition ^c	
	Uncensored	Uncensored and Right-Censored	Uncensored	Uncensored and Right-Censored
(1) Spells of Disconnectedness (Based on First Non-Left-Censored Spells) ^a				
Less than or equal to 4 months	71.2	65.4	74.4	70.4
5 to 8 months	16.6	17.8	15.0	15.4
9 to 12 months	7.7	7.5	6.6	6.4
13 to 16 months	2.9	4.9	3.0	4.8
17 to 20 months	0.8	1.5	0.7	1.1
21 to 24 months	0.5	1.3	0.2	0.7
25 to 28 months	0.3	0.9	0.2	0.6
28 to 32 months	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.5
Average number of months disconnected	4.4	5.3	4.2	4.8
Total number of non-left-censored spells		1168		812
Percentage of low-income single mothers with a non-left-censored spell		27.4		19.0
(2) Total Time Spent Disconnected (Without Regard to Continuity of Spells)				
Less than or equal to 4 months		51.7		56.1
5 to 8 months		20.1		18.1
9 to 12 months		9.8		8.3
13 to 16 months		6.9		7.5
17 to 20 months		3.7		3.6
21 to 24 months		2.9		2.6
25 to 28 months		2.0		1.4
28 to 32 months		1.5		1.2
32 to 36 months		1.4		1.2
Average number of months disconnected		7.4		6.9
Total number of individuals ever disconnected		1,726		1,139
Percentage of low-income single mothers ever disconnected		40.4		26.7

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Survey of Income and Program Participation panel 2001.

a. This panel does not include left-censored spells, thus omitting spells that are both right- and left-censored. There were forty-nine both-censored spells that lasted more than twelve months based on the standard definition of disconnectedness and twenty-six both-censored spells based on the stricter definition.

b. See definition 3 in table 7.2. This includes all single mothers in families whose total family income is below 200 percent of the official poverty line, who are not in school and have 12 x monthly earnings ≤ \$2,000; 12 x monthly welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000; 12 x monthly household SSI receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

c. Includes only disconnected single mothers living without other adults or living with other disconnected adults.

TABLE 7.6 / Reasons for Entering and Leaving a Spell of Disconnectedness^a Among Disconnected Single Mothers Age Eighteen to Fifty-five with Family Incomes Below 200 Percent of the Poverty Line

	First Non-Left-Censored Spell
(1) Percent breakdown of Reasons for Starting a Spell of Disconnectedness ^b	
Left marriage	6.0%
Child under eighteen entered family	8.7
Mother aged into sample (became eighteen)	1.6
Welfare income fell below \$1,000 per year or SSI income fell below \$1,000 per year ^c	13.8
Earnings fell below \$2,000 per year ^c	57.5
Family income fell below 200 percent of poverty line	5.4
No longer in school as primary activity	6.8
	First Non-Right-Censored Spell
(2) Percent breakdown of Reasons for Ending a Spell of Disconnectedness ^b	
Entered marriage	5.7%
Mother aged out of sample (became fifty-six)	0.4
No more children under eighteen in family	8.2
Earnings rose above \$2,000 per year ^c	55.1
Family income rose above 200 percent of poverty line	8.2
Welfare income rose above \$1,000 per year or SSI income fell below \$1,000 per year ^c	15.1
Entered school as primary activity	7.3

Source: Authors' tabulation based on Survey of Income and Program Participation panel 2001.

a. Based on definition 3 in table 7.2. This includes all single mothers in families whose total family income is below 200 percent of the official poverty line, who are not in school and have 12 x monthly earnings \leq \$2,000; 12 x monthly welfare receipt \leq \$1,000; 12 x monthly household SSI receipt \leq \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

b. Reasons sum to 100 percent (up to rounding error) and are tabulated sequentially, so (for instance) changes in marital status take precedence over changes in earnings. As a result, ordering of reasons matters, although changes in order produce little change in relative magnitudes.

c. In real year 2005 dollars, deflated using the BEA's PCE price deflator.

TABLE 7.7 / Percentage of Low-Income Disconnected and Not Disconnected Single Mothers Receiving Public Assistance and Insurance Coverage in 2005

Type of Assistance or Coverage ^f	Not Disconnected			Disconnected	
	With Significant Welfare Income ^a	With Significant Earnings ^b	With Significant SSI Income ^c	Standard Definition ^d	Stricter Definition ^e
Welfare	100.0%	8.3%	25.3%	4.0%	4.8%
SSI	11.8	2.2	100.0	1.1	1.2
Food Stamps	92.5	34.8	74.9	44.7	52.5
Medicaid	100.0	57.6	99.3	65.4	65.2
Employer-provided group health insurance	5.7	37.2	5.2	5.6	5.2
Any of the above	100.0	84.0	100.0	74.4	75.5

Source: Authors' tabulation based on the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2006.

a. Annual welfare receipt > \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

b. Annual earnings > \$2,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

c. Annual household SSI income > \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

d. See definition 3 in table 7. 2. This includes all single mothers in families whose total family income is below 200 percent of the official poverty line, who are not in school and have annual earnings ≤ \$2,000; annual welfare receipt ≤ \$1,000; annual household SSI receipt ≤ \$1,000 (real year 2005 dollars).

e. Includes only disconnected single mothers living without other adults or living with other disconnected adults.


f. Survey responses indicating receipt or coverage are based on whether anyone in the family is covered by the relevant program.

TABLE 8.1 / Estimated Direct Costs: Take-Up of Paid Family Leave and Early-Childhood Education and Care Programs

Type of Program	Cost in U.S. Dollars (billions)	Percentage of U.S. GDP
Paid family leave		
High take-up (100 percent)	45.0	0.43
Moderate take-up (approximately 50 percent)	22.5	0.22
Early-childhood education and care (ECEC)		
High take-up (100 percent of children)	111.1	1.07
Moderate take-up (50 percent of children under three)	84.4	0.81
Total		
High family leave take-up and high ECEC take-up	156	1.50
High family leave take-up and moderate ECEC take-up	129	1.24
Moderate family leave take-up and high ECEC take-up	134	1.28
Moderate family leave take-up and moderate ECEC take-up	107	1.03

Source: Authors' calculations.

FIGURE 9.1 / Spending on Low-Income Families in Selected Programs, as a Percentage of GDP



Sources: “AFDC/TANF Cash Assistance” includes both federal and state expenditures. Data are from House and Ways Committee, 1998 *Green Book*, p. 411, “Total Benefit Payments”), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, “TANF Financial Data”, Table F, various years. Expenditures for 2006 and 2007 are extrapolated from 2005 data, assuming a constant relationship to the 2005 federal block grant.

“Tax-based” payments are the refundable section only of the federal Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. Data are from Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3.

“Foster care, child care, TANF noncash, and LIHEAP” data are federal expenditures only for child care and foster care plus LIHEAP plus combined federal and state expenditures under TANF other than expenditures under basic assistance and expenditures under prior law. Sources are Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3, and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, “TANF Financial Data,” Table F, various years.

“Food Stamps” are federal expenditures for all categories of Food Stamp recipients, and “Nutrition Except Food Stamps” are federal expenditures under the child nutrition and special milk programs and the supplemental feeding programs (WIC and CSFP programs). Source is Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3. Health-care expenditures are federal and state vendor payments under the Medicaid program for dependent children under age twenty-one and for adults in families with dependent children, plus federal payments under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. Sources are for Medicaid, *Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1984–85*, Table 155, and *Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2006*, Table 8E; for S-CHIP, Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3. Medicaid expenditures after 2003 are extrapolated from 2003 assuming a constant ratio between federal Medicaid expenditures and total Medicaid expenditures for children under age twenty-one and adults in families with dependent children.

Unemployment Insurance expenditures are total UI expenditures as listed in Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3.

TABLE 9.1 / Spending on Low-Income Families in Selected Programs, 1980 and 2005
(as a Percentage of Total)

Program Category	1980	2005
AFDC/TANF cash assistance	23	5
Foster care, child care, TANF noncash, and Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program	3	6
Tax-based assistance	2	21
Food Stamps	18	14
Nutrition except Food Stamps	9	8
Health care	12	32
Unemployment Insurance	33	14

Source: "AFDC/TANF Cash assistance" includes both federal and state expenditures. Data are from House and Ways Committee, *1998 Green Book*, p. 411, "Total Benefit Payments", and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, "TANF Financial Data", Table F, various years. Expenditures for 2006 and 2007 are extrapolated from 2005 data, assuming a constant relationship to the 2005 federal block grant.


"Tax-based" payments are the refundable section only of the federal Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. Data are from Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3.

"Foster care, Child Care, TANF noncash, and LIHEAP" data are federal expenditures only for child care and foster care plus LIHEAP plus combined federal and state expenditures under TANF other than expenditures under basic assistance and expenditures under prior law. Sources are Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3, and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, "TANF Financial Data," Table F, various years.

"Food Stamps" are federal expenditures for all categories of Food Stamp recipients, and "Nutrition except Food Stamps" are federal expenditures under the child nutrition and special milk programs and the supplemental feeding programs (WIC and CSFP programs). Source is Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3. Health-care expenditures are federal and state vendor payments under the Medicaid program for dependent children under age twenty-one and for adults in families with dependent children, plus federal payments under the State Children's Health Insurance Program. Sources are for Medicaid, *Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1984-85*, Table 155, and *Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2006*, Table 8E; for S-CHIP, Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3. Medicaid expenditures after 2003 are extrapolated from 2003 assuming a constant ratio between federal Medicaid expenditures and total Medicaid expenditures for children under age twenty-one and adults in families with dependent children.

Unemployment Insurance expenditures are total UI expenditures as listed in Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, Table 11-3.

FIGURE 9.2 / Federal Government Budget Surpluses and Deficits, 1950 to 2007




Source: *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Tables 1.2 and 1.4.

TABLE 9.2 / Distribution of Deficit Reduction Across Program Categories in Recent Deficit-Reduction Packages

Legislation	Percentage of Deficit Reduction				Five-Year Totals (Billions of Current \$\$)
	Revenue Changes	Mandatory Spending Changes	Discretionary Spending Changes	Debt Service Changes	
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990	32.8	15.6	39.4	12.2	-482
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993	55.7	17.8	15.9	10.9	-433
Balanced Budget and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997	-67.8	90.7	75.4	1.7	-118

Source: Robert Keith, *Deficit Impact of Reconciliation Legislation Enacted in 1990, 1993 and 1997*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RS22098 (Washington, D.C.: updated August 30, 2006).

FIGURE 9.3 / Liberal Control of Federal Executive and Congress, 1929 to 2008



Sources: Congressional seat share data is from Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress, 2008*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, pp. 46–53. DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores are from “Party Medians from DW-NOMINATE Congresses 1-110, available at: <http://voteview.ucsd.edu/pmediant.htm> (accessed January 28, 2009).

Scores in figure 9.3 are the additive results of the following components:

- a. A measure of party control of the presidency, with a Democratic president getting a score of +1, and a Republican president a score of –1.
- b. A continuous scale of the Democratic presidential candidate’s share of the presidential popular vote, with a Democratic share of 60 percent counting as +1, 50 percent as 0, and 40 percent as –1 (thus scores of greater than +1 and less than –1 are possible).
- c. A continuous scale of the Democratic presidential candidate’s share of the electoral vote, with a Democratic share of 90 percent counting as +1, 50 percent as 0, and 10 percent as –1 (thus scores of greater than +1 and less than –1 are possible).
- d. A measure of party control of the U.S. Senate, with Democratic control getting a score of +1, and Republican control a score of –1.
- e. A continuous scale of Democratic seat share in the U.S. Senate, with a Democratic share of 60 percent counting as +1, 50 percent as 0, and 40 percent as –1 (thus scores of greater than +1 and less than –1 are possible).
- f. Standardized DW-Nominate first dimension chamber median scores for the entire Senate for Congress, with scores of 1.5 standard deviations from the mean equaling a difference of 1 on the scale.
- g. A measure of party control of the U.S. House of Representatives, with Democratic control getting a score of +1, and Republican control a score of –1.
- h. A continuous scale of Democratic seat share in the U.S. House of Representatives, with a Democratic share of 60 percent counting as +1, 50 percent as 0, and 40 percent as –1 (thus scores of greater than +1 and less than –1 are possible).
- i. Standardized DW-Nominate first dimension chamber median scores for the entire U.S. House of Representative for Congress,