

Table 2.1 Announced Preferences of the Delegates on the Monetary Standard and Adoption of the Silver Plank in the National Democratic Platform

	<i>Chicago Tribune</i> (June 27)		Platform Roll Call (July 9)		Discrepancy (if Any)
	Silver	Gold	Silver	Gold	
State					
Alabama	22		22		
Arkansas	16		16		
California	18		18		
Colorado	8		8		
Connecticut		12		12	
Delaware		6	1	5	1
Florida	4	4	5	3	1
Georgia	26		26		
Idaho	6		6		
Illinois	48		48		
Indiana	30		30		
Iowa	26		26		
Kansas	20		20		
Kentucky	26		26		
Louisiana	16		16		
Maine	5	7	2	10	3
Maryland		16	4	12	4
Massachusetts		30	3	27	3
Michigan	28		28		
Minnesota	6	12	6	11	(1 absent)
Mississippi	18		18		
Missouri	34		34		
Montana	6		6		
Nebraska	16		16		
Nevada	6		6		
New Hampshire		8		8	
New Jersey		20		20	
New York		72		72	
North Carolina	22		22		
North Dakota	6		6		
Ohio	46		46		
Oregon	8		8		
Pennsylvania		64		64	
Rhode Island		8		8	

(Table continues on p. 34.)

Table 2.1 *Continued*

	<i>Chicago Tribune</i> (June 27)		Platform Roll Call (July 9)		Discrepancy (if Any)
	Silver	Gold	Silver	Gold	
South Carolina	18		18		
South Dakota		8		8	
Tennessee	24		24		
Texas	30		30		
Utah	6		6		
Vermont		8		8	
Virginia	24		24		
Washington	5	3	5	3	
West Virginia	12		12		
Wisconsin		24		24	
Wyoming	6		6		
Territory					
Alaska	6			6	6
Arizona	6		6		
District of Columbia	5	1	4	2	1
Indian Territory	6		6		
New Mexico	6		4	2	2
Oklahoma Territory	6		6		
Total	627	303	624	305	21

Sources: Delegate preferences were reported in the *Chicago Tribune*, June 27, 1896. The roll call on the minority report from the resolutions committee (supporting the gold standard) appeared in Dickinson (1896, 241).

Notes: Delegate preferences, as originally reported in the *Tribune*, have been adjusted to take into account the expansion of the delegations from the territories (from two to six delegates in each case) and the seating of one or the other of competing delegations after contests were decided. Because the monetary preferences of the individuals involved in these expansions and contests were already known, the consequences of these actions were well anticipated before the fact. The *Tribune* also adjusted individual preferences where a unit rule was expected to suppress a minority of a state delegation. For example, the Wisconsin delegation was split, with nineteen delegates favoring gold and five supporting silver. Because the state convention had bound all the delegates to gold, the *Tribune* reported the five silverites as favoring the yellow metal. In one instance, the state of Washington, the *Tribune* expected the unit rule to be enforced and, thus, that all eight votes would be cast for silver even though three delegates supported gold. When the rule was not enforced, the delegates split five to three for silver on the roll call, just as the *Tribune* had reported their individual preferences. Since the purpose of this table is to demonstrate the extent to which preferences had been accurately identified prior to the convention (and not to predict whether or not the unit rule would be enforced within a state delegation), the distribution of preferences have been entered in this table as the *Tribune* assigned them to individual delegates.

Figure 3.1 Civil Rights Policy Proposals Arrayed by Degree of Liberalism
>>> Conservatism



Source: Authors' compilation.

Table 3.1 Measures of Civil Rights Attitudes in the 1960s

Question Wording	1963	1964	1966	1968	1970
Federal government see to it that blacks get fair employment treatment ^a		33		33	
See to it that white and Negro children go to the same schools ^b		38		33	41
Blacks can go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford ^c		41		48	56
White people have a right to keep Negroes out ^d		29		24	21
Negroes have tried to move too fast ^e	64		70		
Justified to march in protests ^f	53		35		

Sources: Campbell (1971) and Brink and Harris (1966).

Note: All questions asked of whites only.

^aCampbell (1971, 129)

^bCampbell (1971, 130)

^cCampbell (1971, 131)

^dCampbell (1971, 133)

^eBrink and Harris (1966, 220)

^fBrink and Harris (1966, 222)

Table 3.2 Effects of Partisan Replacement on Voting on Civil Rights Acts, 1964 to 1965

		Yes	No	Did Not Vote
Northern districts that switched Republican to Democrat	Vote on 1964 Civil Rights Act	32	11	1
	Vote on 1965 Voting Rights Act	44	0	0
Southern districts that switched Republican to Democrat	Vote on 1964 Civil Rights Act	0	2	0
	Vote on 1965 Voting Rights Act	2	0	0
Districts that switched Democrat to Republican	Vote on 1964 Civil Rights Act	3	7	0
	Vote on 1965 Voting Rights Act	2	8	0

Source: Calculated by the authors based on *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1964, 1965c).

Table 3.3 The Effect of Intraparty Replacement in Voting on Civil Rights Bills

		Yes	No	Did Not Vote
Northern districts that switched Democrat to Democrat	Vote on 1964 Civil Rights Act	13	2	4
	Vote on 1965 Voting Rights Act	19	0	0
Southern districts that switched Democrat to Democrat	Vote on 1964 Civil Rights Act	0	7	0
	Vote on 1965 Voting Rights Act	2	4	1
Districts that switched Republican to Republican	Vote on 1964 Civil Rights Act	9	1	3
	Vote on 1965 Voting Rights Act	8	3	2

Source: Calculated by the authors based on *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1964, 1965c).

Table 3.4 Support for Aid to Education Bills in the 87th and 89th Congress

	Pro-Pro ^a	Anti-Pro	Pro-Anti	Anti-Anti
Northern Democrats	99	4	2	2
Southern Democrats	7	10	3	39
Republicans	5	16	1	63

Source: Calculated by the authors based on *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1961, 1965a).

^aPro- indicates a yes vote on the proposal, and Anti- indicates a no vote. Thus a Pro-Anti legislator would be one who initially supported the bill, but shifted to opposition when the similar proposal was considered later.

Table 3.5 Support for Open Housing Legislation in the 89th and 90th Congress

	Pro-Pro	Anti-Pro	Pro-Anti	Anti-Anti
Northern Democrats	117	10	4	17
Southern Democrats	4	3	1	53
Republicans	44	11	3	65


Source: Calculated by the authors based on *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1965b, 1968).

Table 3.6 Median Adjusted ADA Scores in the Senate

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
All chairs (Mean)	11.57 (24.09)	10.61 (26.19)	17.21 (30.84)	53.51 (42.32)	66.45 (62.07)
Democratic caucus	55.24	62.93	66.38	61.95	64.23
Floor	41.99	49.03	34.98	50.70	47.53


Source: Calculated by the authors based on data provided by Timothy Groseclose.

Figure 7.1 The Congress-Centered Account (Version 1)




Source: Author's compilation.

Figure 7.2 Congress-Centered Account (Version 2)




Source: Author's compilation.

Figure 7.3 The Court-Centered Account



Source: Author's compilation.


Figure 7.4 The Jurisdiction Game



Source: Author's compilation.


Note: Prior to Congressional action, state voters elect congressmen.

Figure 7.5 Northern Abolitionists are Nationalizers in Terms of Rights for Negroes, Southerners are States Rightists



Source: Author's compilation.

Figure 7.6 Southerners are Nationalizers in Protecting Slave
“Property”; Abolitionists become States Rightists




Source: Author's compilation.

Table 7.1 Equilibria in the Jurisdiction Game

	Activist Court	Deferential Court	Retiring Court
Nationalizer or pro-jurisdiction moderate Congress	Congress offers, Court accepts.	Congress offers, Court accepts	Congress does not offer, Court does not assert
States rightist or anti-jurisdiction moderate Congress	Congress does not offer, Court asserts	Congress does not offer, Court does not assert	Congress does not offer, Court does not assert

Source: Author's compilation.

Figure 11.1 Summary of Legacies of Policy Options



Source: Author's compilation.

Table 11.1 Components of Choice and Preference in Rational Decision Theory

Option	Outcome	Utility	Probability	Expected Utility
C ¹	O ^{1,1}	U ^{1,1}	P ^{1,1}	U ^{1,1} × P ^{1,1}
	O ^{1,2}	U ^{1,2}	P ^{1,2}	U ^{1,2} × P ^{1,2}
	O ^{1,3}	U ^{1,3}	P ^{1,3}	U ^{1,3} × P ^{1,3}
C ²	O ^{2,1}	U ^{2,1}	P ^{2,1}	U ^{2,1} × P ^{2,1}
	O ^{2,2}	U ^{2,2}	P ^{2,2}	U ^{2,2} × P ^{2,2}
	O ^{2,3}	U ^{2,3}	P ^{2,3}	U ^{2,3} × P ^{2,3}

Source: Adapted from Little (1991, 41).

Table 11.2 Preference Structure for Actors Adopting a Radical Policy Option

Option	Outcome	Utility (1= Least)	Probability (1 = Lowest)	Expected Utility (1 = Least)
Radical policy	Overthrow of liberal rule	Very negative (1)	Very unlikely (2)	Slightly negative (2)
	Unstable liberal rule	Positive (3)	Likely (4)	Positive (4)
	Stable liberal rule	Very positive (4)	Unlikely (3)	Positive (4)
Reform policy	Overthrow of liberal rule	Very negative (1)	Unlikely (3)	Negative (1)
	Unstable liberal rule	Marginally positive (2)	Likely (4)	Marginally positive (3)
	Stable liberal rule	Positive (3)	Nearly impossible (1)	Marginally positive (3)

Source: Author's compilation.

Table 11.3 Preference Structure for Actors Adopting a Reform Policy Option

Option	Outcome	Utility (1= Least)	Probability (1 = Lowest)	Expected Utility (1 = Least)
Radical policy	Overthrow of liberal rule	Very negative (1)	Likely (4)	Very negative (1)
	Unstable liberal rule	Positive (3)	Unlikely (3)	Marginally positive (3)
	Stable liberal rule	Very positive (4)	Nearly impossible (1)	Marginally positive (3)
Reform policy	Overthrow of liberal rule	Very negative (1)	Very unlikely (2)	Slightly negative (2)
	Unstable liberal rule	Marginally positive (2)	Likely (4)	Marginally positive (3)
	Stable liberal rule	Positive (3)	Unlikely (3)	Marginally positive (3)

Source: Author's compilation.

Table 11.4 Sources of Preferences for Liberals

Option	Outcomes	Utilities	Probabilities
Liberal ideology shapes the choice between radical and reform options.	Outcomes associated with each option are evaluated according to their political consequences for liberal leaders.	Both ideology and political considerations affect the utility values of each outcome.	The probabilities of outcomes reflect actors' understandings of the level of threat posed by opposition forces.

Source: Author's compilation.