


**Figure 3.1 A Trust-Distrust Continuum**


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*Source: Author's compilation.*

**Figure 5.1 Decision Tree for Case Filing at the National Labor Relations Board**

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
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Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: First mover can be either management or labor.

**Figure 5.2 Simple Strike Game, Perfect Information (Without Institutional Framework)**

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
Management preferences:  $y_1 > x_1 > z_1$

Labor preferences:  $x_2 > y_2 > z_2$

**Figure 5.3 Simple Filing Game, Perfect Information (with Institutional Framework)**

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$c$  = costs of filing and defending




Management preferences:  $y_1 > x_1 > (z_1 - c)$

Labor preferences:  $x_2 > (z_2 - c) > y_2$

**Figure 5.4 Labor Filing Game, One-Sided Imperfect Information (with Institutional Framework)**


$c$  = costs of filing  
 $s$  = costs of strike  
 $p$  = probability



Management preferences:  $y_1 > x_1 > (z_1 - c_1) > (z_1 - c_1 - s_1)$


Labor preferences:  $x_2 > (z_2 - c_2) > y_2 > (z_2 - c_2 - s_2)$

**Figure 5.5 Unfair Labor Practice Cases Filed at the National Labor Relations Board, 1944 to 1998**




Source: NLRB (1948-99).

**Figure 5.6** Employer-Filed Unfair Labor-Practice Cases, 1948 to 1998



Source: NLRB (1945–99).


**Figure 5.7 Total Cases Filed, Personnel, and Budget at the National Labor Relations Board, 1944 to 1998**



Source: NLRB (1945-99).




Figure 5.8 Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 1965 to 1997



Source: NLRB (1966–99).

Figure 5.9 Days Idle and Work Stoppages, 1945 to 1997



Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1946-99).

**Table 5.1 Political and Economic Effects on Case-Filing Behavior, 1945 to 1999**

Variable	Employer-Filed Cases			Labor-Filed Cases		
	Beta Statistic	t Score	p Value	Beta Statistic	t Score	p Value
Constant		2.84	.012		7.620	.000
Inflation (GDP <sup>a</sup> deflator)	.411	4.82	.000	.251	2.540	.022
Unemployment rate	.268	3.57	.003	.241	2.930	.010
Total union membership	.571	5.87	.000	-.082	-.609	.551
Union density	-.732	-4.03	.001	-.788	-8.150	.000
NLRB staff dismissal rates	-.328	-2.27	.037	-.069	-.740	.470
Republican president (t - 1)	-.131	-2.36	.031	-.126	-1.880	.078
R	.982			.976		
R-squared	.965			.953		
Durbin Watson	2.13			1.30		
N <sup>b</sup>	23			23		

*Source:* Data from U.S. Department of Labor (1946–1999); NLRB (1945–1999); Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (2002); World Bank (1998).

<sup>a</sup>Gross domestic product.

<sup>b</sup>The N of 23 represents the number of years for which there was full data.

**Table 10.1 Most Important Personal Features of Business Partners**

Feature	Percentage
Honesty, trustworthiness	79
Responsibility, reliability	29
Professional skills, competence	19
Accuracy, precision	12
Initiative	8
Financial sustainability	4
Gender, ethnicity	1
Work experience, other	2

*Source:* Author's compilation.

*Note:* N = 227

**Table 10.2 Tensions with Partners and Clients, by Type of the Firm Characteristics**

Characteristic	Percentage Reporting Tensions in the Last Year
Size of firm	
Large and medium	54
Small	40
Type of firm	
Privatized	54
Newly established private	40
State-owned assets	
Yes	56
No	40

*Source:* Author's compilation.

*Note:* N = 227

**Table 10.3 Rate of Contract Infringement in Russian Business (Percentage)**

	Frequency of Infringement		
	Often	From Time to Time	Rarely
In Russian business in general	49	43	8
In one's personal experience	32	50	18

*Source:* Author's compilation.

*Note:* N = 227

**Table 10.4 Tensions with Partners and Clients Within the Past Year, by Frequency of Contract Infringement (Percentage)**

	Frequency of Contract Infringement		
	Often	From Time to Time	Rarely
	In Russian business generally		
Have tensions	53	37	16
Do not have tensions	47	63	84
	In personal experience		
Have tensions	59	39	23
Do not have tensions	41	61	77

Source: Author's compilation.

Note: N = 227

**Table 10.5 Rate of Contract Infringement, by Enterprise Characteristic (Percentage)**

Characteristic	Frequency of Infringement	
	Often in Russian Business	Often in Personal Experience
Size of enterprise		
Large and medium	57	40
Small	47	30
State-owned assets		
Yes	58	36
No	47	31
Age of enterprise		
Established (privatized) before 1996	52	35
Established (privatized) in 1996 or 1997	41	25
Sector		
Industrial production	56	38
Construction, transportation	47	47
Wholesale trade	62	43
Retailing, catering, consumer services	47	30
Finance, market services	61	44
Science, health care, culture	44	20
Other	42	26

Source: Author's compilation.

Note: N = 227

**Table 10.6 Rate of Contract Infringement, by Entrepreneur Characteristics (Percentage)**

Characteristic	Frequency of Infringement	
	Often in Russian Business	Often in Personal Experience
Owner of the firm	51	34
Manager of the firm	42	27
Males	52	35
Females	41	25
University degree	46	16
No university degree	50	35
Low- and medium-level human capital	45	25
High-level human capital	55	43


*Source:* Author's compilation.

*Note:* N = 227



**Figure 11.1 Annual European Union Antidumping Cases Initiated Against Nonmarket Economies, 1980 to 2000**


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
Source: European Commission (1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1995, 1996, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2001).

**Figure 11.2 Cross-Group Comparison of European Union Antidumping Cases, 1980 to 2000**




Source: European Commission (1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1995, 1996, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2001).

**Figure 11.3 European Union Imports from Nonmarket Economies Compared with Antidumping Cases Against Nonmarket Economies, 1980 to 2000**



Source: International Monetary Fund (1997); European Commission (1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1995, 1996, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2001).

**Figure 11.4 Ratio of Imports to Antidumping Cases, by Country Grouping, 1980 to 1999**



Source: International Monetary Fund (1997); European Commission (1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1995, 1996, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2001).

**Table 11.1 Sample of Affirmative Antidumping Cases Against Nonmarket Economies Using Developing Countries as Analogues, 1990 to 1999**

Case	Nonmarket Economies	Product	Analogue
EC No. 2093/91, OJL 18/07/91	China	Small-screen TVs	Hong Kong
91/522/EEC, OJL 02/10/91	Soviet Union	Artificial corundum	Yugoslavia
91/522/EEC, OJL 02/10/91	Hungary	Artificial corundum	Yugoslavia
91/522/EEC, OJL 02/10/91	Czechoslovakia	Artificial corundum	Yugoslavia
EC No. 3433/91, OJL 28/11/91	China	Pocket lighters	Thailand
EC No. 1189/93, OJL 15/05/93	Hungary	Seamless iron pipe	Croatia
EC No. 1189/93, OJL 15/05/93	Poland	Seamless iron pipe	Croatia
EC No. 710/95, OJL 01/04/95	China	Color TVs	Singapore
EC No. 2022/95, OJL 23/08/95	Russia	Ammonium nitrate	Poland
EC No. 2022/95, OJL 23/08/95	Lithuania	Ammonium nitrate	Poland
EC No. 5/96, OJL 04/01/96	China	Microwave ovens	Korea
EC No. 584/96, OJL 03/04/96	China	Iron or steel pipe fittings	Thailand
EC No. 2208/96, OJL 18/11/96	China	Unbleached cotton	India
EC No. 1490/96, OJL 30/07/96	Belarus	Polyester fiber	Taiwan
EC No. 119/97, OJL 24/01/97	China	Ring binders	Malaysia
EC No. 165/97, OJL 01/31/97	China	Footwear	Indonesia
EC No. 981/97, OJL 31/05/97	Russia	Seamless iron pipe	Czech Republic
EC No. 1786/97, OJL 17/09/97	Ukraine	Silicon carbide	Brazil
EC No. 1931/97, OJL 04/10/97	Russia	Unalloyed zinc	Poland
EC No. 1931/97, OJL 04/10/97	Kazakhstan	Unalloyed zinc	Poland

*(Table continues on p. 258.)*

**Table 11.1** *Continued*

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Case	Nonmarket Economies	Product	Analogue
EC No. 1931/97, OJL 04/10/97	Ukraine	Unalloyed zinc	Poland
EC No. 1931/97, OJL 04/10/97	Uzbekistan	Unalloyed zinc	Poland
EC No. 2380/98, OJL 23/01/98	China	Leather handbags	Indonesia
EC No. 393/98, OJL 20/02/98	China	Metal fasteners	Taiwan
EC No. 904/98, OJL 30/04/98	China	Fax machines	Korea

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*Source:* Data from European Commission and European Council (1980–2001).

**Table 11.2 Sample of Affirmative Antidumping Cases Against Nonmarket Economies Using OECD Member Countries as Analogues, 1990 to 1999**

Case Number	Country	Product	OECD Analogue
EC No. 1937/90, OJL 07/07/90	China	Typewriter ribbon	EU
EC No. 3642/92, OJL 14/12/92	Poland	Ferrosilicon	Norway
EC No. 3068/92, OJL 24/10/92	Ukraine	Potash	Canada
EC No. 3068/92, OJL 24/10/92	Russia	Potash	Canada
EC No. 3068/92, OJL 24/10/92	Belarus	Potash	Canada
EC No. 821/94, OJL 13/04/94	China	Silicon carbide	United States
EC No. 821/94, OJL 13/04/94	Poland	Silicon carbide	United States
EC No. 821/94, OJL 13/04/94	Russia	Silicon carbide	United States
EC No. 821/94, OJL 13/04/94	Ukraine	Silicon carbide	United States
EC No. 821/94, OJL 13/04/94	Norway	Silicon carbide	United States
EC No. 137/96, OJL 27/01/96	China	Chamottes	United States
EC No. 600/96, OJL 04/04/96	China	Coumarin	United States
EC No. 1006/96, OJL 05/06/96	China	Powdered carbon	United States
EC No. 1347/96, OJL 12/07/96	Russia	Unwrought magnesium	Norway
EC No. 1347/96, OJL 12/07/96	Ukraine	Unwrought magnesium	Norway
EC No. 1347/96, OJL 12/07/96	Kazakhstan	Unwrought magnesium	Norway
EC No. 2496/97, OJL 16/12/97	China	Silicon metal	Norway
EC No. 449/98, OJL 27/02/98	Belarus	Potassium chloride	Canada
EC No. 449/98, OJL 27/02/98	Russia	Potassium chloride	Canada
EC No. 449/98, OJL 27/02/98	Ukraine	Potassium chloride	Canada

*(Table continues on p. 266.)*

**Table 11.2** *Continued*

Case Number	Country	Product	OECD Analogue
EC No. 771/98, OJL 09/04/98	China	Tungsten carbide	United States
EC No. 2402/98, OJL 07/11/98	China	Unwrought magnesium	Norway
EC No. 603/99, OJL 20/03/99	Czech Republic <sup>a</sup>	Polypropylene binder	United States
EC No. 603/99, OJL 20/03/99	Hungary <sup>a</sup>	Polypropylene binder	United States

*Source:* Data from European Commission and European Council (1980–2001).

<sup>a</sup>In these cases the countries had been reclassified as market economies, but surrogates were still used in determining normal value.