



Figure 2.1 Has War in Iraq Contributed to U.S. Security?
(Washington Post–ABC News Poll)



Source: Author’s compilation of data from Washington Post–ABC News Poll.


Figure 2.2 Confidence in the Government to Prevent Attacks
(Washington Post–ABC News)



“How Much Confidence Do You Have in the Ability of the U.S. Government to Prevent Further Terrorist Attacks Against Americans in this Country?”
 (“A Great Deal” and “A Good Deal” Combined)


Source: Author’s compilation of data from Washington Post–ABC News Polls.

Figure 3.1 Civil Liberties Versus Security Responses, 2001



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 3.2 Distribution of Civil Liberties Responses



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2003, 2004).

Table 3.1 Early Polling Questions on Civil Liberties Trade-Offs (Percentages)

Gallup	For each of the following measures – please tell me whether you would support it as a way to reduce terrorist attacks, or whether you think it is going too far . . . Increasing surveillance of U.S. citizens by the government	April 1995	July 1996	
		(n = 601)	(n = 649)	
		Support	38	47
	Going too far	62	53	
Los Angeles Times	In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average person to give up some civil liberties, or not?	April 1995		
		(n = 1,032)		
	Necessary	53		
	Not necessary	47		
	Would you be willing to give up some civil liberties if that were necessary to curb terrorism in this country, or not?	April 1995	August 1996	
		(n = 1,032)	(n = 1,572)	
	Willing	57	58	
	Not willing	43	42	
	How concerned are you that new measures enacted to fight terrorism in this country may end up restricting some of our civil liberties?	April 1995	August 1996 ^a	
		(n = 1,032)	(n = 1,572)	
Concerned		70	65	
Not concerned	30	35		
Princeton Research Associates	In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average to give up some civil liberties, or not?	March 1996	April 1997	
		(n = 1,500)	(n = 1,206)	
		Necessary	32	32
		Not necessary	68	68

Source: Author's compilations.

Note: All percentages were recalculated excluding the "don't knows" and "refusals."

^aTo maintain consistency with the previous year, the four response categories (that is, "very concerned," "somewhat concerned," "not too concerned," and "not concerned") were collapsed to two categories.

Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix of Civil Liberties Items, 2001

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Abstract support	1.0							
2. Identification card	.22**	1.0						
3. Guilt by association	.14**	.12**	1.0					
4. Detain noncitizens	.17**	.18**	.18**	1.0				
5. Racial profiling	.09*	.10**	.04	.19**	1.0			
6. Teachers criticize	.06	.18**	.15**	.19**	.07*	1.0		
7. Search and seizure	.16**	.20**	.13**	.25**	.15**	.18**	1.0	
8. Wiretapping	.26**	.22**	.13**	.25**	.23**	.10*	.31**	1.0
9. Nonviolent protest	.05	.14**	.08	.14**	.06	.16**	.13**	.12*

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Entries are tau-b's, listwise N = 1,095.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 3.3 Factor Analysis of Civil Liberties and Security Items, 2001

	First Factor	Second Factor	Third Factor
Wiretapping	.53	-.33	-.15
Search and seizure	.60	-.02	-.55
Detain noncitizens	.55	-.37	-.32
Identification cards	.41	-.50	.43
Teachers criticize	.52	.46	-.16
Guilt by association	.59	-.16	.30
Racial profiling	.62	-.13	.10
Nonviolent protest	.34	.54	.51
Eigenvalue	2.08	1.04	1.02
Variance explained	.26	.13	.13
Cronbach's alpha	.66		

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Principle Components Factor extraction, with no rotation.

N = 1,104

Table 3.4 Mean Civil Liberties Responses by Social Demographics, 2001

		Mean	SD	r/Significance Level	N
Race-ethnicity	African Americans	67.4	20.7	.18/.00**	322
	Latinos	54.0	22.9	-.10/.00**	152
	Whites	57.6	22.8	-.10/.00**	878
Gender	Female	57.9	21.8	-.06/.04*	783
	Male	60.4	23.9		602
Education	0 to 11 years	61.0	21.7	.10/.00**	108
	High school graduate	55.6	21.7		381
	Some college	59.7	23.6		382
	College graduate	64.8	22.3		347
	Advanced degree	61.9	26.6		147
Age	18 to 24	68.6	21.0	-.16/.00**	123
	25 to 29	59.9	22.1		107
	30 to 39	59.7	21.3		255
	40 to 49	60.9	23.3		295
	50 to 59	57.6	22.8		234
	60 and older	51.0	23.9		87
Community size	Urban	62.5	24.2	.04/.14	359
	Suburban	57.2	22.7		254
	Small city, town	60.7	21.8		446
	Rural	57.7	23.5		264
Region	Northeast	58.8	22.0	-.01/.78	236
	Midwest	59.3	23.6		328
	South	59.4	23.5		509
	West	58.6	22.0		219

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

*p < .05; **p < .01.


Table 3.5 Mean Civil Liberties Responses by Attitudinal Measures, 2001

		Mean	SD	r/Significance Level	N
Ideology	Very liberal	62.7	24.1	-.21/.00**	79
	Somewhat liberal	64.4	22.0		327
	Moderate	56.2	21.6		107
	Somewhat Conservative	56.3	22.1		586
	Very Conservative	53.7	23.2		116
Partisanship	Strong Democrat	62.9	21.3	.10/.00**	274
	Democrat	55.0	23.3		259
	Independent	63.1	21.9		318
	Republican	59.4	21.6		178
	Strong Republican	51.5	21.7		188
Political trust	Very trusting	49.7	24.5	-.15/.00**	95
	Trusting	55.8	21.0		355
	Low trusting	58.6	23.2		164
	Moderate	65.2	25.4		19
	Low nontrusting	61.9	21.4		165
	Nontrusting	63.0	22.9		384
	Very low nontrusting	63.9	28.1		62
Political interest	Very interested	57.8	24.3	-.07/.07	344
	Somewhat interested	58.4	22.4		710
	Not very interested	61.9	23.3		200
	Not at all interested	62.5	21.4		94
Patriotism	Very proud	57.1	22.0	-.25/.00**	1057
	Proud	69.7	22.7		193
	Somewhat proud	74.3	23.1		79
	Not very proud	90.2	9.5		19
	Not at all proud	78.8	43.5		10
Sociotropic threat	Very concerned	52.7	22.0	-.22/.00**	514
	Somewhat concerned	61.0	22.0		653
	Not very concerned	68.5	24.2		164
	Not at all concerned	64.4	22.6		48

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).


Note: See appendix C for specific question wording. Political trust is an additive index based on two questions.

Figure 4.1 Theoretical Model of the Civil Liberties and Security Trade-Off




Source: Author's compilation.

Figure 4.2 Distribution of Responses to Sociotropic and Personal Threat Items




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 4.3 Effects of Trust in Federal Government and Sociotropic Threat on Support for Civil Liberties




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 4.4 Effects of Liberalism-Conservatism and Sociotropic Threat on Support for Civil Liberties, 2001



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 4.5 Race, Ethnicity, Sociotropic Threat, and Support for Civil Liberties, 2001



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Table 4.1 Open-Ended Response to Sociotropic Threat Question, 2005

"What is causing you to be concerned about the possibility of another attack?"

1. National security – 40 percent

Examples: "If it happened once it can happen again."

"Not enough security."

"The London attack."

2. Situation in the Middle East – 22 percent

Examples: "Everything is going on in Iraq."

"They have not caught Bin Laden."

"In a country we should not be in."

3. World situation/American foreign policy – 9 percent

Examples: "America went to Iraq without approval from European Union."

"Our lack of friendship toward other countries."

"The USA takes control over other countries."

4. Immigration – 6 percent

Examples: "Letting too many people in the country without knowing who they are."

"Everything is still going on, letting them come to this country."

"It's so easy to come here and do whatever they want to, we let everybody in."

5. Trust in Bush and political leaders – 5 percent

Examples: "Don't like the way the Bush administration is handling all of this."

"The way the country is being run."

"The government is lying to the public."

6. Media – 5 percent

Examples: "Listening to the media."

"Things you hear in the news."

"See it on the news everyday."

7. General hatred toward the U.S. – 4 percent

Examples: "Widespread hatred of the U.S. around the world."

"The amount of hate that George W. has created for Americans around the world."

"Because so many countries dislike us."

8. Domestic consequences – 4 percent

Examples: "Prices of gas going up."

"The rate of inflation and the rise of gas."

"Jobs are leaving."

9. Personal issues – 2 percent

Examples: "I'm a firefighter."

"Have parents and children who are living abroad."

"Son in the military."

Source: Author's compilations of data from 2005 State of the State Survey, May 2005 to July 2005. Institute for Public Policy and Social Research. Michigan State University.

Note: These data come from a survey that is part of the quarterly State of the State Surveys series in Michigan. N = 577.

Table 4.2 Mean Threat Perceptions by Social Demographics, 2001

		Sociotropic Threat	r/Significance Level	N	Personal Threat	N	r/Significance Level
Race-ethnicity	African Americans	3.14	-.02/.36	320	2.66	320	.23/.00**
	Latinos	3.31	.04/.14	158	2.59	158	.14/.00**
	Whites	3.16	-.02/.49	885	2.13	887	
Gender	Female	3.22	.08/.00**	791	2.43	795	.21/.00**
	Male	3.23		605	2.06	606	
Education	0 to 11 years	3.29	-.08/.00**	107	2.39	109	-.16/.00**
	High school graduate	3.20		381	2.39	382	
	Some college	3.09		383	2.16	383	
	College graduate	3.10		349	2.07	349	
	Advanced degree	3.11		146	2.04	148	
Age	18 to 24	2.77	.14/.00	121	1.98	123	-.01/.68
	25 to 29	3.28		107	2.33	107	
	30 to 39	3.09		254	2.28	255	
	40 to 49	3.24		298	2.41	298	
	50 to 59	3.10		235	2.24	235	
	60 and older	3.31		340	2.17	341	
Community size	Urban	3.18	.00/.87	355	2.34	359	.04/.14
	Suburban	3.21		257	2.21	257	
	Small city, town	3.04		447	2.22	448	
	Rural	3.20		264	2.22	264	
Region	Northeast	3.20	.03/.32	234	2.22	236	.04/.16
	Midwest	3.11		331	2.25	332	
	South	3.13		610	2.30	611	
	West	3.25		221	2.19	222	

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4.3 OLS Regression of Determinants of Civil Liberties Trade-Offs, 2001

	Model 1	Beta	Model 2
Sociotropic threat	-4.74** (1.00)	-.15	-3.57 (2.42)
Personal threat	-1.31 (.98)	-.04	-1.31 (.98)
Political trust	-1.11** (.34)	-.09	-.38 (1.44)
Patriotism	-4.40** (1.09)	-.12	-4.51** (1.11)
Conservative	-1.90** (.62)	-.10	-1.89** (.62)
Dogmatism	-4.49** (.75)	-.18	-4.49** (.75)
African American	8.38** (2.07)	.12	8.34** (2.07)
Latino	-5.19* (2.41)	-.06	-5.09* (2.41)
Education	.80 (.65)	.04	.78 (.65)
Sex (1 = female)	-.41 (1.30)	.01	-.41 (1.30)
Age	-1.61** (.36)	-.13	-1.61** (.36)
Sociotropic threat × political trust			-24.45 (1.07)
Constant	127.91** (5.84)		124.76** (8.33)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.20/.19		.20/.19
Root MSE	20.74		20.74
N	1081		1081

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 5.1 Distribution of Civil Liberties Counterarguments, 2001

Initial Position	Counter-arguments	Less Democratic	No Difference	More Democratic
1. Crime to belong to terrorist organization; guilt should not be determined by association.				
a. Crime to belong to terror organization (security)	Suppose people were judged guilty by association rather than by a crime they committed	36.7 (349)	48.4 (460)	14.9 (142)
b. Innocent (civil liberties)	Suppose people are actually supporting terrorists activities	54.9 (217)	31.4 (124)	13.7 (54)
2. Noncitizens suspected of belonging to terrorist organization should be detained indefinitely; no one should be held for long without being formally charged with a crime.				
a. Detained as long as it takes (security)	Suppose innocent people could be locked up for a very long time without being charged with a crime	17.2 (111)	40.8 (271)	42.0 (263)
b. Oppose detaining noncitizens (civil liberties)	Suppose detaining them would prevent them from committing other crimes	43.1 (313)	33.8 (245)	23.1 (168)
3. Law enforcement should be to stop or detain people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds; racial profiling harasses innocent people just because of their race or ethnicity.				
a. Allow racial profiling (security)	Suppose this leads to unequal treatment of people just because of their race or national origin	38.8 (83)	49.1 (105)	12.2 (26)
b. Oppose racial profiling (civil liberties)	Suppose people from certain racial or ethnic backgrounds were actually more likely to commit crimes	14.4 (163)	70.3 (798)	15.3 (174)

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Table 5.2 Effects of Dogmatism on Counterarguments, 2001 (Percentages)

	Security	No Change	Democracy	Net Change	N
1a. Initially supported security on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
Low dogmatism	34	47	19	52	251
Medium dogmatism	40	51	9	53	325
High dogmatism	44	36	20	59	236
	$\chi^2(4) = 10.15; p = .038$				
1b. Initially supported civil liberties on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
Low dogmatism	65	21	14	80	128
Medium dogmatism	63	25	12	67	129
High dogmatism	57	26	17	63	108
	$\chi^2(4) = 18.66; p = .001$				
2a. Initially supported security on indefinite detention					
Low dogmatism	16	42	41	57	160
Medium dogmatism	13	43	43	57	290
High dogmatism	17	36	47	62	221
	$\chi^2(4) = 5.63; p = .228$				
2b. Initially supported civil liberties on indefinite detention					
Low dogmatism	46	36	18	65	252
Medium dogmatism	44	33	23	70	248
High dogmatism	46	32	22	67	192
	$\chi^2(4) = 14.92; p = .005$				
3a. Initially supported security on racial profiling					
Low dogmatism	2	4	48	51	68
Medium dogmatism	12	45	43	56	70
High dogmatism	22	55	23	47	67
	$\chi^2(4) = 7.81; p = .100$				
3b. Initially supported civil liberties on racial profiling					
Low dogmatism	10	79	11	23	338
Medium dogmatism	11	75	14	27	402
High dogmatism	20	64	15	41	335
	$\chi^2(4) = 30.72; p = .000$				

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Because the initial dogmatism is a scale ranging from 1 to 5, it was reduced to a three-category measure to simplify the analysis: Low is identified as the scale score ranging from 1 and less than 2.5, medium is greater than 2.5 and less than 3.5, and high is greater than or equal to 3.5.

Table 5.3 Effects of Ideology on Counterarguments, 2001 (Percentages)

	Security	No Change	Democracy	Net Change	N
1a. Initially supported security on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
Conservative	50	37	13	54	324
Moderate	30	49	20	49	354
Liberal	40	47	14	52	134
$\chi^2(4) = 8.41; p = .078$					
1b. Initially supported civil liberties on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
Conservative	60	28	12	64	100
Moderate	58	23	19	70	144
Liberal	69	20	11	70	86
$\chi^2(4) = 5.63; p = .228$					
2a. Initially supported security on indefinite detention					
Conservative	19	41	41	59	254
Moderate	17	34	49	58	232
Liberal	8	51	41	60	86
$\chi^2(4) = .48; p = .976$					
2b. Initially supported civil liberties on indefinite detention					
Conservative	44	36	20	63	200
Moderate	54	28	18	71	295
Liberal	32	44	24	59	141
$\chi^2(4) = 10.45; p = .034$					
3a. Initially supported security on racial profiling					
Conservative	21	50	29	45	95
Moderate	2	51	47	53	84
Liberal	12	45	43	61	19
$\chi^2(4) = 7.61; p = .107$					
3b. Initially supported civil liberties on racial profiling					
Conservative	16	70	14	34	344
Moderate	12	75	13	28	433
Liberal	11	74	15	24	207
$\chi^2(4) = 8.10; p = .088$					

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: To simplify the analysis, political ideology was collapsed from a five-category (that is, very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, and very liberal) measure to a three-category measure.

Table 5.4 Effects of Race and Ethnicity on Counterarguments, 2001
(Percentages)

	Security	No Change	Democracy	Net Change	N
1a. Initially supported security on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
African American	45	29	25	52	166
Latino	25	41	34	54	108
White	41	46	12	49	573
	$\chi^2(4) = 7.51; p = .111$				
1b. Initially supported civil liberties on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
African American	56	34	10	60	115
Latino	65	10	24	64	32
White	62	24	13	72	208
	$\chi^2(4) = 11.87; p = .018$				
2a. Initially supported security on indefinite detention					
African American	18	31	51	68	110
Latino	16	25	59	57	88
White	15	43	43	57	413
	$\chi^2(4) = 12.04; p = .017$				
2b. Initially supported civil liberties on indefinite detention					
African American	45	36	19	61	185
Latino	54	4	42	72	61
White	47	34	19	67	424
	$\chi^2(4) = 11.58; p = .021$				
3a. Initially supported security on racial profiling					
African American	45	38	18	63	19
Latino	6	51	43	47	27
White	11	51	38	50	156
	$\chi^2(4) = 5.89; p = .207$				
3b. Initially supported civil liberties on racial profiling					
African American	19	60	21	33	278
Latino	8	85	7	36	119
White	13	73	13	27	650
	$\chi^2(4) = 6.73; p = .151$				

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Table 5.5 Effects of Sociotropic Threat on Counterarguments (Percentages)

	Security	No Change	Democracy	Net Change	N
1a. Initially supported security on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
Very concerned	41	44	15	52	333
Somewhat concerned	36	47	17	50	410
Not very concerned	40	47	13	51	92
Not at all concerned	45	38	17		29
	$\chi^2(4) = 3.53; p = .740$				
1b. Initially supported civil liberties on crime to belong to terrorist organization					
Very concerned	61	22	17	71	120
Somewhat concerned	63	25	12	69	179
Not very concerned	67	22	11	59	49
Not at all concerned	41	19	40		15
	$\chi^2(4) = 13.26; p = .039$				
2a. Initially supported security on indefinite detention					
Very concerned	18	35	46	63	268
Somewhat concerned	12	44	44	57	271
Not very concerned	19	47	34	48	62
Not at all concerned	3	52	45		19
	$\chi^2(4) = 10.78; p = .095$				
2b. Initially supported civil liberties on indefinite detention					
Very concerned	50	27	23	70	218
Somewhat concerned	46	37	18	63	356
Not very concerned	47	40	13	63	90
Not at all concerned	35	15	50		26
	$\chi^2(4) = 11.97; p = .063$				
3a. Initially supported security on racial profiling					
Very concerned	10	50	40	52	71
Somewhat concerned	16	48	36	50	99
Not very concerned	4	62	34	49	26
Not at all concerned	0	27	73		9
	$\chi^2(4) = 2.12; p = .908$				
3b. Initially supported civil liberties on racial profiling					
Very concerned	16	68	16	37	35
Somewhat concerned	11	77	12	22	128
Not very concerned	12	47	17	30	403
Not at all concerned	36	47	17		405
	$\chi^2(4) = 29.27; p = .000$				

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Table 5.6 Ordered Probit Analysis of Counterarguments on Survey Experiments, 2001 (Whites Only)

Independent Variables	Terrorist Organization		Detaining Citizens		Racial Profiling	
	Initially Pro-Security	Initially Pro-Civil Liberties	Initially Pro-Security	Initially Pro-Civil Liberties	Initially Pro-Security	Initially Pro-Civil Liberties
Sociotropic threat	.02 (.09)	-.30* (.16)	.10 (.10)	-.14 (.10)	.03 (.17)	.00 (.08)
Personal threat	-.19** (.08)	-.04 (.14)	-.23** (.09)	-.11 (.09)	-.34* (.15)	-.06 (.07)
Political trust	-.16* (.07)	-.07 (.15)	-.01 (.08)	-.10 (.10)	.15 (.14)	.22 (.07)
Dogmatism	-.13* (.06)	.01 (.10)	.05 (.07)	-.01 (.07)	-.12 (.11)	-.02 (.06)
Self-reported ideology	.11 (.07)	.12 (.14)	.09 (.08)	.14 (.09)	.33 (.18)	.20** (.07)
Education	-.02 (.05)	-.15 (.09)	-.08 (.06)	-.16** (.06)	-.10 (.10)	-.11** (.05)
Age	-.02 (.03)	.09 (.05)	.01 (.03)	-.05 (.03)	.08 (.05)	.07** (.03)
Female	.47** (.11)	.54** (.20)	-.01 (.12)	-.02 (.12)	.82** (.22)	.08 (.10)
X ²	35.81	15.88	9.24	22.40	32.11	27.94
Pseudo R ²	.03	.04	.01	.03	.11	.03
N	535	189	383	396	148	603

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Dependent variable: change in civil liberties direction. 1 = civil liberties response, 0 = no change, -1 = security response. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 5.7 Ordered Probit Analysis of Counterarguments on Survey Experiments (African Americans)


Independent Variables	Terrorist Organization		Detaining Citizens		Racial Profiling	
	Security	Civil Liberties	Security	Civil Liberties	Security	Civil Liberties
Sociotropic threat	-.01 (.15)	.66** (.19)	-.28 (.21)	.32** (.13)	—	.08 (.11)
Personal threat	.58** (.18)	-.74** (.20)	-.32 (.18)	.07 (.15)	—	.42** (.12)
Political trust	.07 (.15)	-.26 (.17)	.36 (.20)	.28* (.13)	—	-.54** (.12)
Dogmatism	.19 (.13)	.13 (.16)	-.07 (.15)	.11 (.13)	—	-.35* (.10)
Self-reported ideology	.26 (.15)	-.10 (.20)	.27 (.18)	-.05 (.14)	—	-.29** (.12)
Education	.30** (.11)	-.99** (.20)	-.14 (.16)	.16 (.11)	—	-.09 (.09)
Age	-.30** (.07)	.07 (.09)	-.23* (.11)	.01 (.06)	—	-.06 (.05)
Female	-.66** (.25)	-.76* (.32)	.03 (.27)	-.22 (.20)	—	-.33** (.17)
X ²	42.65	49.57	29.22	19.80		71.53
Pseudo R ²	.14	.28	.17	.01		.17
N	142	94	92	157		233

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Dependent variable: change in civil liberties direction. 1 = positive civil liberties response, 0 = no change, -1 = positive security response. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Figure 6.1 Sociotropic Threat Measures Over Time



CBS–New York Times Poll:

How Likely Do You Think It Is that There Will Be Another Terrorist Attack in the United States Within the Next Few Months? (Very Likely and Somewhat Likely Combined)

USA Today–Gallup Poll:


How Likely Is It that There Will Be Further Acts of Terrorism in the United States over the Next Several Weeks? (Very Likely and Somewhat Likely Combined)

Pew Research Center:

How Worried Are You that There Will Soon Be Another Terrorist Attack in the United States? (Very Worried and Somewhat Worried Combined)


Source: Author’s compilation of data from CNN–USA Today–Gallup Poll, Pew Research Center, CBS–New York Times Poll.

Figure 6.2 Correlations Between Civil Liberties and Sociotropic Threat Across Panel Waves




Source: Author's compilations.

Figure 6.3 Political Trust Over Time




Source: Author's compilations from Gallup polls.

Figure 6.4 Perceptions of Effect of Patriot Act on Security, 2002 and 2003



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2002, 2003).

Figure 6.5 Perceptions of Effect of Patriot Act on Civil Liberties, 2002 and 2003



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2002, 2003).

Table 6.1 Analysis of Civil Liberties Trade-offs by Panel Waves

Panel A. Civil Liberties Responses

	Wave 2				Wave 3		
	Wave 1	Panel	New Case	t	Panel	New Case	t
Abstract	55	50	50	-.39	54	42	1.59
Identification cards	46	42	46	-.73	42	41	-2.23*
Guilt by association	28	25	24	.68	25	27	.86
Detain noncitizens	51	57	57	1.22	61	62	-1.52
Racial profiling	82	81	81	.48	80	85	1.17
Teachers criticize	38	50	47	-1.98*	53	48	-2.32*
Search and seizure	75	77	73	3.48**	74	74	-1.30
Wiretapping	65	61	60	.72	67	61	-.12
Nonviolent protest	90	92	88	2.85**	90	93	-.38
Total N	1,450	679	1,284		349	954	

Panel B. Cross-Tabulations by Wave 1 and Wave 2

Wave 1	Wave 2					
	High Security	Low Security	Moderate	Low Civil Liberties	High Civil Liberties	N
High security support	54	11	31	3	0	35
Low security support	21	22	43	8	5	134
Moderate	4	24	43	23	7	114
Low civil liberties support	3	7	38	30	21	229
High civil liberties support	2	1	9	21	67	163
X ² (16) = 380.76, p = .000						

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002).

Note: The civil liberties measure is the percentage of supportive responses on the nine civil liberties items. To simplify the interpretation, the civil liberties measure was divided into five equal categories: 1 to 20 is high security support, 21 to 40 is low security support, 41 to 60 is moderate support, 61 to 80 is low support, and 81 to 100 is high support.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 6.2 Analysis of Threat Perceptions by Panel Waves (Percentages)

Panel A. Threat Responses

	Wave 2				Wave 3		
	Wave 1	Panel	New Case	t	Panel	New Case	t
Sociotropic threat	85	84	81	.48	80	79	.93
Flying in airplane	49	58	48	4.29**	40	48	-2.24**
Opening mail	33	17	27	-5.12**	9	21	-3.06**
Safety of food and water	46	43	52	-4.29**	41	49	-2.79**
Being in tall buildings	37	35	41	-3.93**	29	38	-2.62**
Being in stadiums or crowds	42	48	52	-2.99**	42	45	-.71
Mean personal threat	2.25	2.12	2.34	5.29**	2.09	2.24	2.91**
Total N	1,450	679	1,284		349	954	

Panel B. Cross-Tabulations by Wave 1 and Wave 2

Wave 1 Threat Perceptions	Wave 2 Threat Perceptions				
	Not at All Concerned	Not Very Concerned	Somewhat Concerned	Very Concerned	N
Not at all concerned	36	18	27	18	22
Not very concerned	13	34	38	15	82
Somewhat concerned	1	14	61	24	343
Very concerned	1	2	35	62	229

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002).

Note: To simplify the analysis, response categories "Very concerned" and "Somewhat concerned" are combined in panel A.

$\chi^2(9) = 237.48$; $p = .000$

Table 6.3 Analysis of Political Trust by Panel Waves, 2001 and 2002 (Percentages)

Panel A. Political Trust Measures

	Wave 1	Wave 2			Wave 3		
		Panel	New Case	t	Panel	New Case	t
Trust government to do what is right	51	47	48	1.66	46	36	-2.02**
Government run for the benefit of all	52	42	48	2.03*	42	43	1.36
Total N	1,450	679	1,284		349	954	

Panel B. Wave 1 and Wave 2 of Cross-Tabulations of "Trust Government to Do What Is Right"

Wave 1 Trust Perceptions	Wave 2 Trust Perceptions				
	Never	Some of the Time	Most of the Time	Always	N
Never	26	48	26	0	27
Some of the time	3	73	23	1	291
Most of the time	1	38	54	7	290
Always	0	23	49	28	57

Panel C. Wave 1 and Wave 2 Cross-Tabulations of "Government Run for the Benefit of All"

Wave 1 Trust Perceptions	Wave 2 Trust Perceptions		
	Government Run by a Few Big Interests	Government Run for the Benefit of All	N
Government run by a few big interests	81	19	284
Government run for the benefit of all	33	67	284

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, 2004).

Note: For "trust government to do what is right," "Always" and "Most of the time" are combined in Panel A.

$\chi^2(9) = 203.27$; $p = .000$ for Panel B.

$\chi^2(9) = 139.07$; $p = .000$ for Panel C.

Table 6.4 Analysis of Patriotism by Panel Waves (in Percentages)

Panel A. Proud to Be an American

	Wave 1	Wave 2		Wave 3	
		Panel	New Case	Panel	New Case
Very proud	78	74	72	72	70
Proud	14	14	17	17	18
Somewhat proud	9	9	8	8	7
Not very proud	2	2	3	3	5
Total N	1,450	679	1,284	349	954

Panel B. Cross-Tabulation of Proud to Be an American by Wave 1 and Wave 2

Wave 1 Pride Perceptions	Wave 2 Pride Perceptions				
	Not Very	Somewhat	Proud	Very Proud	N
Not very	45	27	0	28	11
Somewhat	12	50	21	17	34
Proud	1	21	40	38	97
Very proud	1	4	9	87	509

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, 2004).

Note: To simplify the analysis, "Not very proud" and "Not proud at all" were combined to form four categories for Panel A.

$\chi^2(16) = 502.69$; $p = .000$ for Panel B.

Table 6.5 OLS Regression Coefficients of Explanations of Change in Civil Liberties Trade-Offs

	Change from Wave 1 to Wave 2	Change from Wave 2 to Wave 3
Civil liberties (wave 1 or 2)	-.43** (.04)	-.43** (.05)
Sociotropic threat (wave 1 or 2)	-.37 (1.28)	-2.84 (1.73)
Change in sociotropic threat	-.39 (1.25)	-2.06 (1.55)
Political trust (wave 1 or 2)	-3.11** (.51)	-1.46* (.70)
Change in political trust	-.87 (.53)	-2.37** (.73)
Patriotism (wave 1 or 2)	-2.56 (1.60)	-1.36 (1.80)
Change in patriotism	-2.64 (1.49)	-1.30 (1.90)
Ideology	-.47 (.77)	-3.29** (.99)
African American	5.16* (2.78)	8.55* (3.65)
Latino	3.45 (2.89)	-14.00** (5.51)
Female	-2.53 (1.62)	5.70** (2.09)
Constant	55.57** (8.69)	60.50 (10.37)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.25/.23	.33/.30
Root MSE	18.17	16.37
N	520	275

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, 2004).

*p < .05; **p < .01.


Table 6.6 Cross-Sectional Determinants of Civil Liberties Trade-Offs
(Standardized Regression Coefficients)

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Sociotropic threat	-.17**	-.05**	-.08**
Personal threat	-.05	-.07	.03
Political trust	-.19**	-.06**	-.16**
Ideology	-.17**	-.22**	-.25**
Patriotism	-.17	-.16**	-.17**
African American	.10**	.10*	.08**
Latino	-.04	.02	-.01
Gender (1 = female)	-.02	-.02	-.12**
Education	.07	.03**	.05*
	N = 1226	N = 1671	N = 1509

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, 2004).

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Figure 7.1 Monthly Party Affiliation




Question: "In Politics, as of Today, Do You Consider Yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?"

Source: Author's compilation of data from Gallup Poll.


Note: Each point represents an average of monthly surveys.

Figure 7.2 Presidential Approval By Partisanship




Source: Author's compilation of data from Washington Post-ABC News Poll.

Figure 7.3 Presidential Approval on War Against Terrorism by Partisanship (Washington Post–ABC News)




Source: Author's compilation of data from Washington Post–ABC News Poll.

Figure 7.4 Presidential Approval on War in Iraq By Partisanship
(Washington Post–ABC News Polls)



Source: Author's compilation of data from Washington Post–ABC News Polls.

Figure 7.5 Presidential Approval on the Economy (Washington Post-ABC News)



Source: Author's compilation of data from Washington Post-ABC News Poll.

Table 7.1 Analysis of the Stability of Party Identification, 2001, 2002, 2004 (Percentages)

Panel A. Cross-Tabulation of Wave 1 and Wave 2 Partisanship

Wave 1	Wave 2					N
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	
Strong Democrat	71	25	3	1	1	126
Weak Democrat	20	50	24	4	2	118
Independent	2	6	83	7	1	149
Weak Republican	2	9	22	46	21	87
Strong Republican	0	1	9	19	71	103

Panel B. Partisan Stability Across All Waves

Stable	52
Absolute movement = 1	23
Absolute movement = 2	14
Absolute movement = 3	5
Absolute movement = 4	4

Panel C. Partisan Stability by Wave Comparisons and Correlations

	Wave 1 to Wave 2	Wave 2 to Wave 3	Wave 1 to Wave 3
Stable	66	68	63
r	.83**	.80**	.81**

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, 2004).

$\chi^2(16) = 832.86$; $p = .000$ for Panel A.

** $p < .01$.

Note: This analysis is based on the five-category partisanship measure. The percentage of stable identifiers and the correlation across waves increase if a three-category partisanship measure is used.

Table 7.2 Cross-Tabulation and Correlations Between Party Identification and Ideology

Panel A. Cross-Tabulation in Wave 1 (Percentages)

Partisanship	Very	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Very	N
	Liberal				Conservative	
Strong Democrat	13	43	7	28	10	255
Weak Democrat	8	38	9	43	2	249
Independent	5	27	16	47	5	301
Weak Republican	1	15	5	71	7	174
Strong Republican	2	4	3	62	30	186

Panel B. Mean Discrepancies

	Wave 1		Wave 2	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Whites	-.05	1.14	-.19	1.16
African Americans	.85	1.39	.82	1.40
Latinos	.01	1.15	.42	1.38

Panel C. Correlations by Race

	Wave 1		Wave 2	
	r	p	r	p
All respondents	.39	.000	.41	.000
Whites	.41	.000	.49	.000
African Americans	.10	.097	.07	.201
Latinos	.49	.002	.09	.106

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, 2004).

Panel A Note: To simplify the analysis, initial seven-point scales were reduced to five-point scales in which leaning independents were treated as pure independents.

$\chi^2(16) = 286.34$; $p = .000$.

Panel B Note: This measure of discrepancy was derived by subtracting party identification from ideology. High positive values indicate party identification is more liberal than ideology.

Table 7.3 OLS Regression of Explanations of Self-Reported Ideology

	Wave 1		Wave 2	
	Democratic Identifiers	Independent Identifiers	Democratic Identifiers	Independent Identifiers
Sociotropic threat	.02 (.06)	.11 (.10)	-.02 (.05)	.03 (.06)
Patriotism	.35** (.08)	.26** (.09)	.43** (.06)	.47** (.08)
Political interest	-.11* (.06)	-.02 (.08)	-.27 (.07)	.13** (.07)
Education	-.37** (.05)	-.09 (.06)	-.18** (.05)	-.02 (.05)
Age	.02 (.03)	.07 (.04)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.03)
Female	-.03 (.10)	-.08 (.12)	-.02 (.09)	-.33** (.10)
South	.30** (.10)	-.00 (.13)	.06 (.10)	.10 (.11)
African American	-.03** (.11)	.13 (.12)	.15 (.11)	-.32 (.22)
Latino	-.32 (.17)	-.47 (.26)	.41** (.13)	-.30 (.21)
Constant	2.14** (.46)	1.61** (.49)	1.93** (.40)	.60 (.46)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.21/.19	.11/.08	.20/.19	.13/.11
Root MSE	.98	1.01	1.06	1.06
N	471	292	616	439

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002).

Note: The dependent variable is the self-reported ideology. High values on the dependent variable indicate strong conservative identification.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 7.4 OLS Regression Coefficients of Wave 1 to Wave 2 Change in Ideology

	Democratic Identifiers	Independent Identifiers
Ideology t_{-1}	-.40** (.05)	-.41** (.07)
Change in political trust	.53** (.10)	.29* (.14)
Political trust t_{-1}	.41** (.12)	.20 (.13)
Change in patriotism	.12 (.11)	.16 (.14)
Patriotism t_{-1}	.09 (.12)	.24* (.12)
Change in sociotropic threat	-.03 (.09)	.04 (.11)
Sociotropic threat t_{-1}	-.17 (.09)	.05 (.13)
African American	.40** (.16)	.14 (.30)
Latino	-.06 (.15)	-.44 (.43)
Constant	.27 (.61)	-.54 (.63)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.38 / .35	.23 / .19
Root MSE	.81	.85
N	208	169

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002).

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 7.5 Mean Level of Support for Civil Liberties Items, 2001, 2002, and 2003

Panel A. Civil Liberties by Partisan (Means)

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Strong Republican	51	43	49
Weak Republican	58	51	56
Independent	63	62	68
Weak Democrat	63	61	64
Strong Democrat	64	63	72
r	-.17**	-.19**	.28**

Panel B. Civil Liberties by Ideology (Means)

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Strong conservative	51	45	52
Conservative	57	53	60
Moderate	60	57	64
Liberal	67	67	72
Strong liberal	74	73	79
r	-.26**	-.34**	-.35**

Panel C. Correlations

	Wave 1		Wave 2	
	Partisanship	Ideology	Partisanship	Ideology
All respondents	-.09	-.21	-.23	-.31
Whites	-.07	-.20	-.24	-.35
African Americans	-.08	-.10	.01	-.19
Latinos	.16	-.10	-.04	-.17

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, and 2003).

**p < .01.

Table 7.6 Unstandardized Regression for Predictors of Civil Liberties and Security Trade-Offs by Panel Respondents, 2001, 2002, 2003


	New Panel Respondents			Panel Respondents		
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Partisanship	.40 (.55)	-3.00** (.63)	-2.01** (.64)	-.25 (.81)	-1.13 (.88)	-3.30** (1.04)
Ideology	-2.92** (.64)	-5.28** (.69)	-3.51** (.69)	-3.12** (.95)	-.34 (.99)	-3.04** (1.19)
Sociotropic threat	-6.33** (.88)	-.46 (.87)	-1.71** (.96)	-7.96** (1.28)	-5.27** (1.29)	-4.90** (1.83)
Political trust	-2.47** (.90)	-1.65 (1.02)	-4.41** (1.19)	-6.09** (1.36)	-8.14** (1.58)	-7.75** (2.07)
Patriotism	-5.72** (1.06)	-6.14** (1.17)	-5.56** (.99)	-4.61** (1.67)	-6.94** (1.52)	-4.69** (1.87)
African American	6.37** (2.03)	2.45 (2.28)	3.89 (2.71)	3.27 (3.64)	8.87** (3.57)	4.08 (4.13)
Latino	-3.34 (2.23)	.37 (2.56)	-3.48 (2.72)	-5.21 (3.52)	-5.23 (3.20)	-22.14** (6.17)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.14/.14	.20/.20	.21/.20	.16/.16	.18/.17	.23/.21
Root MSE	22.16	21.61	19.69	21.13	22.87	20.95
N	1138	944	713	577	567	296

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001, 2002, 2003).

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients; t statistics are in parentheses.


*p < .01; **p < .05.

Figure 8.1 Predicted Trust in Federal Government, 2001




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 8.2 Presidential Approval, November 2001




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 8.3 Favorable Responses to Democratic Norm Items, 2001




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 8.4 Predicted Support for Democratic Norms, 2001




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 8.5 Predicted National Pride, 2001




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 8.6 Responses to Qualities of a True American, 2001




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 8.7 How Responsible Is the United States for Hatred that Led to the 9/11 Attacks?



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 8.8 Distribution of Responses to U.S. Responsibility Items, 2001



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001)

Note: Responses are those who “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” to U.S. responsibility.

Table 8.1 OLS Regression Coefficients of the Determinants of Trust in Federal Government, 2001

	All	African American	White	U.S.-Born Latino
Sociotropic threat	.08** (.03)	-.14** (.06)	.17** (.04)	.08* (.08)
Personal threat	-.02 (.03)	-.12 (.07)	-.06 (.04)	.01 (.09)
Conservative ideology	-.01 (.01)	-.10** (.03)	-.02 (.02)	-.16** (.06)
Female	.13** (.04)	-.23** (.10)	.11* (.05)	-.62** (.13)
Education	.01 (.03)	.04 (.06)	-.01 (.02)	.21** (.07)
Age	.03* (.01)	.15** (.03)	-.00 (.01)	-.04 (.04)
African American	-.10 (.07)	—	—	—
Latino	-.23** (.05)	—	—	—
Born in United States	.06 (.08)	—	—	—
Constant	2.11** (.14)	2.37** (.30)	2.22** (.15)	2.22** (.58)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.04/.03	.17/.15	.03/.03	.45/.41
MSE	.70	.76	.67	.55
N	1240	253	787	123

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 8.2 Logit Coefficients of Model Predicting Bush Approval, 2001

	All	African American	White	U.S.-Born Latino
Sociotropic threat	.10 (.17)	-.52* (.22)	.11 (.25)	1.24 (1.05)
Personal threat	.03 (.17)	.37 (.34)	.29 (.24)	-3.39* (1.61)
Conservative ideology	.25** (.11)	.06 (.18)	.35* (.16)	1.38 (.90)
Patriotism	.74** (.15)	1.03** (.36)	.88** (.20)	1.94* (.99)
Partisanship	.45** (.11)	.97** (.33)	.37** (.14)	2.20* (1.04)
Female	.32 (.23)	-1.50** (.49)	.92** (.33)	.78 (1.52)
Education	-.24 (.11)	-.01 (.25)	-.10 (.15)	-1.52** (.69)
Age	-.08 (.07)	-.02 (.14)	-.12 (.08)	.02 (.57)
African American	-.70** (.32)	—	—	—
Latino	-.29 (.46)	—	—	—
Born in United States	.79 (.61)	—	—	—
Constant	-1.98 (1.04)	3.34 (2.05)	-4.37** (1.22)	-6.51** (6.75)
Pseudo R ²	.16	.17	.16	.70
N	1084	193	720	148

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 8.3 OLS Regression Coefficients of the Determinants of Democratic Norms, 2001

	All	African American	White	U.S.-Born Latino
Sociotropic threat	-.12** (.03)	-.11** (.04)	-.09** (.03)	-.40** (.08)
Personal threat	.01 (.03)	.23** (.04)	-.00 (.03)	-.29** (.08)
Conservative ideology	-.06** (.02)	-.06 (.03)	-.06** (.02)	-.07 (.06)
Female	-.04 (.03)	-.14* (.06)	-.08* (.04)	-.66** (.13)
Education	.11** (.02)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.02)	-.22** (.07)
Age	-.00 (.01)	-.02 (.02)	-.03** (.01)	.09** (.03)
African American	.06 (.05)	—	—	—
Latino	-.46** (.06)	—	—	—
Born in United States	-.12 (.07)	—	—	—
Constant	3.18** (.12)	2.65** (.18)	3.11** (.13)	4.13** (.44)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.15/.14	.18/.16	.09/.08	.55/.53
MSE	.55	.44	.54	.55
N	1100	225	689	119

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 8.4 OLS Regression Coefficients of the Determinants of Patriotism (National Pride), 2001

	All	African American	White	U.S.-Born Latino
Sociotropic threat	.15** (.03)	.16** (.05)	.12** (.03)	.45** (.08)
Personal threat	.01 (.03)	.01 (.05)	-.03 (.03)	.01 (.10)
Conservative ideology	.11** (.02)	.11** (.03)	.11** (.02)	-.02 (.06)
Female	.01 (.04)	.10 (.08)	.03 (.04)	.15 (.13)
Education	-.04* (.02)	.02 (.04)	-.07** (.02)	-.16* (.08)
Age	.04** (.01)	.12** (.02)	.03* (.01)	.05 (.04)
African American	-.14* (.06)	—	—	—
Latino	-.16** (.06)	—	—	—
Born in United States	.48** (.08)	—	—	—
Constant	3.32** (.13)	3.15** (.23)	4.09** (.12)	3.23** (.44)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.15/.14	.20/.18	.10/.09	.39/.36
MSE	.60	.56	.55	.62
N	1236	249	789	128

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 8.5 OLS Regression Coefficients of a Restrictive American Identity, 2001

	All	African American	White	U.S.-Born Latino
Sociotropic threat	.00 (.03)	.12** (.04)	-.02 (.03)	-.04 (.07)
Personal threat	.15** (.02)	.10 (.05)	.16** (.03)	.12 (.08)
Conservative ideology	.11** (.02)	.04 (.03)	.11** (.02)	.07 (.05)
Patriotism	.14** (.03)	.13* (.06)	.19** (.04)	.03 (.07)
Female	-.04 (.03)	-.01 (.07)	-.04 (.04)	-.13 (.10)
Education	-.14** (.02)	-.15** (.04)	-.14** (.02)	.01 (.06)
Age	.06** (.01)	.13** (.02)	.05** (.01)	-.03 (.03)
African American	.35** (.05)	—	—	—
Latino	-.03 (.06)	—	—	—
Born in United States	.10 (.08)	—	—	—
Constant	1.29** (.15)	1.44** (.47)	1.14** (.20)	2.21** (.41)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.27/.27	.35/.33	.24/.23	.07/.02
MSE	.55	.48	.56	.48
N	1198	240	765	126

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 8.6 OLS Regression Coefficients of U.S. Responsibility, 2001

	All	African American	White	U.S.-Born Latino
Sociotropic threat	.05 (.05)	-.14 (.10)	.04 (.06)	.87** (.16)
Personal threat	.04 (.05)	.16 (.11)	.03 (.06)	-.51** (.15)
Conservative ideology	-.13** (.03)	-.06 (.07)	-.13** (.03)	-.04 (.09)
Female	-.12* (.06)	-.03 (.16)	-.03 (.07)	-.96** (.19)
Education	.00 (.03)	.19* (.09)	-.02 (.03)	.17 (.11)
Age	-.01 (.02)	.04 (.05)	-.01 (.02)	-.06 (.06)
African American	.20* (.07)	—	—	—
Latino	.44** (.10)	—	—	—
Born in United States	-.09 (.12)	—	—	—
Constant	2.75** (.21)	2.42** (.47)	2.61** (.21)	1.85** (.63)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.05/.04	.04/.01	.02/.01	.41/.39
MSE	1.02	1.18	.67	.89
N	1231	250	783	128

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 8.7 Standardized OLS Regression Coefficients of Perceived Causes of Hatred toward United States on Responsibility for Attacks, 2001


	African American	White	U.S.-Born Latino
U.S. support for Israel	.27**	.06	-.39**
Not enough U.S. aid	-.01	.10**	.10
Islamic religion	-.15*	-.17**	-.16
U.S. pursuing own interests	-.26**	.19**	.34**
Terrorist air grievances	.14*	.10*	.08
U.S. meddling	.35**	.18**	.12
Feelings of revenge	.05	.09*	.11

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. To simplify the presentation, control variables are not reported.


* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Figure 9.1 Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings (2000 National Election Study)




Source: Author's compilations.

Figure 9.2 Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings, 2001




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 9.3 Mean Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Sociotropic Threat (White Respondents)




Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 9.4 Mean Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Sociotropic Threat (Black Respondents)



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Figure 9.5 Mean Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Sociotropic Threat (Latino Respondents)



Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Table 9.1 Perceptions of Islam before September 11, 2001
(Percentages)

“What is your impression of the religion called Islam?”

Haven't heard enough to say	56
Very favorable	2
Somewhat favorable	12
Somewhat unfavorable	11
Very unfavorable	11

“When you think of the religion called Islam, what comes to your mind?”

Nothing (27)	Fanatics-Zealots
The Middle East (13)	Great Religion
The Arab countries (8)	Anti-Israel
Black Muslims (3)	Violence-Terrorism
Iran (2)	Foreign religion
Ayatollah Khomeini	Mohammed
Saddem Hussein	Mecca
Rev. Louis Farrakhan	War
Malcolm X	Israel
Fundamentalism	Other
Anti-American	Not Sure
Women subservient	Refused

“Do you think the religion called Islam is compatible with western style political democracy or is Islam basically an anti-democratic religion?”

Democrat	10
Antidemocratic	41
Not sure	45

“Do you think the religion called Islam poses a threat to the security to the United States and its western allies or not?”

Not threat	38
Major	13
Minor	15
Not sure	30

Source: Los Angeles Times (February 18–19, 1993).

Note: This survey was a national survey with a sample of 1,273.

Table 9.2 OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings
(2000 National Election Study)

	Christian Fundamentalists	Jews	Latinos	African Americans	Whites
White affect	-.29** (.05)	-.05 (.03)	-.17** (.03)	-.12** (.03)	—
Political trust	-.30 (.47)	-.17 (.28)	.08 (.28)	.53* (.27)	-.44 (.35)
Conservative ideology	4.44** (.37)	-1.23** (.22)	-.77** (.22)	-.99** (.22)	.40 (.28)
Education	-2.50** (.28)	.81** (.17)	.53** (.17)	.88** (.16)	-.94** (.21)
Sex (1 = female)	.54 (1.23)	-.22 (.75)	-1.37 (.74)	.39 (.72)	.28 (.92)
Age	-.15** (.04)	.09** (.02)	-.06 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.03 (.03)
Constant	14.72 (5.44)	-3.33 (3.30)	4.70 (3.28)	-6.17 (3.16)	22.30** (3.99)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.23/.23	.08/.09	.10/.09	.10/.09	.03/.03
Root MSE	17.99	10.92	10.85	10.45	13.46
N	865	865	865	865	865

Source: 2000 National Election Study.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 9.3 OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings, 2001

	Islamic Funda- mentalists	Christian Funda- mentalists	Arabs	Jews	Latinos	Blacks	Whites
Sociotropic threat	-.18* (.08)	.01 (.07)	-.14* (.06)	.04 (.05)	.13** (.05)	.12* (.05)	-.02 (.05)
Political trust	.23** (.09)	-.01 (.08)	-.03 (.07)	-.01 (.05)	-.04 (.05)	-.13* (.05)	-.01 (.05)
Patriotism	-.27** (.10)	.15 (.09)	-.29** (.08)	.11 (.06)	.13* (.06)	.04 (.06)	.13 (.06)
Conservative ideology	-.05 (.06)	.42** (.05)	-.09 (.05)	-.02 (.04)	-.11** (.03)	-.11** (.03)	-.03 (.03)
Dogmatism	-.06 (.07)	.39** (.06)	-.30** (.06)	.04 (.04)	.08* (.04)	-.04 (.04)	.13** (.04)
African American	.82** (.19)	-.08 (.17)	.04 (.15)	-.66** (.12)	-.40** (.11)	.67** (.11)	-.54** (.12)
Latino	-.61* (.22)	-.50* (.19)	-.75** (.17)	-.31* (.13)	1.45** (.12)	.27 (.13)	.45** (.13)
Education	-.12** (.06)	-.10 (.05)	.06 (.05)	.11** (.04)	.15** (.04)	-.07* (.03)	-.04 (.04)
Sex (1 = female)	.18 (.12)	-.10 (.10)	-.01 (.09)	-.04 (.07)	-.02 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	.04 (.07)
Age	.04 (.03)	-.09** (.03)	.01 (.03)	.10** (.02)	-.07** (.02)	-.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)
Constant	-.50 (.57)	-2.81** (.48)	2.43** (.44)	-.42 (.34)	.11 (.32)	1.22** (.32)	-.02 (.34)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.06/.05	.15/.14	.16/.15	.08/.08	.19/.18	.07/.06	.05/.05
Root MSE	1.96	1.68	1.51	1.17	1.11	1.13	1.19
N	1055	1055	1055	1055	1055	1055	1055

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 9.4 OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings, 2001 (White Respondents)

	Islamic Fundamentalists	Christian Fundamentalists	Arabs	Jews	Latinos	Blacks	Whites
White affect	-.91** (.05)	-.12** (.05)	-.53** (.04)	.16** (.04)	.12** (.03)	.28** (.03)	—
Sociotropic threat	-.23* (.10)	-.02 (.09)	-.06 (.07)	.09 (.06)	.08 (.06)	.02 (.05)	-.01 (.06)
Political trust	.04 (.10)	.03 (.09)	-.10 (.08)	.08 (.07)	-.06 (.06)	.01 (.05)	.03 (.07)
Patriotism	-.08 (.12)	.20 (.11)	-.11 (.09)	.07 (.08)	-.08 (.07)	.01 (.06)	.09 (.08)
Conservative ideology	-.07 (.06)	.46** (.06)	-.14** (.05)	-.05 (.04)	-.09* (.04)	-.11** (.03)	-.01 (.04)
Dogmatism	-.03 (.09)	.43** (.07)	-.20** (.06)	-.09 (.05)	-.14** (.04)	-.04 (.04)	.08 (.05)
Education	-.18* (.07)	-.12 (.06)	.09 (.05)	.08** (.04)	.15** (.04)	.01 (.04)	-.01 (.04)
Sex (1 = female)	.16 (.13)	.04 (.13)	-.02 (.10)	-.11 (.09)	-.06 (.08)	-.01 (.07)	-.02 (.09)
Age	.06 (.04)	-.08** (.03)	-.01 (.03)	.08** (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.00 (.02)	.03 (.02)
Constant	-.14 (.67)	-3.32** (.63)	1.54** (.52)	-.33 (.44)	1.36** (.41)	.89** (.35)	-.07 (.44)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.28/.27	.19/.18	.21/.21	.07/.06	.09/.07	.13/.12	.01/.01
Root MSE	1.77	1.65	1.39	1.15	1.09	.94	1.15
N	727	727	727	727	727	727	727

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 9.5 OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings (Black Respondents)

	Islamic Fundamentalists	Christian Fundamentalists	Arabs	Jews	Latinos	Whites	Blacks
Black affect	-.39** (.05)	-.17** (.07)	-.03 (.06)	-.31** (.05)	-.18** (.05)	.08 (.05)	—
Sociotropic threat	.06 (.09)	-.01 (.12)	-.47** (.10)	.14 (.09)	.30** (.09)	-.03 (.08)	.19 (.12)
Political trust	.29** (.10)	-.06 (.13)	.16 (.12)	-.45** (.09)	-.19 (.09)	.23** (.09)	.01 (.13)
Patriotism	-.49** (.14)	-.62** (.18)	.07 (.16)	.37** (.13)	.16 (.13)	.52** (.13)	.13 (.18)
Conservative ideology	.18** (.07)	.24** (.09)	-.09 (.08)	-.00 (.06)	-.25** (.06)	-.08 (.06)	.17 (.09)
Dogmatism	-.21* (.09)	-.18 (.12)	.01 (.10)	.46** (.08)	-.13** (.08)	.06 (.08)	-.19 (.11)
Education	-.01 (.08)	-.15 (.11)	.22* (.10)	.18* (.08)	-.04 (.08)	-.21** (.08)	-.17 (.11)
Sex (1 = female)	-.28 (.16)	-.16 (.22)	-.32 (.19)	-.06 (.15)	-.04 (.15)	.78** (.15)	.74** (.21)
Age	-.09 (.05)	-.00 (.06)	-.06 (.05)	.18** (.05)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	.15 (.06)
Constant	1.33* (.64)	3.38** (.86)	.62 (.75)	-3.13** (.61)	.33 (.60)	-2.54** (.59)	-.43 (.84)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.36/.34	.14/.10	.17/.13	.37/.34	.21/.17	.29/.26	.13/.10
Root MSE	1.06	1.43	1.24	1.01	1.00	.98	1.40
N	224	224	224	224	224	224	224

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 9.6 OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings (Latino Respondents)

	Islamic Fundamentalists	Christian Fundamentalists	Arabs	Jews	Blacks	Whites	Latinos
Latino affect	-.68** (.14)	-.24 (.15)	-.37** (.10)	-.21* (.10)	.10 (.09)	.40** (.10)	—
Sociotropic threat	-.22 (.23)	.80** (.23)	-1.17** (.17)	-.05 (.17)	.35* (.15)	.30 (.16)	.07 (.13)
Political trust	.88** (.26)	-.66** (.26)	.51** (.19)	-.41* (.19)	-.51** (.17)	.18 (.18)	.02 (.15)
Patriotism	-.28 (.24)	.01 (.25)	-.34 (.18)	.10 (.18)	.36* (.16)	.14 (.17)	.16 (.11)
Conservative ideology	-.31 (.17)	.05 (.17)	.23 (.12)	.08 (.12)	-.05 (.11)	-.01 (.12)	-.14 (.09)
Dogmatism	.09 (.23)	.30 (.24)	-.65** (.17)	-.24 (.17)	.21 (.15)	.29 (.16)	.37** (.13)
Education	-.47* (.23)	.21 (.23)	-.79** (.16)	.21 (.16)	.52 (.14)	.31 (.16)	-.04 (.11)
Sex (1 = female)	.87* (.39)	.56 (.39)	-.35 (.28)	.24 (.27)	-.75** (.25)	-.58* (.27)	.14 (.21)
Age	.01 (.10)	-.31** (.10)	.25** (.07)	.11 (.07)	-.14** (.06)	.10 (.07)	-.32** (.05)
Constant	-.59 (1.55)	-1.88** (1.57)	5.46** (1.12)	.99 (1.12)	1.20 (.98)	-2.78** (1.07)	1.01 (.88)
R ² /adjusted R ²	.37/.32	.23/.16	.67/.64	.24/.18	.41/.36	.33/.27	.30/.26
Root MSE	1.60	1.62	1.15	1.15	1.02	1.10	1.05
N	122	122	122	122	122	122	122

Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Terror Event Timeline

Table A.1 Timeline

2001	11-Sep	World Trade Center and Pentagon struck by airplanes	
	14-Sep	President at Ground Zero: "The people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon."	
	20-Sep	President speaks to the nation in Joint Session of Congress	
	5-Oct	Anthrax death: Robert Stevens first of five to die, awakens national concern about bioterrorism	
	7-Oct	Invasion of Afghanistan ("Operation Enduring Freedom")	
	8-Oct	Office of Homeland Security set up in White House, headed by Tom Ridge	
	26-Oct	President signs USA Patriot Act after overwhelming support in Congress	
	12-Nov	Taliban flee Kabul, Northern Alliance enters on	
	13-November		
	12-Nov	AA Flight 587 crashes shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia, initial concern it is caused by terrorists	
	22-Dec	"Shoe bomber" Richard Reid attempts to blow up Paris to Miami flight, subdued by crew	
	2002	17-Jan	Ashcroft, Mueller news conf.—release tapes recovered from rubble of Afghanistan, name suspects
		25-Jan	Ashcroft, Mueller news conf.—release photos of five suspected terrorists
29-Jan		Ashcroft press release announces heightened security at Winter Olympics	
29-Jan		Bush State of Union: "states in the...axis of evil...pose a grave and growing danger."	
3-Feb		Terrorism alert (before the color-coded scheme introduced)	
8-Feb		Winter Olympic Games open in Salt Lake City	
24-Feb		Winter Olympic Games end	
27-Feb		Terrorism alert ends	
12-Mar		Color-coded "Homeland Security Advisory System" created by presidential order	

- 26-Aug Cheney to VFW in Nashville: "The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action" in Iraq.
- 10-Sep Orange alert – anniversary of 9/11 (first actual use of color-coded system)
- 12-Sep Bush to UN General Assembly: Iraqi regime a threat to the UN and to peace
- 24-Sep Alert back to yellow
- 4-Oct "Shoe bomber" pleads guilty, sentenced to 20 years
- 11-Oct Congress authorizes the use of U.S. military force against Iraq
- 12-Oct Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist bomb in Bali nightclub kills 202 people
- 25-Nov Homeland Security Act signed by President, authorizes Dept. of Homeland Security
- 2003 24-Jan Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) opens, ending WH Office of Homeland Security
- 29-Jan Bush State of Union: "If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm we will lead a coalition to disarm him."
- 5-Feb Colin Powell addresses UN Security Council on Iraq denial and deception on WMD
- 7-Feb Orange alert (run on sales of duct tape and plastic sheeting)
- 13-Feb Law enforcement, Americans brace for imminent attack on NY, DC, or FL: "dirty bomb scare"
- 27-Feb Alert back to yellow
- 1-Mar DHS absorbs 180,000 employees from other agencies and offices
- 1-Mar Announcement of arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Pakistan
- 17-Mar Bush 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein
- 17-Mar Orange alert (DHS announces "Operation Liberty Shield")
- 19-Mar Bush speech from Oval Office (bombs over Baghdad 20 Mar) ("Operation Iraqi Freedom")
- 25-Mar Texas oil plants on terror alert
- 9-Apr Saddam Hussein statue pulled down in Firdos Square in Baghdad
- 11-Apr 101st Airborne enters Baghdad
- 16-Apr Alert back to yellow
- 1-May Bush on deck of USS Abraham Lincoln, declares "major combat operations in Iraq have ended"
- 12-May Bombings in Saudi Arabia (May 12), Morocco (May 16)
- 20-May Orange alert—Boston, NY, in wake of Saudi Arabia and Morocco bombings
- 30-May Alert back to yellow
- 22-Jul Saddam Hussein's sons killed in shoot-out with American troops in Mosul
- 4-Sep DHS warning of al Qaeda plans to hijack airliners between international points and U.S.
- 21-Nov DHS urges vigilance in holiday season, refers to aircraft and chemical/hazmat facilities
- 13-Dec Saddam Hussein rooted out of spider hole
- 21-Dec Orange alert—"chatter" suggests could be holiday attack

2004	9-Jan	Alert back to yellow, but stays orange for NYC, LA, DC, and Las Vegas
	11-Mar	Madrid train bombings kill 191, injure 2,000 (no Orange Alert)
	24-Mar	Richard Clarke testimony before 9/11 Commission
	8-Apr	Condoleezza Rice testimony before 9/11 Commission
	29-Apr	Bush and Cheney testimony before 9/11 Commission in closed-door session
	26-May	Ashcroft warning of terrorist plans related to coming major political events
	28-May	Ashcroft-Ridge joint press release strikes calmer tone
	25-Jun	AP story about Fed. Election Assistance Comm. researching how to “cancel the election”
	25-Jun	“Fahrenheit 9/11” released in movie theaters
	1-Jul	Ashcroft in Miami: plot to attack U.S. this year is “between 75 and 90 percent complete”
	2-Jul	FBI urges increased vigilance for July 4th weekend
	8-Jul	Ridge reports al Qaeda plans major attack on U.S. to “disrupt our democratic process”
	22-Jul	9/11 Commission issues report: “We are not safe”
	26-29 Jul	Democratic National Convention
	1-Aug	Orange alert – DC, NY, northern New Jersey “iconic economic targets”
	4-Aug	Swift Boat Vets for Truth political ads begin (first of nine new ads released through 13-Oct)
	30-Aug-	Republican National Convention
	2-Sep	
	7-Sep	Cheney “wrong choice” comment concerning terror and 2004 Presidential election
	30-Sep	First Presidential debate (focusing on foreign policy and homeland security)
	5-Oct	Vice Presidential debate
	8-Oct	Second Presidential debate (town-hall debate on foreign and domestic policy)
	19-Oct	Progress for America Voter Fund releases “Ashley’s Story” political advertisement
	22-Oct	Bush-Cheney campaign begins using “Wolves” political advertisement
	2-Nov	Election Day
	10-Nov	Alert back to yellow

Source: Adapted from Davis, Silver, and Raile (2005).

Table B.1 Data Description

	Field Dates	N	Samples	Completion Rate	Language
Wave-1	November 15, 2001 to January 14, 2002	1,448	National, random digit dialing, oversamples of African Americans and Latinos	52.4 percent	English
Wave-2 panel	January 31, 2003 to May 28, 2003	679	Re-interview of wave-1 respondents ^a	46.9 percent	English and Spanish
Wave-2 new cross-section	January 31, 2003 to May 28, 2003	1,284	National random digit dialing, oversamples of African Americans and Latinos	41.1 percent	English and Spanish
Wave-3 all panel (W1+W2+W3)	July 20, 2004 to November 5, 2004	342	Re-interview of wave-1 and wave-2 respondents		English and Spanish
Wave-3 W2+W3 panel	July 20, 2004 to November 5, 2004	811	Re-interview of wave-1 and wave-2 respondents	41.3 percent	English and Spanish
Wave-3 new cross-section	July 20, 2004 to November 5, 2004	960	National random digit dialing, oversamples of African Americans and Latinos ^b	49.4 percent	English and Spanish

Source: Author's compilation.

The data from each wave are weighted to account for the oversampling of African Americans and Latinos, as well to adjust for differences by education, age, and sex between the respondents and the U.S. population for the year 2002.

a. In Wave-2, interviews were attempted only with respondents from the first wave who agreed to be recontacted (93 percent). Of the 1,298 who agreed, interviews were completed with 679 (53.2 percent). Most of the attrition was due to not being able to locate some respondents.

b. Follow-up interviews were attempted only with respondents from the second wave who agreed to be recontacted (95 percent). Of the 1,832 who agreed, interviews were completed with 811 (44.3 percent). Again, most of the attrition was due to not being able to locate respondents.

Table B.2 Assessment of Panel Differences (Differences in Means)

	Wave 1 Measures			Wave 2 Measures		
	Refused	Panel	t	Refused	Panel	t
Attitudinal						
Civil liberties	61.38	59.50	-1.52	56.10	58.52	1.66
Sociotropic threat	3.16	3.23	1.77	3.20	3.06	-2.94**
Personal threat	2.43	2.35	3.63**	2.43	2.19	-4.77**
Political trust	2.56	2.52	-1.19	2.54	2.50	-.94
Patriotism	4.68	4.65	.32	4.56	4.57	.33
Ideology	3.28	3.26	.78	3.33	3.11	-2.99**
Demographic						
Female	.55	.59	1.60	.61	.61	.06
Education	2.17	1.89	-4.67**	1.69	2.17	6.98**
Age	49.14	45.24	-4.32**	45.84	53.45	7.44**
African American	.17	.27	4.59**	.24	.16	-3.42**
Latino	.10	.18	4.42**	.30	.22	-3.42**
White	.71	.52	-7.47**	.42	.60	.06

Source: Author's compilation.

**p < .01.