The children of immigrants are central to the future of the large cities of western Europe and the United States and of the countries surrounding these cities. Not only do young people from immigrant backgrounds make up a large and growing share of their populations, they will also steadily replace the native-born baby boom generation as it ages out of the workplace and positions of influence. It is critical, then, that these young people are prepared—and enabled—to realize their full potential. Their success in school; finding good jobs; forming solid families; identifying strongly, if not uncritically, with their countries of birth; and participating fully in civic and political life augur well for the future. If many drop out of school, lack work, rely on welfare, or form an alienated new urban poor, the chances that western European and American societies can live up to the values they profess will drop sharply.

The large size of the second generation guarantees that these individuals will have a profound impact on the cultural and ethnic differences within their societies. In many places, members of the white majority of native descent feel deep anxieties about this shift. They see people speaking other languages filling their neighborhood schools and shopping places, they encounter minority group members in public spaces, and they
may even have new kinds of neighbors. All these make them worry that their way of life is at risk of being displaced. These experiences and reactions make them—especially those in precarious positions—available for anti-immigrant mobilization not only under the right-wing banners of patriotism, protecting a leitkultur, or obeying the law, but also under the left-wing banners of the emancipation of women, tolerance for homosexuality, and secularism.

With an extra push from the current economic and fiscal crisis, the tenor of public debate has already shifted dramatically against immigrants and their children. In the United States, this debate focuses particularly on undocumented immigrants and their children. Some 12 million U.S. residents, or one in twenty-five, are estimated to be undocumented, with far larger shares in immigrant destinations. Many undocumented adults have U.S.-born children, creating a difficult mix in which the children have rights but the parents do not. The great majority of these 12 million are from Mexico. Some see them as highly problematic—using costly social services, committing crimes, taking jobs away from American citizens, lowering wage standards, and being exploited without contributing much. To be sure, their severely disadvantaged position creates major barriers for their children. An important academic strain of thought warns that these children may be subject to segmented assimilation, in which those with disadvantaged and discriminated-against immigrant parents join an alienated and angry native minority underclass.

In Europe, one populist party after another has put the threat of Islam on the political agenda. In Denmark and the Netherlands, success led to minority governments that must rely on votes from legislators from anti-immigrant parties outside of government, giving them a veto power that enables them to highjack the topic of migration and integration and normalize an anti-immigrant discourse that links unemployment, crime, and Islamist extremism with immigrants and their children. Although the murder of sixty-seven Norwegian young people at a Social Democratic party camp by a right-wing zealot in July 2011 is undoubtedly an extreme—and hopefully rare—expression of this tendency, it nonetheless bears witness to the depth of anti-immigrant anxiety.

This trend is pronounced even in the most strongly assimilationist country of Europe, France. The anti-immigrant voice of Marie Le Pen, the popular new leader of the Front National, has gained prominence in the center of the French political arena. Similarly, the relatively moderate leaders of Germany and the United Kingdom, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Prime Minister David Cameron, both recently declared multiculturalism to have failed. Thilo Sarrazin, a former member of the
German Central Bank board from the Social Democratic Party, amplified Merkel’s theme in a controversial book arguing that Muslim immigrants did not want to integrate and were happy to rely on criminality and welfare instead. This debate echoes worries about the emergence of a Parallelgesellschaft in which 2 million people of Turkish descent live in a life-world supposedly detached from the wider German society.

What is actually happening to the young adult immigrants is thus a paramount concern to the democratic states of western Europe and the United States. Are media voices correct in asserting that important sections of immigrant communities are failing to integrate and therefore pose a danger to social cohesion? Is classical assimilation theory wrong about the waning of ethnic, cultural, and social distinctions as immigrant ethnic groups become more like the majority—and as the majority in turn evolves as it absorbs new groups? Does the fact that not all immigrants and their children “become similar” and some even resent the host society mean that multiculturalism has failed and cannot succeed?

To answer these questions, the authors of this volume and their colleagues have undertaken a coordinated set of studies to collect data about immigrant and native-origin young people in fifteen major cities in eight western European countries and two major cities in the United States. Our studies focus on young adult children from the most important immigrant groups that have concentrated in these cities over the last fifty years. Described at length in the following chapters, these cities are among the most economically, socially, culturally, and politically dynamic locations within their nations.

Although many suffered from the stresses of deindustrialization, economic restructuring, suburbanization, and group succession, they are also vanguards in the advanced service economy, and all have rebounded from low points reached in the 1960s or 1970s. This dynamism has attracted young people from native-born backgrounds as well as immigrants—these cities provide opportunity, display some degree of tolerance for difference, and host many important institutions. Although we call them world cities in the title of this volume, they are in essence cities of the world, or the world in cities. That is to say, their institutions span continents, not just metropolitan or national borders. Their populations have come from beyond international borders, not just from within their metropolitan areas or national borders. They are laboratories where urban dwellers are experimenting with new patterns and new relationships that will have fundamental implications for their larger national and continental contexts. The trajectories that the young adult children of immigrants wish to take, can take, or are prevented from taking will be central to this story.
A gigantic population turnover is taking place in the cities and metropolitan areas that are the sites of our studies. Statistically, many of their populations have been entirely replaced within one generation. Although most U.S. cities have long been multiethnic—typically since their initial rapid growth in the nineteenth century—the phenomenon that the former ethnic majority group is now rapidly becoming just one more minority group is relatively new in Europe. The authors of the New York study discussed in this chapter (Kasinitz et al. 2008) point out that though non-Hispanic whites are still the largest ethno-racial group in the city, but only by combining all European-origin groups, they are now just one of the city’s many ethnic minority groups. (Indeed, fewer than one in five New Yorkers is a native-born non-Hispanic white person with native-born parents.) In most western European cities, people with immigrant origins make up the majority of the population under age fifteen (first, second, or third generation). The reality of a majority-minority population, already prevalent in the United States, will also come to pass in most large western European cities over the coming ten to fifteen years.

The spatial organization of the economies of these cities and metropolitan areas has also undergone a profound transformation in the last half century. Deindustrialization and globalization have vastly diminished the blue-collar jobs that absorbed immigrants in these cities as recently as the 1960s, and central-city economies have increasingly specialized in corporate, professional, social, and individual services, yielding new occupational structures featuring both many positions requiring postsecondary educations and many low-skilled—and low-wage—service jobs. As a result, new barriers have arisen to the upward mobility of those who lack advanced educations needed in the new urban service economies.

The interaction between racial and ethnic succession and economic restructuring poses many challenges. As the old majority group slowly loses its dominant position in the workforce and the larger population, it could well develop a backlash against the new immigrant ethnic groups. However much it resists this trend, the demographic and economic processes seem irreversible. Sooner or later, the old majority group will simply have to adapt to its new minority position within a more diverse terrain of home and work. As it does, the fact that its political and institutional influence will diminish more slowly than its overall population will cushion its decline.

What opportunities does this landscape provide for the young adult children from the rising immigrant ethnic groups? Richard Alba (2009) recently argued that the aging of the baby boomers in the United States (and, by extension, western Europe) provides a unique opportunity for
the young adult children of immigrants to rise into the positions being opened up by departing baby boomers. He notes that the supply of native white males in the succeeding generation is simply too sparse to occupy all the positions their fathers held. Prospects are thus potentially bright for well-educated children of immigrants. But social tensions could well grow in places where the descendants of immigrants are barred from these positions by a lack of required credentials or discrimination even when they have them. As the growth of temporary work and flexible labor contracts make low-skilled jobs increasingly precarious, the prospects for those children of immigrants consigned to such positions are uncertain. The resulting lack of social mobility may spill over into feelings of rejection and anger.

The authors of this book use unique new sources of information on how the children of immigrants are actually faring to address these fundamental questions. They and their colleagues have conducted the first large-scale, comprehensive, comparative surveys of the children of immigrants in the two largest destinations in the United States, New York (the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York study, or ISGMNY) and Los Angeles (the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles study, or IIMMLA), as well as in fifteen cities in eight western European countries with large postwar migration experiences (The Integration of the European Second Generation study, or TIES). These authors closely examine the urban “proving grounds” where the processes of immigrant integration—or exclusion—are most pronounced and most profound. They do so with instruments specifically designed to elicit information not only about the young adult children from the largest immigrant groups but also from comparison groups of native-born young people with native-born parents who reflect the makeup of the majority populations of their countries.

The ISGMNY, IIMMLA, and TIES studies, all carried out between 1999 and 2006, were modeled on one another with the intention of collecting highly comparable data on multiple groups across the most important urban research sites. The result is a groundbreaking effort not just to look at similar outcomes for similar groups across sites in one country but to compare rigorously the European and American experiences.

The chapters in this volume provide ample evidence that second-generation members of immigrant groups show marked variations in their socioeconomic and cultural assimilation or integration across European and American cities. This variation reflects both the characteristic large differences in resources and social position these immigrant groups bring
with them on arrival (with groups with higher median levels of education and other assets doing better than those with less) and the specific ways in which these group profiles mesh, or fail to mesh, with the opportunity structure presented by the receiving society. Here, however, we want to focus specifically and comparatively on the groups most disadvantaged in each setting and explain why outcomes differ even when starting positions are similarly disadvantaged.

We identify two main reasons this is so. First, western European societies and the United States have deep-seated differences in how they view immigration, which has important consequences for identity formation and feelings of belonging. Members of the U.S. immigrant second generation, even when they are not always doing well in the labor market, feel more as if they belong, at least to their cities, than their western European counterparts. Second, societies also differ greatly in how their integration contexts, specifically such national and local sorting mechanisms as school systems, housing markets and housing policies, labor markets, and welfare state arrangements, hinder or promote the assimilation or integration of the most disadvantaged second-generation groups. On this score, the U.S. cities are not the unambiguous leaders; indeed, a number of western European cities, particularly Stockholm, have central outcome tendencies that are as good as or better than those of New York and Los Angeles, and far fewer fall to the bottom, as sometimes happens in the United States.

EXPLAINING OUTCOMES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

Because the United States has a long history of absorbing waves of immigrants, its politicians, policymakers, researchers, and broader public perceive immigration and immigrants differently than their European counterparts. As the authors of the next chapter argue, European nations remain in denial about being immigrant societies. This is reflected, as is debated in the third chapter, in the central concepts of their research debates: assimilation in the United States and integration in Europe. The term assimilation implies that immigrants or their offspring can become similar to members of the majority society, who are themselves diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, and class. The assimilation paradigm originates in the historical necessity of creating a common culture out of immigrant elements during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the initial wave of English and other Europeans as immigrants. As Ewa Morawska (2001) has pointed out, immigrants became Americans by fashioning a hyphenated Americanism.
In Europe, integration focuses explicitly on positions within the social structure, especially with regard to educational attainment and labor market outcomes. Given the stronger welfare state traditions in western Europe, many governments designed active policies to remediate ethnic minority group inequalities (for a catalog of these policies, see Huddleston and Niessen 2011). For Europeans, measuring integration almost automatically means looking at how many immigrants and their offspring are college graduates or hold professional jobs. European policymakers and social research organizations have spent a good deal of time developing such indicators of integration.

The contrasting assumptions embedded in the terms *assimilation* and *integration* reflect different historical discourses and societal responses to a rapidly changing demographic reality. The two chapters that follow discuss these differences at length. One lesson they convey is that scholars on both sides of the Atlantic must be cautious about transplanting American theoretical frameworks to the European context. Rather than remolding historically loaded concepts like assimilation and integration into one general theoretical straightjacket, we take the fundamental differences between the two settings as one important route into understanding how and why outcomes vary across the Atlantic.

Continental Europe and the United States also display many long-embedded differences in the context of integration. Although they certainly vary across the continent, European housing markets, education systems, labor markets, and political structures also differ systematically from those of the United States: western European urban settings have much more social housing and more highly regulated private rental housing; their education systems tend to be stratified more by tracks and less by geography, and the selection point for university educations comes much earlier; their labor markets are more highly regulated, less flexible, and less open to entry; and their political systems are more centralized, with stronger national planning and regulation. At the same time, as the chapters in part II of the book explore, the significant variation across European urban welfare state contexts also has important consequences for the opportunities available to the young adult children of immigrants (for one thoughtful discussion, see Kazepov 2010).

As a result, the authors of this volume seek to think about transatlantic comparisons in ways that are outside the normal American-European box. Although New York and Los Angeles share many American characteristics, they also differ from each other as well as from other U.S. big cities. Similarly, the fifteen cities in the TIES project offer a wide range of local settings. Our
comparison thus highlights not only differences between so-called typical American and European assimilation and integration contexts but the way local settings vary around those central tendencies.

Researchers in the United States have paid particular attention to how the national and city contexts affect the forward movement of the second generation. This includes specific modes of incorporation for different ethnic groups (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, and Haller 2009) as well how finer-grained city and even neighborhood contexts can influence outcomes (Kasinitz et al. 2008, 150–58; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). They have also extensively studied how school systems and labor markets offer differential access to children from different ethnic groups and social classes, though they have rarely extended this to cross-national comparison. As a result, American theoretical models are still relatively blind to the specifically American contexts of reception that shape second-generation outcomes (for exceptions, see Alba 2005; Foner and Alba 2008; Mollenkopf 2000; Portes et al. 2010). To some extent, this is mirrored in the uncritical importation of American concepts by western European scholars.

The tendency to take U.S. national institutional arrangements for granted in thinking about assimilation or incorporation introduces some serious problems for comparative analysis. When different groups are compared across local contexts, the focus inevitably falls more on the characteristics of the immigrant groups than on the structural features of their settings. Cross-national comparison of similar groups across local settings in turn highlights how national institutional dynamics, varying by urban location, sort groups regardless of their specific characteristics. We do not wish to say that differences across groups—for example, between Dominican and Chinese young people in New York or between Dominicans in New York and Mexican Americans in Los Angeles—are not important. Far from it. But we believe that such differences cannot tell the whole story. The absence of cross-national comparison leaves all the constant factors of U.S. urban settings invisible to such an analysis.

Because European studies of the second generation more often involve cross-national comparison, they pay much more attention to how national contexts shape immigrant integration pathways (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a; Doomernik 1998; Eldering and Kloprogge 1989; Fase 1994; Heckmann, Lederer, and Worbs 2001; Mahnig 1998). The European cases are both differently structured and closely linked, making the distinctive impact of national institutions far more obvious. The European contribution to theoretical debates on integration is thus to highlight how these variations in national context (here extended to the equally important, but more
often overlooked, level of urban context) have large impacts on integration outcomes. Second-generation outcomes vary across Europe for many reasons: the quality and funding of different educational streams (vocational or academic), the availability of comprehensive schooling or various post-educational opportunities (apprenticeships), the patterns of neighborhood segregation (inside or outside of social housing), or the type of welfare regime. Such factors not only shape “hard” outcomes like schooling and jobs but also affect identity, belonging, and citizenship. National and local citizenship regimes and the organization of political rights are part of this picture (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009) and are frequently reflected in everyday discourse about groups and individuals (Schneider 2002).

In their comparative integration context theory, Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider (2010) call for researchers to explore exactly how national and local institutional arrangements facilitate or hamper participation and access, reproducing or reducing inequality. Failed participation indicates obstacles to access, for example when the late start of compulsory schooling has a disproportionately negative impact on children growing up in households whose members do not speak the national language on an everyday basis. This inverts the normal focus on how individual or family traits may correlate with failure and puts the explanatory burden on how institutions sort groups with such traits toward failure. They also highlight how individuals and groups actively develop options and make choices in the face of restricted opportunities and barriers to mobility. The German half-day primary school system, for example, assumes and expects that parents will actively help their children with homework. Longtime native residents have a much better grasp than immigrant newcomers of the information that is crucial for succeeding within the complex Dutch school system. Such differences structure the subjective and objective options facing individuals as they seek to successfully apply their individual and group resources—economic, social, cultural, and political capital, or lack of it.

The chapters that follow pay close attention to the interaction between institutional constraints and opportunities and the strategies individuals and groups develop in response to them. In so doing, we wish to avoid overemphasizing ethnic background as the main signifier. Instead, we try to tease out the ways in which national and urban arrangements in education, work, housing, social services, and politics shape integration and assimilation outcomes. This does not mean that we ignore the ways in which the migration histories of specific groups in specific places also help explain outcomes, but we can best understand their contribution in
terms of how they influence the ways in which groups engage the structural features of the larger setting.

This approach leads us to ask whether the U.S.-centered nature of American theoretical frameworks limits their portability to European settings (Crul and Holdaway 2009; Crul and Schneider 2010). Do not the second-generation outcomes in the United States reflect the distinctively American institutional arrangements in school systems and labor markets? An immigrant group living in a poor neighborhood in a big American city is likely to send its children to poor quality public schools (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, and Haller 2009, 1081; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Todorova 2008, 88–145) from which they have little chance of entering elite private universities. The extreme geographic quality variation in formally similar primary and secondary schools is a distinctively American characteristic (Crul and Holdaway 2009). Although European schools also vary greatly in their performance and linkage to university education, this variation is organized in quite different ways. Theories of assimilation based on an unexamined assumption that other national educational settings will be functionally equivalent to American institutional arrangements are thus on shaky scientific grounds. In each domain explored, we try to strengthen our social-scientific thinking by paying attention to differences in institutional arrangements across and within nations.

**Studies of the Second Generation**

Increasing numbers of immigrants entered both the United States and western Europe in the decades after 1960. The oldest of their children (the second generation) have now finished their schooling and are entering the labor market in large numbers. This provided the first opportunity to examine their experiences and compare them across settings.

Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut undertook the first large-scale U.S. study of second-generation outcomes, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), in 1992. They followed fifteen-year-old high school students who were born in the United States or arrived as small children into their adolescence. They followed up this initial wave of surveys two more times, creating an unprecedented longitudinal data set. Their work resulted in several highly influential books and journal special issues that framed the subsequent debate (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). To compare a representative sample of the children of major immigrant groups with native-born white and minority peers, a research team led by Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway
fielded a multimethod study of second- and 1.5-generation and native-born groups in the greater New York area in 1999. The ISGMNY study inspired a similar project in Los Angeles (IIMMLA) initiated by a team including Frank Bean, Susan Brown, Leo Chavez, Leo DeSipio, Jennifer Lee, and Rubén Rumbaut of the University of California, Irvine, and Min Zhou of the University of California, Los Angeles, in 2002. Analysis of results from both projects initiated a lively debate about second-generation trajectories in the United States.

At about the same time, scholars in France (Tribalat 1995), the Netherlands (Crul 1994; Veenman 1996), and Belgium (Lesthaeghe 1996) began to study the position of the European second generation. The first European project, Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies toward Second Generation Migrant Youth in Comparative European Perspective (EFFNATIS), compared national approaches to integrating the second generation across Europe. Initiated by Friedrich Heckmann, it compared second-generation groups in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and reviewed the literature on Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland (Heckmann, Lederer, and Worbs 2001; Penn and Lambert 2009). This project was followed by the study of The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) on second-generation and native-born comparison youth in fifteen cities in eight European countries. Coordinated by Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, the TIES team used the New York survey as a starting point, with John Mollenkopf advising the TIES team about the experiences of the ISGMNY and IIMMLA studies. Because the California and European studies were both built on the general approach taken by the New York study, we can now make transatlantic comparisons involving two American cities and fifteen cities in eight European countries on the same topics with data gathered in closely parallel ways. The ISGMNY, IIMMLA, and TIES studies provide the empirical basis for the following transatlantic comparisons.

**The New York ISGMNY**

With guidance from the Russell Sage Foundation and its advisory committee on immigration research, the New York team began a series of pilot projects for the final study in the mid-1990s. This facilitated a large-scale telephone survey (in 1999 and 2000) of 3,415 young adult children in representative samples of five immigrant-origin groups (Dominicans; Anglophone Afro-Caribbeans; Chinese; Colombians, Ecuadorans, and Peruvians; and Jews from Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union) and three comparison groups (whites, African Americans, and
Puerto Ricans with native-born parents). With additional support from national foundations and the National Institutes of Health, the research team complemented the survey with in-depth, in-person interviews of 330 survey respondents and with ethnographies of key sites of interaction between young people from second-generation and native backgrounds. The results are reported in a coauthored volume (Kasinitz et al. 2008), an edited volume of the ethnographies (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004), and many journal articles and papers.

The Los Angeles IIMMLA
With ISGMNY well under way, the Russell Sage Foundation launched a comparison study in the other large gateway for contemporary immigration to the United States, Los Angeles. The University of California, Irvine, team designed a similar sampling frame to that of New York with several modifications: it extended the age range to capture a broader range of experiences and sampled both first-generation Mexican immigrants and third-plus-generation individuals of Mexican background. The study covered other major groups in Los Angeles, including Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Filipinos, and a sample of all other immigrant backgrounds, comparing them with whites and African Americans with native parents. The IIMMLA survey was carried out in 2004. The results have been reported in a series of journal articles.

The European TIES
The TIES project officially started in 2005 with support from the Volkswagen Stiftung in Germany and the Swiss foundation Stiftung für Bevölkerung, Migration und Umwelt (BMU). The project was initially managed by Maurice Crul and Hans Vermeulen at the University of Amsterdam, with Jens Schneider becoming cocoordinator when Vermeulen retired. Liesbeth Heering and Jeannette Schoorl from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) coordinated the international TIES survey. Senior researchers from nine research institutes participated: Rosa Aparicio-Gomez (IEM, Madrid); Michael Bommes and Maren Wilmes (IMIS, Osnabrück); Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider (IMES, Amsterdam); Rosita Fibbi (SFM, Neuchâtel); Liesbeth Heering, George Groenewold, and Laurence Lessard-Phillips (NIDI, The Hague); Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger (ÖAW, Vienna); Karen Phalet (ERCOMER/KUL, Leuven); Patrick Simon and Christel Hamel (INED, Paris); and Charles Westin, Alireza Behtoui, and Ali Osman (CEIFO, Stockholm).3
The TIES study compares second-generation young adults who were eighteen to thirty-five years old at the time of the survey (during 2007 and 2008) across fifteen cities in eight European countries. Sampled groups included the children of immigrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Morocco as well as young people with both parents born in the survey country. The sites include Paris and Strasbourg in France, Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, Madrid and Barcelona in Spain, Vienna and Linz in Austria, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Brussels and Antwerp in Belgium, Zürich and Basel in Switzerland, and Stockholm in Sweden. The interviews were conducted face to face among almost ten thousand respondents. The TIES team faced a major challenge in developing comparable samples across these settings. Municipal registers provided samples in the Netherlands and Sweden. Though population registers were also available in Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, they were difficult to access because of privacy rules and regulations (Belgium) or lacked information on the birth place of both respondents and their parents (France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria). In Austria, France, Germany, and Switzerland, the TIES teams compiled sampling frames of the ethnic origin groups by analyzing ethnically distinctive surnames and forenames (onomastic sampling) on up-to-date listings of names and addresses from electricity board registers, telephone listings, and city registers.

The TIES team can thus compare young people from the same ethnic backgrounds and starting positions (all born in Europe) across cities and countries. The primary project focus of TIES was thus to analyze how specific city and national contexts promote or hamper the integration of the same second-generation groups. To pursue this objective, the national TIES partners spent a great deal of effort gathering additional information on national and local institutional arrangements in school and the labor market as well as citizenship policies and antidiscrimination measures. The project resulted in an international comparative volume (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012), numerous separate country publications, articles, and papers.

THREE MAIN COMPARISON GROUPS

All the chapters of this volume focus on the most disadvantaged groups in each of the settings, even though ISGMNY, IIMMLA, and TIES looked at a number of different second-generation groups. As will be elaborated subsequently, we focus on these groups not because they represent the entire second-generation experience but because they represent the most
challenging case and thus the strongest test of whether individuals and groups can be upwardly mobile. On the American side of the Atlantic, chapters focus on Dominicans in New York and Mexicans in Los Angeles, and Turks in western European cities are the focus on the European side. Because the Mexican and Turkish second generations are by far the largest second-generation groups in the United States and western Europe, any assessment of failed or successful integration must include them. (Some 32 million Mexican-origin individuals live in the United States, and Europe is home to 4 million first-, second-, and third-generation Turks. Although the Mexican population of New York has risen rapidly in the last two decades, the biggest single national-origin group in the city is its 577,000-strong Dominican population.)

Because Mexicans and Turks hold similar positions in their respective settings, earlier researchers have already compared them (Faist 1995). Both groups came from rural areas that had poor schools, little access to secondary education, and no universities. They arrived in the United States and western Europe to do unskilled jobs that native workers often no longer wished to do, filling the lowest positions in the labor market and living in poor working-class neighborhoods. At the same time, both groups have a tradition of setting up small businesses that provide one pathway for upward mobility. (Dominican migrants to New York followed a roughly similar path to Mexican migrants to Los Angeles, though their country had suffered more recently from dictatorship and U.S. occupation.)

Although members of these first-generation groups all occupy low social positions, they do differ in some respects, especially in educational attainment. Far more Turkish parents have no more than a primary school education (sometimes no schooling at all) compared with the Dominican and Mexican parents (see tables 1.1 and 1.2). Some Turkish mothers are illiterate and their children often grow up surrounded by adults with only primary school educations. Only in Stockholm did a significant share of Turkish fathers have a postsecondary education. Most Turkish parents in Amsterdam and Berlin had no more than a primary school education. In the United States, by contrast, more Mexican and Dominican parents had postsecondary educations and fewer had only primary school educations. The Turkish mothers were even more disadvantaged than the Dominican or Mexican mothers (see tables 1.3 and 1.4). Given the importance of parental education for their children’s progress, we would therefore expect that the Dominican and Mexican second generation should slightly outperform the Turkish Europeans in school, all other things being equal.
### Table 1.1 Father’s Education, Second-Generation Turks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Vienna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school or less</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsecondary</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Authors’ compilation based on TIES survey 2007, 2008 (data not yet publicly available).

*Note:* The TIES survey comprises eight separate national data sets, collected by Institute for Studies on Migrations (IEM), Comillas Pontifical University, Spain; Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM), Neuchâtel, Switzerland; Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), The Hague, Netherlands; Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW), Vienna, Austria; the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER), Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium; National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), Paris, France; Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), University of Osnabrück, Germany; Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO), Stockholm University, Sweden. The TIES national surveys will be made publicly available by the national TIES partners individually, but were not yet available at the time of publication.

### Table 1.2 Father’s Education, Second-Generation Dominicans and Mexicans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school or less</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–high school</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Authors’ compilation based on ISGMNY (Mollenkopf, Kasinitz, and Waters 1999); IIMMLA (Rumbaut et al. 2004).

### Table 1.3 Mother’s Education, Second-Generation Turks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Vienna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school or less</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsecondary</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although some Turkish parents came as refugees or students, most came as labor migrants. Although many entered on temporary visas, almost all eventually were legalized. It would be exceptional for an illegal Turkish parent to raise a child born in western Europe. This was much more common in the United States, however. In a nontrivial number of cases, the parent of a Mexican American or Dominican American young person arrived without authorization. Although the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) legislation enabled many of them to gain legal status, at least a few of these parents continue to be undocumented.

First-generation parents had to apply for citizenship in both the United States and Europe (see tables 1.5 and 1.6). Although the United States considers itself a country of immigration, the citizenship chapter demonstrates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.4</th>
<th>Mother's Education, Second-Generation Dominicans and Mexicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school or less</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–high school</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation based on ISGMNY (Mollenkopf, Kasinitz, and Waters 1999); IIMMLA (Rumbaut et al. 2004).

Table 1.5  Citizenship of Parents of Second-Generation Turks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Vienna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation based on TIES survey 2007, 2008.
NA, not applicable.

Table 1.6  Citizenship of Parents of Second-Generation Dominicans and Mexicans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation based on ISGMNY (Mollenkopf, Kasinitz, and Waters 1999); IIMMLA (Rumbaut et al. 2004).
that even long-term immigrant parents do not always become U.S. citizens. In fact, the immigrant parents in Amsterdam and Vienna were as likely to become citizens as the Mexican and Dominican parents in Los Angeles and New York.

American-born children with immigrant parents all have the great advantage of birthright citizenship. The European cities present a mixed picture. In some cases, the children were citizens at birth because their parents had already naturalized. In France, the second generation also receives citizenship automatically at age eighteen. As table 1.7 shows, however, in the end, regardless of their location, almost all members of the Turkish second generation did become citizens in young adulthood. Even in Germany and Austria, where second-generation Turks must apply for citizenship, almost as many did so as in the other cities. The legal situation of the parents and children in the United States and Europe thus ends up differing far less than we might have expected based on the long immigration tradition in the United States.

The second generation grows up in quite different family settings on the two sides of the Atlantic (see tables 1.8 and 1.9). Marriages among the Mexican and Dominican parents sometimes dissolved early in the respondent’s childhood, or never took place. It was also fairly common for one parent never to have come to the United States. Members of the Dominican and Mexican second generation therefore often grew up in more fluid and less traditional family situations than their Turkish counterparts did. With the exception of those in Amsterdam, second-
The Changing Face of World Cities

The disadvantaged groups we examine across these settings, then, were comparable without being the same. The European second generation grew up with parents in less favorable labor market positions and less human capital than their U.S. counterparts but in more secure environments, in the sense of intact families living in secure housing and neighborhoods. All these second-generation youngsters experienced some disadvantages, but of somewhat different kinds.

**Table 1.9** Percentage of Second-Generation Dominicans and Mexicans Whose Parents Are Divorced or Separated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents now divorced or separated</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not grow up with both parents</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ compilation based on ISGMNY (Mollenkopf, Kasinitz, and Waters 1999); IIMMLA (Rumbaut et al. 2004). NA = not applicable*

generation Turks overwhelmingly grew up in two-parent families that remained intact into their adulthood. In the United States, one-third of the respondents grew up in separated families, a factor that can have important negative consequences for the children. We would thus expect the family backgrounds of the Turkish respondents to work in their favor.

The disadvantaged groups we examine across these settings, then, were comparable without being the same. The European second generation grew up with parents in less favorable labor market positions and less human capital than their U.S. counterparts but in more secure environments, in the sense of intact families living in secure housing and neighborhoods. All these second-generation youngsters experienced some disadvantages, but of somewhat different kinds.

**OVERVIEW**

This volume has a simple design. We asked teams of researchers who are experts on specific themes (such as education, the labor market, or identity) to pair up across the Atlantic. Although all had research experience in their own settings, none had previously worked together on transatlantic comparisons. It was therefore challenging for us to synthesize findings across settings despite having parallel data sets, not least because each national survey took a somewhat different approach to each topic. Religion (Islam) was a big issue in the European surveys, for example, whereas language (Spanish) was a central focus in the United States. Despite the lack of previous experience in working together, however, the researchers went through a long process of finding common ground. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation enabled us to launch this process at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Conference Center, an ideal place for extended reflection. Each team worked hard to reconcile differences in the ways surveys explored themes, operationalized concepts, and categorized answers. We undertook new analyses to fashion common
variables and commensurable answer categories with increasing enthusiasm about being able to synthesize our findings.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first expands on the themes introduced here concerning the historical and the theoretical debates about the second generation in the United States and Europe. The second describes the empirical results of the transatlantic comparison. The third synthesizes our overall findings.

The volume opens with three introductory chapters on the historical differences between Europe and the United States concerning immigration. They explain the factors that were crucial to the emphasis and design of the various surveys.

In chapter 2, Nancy Foner and Leo Lucassen show how the discussion of immigration has very different starting points on the two sides of the Atlantic. Foner highlights the great extent to which contemporary U.S. studies of immigration have been influenced by the literature on the assimilation of descendants of earlier immigrants—as well as on the negative racialization experienced by African Americans and certain other groups. The continued disadvantage among African Americans led to a focus on how segregation and discrimination yielded a black urban underclass that has no parallel in Europe. This accounts for why the U.S. studies include native-descent blacks and whites as well as Puerto Rican and third-generation Mexican native comparison groups and the TIES survey examines those of native-born parentage in an undifferentiated way.

Lucassen argues that Europe has a historical amnesia about its earlier waves of migration. European scholars do not label intra-European migrants or returnees from former colonies as immigrants. Despite this amnesia, however, European countries took widely varied approaches toward the immigrants of the 1960s and 1970s in terms of both integration policies and gathering statistical information about ethnicity. Before the TIES study, it was quite difficult to compare or even describe the second generation across Europe. European countries also have different policies regarding survey questions about race, ethnicity, religion, or sexuality. Even certain questions (racial identification) were considered taboo for TIES and not asked at all or asked only in certain countries (some religion and sexuality questions).

In chapter 3, Richard Alba, Jeffrey Reitz, and Patrick Simon build on chapter 2 to describe the theoretical debate around integration and assimilation. Developed in the American context, assimilation theory holds that becoming similar to the mainstream is an empirical and normative part of the American framework. This classical approach, however,
has been revised by contemporary analysts partly to better explain differences in current outcomes and partly to account for the remaking of the mainstream itself. They describe and discuss the two most important theories, new assimilation theory and segmented assimilation theory.

The Canadian and western European literatures see assimilation as just one possible outcome among others, like pluralism or marginalization. Following French sociologist Émile Durkheim, they define integration as equal participation of immigrants in different social spheres. This emphasis on equality fits with Europe’s more developed welfare states. The Durkheimian concept of integration also leaves room for solidarity with one’s community as a key part of psychological and emotional well-being for immigrants and their children, an important pillar for multiculturalist approaches in Canada and some European countries.

On the basis of these introductory chapters, the chapters in part II delve into specific explorations of education, the labor market, gender, neighborhoods, citizenship, and identity. Because educational attainment is pivotal for all assimilation and integration outcomes, the second part opens with a chapter on this topic. In chapter 4, Maurice Crul, Min Zhou, Jennifer Lee, Philipp Schnell, and Elif Keskiner compare second-generation Mexicans in Los Angeles with second-generation Turks in western European cities. More precisely, they focus on the success stories, those who are studying at a college or university or have completed a bachelor’s degree (BA). The outcomes in this chapter foreshadow a trend visible in other chapters. The rate of college attendance in the United States positions it between the relatively positive European cases (Sweden and France) and those with considerably worse second-generation educational outcomes (Germany and Austria). On both sides of the Atlantic, successful students often had to take an alternative—and often longer—route to higher education (for instance, through community college). Help from committed parents, older siblings, or teachers and mentors also played a significant role in their success. In the United States, low or uneven primary and secondary school quality and the cost of higher education can block success; in western Europe, early tracking selection and/or a high need for practical support from parents who cannot provide it block success.

Two chapters on the labor market follow. The first focuses on men and women and the second specifically on women.

In chapter 5, Liza Reisel, Laurence Lessard-Phillips, and Philip Kasinitz compare labor market outcomes across the western European and U.S. cities. The authors compare the NEET (not in employment, education, or training) rates, percentages in professional jobs, and incomes. The groups
vary most in terms of NEET rates. It seems that the most negatively stereotyped minority individuals are usually at the end of the hiring queue. Because native black groups occupy this least favorable position in the two U.S. cities, disadvantaged second-generation groups often occupy a somewhat more favorable position in the hiring queue. In Europe, however, Turks often occupy the least favorable position in the hiring queue, especially in Berlin, Brussels, and Vienna. Counter to the usual stereotype about the urban underclass, women have the highest NEET rates in western Europe.

In chapter 6, Thomas Soehl, Rosita Fibbi, and Constanza Vera-Larrucea look at gender differences on the labor market. Picking up on the high NEET rates among women discussed in chapter 5, the authors analyze how welfare regime treatment of care work and paid work influences labor force participation. The authors show that welfare regimes afford second-generation women very different chances to participate in the labor market. Sweden provides the best opportunities through a welfare system wholly geared toward enabling women with children to work full time. Despite often coming from strongly traditional families, second-generation Turkish women join Stockholm’s labor market in massive numbers. This raises interesting questions about the potential role of welfare systems for the emancipation of women from conservative (immigrant) communities.

In chapter 7, Van Tran, Susan Brown, and Jens Schneider discuss the often neglected aspect of the neighborhood where the second generation lives. The authors geocoded the home addresses of second-generation respondents and linked them with neighborhood and city statistics from census sources. Because this is an elaborate task, the authors were able to compare only the two U.S. cities and Berlin. Berlin was chosen as the “Turkish capital of Europe.” With up to 300,000 people with partial Turkish ancestry living in its neighborhoods, Berlin would be the European city most likely to show clear neighborhood effects. This chapter shows that the Mexican and the Dominican second generations live in far more disadvantaged neighborhoods in Los Angeles and New York than Turks in Berlin do. Both objectively and relatively, the Mexican and Dominican second-generation youths perceive a lot of disorder (among other things, crime and gangs) in their neighborhoods. Their Turkish counterparts in Berlin (the most deprived second-generation group in the western European cities) live in far better neighborhood conditions. Levels of disorder are much lower and differences minimal in how the Turkish second-generation and native-descent respondents perceive neighborhood disorder.
In chapter 8, Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger, Rosita Fibbi, Constanza Vera-Larrucea, Louis DeSipio, and John Mollenkopf discuss differences in citizenship regimes and participation across the Atlantic. For the comparison with the United States, the authors chose western European countries with big differences in their citizenship regimes. For historical reasons, the U.S. context should be much more favorable because it provides unconditional birthright citizenship. Although this holds for the second generation at birth, the differences are much less pronounced by the time these youngsters come of age. Differences are also much less pronounced among the parents. Indeed, many immigrant parents in the United States have a much more precarious legal situation. Parental illegality can also affect members of the second generation, even when they hold citizenship. The political and civic participation (the broader aspects of citizenship) of the second generation is substantial, both in mainstream as well as in community organizations and engagement, along with citizenship, and seems highest in the United States and Sweden.

In chapter 9, Jens Schneider, Leo Chávez, Louis DeSipio, and Mary Waters describe a wide range of topics around identity and belonging. The data on this topic were most difficult to compare across the Atlantic because of differences in both questions and answer categories. It is probably a sign in itself that the context and outcomes on this topic differ significantly across the Atlantic. As the authors put it, historically being of immigrant descent is not a major obstacle for becoming an American, whereas in western Europe having immigrant parents almost automatically makes it problematic to identify with being, for instance, German or Dutch. Religiosity, especially having a visible Muslim identity, is a further major obstacle in western Europe but in the United States has a bridging function for the largely Catholic immigrants. The authors, however, also show that the American second generation does not simply dissolve in the mainstream but rather remakes it.

Part III and its single, final chapter draws larger conclusions about the transatlantic comparison and synthesizes the findings of the previous chapters, underscoring how local and national institutional contexts of integration shape second-generation outcomes. In it, Maurice Crul and John Mollenkopf revisit the trajectories of second-generation Turks in western Europe and second-generation Mexicans and Dominicans in the United States. They find that the Turkish second generation, in most cities of western Europe, achieves considerable upward mobility compared with their parents and that national welfare systems usually prevent the lagging part of the group (which differs considerably in size across Europe) from
completely falling through the cracks. By contrast, the more open U.S. labor market and its weaker welfare system compel disadvantaged immigrant groups and their children to find upward mobility through work. A great many members of disadvantaged immigrant minority groups manage to do so. Those who are stuck in low-paying jobs or are not in the labor force, however, can end up in worse material conditions facing greater personal insecurity than their low-achieving counterparts in the European cities. However, U.S. cities are more open to the disadvantaged second generation in terms of belonging and identity formation. Although the European cities vary on this point, it is problematic to be a Muslim in any of them. Historical differences in the incorporation of immigrants and their children and differences in welfare state regimes have important consequences for the position of the second generation across the Atlantic.

NOTES
1. We define the immigrant second generation as the children born to first-generation foreign migrants in the countries where they have moved, regardless of the nationality status of these children. When specifically noted, we also include the children of first-generation immigrants who migrated into the host country along with their parents at a young age and mostly grew up there, often called the 1.5 generation.

2. In the United States, the word Hispanic refers to people who identify themselves as being descendants of those born in Spanish-speaking countries and is used interchangeably with Latino. Because the U.S. Census defines Hispanic as an ethnic rather than a racial category, Hispanics can be of any or multiple races. U.S. researchers often distinguish five mutually exclusive categories: non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic Asians, non-Hispanic others (that is, Native Americans), and all Hispanics (of any race).

3. IEM = Instituto Universitario de Estudios sobre Migraciones
IMIS = Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien
IMES = Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies
SFM = Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies
OAW = Austrian Academy of Science
ERCOMER = European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations
KUL = Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
INED = Institut National Etudes Démographiques
CEIFO = Centrum för forskning om internationell migration och etniska relationer or Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations.

4. Normally, in the U.S. context, we would use Dominican American or Mexican American to describe these and other second-generation groups, but here we shorten this to national origin for the sake of brevity. Turkish-German or Turkish-Dutch are less common usages in Europe.