

Appendix I

Remarks of Alexander Aleinikoff

I'll make four brief comments.

First, I would like us to recall what many of us said during the debates on the 1996 welfare legislation. Some of us—most of us?—spoke in fairly apocalyptic terms: “This is a watershed.” “The legislation breaks the bargain that America has always made with its immigrants.” The Clinton Administration made passing a welfare reform law a top priority, but the provisions on means-tested assistance to immigrants were not part of the original administration proposal. Because of the opposition of some within the administration to the immigrant provisions, the president’s signing statement included language stating that the administration would work to restore benefits to permanent resident aliens. The data that has been presented here provides a mixed picture regarding our fears and warnings. For lawful permanent residents (LPRs), welfare (TANF) and food stamp usage went down (as we had worried they would); but Medicaid usage seems to have gone up and SSI usage has stayed stable. These are, I think we must concede, somewhat surprising findings.

And as to the claim that the legislation breached a nation - immigrant contract, it’s not clear to me that we’re in a fundamentally different place today than we were ten years ago. The states have stepped up to help preserve the contract; the five-year rule is not a lot different from long-standing policy directed at excluding from admission persons who are likely to become public charges. So too current legislative proposals for regularization programs that would give legal status to millions of undocumented migrants is evidence that we haven’t fundamentally shifted our views about what is owed to immigrants who contribute to the nation. If there has been a watershed event in how we conceptualize immigrants and immigration, it was September 11th—not the 1996 legislation. Can it be comforting for us to have been wrong about the dire consequences of the 1996 Act?

My second point is that the aftermath of the 1996 legislation is further evidence of the regular and repeated failure of US immigration laws and policy. This was surely true for IRCA, a statute that failed entirely of its purpose to end undocumented migration by imposing sanctions on employers. We have been presented here with pretty good evidence that the 1996 welfare law likewise failed—if, as Ron Haskins has suggested, its primary purpose was to get immigrants off means-tested benefits.

Third, a comment about the need for further study. There was great concern in 1996 that the new sponsorship rules would have a dramatic impact on immigrant admissions. Some went so far as to claim that these provisions were intended as a low-visibility way

to reduce overall immigration to the United States. While we know that immigration levels have not declined, we really don't have any good data on the impact of the sponsorship requirements; nor do we have, until now, much evidence on the impact of the welfare rules on immigrant poverty levels. Perhaps, again, it would be better to see these provisions—like IRCA's employer sanctions—as more symbolic than substantive; that is, legislators could point to tough provisions in the new law, reasonably safe in the knowledge that they would never be effectively enforced. It would be interesting, I think, to see what data can be gathered on the impact of the sponsorship rules.

My final comment relates to broader theories of membership and citizenship. I am able to identify three distinct views in the chapters and discussion today. The first I'll call the *nationalist* perspective. The central idea—shared by perhaps most Americans—is that citizenship matters and that distinctions between citizens and noncitizens are frequently justified. One can visualize this model as a set of concentric circles. Citizens are at the core, and an individual's possession of citizenship guarantees him or her to equal access to all of society's rights, benefits, and entitlements. LPRs are in the next circle, and nonimmigrants and undocumented migrants are in circles further out. The farther one gets from the core, the lesser the claim to social, political, and economic rights. From this perspective, the purpose of the 1996 welfare law was to draw a hard, dark circle around the inner core—identifying a set of entitlements available only to citizens.

The second view I'll call the *integration* perspective. It is the view that LPRs are in effect citizens-in-training and that treating them equal to citizens might be a good thing. Hiroshi Motomura develops this approach at length in his new book, *Americans in Waiting*. The idea is that giving LPRs benefits early enhance their integration, both because of the material support it provides and because of the message it sends.

A third perspective I'll label the *residence-as-membership* perspective. This view finds support in human rights law and also in the language of the US Constitution, which does not limit its protections to citizens but guarantees equal protection to all "persons" within the jurisdiction of the United States. Mike Wishnie's contribution describes a checkered story at the local level, but I read things a bit more optimistically. In many communities, LPRs are seen as (nearly) full members. Even undocumented migrants can attain some degree of "membership": consider that a number of large cities prohibit their officials from inquiring about the legal status of residents and that undocumented children (thanks to the Supreme Court's decision in *Plyler v. Doe*) are guaranteed the right to attend public schools.

Which of these perspectives apply here? I have heard a range of answers. As to the current political climate, it seems that the nationalist perspective is very strong. The intuition is that citizenship—such a scarce and valuable status—must mean something, and what better way to make it mean something than to provide some benefits to citizens that are not provided to noncitizens. The "bargain" that Haskins describes in his

chapter may resonate more deeply with most Americans than the bargain described by opponents of the 1996 legislation; it is just this: America will take you in and provide you with a number of benefits—free schools, access to courts, a rule of law—but you are responsible for your economic well-being until you fully join us as a citizen. But even if this accurately describes our theoretical approach, does it correctly portray American practice? I would suggest that the residence-as-membership view gets it right as a matter of our day-to-day life, where in our communities we tend to treat people as members irrespective of their immigration status.

As a matter of policy, it may be that the second view—the integration perspective—provides a useful way to steer between the exclusionary tendencies of the nationalist perspective and the unrealistic idealism of the residence-as-membership approach. That is, if one is of the view that our welfare laws should be more inclusive—should give benefits to LPRs, refugees, and other classes of immigrants—but also believes that such a policy is not sustainable on the residence-as-membership claim, then it might be advisable to make the case in terms of integration—that is, that these immigrants are on the road to citizenship and that we are going to make them better citizens by treating them like citizens sooner. And the claim becomes even stronger when one points to the harms imposed on citizen children by denying their immigrant parents benefits.

Let me conclude with a methodological question that the day's discussion has brought out. How do we create further opportunities for cross-disciplinary research and conversation? This workshop has put in the same room two groups that don't usually spend a great deal of time together: social scientists and lawyers. We have, I think, learned a fair amount from each other. But there is a bigger possible pay-off in terms of conceptualization and theory. Take, for instance, the integration perspective I have briefly sketched. The lawyers have a theory that welfare benefits should be extended to LPRs because it is likely to enhance integration and ultimately practices of citizenship. The social scientists may have ways of demonstrating what the lawyers are willing to simply assert. Conversely, the lawyers may provide conceptual approaches that help the social scientists work out the policy implications of their research.

Appendix II

Remarks of Roberto Suro

My reflections today begin with a need to contextualize welfare starting with the notion that immigration since the mid-1990s has to be viewed as a very distinct phase of a broader era of immigration that dates back to the 1960s or 1970s. Both the nature of immigration and the public reaction to it have been fundamentally different in last ten years. Consider the changes in the size of immigration flows, changes in the communities of origin and destination, and the role of immigrants in the labor force. There have also been changes in the context of reception, and I think that welfare reform has to be seen as a very important touchstone in the analysis of the way the context of reception has changed over the past ten years.

Changes in the context of reception have paralleled changes in the nature of immigration flows since the mid-1990s and together they constitute a clearly definable phase in the current era of migration to the United States. The adoption of welfare reform stands as a seminal moment at the onset of this new phase in the immigration saga.

In that context, I think it is important to remember what else was happening from 1994 to 1996. There was a growing perception that policies of entry were failing. We had significant efforts in Washington to tighten controls over flows: The Smith-Simpson Bill would have restricted legal immigration, and Barbara Jordan's Commission on Immigration Reform had suggested very strict limits on the number of low-skilled immigrants. And so there was an atmosphere, in which the notion of reducing the flow of certain types of immigrants, particularly low-skilled immigrants, had gained currency in Washington. That goal was part of the discourse, in a very basic way, and importantly, those measures have failed by the time welfare reform went into its final passage. There was a sense by the summer of 1996 that the 104th Congress clearly was not going to enact restrictions on legal immigration.

Although we cannot draw causality from Proposition 187 to the welfare reform act, there was certainly a correlation, and we have gotten a lot of mileage out of correlations today. There is at least a correlation to the extent that Proposition 187 very prominently brought into the discourse an idea that remains prevalent. It is what I call the use of proxy policies. When immigration policies fail to control inflows, governments turn to policies that are designed to achieve altogether different objectives and use them as proxies for immigration policies. So, for example, policies designed to license automobile drivers or to set tuition for public universities have been modified in efforts to affect immigration flows. The underlying notion is that if you cannot control entry, you try to make life difficult for undesired immigrants. One way or another, you deny

them access to public services or even necessities, like driving. You squeeze people who you would rather exclude at the door, however possible, in the hope that they will go home. This logic was reflected in how Ron Haskins talked about the effects of welfare reform on immigration: If you deny benefits to people who aren't making it, they'll go home.

It fits that basic logic of proxy policies, where you are executing entry controls with policies you would normally put under the basket of integration. As I raise this question early on, I think it is also important to contextualize what's happened since the enactment of welfare reform. Looking at the business cycle, in many ways, the importance of welfare reform as regards immigration over these past ten years, seems more political and symbolic than economic or fiscal. I think it has affected the discourse on immigration in ways that go far beyond welfare programs, certainly far beyond the number of immigrants who have been directly touched by the law. It clearly has had an impact in the ways we define policies of entry and integration. Additionally, I think it has had an impact on the whole notion of federalism, which has been one of the undercurrents of this conversation. It has also had an impact on the way we define citizenship most broadly.

I would like to take a moment to talk about welfare reform and how you assess it on its own terms, in the narrow framework of trying to manage access to benefits.

In the immigration components, I think there are two interesting conclusions: One is that it presents an example of how the federal government can defeat one of the perceptions that can often be very powerful in discussions in immigration policy, which I summarize simply with the phrase "Out of control." Whenever, you hear that phrase, especially in terms of immigration flows, you know something is going to happen, and you can point to several moments in the last 25, 30, or 100 years when the notion of flows "out of control" becomes the dominant element in the discourse. We are close to that now, where there is this human event that is beyond the reach of government, and that becomes a very powerful political perception.

Interestingly, what these chapters show me, if I have understood them correctly, is that at least in some parts of some of the programs, the federal government was able to enact policies and achieve their goals, for example, by reducing immigrants' participation in certain, but not all programs. In TANF, it seems to have happened. If immigrants respond to policy, that's not a small thing. It actually seems simplistic, but in the context of an immigration policy debate, where the notion of the lack of the possibility of control, or where flows are perceived as being beyond the reach of policy, it is not a small thing to have concrete examples of very specific policy goals that were achieved, achieved concretely, and in a quantifiable manner, with very specific and targeted policy tools.

However, balancing that, you have to look at SSI, which doesn't fit that overall rubric. The rise of SSI use had so much impact at the time of the welfare reform debate and really became part of the public imagination. The Asian family that brought their parents over. I found them, as did just about every journalist at the time, and popularized them. But that phenomenon was not a failure of policy; it was a failure of enforcement. It was fraud and the extent of fraud is not a measure of policy success but rather a measure of policy implementation. It is very important, now, in retrospect to keep that clearly in mind – that what was failing then was not the nature of eligibility rules, but the way they were implemented.

The other issue to keep clearly in mind is that if there has been success in managing program participation, there has been an absolute failure in managing flows. If any part of the intent of the welfare reform law was to limit the flow of low-income poor immigrants coming to the United States, the numbers suggest it didn't work. That is very important to keep in mind going forward to the extent that proxy policies are now proliferating down to the neighborhood level with public officials around the country looking for policy instruments that will control the number of immigrants, particularly unauthorized immigrants, living in the communities. Welfare reform, to the extent that it was meant to discourage migration by certain kinds of people, offers a very large example of a proxy policy at the federal level that failed to accomplish its objective.

In a rising economy and in the absence of actual federal policies to control entry, what I think the Welfare Reform story tells us is that denial of eligibility for government benefit will reduce the use of that benefit but it won't control flows. Therefore, you can deny individuals access to driver's licenses and decrease the number of people with licenses, but you will not decrease the number of drivers. Further, if you deny access to legal employment, you will reduce the number of people with legal jobs, but not employment. That seems to be one of the lessons to come out of the institutional analysis.

In context of the immigration policy debate as it is now developing, I think there are three questions that have come up repeatedly in our conversation already and that welfare reform illuminates:

The first is the test of pertinence. Is any given policy really pertinent to its intent? The second is the nature of federalism and the third is the question of citizenship — both of which we have already discussed.

In terms of pertinence, welfare reform to a certain extent was a proxy policy to control entry and all the current proxy policies need to be put to this simple test: Is the goal of immigration control pertinent to the original intent of the policy? Is the goal of reducing low-skilled immigration flows pertinent to policies intended to regulate eligibility for federal welfare programs? And, there is a flip side to the test of pertinence that has to be

applied to welfare reform. Just as the test of pertinence has to be applied to welfare reform as an instrument of immigration control, it also has to be applied to welfare programs as instruments for settlement and integration. You have to use that test both ways, and many in this room have depicted welfare policies as a way of advancing integration and settlement.

I think we have to ask, is that objective really pertinent to the original and most effective intent of those policies. I am not arguing against the desirability of integration and settlement objectives, but I am suggesting that it is important to ask whether welfare policies are the best instruments for achieving those objectives.

As to the Federalism issue, I think you have to acknowledge that Humpty Dumpty fell off the wall. We now have a very fragmented way of policymaking, and welfare reform opened the door to it: even if there is not a straightforward legal connection between the power of authorization given to states to control benefits for legal immigrants and the kind of policies aimed at the undocumented developing at the state and local level today. I think there is a political connection, however, and we are now in a very highly fragmented situation with a great deal of policymaking taking place in state legislatures and city councils. What we see developing for the first time since the 1870s is an uneven landscape for immigrants. While some states and localities are clearly welcoming to newcomers from abroad, others are not. This patchwork applies both to authorized immigrants with regard to eligibility for welfare programs and more broadly still to unauthorized migrants who are met with state and local regulations that can range from *laissez faire* to outright hostility. Prior to welfare reform, there was little or no immigration policy being debated outside of Washington, DC.

Moreover, as this devolution of power to the states and to local government progresses, I think we need to make more careful distinctions among different kinds of policies related to immigrants. The most common distinction is between policies of entry—the policies that try to determine who gets into the country—and policies of integration—the policies that try to determine what happens to immigrants after they are in the country. The discussion today makes me think that safety net policies, policies that are meant to prevent people from falling into destitution or living without health care when they are ill, have to be placed in separate baskets. They are certainly not policies of entry nor are they clearly policies of integration. They are in a separate category from either. They should be judged and valued in their own right. There is a separate discussion to be had about what the limits of destitution that we as a society are willing to accept? What are limits in illness that we are willing to accept? And, these are separate topics from the number and type of immigrants we want to admit to the country and what we are willing to do to ensure their success here.

Once you set those values—how destitute and how sick—you can then decide to what extent they apply to different categories of people. That can then end up being

something of a budgetary discussion and you may end up having to compromise those values. But, I don't know if you can. Part of the problem with welfare reform is that it was conceived of as bars on eligibility and then subsequently, in the last revisions, as exceptions to bars. The question I posed this morning is whether going forward, we need to flip question, and define what are the positive values we are trying to advance as a society. Rather than elaborate restrictions to eligibility that are meant to exclude certain categories of people, we define values and hence determine what categories of people should be covered and who deserves to fall under safety net protections.

This leads very quickly to the discussion of citizenship that has already been mentioned because participation in programs that keep you from certain perils really is one measure of your participation in society and hence relates to the ways that citizenship is defined. Again, welfare reform is really an interesting touchstone of what has happened in the last ten years, where the categories of status have become much more complicated. This isn't just a country of citizens and noncitizens. It is a country of qualified, nonqualified, and super nonqualified people as regards welfare programs. If anything, the categories of status are becoming more complicated as a matter of policy and as a matter of demography. The comprehensive immigration reform proposals that were discussed in the Senate in the spring would have added entire new levels of status. Status determined by how long you have been in the country, whether you are guest worker or have a permanent visa. There would have been a whole set of new status that would determine your place in society in a variety of ways. One of them is how states determine welfare eligibility based on status. It becomes much more complicated because of the way that the demography of immigration has changed in the last ten years. Interestingly, people generally agree that native-born US citizen-children constitute a valued category and that as a society we should take care of them. There is consensus around the idea of a positive social interest in advancing the welfare, education, and the health of US citizen children. Indeed, there is a growing recognition that our economy and our social security system are going to depend on them in the future.

A very large number of those children are now in households headed by immigrants, many of whom are "super unqualified" immigrants. And so, the question of status, the question of citizenship here becomes much more complicated if you think about those parents and their children as a unit. After all, they are a family and while the law may differentiate between the citizen child and the undocumented parents within the family unit, these distinctions are irrelevant. The money is fungible; the benefits are fungible. It seems to be a self-defeating social policy to separate them out—considering the children separately from their parents. These mixed status families really do complicate the question of status and produce, in my mind, a sort of peculiar situation where in many cases the most unqualified citizens, undocumented immigrants are, in fact, acting as regents for the people who, in a welfare regime, we must consider the most qualified, US citizen children, especially young children who need food and healthcare, poor

children whose parents are a great number of the most unqualified. Yet, we are calling on those parents to ensure positive outcomes for these children and that is the type of contradiction that is very difficult to sustain either in social policy or immigration policy, and certainly it raises all kinds of questions about integration.

If you are trying to sort out these different baskets, policies of entry, politics of integration, and a safety net, I would think that if there is a sweet spot for policy analysis, it is somewhere along the spectrum of integration.

In that realm of policy, we think of envisioning the foreign born 5, 10 or 15 years after arrival and imagining what we want them to look like, and what policies it would take to produce those outcomes and what do we have to do to get them to that point? That is the classic view of integration.. If you add this element of their children as the key social value, the key component that you are investing in, then that is not an adequate way of thinking of integration. You really have to then think another 25 years down the road to another set of kids—what are the children of immigrants going to look like when they become adults and eventually parents themselves? That is where immigration has always paid off in the long term. And it is at that point in the future, a full generation down the road where you measure success for all policies of integration, and indeed also for policies of entry and the safety net. What do we want the US-born children of immigrants to look like when they are voters, workers, parents—payers into the social security system? If you take that logic and work back to all these baskets of policies, you produce a very different set of conclusions than if you start by the notion of bars, exceptions to bars, which is also how we formulate many policies now. Even comprehensive immigration reform as it was drafted in the spring of 2006 was formulated in terms of bars and exceptions to bars. It is not a very logical starting point if what you are really trying to figure out is how these very worthy kids are going to become the most productive citizens possibly sometime in the middle of the century..

Appendix III

Remarks of Olivia Golden

While most of the participants here are experts in immigration, my own background is in social welfare policy. My role, then, is to bring something of an outsider's perspective.

One point I would like to make before plunging in is that I am here not only as someone who has a policy interest in social welfare issues having to do with children, families, and poverty—but also, like many people in this room and certainly many Americans—as someone with a personal stake in immigration. I am the native-born citizen child of two immigrant naturalized citizen parents, and my parents' experience is always very present when I think about these issues. If I think about my father, I realize that a whole set of public programs and institutions were key to his ability to live a middle-class life: the New York City Public Schools, City College, the armed forces, and the GI Bill. Each is an example of a broad policy strategy that happened to affect immigrants, as opposed to strategies targeted at immigrants.

So one question I will discuss is which issues make most sense to address through strategies focused on immigrants, and which should be addressed in a broader way? As I try to answer that question, my belief that our current strategies for low-income families are very weak will remain an overarching issue for me.

I want to start with several themes.

Values and Means-Tested Benefits

My first point is about American values. In my work on social welfare policy, I have spent considerable time thinking about differing values and how they play out in American politics—values that determine who gets which benefits. More specifically, if you compare the United States to other Western countries, the US framework for social welfare policy depends more on means-tested programs than those of other countries. These means-tested programs are tough to get into—there are lots of rules, applications, safeguards against fraud, and the like—and the public does not want people getting into them, as a general rule. So, for example, why have we been spending so much time today talking about Medicaid and its particular eligibility rules? Because, in contrast to other countries with different values about how to provide health care, we don't have health insurance coverage that is available to everyone as a matter of course.

Policies to support immigrant families are shaped by two sets of values issues—one bearing on migration, the other on public benefits—and the two issues make each other harder.

Other countries have a broader view of policy in terms of what everyone ought to have, often for their own good—like health insurance—or for the good of the nation as a whole, such as various supports for parents and children. This difference also occurs in unemployment insurance, which covers only a tiny fraction of people here compared with much of the Western world. So, in general, one of our challenges in the United States is that we have a value and policy framework that doesn't work very well for many struggling low-income families.

Let me turn next to several specific programs.

Health Insurance and Food Stamps

Even though there is a “success” story here, in terms of rising public coverage for some groups, a grim overall picture remains: a very high level of uninsurance for lots of people. Yes, rates of uninsurance are higher for immigrant kids, but they are also high for low-income working families in general as private insurance has fallen apart.

The partial success story is also a story about public comfort with supporting children. But in health insurance, while helping children matters a lot, the problem is that kids don't get their health care all by themselves, so helping children without fixing the system for adults won't get you all the way even to improving children's circumstances. As the health policy group at the Urban Institute has argued, if you look at the states with better health care coverage for parents, then you see children going to the doctor more often and having a regular source of care. Children come in families and the assumption that insuring only children will fix the health problem is a risky proposition.

So what I take away from these observations about health care is that trying to fix the health insurance problem in narrow ways specifically for immigrants has limited impact in the face of a system that does not work overall for families, and especially low-income families. That is, we are going to have to make big strides on health care for families as a whole, while also designing the new policies in ways that work for immigrants—rather than trying to solve the problem only for immigrants. But, I suspect the people who know the health world would tell me that is overly optimistic and will not happen; and so you take the reforms you can get.

Turning to Food Stamps, the theme that I want to emphasize is that the success story in terms of expanding enrollment reserves deserves a lot of attention. This success goes beyond practical issues about additional federal money and a change in laws. It is also about a change in how people conceive of the program: from an income supplement to a work support. So the key strategic question is: What drove that success? How did we, as a broad group of policymakers and policy advocates, successfully persuade the states, the federal government, and members of both parties to accept Food Stamps as a work support? I think that is a very interesting strategic question, with implications for other policy areas.

Role of the States

It was interesting to hear the exchange about whether, as a matter of theory, it is better or worse to devolve. I have always been a pragmatist on that issue, having worked at the local, state, and federal levels. The last six years have made the best case for the idea that policy is not always better done at the federal level—but there are also good arguments in both directions. We have noted today that states made some unexpected decisions in terms of being more generous and having a set of values that were about investing in, at least, citizen families.

But, what we have hardly talked about are the fiscal implications: the extent to which the bargain between the federal government and the states has changed. I would urge that this is an area that deserves a lot of attention, particularly as you think about the best future strategies for immigrants' families. The burdens of immigration are left to the states or local communities while the benefits are national. For example, educating kids happens in local communities with pretty small federal expenditures, but kids do not stay where they go to school, so the benefits are national. I think we need a new set of analyses that track expenditures across levels of government, not just for immigrants but the population as a whole.

Moving Policy in a Positive Direction

What values might drive policy in a positive direction, acknowledging the tensions over values that I've described earlier? Alex Aleinikoff closed his remarks by talking about where he believes things are moving in terms of our values about immigration and citizenship status. So I want to offer some corresponding thoughts about where our values about children, families, economic security, and opportunity might drive a future debate. I think that Ron Haskin's view that immigrant and other children are going to pay for my social security, as they will for other aging baby boomers, and that they will take care of us when we are in the nursing home is a powerful one.

What is frightening, if you look at the trends, is that the ratio of kids to our aging population is getting smaller, while, at the same time, the kids are more different in terms of ethnicity, race, and income from the older population. Kids are more likely to be children of immigrants, they are more likely to be a minority rather than white, and they are more likely to be children of less-educated parents. We are not in as extreme a position as Western Europe, but the changes are clear.

These demographic facts could lead us as a nation to one of two possible places. The hopeful possibility is that we say, "Wait a moment, we have to invest in all these kids because they are our future." Trends like state investments in universal preschool could make you optimistic, as could trends in policies regarding child health.

More pessimistically, this divergence could lead to battle and confrontation over future investments in children, because we see them as undeserving or unlike us. But I am an optimist. So I do believe that the fact that children of immigrants are now 20 percent of all kids and 25 percent of low-income kids and rising—probably, that fact is a force that will lead us to care about those immigrant families.

Our values regarding economic security could also lead us in different directions. I read both the 1996 elections as saying that many people in working- and middle-class families are very scared about their own economic positions. I have taken that, in general, to be positive for the policy agenda for low-income families. That kind of anxiety can drive an agenda around health insurance, around parental leave, and around the minimum wage. But, clearly, it can cut both ways on immigrants. It can mean either that people are afraid of the impact immigrants might have on them, or that they think these families are like us and they are struggling to do the same thing.

Employers' interests may also help move policy in a positive direction. One participant said that public health insurance is a subsidy to Wal-Mart. But, from the perspective of policy opportunities, Wal-Mart getting a subsidy from a public program may be a hugely positive development for the survival and expansion of that public program. Or, to put it differently, once you have the auto companies realizing that public health insurance would help them compete, you have the ability to make a case for health insurance investments in working families that has the business community behind it.