possibility that other attacks were imminent and a sense of vulnerabili-
ty that the government response at times exacerbated. I am not seeking
to blame the government and political authorities or to suggest they
manipulated or took advantage of such emotions. The point I hope to
make clear is that the government was in a tenuous situation because it
is almost impossible not to enhance a sense of vulnerability when at-
tempting to warn people to be more vigilant. The automatic response,
of course, is that there must be a creditable threat if the government is
warning people about a possible threat, because people would not au-
tomatically assume that the government would manipulate the situa-
tion. This act alone, without any other form of government activity, is
probably enough to exacerbate perceptions of threat. But, there were
lapses in intelligence, the government did make false and inflamma-
tory statements and did entertain both domestic and international ac-
tivities that increased perceptions of vulnerability. This is also part of

Figure 2.1  Has War in Iraq Contributed to U.S. Security?
(Washington Post–ABC News Poll)

Source: Author’s compilation of data from Washington Post–ABC News Poll.
the evolving context and political environment surrounding the war on terrorism.

Over time, many individuals perceived government policies as less and less effective in ensuring security from terrorism. Again, a series of ABC News polls is instructive. Figure 2.2 shows the responses to the following question concerning the effectiveness of U.S. policies: “How much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. government to prevent further terrorist attacks against Americans in this country?” (“A Great Deal” and “A Good Deal” Combined). Beginning in September 2001, 66 percent of American citizens indicated confidence. This is not as an incredibly high level of support as one might expect, but is nonetheless strong. It declines sharply, however. Almost immediately, it drops by 14 percent but nearly rebounds to its previous level just as quickly. However, after January 2002, it drops again by more than 20 percent and never recovers to the September 2001 level. I
civil liberties, though this percentage decreased by 5 percent a year later. Seemingly inconsistent with this level of concern, though 53 percent of respondents considered it necessary for the average person to give up some civil liberties, 57 percent were personally willing to do so. Over time, there was virtually no change. In a 1996 Princeton Research Associates poll, 32 percent thought it would be necessary for the average person to give up civil liberties. To the extent that the term *civil liberties* elicits the same reaction as more specific values, about which I am extremely doubtful, this could not account for the lukewarm support abstract civil liberties received following the terrorist attacks. Rather, it attests to the influence of the threat of terrorism, and perhaps evidence of the beginning a “new normal.”

Figure 3.1 also shows responses to specific civil liberties contested after the 9/11 attacks. It is clear that though many responses to some specific civil liberties break down relative to the abstract question, others elicit greater protection from government encroachment. In moving from the abstract trade-off to specific trade-off questions, support depended on the particular civil right being contested. When the value trade-off decision was framed as a question about the need to be safe and secure versus judging people guilty by association, 72 percent supported treating people as guilty based on their associations. Although people’s willingness to judge others guilty by association is extreme, other appli-

---

**Figure 3.1** Civil Liberties Versus Security Responses, 2001

- Abstract Support 45% 55%
- Nonviolent Protest 10% 90%
- Racial Profiling 18% 82%
- Search and Seizure 25% 75%
- Wiretapping 35% 65%
- Detain Noncitizens 49% 51%
- National Identification Cards 54% 46%
- Teachers Criticize United States 62% 38%
- Guilty by Association 72% 28%

*Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).*
are no way near an absolute or unequivocal support for civil liberties or security. Preference for civil liberties over personal security is not a matter of people agreeing on a few items, but of consistently supporting the same position over a wide range of issues. In the first wave, less than 1 percent endorsed a security position across all of the items, and only 8 percent consistently preferred a civil liberties position. Sixty-one percent of first wave respondents answered at least 5 (a majority of the items) in favor of protecting civil liberties. This did not change much later in the second wave. In the third wave in 2004, there was a noticeable increase in support for civil liberties. Less than 1 percent continued to stake a strictly security claim, and 8 percent held a strictly civil liberties position. Sixty-five percent in the third wave answered a majority of the items in favor of civil liberties.

The intercorrelations (tau b values) between the trade-off items in table 3.2 reveal a series of moderate relationships. Falling well short of perfect colinearity, each item reflects a unique component of the conflict over rights. Knowing how individuals responded to the abstract support for civil liberties is a good predictor of support for NID, the detention of noncitizens, search and seizure, and electronic surveillance. Racial profil-
Table 3.1  Early Polling Questions on Civil Liberties Trade-Offs  
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>April 1995</th>
<th>July 1996</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Going too far</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gallup</td>
<td>For each of the following measures – please tell me whether you would support it as a way to reduce terrorist attacks, or whether you think it is going too far . . . Increasing surveillance of U.S. citizens by the government</td>
<td>(n = 601)</td>
<td>(n = 649)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average person to give up some civil liberties, or not?</td>
<td>(n = 1,032)</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would you be willing to give up some civil liberties if that were necessary to curb terrorism in this country, or not?</td>
<td>(n = 1,032)</td>
<td>(n = 1,572)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton Research Associates</td>
<td>How concerned are you that new measures enacted to fight terrorism in this country may end up restricting some of our civil liberties?</td>
<td>(n = 1,032)</td>
<td>(n = 1,572)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average to give up some civil liberties, or not?</td>
<td>(n = 1,500)</td>
<td>(n = 1,206)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilations.

Note: All percentages were recalculated excluding the “don’t knows” and “refusals.”
*aTo maintain consistency with the previous year, the four response categories (that is, “very concerned,” “somewhat concerned,” “not too concerned,” and “not concerned”) were collapsed to two categories.
An index derived from the combination of these questions about the trade-off between civil rights and security is the principal dependent variable in this book. I do not consider the determinants of the individual items unimportant, but the focus of this analysis is on the general sense of the compromise. As a result, the extent to which these items can be combined to form a single reliable scale is paramount. Assessing whether the civil liberties and security items reflect an underlying or latent value dimension is probably asking a great deal. Whereas many of the reliable indices in the social sciences (such as self-esteem, conservatism, dogmatism, and authoritarianism) were structured by independent conceptualizations, each item was written to reflect an important contested civil right in the context of the terrorist attacks. In planning the survey it was not clear whether citizens structured their civil libertarian beliefs along the lines indicated by these items. Additionally, though the specific tradeoff aspect may appear straightforward, the trade-off and value conflict approach may also make answering the questions difficult for some respondents. Because there is no middle position for respondents who might be able to understand both sides of the issue, the trade-off approach may compel some to take positions they may not totally support. These combined factors may diminish with the coherence of the items.

In spite of such drawbacks, a factor analysis using principled components factor extraction of the civil liberties and security items reported in table 3.3 suggests that the individual items form a reliable scale, though it goes without saying that it could be higher. Although the items produced three latent dimensions with eigenvalues of greater than 1.0, the factor loadings indicate that the first factor most likely represents the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2</th>
<th>Correlation Matrix of Civil Liberties Items, 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Abstract support</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Identification card</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guilt by association</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Detain noncitizens</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Racial profiling</td>
<td>.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Teachers criticize</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Search and seizure</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wiretapping</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Nonviolent protest</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Entries are tau-b’s, listwise N = 1,095.

*p < .05; **p < .01.
civil liberties trade-off. With the exception of nonviolent protest, which was not a major concern for many people in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the civil liberties items load moderately high on the first factor, which explains 26 percent of the variance—twice as much as the remaining two factors. Wiretapping, search and seizure, detaining noncitizens, freedom of speech, guilt by association, and racial profiling are all clearly associated with the first factor. Although using factor scores would be appropriate in constructing a scale for the value of the civil liberties trade-off, for ease of interpretation and to recapture missing cases, I chose to rely on an index based on the percentage of civil liberty responses out of the eight trade-off items. Correlated at .98, a factor score and my summary measure capture an essentially identical underlying civil liberties dimension. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha = .66) suggests that these items can be combined in a single index.

### Bivariate Analysis of Civil Liberties Trade-offs

Examining the convergent validity of the civil liberties trade-off index with social demographic and attitudinal factors is my first stab at understanding what is involved in the value compromise. This is very much a kitchen sink approach to analysis, trying out relevant factors related to the trade-off decision without first laying out theoretical expectations for each. My intent is to explore the convergent validity of the trade-off measure. Table 3.4 shows the univariate statistics for the civil liberties trade-
off index by various demographic variables, and Table 3.5 shows the same by attitudinal variables. The next chapter develops the underlying theoretical connection of the various factors. For now, I consider social demographic explanations to reflect broader historical and cultural contexts, and the attitudinal measures to reflect different reactions to the terrorist attacks. However, this cursory view of the univariate statistics is a good start in anticipation of developing a theoretical model.

Clearly, race and ethnicity will be an important part of the story behind the willingness to compromise civil liberties for security. African Americans appear more committed to civil liberties: 10 percentage points higher than whites, and 14 percentage points higher than Latinos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.4</th>
<th>Mean Civil Liberties Responses by Social Demographics, 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 11 years</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced degree</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 to 24</td>
<td>68.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>59.9</td>
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<td>30 to 39</td>
<td>59.7</td>
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<td>40 to 49</td>
<td>60.9</td>
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<td>50 to 59</td>
<td>57.6</td>
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<td>60 and older</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small city, town</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>57.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>58.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01.
Such racial and ethnic distinctions raise important questions about how aggrieved groups in American society respond when an external enemy attacks the country. Because these differences remain robust in the following chapters, additional analyses are required to determine whether
tacks. As people began to anticipate an unknown risk, however, the emotional reaction is perhaps most appropriately described as anxiety, which can be just as debilitating and politically important as fear. Because the basis of both fear and anxiety is a concern that something bad is going to happen (or is happening) or a perceived threat and vulnerability, I use these terms threat and vulnerability rather than fear and anxiety to describe a range of emotions experienced after the terrorist attacks.

One of the few attempts to comprehend the consequences of threat, terror management theory (TMT) links individual reactions to a heightened sense of threat and anxiety to political and social behavior. Although it does not explain why people perceive threats or why they become vulnerable, it does explain how the emotional consequences of threat lead to support for political authorities, national identity, and the trade-off of civil liberties for security. According to TMT, the desire for survival and the awareness of the inevitability of death heightens individual perceptions of threat and potential for terror, but individuals can manage their anxiety by employing direct, rational, and threat-focused defense mechanisms (Greenberg et al. 1990; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon 1997). The initial response to heightened awareness of death is to engage in simple, threat-focused defenses to eliminate conscious thoughts of it. Individuals also seek to bolster their self-esteem by intensifying their loyalty to their cultural worldviews. In threatening situations, people seek a connection to a larger belief system and the vali-

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**Figure 4.1** Theoretical Model of the Civil Liberties and Security Trade-Off

![Theoretical Model of the Civil Liberties and Security Trade-Off](image)

*Source: Author’s compilation.*
as a measure of personal threat. This scale is intended to simplify analyses, but also capture a general sense of personal vulnerability.3

As a follow-up to the sociotropic threat question, an open-ended question probing respondents’ causes of concern was included in a survey of the state of Michigan in the summer of 2005.4 Despite the time gap and different sample, the verbatim responses are useful in understanding the force behind the sustained sense of threat and vulnerability among American citizens. Even at this late date, I suspected that many of the policies the Bush administration proposed, which were intended to make people feel secure in the long term, had the opposite effect in the short term. Following the closed sociotropic threat question, respondents who were either “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about the United States coming under another attack (63 percent), were asked an open-ended follow-up question: “What is causing you to be concerned about the possibility of another terrorist attack?” Respondents were able to answer in their own words. A content analysis of the verbatim re-

Figure 4.2 Distribution of Responses to Sociotropic and Personal Threat Items

political trust. For instance, figure 4.3 shows the predicted civil liberties responses that are conditional on how much people trust the federal government and the level of sociotropic threat. Taking into account that the effect of trust on support for civil liberties depends on how threatened people feel, each line represents a different degree of sociotropic threat. At almost every level, increased political trust is associated with decreased support for civil liberties. Especially among those who claim at least some trust in the federal government, greater concern about another terrorist attack is associated with greater willingness to cede some civil liberties for greater security and safety. The two variables clearly interact with one another, however. At low levels of trust in the government, those most concerned about another attack differ little from those with little or no concern in their support for civil liberties. The predicted civil liberties line for individuals who are not concerned about another attack is essentially flat, meaning that under no level of trust are they willing to concede their civil liberties for security. However, among those who have some or significant trust in the government, greater concern about another attack is associated with markedly less support for civil liberties. In short, trust in government and threat can combine to have powerful effects on support for civil liberties. At one extreme, individuals who do not feel threatened and “never” trust the government sup-

Figure 4.3  Effects of Trust in Federal Government and Sociotropic Threat on Support for Civil Liberties

port civil liberties positions between 67 and 72 percent of the time. At the other extreme, those who do feel threatened and “always” trust the government support the civil liberties positions only 46 to 50 percent of the time.

Like the previous chart, figure 4.4 is based on model 2 in table 4.3. That is, the relations between support for civil liberties, sociotropic threat, and political ideology are adjusted for the effects of other variables in the equation (for example, personal threat, trust in government, dogmatism, faith in people, and national pride). On the whole, liberals are more protective of civil liberties than moderates, and moderates are more protective of civil liberties than conservatives. But for each ideological group, the level of support depends on the perceived level of threat. For all three groups, the greater the sense of threat, the lower the support for civil liberties. Extreme liberals who are not concerned at all about the likelihood of another terrorist attack support 74 percent of the civil liberties positions. Liberals who are very concerned about another attack support register 64 percent. The analogous percentages for extreme conservatives are 66 percent and 50 percent. Thus, whatever their ideological position, respondents’ willingness to exchange liberties for security in-

Figure 4.4  Effects of Liberalism-Conservatism and Sociotropic Threat on Support for Civil Liberties, 2001

increases with their perceptions of sociotropic threat. Far from wishing to commit constitutional suicide, in the face of a terrorist threat, both liberals and conservatives endorse granting greater authority to the state. Indeed, liberals who are very concerned about the possibility of a future attack support fewer civil liberties positions than conservatives who are not at all concerned do.

Although figure 4.5 shows that at all levels of sociotropic threat African Americans support civil liberties more than whites do, it also reveals the fundamental similarity between Latinos and whites in support for civil liberties among those who express some or significant concern about another attack. I again find that, regardless of race or ethnicity, people are more willing to exchange civil liberties for security if they are more afraid. The amazing story here is that blacks at all levels of sociotropic threat were more protective of civil liberties than whites and Latinos, but were still willing to cave in to their threat to a certain degree. Also, whites and Latinos reacted very similarly, or at least responded very similarly, to the same level of threat. Such differences are not statistically significant given the small samples sizes for Latinos, but clearly at all levels of threat Latinos were less protective of civil liberties than blacks.
Table 4.1  Open-Ended Response to Sociotropic Threat Question, 2005

“What is causing you to be concerned about the possibility of another attack?”

1. National security – 40 percent
   Examples: “If it happened once it can happen again.”
   “Not enough security.”
   “The London attack.”

2. Situation in the Middle East – 22 percent
   Examples: “Everything is going on in Iraq.”
   “They have not caught Bin Laden.”
   “In a country we should not be in.”

3. World situation/American foreign policy – 9 percent
   Examples: “America went to Iraq without approval from European Union.”
   “Our lack of friendship toward other countries.”
   “The USA takes control over other countries.”

4. Immigration – 6 percent
   Examples: “Letting too many people in the country without knowing who they are.”
   “Everything is still going on, letting them come to this country.”
   “It’s so easy to come here and do whatever they want to, we let everybody in.”

5. Trust in Bush and political leaders – 5 percent
   Examples: “Don’t like the way the Bush administration is handling all of this.”
   “The way the country is being run.”
   “The government is lying to the public.”

6. Media – 5 percent
   Examples: “Listening to the media.”
   “Things you hear in the news.”
   “See it on the news everyday.”

7. General hatred toward the U.S. – 4 percent
   Examples: “Widespread hatred of the U.S. around the world.”
   “The amount of hate that George W. has created for Americans around the world.”
   “Because so many countries dislike us.”

8. Domestic consequences – 4 percent
   Examples: “Prices of gas going up.”
   “The rate of inflation and the rise of gas.”
   “Jobs are leaving.”

9. Personal issues – 2 percent
   Examples: “I’m a firefighter.”
   “Have parents and children who are living abroad.”
   “Son in the military.”

Note: These data come from a survey that is part of the quarterly State of the State Surveys series in Michigan. N = 577.
Table 4.2  Mean Threat Perceptions by Social Demographics, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sociotropic Threat</th>
<th>r/Significance Level</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Personal Threat</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r/Significance Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race-ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>−.02/.36</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>.23/.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>.04/.14</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>.14/.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
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<td>2.13</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>.08/.00**</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>.21/.00**</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>381</td>
<td>2.39</td>
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<td>Some college</td>
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<td>2.07</td>
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<td>Advanced degree</td>
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<td>146</td>
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<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 to 24</td>
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<td>.14/.00</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1.98</td>
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<td>235</td>
<td>2.24</td>
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<td>60 and older</td>
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<td>340</td>
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<td><strong>Community size</strong></td>
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<td>257</td>
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<td>Small city, town</td>
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*Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).*
* *p < .05; **p < .01.*
Table 4.3  OLS Regression of Determinants of Civil Liberties Trade-Offs, 2001

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<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<td>-4.74**</td>
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<td>-1.31</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.98)</td>
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<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.38</td>
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<td>(1.44)</td>
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<td>-.12</td>
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<td>(1.11)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.62)</td>
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<td>-.18</td>
<td>-4.49**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>African American</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
<td>-5.09*</td>
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<td>(2.41)</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.78</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.65)</td>
<td>(.65)</td>
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<td>Sex (1 = female)</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>-.13</td>
<td>-1.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
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<td>Sociotropic threat × political trust</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(8.33)</td>
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<td>.20/.19</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Table 5.1  Distribution of Civil Liberties Counterarguments, 2001

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Initial Position</th>
<th>Counterarguments</th>
<th>Less Democratic</th>
<th>No Difference</th>
<th>More Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Crime to belong to terrorist organization; guilt should not be determined by association.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Crime to belong to terrorist organization (security)</td>
<td>Suppose people were judged guilty by association rather than by a crime they committed</td>
<td>36.7 (349)</td>
<td>48.4 (460)</td>
<td>14.9 (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Innocent (civil liberties)</td>
<td>Suppose people are actually supporting terrorists activities</td>
<td>54.9 (217)</td>
<td>31.4 (124)</td>
<td>13.7 (54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Noncitizens suspected of belonging to terrorist organization should be detained indefinitely; no one should be held for long without being formally charged with a crime.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Detained as long as it takes (security)</td>
<td>Suppose innocent people could be locked up for a very long time without being charged with a crime</td>
<td>17.2 (111)</td>
<td>40.8 (271)</td>
<td>42.0 (263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Oppose detaining noncitizens (civil liberties)</td>
<td>Suppose detaining them would prevent them from committing other crimes</td>
<td>43.1 (313)</td>
<td>33.8 (245)</td>
<td>23.1 (168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Law enforcement should be to stop or detain people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds; racial profiling harasses innocent people just because of their race or ethnicity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Allow racial profiling (security)</td>
<td>Suppose this leads to unequal treatment of people just because of their race or national origin</td>
<td>38.8 (83)</td>
<td>49.1 (105)</td>
<td>12.2 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Oppose racial profiling (civil liberties)</td>
<td>Suppose people from certain racial or ethnic backgrounds were actually more likely to commit crimes</td>
<td>14.4 (163)</td>
<td>70.3 (798)</td>
<td>15.3 (174)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2  Effects of Dogmatism on Counterarguments, 2001 (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>No Change</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Net Change</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a. Initially supported security</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on crime to belong to terrorist</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low dogmatism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium dogmatism</td>
<td>x²(4) = 10.15; p = .038</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High dogmatism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>1b. Initially supported civil</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberties on crime to belong to</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on indefinite detention</td>
<td>Low dogmatism</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium dogmatism</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x²(4) = 5.63; p = .228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. Initially supported civil</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberties on indefinite detention</td>
<td>Low dogmatism</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Note: Because the initial dogmatism is a scale ranging from 1 to 5, it was reduced to a three-category measure to simplify the analysis: Low is identified as the scale score ranging from 1 and less than 2.5, medium is greater than 2.5 and less than 3.5, and high is greater than or equal to 3.5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Security</th>
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<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Net Change</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>20</td>
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</table>

Note: To simplify the analysis, political ideology was collapsed from a five-category (that is, very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, and very liberal) measure to a three-category measure.
Table 5.4  Effects of Race and Ethnicity on Counterarguments, 2001  
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Net Change</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1a. Initially supported security on crime to belong to terrorist organization</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>573</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1b. Initially supported civil liberties on crime to belong to terrorist organization</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>African American</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>Latino</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3a. Initially supported security on racial profiling</strong></td>
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<td>$x^2(4) = 6.73; p = .151$</td>
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### Table 5.5  
Effects of Sociotropic Threat on Counterarguments  
(Percentages)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Security</th>
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<th>Net Change</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very concerned</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat concerned</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very concerned</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all concerned</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
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<td>$\chi^2(4) = 3.53; p = .740$</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1b. Initially supported civil liberties on crime to belong to terrorist organization</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Very concerned</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not at all concerned</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\chi^2(4) = 13.26; p = .039$</td>
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<td><strong>2a. Initially supported security on indefinite detention</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all concerned</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
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<td>$\chi^2(4) = 10.78; p = .095$</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>2b. Initially supported civil liberties on indefinite detention</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Very concerned</td>
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<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all concerned</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2(4) = 11.97; p = .063$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3a. Initially supported security on racial profiling</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very concerned</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat concerned</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2(4) = 2.12; p = .908$</td>
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<td><strong>3b. Initially supported civil liberties on racial profiling</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Very concerned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not at all concerned</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2(4) = 29.27; p = .000$</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).*
results suggest that it was appropriate to analyze blacks in separate equations, they also confirm my expectations. Whites may have the luxury of thinking mainly about the source of threat from the attacks, but blacks may perceive multiple threats in a national crisis—the threat from terrorism and from the government itself—and support civil liberties more strongly. To be more exact, among African Americans who initially opposed treating contributions to terrorist organizations as a crime, a heightened sense of sociotropic threat led to greater support for civil lib-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Terrorist Organization</th>
<th>Detaining Citizens</th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initially Pro-Security</td>
<td>Initially Pro-Civil Liberties</td>
<td>Initially Pro-Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
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<td>−.30*</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal threat</td>
<td>−.19**</td>
<td>−.04</td>
<td>−.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>−.16*</td>
<td>−.07</td>
<td>−.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>−.13*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reported ideology</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>−.15</td>
<td>−.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>−.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X²</td>
<td>35.81</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>9.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
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<td>383</td>
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</table>

Note: Dependent variable: change in civil liberties direction. 1 = civil liberties response, 0 = no change, −1 = security response. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Table 5.7  Ordered Probit Analysis of Counterarguments on Survey Experiments (African Americans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Terrorist Organization</th>
<th>Detaining Citizens</th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
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<td>.66**</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal threat</td>
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<td>-.74**</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reported ideology</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>-.99**</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.66**</td>
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<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X²</td>
<td>42.65</td>
<td>49.57</td>
<td>29.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable: change in civil liberties direction. 1 = positive civil liberties response, 0 = no change, −1 = positive security response. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.

properties after a counterargument that, in effect, reminded them of actions that law enforcement officers could take. The significant and positive coefficient suggests that African Americans, rather than moderating their positions in the face of sociotropic threat, became even more committed to civil liberties on hearing the consequences of strict adherence to civil liberties. This relationship must be regarded with some circumspection, however. The coefficients of measures of personal threat suggest that a heightened sense of personal threat leads to moderate support for civil liberties regardless of where one begins. This result is the only instance in which this happened. I rely on the two remaining experiments to clarify.
respondents in a survey “about events that have taken place since September 11.” Although the questions about perceptions of threat were at the beginning of my questionnaire, respondents may have been self-selected to some degree based on their being more concerned about terrorism than the average person. Second, the volatility in levels of sociotropic threat shown in the Gallup, CBS News, and Pew Surveys may be partly
ishes over time, it remains relatively strong. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the bivariate correlation is −.24. The sign is in the right direction, but it declines to −.22 in 2002. Two years after the attacks, it declines again to −.13. A similar weakening role of threat can also be seen in the lagged correlations with support for civil liberties. Thus, departing from the cross-sectional analysis in chapter 4, the bivariate relationship between sociotropic threat and civil liberties using panel data suggests a much weakened relation. Which of the remaining factors will be able to account for the increased support for civil liberties?

**Declining Trust**

Whereas threat and vulnerability were the most dramatic consequence of the September 11 attacks, by far the most dramatic change in the years that followed involved the declining trust in political authorities and the support for President Bush in particular. As noted in chapter 4, the immediate aftermath witnessed a general acquiescence and unprecedented increase in political trust, despite cynicism toward government about the 2000 presidential elections (Price and Romantan 2004). As illustrated in the monthly percentage of political trust in figure 6.3, not since the Kennedy administration in the mid-1960s has political trust breached 60 percent. Domestic issues, dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War, and Watergate in the late 1960s and early 1970s began a gradual decline in trust.
that bottomed out in 1980. It recovered briefly with the first Reagan administration, but by the end of the 1980s it was in another downturn. By 1994, it was at its lowest level since the measure had been introduced, but afterward fluctuated without fully recovering. Polling data taken in March 2001 indicated that 30 percent of American citizens said they trusted the government “just about always” or “most of the time.” After the attacks, Gallup data indicated that 65 percent trusted the government. This tide of good will was short lived. By December 2001, polling data revealed that trust in government had declined to 49 percent. This decline is supported by my data as well, in which 51 percent of American citizens trusted the government. The high level of political trust, which it ultimately could not sustain, gave the government considerable flexibility in conducting the antiterrorist campaign. The increase in trust was a direct result of the terrorist attacks and the decrease was a reaction to governmental efforts to provide for the safety and security from terrorism, such as the Patriot Act and the challenge to civil liberties.

The attacks of September 11 reflect an incredible period of partisan and ideological depolarization, in which individuals placed greater faith in the government and expected the government to protect them in turn. Because of their sense of threat and patriotism, people were probably willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt; likewise, the de-
The Patriot Act

Although the focus has been on the underlying civil liberties issues that the Patriot Act raised, an interesting question is how effective citizens perceived the act in combating terrorism. Do the factors that drive the trade-off decision also drive the explicit support for the act? Despite President Bush’s having signed the act into law on October 26, 2001, no survey questions addressed this issue in the first wave of the data.

I included a question on the effects of the Patriot Act on security in the two subsequent surveys. From the distribution of responses to this question, shown in figure 6.4, few people thought that the act itself would decrease their security. Although 31 percent thought it would have little impact, twice as many (62 percent) thought it would heighten security. This is a ringing endorsement, despite the problems that some citizens have with certain aspects of the legislation. The Patriot Act was viewed positively and as increasing security against terrorism. Despite the controversy, which involved allegations of civil rights abuses and a desire in the Bush administration to make certain temporary provisions permanent, perceptions of effectiveness remained high. There was only a 4 percent decline in the perceived effectiveness of the Patriot Act from 2002 to 2004. Thus, though people were willing to move to a more civil libertar-

---

**Figure 6.4**  Perceptions of Effect of Patriot Act on Security, 2002 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Second Wave</th>
<th>Third Wave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Security</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Impact</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Security</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“What Effect Will the Patriot Act Have on Your Security Against Terrorists?”

*Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2002, 2003).*
ian position after the attacks, support for the Patriot Act faltered only slightly.

To shed some light on this finding, another question explored the perceived effects of the Patriot Act on civil liberties and civil rights. This is a different question in the sense that it asks about the specific effect of the act on civil liberties. Responses are illustrated in figure 6.5. Considering that relatively few people thought the act would increase their civil liberties, perceptions were basically divided into two camps: 40 percent thought the act would reduce their civil liberties and 46 thought it would have little impact. In the third wave, these numbers shifted to 46 percent and 43 percent. The story these figures tell suggests that though the Patriot Act was perceived as effective, it was also seen as having a price tag on civil liberties.

**Conclusion**

The September 11 terrorist attacks were expected to forever change the American way of life. American citizens, many argued, would have to get used to a new normal, in which their well-being would be connected to that of the rest of world, and in which they would have to tolerate greater limitations on their civil liberties and freedom. I show that this
be caught up in such a predicament, denied other legal rights, such as the right to legal representation, and possibly jailed for more than three years. Others may have understood the issue, but nonetheless acquiesced to a popular presidential administration. However, as the deten-

Table 6.1 Analysis of Civil Liberties Trade-offs by Panel Waves

Panel A. Civil Liberties Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 2 New Case</th>
<th>Wave 3 New Case</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification cards</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt by association</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detain noncitizens</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers criticize</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-.98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and seizure</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiretapping</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent protest</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2.85**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>1,450</td>
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<td>1,284</td>
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</table>

Panel B. Cross-Tabulations by Wave 1 and Wave 2

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<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>High Security</th>
<th>Low Security</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Low Civil Liberties</th>
<th>High Civil Liberties</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
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<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>229</td>
</tr>
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<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>163</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$X^2(16) = 380.76$, $p = .000$

Note: The civil liberties measure is the percentage of supportive responses on the nine civil liberties items. To simply the interpretation, the civil liberties measure was divided into five equal categories: 1 to 20 is high security support, 21 to 40 is low security support, 41 to 60 is moderate support, 61 to 80 is low support, and 81 to 100 is high support.

*p < .05; **p < .01.
tack on Iraq, which began while the second wave was in the field. Moreover, concern for flying on an airplane increased in wave 2 by 9 percent, but by the third wave this was 9 percent lower than the immediate reaction following the September 11 attacks. Along with no airplane-related attacks or crashes occurring, the strict security measures in airports and by the airlines are probably linked to this reduced threat. In the end, when combining the personal threat items into a single index minimizes the idiosyncratic component of each item, I found that the sense of personal threat declined significantly over the three waves of the survey.

Panel B presents the cross-tabulations of sociotropic threat in the first and second waves. Based on these results, the aggregate responses obviously masked a great deal of movement among respondents. To the ex-

### Table 6.2 Analysis of Threat Perceptions by Panel Waves (Percentages)

**Panel A. Threat Responses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Perception</th>
<th>Wave 2 New Panel Case</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Wave 3 New Panel Case</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying in airplane</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening mail</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>−5.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety of food and water</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>−4.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being in tall buildings</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>−3.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being in stadiums or crowds</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>−2.99**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean personal threat</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>5.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B. Cross-Tabulations by Wave 1 and Wave 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1 Threat Perceptions</th>
<th>Not at All Concerned</th>
<th>Not Very Concerned</th>
<th>Somewhat Concerned</th>
<th>Very Concerned</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all concerned</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very concerned</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat concerned</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very concerned</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: To simplify the analysis, response categories “Very concerned” and “Somewhat concerned” are combined in panel A.

\[ x^2(9) = 237.48; p = .000 \]
Table 6.3  Analysis of Political Trust by Panel Waves, 2001 and 2002 (Percentages)

Panel A. Political Trust Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel</td>
<td>New Case</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust government to do what is right</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government run for the benefit of all</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B. Wave 1 and Wave 2 of Cross-Tabulations of “Trust Government to Do What Is Right”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1 Trust Perceptions</th>
<th>Wave 2 Trust Perceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Some of the Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C. Wave 1 and Wave 2 Cross-Tabulations of “Government Run for the Benefit of All”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1 Trust Perceptions</th>
<th>Government Run by a Few Big Interests</th>
<th>Government Run for the Benefit of All</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government run by a few big interests</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government run for the benefit of all</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For “trust government to do what is right,” “Always” and “Most of the time” are combined in Panel A.
\[ x^2(9) = 203.27; p = .000 \] for Panel B.
\[ x^2(9) = 139.07; p = .000 \] for Panel C.
weight to subsequent support for civil liberties. A higher previous level is associated with a decline in support for civil liberties over time. Individuals who previously valued security over civil liberties become more likely to support civil liberties in the future, and vice versa. In other words, people were likely to moderate their views over time.

Second, as expected, change in sociotropic threat did not produce a statistically significant influence on change in the trade-off decisions. Although a previous sense of sociotropic threat made people more concerned about security than civil liberties in the third wave, sociotropic threat lost its power to predict change. In these analyses, sociotropic threat and the trade-off decisions were only moderately related, and appeared to evolve in different directions. Threat tended to increase slightly over time, but respondents who were probably most threatened initially began to moderate their security positions more than those who had held civil liberties positions.

Third, higher initial trust in government, as well as increasing trust in

### Table 6.4 Analysis of Patriotism by Panel Waves (in Percentages)

**Panel A. Proud to Be an American**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panel</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very proud</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat proud</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very proud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>1,284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B. Cross-Tabulation of Proud to Be an American by Wave 1 and Wave 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1 Pride Perceptions</th>
<th>Wave 2 Pride Perceptions</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Very</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very proud</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note:* To simplify the analysis, “Not very proud” and “Not proud at all” were combined to form four categories for Panel A.

\[ x^2(16) = 502.69; p = .000 \] for Panel B.
government over time, is associated with a greater willingness to trade
civil liberties for greater security. Both regression coefficients are large
and statistically significant. As a result, political trust plays a more im-
portant role in the extent to which people were willing to change their
trade-off decisions. Among the explanatory factors, political trust de-
clined the most over the three years after 9/11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change from Wave 1 to Wave 2</th>
<th>Change from Wave 2 to Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties (wave 1 or 2)</td>
<td>−.43** (0.04)</td>
<td>−.43** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat (wave 1 or 2)</td>
<td>−.37 (1.28)</td>
<td>−2.84 (1.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in sociotropic threat</td>
<td>−.39 (1.25)</td>
<td>−2.06 (1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust (wave 1 or 2)</td>
<td>−3.11** (0.51)</td>
<td>−1.46* (0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in political trust</td>
<td>−.87 (0.53)</td>
<td>−2.37** (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism (wave 1 or 2)</td>
<td>−2.56 (1.60)</td>
<td>−1.36 (1.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in patriotism</td>
<td>−2.64 (1.49)</td>
<td>−1.30 (1.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>−.47 (0.77)</td>
<td>−3.29** (0.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>5.16* (2.78)</td>
<td>8.55* (3.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>3.45 (2.89)</td>
<td>−14.00** (5.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−2.53 (1.62)</td>
<td>5.70** (2.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>55.57** (8.69)</td>
<td>60.50 (10.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²/adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.25/0.23</td>
<td>0.33/0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>18.17</td>
<td>16.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01.
Fourth, despite significant reductions in the sample proportion of African Americans in the subsequent waves, race continues to be a very important factor shaping support for civil liberties. The positive coefficient for blacks indicates that, everything else being equal, they were more likely than whites to support civil liberties more strongly a year later. This overwhelming support is consistent with findings in chapters 4 and 5. By the third panel wave, blacks are no longer distinctive, but again, some caution should be used, given the reduced number of black panel respondents.

Overall, the major factors accounting for the level of support for civil liberties in the cross-sectional analysis reported in chapter 4 are also important in accounting for change in support for civil liberties over time. Perhaps the most telling result of our examination of longitudinal change in support for civil liberties, however, is that change in sociotropic threat does not have nearly the impact of change in political trust. Another way to look at the relative strength of the various explanations is to compare the standardized variables across each period. Table 6.6 reports the standardized OLS coefficients for each cross-section. Several important conclusions can be drawn from this table. Consistent with the noted results, sociotropic threat and trust were the two most important explanations of the trade-off decision in the immediate aftermath of the attacks (chapter 4). A year later, sociotropic threat and political trust declined significantly in importance, being surpassed by political ideology and patriotism. In 2004, however, although ideology and patriotism retained their relevance, trust regained its potency and sociotropic threat remained significant, but not as powerful in the immediate aftermath.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.6</th>
<th>Cross-Sectional Determinants of Civil Liberties Trade-Offs (Standardized Regression Coefficients)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>−.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal threat</td>
<td>−.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>−.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>−.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>−.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>−.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = female)</td>
<td>−.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 1226</td>
<td>N = 1671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*p < .05; **p < .01.
were simply willing to suffer in silence, acquiesce, and tolerate a certain amount of dissonance to solve the pressing problems facing the country. Partisans can, and frequently do, support opposing party positions without feeling pressure to change their attachments. Despite prior polarizing views, Democrats operating from a variety of motivations (such as fear, threat, patriotism) could be expected to support the policies of a Republican president, and their willingness to acquiesce need not be interpreted as acceptance or conversion. As mentioned, it could have been simply tolerance, or fear of being seen as un-American, as disloyal, or as weak. Meanwhile, their existing partisan orientation may have strengthened. This is what might be expected from terror management theory (chapter 4).

Figure 7.1 uses monthly Gallup data to show the change in party affiliation from January 2001 to January 2006. As Abramson and Ostrom (1994) have shown, we should expect some volatility from the Gallup measure. At first glance, the figure gives the appearance of instability as both Democratic and Republican identifiers bounce around. However, swings in party affiliation following the attacks are relatively small—usually within sampling error—and short-lived. Early in Bush’s first

Figure 7.1  Monthly Party Affiliation

![Graph showing monthly party affiliation from January 2001 to January 2006](image)

Question: “In Politics, as of Today, Do You Consider Yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?”

Source: Author’s compilation of data from Gallup Poll.
Note: Each point represents an average of monthly surveys.
sans to basically repolarize. Figure 7.2 shows President Bush’s monthly approval ratings by partisanship in the months leading up to the attacks, and for three years afterward. Following the 2000 presidential elections, partisan identifiers were understandably highly polarized in their opinions of President Bush. Given the contentiousness of the election, there was no reason to be cooperative. In June 2001, 30 percent of Democratic identifiers approved of Bush, and 92 percent of Republican identifiers and 59 percent of independent identifiers approved of him. Although issues such as the economy and tax cuts exacerbated partisan differences, the 2000 election figured prominently in the level of partisan polarization. The attacks of September 11 led to a depolarization or rally effect among Democratic identifiers, but this level of support was only temporary (Jacobson 2005). Although the initial approval of the president was well over 90 percent among Republicans and more than 80 percent among Democrats, approval among Democratic identifiers fell off fairly quickly, as if they were turned off by the president’s initial rhetoric and framing of the attacks. The pace of declining approval reversed briefly
with the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, but this reprieve did not last long. By September 2004, Republican identifiers retained very high approval for President Bush, above 85 percent, but approval among Democrats was at its all-time low, below 20 percent. To appreciate the extent of polarization during this event, one has to go back to Eisenhower’s administration in 1956 to find a comparable partisan difference.

President Bush’s approval for the handling of the war against terrorism follows a similar pattern in figure 7.3. In January 2002, when ABC News began asking this question, Democratic and Republican identifiers were very close. Over 80 percent of Republicans approved, and despite showing signs of more volatility than previous performance measures, did not drop below 75 percent. Independents remained between Republican and Democratic identifiers. As the war unfolded amidst growing criticism that the president and Secretary of State Colin Powell misled the country on the justification for war, approval among independents and Democrats continued to decline significantly. Saddam Hussein’s capture led to a temporary increase in Bush’s approval rating but the partisan gap on the war was over 65 percent three years later.

**Figure 7.3** Presidential Approval on War Against Terrorism by Partisanship (Washington Post–ABC News)

*Source: Author’s compilation of data from Washington Post–ABC News Poll.*
Indicative of the partisan disagreement on the invasion of Iraq, a large gap existed initially between Republicans’ and Democrats’ perceptions of the president’s handling of the war with Iraq. As figure 7.4 suggests, Republicans were highly supportive of Bush’s handling of the Iraq war and they did not appear to be phased too much by the allegations of the false pretenses of going to war or the capture of Saddam Hussein. Among Democrats, as the time wore on their initially lukewarm support for Bush’s handling of the war deteriorated, though there was a temporary increase in response to Saddam Hussein’s capture.

Partisan perceptions of President Bush’s handling of the economy (figure 7.5) continue the previous patterns. Despite claims that the attacks created the economic recession, they actually occurred in the middle of a recession and during ongoing collapses in both business investment and the stock market. Although the process leading to recession can be traced to 2000, the attacks of September 11 exacerbated it by undermining consumer confidence and producing joblessness. It was estimated that from September to December of 2001, the economy lost more than 1 million jobs. Democrats’ approval briefly increased after the at-
attacks, though it was considerably less than the level of general presidential approval or perceptions of handling of the war in Iraq. Thus, issues not directly connected to terrorism temporarily benefit from Democratic willingness to rally around the president following the attacks. Republicans continued to overwhelmingly approve of the president. Political independents rallied somewhat, but this was also short-lived. Neither the war in Iraq nor the capture of Saddam Hussein translated into positive perceptions of the economy. By January 2003, Democrats were solidly polarized, with less than 20 percent approving of Bush’s economic performance.

These graphs support the general conclusion that while Republicans hardly wavered in their support for President Bush, Democratic identifiers depolarized following the terrorist attacks, but this was extremely short-lived. Immediately, perceptions of presidential performance began to decline, eventually culminating in extreme partisan polarization. I now turn to how individual-level partisanship and ideology may have been shaped by the context of threat.⁹

---

**Figure 7.5** Presidential Approval on the Economy (Washington Post–ABC News)

*Source: Author’s compilation of data from Washington Post–ABC News Poll.*
partisanship. Taking advantage of my three-wave panel, respondents are classified by the total distance they move on the party identification question across all three waves. For instance, if a weak Democrat in the first wave moved to being independent in the second, and then to a weak

Table 7.1  Analysis of the Stability of Party Identification, 2001, 2002, 2004 (Percentages)

Panel A. Cross-Tabulation of Wave 1 and Wave 2 Partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Strong Democrat</th>
<th>Weak Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Weak Republican</th>
<th>Strong Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B. Partisan Stability Across All Waves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x²(16)</td>
<td>832.86; p = .000 for Panel A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p &lt; .01.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This analysis is based on the five-category partisanship measure. The percentage of stable identifiers and the correlation across waves increase if a three-category partisanship measure is used.
crepancy also existed a year after the attacks. In the first wave, whites were slightly more liberal than their Republican affiliation suggested, but a year later, their liberal discrepancy increased. Partisanship among Latinos following the 9/11 closely matched their ideological identities. However, in the second wave, they developed a more conservative identity than expected from their Democratic affiliation. These findings are

Table 7.2 Cross-Tabulation and Correlations Between Party Identification and Ideology

Panel A. Cross-Tabulation in Wave 1 (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisanship</th>
<th>Very Liberal</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Very Conservative</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B. Mean Discrepancies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C. Correlations by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Panel A Note: To simplify the analysis, initial seven-point scales were reduced to five-point scales in which leaning independents were treated as pure independents.

\[ x^2(16) = 286.34; p = .000. \]

Panel B Note: This measure of discrepancy was derived by subtracting party identification from ideology. High positive values indicate party identification is more liberal than ideology.
after the attacks, fostered by other events, such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, but continued patriotism also increased support for conservative appeals. However, unlike threat and patriotism, political trust changed in a way that did not support the president

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.3</th>
<th>OLS Regression of Explanations of Self-Reported Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Identifiers</td>
<td>Independent Identifiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>-.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²/adjusted R²</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The dependent variable is the self-reported ideology. High values on the dependent variable indicate strong conservative identification.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Partisanship was not included in my analysis of civil liberties (chapter 4) because I did not expect it to be meaningful in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks and in context of the other variables it was up against. However, as ideological and issue preferences realign with partisan attachments, partisanship should regain its connection to the trade-off decision.

I analyze the bivariate relation between partisanship and the various civil liberties items following the attacks in table 7.5 (panel A). Partisanship is definitely related, at least in the bivariate case, to the trade-off between civil liberties and security. Democrats support civil liberties more
than Republicans do, but even Republicans support civil liberties strongly. With the exception of strong Republican identifiers in wave 2 and wave 3, a majority of Republican identifiers have supported civil liberties. I do not wish to portray Republican identifiers as blinded by security concerns, because the data clearly suggest the opposite. Support for civil liberties over security boils down to degrees, whereby Democratic identifiers supported civil liberties more. Individuals who claim they do

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A. Civil Liberties by Partisan (Means)</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>−.17**</td>
<td>−.19**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B. Civil Liberties by Ideology (Means)</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong conservative</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong liberal</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>−.26**</td>
<td>−.34**</td>
<td>−.35**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel C. Correlations</th>
<th>Wave 1 Partisanship</th>
<th>Wave 2 Partisanship</th>
<th>Wave 1 Ideology</th>
<th>Wave 2 Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>−.23</td>
<td>−.21</td>
<td>−.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>−.07</td>
<td>−.24</td>
<td>−.20</td>
<td>−.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>−.08</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>−.10</td>
<td>−.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>−.04</td>
<td>−.10</td>
<td>−.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ciotropic threat and patriotism, lose some of their influence, but nonetheless remain quite important in structuring trade-off decisions. This general pattern of effects is also confirmed by the analysis of panel respondents. Again, partisanship increases its structuring ability by the third wave. Political trust becomes more important and so-ciotropic threat becomes less so. The influence of patriotism increases in the second wave, but continues to be significant.

### Conclusion

The question motivating this chapter involves the extent to which political partisanship structured individual reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11, during a brief period of depolarization between the two major political parties. I have argued that with events such as the attacks, individuals are moved by their sense of threat, trust, or patriotism to take

---

**Table 7.6**  Unstandardized Regression for Predictors of Civil Liberties and Security Trade-Offs by Panel Respondents, 2001, 2002, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Panel Respondents</th>
<th></th>
<th>Panel Respondents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>Wave 3</td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-3.00**</td>
<td>-2.01**</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.55)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td>(.64)</td>
<td>(.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-2.92**</td>
<td>-5.28**</td>
<td>-3.51**</td>
<td>-3.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.64)</td>
<td>(.69)</td>
<td>(.69)</td>
<td>(.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>-6.33**</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>-1.71**</td>
<td>-7.96**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.88)</td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td>(.96)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>-2.47**</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
<td>-4.41**</td>
<td>-6.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.90)</td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>-5.72**</td>
<td>-6.14**</td>
<td>-5.56**</td>
<td>-4.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>6.37**</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>(2.71)</td>
<td>(3.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>-3.34</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-3.48</td>
<td>-5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.23)</td>
<td>(2.56)</td>
<td>(2.72)</td>
<td>(3.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>22.16</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>19.69</td>
<td>21.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients; t statistics are in parentheses.
*p < .01; **p < .05.

---
perhaps harkens back to a period when blacks were more supportive of political institutions (see Gibson and Caldeira (1992). Higher levels of education are associated with greater political trust among Latinos, but not among blacks. Whether or not survey respondents were born in the United States did not affect their trust in the government. The most impressive result of this part of the analysis, however, is the difference between blacks, Latinos, and whites in the effect of perceptions of sociotropic threat on trust in government. As figure 8.1 shows, with each step up in concern about another terrorist attack on America, Latinos and whites put more trust in the government and blacks put less. The more strongly blacks sense the external threat of terrorism, the more guarded their support for the government is.

Because there is generally no greater object of political trust than the president, there is a question concerning the extent to which political trust captures an evaluation of President Bush. The vast majority of Americans rallied to the president in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 90 percent as reported in a Gallup survey. As can be seen in figure 8.2, President Bush’s job performance was rated very high among all three groups in the National Civil Liberties Survey: 92 percent of whites, 88 percent of Latinos, and 77 percent of blacks supported him.
This level is statistically significant: each group can be considered highly supportive. President Bush also received extremely strong support for his handling of the war on terrorism: 95 percent of whites, 86 percent of Latinos, and 80 percent of African Americans gave this rating. There is no significant difference between general approval of the president and of his handling the war on terrorism. Moreover, given the initial high level of approval, an interesting question is what caused individuals to rally around the president, even those who might have questioned his electoral victory in the 2000 election. Logit estimates of a model predicting support for Bush, reported in table 8.2, show that blacks were less likely to approve than whites were, everything else being equal. Latinos were not statistically distinct from whites. It is clear from this model that threat did not work to Bush’s advantage early on. Partisanship, as opposed to political ideology (see chapter 7), and patriotism across all groups were the driving forces behind approval of the president immediately after the attacks. As with most rally events, people looked to the president for comfort and guidance and perhaps thought it their duty and obligation to support him.

It is worth noting that sociotropic threat among African Americans is significant and negatively related to the approval of President Bush. For whites and Latinos, it is positive but inconsequential. Taken together with the effects for political trust, it is again clear that blacks became
Support for Democratic Norms

Support for the “operating rules and the rules of the game” conveys a different dimension of system support. According to Easton (1965), for decisions “to be accepted as binding, the members would need to accept some basic procedures and rules relating to the means through which controversy over demands was to be regulated and work out some ends that would at least broadly and generally guide the search for such settlements” (191). Support for democratic norms involves endorsing the rules of the political order and democratic governance. This dimension became especially relevant after 9/11, reflecting the extent to which commitment to fundamental values may be challenged in a crisis. Support for abstract democratic values is derived from five survey questions tapping a generalized commitment to the democratic rules of the game, such as the right of someone suspected of treason to be released on bail, equal protection under the laws, freedom of speech, and the right against self-incrimination. Figure 8.3 illustrates support for democratic principles following the attacks. The question of posting bail for treason is the only factor that seems to be influenced by events surrounding the terrorist attacks. Perhaps reflecting an aspect of patriotism, relatively few people were willing to support bail for a person suspected of treason, though blacks (32 percent) were more so than whites and Latinos. How-

![Figure 8.3](image_url)

**Figure 8.3** Favorable Responses to Democratic Norm Items, 2001

As an indicator of attachment to the political community, I use a measure of national pride, typically viewed as a component of patriotism (Hurvitz and Peffley 1990; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). National pride captures an affective attachment to the larger political community, society, and people who share a common political identity. This form of patriotism is the last of three dimensions of system support Easton considered essential for a system to persist. The bivariate results indicate that all groups have high levels of affective attachment to the American political community. Slightly higher, though statistically insignificant, percentages of whites (95 percent) than blacks (92 percent) said that they were proud to be Americans. At the same time, 85 percent of Latinos said the same thing. Based on the multivariate results reported in table 8.4, a heightened sense of sociotropic threat led to greater patriotism in the overall equation. People under a heightened sense of threat clearly supported the political community more. A conservative belief system and older individuals were associated with heightened sense of patriotism and a connection to a larger political community, whereas higher levels of education led to a weakened attachment to the political commu-

**Figure 8.4** Predicted Support for Democratic Norms, 2001

*Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).*
tional pride among all three groups. Whites, blacks, and Latinos all gravitated toward the national community, but it is clear that they did not do so at the same level or rate. The slope of the line for Latinos is steeper than the lines for whites or blacks. A sense of sociotropic threat had a greater influence on Latinos, and at the same level of threat, whites and Latinos were always more patriotic than blacks were. Nonetheless, blacks were not out of sync with whites and Latinos. But, given the small cell frequencies and large standard errors, they are likely to be essentially the same.

Definitions of American Citizenship

Here I am interested in the extent to which definitions of American identity and citizenship became more intolerant and restrictive among individuals under a heightened sense of threat. So far, I have relied on individuals’ perceptions of a liberal democracy: basically, the support for freedom, civil liberties, and political authorities. Liberal definitions of identity assume that race, ethnicity, and religious preferences are not barriers to supporting the rules of the game, whereas a nativist conceptualization of identity makes a very explicit claim about ascribed racial and ethnic characteristics. Unlike a liberal conceptualization, American identity that related to democratic support and inclusion, a normative or eth-

Figure 8.5  Predicted National Pride, 2001

The willingness to serve in the military, however, was a consensus across all three groups.

To what extent did the context of heightened threat, political trust, and patriotism after September 11 give rise to a more restrictive conception of what it means to be an American? This is the question to which I now turn. To facilitate the analysis of a restrictive American identity, an additive scale was created using the five items. A high score indicates a restrictive view, and a low one indicates an egalitarian view. OLS regression results of the standard set of variables predicting support for a restrictive American identity are presented in table 8.5. Although none of the standard set of predictors are statistically significant for Latinos, the results reveal important features of the context for blacks and whites. For both, higher levels of education are related to a less restrictive view. Older African Americans and whites, however, seem to develop a more restrictive concept. In the context of the terrorist attacks, patriotism, perhaps touching more of its ethnocentric roots, leads to a restrictive American identity. A heightened sense of sociotropic threat produces a restrictive view of American identity among blacks, but among whites and Latinos is unrelated. This suggests that under a heightened sense of threat, blacks might be reminded of how different they are from what they perceive as equality. For whites, the basis of equality and an Amer-

Figure 8.6 Responses to Qualities of a True American, 2001

responsibility because they were very familiar with and sensitive to the effects of U.S. policies on other countries, in particular those in Latin America. In other words, Latinos were more likely to share the perceptions of many foreigners. The extent to which responses to the question of U.S. responsibility are driven by race and a sense of threat is another important dimension of people’s reactions to the attacks and their perceptions of the political system. Politically alienated groups, or groups with a peripheral view of the American political system, may be more likely to attribute some responsibility to U.S. policies and behavior abroad, whereas members of the dominant culture may not see such a connection.

Using the same set of predictors, I analyze the factors that may underlie the belief that the United States was responsible for the hatred that led to the events of September 11. OLS estimates of the single item reveal (column 1 in table 8.6) that a heightened sense of sociotropic threat is not related. However, supporting the conclusions in figure 8.6, Latinos are more willing than whites to assign blame. Disaggregating the analysis by race and ethnicity reveals that the regression line for sociotropic threat for whites and blacks is virtually flat, but increases for Latinos. Although for the most part the reactions of Latinos to the threat of terrorism resembled those of whites, Latinos had distinctive views of the
economic aid: 69 percent of African Americans, 49 percent of Latinos, and 56 percent of whites. Similarly, concerning the United States not providing enough economic aid, 60 percent of blacks and 55 percent of Latinos considered this an important or very important root cause of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, versus only 41 percent of whites.

Although this graphical illustration is suggestive, it does not establish a clear link between perceptions of causes and the feelings of U.S. responsibility. To address this issue, I regressed perceptions of U.S. responsibility on each of the perceived root causes of terrorism by race and ethnicity, controlling for other factors. This allows us to understand better what people might have had in mind when assessing U.S. responsibility. Based on the standardized regression coefficients reported in table 8.7, respondents had several important issues in mind. Whites’ perceptions stems from several different sources, but the most important are the United States’ pursuing its own interests abroad and meddling in the affairs of the other countries. The extent to which respondents consider the Islamic religion a root cause of terrorism is not a contributing factor. Among blacks, perceived hatred is linked to its meddling in the affairs of other countries and the support for Israel. However, blacks do not see

---

**Figure 8.8** Distribution of Responses to U.S. Responsibility Items, 2001

| Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001) |
| Note: Responses are those who “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” to U.S. responsibility. |
in the federal government decreased among blacks but increased among whites. Thus, when the country faced a national crisis, blacks trusted political authorities less, and whites and Latinos gravitated toward them. Chapter 4 argued that during a national crisis, political authorities are likely to encroach on individual rights and civil liberties, which blacks are especially unwilling to concede. Whites, by contrast, place greater trust in political authorities to help assuage their fears. This could be based on a realistic assessment that providing greater support for the government will reduce threat. Latinos similarly exposed to the threat of terrorism behaved more like whites. As their level of threat increased, so did their trust in government, but less than whites.

A wellspring of trust exists among older African Americans, which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.1</th>
<th>OLS Regression Coefficients of the Determinants of Trust in Federal Government, 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal threat</td>
<td>–.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ideology</td>
<td>–.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.13**</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.03*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>–.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>–.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in United States</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²/adjusted R²</td>
<td>.04/.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
more suspicious and less trusting as the sense of threat and vulnerability increased. I argue that such a finding is expected. A healthy sense of distrust has been a functional and integral component of the African American response to politics for some time.

### Table 8.2 Logit Coefficients of Model Predicting Bush Approval, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>U.S.-Born Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>−.52*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal threat</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>−3.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative ideology</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.35*</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.74**</td>
<td>1.03**</td>
<td>.88**</td>
<td>1.94*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.97**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>2.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>−1.50**</td>
<td>.92**</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.49)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−.24</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>−1.10</td>
<td>−1.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>−.02</td>
<td>−1.12</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>−.70**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>(6.75)</td>
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<td>1084</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>148</td>
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</table>

*Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).*

*Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*

*p < .05; **p < .01.
minimal and the predicted regression line is quite flat. Latinos, by contrast, started from a slightly higher level of commitment to democratic norms under the no-threat condition, but their predicted support for democratic norms declined substantially as the perceived level of sociotropic threat increased. Thus, only among Latinos did higher sociotropic threat produce a weaker commitment to fundamental democratic norms. Unlike questions about trust in political authorities, blacks are not significantly different from whites in their support for democratic norms.

Table 8.3  OLS Regression Coefficients of the Determinants of Democratic Norms, 2001

<table>
<thead>
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<td>(.08)</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>−.06</td>
<td>−.06**</td>
<td>−.07</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
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<td>−.08*</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>4.13**</td>
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<td>.15/.14</td>
<td>.18/.16</td>
<td>.09/.08</td>
<td>.55/.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1100</td>
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<td>689</td>
<td>119</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
nity. Disaggregating the effects by social groups revealed a similar influence of threat in increasing support for the political community across the groups. This suggests that blacks, whites, and Latinos were influenced in similar ways.

A plot of the regression estimates in figure 8.5, based on the group equations in table 8.4, shows a positive relationship between sociotropic threat and national pride for all three groups. At each level of perceived threat, whites and Latinos showed greater national pride than blacks did, but an increasing sense of threat was associated with greater na-

### Table 8.4  OLS Regression Coefficients of the Determinants of Patriotism (National Pride), 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>African American</th>
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<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.11**</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
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<td>(.06)</td>
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<td>.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<td>(.04)</td>
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<td>−.07**</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Latino</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>(.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²/adjusted R²</td>
<td>.15/.14</td>
<td>.20/.18</td>
<td>.10/.09</td>
<td>.39/.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1236</td>
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</table>

*Source: National Civil Liberties Survey (2001).*

*Note: Standard errors in parentheses.*

*p < .05; **p < .01.*
The identity is not determined by sociotropic threat but tied instead to political conservatism, patriotism, and personal threat.

**Table 8.5** OLS Regression Coefficients of a Restrictive American Identity, 2001

<table>
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<th>African American</th>
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<td>(.05)</td>
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<td>.35/.33</td>
<td>.24/.23</td>
<td>.07/.02</td>
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<td>.48</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>1198</td>
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<td>765</td>
<td>126</td>
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*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Underlying many reactions to 9/11 was a belief that the United States and its policies were to blame for the hatred that led to the attacks. As if
Many issues may come to mind when individuals are asked to reflect on the degree of U.S. responsibility. Following the attacks, public speculation and agonizing in the media was rife about why the terrorists hate America, but theories that highlighted teachings of Islam and hatred of American democracy were more prominent. For instance, in a speech before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush suggested that

<table>
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<td>(.15)</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
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<td>(.47)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
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<td>.05/.04</td>
<td>.04/.01</td>
<td>.02/.01</td>
<td>.41/.39</td>
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<td>1.18</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.89</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1231</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>783</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
pursuing national interests abroad as contributing to the hatred. Latinos, on the other hand, see this as an important factor, but not the support for Israel. In sum, although there is a general perception that U.S. policies and meddling in the affairs of other countries are linked to how the United States is perceived abroad, blacks are the most likely to perceive the support for Israel as a significant factor.

Respondents who were more likely to perceive terrorists as wanting to highlight their grievances were more likely to believe the United States was liable for the hatred directed toward it. The same applies across the board for citizens who believed that the United States meddles too much in the affairs of other countries.

**Conclusion**

Because of greater psychological distance from the political system and political authorities, aggrieved citizens, such as African Americans, might be expected to have less sympathy for a political system when it is attacked. Political disaffection has been said to produce a level of resentment toward the political system: the government, political authorities, and the norms under which it operates. As a consequence, when the government is attacked and needs the support of its citizens, aggrieved groups would not be expected to acquiesce to government requests. Aggrieved groups would not necessarily present an internalized threat to
nistic feelings toward evangelical, fundamentalist, and born-again Christians than toward more mainline Protestant groups. Furthermore, Christian fundamentalists were considered a negative political reference group, diminishing support for groups closely associated with them, such as the Republican Party and GOP presidential candidates (Bolce and de Maio 1999).

Americans’ affection for Latinos is lower than it is for blacks and whites. In 2000, Latinos were ranked just below environmentalists and Protestants, though affective evaluations of Latinos have improved over time. In 1976, Latinos received a 55 degree feeling thermometer rating, 6 degrees lower than blacks. Before the attacks, affection for Latinos increased steadily to 64 degrees. Latinos continue to be associated, however, with negative issues, such as immigration and making illegitimate demands on the political system. Blacks as a social group were viewed relatively positively in 1964, with a 63 degree rating. Before the terrorist attacks, in 2000, positive affect toward African Americans had increased to 67 degrees. Americans were also relatively sup-
attacks exacerbated negative perceptions, making policies that limit the behavior and civil liberties of Islamic fundamentalists—such as racial profiling, strict immigration rules, and violations of habeas corpus—more tolerable. Such policies would probably receive majority support.

Arabs, though also seen in a negative light, are not considered as extreme as Islamic fundamentalists. Respondents looked on Arabs with suspicion and perceived them as possibly sympathetic to foreign terrorists. The level of antipathy for Arabs is probably not enough to produce consensus on measures to curtail their freedom, but as seen following the attacks, Arabs and those perceived as Arab were targets of violence, intimidation, and discrimination by political authorities and citizens. Because of a perceived connection to terrorists, citizens attributed certain motives and behavior to Arabs.

Because the country fixated on Islamic fundamentalists and Middle Easterners as inspiring the greatest threat and anxiety, an important question I might ask is how were other social groups in American society
talists (figure 9.5), but under a heightened sense of threat, they developed more negative perceptions of Arabs. In short, Latinos and whites perceived Islamic fundamentalists more negatively than blacks did, but the level of threat did not seem to matter much. This suggests a more complex process that is not being captured in the bivariate relation. Also, although whites, blacks, and Latinos evaluated their own social groups more positively than other groups, only among Latinos did a high level of threat result in positive in-group affect. However, a high level of threat also made Latinos turn away from Jews.

The perceptions of blacks, Latinos, and whites of each other underscore the results from previous chapters. Although whites had positive affect toward blacks and Latinos, a heightened sense of threat among whites led to more negative perceptions of Latinos. Concerns about immigration likely drive this reaction. Latinos might not pose a direct threat in the context of terrorism, but the issue of their immigration status may resonate with whites concerned about future terrorist attacks. Among blacks, a heightened sense of threat led to positive evaluations of whites. This is a big turnaround, considering that blacks under low threat perceive whites more negatively. It is perhaps a sign of terror management theory that blacks may gravitate very slightly toward whites when the country is attacked, but certainly not to the extent that they do toward Latinos. Latinos were perceived positively by blacks, but the

**Figure 9.3** Mean Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Sociotropic Threat (White Respondents)

![Figure 9.3](attachment:image.png)

Figure 9.4  Mean Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Sociotropic Threat (Black Respondents)


Figure 9.5  Mean Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings by Sociotropic Threat (Latino Respondents)

202   Negative Liberty

Table 9.1  Perceptions of Islam before September 11, 2001
(Percentages)

“What is your impression of the religion called Islam?”
   Haven’t heard enough to say 56
   Very favorable 2
   Somewhat favorable 12
   Somewhat unfavorable 11
   Very unfavorable 11

“When you think of the religion called Islam, what comes to your mind?”
   Nothing (27) Fanatics-Zealots
   The Middle East (13) Great Religion
   The Arab countries (8) Anti-Israel
   Black Muslims (3) Violence-Terrorism
   Iran (2) Foreign religion
   Ayatollah Khomeini Mohammed
   Saddam Hussein Mecca
   Rev. Louis Farrakhan War
   Malcolm X Israel
   Fundamentalism Other
   Anti-American Not Sure
   Women subservient Refused

“Do you think the religion called Islam is compatible with western style political democracy or is Islam basically an anti-democratic religion?”
   Democrat 10
   Antidemocratic 41
   Not sure 45

“Do you think the religion called Islam poses a threat to the security to the United States and its western allies or not?”
   Not threat 38
   Major 13
   Minor 15
   Not sure 30

Source: Los Angeles Times (February 18–19, 1993).
Note: This survey was a national survey with a sample of 1,273.

since 1988, when the NES first asked about them in a feeling thermometer. With a raw feeling thermometer score of 51 degrees, Christian fundamentalists were also perceived somewhat negatively in the late 1980s as the religious right began to exert greater political influence and take positions on abortion, school prayer, and homosexuality. According to Louis Bolce and Gerald de Maio (1999), citizens developed more antago-
tain minorities might be at greater risk if whites’ sense of identity becomes activated in context.

### Social Group Affect and Threat

The relative feeling thermometer ratings for the seven groups following the terrorist attacks of September 11 are illustrated in figure 9.2. As expected, Islamic fundamentalists were looked on least favorably. Although all groups evaluated Islamic fundamentalists and Middle Easterners negatively, blacks had the least negative opinion, and the difference is notable. However, it is this sort of consensus on maligned groups that can lead to political repression. Sullivan and his colleagues (1982) observed that when there is no general consensus on threatening groups (pluralistic intolerance), it is difficult to get majority support for policies constraining their behavior. Repression is facilitated when citizens agree generally, and are able to zero in on a group. The context of the terrorist
conditioned by their perceptions of the Nation of Islam, regardless of whether there is no direct link to Islam and Islamic fundamentalism.

### Table 9.3  OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings, 2001

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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.

**Did Americans Gravitate Toward Others After the Attacks?**

This chapter began with a very big assumption, that Americans reached out or gravitated toward each other in response to the horror of the Sep-
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Table 9.5  OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings (Black Respondents)

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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Table 9.6  OLS Regression of Relative Feeling Thermometer Ratings (Latino Respondents)

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<td>(1.57)</td>
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<td>(1.07)</td>
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05; **p < .01.
## Appendix A

### Terror Event Timeline

Table A.1  Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11-Sep</td>
<td>World Trade Center and Pentagon struck by airplanes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14-Sep</td>
<td>President at Ground Zero: “The people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-Sep</td>
<td>President speaks to the nation in Joint Session of Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-Oct</td>
<td>Anthrax death: Robert Stevens first of five to die, awakens national concern about bioterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7-Oct</td>
<td>Invasion of Afghanistan (“Operation Enduring Freedom”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-Oct</td>
<td>Office of Homeland Security set up in White House, headed by Tom Ridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-Oct</td>
<td>President signs USA Patriot Act after overwhelming support in Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-Nov</td>
<td>Taliban flee Kabul, Northern Alliance enters on 13-November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-Nov</td>
<td>AA Flight 587 crashes shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia, initial concern it is caused by terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22-Dec</td>
<td>“Shoe bomber” Richard Reid attempts to blow up Paris to Miami flight, subdued by crew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>17-Jan</td>
<td>Ashcroft, Mueller news conf.—release tapes recovered from rubble of Afghanistan, name suspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-Jan</td>
<td>Ashcroft, Mueller news conf—release photos of five suspected terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29-Jan</td>
<td>Ashcroft press release announces heightened security at Winter Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29-Jan</td>
<td>Bush State of Union: “states in the…axis of evil…pose a grave and growing danger.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-Feb</td>
<td>Terrorism alert (before the color-coded scheme introduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-Feb</td>
<td>Winter Olympic Games open in Salt Lake City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24-Feb</td>
<td>Winter Olympic Games end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27-Feb</td>
<td>Terrorism alert ends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-Mar</td>
<td>Color-coded “Homeland Security Advisory System” created by presidential order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

225
26-Aug Cheney to VFW in Nashville: “The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action” in Iraq.

10-Sep Orange alert – anniversary of 9/11 (first actual use of color-coded system)

12-Sep Bush to UN General Assembly: Iraqi regime a threat to the UN and to peace

24-Sep Alert back to yellow

4-Oct “Shoe bomber” pleads guilty, sentenced to 20 years

11-Oct Congress authorizes the use of U.S. military force against Iraq

12-Oct Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist bomb in Bali nightclub kills 202 people

25-Nov Homeland Security Act signed by President, authorizes Dept. of Homeland Security

2003

24-Jan Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) opens, ending WH Office of Homeland Security

29-Jan Bush State of Union: “If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”

5-Feb Colin Powell addresses UN Security Council on Iraq denial and deception on WMD

7-Feb Orange alert (run on sales of duct tape and plastic sheeting)

13-Feb Law enforcement, Americans brace for imminent attack on NY, DC, or FL: “dirty bomb scare”

27-Feb Alert back to yellow

1-Mar DHS absorbs 180,000 employees from other agencies and offices

1-Mar Announcement of arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Pakistan

17-Mar Bush 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein

17-Mar Orange alert (DHS announces “Operation Liberty Shield”)


25-Mar Texas oil plants on terror alert

9-Apr Saddam Hussein statue pulled down in Firdos Square in Baghdad

11-Apr 101st Airborne enters Baghdad

16-Apr Alert back to yellow

1-May Bush on deck of USS Abraham Lincoln, declares “major combat operations in Iraq have ended”

12-May Bombings in Saudi Arabia (May 12), Morocco (May 16)

20-May Orange alert—Boston, NY, in wake of Saudi Arabia and Morocco bombings

30-May Alert back to yellow

22-Jul Saddam Hussein’s sons killed in shoot-out with American troops in Mosul

4-Sep DHS warning of al Qaeda plans to hijack airliners between international points and U.S.

21-Nov DHS urges vigilance in holiday season, refers to aircraft and chemical/hazmat facilities

13-Dec Saddam Hussein rooted out of spider hole

21-Dec Orange alert—“chatter” suggests could be holiday attack
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9-Jan Alert back to yellow, but stays orange for NYC, LA, DC, and Las Vegas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11-Mar Madrid train bombings kill 191, injure 2,000 (no Orange Alert)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24-Mar Richard Clarke testimony before 9/11 Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-Apr Condoleezza Rice testimony before 9/11 Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29-Apr Bush and Cheney testimony before 9/11 Commission in closed-door session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-May Ashcroft warning of terrorist plans related to coming major political events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28-May Ashcroft-Ridge joint press release strikes calmer tone</td>
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<td></td>
<td>25-Jun AP story about Fed. Election Assistance Comm. researching how to “cancel the election”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-Jun “Fahrenheit 9/11” released in movie theaters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-Jul Ashcroft in Miami: plot to attack U.S. this year is “between 75 and 90 percent complete”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-Jul FBI urges increased vigilance for July 4th weekend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-Jul Ridge reports al Qaeda plans major attack on U.S. to “disrupt our democratic process”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22-Jul 9/11 Commission issues report: “We are not safe”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-29 Jul Democratic National Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-Aug Orange alert – DC, NY, northern New Jersey “iconic economic targets”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-Aug Swift Boat Vets for Truth political ads begin (first of nine new ads released through 13-Oct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-Aug-Republican National Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-Sep Cheney “wrong choice” comment concerning terror and 2004 Presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-Sep First Presidential debate (focusing on foreign policy and homeland security)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-Oct Vice Presidential debate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-Oct Second Presidential debate (town-hall debate on foreign and domestic policy)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>19-Oct Progress for America Voter Fund releases “Ashley’s Story” political advertisement</td>
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<tr>
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<td>22-Oct Bush-Cheney campaign begins using “Wolves” political advertisement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2-Nov Election Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-Nov Alert back to yellow</td>
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*Source: Adapted from Davis, Silver, and Raile (2005).*
Table B.1  Data Description

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<th>Samples</th>
<th>Completion Rate</th>
<th>Language</th>
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<td>Wave-1 November 15, 2001 to January 14, 2002</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>National, random digit dialing, oversamples of African Americans and Latinos</td>
<td>52.4 percent</td>
<td>English</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave-2 panel January 31, 2003 to May 28, 2003</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>Re-interview of wave-1 respondents(^a)</td>
<td>46.9 percent</td>
<td>English and Spanish</td>
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<td>Wave-2 new cross-section January 31, 2003 to May 28, 2003</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>National random digit dialing, oversamples of African Americans and Latinos</td>
<td>41.1 percent</td>
<td>English and Spanish</td>
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<td>Wave-3 all panel (W1+W2+W3) July 20, 2004 to November 5, 2004</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>Re-interview of wave-1 and wave-2 respondents</td>
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<td>English and Spanish</td>
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<td>Wave-3 W2+W3 panel July 20, 2004 to November 5, 2004</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>Re-interview of wave-1 and wave-2 respondents</td>
<td>41.3 percent</td>
<td>English and Spanish</td>
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<td>Wave-3 new cross-section July 20, 2004 to November 5, 2004</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>National random digit dialing, oversamples of African Americans and Latinos(^b)</td>
<td>49.4 percent</td>
<td>English and Spanish</td>
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</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.

The data from each wave are weighted to account for the oversampling of African Americans and Latinos, as well to adjust for differences by education, age, and sex between the respondents and the U.S. population for the year 2002.

\(^a\) In Wave-2, interviews were attempted only with respondents from the first wave who agreed to be recontacted (93 percent). Of the 1,298 who agreed, interviews were completed with 679 (53.2 percent). Most of the attrition was due to not being able to locate some respondents.

\(^b\) Follow-up interviews were attempted only with respondents from the second wave who agreed to be recontacted (95 percent). Of the 1,832 who agreed, interviews were completed with 811 (44.3 percent). Again, most of the attrition was due to not being able to locate respondents.
Table B.2  Assessment of Panel Differences (Differences in Means)

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*Source: Author’s compilation.*

**p < .01.