

# A Tale of Two States: How State Immigration Climate Affects Belonging to State and Country among Latinos

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## ABSTRACT

This study assesses the impact of different immigrant policy climates on how Latinos feel about themselves, their place in their state and country, and how they think they are viewed by others. Using survey data from Arizona and New Mexico, we find that Latinos in Arizona exhibit lower levels of belonging than Latinos in New Mexico, but their alienation is confined to the state level. We also find that the U.S. born are most sensitive to the state climate. We conclude that policies that delineate outsiders from insiders by immigration status have wide ranging effects that fall prominently on the U.S. born.

**KEYWORDS:** Latinos; immigration; Arizona; New Mexico; identity; belonging.

In Arizona, police are allowed to check the immigration status of anyone they stop if they have reason to think the person is an undocumented immigrant. State residents who are undocumented immigrants cannot receive in-state college tuition rates or financial aid. Public schools cannot offer bilingual education to limited-English proficient students for more than one year, and the state constitution requires that all official actions be conducted in English. The state is also home to former Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the self-described “toughest sheriff in America,” whom a federal judge deemed guilty of racial profiling and violating the constitutional rights of Latinos in the state (President Trump later pardoned him) (Berry and Billeaud 2016; Varsanyi and Provine 2016).<sup>1</sup> Next door, undocumented immigrants in New Mexico can get both financial aid and in-state tuition for college. The state has an “English Plus” law that highlights the value of multiculturalism and multilingualism, and the state’s law enforcement agencies have had relatively few formal cooperative agreements with federal immigration officers (New Mexico Legislative Council Service 2011; Varsanyi and Provine 2016).

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1 Throughout this study, we use “Latino” and “Hispanic” interchangeably, and “white” refers to whites who are not of Hispanic or Latin origin. We also use “undocumented” immigrant and “unauthorized” immigrant interchangeably.

These two states, which are similar in many respects but that have taken vastly different paths regarding immigrant incorporation and immigrant policy, reflect trends in a “new federalism” of immigration policy playing out across the United States (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Varsanyi 2010; Varsanyi et al. 2012). Indeed, both unwelcoming and welcoming responses to immigration have proliferated at the local and state levels in recent years, while attempts at national comprehensive immigration reform have stalled in Congress (NCSL 2016). There is evidence for the political origins of diverging state and local policies and for the contextual factors that shape implementation of these policies (Chavez and Provine 2009; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011; Williamson 2018). Whatever the origins of such policies, understanding their effects on their target populations is paramount. Policies clearly can have a material effect on immigrants, determining their socioeconomic attainment and degree of inclusion in the polity (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). But policies also have symbolic importance, signaling to those governed a sense of worth and belonging (Campbell 2012). Here we seek to understand the nature and extent of that symbolic influence on the largest U.S. immigrant population: Latinos. What impact do these different immigrant policy climates have on how Latinos feel about themselves; about their place in their state and country; and about how they think they are viewed by their state and country compatriots?

We focus on attitudes about identity and belonging among Latinos because such concerns are a driving force behind the development of intergroup attitudes, positions on national and local policies, and civic engagement (Citrin and Sears 2014; Schildkraut 2005, 2011; Verkuyten 2004). We draw upon original survey data collected in 2016 in Arizona and New Mexico. We examine several measures related to identity and belonging, such as how much respondents feel that they belong in their state and the nation, how much they feel that others in their state and in the United States welcome them, how much pride they feel in their state and in the United States, and how much importance they place on their ethnic, national, and state identities.

Our study is not about the reasons why different state governments adopt different types of immigrant policies, which has predominated research on subnational immigration policy (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015). Instead, we are interested in how these policies affect the attitudes of individuals who reside within the affected states. The main hypothesis under investigation is that Latinos living in Arizona will exhibit a depressed sense of belonging to both their state and the nation relative to Latinos living in New Mexico.

It is important to note that the Latino populations in New Mexico and Arizona may also differ in important ways because of the histories of their respective states. The Latino population in New Mexico may be distinctive, not only relative to the Latino population in Arizona, but also in other parts of the United States. Many New Mexico Latinos represent the long-standing *Hispano* population that traces its roots in New Mexico to the time of Spanish rule, more than 400 years ago. Throughout history, New Mexico’s *Hispanos* have had much better social and political standing relative to Latinos in other parts of the Southwest, including Arizona (Gómez-Quiñones 1994; Noel 2014). Thus, there may be an unusually strong sense of New Mexico pride, and therefore belonging, among the Latino population there. As a consequence, we focus not simply on overall differences in belonging in their state of residence between the Latino populations in Arizona and New Mexico, but also in their sense of belonging in the United States, as well as differences between U.S.-born and foreign-born Latinos in these states. We find that Latinos in Arizona are indeed less likely to express feelings of belonging than Latinos in New Mexico. The different political histories of the two states likely account for some of disparities in feelings of belonging. But these histories may have also influenced the formation of the very different policy approaches that appear today. On this point, we bolster our findings with a discussion of an experiment that indicates that Latinos in both states say they would feel less at home and would consider moving should their state adopt new unwelcoming policies. The more welcoming history in New Mexico does not appear to shield Latinos from new anti-immigrant discourse.

Additionally, we find that living in Arizona increases alienation for the U.S. born more than for the foreign born in either state.<sup>2</sup> This finding suggests that the continuous Latin American immigration—immigrant “replenishment” (Jiménez 2010)—and the corresponding policy reaction, has the strongest effect on a U.S.-born Latino population that, in spite of high levels of integration, continues to navigate contexts in which politics and policies frame Latino ethnicity as “illegal” and foreign (Chávez 2008). Our findings suggest that the U.S. born seem to feel less welcomed when their state adopts a hostile stance toward immigrants and when the enactment of unwelcoming policies implicates the native born as well as the foreign born through tactics such as racial profiling. And yet there is little difference between Latinos in the two states, regardless of nativity, in how they view their place in the United States more generally. Well aware of the varying policy responses across the United States, Latinos appear to individuate their state’s policy response to immigration, seeing the entire nation as generally welcoming of immigrants and Latinos (Schildkraut 2011, 2013a). In our conclusion, we discuss this finding in the context of the Trump administration, which has taken a decidedly more unwelcoming stance than was the case when our survey was conducted.

Our study contributes to the growing literature on the increasing prevalence of subnational immigration policy formation. To date, much of this literature focuses on when, where, and why such policies get enacted (Chavez and Provine 2009; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Varsanyi et al. 2012; Walker and Leitner 2011; Williamson 2018). We build upon these studies by turning our attention to the *effects* of state-level immigration policies (also see Leerkes, Leach, and Bachmeier 2012). Across the social sciences, studies show that perception of a common, shared identity is an important ingredient for stability, cooperation, obligation, and trust (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Huo 2003; Putnam 2007; Schildkraut 2011; Theiss-Morse 2009) and that federal-level policies that support recognition of immigrant minorities can be conducive to social cohesion (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). Our findings suggest that enactment of state and local policies aimed at drawing clearer distinctions between the rights of national insiders and outsiders exacts psychological damage to those who share an ethnicity with the groups tagged as outsiders. That damage dampens the very sense of social unity that such policies purport to achieve.

### THE POWER OF PERCEPTIONS OF POLICY CLIMATE

When discussing state climate with respect to immigration, states can be characterized as more or less welcoming (or more or less hostile). Welcoming policies include policies that allow unauthorized immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses or be eligible for in-state tuition or financial aid at state colleges and universities. Welcoming policies might also support the use of multiple languages in the public sphere and restrain the extent to which local law enforcement officials can aid federal immigration officers. Unwelcoming policies, on the other hand, include policies that prohibit unauthorized immigrants from receiving higher education benefits, require local law enforcement to check people’s immigration status if they have reason to believe they might be undocumented (aka “show me your papers” provisions), and establish partnerships with federal immigration enforcement agencies (i.e., so-called 287g agreements). They mandate the use of English in public places, limit the amount of bilingual instruction students can receive, prevent unauthorized immigrants from renting housing, and forbid access to state professional licenses for the unauthorized.

Past research documents that perceptions of an unwelcoming or discriminatory environment for Latinos or immigrants can affect their attitudes and behaviors. Such perceptions can lead to a heightened sense of Latino identity, a weakened sense of American identity, an increased likelihood of being engaged in politics, and a greater chance of seeking naturalization (Félix, González, and Ramírez 2008; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Schildkraut 2011). Research has also shown that a strong sense of ethnoracial identity in the absence of shared national identity among

2 The correlation between nativity and citizenship status is .66. Later, we discuss patterns of belonging among naturalized and non-naturalized foreign-born Latinos in the two states, but that is not where our focus lies.

immigrants can undermine acceptance of the laws and policies of the host society and lead to conflict with host-community members (Huo and Molina 2006; Lipponen, Helkama, and Juslin 2003).

Despite these important insights, investigations of how Latinos respond to more *welcoming* environments are lacking, even though welcoming policies at the state and local level have become common (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Steil and Vasi 2014; Williams 2015; Williamson 2018). Extant research suggests that a welcoming climate will have a beneficial effect on attitudes about identity and belonging among Latinos. Studies show that immigrants exhibit better adjustment and more positive intergroup attitudes toward the host society when their views about integration accord with the dominant ideology (Bourhis et al. 2009; Pfafferott and Brown 2006). Other research shows that minorities regard their ethnoracial and national identities as more compatible when they perceive that the host community values their group (Huo and Molina 2006; Huo et al. 2010; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2014).

Of course, the effect of any policy depends on the attributes of the people who live under those policies. In the case of subnational immigration policies, ethnoracial background and nativity are paramount. On the one hand, unwelcoming policies might be particularly influential among Latino immigrants, who may experience a greater sense of societal exclusion owing to their foreign-born (and possibly unauthorized legal) status, as compared to U.S.-born Latinos (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2013b). This heightened sense of exclusion might make them more responsive to variations in state immigration climate. On the other hand, it is also possible that the U.S. born are more aware of their status as ethnoracial minorities, and are thus more concerned about the ways in which unwelcoming policies will affect themselves, their families, and their ethnoracial group as a whole (Jiménez 2010; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Waters 1999). Indeed, past research maintains that acculturation (assessed through nativity, generation, and/or language use) increases awareness of, and experience with, the American ethnoracial hierarchy, which in turn, can reduce trust in political institutions (Michelson 2003, 2007; Schildkraut 2011; Wenzel 2006). Ethnographic research demonstrates that negative and positive societal and policy responses to Mexican immigration has a profound influence on the way later-generation Mexican Americans experience their ethnoracial identity (Jiménez 2010). As such, a greater familiarity with the realities that ethnoracial minorities face might make the U.S. born more responsive to their state's climate with respect to immigration.

It is also noteworthy that most relevant studies concentrate on attitudes that pertain to the United States as a whole, such as whether people think their group is discriminated against in the United States, or to their ethnic group, such as whether being Latino is important. But examining the effect of national immigration policy on outcomes related to national belonging and integration glosses over the potential for significant variation in how state and local immigration policies affect more localized populations that are subject to those policies. There is now a patchwork of state, county, and municipal immigration policies across the United States (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2014; Varsanyi et al. 2012). These policies together register on a “welcoming” spectrum that varies tremendously across subnational units. What are the attitudinal effects of living in a more welcoming or unwelcoming subnational locale?

### A TALE OF TWO STATES

To answer that question, we turn to neighboring states that, while similar in many historical and demographic respects, sit at opposite ends of the subnational immigration policy “welcoming” spectrum: Arizona and New Mexico. As Varsanyi and Provine (2015) argue, when it comes to examining state-level immigration action, Arizona and New Mexico “provide ideal comparative cases for study because of their many similarities” (p. 4). They both became states in 1912, share a border with each other and with Mexico, and have similar demographic portraits, as can be seen in the first rows of Table 1 (Migration Policy Institute 2016; U.S. Census Bureau 2016).

**Table 1. Comparison of Arizona and New Mexico**

	<i>New Mexico</i>	<i>Arizona</i>
<b>Demographics</b>		
Total population	2,080,085	6,561,516
% Hispanic	47.0	30.1
% white, non-Hispanic	39.6	56.9
% foreign born	9.9	13.5
% Hispanic U.S. born	83	72
% of immigrants unauthorized	3.4	4.0
% English only spoken at home	63.8	73.2
% language other than English spoken at home	36.2	26.8
% English spoken “less than very well”	9.4	9.4
<b>Immigrant policy</b>		
Driver’s licenses for undocumented residents	Yes	No
In-state higher ed. tuition for undocumented residents	Yes	No
Higher ed. financial aid for undocumented residents	Yes	No
287g agreements	0	4
“Show me your papers” provision	No	Yes
Official English	No	Yes
Limits on bilingual education	No	Yes
E verify	No	Yes

Sources: Migration Policy Institute (2016); New Mexico Legislative Council Service (2011); Pew Research Center (2016b); U.S. Census Bureau (2016); Varsanyi and Provine (2016).

Despite these similarities, however, the states have different ethnoracial political histories. After the United States annexed the contemporary Southwest territory from Mexico in 1848 at the conclusion of the U.S.-Mexico War, whites overwhelmed Mexicans numerically in the Arizona territory and supplanted the Mexican way of life that prevailed before 1848 with political, economic, and social systems designed to benefit whites at the expense of Mexicans (Gómez-Quíñones 1994; Noel 2014). The Hispano (or *nativo*) population of New Mexico, in contrast, retained its large numbers relative to whites, held onto political and economic power, continued to speak Spanish, and made Hispano identity an important part of the New Mexico identity (Gómez-Quíñones 1994; Noel 2014). New Mexico’s politics in the early part of the twentieth century, after statehood, were marked by progressive Republicanism and, later, Democratic liberalism (Gonzalez 2015). These distinct trajectories and the ethnoracial systems they produced are evident in the differing immigrant policies in Arizona and New Mexico today, with New Mexico adopting policies that are more accommodating toward immigrants, compared to Arizona, as can be seen in Table 1 (also see Varsanyi and Provine 2015).

### Contemporary Immigrant Policies in Arizona

Perhaps no state in the union is more emblematic of an unwelcoming state-level response to immigration than Arizona. Over the past decade or so, the state of Arizona has passed several measures aimed at restricting immigration and purging the state of its unauthorized immigrant population. In 2004, voters approved proposition 200, which requires proof of legal residence to access most forms of state and local social welfare and requires state and local workers to report suspected immigration violators to federal authorities. Two years later, voters passed ballot initiatives that deny bail to unauthorized immigrants accused of a felony (Proposition 100); prevent unauthorized immigrants from collecting punitive damages in civil lawsuits (Proposition 102); and require verification of immigration status for individuals who apply for state-funded services and who request in-state tuition or

financial aid for college, as well as denying subsidies to unauthorized immigrants who wish to access childcare or adult education (Proposition 300) (Menjívar and Abrego 2012). In 2009, the state legislature approved a budget that included a requirement for anyone applying for any state or local benefit to provide proof of citizenship. The following year, then-Governor Janet Napolitano signed a bill allowing the state to suspend or revoke the business licenses of employers who were found to have hired unauthorized immigrants. As noted earlier, Arizona also mandates that English be used by state employees and limits the use of bilingual education schools.

Arizona's approach to immigration garnered national headlines in 2010, when then-Governor Jan Brewer signed into law SB 1070, a comprehensive immigration enforcement law mandating immigrants living in United States for longer than 30 days to carry U.S. government registration documents that state law enforcement officers can demand to see during a lawful detention or arrest, or when law enforcement officers have a reasonable suspicion that an individual is unauthorized. The law also prevents local or state agencies from interfering with the enforcement of federal immigration laws and levies penalties on individuals who hire, shelter, or transport unregistered immigrants. The U.S. Supreme Court deemed parts of the law to be unconstitutional in 2012. Namely, the Court struck down the portions of the law that would require immigrants to carry documentation proving their legal residency, which would have allowed the state to make arrests without a warrant in certain situations, and would have prevented people from applying to work in the state without federal work authorization. Still, the Supreme Court allowed other provisions to remain in effect, including the one allowing state police officers to check the immigration status of individuals with whom they come into contact.

Other policies less directly related to immigration punctuate an unwelcoming immigration policy context in Arizona. For example, in 2010, the state banned Mexican American studies classes in public high schools. Former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio's infamous "crime suppression sweeps" targeted Latino immigrant neighborhoods, often rounding up Latinos who the County Sheriff's deputies assumed to be unauthorized. Sheriff Arpaio is also an icon of the supporters of restrictionist immigration policies. He frequently speaks out publicly against unauthorized immigrants, often appearing on national news outlets. He appeared at campaign rallies with Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign. Arpaio's outspokenness animates a context that is decidedly hostile for immigrants (Menjívar 2011).

### Contemporary Immigrant Policies in New Mexico

If Arizona anchors the unwelcoming pole of a welcoming spectrum, New Mexico, Arizona's immediate neighbor to the east, holds down the welcoming end. The welcoming state context in New Mexico is highlighted by a series of policies that bring unauthorized immigrants' rights in the state close to that of its citizen residents. One of the most hotly contested issues in states around the country has been whether unauthorized immigrants should be able to obtain a driver's license. While states like Arizona have put their foot down against such efforts, New Mexico has allowed its unauthorized residents to obtain a driver's license since 2003 (Varsanyi and Provine 2015).<sup>3</sup> It also allows recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to obtain a driver's license, a step that Arizona resisted, but was ultimately required to adopt by federal courts (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2014).

An equally contentious issue relates to the access that unauthorized immigrant state residents have to state-sponsored colleges and universities. Only 20 U.S. states permit unauthorized immigrants to pay in-state tuition at public colleges and universities. In 2005, New Mexico passed a measure allowing any student who graduated from and attended high school in New Mexico for at least three years to pay in-state tuition at colleges and universities. Even fewer states—just eight—offer unauthorized

3 In 2016, Governor Susanna Martinez signed into law a bill that allows unauthorized immigrants to obtain drivers permits instead of licenses.

immigrants state-sponsored financial aid at state colleges and universities; New Mexico is one of them. In 2005, New Mexico passed SB582, which relies on the same criteria used to determine in-state tuition rates to ascertain student qualification for state-sponsored financial aid. The bill also explicitly prohibits colleges and universities from discriminating against students based on immigration status.

These measures proactively constitute a welcoming context for immigrants. But it is also what New Mexico has *not* done in the way of state-level immigration policy that cultivates this context. Unlike Arizona, where four local law enforcement agencies had a 287g agreement with the federal government, no county in New Mexico ever entered into such an agreement (the state prison system does have a 287(g) agreement, however).<sup>4</sup> Nor has New Mexico enacted sweeping state-level policies, such as Arizona's SB 1070. Indeed, the state has, as much as any in the Union, laid out a welcome mat for immigrants (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2014).

The question of why two neighboring border states have adopted such differing approaches to immigrant policy is an important one, but is beyond the scope of our analysis. We recognize, however, that the differing political cultures of the two states has been centuries in the making (Varsanyi and Provine 2016). Whether that political culture has engendered a strong enough sense of belonging in New Mexico that could withstand a sudden change of course (i.e., if New Mexico started passing unwelcoming policies) is not a question that can be answered definitively. What we can do is recognize that the states differ dramatically in their approach to immigration today and examine whether Latino residents in these states differ in their sense of belonging in ways that existing theory and scholarship would predict.

### HYPOTHESES

Based on the research described earlier and the differing policy climates in Arizona and New Mexico, the main hypothesis under investigation is that *Latinos in Arizona will exhibit lower levels of belonging to both their state and the United States than Latinos in New Mexico*. As we discuss in the next section, we use several measures to assess different aspects of belonging.

A secondary hypothesis is that the effect of the state climate will vary with nativity. As noted earlier, it is possible that Latino immigrants are more sensitive to the immigration climate because they are the intended targets of immigration policies and are at the center of discourse surrounding those policies. Yet it is also possible that Latinos born in the United States will be the ones who are affected more. Unwelcoming policies and the associated discourse have strong anti-Latino overtones that can make unwelcoming policy contexts generally hostile for anyone who identifies as Latino (Chávez 2008; Jiménez 2010; Pérez 2016). The gap between expectations to be free of the prejudice and discrimination typically visited upon immigrants and the daily reality that frames all Latinos as foreign (and possibly “illegal”) may make U.S.-born Latinos feel especially alienated in unwelcoming immigration policy contexts.

### DATA AND MEASURES

Data for this analysis come from a random digit-dial telephone survey conducted in Arizona and New Mexico in February and March of 2016 (Dovidio et al. 2016). The survey included 478 Latinos in Arizona and 476 Latinos in New Mexico (total  $N = 954$ ).<sup>5</sup> A Spanish version of the survey was available and was used by 29 percent of the Latino respondents.<sup>6</sup> Measures for the central dependent

4 So named for the portion of federal law from which it is derived, 287g agreements were partnerships between immigration and customs enforcement and local law-enforcement agencies wherein the federal government trains local law enforcement to enforce immigration policy.

5 The survey also included 949 non-Hispanic whites; the present analysis examines Latino respondents only.

6 The survey was conducted by ISA Corp. A mixture of sampling methods was used: Random digit dial (RDD) landline untargeted; RDD landline targeted (zip codes where 30 percent or more of the population is Latino); RDD wireless; and targeted surname landline. Two early survey questions asked respondents their race and if they are “of Hispanic or Latin origin or descent.”

and independent variables are described here; full question wording for the survey can be found in the [online Appendix](#).

### Dependent Variables

The dependent variables can be divided into five categories, each one designed to capture a different element of belonging: whether the state is perceived as welcoming toward immigrants, identity, discrimination, insider/outsider, and pride.

#### *Perceptions of Welcome*

Our measure of whether respondents live in a welcoming or unwelcoming state (our key independent variable) is admittedly blunt: we simply designate whether the respondent lives in Arizona or New Mexico. It is therefore important to establish that the states are in fact perceived differently with respect to immigration. We therefore ask people directly whether they feel that their state is welcoming toward immigrants. Respondents were asked, “In general, do you think that the state of [Arizona/New Mexico] tries to make immigrants feel: very welcome, somewhat welcome, somewhat unwelcome, or very unwelcome?” Overall, 40.8 percent of Latinos felt that their state tries to make immigrants feel very or somewhat *unwelcome*. Latinos in Arizona were much more likely to feel this way than Latinos in New Mexico: 51.3 percent versus 21.3 percent.

#### *Identity*

The next set of questions address social identities, or the extent to which membership in a particular group is seen as an important component of one’s sense of self (Tajfel 1982). We interpret high importance to indicate that one feels a greater sense of belonging to the group in question. To measure identity importance, respondents were asked three questions (in random order) examining how important it is to them that they are American, that they are Hispanic, and that they are from New Mexico or Arizona (not at all important, not very important, somewhat important, very important). Overall, 86 percent said that being American is very important to them (85 percent in AZ; 87 percent in NM), 65 percent said being Hispanic is very important (68 percent in AZ; 62 percent in NM), and 58 percent said being from their state is very important (56 percent in AZ; 62 percent in NM).

#### *Discrimination*

We also examine perceptions of discrimination as an indicator of belonging. Perceiving discrimination means that one thinks he or she is being treated as less than a full member of the community, with diminished access to the full range of rights and opportunities that members of other groups possess. Discrimination perceptions are therefore an indicator of an awareness of exclusion, the opposite of belonging. We measure this awareness at three levels: the individual level, the state level, and the national level. At the individual level, we asked two questions: how often people feel they are treated with less courtesy than other people and how often they feel they are treated with less respect than other people due to their race and ethnicity.<sup>7</sup> Responses were combined into a single scale that runs from 1 to 6, with 1 being the lowest level of perceived discrimination ( $\alpha = .83$ ,  $M = 2.26$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ;  $M = 2.23$  in AZ and 2.29 in NM). Respondents were then asked (in random order) how much discrimination there is in the United States and in their state toward Hispanics (none at all, a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal). Fifty-one percent of Latinos felt there is a lot or a great deal of discrimination against their group in the United States (54 percent AZ; 47 percent NM) while 34.5 percent felt the same about their state (49 percent AZ; 20 percent NM).

Respondents who were not white, non-Hispanic or Hispanic of any race had the survey terminated. The mean interview length was 15.65 minutes. The cooperation rate (percentage of respondents contacted who agreed to participate) was 25.6 percent. Data are available from the authors upon request.

7 This question is adopted from the “Everyday Discrimination Scale,” (Williams 2012). The correlation for these two items is .71.

*Insider/Outsider*

The survey asked respondents a series of questions directly assessing the extent to which they feel like an insider or an outsider. For this set of questions, respondents were first asked how much they feel like they belong in the United States and in their state (none at all, a little, some, or a lot). They were then asked how much they think that *other people* feel like they belong in the United States and in their state. Finally, they were asked how much they agree or disagree that they feel like an outsider in the United States and in their state. For each pair of insider/outsider questions, respondents were randomly assigned to be asked about the United States first or about their state first. It is noteworthy that 82 percent of Latinos said that they feel like they belong in the United States a lot (78 percent AZ; 87 percent NM). A smaller, but still very high, percentage felt the same about belonging to their state (76.8 percent; 74 percent AZ; 79 percent NM). They were less likely to think that others agreed, however, with 57.2 percent saying they think others feel like they belong in the United States (54 percent AZ; 61 percent NM) and 57.4 percent saying they think others feel they belong in the state (50 percent AZ; 65 percent NM). Just over 17 percent agreed (somewhat or strongly) that they feel like an outsider in the United States or in their state (20 percent AZ and 15 percent NM for outsider in United States; 22 percent AZ and 13 percent NM for outsider in state).

*Pride*

The last set of questions gauges how much pride people feel in being associated with their state and with the United States. Respondents were asked the extent to which they agree with the following statements: “I am proud to be American,” and “I am proud to tell people I am from [Arizona/New Mexico].” Eighty-two percent of Latinos agreed strongly that they are proud to be American (78 percent AZ; 86 percent NM), while 70 percent felt the same about their state (64 percent AZ; 77 percent NM).

These variables are designed to capture “belonging.” Together, they cover psychological and perceptual elements of attachment to, and inclusion in, a particular place. Our main hypothesis contends that Latinos in Arizona will be more likely than Latinos in New Mexico to:

*perceive that their state is unwelcoming toward immigrants; say that their American and state identities are not important; say that their Latino identity is important; perceive individual-level, state-level, and national-level discrimination; think that they do not belong in the United States or their state; think that other people feel that they do not belong in the United States or their state; feel like an outsider in the United States and their state; have lower levels of pride in the United States and their state.*

**Independent Variables**

The main independent variable is the respondent’s state of residence. This dichotomous variable equals 1 if respondents live in Arizona and 0 if they live in New Mexico. Even though this is a blunt measure for capturing state immigration climate, the states are arguably at opposite poles of the welcoming spectrum, Arizona’s approach to immigration has garnered sustained national attention, and our measure of perceptions of state welcome confirms that in the aggregate, respondents perceive the two states quite differently in the way they treat immigrants. We include several additional independent variables as well. First, it is reasonable to expect that acculturation plays a large role in shaping the attitudes examined here, with more acculturated Latinos exhibiting a greater sense of belonging (Citrin and Sears 2014; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Schildkraut 2011). As such, all of our models include measures for nativity (66 percent of Latino respondents were born in the United States) and language used at home (57 percent primarily speak English at home).<sup>8</sup> We also include a term that

8 New Mexico has a greater percentage of U.S. born and English-dominant Latinos than Arizona (see Table 1), as does our sample: 54 percent U.S. born in our Arizona sample vs. 78 percent in our New Mexico sample; 60 percent of respondents in Arizona used the English version of the survey versus 82 percent in New Mexico.

captures the interaction between being born in the United States and living in Arizona. This term is used to test whether the U.S. born in Arizona are more sensitive to state climate than the foreign born. Second, we control for educational attainment and income, both of which provide security and stability, which could in turn enhance one's sense of belonging.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, we add measures for whether the respondent identifies as a Democrat, an independent, or a Republican.<sup>10</sup> The omitted category in our models is whether the respondent declined to answer the question on partisan affiliation. Research shows that nonwhites and immigrants are often uncomfortable placing themselves in traditional partisan categories, indicating that adopting any kind of partisanship is itself a form of acculturation (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011). It may therefore be the case that partisans, regardless of which party they choose, feel a greater sense of belonging than people who lack a partisan affiliation. It is also likely that Democrats and Republicans feel differently about several of the measures examined here. Since the two political parties increasingly diverge on issues pertaining to immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015), it is likely at Democrats will be more likely to perceive hostile treatment in the form of discrimination than Republicans. Fifty-three percent of respondents identified as Democrats (strong, weak, or leaning), and 18 percent identified as Republicans. Only 6 percent are independent, while 22 percent either skipped the question or said they don't know whether they think of themselves in partisan terms.

## FINDINGS

Table 2 displays the results for whether respondents perceive their state as unwelcoming and how important being American, Latino, and from their state are to them.<sup>11</sup> Because the models include an interaction between state and nativity, the coefficient on Arizona can be interpreted as the impact of living in Arizona for the foreign born. The coefficient on the interaction shows whether the effect of living in Arizona is different for the U.S. born than it is for the foreign born (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

Looking first at perceptions of state welcome, the results show that *Latinos in Arizona are more likely to say that their state is unwelcoming to immigrants, and this perception is especially strong among the U.S. born*. In order to ease interpretation of the results, we present them in terms of predicted probabilities in Figure 1. The figure shows how state of residence and nativity interact to affect perceptions of state welcome.<sup>12</sup> It indicates that both the foreign born and the U.S. born in Arizona have a higher probability than their counterparts in New Mexico of saying that their state is very unwelcome for immigrants, and the group most likely to have this perception is U.S.-born Latinos in Arizona.

The results for the three measures of self-identification reveal that neither state residence nor nativity matter for whether one considers being American or Latino important, but that these factors do matter when Latinos consider the importance of their state identity. Moreover, as with perceptions of state welcome, *it is the U.S. born who are particularly affected by their state climate*. Figure 2 presents the predicted probability of saying that being from Arizona or New Mexico is important by nativity. It shows that *the U.S. born in Arizona were by far the least likely to say that their state identity was very*

9 Because 155 respondents refused to give their income, income is included as a series of dummy variables, with "less than \$25,000" as the omitted category.

10 Democratic and Republican "leaners" are coded as partisans.

11 When the dependent variable is a continuous scale (individual discrimination), we use ordinary least squares regression; for all other dependent variables, which are ordinal, we use ordered probit models. One variable we do not include in our models is racial identification. Although it is possible that racial identification is related to perceptions of belonging, this question is beyond the scope of the current project. The survey respondents do not differ by state in their racial identification; in both states, for example, over 75 percent of Latino respondents identified racially as Latino ( $p = .44$ ). This lack of variation means that any differences we find across the two states with respect to belonging would not be due to differing patterns of racial identification.

12 Predicted probabilities are calculated using "margins" in Stata. All independent variables besides nativity and state of residence are set to their mean or modal values.

**Table 2. State Welcome and Identity Importance**

	<i>State is Unwelcoming</i>	<i>American Identity Important</i>	<i>Latino Identity Important</i>	<i>State Identity Important</i>
Arizona	<b>.528***</b> (.148)	.255 (.173)	.127 (.159)	.085 (.145)
Born in U.S.	-.092 (.145)	.161 (.193)	-.002 (.165)	<b>.282*</b> (.160)
Arizona*born in U.S.	<b>.308*</b> (.170)	-.246 .218	-.182 (.189)	<b>-.519***</b> (.176)
Speaks English at home	<b>-.185*</b> (.107)	<b>.423***</b> (.149)	<b>-.372***</b> (.117)	-.175 (.112)
Education	.014 (.024)	-.004 (.034)	-.030 (.027)	<b>-.084***</b> (.025)
\$25K-\$50K	-.036 (.106)	-.090 (.145)	.149 (.119)	-.115 (.114)
\$50K-\$100K	.059 (.110)	.169 (.180)	.127 (.127)	-.140 (.120)
\$100-\$150K	<b>.318**</b> (.155)	.017 (.244)	.128 (.173)	-.390** (.168)
Over \$150K	.096 (.03)	-.221 (.258)	-.041 (.224)	-.368* (.220)
Refused to give income	-.080 (.135)	.050 (.167)	.170 (.140)	.117 (.139)
Democrat	.082 (.096)	.162 (.127)	<b>.226**</b> (.107)	.143 (.102)
Independent	.059 (.172)	<b>-.376*</b> (.219)	<b>-.309*</b> (.186)	<b>-.380**</b> (.172)
Republican	<b>-.350***</b> (.124)	<b>.472***</b> (.182)	<b>-.326**</b> (.132)	.033 (.131)
Cutpoint 1	-.600	-1.910	-1.815	-1.897
Cutpoint 2	.496	-1.389	-1.360	-1.347
Cutpoint 3	1.244	-.580	-.556	-.547
N	857	901	879	894
X <sup>2</sup>	138.95	36.28	67.79	77.46

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at  $p = .1$  or lower are highlighted in bold.


Source: Dovidio et al. 2016.

\*  $p < .1$  \*\*  $p < .05$  \*\*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests)


important to them. Even after controlling for income, education, partisanship, and language use, the U.S. born in Arizona were 14 percentage points less likely than the U.S. born in New Mexico to say that being from their state is very important (54 vs. 68 percent).

Table 2 also shows that language use and partisanship are consistent influences over perceptions of state welcome and social identity. For instance, speaking English at home and being Republican made it more likely that respondents would perceive their state as welcoming and say being American is important, and made it less likely to say being Latino is important.

Table 3 displays the results for perceptions of individual-level, national-level, and state-level discrimination. As with the results in Table 2, the results in Table 3 indicate that state residence only matters when asking respondents about conditions in their state, and it matters in the expected



**Figure 1.** Predicted Perception of State as Unwelcome



**Figure 2.** Predicted Probability of State Identity Importance

direction: *Latinos in Arizona were more likely than Latinos in New Mexico to think that Latinos in their state face discrimination.* The interaction term, however, is not significant, indicating that both the U.S. born and the foreign born in Arizona perceive higher levels of discrimination against Latinos in their state than their counterparts in New Mexico. The predicted outcomes, displayed in [Figure 3](#), show that respondents in Arizona were much more likely to perceive a “great deal” of discrimination in their state than respondents in New Mexico. The other notable result in [Table 3](#) is the effect of partisanship, with Republicans less likely to perceive group-level discrimination and Democrats more likely than nonpartisans.

The results for whether respondents see themselves as an insider or outsider are in [Table 4](#). They show that *state residence matters, and it matters primarily for the U.S. born in Arizona.* U.S.-born Latinos in Arizona are *less likely* than U.S.-born Latinos in New Mexico to say that they feel like they belong in their state. They are also *less likely* to say that other people think that they belong in their state. Notably, this effect is found only when asking respondents about their sense of belonging to their state, not their sense of belonging to the country.

**Table 3. Perceptions of Discrimination**


	<i>Individual Discrimination Scale</i>	<i>Discrimination in U.S.</i>	<i>Discrimination in State</i>
Arizona	-.260 (.177)	-.001 (.129)	<b>.560***</b> (.138)
Born in U.S.	.022 (.188)	-.219 (.136)	-.110 (.138)
Arizona*born in U.S.	.259 (.206)	.146 (.157)	.261 (.163)
Speaks English at home	-.144 (.137)	.084 (.104)	-.030 (.099)
Education	.033 (.031)	.007 (.023)	-.019 (.022)
\$25K-\$50K	-.091 (.137)	-.157 (.102)	<b>-.205**</b> (.098)
\$50K-\$100K	<b>-.313**</b> (.145)	-.089 (.113)	-.013 (.114)
\$100-\$150K	<b>-.326*</b> (.192)	.202 (.156)	.078 (.158)
Over \$150K	-.387 (.247)	<b>-.319*</b> (.193)	-.208 (.193)
Refused to give income	<b>-.476***</b> (.153)	-.145 (.122)	-.152 (.118)
Democrat	.157 (.118)	.104 (.094)	<b>.253***</b> (.090)
Independent	-.095 (.203)	<b>-.296**</b> (.150)	.017 (.167)
Republican	-.144 (.150)	<b>-.476***</b> (.120)	<b>-.361***</b> (.118)
Constant	2.441		
Cutpoint 1		-1.989	-1.169
Cutpoint 2		-1.086	-.254
Cutpoint 3		-.167	.652
Cutpoint 4		.553	1.301
N	902	871	881
R <sup>2</sup>	.032		
X <sup>2</sup>		53.09	155.56

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at  $p = .1$  or lower are highlighted in bold. Discrimination in state and U.S.: 0 = none at all; 1 = a little; 2 = a moderate amount; 3 = a lot; 4 = a great deal.

Source: Dovidio et al. 2016.

\*  $p < .1$  \*\*  $p < .05$  \*\*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests)

Figure 4 shows the predicted probability of feeling a sense of belonging to one's state. It shows that although nativity enhances the sense of belonging, the U.S. born in Arizona are 6 percentage points less likely to feel a sense of belonging than the U.S. born in New Mexico. Although the magnitude of this effect is not large, it is both statistically significant and indicative of a pattern that appears, often to a greater degree, across our other measures. For instance, a similar finding emerges in Figure 5, which shows the predicted probability of feeling that other people think the respondents belong in their state. Here, U.S.-born Latinos in Arizona resemble the foreign born in both states rather



**Figure 3.** Predicted Probability of Perceiving State Discrimination

than the U.S. born in New Mexico. There is a 67 percent chance that a U.S.-born Latino in New Mexico will say that others feel like they belong “a lot,” but only a 55 percent chance that a U.S.-born Latino in Arizona will say the same.

The only case in which the interaction between nativity and state is the same across locales is when asking if respondents agree or disagree that they feel like an outsider to the country and to their state (see last two columns of Table 4). In both of those cases, what matters most is acculturation: being born in the United States and speaking English at home both decrease agreement. State of residence does not matter. Indeed, acculturation matters a great deal for all of the measures of belonging in Table 4. In nearly every instance, respondents who were born in the United States or who primarily speak English at home express a greater sense of belonging than other Latinos. Partisanship matters as well. But whereas earlier results showed Democrats and Republicans with differing views with respect to discrimination, here the relevant distinction is between partisans and nonpartisans: both Democrats and Republicans show a greater sense of belonging than nonpartisans, supporting extant research arguing that the adoption of partisanship is a form of incorporation (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011).

Finally, Table 5 shows results for levels of pride in the United States and in one’s state. Looking first at pride in being American, acculturation boosts pride, but that boost is undermined for the U.S. born if they live in Arizona. As for being proud to be from one’s state, neither acculturation nor state residence seem to matter. Familiar patterns emerge, however, regarding language and partisanship. English usage leads to greater levels of pride in both the state and nation. Having a partisan identity, regardless of which party, also enhances pride in being American.

To summarize, across 15 dependent measures, a fairly consistent picture emerges: state residence, our proxy measure for state climate, is routinely associated with perceptions of belonging at the state level, especially for those Latinos who are born in the United States. Arizona is—and is perceived to be—more unwelcoming toward immigrants than New Mexico.<sup>13</sup> Even after controlling for language use, education, income, and partisanship, the state of residence often matters, and it matters particularly for the U.S. born. Put simply, *living in Arizona reduces perceptions of belonging for the U.S. born.* Moreover, *U.S.-born Latinos in Arizona exhibit more alienation in their state than U.S.-born Latinos in*

13 There are additional effects for income and education throughout Tables 2 through 5, though they are not discussed here in the interest of space.

**Table 4. Perceptions of Being an Insider or Outsider**

	<i>Belong in U.S.</i>	<i>Belong in State</i>	<i>Others Feel R Belongs in U.S.</i>	<i>Others Feel R Belongs in State</i>	<i>Outsider in U.S.</i>	<i>Outsider in State</i>
Arizona	.071 (.155)	<b>.351**</b> (.143)	.131 (.138)	.066 (.143)	.072 (.138)	.095 (.132)
Born in U.S.	<b>.659***</b> (.182)	<b>.679***</b> (.163)	<b>.672***</b> (.153)	<b>.489***</b> (.151)	<b>-.479***</b> (.157)	<b>-.434***</b> (.144)
Arizona*born in U.S.	-.223 (.216)	<b>-.580***</b> (.187)	-.157 (.175)	<b>-.382**</b> (.178)	-.088 (.177)	.127 (.171)
Speaks English at home	<b>.533***</b> (.145)	<b>.188</b> (.124)	.159 (.121)	<b>.313***</b> (.111)	<b>-.230**</b> (.116)	<b>-.337***</b> (.109)
Education	-.012 (.035)	-.007 (.028)	.001 (.027)	.014 (.029)	-.052 (.028)	<b>-.045*</b> (.028)
\$25K-\$50K	-.021 (.140)	.04 (.123)	.187 (.116)	-.028 (.112)	.046 (.112)	.114 (.112)
\$50K-\$100K	.212 (.179)	.119 (.139)	<b>.321***</b> (.128)	<b>.242*</b> (.127)	<b>.218*</b> (.130)	.051 (.129)
\$100-\$150K	<b>.655**</b> (.318)	.095 (.208)	<b>.457***</b> (.185)	.259 (.188)	<b>-.524**</b> (.216)	-.215 (.177)
Over \$150K	-.274 (.228)	-.087 (.224)	.213 (.212)	.185 (.239)	.182 (.225)	<b>.470**</b> (.211)
Refused to give income	.191 (.160)	<b>.248*</b> (.152)	<b>.263*</b> (.141)	<b>.272*</b> (.150)	.187 (.135)	-.023 (.137)
Democrat	<b>.491***</b> (.118)	<b>.285***</b> (.111)	.065 (.105)	.065 (.106)	<b>-.244**</b> (.103)	-.039 (.106)
Independent	.183 (.212)	-.045 (.210)	-.108 (.181)	.002 (.207)	-.249 (.172)	-.106 (.180)
Republican	<b>.529***</b> (.178)	<b>.238*</b> (.146)	<b>.291**</b> (.149)	.204 (.147)	<b>-.338**</b> (.138)	-.129 (.138)
Cutpoint 1	-1.380	-1.197	-1.007	-1.157	-.331	-.171
Cutpoint 2	-.652	-.542	-.160	-.379	.106	.316
Cutpoint 3	.040	.051	.649	.470	.301	.511
Cutpoint 4					.816	1.014
N	901	905	813	805	904	902
X <sup>2</sup>	113.63	51.11	94.41	76.59	120.88	101.51

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at  $p = 0.1$  or lower are highlighted in bold. Coding for the four belonging variables: 0 = not at all; 1 = a little; 2 = some; 3 = a lot. Coding for the two outsider variables: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

Source: Dovidio et al. 2016.

\*  $p < .1$  \*\*  $p < .05$  \*\*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests)

*New Mexico.* Furthermore, *this alienation is generally confined to feelings of belonging to one's state.* These results are summarized in [Table 6](#). This summary indicates that in five of the seven state-level measures, living in Arizona decreases the sense of belonging. In three of those five cases, the effect exists primarily for the U.S. born (importance of state identity, sense of belonging to the state, and whether others think the respondent belongs). In a fourth (whether the state is welcoming), the effect is present regardless of nativity, but it is exacerbated for the U.S. born. In the remaining case (state-level discrimination), state residence matters regardless of nativity.




Figure 4. Predicted Level of Belonging to One's State




Figure 5. Predicted Level of Feeling Others Think You Belong to Your State

The summary in Table 6 also makes it clear that when it comes to perceptions of belonging to the United States as a whole, state residence is largely irrelevant. The one instance in which state residence mattered is on pride in being American. In that case, U.S.-born Latinos in Arizona, once again, exhibit more alienation than other respondents. Otherwise, the differing immigration climate across Arizona and New Mexico does not produce a sense of alienation that generalizes to how people feel about their place in the United States as a whole. This finding may reflect respondents individuating the state context relative to the rest of the United States. Well aware that the patchwork of state and local immigration policies across the United States sit on a welcoming spectrum (Schildkraut 2013a; Varsanyi et al. 2012), respondents may place the United States as a whole on the more welcoming end of the spectrum, especially relative to states like Arizona. If they think Arizona is an alienating place for people like them, more often than not, they do not generalize the climate in Arizona to the nation.

**Table 5. National and State Pride**

	<i>Proud to be American</i>	<i>Proud to be from State</i>
Arizona	<b>.274*</b> (.149)	-.192 (.142)
Born in U.S.	<b>.706***</b> (.181)	.200 (.163)
Arizona*born in U.S.	<b>-.449**</b> (.206)	-.200 (.179)
Speaks English at home	<b>.593***</b> (.138)	<b>.223*</b> (.118)
Education	-.038 (.031)	<b>-.068***</b> (.025)
\$25K-\$50K	.106 (.131)	-.124 (.123)
\$50K-\$100K	.122 (.177)	<b>-.227*</b> (.137)
\$100-\$150K	.107 (.211)	<b>-.346**</b> (.169)
Over \$150K	.070 (.280)	-.195 (.210)
Refused to give income	<b>.298*</b> (.158)	.164 (.143)
Democrat	<b>.378***</b> (.122)	-.117 (.109)
Independent	.097 (.235)	-.267 (.192)
Republican	<b>.417***</b> (.165)	-.028 (.139)
Cutpoint 1	-1.149	-1.939
Cutpoint 2	-.822	-1.629
Cutpoint 3	-.504	-1.376
Cutpoint 4	.059	-.824
N	901	903
$\chi^2$	104.75	44.69

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at  $p = .1$  or lower are highlighted in bold. Coding: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.

Source: Dovidio et al. 2016.

\*  $p < .1$  \*\*  $p < .05$  \*\*\*  $p < .01$  (two-tailed tests)

Overall, the results contain another noteworthy finding: acculturation promotes belonging. Nativity and/or language use are consistently among the strongest predictors in our models. This finding fits within a long line of scholarship showing that, over time and across generations, immigrants and their descendant assimilate ([National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine 2015](#)).<sup>14</sup> The finding also indicates that while English-only policies like the one in Arizona can

14 To probe our findings on acculturation further, we re-ran all of our analyses on the foreign born only ( $n = 347$ ), controlling for naturalization and including an interaction between state of residence and naturalization. The results indicate that living in Arizona increased state-level alienation for four of our seven state-level measures. On two of those measures, the effect was present only for those who were U.S. citizens. This pattern is consistent with our full sample results: state climate matters, and it

**Table 6. Summary of Results**

<i>Measure of Belonging</i>	<i>Level of Target</i>	<i>Effect of Living in Arizona for Foreign Born</i>	<i>Effect of Living in Arizona for U.S. Born</i>
<b>State is unwelcoming</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Less welcoming</b>	<b>Less welcoming</b>
American identity important	United States	Not significant	Not significant
Latino identity important	Neither	Not significant	Not significant
<b>State identity important</b>	<b>State</b>	Not significant	<b>State id less important</b>
Individual discrimination	Neither	Not significant	Not significant
Discrimination in U.S.	United States	Not significant	Not significant
<b>Discrimination in state</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>More discrimination</b>	<b>More discrimination</b>
R belongs in U.S.	United States	Not significant	Not significant
<b>R belongs in state</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>More belonging</b>	<b>Less belonging</b>
Others feel R belongs in U.S.	United States	Not significant	Not significant
<b>Others feel R belongs in state</b>	<b>State</b>	Not significant	<b>Less belonging</b>
Feels like outsider in U.S.	United States	Not significant	Not significant
Feels like outsider in state	State	Not significant	Not significant
<b>Proud to be American</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>More pride</b>	<b>Less pride</b>
Proud to be from state	State	Not significant	Not significant

contribute to an unwelcoming context for Latinos, the ability to speak English still affords Latinos the ability to participate more fully in daily life, contributing to a greater sense of belonging, independent of what language policies communicate.

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Existing research has done much to highlight the political factors accounting for the rise of these unwelcoming policies (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015), and to some degree the effect these policies have on everyday life (Menjívar 2011). But policies also have a symbolic value, signaling which populations belong socially, politically, and economically (Campbell 2012). The way in which individuals internalize the symbolism of those policies can have a profound influence on the degree to which individuals feel a sense of belonging and on social cohesion more generally (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Huo 2003; Putnam 2007; Schildkraut 2011; Theiss-Morse 2009).

We examined how different subnational immigration policy contexts affect individuals' perception of belonging and alienation in Arizona and New Mexico, states with different histories, similar geographic and contemporary demographic attributes, and very different state-level immigration policy approaches. Indeed, Arizona and New Mexico occupy opposite ends of the welcoming state immigration policy spectrum. We found across several measures that Latinos in Arizona exhibit greater alienation than Latinos in New Mexico.

Our findings partly reflect the two states' different political histories. Since Arizona's early days as a state, Mexicans there have experienced the same social and political marginality that whites forced upon Mexicans in other parts of the Southwest. By contrast, the relatively large Hispano population in New Mexico retained political, economic, and cultural power, reducing perceived status difference between Hispanics and whites that are more apparent in Arizona (Gómez-Quíñones 1994; Noel 2014; Varsanyi and Provine 2016). The contemporary state-level immigration policies in these

matters most for those who are more integrated into American society. However, when analyzed separately, the foreign born showed less of a tendency to distinguish the state from the United States as a whole than our full sample. For example, foreign-born citizens in Arizona were less likely than foreign-born citizens in New Mexico to say that being American is important to them.

respective states have roots in these distinctive political histories. Those histories also may have also laid a foundation for a sense of cultural belonging among New Mexico's Hispanos, Latino immigrants, and the descendants of immigrants.

We do, however, have some evidence that supports the independent influence of contemporary immigration climate on Latinos' sense of alienation. Though not the focus of the analyses here, our survey included an experiment at the end in which respondents were randomly assigned to consider the adoption of policies that were either welcoming or hostile toward immigrants in their home state. Latinos reported that they felt more welcomed and were less likely to consider moving away from their state after considering the adoption of policies welcoming to immigrants compared to those who considered policies that were hostile to immigrants (Huo et al. 2016). The magnitude of the effect was similar in both states: on feeling less at home, Latinos in both states moved over a full point on a five-point scale; on whether they would consider moving, Latinos in both states moved over half of a point on a five-point scale. For both measures, these results were statistically significant. While responses to proposed (versus actual) policies has its own limitations, these experimental findings lend support to the argument that local climate, in and of itself, can shape Latino's sense of belonging, even if one's home state has a long history of immigrant accommodation.

Support for our hypothesis is also evident when comparing the sense of alienation by nativity as well as by state. Foreign-born Latinos cannot lay claim to Hispano heritage in New Mexico. But they do navigate a more welcoming immigration policy context, the formation of which may have been informed by that heritage. In several of our analyses, foreign-born New Mexico residents express less alienation than their counterparts in Arizona. And when we analyze the foreign born separately, living in Arizona increased state-level alienation on four of our seven state-level measures, particularly among those who have naturalized.

Why would U.S.-born Latinos be affected by state residence more than other respondents, especially when the targets of state-level immigration policies are foreign born? It appears that unwelcoming immigration policies, though ostensibly targeted at the foreign born, have a severe collateral effect on U.S.-born Latinos who are not explicitly subject to these policies. They are, however, subject to the implementation of these policies when skin color and surname are part of the on-the-ground basis for policy enforcement (Golash-Boza 2012; Jiménez 2008; Menjívar 2011). U.S.-born Latinos are also targets of an anti-Latino rhetoric that supports these policies. Indeed, anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric have a distinctly anti-Latino tone, tying anyone who is Latino together, regardless of nativity and legal status (Pérez 2016). Because of their ethnic and often familial ties to immigrants, Latinos internalize this discourse, identifying with a Latino *immigrant* identity (Jiménez 2010). But because U.S.-born Latinos often trace their family origins back several generations in the United States, and because they often have high levels of acculturation, they have expectations of being insulated from the prejudice and discrimination generally reserved for an immigrant population. In Arizona, and other places that are unwelcoming toward immigrants, the gap between those expectations and the reality on the ground may help account for why U.S.-born Latinos in Arizona feel especially alienated.

U.S.-born Latinos are not alone in expressing the sting of discrimination more than their foreign-born ethnoracial brethren. The U.S.-born children of Caribbean immigrants also report more discrimination and greater alienation than the foreign born (Waters 1999). While the outcomes of U.S.-born Latinos and the Caribbean second generation are similar, the origin of those feelings differ. In the Caribbean second-generation case, the entrenched racism against blacks means that becoming American makes the Caribbean second generation more susceptible and more aware of racism visited upon anyone identified as black, regardless of family immigrant history (Deaux et al. 2007). There is historically rooted racism against Latinos as well. Indeed, in the case of Mexicans, while there is evidence of intergenerational assimilation, there can be little doubt that the history of Mexicans in the United States is built on a foundation of profound racism (Montejano 1987; Telles and Ortiz 2008). Layered on top of that foundation is a continual replenishment of the immigrant population fuels vestiges of

historical racism and sustains the relevance of immigration to the U.S. Latino experience regardless of one's own immigration history, a phenomenon known as "immigrant replenishment" (Jiménez 2010). As our findings show, state-level immigration policies are an important component of this process.

There is a silver lining for those interested in having the United States remain relatively open to immigrants: in neither state do Latinos seem to generalize their views to the entire nation. When asked about their sense of belonging in the United States, Latinos in Arizona and New Mexico were, for the most part, no different in their responses. Those findings suggest that Latinos, well aware of subnational differences in the climate of reception toward immigrants, may not necessarily see the climate in their state as representative of the rest of the nation. Indeed, states like Arizona reflect an ethnonational tradition of American identity and its policies, where belonging is based on having a particular ethnoracial origin (Smith 1997). While the unwelcoming policies may not always make explicit mention of a particular ethnoracial group, the discourse surrounding the policies make Latinos in general, and Mexicans in particular, the clear target (Chávez 2008). In contrast, the United States increasingly reflects an incorporationist tradition that includes a legacy of immigration in its contemporary national self-understanding (Schildkraut 2011), which increasingly celebrates ethnoracial diversity in ways that make diversity a core part of American identity (Bean et al. 2015). Our findings suggest that Latinos are aware of these competing visions of belonging, and of differences in how they operate at the national, state, and local levels. Respondents may evaluate their sense of belonging according to their reading of those differences.

We recognize, however, that the incorporationist and inclusive tradition has become the target of backlash. Since Donald Trump became president in 2017, the federal government has adopted an approach to immigration that is decidedly more unwelcoming than the approach taken by former President Barack Obama. Examples include Trump's executive orders banning immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries, expanding the priorities for immigration detention and deportation, temporarily banning refugee entry, and withholding federal funds from so-called "sanctuary jurisdictions," which are political jurisdictions that limit the cooperation of their government employees with federal immigration officers (Yee 2017). Although many aspects of these orders have been blocked by the courts, media coverage of their content has been intense, creating a shift in climate that would be hard to ignore. The responses of states like New Mexico and Arizona to these developments has been in keeping with their respective locations on the welcoming spectrum, with New Mexico introducing legislation to become a sanctuary state, while Arizona's Governor Ducey announced that his state would not have any sanctuary cities (Mac & Gaydos 2017; McKay 2017).

Given that Arizona and New Mexico are playing to type, some of our findings would be expected to remain in the current political climate. In particular, the diminished sense of belonging in Arizona relative to New Mexico, especially among the U.S. born, would likely be unchanged. Whether attitudes of belonging to the nation would continue to be immune to state climate, however, is more uncertain. In New Mexico, and in any other state that takes a defiant stance toward President Trump's immigration agenda, it is likely that Latinos will become especially aware of the contrasting approaches offered by the two levels of government and may become even more appreciative of their local climate. In Arizona, and in any other state that endorses Trump's unwelcoming orders, Latinos may feel doubly besieged. How might these different scenarios affect our findings? One possibility is that Latinos in Arizona will start to exhibit lower levels of belonging to the nation than Latinos in New Mexico due to the double whammy of an unwelcoming state and nation. Another possibility is that it is Latinos in New Mexico who will have their sense of belonging to the nation diminished on account of the greater contrast that they witness between their state and their country. A third possibility is that belonging to the nation will not be affected as long as the executive orders are held up in court; perhaps it is only *implementation* that generates effects. As we lack survey data in this new climate, we cannot replicate the analyses presented here to examine these competing possibilities. The fact that immigration played such a central role in the 2016 presidential election and that the makeup of the Democratic and Republican parties is increasingly shaped by race makes it critically important

that scholars investigate the topics explored here in a variety of locations and with a variety of methods (Le Miere 2017; Pew Research Center 2016a).

Beyond the “Trump question,” additional questions for further research include: how are perceptions of belonging affected when people live in a welcoming city situated within an unwelcoming state or county? Are the patterns of alienation here present among other immigrant minority communities and their U.S.-born coethnics, such as Asian Americans? Do welcoming or hostile immigration policy climates affect the sense of belonging found among non-Hispanic whites? Does the alienation uncovered here affect social and political behaviors, such as political engagement or geographic mobility? Are there perhaps other factors not included in our study that lead Latinos in Arizona and Latinos in New Mexico to differ from one another, such as national origin differences or, among immigrants, reasons for moving to the United States? For instance, a greater concentration of conationals, along with other state differences, could create different incentives for choosing to live there than, say, choosing to move primarily for job opportunities, which ultimately could influence feelings of belonging. We note that, because of our main intent of focusing on the similarities and differences between Latinos and non-Latinos, and given time constraints on our survey, we did not include items that enabled us to explore national origin differences among Latino respondents. Our results likely reflected the views of Latinos of Mexican heritage: The majority of foreign-born residents in both states is from Mexico, and the figure is higher for New Mexico than Arizona (Migration Policy Institute 2017). Future research, however, might further consider national origin differences among Latinos. On the one hand, the social and psychological significance of the Latino versus non-Latino distinction in the states we studied may limit variability in responses among Latinos differing in national origin. On the other hand, it is possible that Latinos who have national origins other than Mexico may experience minority status with the Latino populations of these states, producing differences in responses among Latino groups differing in national origin.

Finally, our measure of immigration climate is blunt and likely captures not just the current context but also the entrenched political culture that led to the different policy contexts in each state in our current era. We also have data from just two states. It is possible that it is not Latinos in Arizona who experience a depressed sense of belonging, but rather Latinos in New Mexico who possess an enhanced sense of belonging given that state’s long history of Latino incorporation (Varsanyi and Provine 2016). With only two states in our analysis, it is difficult to assess a baseline level of belonging. What we do know is that the contemporary policy climates in these states are quite different and that the patterns of findings in our analyses are consistent with theoretical expectations based on those differences. Our findings offer a compelling rationale for future quantitative data collection across more states and qualitative data collection within Arizona and New Mexico in order to examine these issues further. As the nation progresses toward having a majority-minority population and as leading political figures stoke anti-immigration anxiety, investigating questions such as these is both timely and important.

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