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# ADMINISTRATION OF RELIEF ABROAD

*A Series of Occasional Papers*

## RECENT RELIEF PROGRAMS OF THE AMERICAN FRIENDS IN SPAIN AND FRANCE

—IN SPAIN, 1937-1939. *By* John Van Gelder Forbes

—IN FRANCE, 1941-1942. *By* the American Friends  
Service Committee



*Edited by* DONALD S. HOWARD

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION



## FOREWORD

This pamphlet is the seventh of a series of Occasional Papers, under the editorship of Donald S. Howard, assistant director of the Charity Organization Department. It is intended to offer those interested in planning or administering relief abroad a digest of pertinent material prepared under auspices other than our own and not readily available. Some of the texts included in this series have never been published, some are out of print; since they are inaccessible to many readers, it has not been felt necessary to designate the exact pages quoted.

Restrictions upon the use of paper in the present emergency make it necessary sharply to limit the length of these Occasional Papers. The material has therefore been cut severely. Except for certain headings and subheadings, the wording of the text is that of the original authors. Only omissions *within* paragraphs are shown by dots. In order to give a consecutive, though curtailed account, the order of the paragraphs has sometimes been rearranged.

To Mr. John Van Gelder Forbes and the American Friends Service Committee the Russell Sage Foundation is deeply grateful for the fine-spirited co-operation which has made this pamphlet possible.

JOANNA C. COLCORD, *Director*  
Charity Organization Department

August, 1943

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## THE AMERICAN FRIENDS IN SPAIN, 1937-1939<sup>1</sup>

### NEEDS TO BE MET

**E**VEN before the Spanish Civil War began, nutritional standards in Spain were among the lowest in Western Europe. This condition prevailed because of Spain's relatively small food production, the inadequate purchasing power of the bulk of the population, and poor transportation throughout the country. When the war came, these deficiencies were aggravated by the diversion of men from farms to munitions production and armies, by the disintegration of normal business enterprises, and by the disruption of transportation.

Both the Republican Government and the Nationalist officials, as well as private foreign relief agencies, found it difficult to make accurate estimates of the number of persons in need of supplementary feeding and of the amounts of food available. Many relief officials seem to have been out of touch with the facts of the situation for which they had accepted responsibility. It was hard to get correct information.

It was not long before the need for more food became desperate. Refugees flocked into the cities in the effort to escape advancing armies and in the hope of finding something to eat. They crowded into government *refugios*—which were usually large, previously empty, factories or warehouses. And there they lived in dreadfully close quarters, in filth, and in continual hunger.

Of all the refugees, the children experienced the worst physical deterioration. Those between one and four years of age no longer had mother's milk, nor could they much benefit from the adult foods which the Government supplied. In July, 1936, it was estimated that there were about 400,000 needy children in Republican Spain and that about 100,000 of them were approaching starvation or were already starving. Most of them were children of refugees. Although the Government and the private agencies did what they could to evacuate, shelter, and feed these children, there was always far more suffering than could possibly be relieved. By December, 1936, meat, vegetables, and milk were hardly to be found in the cities. Six months later the average daily ration allotted by the Government to an adult refugee consisted of a teaspoonful of olive oil, five teaspoonfuls of rice, four of peas, and a piece of dried fish or tinned meat about half the size of a hockey puck. This ration, barely enough to sustain quiescent life, was later reduced.

By the time a year had passed, an adult refugee in Barcelona received as his

<sup>1</sup> Condensed from A Short Account of the Collection, Administration, and Distribution of Relief for Spanish Civilians by the American Friends Service Committee During the Spanish Civil War, by John Van Gelder Forbes. Unpublished manuscript, 1942. 315 pp.



daily ration from the authorities about seven ounces of beans or rice or lentils. He was fortunate if he could find any other food. In Valencia, just before the end of the war, the infant mortality rate was twelve times the normal rate and adults were getting about 800 calories of food per day. Consequently, they were losing about one pound of weight a day. The average adult can survive for about eight weeks at this level of nutrition. It can be accurately stated that even in the earliest, least hungry, period of the war serious malnutrition was general and death by starvation was frequent. Young children and infants were the first to suffer.

#### OFFICIAL RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS

The two major civilian relief agencies in Nationalist Spain were the Spanish National Red Cross and the Auxilio Social. The Auxilio Social was a faithful copy, both in purpose and in organization, of the Winter Help relief agency in Germany and was set up under the direction of German advisers. The relations between the American Friends Service Committee and the Republican organizations and the Auxilio Social are described elsewhere in this summary account.

The several semi-public relief agencies in Republican territory, in August, 1937, were put under the authority of the Government's Ministry of Public Education and Health in order to co-ordinate their activities with foreign relief agencies, to insure their loyalty to the Government, to reinforce their pro-Republican bias, and to increase their efficiency. The Republic's Ministry of Labor and Social Assistance, its Central Office of Evacuation and Aid to Refugees, and its Council of Protection to Minors, together with provincial governmental agencies, co-operated in a system for evacuating, feeding, and re-establishing refugee and endangered children. The Republic's attempts in this direction were constantly hampered by local inefficiency and by lack of resources. But all observers agree that, within its limitations, the work was sincerely and expertly done.

#### THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND SPAIN'S NEEDS

The Republican delegate to the League of Nations, Alvarez del Vayo, in September, 1938, asked the League to help care for the 3,000,000 refugees with whom the Spanish Republic was saddled. Earlier, in December, 1936, the League Council had decided to make technical advisory help with the refugee problem available to the Republic upon request and had sent a commission to Spain to study conditions. Now, the League Council appropriated 45,000 Swiss francs for another investigation and appointed Sir Denys Bray, who had been prominent in England's Indian affairs, and Mr. Lawrence Webster, who had figured in Bulgarian relief, to go to Spain and make the investiga-

tion. They traveled about for three weeks, making considerable inquiries into both foreign and domestic relief efforts, then returned and submitted their findings to the Council.

The substance of their memorandum was that great stocks of food were needed by the refugees and that new gates would have to be opened to get them into their hands. The report was strong in its praise of the relief agencies already in the field but said that their resources simply were not adequate to meet the needs. Wheat, milk, cocoa, vegetables, fats, meats—all were urgently required in Spain. The commissioners concluded that the immediate necessity was to reinforce all attempts then in operation:

... despite regional differences in detail and constant breakdowns due to lack of supplies, deficiencies of transport, and other difficulties, an organization exists for the feeding of refugees as separate and distinct from the civil population. The problem of their feeding is a mass problem . . . the time factor is all important. This alone precludes us from contemplating the setting-up of an independent organization of relief distribution. The only practical course is to utilize and reinforce the [Republican] Government machinery that exists, enlisting the collaboration of and assisting the expansion of all voluntary relief organizations, such as the International Commission, the Society of Friends, and the Swiss Relief, whose work, wherever we had an opportunity of seeing it on the spot, has commanded our admiration.

As a long-term measure, the investigators recommended the establishment of an overall agency to co-ordinate all organized attempts at relieving civilians and urged that this be undertaken by the League of Nations. But they repeatedly emphasized that the League must give some sort of help at once. There is no evidence available to show that the League Council took action on either this report or on the earlier report. The Bray-Webster Report did stir up some public interest. It did not move the Council. In its attempt to enlist help from the League the Republican Government met with failure. It must be remembered that during the Spanish Civil War, the League of Nations followed its leaders, England, France, and less directly, the United States, in their policy of non-intervention.

#### LAUNCHING THE PROGRAM

The entire contributions from foreign relief agencies, of which the American Friends Service Committee was only one, reduced the need in Spain by only a splinter. It was impossible to do more.

Toward the end of 1936, the Service Committee (as it is commonly called) decided to investigate the possibilities of administering relief in Spain. Although sending a person to an area in need of relief is usually the most expensive form of such an investigation, the Service Committee believed that the relevant and first-hand information so collected would be illuminating and would materially help in raising money for the job. The enterprise appeared



so large and intricate and so provocative that if it were to be done well, it would have to be thoroughly understood beforehand. On December 18, the Service Committee announced to the newspapers that it was considering the opening of a relief job in Spain. Sylvester Jones, a Quaker of known competence in relief work, sailed for Spain at the end of the month and on January 4, 1937, he cabled from Barcelona that in his opinion the undertaking would be justifiable — "The Spanish people need and want help." On the basis of Sylvester Jones' findings and much other information, the directors of the Service Committee on February 8, 1937, decided to undertake a non-partisan relief enterprise in Spain for the especial benefit of women and children. It was recognized that a trifling effort would not be worth the trouble and would bring discredit to Quaker relief and its implicit message. Yet the Service Committee was aware that it should do only what was most necessary and nothing that either faction in the Spanish Civil War could do by itself if it really tried. The ideal was to be one of sufficiency, flexibility, and skillful and lean performance. Although never achieved, the ideal did exert influence over the conduct of the work. In the first year attempts were to be made to raise \$100,000 and to send six or seven worker-representatives to Spain as soon as possible. At the start, all supplies were to be distributed through agencies already at work in Spain.

#### SOME POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

The State Department agreed to issue passports to persons whom the Service Committee should choose to send to Spain as worker-representatives. This meant, of course, that the enterprise had been given the State Department's sanction. Later, as the work progressed, the Service Committee frequently assured the American public as well as the State Department that officially it had no concern with the immediate political debates about the Spanish Civil War; as for instance, "our relief work in Spain is in no way connected with the agitation to lift the American embargo on shipments of munitions." But there were times during the war when participants in the relief enterprise were hard put to it not to take action in political matters. The Service Committee believed that it walked a tightrope through the State Department. Getting the Government's sanction to do relief work had been difficult. They would not risk their freedom to go on with relief work by pressing for equal freedom in political action, even if that had been desirable.

A practical illustration of the application of that decision may be described: Requests to find and help political prisoners and prisoners of war were continually being pressed upon the Service Committee. Most of these requests were valid. Yet the Service Committee had trouble keeping its own operations, its own representatives, and the Spanish co-operators free from the

interference of officials in Spain, and whenever possible, the Service Committee seems to have avoided treading among political eggs. It was decided that it would be a mistake to jeopardize the opportunity to bring relief to some thousands of Spaniards by trying to help a limited number of political prisoners and prisoners of war. The American Friends Service Committee was alone in its efforts to perform relief in both Republican and Nationalist Spain. A recollection of the international political situation surrounding the Spanish Civil War will illuminate the difficulties which this non-partisan action brought forth.

To gain permission from each of the Spanish factions to distribute civilian relief in its territory and to hold its co-operation and good faith throughout were complicated and trying tasks for the Service Committee, and for other foreign relief agencies. The concentration upon fighting increasingly corroded efforts to sustain common life. Many real troubles had to be overcome. In addition, the conventions of doing business in Spain are pleasant and courteous, but they tend to gloss over delay, disagreement, and serious inefficiency and indecision. But without the help of hundreds of private Spanish men and women the enterprise would have been much more inadequate. The help given was often of such high quality that some of the representatives found it hard to bear in mind that co-operation for social service was a relatively new idea to most Spaniards.

#### PERSONNEL AND FISCAL POLICIES

The actual distribution of foods and supplies to the children and women in need of them was done by persons whom the Service Committee selected in this country and maintained in Spain. There, these people worked in co-operation with Europeans engaged in the same sort of relief. The Service Committee maintained some of the English workers occupied with joint American Friends Service Committee and Friends Service Council (the relief organization of English Quakers, also active in civilian relief in Spain) projects, and also some Spaniards engaged on the spot to help with the work.

Throughout the course of the operation applications for volunteer service kept pouring into the Philadelphia office. Although a small proportion of these people had specific useful skills, most of them were only equipped with longing to participate in the work. Doctors and nurses who applied always received careful consideration. A knowledge of Spanish, while not prerequisite, was considered useful, and persons with previous experience in Spain were of interest. Generally, war relief, social work, and business experience were considered valuable. Strong health and a buoyant spirit were necessary. Because the physical strains of the work were noticeable, all other qualities being equal, a young applicant was preferred. Applicants who were free to do



the work for at least a year or more were favored because it took some months for a beginner to learn the ropes in Spain and also because the Spanish officials, especially Nationalist officials, were suspicious of frequent changes in field personnel. Ability to get on with all sorts of people and a genuine affection for them were desirable.

The conditions of working in relief in Spain required the ability to adopt tactics without sacrificing strategical plans or Quaker principles, and applicants who possessed this evidence of maturity were preferred. Women's distinctive qualities were regarded as important to the work, although men seem to have been generally more acceptable because of their capacity for standing hardship and danger. The most important qualifications were genuine maturity, established self-control, and thorough knowledge of Quaker ways and Quaker principles. These were the standards. Sometimes the Service Committee used the rather unusual criterion of whether the experience in Spain would be beneficial to the applicant. Whenever possible, applicants who were being seriously considered were asked to meet and talk with members of the Service Committee. No applicant was sent abroad without considerable investigation of his qualifications.

As a rule the Service Committee paid the travel and maintenance expenses, the life insurance premiums, and the commitments to dependents of its representatives and also paid each of them about \$10 a month as pocket money.

Every worker was medically examined, vaccinated against smallpox, and inoculated against typhoid fever before he left for Spain.

Every representative was given a credential setting forth his identity, his connection with the Service Committee, and authorization for him to do business in the name of the Service Committee. Each representative was officially approved by the delegate in America of the government in Spain in whose territory he expected to work.

In all, twenty-seven persons went from the United States as representatives of the Service Committee. The length of their periods of service varied from two to twenty months. Seven of them went to Spain only as investigators and inspectors of the work.

*Reliance upon Local Representatives.* The Service Committee, as well as other agencies, relied on the people whom it sent to Spain to carry out the distribution of relief largely through their own individual resourcefulness. This was the only practical policy, for in the field there were all sorts of unique and unpredictable circumstances and difficulties. Detailed and rigid directions from home would have obstructed the progress of the field work. It was usual for workers to consult with one another in frequent conferences, often held in France. In these sessions the comradeship and stimulation of the job found expression. But there was always the turning screw of surrounding hunger and despair.

To maintain sufficient communication between the home office in Philadelphia, the offices and representatives of co-operating agencies, and the Service Committee was not always possible. Mail carriage between the United States and Spain was irregular. Letters took anywhere from two weeks to two months in transit between Spain and England. Within Spain itself, the delivery of communications was subject to erratic delay. Both the Republican and Nationalist Governments practiced obstructive censorship on Service Committee letters, and field representatives sometimes had to go to France in order to send important and confidential information back to Philadelphia or London. Because of these troubles with correspondence the shipping of relief foods and supplies was often set awry.

Fairly regular use was made of the diplomatic pouches of the United States Government and the two Spanish Governments to expedite correspondence. Extra copies of important messages were sometimes made and sent to offices in several different places to be forwarded to the representative concerned. This device often ensured the receipt of a message which might not otherwise have reached its destination. The letters and reports which went back and forth between Philadelphia and Spain were often written in an atmosphere of haste and strain. In the home office, as well as in the field, business was complicated, pressing, and confusing. It seems to have been difficult to express information and ideas clearly, accurately, and completely. Lack of training in the observation and description of facts sometimes obstructed the course of relief operations. Conversely, the ability to communicate clearly, directly, and completely essential information and fruitful ideas often expedited the progress of the enterprise.

The Service Committee tried to keep the ratio of expenditure for overhead to expenditure for relief foods and supplies low both in the home office and in Spain. In this effort it succeeded. Each of the field distribution units was asked to prepare and submit a monthly report of its financial activities. In Philadelphia, efforts to meet the budgets of field operations pricked any tendencies toward unproductive extension of overhead expenditure. The Service Committee tried to avoid cutting down on any field operation once begun.

#### FEEDING PROGRAM

*Selection of Classes of Persons to Be Aided.* When the Service Committee decided to administer relief in Spain, it recognized that the total result of what might be accomplished, even under favorable conditions, would necessarily be small. For this reason it decided to bring supplementary food to specified persons in categories of the population which were hit hardest by the war. As in most other wars, these groups were, in order of need: infants,



children, expectant and nursing mothers, adolescents, infirm adults, and aged persons. The Service Committee distributed food to practically no infirm adults, to a few aged persons, to more adolescents, and to an even greater number of expectant and nursing mothers. The bulk of the food was distributed to children and infants. The Service Committee and the other relief agencies had by no means enough resources to feed adequately large portions of even these restricted groups. Therefore, it was most important that the food resources be used with caution and efficiency.

*Types of Foods Distributed.* Definite efforts were made to determine which foods could be bought to the best advantage with the money available. Nutrition experts in this country were consulted. Previous experience in child feeding was reconsidered. Reports from feeding operations already under way in Spain were studied. During the course of the feeding, Friends Service Council and Service Committee representatives made weight measurements of infants and children to test the nutritive value of the foods being distributed. It was surprising to see how quickly the children improved when supplied with supplementary rations.

Generally, the infants and children certified for the feeding were deficient in proteins, fats, minerals (especially calcium and iron), and vitamins. Powdered milk, albumen powdered milk, malted flour, and sugars were used as supplementary baby foods. These were readily transportable and came to be considered almost requisite. In southern Spain oranges and sometimes vegetables were usually available, and these were used to supply vitamins. Three basic relief foods — milk, wheat, and chocolate — were fed regularly to the children. Other foods ordered from the field were protein vehicles such as preserved meat, cheese, peanut butter, egg powder, and dried fish. Starch foods were constantly used. Dried vegetables, especially beans, peas, and lentils were distributed. Chocolate and chocolate foods were standard materials. Cod liver oil was popular with Spanish children, and to some extent it was used.

Considerable time and effort were spent investigating the possibilities of an omnibus relief food called Farina Lactal. Produced chiefly in Switzerland, it was well known on the Continent but not in the United States. It was a dry mixture composed of nutritive cereal flours, powdered milk, sugar, and malt extract. When mixed with water and cooked, it formed a porridge with a high nutritive and vitamin content. Some quantities of it were bought in Europe and fed to needy persons in Spain.

As the relief was carried on primarily for the benefit of infants and children and expectant — or “creating” mothers, as the Spanish say — and nursing mothers, milk was the chief relief food. In concentrated form it was relatively cheap, readily transportable, easily digestible, highly nutritive — a pillar food. There was never enough milk. The milk canteens were basic units in the re-

lief operations in Republican Spain and had counterparts in Nationalist Spain. The Service Committee bought no powdered milk in the United States — only liquid condensed or evaporated milk. The powdered milk used by the Service Committee came mostly from England, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. In respect to relative food values, it was the cheapest form of concentrated milk, but it usually had to be mixed by emulsifying machinery. In most types of powdered milk the butter fat content turned rancid early. Sweetened condensed milk had more food value by weight than unsweetened evaporated milk. Adding sweetening to evaporated milk was a bother and it made less mixture by weight than condensed milk. Sweetened condensed milk cost more in the United States than evaporated milk. Much of the milk bought from American firms was actually sent to Spain out of stocks in the Netherlands owned by Netherlands associates of the American firms. This system reduced the transportation difficulties. Getting milk into seriously undernourished infants was probably the most important single operation of all the Service Committee relief work done in Spain.

*The Procurement of Foods Distributed.* It is a food-relief tenet that food should not be bought within the country where the feeding is being done if it is available elsewhere. If the whole country is hungry, buying within the country only effects a redistribution of its food, not an addition to its food supply. The Service Committee kept sight of this principle throughout. This principle was reinforced by the need of bringing into Spain food which neither of the two Governments could afford to import because of the devaluation of its currency. The Quakers also tried not to make available (by purchasing food within Spain) to either Government more American dollars than was necessary because it was aware that this cash would be used by both Governments mainly for the purchase of armaments.

The ordering of food supplies from operation centers in Spain was seriously complicated by the irregularity of the ships which delivered food purchased outside the country. This made all ration-planning tentative and shaky. Also, the calls upon the food ordered were usually so insistent that representatives were tempted to buy hand over fist, sometimes in excess of their budgets and in confusion with previous, as yet undelivered, orders.

Each of the distribution centers worked out invoice systems and feeding records which showed what had been done. These helped make the estimates of future food requirements more accurate. Each center was also asked to submit monthly reports fully describing all shipments received and all foods and supplies expended. These records served to make food procurement more efficient. The different agencies also compared notes on how to purchase to the best advantage. In general, the field representatives initiated the purchasing of food, and it was customary for the Philadelphia office to consult with its field representatives before buying foods not ordered from Spain.



Of the foods distributed by the Service Committee wheat, flour, and milk were almost the only stocks sent from the United States. The Service Committee representatives bought more of the food which they distributed (with the exception of wheat) through the Friends Service Council and through other European relief agencies.

*Procurement of Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation Wheat.* Early in 1938 the Nationalist Government intimated that it would welcome consignments of American flour for distribution among needy civilians in its territory although it was hesitant throughout in admitting its need of foreign relief. Later, in the fall, the Nationalist Government reiterated its willingness to receive flour from the Service Committee, but asked to have full control over its distribution. It was informed that while it might distribute the flour through its official relief organization, the Auxilio Social, the Service Committee would have to retain control over distribution policy and the right to inspect the performance of the distribution. The Nationalists accepted the flour on these terms. They also agreed to arrange and pay for the transportation of their share of the flour from ports in France or Spain, where it would be unloaded, to distribution centers within their territory.

In September the Republican Government, which definitely needed flour, also agreed with the Service Committee that if flour were made available, the Service Committee should have complete control over its distribution. Responsibilities for transportation, similar to those accepted by the Nationalists, were accepted by the Republicans, who also promised to furnish trucks and gasoline for moving the flour about in their territory.

After considerable complex negotiation, an agreement was concluded between the Service Committee and the United States Government whereby wheat owned by the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (F.S.C.C.) would be made available to the Service Committee at a token price. The American Red Cross was to act as the intermediary agent.<sup>1</sup> In order to obtain this wheat, which was to be ground into the flour requested by the two Spanish Governments, the Service Committee was obliged to undertake the enforcement of strict control over its distribution. It was made clear that none of this flour was to be allowed to get into the hands of the military of either Government. The F.S.C.C. and the American Red Cross prescribed that "It will be necessary for the American Friends Service Committee to furnish the Red Cross with an affidavit concerning the receipt of the flour, setting forth the method of general distribution and stating definitely that this flour will be utilized by the American Friends Service Committee for the relief of the civilian population in Spain." The State Department also insisted that the entire operation be clear of any cause for charges of partiality. The Service

<sup>1</sup> Editor's note: The F.S.C.C. was not permitted to sell directly to a private agency such as the Service Committee.

Committee made these engagements readily. Not only was it determined that none of this wheat should go to the military of either Spanish Government, but it was also determined that neither Government should use the flour, or any of the relief foods and supplies distributed by the Service Committee, as political instruments. Control devices were effected to keep the distribution of the flour firmly in the hands of the representatives.

The F.S.C.C. flour began to arrive in Spain toward the end of 1938. In January, 1939, the Service Committee office in Philadelphia began to hear rumors that the Nationalists were sending Quaker wheat and flour to Germany to pay for munitions. This rumor was repeated in the American press. Naturally it damaged the reputation of the Service Committee and careful investigation was at once begun in Spain. It was learned that no Quaker wheat or flour had been shipped to Germany, but that wheat and flour owned by the Nationalists had been sold to Germany and other countries because the Nationalists were "under greatest necessity to secure foreign exchange." This information spiked the rumor, but, of course, the Service Committee could not go on sending relief wheat and flour into Nationalist Spain while the Nationalists were exporting their own wheat and flour. The Nationalists were so informed. They promised to stop exporting.

*The Burgos Agreement.* When, early in 1939, it became clear that the Republicans were about to be defeated by the Nationalists, the Service Committee moved to provide safeguards against the mistreatment of its representatives and its expanding operations in Republican territory, which was about to be occupied by Nationalist forces. Events in Russia and Poland immediately after the First World War had shown what damage sudden shifts in military fortunes could bring upon civilian relief operations. In February the Service Committee presented a memorandum to the Nationalist officials stating that it would be bringing in large amounts of American wheat for relief feeding, especially in Republican Spain. A guarantee was desired from the Nationalist officials that relief workers and supplies in Republican Spain would be in no way molested by incoming Nationalist forces. In addition, it was requested that the Nationalist Government accept more concretely the responsibility for transporting relief supplies in its territory and that it pledge to the Service Committee complete freedom in the distribution of these supplies. Exportation of Nationalist wheat and flour was to be stopped entirely. After much difficult negotiation, the Nationalist regime was informally pledged to these terms:

1. A Service Committee representative was to have control over the distribution of all relief food and clothing sent to Nationalist Spain by the Service Committee, the Friends Service Council, and the International Commission (another large foreign relief organization).

2. Auxilio Social was to pay for the transportation of all F.S.C.C. wheat from the United States to Nationalist Spain and for the transportation of all other relief



foods and supplies sent by these three agencies from Bordeaux and Le Havre to Nationalist Spain. All such foods and supplies were to be admitted duty free.

3. Auxilio Social was to announce publicly that all foods and supplies sent were gifts from these three agencies to the civilians of Nationalist Spain.

4. Nationalist Spain was to export no grain while receiving gifts of grain from these three agencies.

5. Nationalist forces were to molest in no way ships bearing these agencies' relief foods and supplies to Republican Spain, nor workers distributing them in Republican areas, nor their personal property, nor their agency's property.

This was the Burgos Agreement, so named after the city where it was concluded. In reiterating that Nationalist officials must strictly observe the agreement, the Service Committee said that the bombing of one ship carrying food and supplies to a Republican port would wreck the entire relief enterprise in both territories. It was assured by Nationalist officials that the agreement would be honored. For a long time this was done.

But, as the war drew toward victory for the Nationalists, they appear to have become more high-handed in their dealings with Service Committee representatives. The Nationalists became unwilling to participate in the cost of transporting Quaker relief foods, but grew eager to gain full control of Quaker relief operations. The condition was aggravated by the increasing instances of incompetence and delay in clearing the food through Nationalist ports. Some stocks were held up for as long as six months by these lethargic and confused practices. By that time much of the material had become unfit for consumption. In addition to adopting an obstructive policy, some of the Nationalist officials were negligent, inefficient, and probably dishonest in their relations with this Quaker enterprise conducted for the benefit of Nationalist civilians. The Service Committee had gone into Nationalist Spain with the promise that its freedom from political control would be respected, and it was determined to hold the Nationalists to their word. This promise became less and less valid and finally was broken.

In the main, the Republican Government held conscientiously to its agreements with the Service Committee.

*The Allocation of the F.S.C.C. Wheat.* Much thought was given to the allocation of the F.S.C.C. wheat and the other foods and supplies sent by the Service Committee. It was seen that definite and equitable allocations of foods and supplies between Republican Spain and Nationalist Spain would be necessary if misunderstanding and waste were to be avoided. In deciding where to send shipments of food and supplies, the Service Committee and its representatives appear to have used criteria of relative needs. This was in keeping with the principle underlying impartial relief. Although the Service Committee often repeated that it was not political, several political agents of both Republican and Nationalist sympathies, together with sections of both the pro-Republican and the Catholic press in this country, charged it with

exercising partiality in its allocations between the two territories. The records show no evidence of such partiality. They do show constant evidence of an attempt to determine allocations simply by the criteria of relative needs and practicability. More food was sent to Republican Spain. The food resources of the Republic were less than those of the Nationalists. Toward the end of the war the Republicans held about one-third of the food-producing territory of Spain. Yet they were responsible for the feeding of about one-half the resident population, in addition to more than 3,000,000 refugees from Nationalist territory. Besides holding two-thirds of the food-producing territory and having to feed less than one-half the population, the Nationalists were in a more favorable position for importing food. The Nationalist sea and air blockade against the Republican ports was rather effective, especially against Barcelona and Valencia. Also, the Republican cities were quite cut off from the Republic's grain and meat-producing areas. Up till the last phase of the war, it was a rule of thumb to send food to Republican Spain and clothing to Nationalist Spain. Of course this generalization was ignored whenever instances of need which contradicted it were reported.

Using its own funds and funds collected through a committee appointed by President Roosevelt for this especial purpose, the Service Committee bought and sent to Spain about 484,100 bushels of F.S.C.C. wheat between January and May, 1939. The Service Committee paid ten cents per bushel for 234,100 bushels of this wheat and twelve cents per bushel for the remaining 250,000 bushels. The wheat was sent in six shipments.

Even though the F.S.C.C. wheat operation did not reach the measure of early hopes, it was a large addition to the Service Committee's relief attempt in Spain. The example of co-operation set by the F.S.C.C., the Red Cross, and the United States Government — deeply appreciated by the Service Committee — stimulated several European governments to contribute substantially to the relief of Spanish civilians.

*Transportation and Storage.* If transportation had been better, there would have been less hunger in Spain. Much of the food which was available, both inside and outside the country, could not be moved to places where it was needed. Delayed food shipments and the lack of ships, freight cars, and trucks to carry food were conditions constantly cited in the correspondence. Shipments usually took about a month to come from England, and some took as long as three months. They also turned up in the wrong ports or were received incomplete. Usually there was not enough transportation to haul the food from warehouses to distributing stations. It must be remembered that during the last part of the war, Republican Spain was cut into two separated sections, and this made all communications difficult. One could go from north Republican Spain to south Republican Spain only by air or sea. Several times food in transit was lost through carelessness or pilfering.



In both Republican and Nationalist Spain the lethargy and irresponsibility of several of the officials in charge of transportation seem to have been most trying for the Service Committee workers.

By autumn, 1937, the Service Committee was able to persuade both Spanish Governments to say they would pass its relief goods through their customs free of charge. But shipments were usually delayed by Customs Office red tape. Some railroad transportation was furnished by the Republican Government, which also frequently assigned army trucks and drivers, to haul goods for Service Committee operations. Most of this hauling would have been done more satisfactorily had the participating agencies had enough trucks to do it for themselves; the railroad service was inadequate and army trucking was irregular. Trucks were bought by the Service Committee from European manufacturers and European branches of American firms. Experience in Spain showed that light trucks could not carry enough nor could they stand up under constant driving over the wretched roads. Trucks weighing more than three tons and equipped with four rear driving wheels and double springs were practical, although their consumption of gasoline, which was very scarce, was heavy.

In southern Spain the relief foods and supplies were kept in improvised warehouses until they were used. One such storage place in Murcia was an old beer warehouse rented for four dollars a month. Each of these warehouses was managed by a local Spaniard, a *responsable*, who supervised the receiving and discharging of foods and supplies according to the distribution plan adopted by the local representative of the Service Committee.

*Selection of Individuals to Be Given Food.* To decide who, in a given area, was to have food was a difficult decision, for there was never enough to go around. As a rule, the representatives sent estimates of the requirements for their operations to Philadelphia, and arrangements for filling the requirements, either out of American or European food stocks, were made from there. In other instances, the representatives were allowed to order, up to certain budgetary limitations, directly from the field. Often it was impossible for representatives to keep within their budgets, and then the Service Committee either cabled additional funds or deducted the extra-budgetary expenditure from the operation's next monthly remittance. The State Department required accounts of all relief spending and reports of all allocations made by the Service Committee and other American relief agencies working in Spain.

In addition to using child-weight measurements for testing the nutritive values of different foods, similar criteria were also used to determine which of a large group of children needed food most when there was not enough for all. As this was the usual state of affairs, this weight-taking became a part of the distribution routine. Infants and children who were found to be most

seriously undernourished were booked as being entitled to milk and other available foods from the Service Committee's local feeding stations. For the sake of control, milk distributed in these stations was required to be consumed on the spot. This is a standard relief practice. A station of this sort was usually called, not inaptly, *Gota de Leche*—Drop of Milk. The doctors who did this work were Spaniards employed either by the government (most of this work took place in Republican Spain) or by the local municipality. The weight tests appear to have been a successful device. It was often difficult for the doctors to persuade the mothers of the children to follow instructions for their care after they had begun to be fed supplementarily in a *Gota de Leche*. Sometimes, in remote villages, the workers had to spread the news that food would be available for children who had been weighed and found wanting by sending the town crier shouting through the streets. A decision to limit the number of refugee children fed to seventy-five per cent of total number of children fed, in order to make certain that some local children would also be fed, had to be abandoned. The need among both refugee children and local children had steadily increased and the only fair way to decide which children should be fed was to measure their relative needs by weight tests.

*Extent of Feeding Operations.* By October, 1938, sixteen canteens were in operation and in that month about 83,700 rations were provided. In the next month the number of rations increased to 139,400. Several baby clinics, emergency schools, children's colonies, refugee workshops, and three children's hospitals were functioning. Refugees passing through the district were fortified by meals provided for them in special canteens. Clothing was also given out. In December, 1938, each child fed under the auspices of the Service Committee in the Murcia region received a daily total of 30 grams of milk powder, 12 grams of sugar, 2.5 grams of cocoa, and 100 grams of bread. This ration is probably a fair indication of the quantity of food supplied to a child in an average Service Committee feeding center. At this time about 50,000 children were receiving bread daily in the Quaker canteens and about 10,000 children were receiving milk. By January, 1939, another 4,000 children had been added to those receiving daily rations of bread. Twenty-six canteens were in operation in the Murcia region. About 10,000 breakfasts for children were being distributed.

During the year 1938 the Murcia representatives distributed approximately 27,000 tons of concentrated milks, 1,000 tons of cocoa powders, 15,000 kilograms of sugar, 1,900 tons of F.S.C.C. flour, and 17,000 kilograms of flour from other sources. In the region including Murcia, Almería, Alicante, and Granada the Service Committee, at the end of the year, was feeding 45,000 children a supplementary diet of 100 grams of bread a day. The F.S.C.C. wheat made this possible. Plans were afoot to extend the bread distribution.



Probably the distributing organization which had by this time developed in southeastern Spain could have handled four times the amount of the available foodstuffs and supplies.

In February, 1939, the Service Committee's relief operation in Spain reached its peak. At this time it was supplying at least one daily meal to about 350,000 persons.

#### OTHER RELIEF ACTIVITIES

In addition to supplying food, the various centers in Republican and Nationalist territory were also used to distribute the clothing, shoes, bedding, layettes, and yard goods collected in the United States. Most of the clothing went to the Nationalist region. There was never enough to go around. But many refugee mothers and ragged, dignified, cheery older men, as well as young girls, found things to suit the body and make glad the eyes. The baby clothing was the most welcome of all.

*Workshops for Refugees.* In Republican Spain, especially in the Murcia area, representatives of the Friends Service Council and the Service Committee established a large number of workshops for refugees. Here girls and women made wearing apparel out of cloth supplied by the Government and the relief agencies. This clothing was then distributed to refugees. The girls and women were paid for their labor with extra food. Young boys repaired and made shoes and *alpargatas*, or rope-soled sandals, on the same basis. These workshops proved invaluable, for not only were useful things produced in them, but they provided mental and physical activity for people for whom the idleness of refugee life wrought deterioration. They were especially stabilizing for the girls and young boys.

*Food-Packet Distribution.* Requests to deliver packets of food to designated individuals in Spain came into the Service Committee office in Philadelphia by the hundred. People in this country would send in five or ten dollars and the name and address of some friend or relative and ask that the Service Committee representatives deliver an equal value of food to the person named. This concern for individuals caught in the war was entirely natural, and the Service Committee recognized the validity of such requests. But it was found that carrying through such errands was not practical in the long run. Overhead and transportation costs made the service expensive. The representatives spent as much time hunting up a single family as would have sufficed to distribute food to twenty or thirty people. Generally the relief food stocks were not large enough to stand much of this depletion, for the amount of food that went into one of these packets exceeded the amount which any one person was entitled to receive in the general distribution. The Service Committee was obliged to deduct overhead and freight costs from the sum origi-

nally paid for the gift. Often the beneficiary could not be found, and then the money had to be returned. The representatives asked to make these deliveries found them unwarrantedly troublesome and a cause of friction with government and customs officials. Misunderstanding was apt to arise among other Spaniards, not similarly favored.<sup>1</sup>

*Child Care.* During the course of refugee migrations, thousands of children became separated from their parents. Other thousands were subjected to danger when the cities in which their parents lived were bombed. Still others could not be properly fed by their parents. In order to care for some of these, colonies were started in safe places to which children could be evacuated and fed, calmed, and re-established. These colonies not only afforded refuge, food, and training, but also provided children with an opportunity to regain their balance after having undergone drastic disturbances. The Service Committee contributed to some of these colonies, which were managed by other agencies, but established none itself until it shifted its operation to France to help relieve Spanish refugees there.

#### ENDING OF THE ENTERPRISE

Toward the end of 1938 it became clear that the Service Committee was not welcome in Nationalist Spain, even though its relations with officials were generally amicable. Upon the Nationalist victory in March, 1939, the relations between the Nationalist Government and the Service Committee and its collaborators became worse. Hopes that the relief enterprise might be extended with the end of the fighting in order to help Spain recover itself became shadowy. Almost immediately after the Republic's surrender, the Nationalist relief officials began to assert their new authority throughout the country. Service Committee relief food and supplies were seized by irresponsible officials, valuable records were junked, and representatives were searched and delayed. Some of the Spanish helpers were jailed. Appeal to the Burgos Agreement had little power to modify these extreme measures.

On March 30, four ships belonging to the Mid-Atlantic Shipping Line, carrying as part of their cargo food for the International Commission and the Service Committee, put into Valencia to unload. These ships had been specifically granted safe-conduct under the Burgos Agreement by Nationalist officials. While the ships were being unloaded, Nationalist airplanes dived

<sup>1</sup> Editor's note: Whereas distribution of food packets by the Friends appears to have been infeasible in Spain, the American Relief Administration after World War I seems to have used this method of relief with considerable success. See, for example, *The Famine in Soviet Russia: 1919-1923*, by H. H. Fisher (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927); and *America and Germany: 1918-1925*, by Sidney Brooks (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925). Condensations of both of these books have been published by the Russell Sage Foundation as *Occasional Papers on the Administration of Relief Abroad*.



out of the sky and strafed their decks with machine-gun fire. It is not known whether the pilots acted under orders. Fortunately, no one on the ships or the dock was hurt.

Two days later, on April 1, Nationalist officers and soldiers came down to the docks and seized all of the food, taking it to an army warehouse where it was placed under guard. About \$272,700 worth of food (as reckoned by the International Commission and the Service Committee, which had purchased the food outside of Spain) was seized. The army kept about two-fifths and made the rest over to the Auxilio Social. This act of confiscation was a clear breach of the Burgos Agreement and of other earlier pledges made by the Nationalist Government. On hearing of this seizure, the Service Committee representative in charge vigorously protested to the army officials and to the Auxilio Social. He flatly stated that either the food would be restored at once or else the International Commission and the Service Committee would leave Spain entirely. In October, 1939, after a long and very difficult delay, the Nationalist army made over to the International Commission, which the Service Committee had named as its agent, about \$454,500 worth of food, as reckoned by prevailing food prices in Spain, similar in kind to the items it had seized. This was about \$181,000 worth of food in excess of the amount which the International Commission claimed that the army had originally confiscated. The difference is to be accounted for by the army's appraisal, which it insisted upon following, and by the higher prices of food within Spain, where the army bought the food it returned. "The tonnage . . . returned was less than the tonnage . . . taken but the value [in Spain] of what was returned . . . was greater than the value [had been outside Spain] of what was taken"; so runs the Service Committee's terminal report upon the incident.

Though some of the Nationalist officials were honest, restrained, and co-operative, it was plain that the Service Committee enterprise in Spain could not continue under the chaotic conditions which prevailed. For example, in Valencia, the Auxilio Social had, by the end of April, taken over the entire distribution of Service Committee food and supplies. They even looked to the Service Committee to provide them with more. The free control of distribution by foreign agencies in Spain was almost at an end. The Nationalist authorities appear to have decided that civilian relief was not to be carried on except under their control.

By the end of June, 1939, all but six of the Service Committee representatives had left Spain. Having firmly determined that it could not submit to Nationalist control, the Service Committee at this time was wondering how and where it could best continue in its effort to help those Spaniards who were still in the country and those who had fled over the border into France.

As the Nationalist authorities recovered from their victory and came to

realize the depth of the needs of their countrymen, for whom they were now responsible, they became more friendly to the foreign relief agencies and made some gestures of invitation to renewed collaboration. By summertime it was apparent that the Nationalist Government did not have enough resources to feed its people, nor were the transport and distribution facilities at all adequate, even had there been food available. Death by starvation was still common in southern Spain. The Auxilio Social, feeding about 800,000 needy persons a day, was pressing foreign agencies to keep on sending in supplies. There were indications that its administration was becoming more efficient. But the Auxilio Social was still as open to the charge of discriminatory distribution as it had previously been. It had not stopped using its food distribution as a means of Fascist propaganda. The Nationalist Government was still opposed to allowing foreign relief organizations to carry on their efforts independently within Spain.

Restrictions which the Nationalists placed on the work of the foreign relief organizations, including that of the Service Committee, increasingly reduced the measure of autonomy with which these organizations had begun relief in Nationalist territory. The Service Committee representatives had to find ways by which to keep control of their operations and, at the same time, to stay within the sanction of the Nationalist Government, and this necessary fencing with officials hampered their efforts. The seizure of supplies in Valencia after the Nationalist victory was a severe jolt to the Service Committee operations and clear evidence of the sort of interference which would probably come later from the same source. Those persons who had contributed to the Service Committee's Spanish relief funds looked to the Service Committee to administer the funds in accordance with its announced principles. Under the prevailing conditions in Spain, now entirely given over to Fascist government, it was rapidly becoming impossible to carry out that trust. In addition, the attempt to provide relief for all, without reference to political inclination, had partaken of a certain religious conviction which, to the Service Committee, did not seem capable of modification to meet the requirements of the new circumstances. Such considerations as these made for the decision to bring the work to an end, and, although there was no doubt whatsoever that most Spaniards were still seriously undernourished, the American Friends Service Committee withdrew from civilian relief in Spain near the end of 1939. The enterprise was then carried over into southern France for the purpose of bringing some relief to the thousands of Spaniards who had fled into that country for asylum after the Nationalist victory. There the work was extended to help meet the needs of the refugees from the German invasion of France in May, 1940, and was continued, with modifications, in the Free Zone until the German occupation of all France in December, 1942.



## THE AMERICAN FRIENDS IN FRANCE, 1941-1942<sup>1</sup>

THE AMERICAN Friends Service Committee is now well into the fourth year of continuous relief activity in France. Assistance has been given to refugees of all nationalities. Most of the resources of the Committee have been devoted to helping children.

It has been a year of deepened suffering; less food, shabbier clothing, almost no heat, less transportation, increasing ill health, and hardships of all kinds. The infant death-rate is now nearly twice what it was before the war. Tuberculosis is increasing, marriages are fewer, the number of births is greatly reduced, and the mortality of old and subnormal people has reached extraordinary proportions.

The French ration card provides a little more than 1,000 calories daily. Some things can be bought without ration tickets, but the price is so high that for the average person these commodities are not available.

*Feeding in the Public Schools.* After extensive research and with the help of competent French organizations, eleven of the most needy departments were chosen in the fall of 1941, in which a little food has been supplied each day to 84,500 children in the school canteens. These boys and girls have been selected by the local authorities in each case, partly on a medical basis and partly by the teachers and social agencies who have made every effort to choose the children most in need of extra food.

Quaker workers have inspected the operation of the program and carried the message of friendship and goodwill from the American people to the French people. These workers have been given a most touching reception. On the wall appears a sign telling of the gift of the American people through the medium of the Quakers to the children of France. Often the dining-rooms are decorated with French and American flags. In some instances the children have learned to sing the American National Anthem in our own language. Charming little speeches of thanks are made by tiny French tots. . . . The gratitude expressed by officials, teachers, parents, and children alike, is most sincere and overwhelming.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from report of American Friends Service Committee in France. Philadelphia, April 24, 1942. 27 pp. Reprinted by permission of the Committee.

"American Friends relief services in France spanned the period between 1939 and November, 1942. Obviously, the limited service which we were able to give did not meet the need; indeed, we have not fed in any winter more than 100,000 children, although reports which we are now receiving from France indicate the need for feeding approximately 3,000,000 persons. It also should be emphasized that this entire service was carried on with European supplies, except for a small quantity of Red Cross stores and a single shipment of vitamins. The services which are now being given are under the direction of the French Committee, Secours Quaker."—From memorandum of the American Friends Service Committee, June 28, 1943.

Although written in the present tense, this report refers to the years 1941-1942.

*Vitamin Distribution.* This service has been much less important during the past year than the year before, while the need has been much greater. No way was found to bring vitamins from America. A substantial donation came from Denmark, however, and a distribution of Vitamin D was made in the three most necessitous departments of Var, Gard, and Hérault, to 100,000 children selected by the medical authorities in these three departments. Each child was given a seven weeks' treatment of a little more than 400 units daily.

*Colonies of Children.* The number of colonies has been reduced to twelve, with some children being supported in four colonies, maintained by other committees. Full care is provided for about 600 children. The problem of finding food and clothing for these children is much more difficult than it was a year ago.

The clothing needs of the children have been met so far by making over old clothing, working up scraps and odd lots that have been purchased at factories, auction sales, and in little shops hidden in small villages and out-of-the-way corners. Devoted women working in sewing rooms operated by the Committee have cleverly used such material as could be found for the making of suitable garments for the children.

Most of the children attend the local public schools and are usually at the head of their classes. In some instances classes have been organized in the colonies, conducted by French teachers who have been provided by the departmental authorities.

Hundreds of applications must be sifted in order to make admissions to the colonies. Mothers must be seen with their little ones. It is heartbreaking to have to turn them away, but only a few of the most needy who apply can be admitted.

Costs have been rising, but thirty-three cents a day still provides full care for one of these children.

*Home Colonies.* During the past year many children have been found who live in good homes, under normal surroundings, but whose parents are temporarily unable to provide for them. It has not seemed wise to take them from this satisfactory home environment into colonies. Nevertheless, most of them were losing weight and suffering from undernourishment. The answer to this problem seemed to be periodical assistance for these children in their own homes. Accordingly, after careful investigation to make sure that the mothers were intelligent, conscientious and capable of good judgment, a service of this kind was inaugurated. A small amount of food, plus a sum of money, has been taken into these homes by the Committee workers, who talk in a friendly manner with the mother and counsel with her regarding the child's food and care.

Experience has shown that this service costs about one-half of the expense



of maintaining a child in a colony. It has the advantage of keeping the child under home influences and in its normal environment.

Women whose health has been endangered from long residence in internment camps, often accompanied by delicate children, and women who are preparing for emigration, are cared for in . . . [a home for women and children]. They do the work on a co-operative basis. A woman physician and her sister are in charge of the club. About forty persons can be accommodated.

*Milk Distribution.* Supplies of milk have been less during the past year. . . . Distributions have been reduced to five thousand babies. Most of this milk was given out through official French clinics in Marseille, where mothers bring their children to be examined by attending physicians. Counsel and advice is given to the mothers by the attending French physician. Milk supplied by the Committee is available in each clinic and is given to the mother by the attending nurse.

Stocks of rice and malted products have been maintained in these clinics and given under the direction of the physicians to nursing and expectant mothers. Certain foodstuffs have also been provided for older children. The weight curves kept for each child constitute an impressive proof of the benefit accruing to the children assisted in this manner.

*Welfare Reports.* Over the desk of the Welfare Inquiry department have flowed thousands of requests from England, America, South America, Africa, the Near East, and many countries in Europe, asking the Committee to try to locate a missing relative "somewhere in Unoccupied France." Until December 7, 1941, the Committee was able to transmit messages through its Marseille office to Occupied France.

Dealing with these appeals requires patience and discrimination, but when each case is looked at singly it becomes a matter of rendering an important service to distressed individuals.

*Relief Work in Camps.* Quaker work has been continuous in the internment camps since their inauguration in February, 1939. In the beginning these camps were barbed wire enclosures, without feeding, housing, medical or sanitary facilities of any kind. At first they were populated principally by Spanish refugees and reached the enormous number of nearly 200,000. The population of the camps has changed with the years, and has included politicals and refugees without resources of almost all nationalities. Many of the present internees are Jewish. In the beginning the internees were all men. Now there is a large proportion of women and children. There has been a steady decrease in the number of these internees, down to the present population of about 16,000.

The amazing complexity of life is not noticeable when men and women are free to supply their own needs, but when they are locked up without ac-

cess to market places and without resources with which to buy, the result is appalling. Even though life in the camps is reduced to the lowest terms, there are still an inconceivable number of services that can be and should be rendered.

Over the years, Quaker work in these camps has included the establishment of schools for children, supplying of laboratory outfits, medical equipment and medicines, the distribution of large quantities of clothing for men, women, and children, and the operation of ateliers for self-help where women make clothing with materials supplied to them and men make camp furniture and playthings for the children. Libraries have been established, tooth-brushes, glasses, artificial teeth, orthopedic boots, and hernia belts supplied, and a wide variety of services rendered.

During the past winter . . . the principal service rendered by the Committee has been supplemental food for children, old people and those suffering from illness. About seven thousand persons daily are now receiving a little food. Deficiency diseases due to undernourishment are common in the camps. One sees many persons horribly swollen and suffering acutely from lack of fats in the diet. One sees men of normal stature reduced to a weight of 75 lbs.

*Employment.* Many people coming to the Committee for help are in search of employment. To meet this need an employment office has been set up. Wide contacts have been established and an extensive effort made to unite job and skill. Employment has been found for an average of 70 persons each month. Sometimes these men and women do not have suitable clothing in which to work. Generally the Quaker vestiaire has been able to provide it for them.

A long line of persons present themselves before the Quaker reception rooms each day. Some can be referred to other agencies, some can be given medical care in local institutions. . . . Some are given meal tickets and helped to find temporary lodging. Many are referred to the employment bureau and nearly all are given some form of helpful counsel. Sometimes nothing can be done except to listen patiently and sympathetically to a tragic story, but even that frequently proves helpful.

Workshops for self-help are maintained in Marseille, Montauban, Toulouse, and in the internment camp at Rivesaltes. Some of these are for women. Materials are supplied and the women are taught to knit, sew, remodel and repair garments. Two workshops for the making of espadrilles are operated by refugees under Committee direction. Two cobblers' shops are maintained for repairing the footwear of those refugees who still have shoes. In Montauban, a bakery supplies employment for five men and produces bread for the Committee canteen in that city, where four hundred people are given two meals daily.



Perhaps the most important of the self-help projects is the atelier for making artificial arms and legs at Montauban. This was founded by a group of clever Spanish workmen, most of whom had lost a limb during the war in Spain. The Quakers have supplied machinery and tools and have directed the work of this shop for nearly two years.

*Village Reconstruction.* A year ago an attempt was made to settle refugee families in the nearly abandoned old villages of Puycelci and Penne. This program of rehabilitation undertaken to help families to become self-supporting is a modest experiment in reconstruction. Old houses were leased, repaired, and sub-leased to refugee tenants who have the privilege of purchasing the property later if they wish. A workshop has been established in each village and equipped with machinery and tools. In Puycelci skilled workmen have formed a co-operative and are making furniture. Excellent results have been achieved and orders are outrunning the capacity to produce. In Penne, a toy making industry led by a very clever designer has achieved recognition in its field and has been well supplied with orders.

The future of these two experiments is clouded by the difficulty of obtaining raw materials. Wood is scarce, while nails, screws, varnish, and paint are becoming increasingly difficult to find. Every effort is being made to overcome these handicaps. Garden plots are being established to assist the workers and their families in their struggle toward self-sufficiency.

A third project has been undertaken at Bourg d'Oueil, a village high in the Pyrenees. Sheep herds are being improved, cabins built for shepherds, and spinning and weaving introduced. Roads are being constructed and wood craft and wood working industries introduced. A superior quality of seed potato can be produced in this high altitude and efforts are being made to encourage its cultivation. Plans are being made to operate a cheese factory, and dairying will be stimulated. The French Government is financing these activities and if successful it is expected that similar developments will take place throughout the whole Pyrenees region, including more than 1,000 villages.

*Money Transfers for Individuals.* War restrictions on the international movement of funds have brought hardship to many people in Europe, particularly to those individuals who find themselves wholly dependent on income from sources outside the country in which they are resident. Knowing at first hand the suffering caused by this situation in France, the American Friends Service Committee concerned itself with possible means of assisting those so distressed. Near the end of 1940 special United States Government licenses were secured for the transfer of funds from donors in America to individuals in need in the unoccupied area of France. The first transfer cable was received in Marseille on January 2, 1941. Since that date a steady stream

of small sums of money has been flowing from relatives and friends in America to people overcome by the circumstances accompanying war.

Fifteen or twenty dollars—the average size of American transfers—received at the critical time may provide the means of securing the margin of food or clothing requisite for life itself. The total of American transfers thus far has passed 5,000,000 francs. The current volume of transfers is considerably above that of a year ago.

Funds advanced for transfers under the English system have already amounted to something over 5,000,000 francs.

Although the department has certain well-defined methods of procedure for accomplishing the transfer of funds and making reports to donors, many cases require individual attention. There are similar or identical names. The identity of many individuals is hard to determine. Addresses change frequently. Death of the prospective beneficiary often occurs while funds are in transit. People frequently fail to acknowledge promptly the receipt of payments. For these and other reasons the number of details relative to the volume of money transferred is very high.

There is one fundamental difficulty limiting the effectiveness of this service in transferring funds at the present time. Supplies, even of the simplest necessities, are low and prices are high. The amount of goods which one is able to purchase with the average size transfer seems pitifully small.

*The Committee in France.* A staff of 15 Americans and 150 Europeans share the responsibilities of this service of help and goodwill.

In keeping with Quaker ideals of democracy, a real effort is made to apply collective wisdom in the operation of the Quaker program. There is a conference of all delegates once each quarter, at which the entire program is reviewed and plans made for the ensuing quarter. A weekly conference of all delegates in Marseille is held each Wednesday morning.

*Finance and Accounting.* The financing of relief activities in France while most of the world is at war has presented many difficulties. Stringent foreign exchange and export controls in all countries require numerous governmental approvals for each transaction involving the movement of funds or commodities between countries. Transactions in a variety of currencies and receipt of many items of earmarked donations also present a variety of accounting problems. At the same time, the war censorships are making international communications extremely slow and uncertain. Accounting facilities are limited by the lack of adequate equipment and supplies. As in the case of all administrative activities, it is the Committee's aim to keep indirect expenses to a minimum consistent with adequate safeguards and control of the resources entrusted to it for distribution to those in need.



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