FIGURE 1.1 PARTY AND NONPARTY CONTACT, 1964 TO 2004 (PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING BEING CONTACTED)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the proportion of the ANES sample in each presidential- and off-election year that reports being contacted by either party, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, or a nonparty organization.

FIGURE 1.2 PARTY CONTACT (DEMOCRATIC OR REPUBLICAN), BY INCOME GROUP, 1964 TO 2004 (PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING BEING CONTACTED)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the proportion of each income group in each presidential- and off-election year that reports being contacted by either party.

FIGURE 1.3 REPUBLICAN PARTY CONTACT, BY INCOME GROUP, 1964 TO 2004 (PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING BEING CONTACTED)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the proportion of individuals in each income group in each presidential- and off-election year that reports being contacted by the Republican Party.

FIGURE 1.4 DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONTACT, BY INCOME GROUP, 1964 TO 2004 (PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING BEING CONTACTED)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the proportion of individuals in each income group in each presidential- and off-election year that reports being contacted by the Democratic Party.

FIGURE 1.5 INCOME AS A PREDICTOR OF REPUBLICAN PARTY CONTACT, 1964 TO 2004 (ESTIMATED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FROM MODEL DESCRIBED IN TEXT)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the magnitude of the logit coefficient for income as a predictor of being contacted by the Republican Party for individuals in the middle-income group or the high-income group; excluded category is the low-income group.

FIGURE 1.6 INCOME AS A PREDICTOR OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONTACT, 1964 TO 2004 (ESTIMATED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FROM MODEL DESCRIBED IN TEXT)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the magnitude of the logit coefficient for income as a predictor of being contacted by the Democratic Party in each presidential-election year for individuals in the middle-income group or the high-income group; excluded category is the low-income group.

FIGURE 1.7 NONPARTY CONTACT BY INCOME GROUP, 1980 TO 2004 (PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING BEING CONTACTED)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the proportion of individuals in each income group in each presidential- and off-election year that reports being contacted by a nonparty organization.

FIGURE 1.8 INCOME AS A PREDICTOR OF NONPARTY CONTACT, 1980 TO 2004 (ESTIMATED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FROM MODEL REPORTED IN TEXT)



Source: Authors' calculations from American National Election Studies (2005).
Note: Values graphed represent the magnitude of the logit coefficient for income as a predictor of being contacted by a nonparty organization in each presidential-election year for individuals in the middle-income group or the high-income group; excluded category is the low-income group.

TABLE 2.1 FREQUENCIES OF RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO VOTING, 2004

Type of Limitation	Number of States
Must register prior to Election Day	43
Mental competency rule for exclusion	36
Registration needed at least twenty days before election	31
Early voting not allowed	27
"No excuse" absentee voting not allowed	25
More than state residency requirement	21
Shorter polling place hours	21
Cutoff for receiving absentee ballots prior to Election Day	6
Limits on felon voting	
Parolees cannot vote	32
Felons cannot vote	12

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures website; *Book of the States*, various years.

TABLE 2.2 DETERMINANTS OF STATE-LEVEL VARIATION IN RESTRICTIONS ON VOTING, 2005, OLS ESTIMATES

	Number of Days Must Register Before Election		Index of Restrictions[a]	
Percentage of state population African American	.40** (.16)	.17 (.22)	.13** (.02)	.09** (.04)
Traditional party organization score	1.99** (.92)	2.49** (.98)	.07 (.14)	.17 (.15)
State use of initiative process (average number of initiatives per year)	2.86 (2.31)	3.18 (2.30)	–.53 (.36)	–.47 (.36)
Percentage of state population with higher education	–.32 (.29)	–.17 (.28)	–.03 (.05)	–.00 (.05)
South dummy	—	6.57 (4.85)	—	1.30* (.75)
Intercept	20.41 (7.72)	16.10 (8.20)	4.78 (1.21)	3.92 (1.14)
Adjusted R^2	.18	.20	.45	.47
Number of cases	50	50	50	50

Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. Census Bureau (2000).

[a] Index of restrictions includes no felon voting, no parolee voting, shorter-than-average polling place hours, no polling place registration, no early voting allowed,"no excuse" absentee not allowed, cutoff for receiving absentee ballots prior to Election Day, more than state residency requirement, greater than twenty days advance registration, state code on mental competency.

* = $p < .10$ (two-tail); ** = $p < .05$ (two-tail)

TABLE 2.3 EXAMPLES OF EFFECTS OF STATE-LEVEL REGULATIONS OF VOTING ON VOTER TURNOUT, 2002 AND 2004

	2004	2004	2002
Restriction index	–.008*	–.009**	–.012**
	.004	.004	.005
Percentage with some college	.21	.31*	.173
	.18	.16	.216
Percentage living in poverty	–.84**	–.60**	–.339
	.26	.26	.34
Bush versus Kerry margin	–.11*	—	—
	.06		
Number of campaign visits	—	.16**	—
		.005	
Competitiveness of U.S. Congressional races	—	—	.074**
			.04
South	–.018	—	—
	.021		
Constant	.779	.651	.419
R^2	.37	.45	.28

Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. Census Bureau (2000).
Note: Dependent variable is the proportion of eligible voters who vote. Turnout data from Michael P. McDonald (http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm). Standard errors are listed below the estimated coefficients.
* = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$

TABLE 2.4 LEVEL OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND POLITICS

	2004	2002	2000
Do you care who wins U.S. Presidential or congressional election?			
I care who wins	85	67	76
I don't care who wins	15	33	24
Number of cases	1,212	1,509	1,807
Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs?			
Most of the time	28	27	22
Some of the time	40	42	37
Only now and then	22	22	27
Hardly at all	9	9	14
Number of cases	1,066	1,317	1,555

Source: Authors' compilation from American National Election Studies (2000, 2002).

TABLE 2.5 SELF-REPORTED REASONS FOR NOT VOTING, 1996 TO 2004 (PERCENTAGE)

	2004	2002	2000	1998	1996
Too busy	20	27	21	35	21
Illness or disability	15	13	15	11	15
No interest or believe it won't matter	11	12	12	13	17
Out of town	9	10	10	8	11
Other	11	9	10	8	10
Disliked candidates	10	7	8	5	13
Don't know why or refused	8	8	7	7	3
Registration problems	7	4	7	4	(—)
Nonregistration inconvenience	6	4	6	3	5
Forgot	3	6	4	5	4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006), "Non-voting registered persons."

TABLE 2.6 NONVOTING PREDICTED BY LACK OF INTEREST INDUCED BY ELECTORAL AND PARTY SYSTEM

	Equation 1 Low Interest in 2004		Equation 2 Did Not Vote in 2004		Equation 3 Did Not Vote 2004	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Low interest in public affairs					0.38	0.11**
Low interest associated with perceptions of parties and elections (from equation 1)			5.12	1.80**		
Thinks presidential election close			–0.20	0.22	–0.26	0.22
Doesn't care who wins presidency			1.41	0.23**	1.21	0.24**
Doesn't care who wins House			0.42	0.11**	0.32	0.12**
Thinks elections don't make government pay attention	0.20	0.05**			0.09	0.07
Thinks party represents respondent	–0.30	0.15**			–0.32	0.21
Thinks of self as close to a party	–0.52	0.13**			–0.22	0.19
White (non-Hispanic)	0.16	0.15	–0.42	0.20**	–0.35	0.20*
Age (years)	–0.03	0.00**	0.00	0.01	–0.01	0.01
Education	–0.30	0.04**	–0.20	0.08**	–0.29	0.07**
Female	0.58	0.12**	–0.60	0.21**	–0.42	0.19**
Household income	0.02	0.01	–0.06	0.02**	–0.05	0.02**
Union household	–0.17	0.16	–0.01	0.27	–0.09	0.27
Constant 1	–2.98	0.36	–0.30	0.70	0.30	0.66
Constant 2	–0.90	0.36				
Constant 3	0.78	0.36				
Pseudo R^2		0.08		0.22		0.23
Number of cases		963		962		962

Source: Authors' compilation from American National Election Study (2004).
Note: b = estimated coefficient; se = standard error. Low interest in equation 2 is an instrumental variable (the predicted values from equation 1). Standard errors listed beside estimated coefficient.
* = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$

TABLE 2.7 NONVOTING PREDICTED BY ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS, BY LEVEL OF INTEREST

	Low Interest		High Interest	
Thinks presidential election close	0.16	0.37	–0.74	0.48
Doesn't care who wins presidency	1.32	0.35**	1.23	0.96
Doesn't care who wins House	0.22	0.19	0.56	0.29**
Thinks elections don't make government pay attention	0.08	0.11	0.25	0.18
Thinks party represents respondent	–0.56	0.30*	–1.15	0.54**
Thinks of self as close to a party	–0.41	0.30	0.19	0.52
White (non-Hispanic)	0.41	0.32	–0.71	0.54
Age (in years)	–0.03	0.01**	0.01	0.01
Education	–0.37	0.12**	–0.29	0.16*
Female	–0.67	0.30**	0.08	0.49
Household income	0.00	0.03	–0.11	0.04**
Union household	0.00	0.43	0.88	0.63
Contacted by party or other organization	–0.50	0.33	–0.70	0.52
State restrictions on voting	0.12	0.08	0.25	0.14*
State margin Bush versus Kerry	2.78	1.46**	–3.56	3.53
Constant	1.34	1.10	–0.83	1.67
Number of cases	278		302	
Pseudo R^2	0.29		0.25	

Source: Authors' compilation from American National Election Study (2004).
Note: Standard errors listed beside estimated coefficient.
* = p. < .05; ** = p < .01

Table 3.1 Institutional Factors Associated with Minority Representation

Country	Limited Power	Special Accommodations	Single-Member District
Albania			
Australia	x		x
Bangladesh			x
Belgium		x	
Brazil			
Canada			x
Chile	x		
Colombia	x	x	
Dominican Republic	x		
Estonia			
Georgia			
Great Britain			x
India	x	x	x
Indonesia	x		
Israel	x		
Latvia	x		
Macedonia			
Mexico	x		
Moldova			
Montenegro	x	x	
New Zealand	x	x	
Nigeria			x
Northern Ireland	x		x
Peru			
Philippines	x		
Serbia	x	x	
South Africa	x		
Spain			
Switzerland		x	
Taiwan	x	x	
United States		x	x
Uruguay			
Venezuela		x	

Source: "Limited Power," see Minorities at Risk Project (2005); "Special Accommodations," see Htun (2003).

TABLE 3.2 MEAN DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT BY MINORITY STATUS AND INSTITUTIONAL RULES

	Political Involvement			Political Participation		
	Non-Minority	Ethnic Minority	Difference	Non-Minority	Ethnic Minority	Difference
No limited access to power	.54	.53	–.02	.43	.49	.06***
Limited access to power	.62	.53	–.10***	.38	.30	–.08***
No special arrangements	.56	.53	–.04***	.39	.37	–.02
Special arrangements	.62	.53	–.09***	.43	.40	–.04***
Proportional rules	.58	.51	–.07***	.35	.35	.01
Single-member districts	.61	.58	–.03***	.57	.47	–.10***
N	50,458	12,453		51,776	13,153	

Source: Authors' compilation from European Values Study Group and World Values Survey (n.d.).
*** $p < .01$

TABLE 3.3 MEAN DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES ABOUT GOVERNMENT BY MINORITY STATUS AND INSTITUTIONAL RULES

	Satisfaction with Reps			Confidence in Government		
	Non-Minority	Ethnic Minority	Difference	Non-Minority	Ethnic Minority	Difference
No limited access to power	.45	.48	.03***	.42	.40	–.02***
Limited access to power	.42	.38	–.04***	.40	.36	–.04***
No special arrangements	.44	.43	–.01	.43	.38	–.05***
Special arrangements	.43	.42	–.02***	.38	.39	.01
Proportional rules	.40	.38	–.03***	.39	.35	–.03***
Single-member districts	.53	.55	.02	.48	.45	–.03***
N	41,277	9,928		38,645	8,393	

Source: Authors' compilation from European Values Study Group and World Values Survey (n.d.).
*** $p < .01$

TABLE 3.4 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT (LOGIT COEFFICIENTS)

	Political Involvement			Political Participation		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Min-Max	Coefficient	Standard Error	Min-Max[b]
Per capita GNI	–.10***	(0.02)	–.11	–.11***	(0.03)	–.10
Women's representation	–.00	(0.00)	–.02	.02***	(0.00)	.11
Established democracy	.19***	(0.06)	.05	.19***	(0.06)	.46
Special accommodation	–.06*	(0.03)	–.01	.10***	(0.04)	.02
Limited access to power	.18***	(0.03)	.04	–.32***	(0.03)	–.08
Single-member district	.18***	(0.03)	.05	.22***	(0.04)	.05
Ethnic minority	–.10*	(0.06)	–.02	–.04	(0.06)	–.01
Minority*special accommodation	–.03	(0.07)	–.01	–.24***	(0.07)	–.05
Minority*limited power	–.18***	(0.07)	–.05	.06	(0.07)	.01
Minority*single-member district	.20***	(0.08)	.05	.01	(0.08)	.00
Pseudo R^2 [a]	.05			0.25		
N (weighted)	27,265			29,084		

Source: Authors' compilation from European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (n.d.).
Note: Estimates for socioeconomic controls (female, age, education, employment status, and income) not shown.
[a] See Cragg and Uhler (1970).
[b] Min-max represents the average change in probability of being in the modal category (above the midpoint) across each category of the dependent variable.
* $p < .10$; *** $p < .01$

TABLE 3.5 POLITICAL ATTITUDES (ORDERED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS)

	Satisfaction with Representatives			Confidence in Government		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Min-Max	Coefficient	Standard Error	Min-Max[b]
Per capita GNI	.43***	(0.02)	.24	.19***	(0.02)	.08
Women's representation	.01***	(0.00)	.06	.00	(0.00)	.01
Established democracy	–.11***	(0.06)	–.21	–.11***	(0.06)	–.10
Special accommodation	.21***	(0.03)	.04	–.09***	(0.03)	–.01
Limited access to power	.09***	(0.03)	.05	.19***	(0.03)	.02
Single-member district	.10***	(0.03)	.18	.10***	(0.04)	.10
Ethnic minority	–.24***	(0.06)	–.05	–.45***	(0.05)	–.04
Minority*special accommodation	.04	(0.07)	.01	.40***	(0.07)	.04
Minority*limited power	–.07	(0.07)	–.01	–.01	(0.07)	–.00
Minority*single-member district	.24***	(0.08)	.05	–.05	(0.08)	–.01
Pseudo R^2 [a]	.04			.03		
N (weighted)	22,791			22,072		

Source: Authors' compilation from European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (n.d.).
Note: Estimates for socioeconomic controls (female, age, education, employment status and income) not shown. Data from Israel are missing.
[a] See Cragg and Uhler (1970).
[b] Min-max represents the average change in probability of being in the modal category (above the midpoint) across each category of the dependent variable.
***$p < .01$

TABLE 4.1 DISTRIBUTION OF ATTRIBUTE REPERTOIRES IN SOMELAND

	Black	White
Foreign	a	b
Native	c	d

Source: Chandra and Boulet (2005).

TABLE 4.2 POTENTIAL CATEGORIES IN SOMELAND

Definition of Category	Membership	Size
Ø	0	0
Black and foreign	BF	a
Black and native	BN	c
White and foreign	WF	b
White and native	WN	d
Black	BF, BN	a + c
White	WF, WN	b + d
Foreign	BF, WF	a + b
Native	BN, WN	c + d
Black or foreign	BF, BN, WF	a + b + c
White or foreign	BF, WF, WN	a + b + d
Black or native	BF, BN, WN	a + c + d
White or native	BN, WF, WN	b + c + d
(Black and native) or (white and foreign)	BN, WF	b + c
(Black and foreign) or (white and native)	BF, WN	a + d
Entire population (black or white; foreign or native)	BN, WN, BF, WF	a + b + c + d = 1

Source: Chandra and Boulet (2005).

TABLE 4.3 AN "INCLUSIVE" DISTRIBUTION IN GOODLAND (K = .51)

	Black	White
Foreign	0.4	0.2
Native	0.2	0.2

Source: Author's compilation.

TABLE 4.4 AN "EXCLUSIVE" DISTRIBUTION IN BADLAND (K = .51)

	Black	White
Foreign	0.4	0.26
Native	0.26	0.08

Source: Chandra and Boulet (2005).

FIGURE 5.1 THE CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF OVERWHELMINGLY WHITE SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1962 TO 2002



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1960–2000).
Note: The figures indicate the number of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives that fit into each of the demographic categories based on Census data.

FIGURE 5.2 COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, 1962 TO 2006



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 5.3 NUMBER OF UNCONTESTED ELECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS IN THE HOUSE, 1962 TO 2006



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 5.4 THE NUMBER OF HOUSE ELECTIONS IN WHICH ONE CANDIDATE GARNERED AT LEAST 80 PERCENT OF THE TWO PARTY VOTE



Source: Authors' compilation.
Note: The correlation between the number of truly lopsided elections and year is .32.

FIGURE 5.5 HISTOGRAM OF IDEOLOGICAL SCORES FOR U.S. HOUSE MEMBERS, 1962 TO 2000



Source: Authors' compilation of NOMINATE data downloaded from Voteview.com.

FIGURE 5.6 HISTOGRAMS OF IDEOLOGICAL SCORES FOR U.S. SENATORS, 1962 TO 2000 (SENATE COMMON SPACE SCORES)



Source: Authors' compilation of NOMINATE data downloaded from Voteview.com.

FIGURE 5.7 MEDIAN NOMINATE COMMON SPACE SCORES IN THE HOUSE, OVERALL AND BY PARTY, 1960 TO 2000



Source: Authors' compilation of NOMINATE data downloaded from Voteview.com.

FIGURE 5.8 MEDIAN NOMINATE COMMON SPACE SCORES IN THE SENATE, OVERALL AND BY PARTY, 1960 TO 2000



Source: Authors' compilation of NOMINATE data downloaded from Voteview.com.

FIGURE 5.9 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTORY MARGIN AND IDEOLOGY FOR HOUSE MEMBERS



Source: Authors' compilation of NOMINATE data downloaded from Voteview.com.
Note: The graph depicts the quadratic regression line for DW-NOMINATE scores regressed on margin of victory (done separately for Democrats and Republicans). The vertical line at 0.5 separates Republicans (to the left of the line) from Democrats (to the right of the line). The sample sizes for the regression models are 4,627 for Republicans and 6,318 for Democrats.

FIGURE 5.10 BIANNUAL CORRELATION BETWEEN DW-NOMINATE SCORE AND VICTORY MARGIN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1952 TO 2000



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 5.11 BIANNUAL CORRELATION BETWEEN DW-NOMINATE SCORE AND VICTORY MARGIN IN THE U.S. SENATE, 1952 TO 2000



Source: Authors' compilation.

TABLE 5.1 DIVERSITY SCORES FOR THE HOUSE AND SENATE FOR EACH OF SIX REDISTRICTING PERIODS, 1962 TO 2002[a]

	Senate		House	
Year	Average	Standard Deviation	Average	Standard Deviation
1962	1.16	0.76	1.87	2.09
1968	1.24	0.78	1.89	2.05
1972	1.15	0.73	1.95	2.35
1982	1.21	0.75	2.15	2.45
1992	1.18	0.88	2.27	2.41
2002	1.23	0.88	2.42	2.33

Source: Authors' compilation.

[a] Higher scores indicate less diversity (more homogeneity). See appendix.

TABLE 5.2 NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WITH DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF AFRICAN AMERICANS, BY REDISTRICTING PERIOD

	Percentage of African Americans in District							
Year	Less than 30	30 to 39	40 to 44	45 to 49	50 to 54	55 to 59	60 to 65	Greater than 65
1962	383	31	6	10	0	2	1	2
1966	389	26	8	3	4	0	1	4
1972	387	26	7	2	5	1	1	6
1982	388	22	6	4	4	1	2	8
1992	390	7	5	1	6	9	9	8
2002	383	18	5	3	4	10	10	2

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1960–2000).

FIGURE 6.1 NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, MEASURED BY NORMALIZED TWO-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE.



Source: Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews (1972, 1974); Barone and Ujifusa (1982, 1984, 1992, 1994, 2002); Barone and Cohen (2004).

TABLE 6.1 POISSON MODEL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WITHIN A STATE

	Restricted Model (1972 to 2002)		Full Model (1992 to 2002)	
	Percentage of Districts in Competitive Range			
Variable	45 to 55	48 to 52	45 to 55	48 to 52
State uncompetitiveness	–0.140**	–0.217**	–0.148**	–0.235**
	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.061)
VRA	–0.670**	–0.960**	–0.825**	–1.294**
	(0.152)	(0.231)	(0.245)	(0.394)
VRA*state uncompetitiveness (Democratic state)	0.087**	0.173**	0.085*	0.134
	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.089)
VRA*state uncompetitiveness (Republican state)	0.075**	0.142**	0.071	0.149*
	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.086)
Incumbent gerrymander	0.164	0.545*	0.088	0.672
	(0.187)	(0.298)	(0.248)	(0.420)
Partisan gerrymander	0.162	0.371	0.083	0.119
	(0.186)	(0.301)	(0.240)	(0.422)
Court	0.051	0.298*	0.042	0.150
	(0.107)	(0.158)	(0.190)	(0.312)
Lose seats	–0.024	–0.283	0.371*	0.340
	(0.112)	(0.175)	(0.196)	(0.307)
Gain seats	–0.047	–0.169	0.282	0.117
	(0.121)	(0.186)	(0.223)	(0.365)
Respect communities of interest	—	—	0.194	–0.080
			(0.237)	(0.406)
Respect political subdivisions	—	—	–0.182	0.178
			(0.195)	(0.335)
Compactness constraint	—	—	0.027	–0.258
			(0.221)	(0.373)
Election data base	—	—	–0.290	–0.392
			(0.222)	(0.348)
Year 1972	0.164	0.417*	—	—
	(0.138)	(0.226)		
Year 1982	0.317**	0.676**	—	—
	(0.131)	(0.212)		
Year 1992	0.185	0.414*	0.137	0.437*
	(0.132)	(0.220)	(0.137)	(0.234)
Constant	–0.614**	–1.657**	–0.356	–1.263
	(0.212)	(0.337)	(0.332)	(0.537)
Number of observations	166	166	84	84
(Average) log likelihood	–270.50	–204.52	–132.79	–90.48

Source: Data on state and district partisanship from Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews (1972, 1974), Barone and Ujifusa (1982, 1984, 1992, 1994, 2002), and Barone and Cohen (2004); redistricting rules from Minnesota Geographic Information Systems, accessed at http://www.commissions.leg.state.mn/gis/html/redistricting.html; redistricting outcomes from McDonald (2004); electronic database use from Altman, Mac Donald, and McDonald (2005).

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$, two-tailed test, standard errors of coefficients in parentheses

FIGURE 8.1 PROBABILITY OF ELECTING CANDIDATE OF CHOICE AND PERCENTAGE OF BLACK VOTING-AGE POPULATION



(a) High Polarization



(b) Low Polarization

Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 8.2 KEY POINTS AND DISTRICT TYPES



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 8.3 PARETO FRONTIER OF DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION



Pre-*Ashcroft:* Areas 2 and 3 were permissible → proposal P is retrogressive
Post-*Ashcroft:* Areas 2, 3, and 4 are permissible → P is nonretrogressive

Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 8.4 OPTIMAL DISTRICTS



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 8.5 EMERGENCE OF THE PARETO FRONTIER IN THE SOUTH AND FOR ALL DISTRICTS



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 8.6 DIFFERENCES IN BLACK VOTING-AGE POPULATION BETWEEN PROPOSED AND BASELINE PLANS



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 8.7 PROBABILITY OF ELECTING A REPUBLICAN, WHITE DEMOCRAT, AND BLACK DEMOCRAT, GEORGIA LEGISLATIVE ELECTION, 1991 TO 2002



Source: Authors' compilation.

FIGURE 8.8 BLACK SUPPORT SCORES FOR REPUBLICAN, WHITE DEMOCRATIC, AND BLACK DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATORS FROM GEORGIA



Source: Authors' compilation.

TABLE 8.1 EXPECTED NUMBER OF CANDIDATES OF CHOICE (CoC's) ELECTED FOR BASELINE AND PROPOSED DISTRICTING PLANS[a]

	Baseline Plan		Proposed Plan	
District	BVAP	P(CoC Elected)	BVAP	P(CoC Elected)
1	0	0.00	0	0.00
2	10	0.01	10	0.01
3	20	0.06	40	0.50
4	60	0.94	50	0.79
5	60	0.94	50	0.79
Expected CoC's		1.96		2.10

Source: Authors' compilation.

[a] Sample data for a city with five council seats and 30 percent black voting-age population (BVAP). Probabilities are derived from probit graph in figure 8.1.

TABLE 8.2 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE PLANS BY THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF INFLUENCE, COALITION, AND MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS CREATED, AND EXPECTED CANDIDATES OF CHOICE

Plan	Influence	Coalition	Majority-Minority	E(CoC)
Baseline (1990 Census)	12	1	10	11.2
Baseline (2000 Census)	12	1	12	13.6
Proposed	17	0	13	12.5
Interim (2002)	17	0	13	12.9

Source: Authors' compilation.

Table 8.3 Mean and Median Support Score, for Each Districting Plan (Percentage)

Plan	Mean	Median
Baseline (1990 Census)	59.0	46.1
Baseline (2000 Census)	62.3	50.2
Proposed	66.6	75.9
Interim (2002)	65.9	69.2

Source: Authors' compilation.

TABLE 9.1 USE OF PRIMARIES TO SELECT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN LATIN AMERICA

Country	No Primaries	Some Primaries	All Primaries
Argentina	1983	1989 (IU, PJ, UCR), 1995 (FREPASO, UCR), 1999 (Alianza-UCR), 2003 (UCR)	
Bolivia	1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 2002, 2005		
Brazil	1989, 1994, 1998, 2006	2002 (PT)	
Chile	1989, 2005	1993 (Concertación-PDC), 1999 (Concertación-PPD)	
Colombia	1982, 1998, 2002	1978 (PL), 1986 (PL), 1990 (PL), 1994 (PL), 2006 (PDA, PL)	
Costa Rica	1990, 1994, 2006	1978 (PUSC), 1982 (PUSC), 1986 (PLN), 1998 (PLN), 2002 (PLN, PUSC)	
Dominican Republic	1978, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2004	1982 (PRD), 1986 (PRD[a]), 2000 (PRD)	
Ecuador	1978, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006		
El Salvador	1984, 1989, 1994, 1999	2004 (ARENA, FMLN)	
Guatemala	1985, 1990, 1995, 1999	2003 (PAN[a])	
Honduras	1985, 1989, 1993, 1997	2001 (PL, PN[a]), 2005 (PL, PN)	
Mexico	1994	2000 (PRI), 2006 (PAN, PRI)	
Nicaragua	1990, 2006	1996 (FMLN), 2001 (FMLN)	
Panama	1994, 2004		1999 (AO, NN, PA)
Paraguay	1989	1993 (PC[a]), 1998 (PC[a]),	2003 (PC, MFDI, MPQ, PEN, PFA, PHP, PPL, PLRA, PUNCE)

TABLE 9.1 *Continued*

Country	No Primaries	Some Primaries	All Primaries
Peru	1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 2000, 2001	2006 (UN)	
Uruguay	1984, 1994	1989 (PC)	1999 (PC, UC, NE, EP, PN), 2004 (EP, UC, PN)
Venezuela	1983, 1988, 1999, 2000, 2006	1978 (AD), 1993 (COPEI, ADI)	

Source: Authors' compilation.

Initials: AD (Acción Democrática), AO (Accion Opositor), COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente), EP (Encuentro Progresivo), FREPASO (Frente del País Solidario), FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional), FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional), IU (Izquierda Unida), MPQ (Patria Querida), MFDI (Movimiento Fuerza Democrática Independiente), NE (Nuevo Espacio), NN (Nuevo Nacion), PA (Partido Arnulfista), PAN (Guatemala: Partido de Avanzada Nacional; Mexico: Partido de Accion Nacional), PC (Partido Colorado), PDA (Polo Democratico Alternativo), PDC (Democracia Cristiana), PEN (Encuentro Nacional), PJ (Partido Justicialista), PFA (Partido Frente Amplio), PHP (Partido Humanista Paraguayo), PL (Partido Liberal: Colombia and Honduras), PLN (Partido de Liberación Nacional), PLRA (Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico), PN (Partido Nacional), PPD (Partido Por Democracia), PPL (Patria Libre), PRD (Dominican Republic and Panama: Partido Revolucionario Democrático), PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), PU (Partido Unido), PUNCE (Union de Ciudadanos Éticos), PUSC (Partido de Unidad Social Cristiana), UC (Civic Union), UCR (Unión Civica Radical), UN (Unidad Nacional).

[a] The candidate elected via primary was replaced by a different party member for the general election.

TABLE 9.2 EFFECTS OF PRIMARY ELECTION ON SHARE OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTE[a]

	Model 1	P > |t|	Model 2	P > |t|	Model 3	P > |t|
Vote percentage$_{t-1}$	.75	.00	.54	.00	.75	.00
	(.05)		(.05)		(.05)	
Incumbent party	–7.59	.01	–9.42	.00	–7.57	.01
	(2.73)		(2.70)		(2.73)	
GDP growth rate	.05	.83	.15	.70	.05	.83
	(.21)		(.40)		(.21)	
GDP*incumbent party	1.14	.02	1.24	.03	1.13	.02
	(.48)		(.57)		(.48)	
Incumbent candidate	12.27	.00	16.00	.00	12.26	.00
	(4.09)		(4.25)		(4.08)	
Coalition	5.30	.01	2.51	.28	5.30	.01
	(1.94)		(2.33)		(1.93)	
Primary (yes/no)	5.05	.05	5.74	.01	5.40	.05
	(2.58)		(2.28)		(2.72)	
Primary*tainted					–3.52	.51
	(5.36)					
Constant	3.83	.00			3.83	.00
	(.81)		(.81)			
	N = 674		N = 304		N = 674	
	R^2 = .62		R^2 = .47		R^2 = .62	

Source: Authors' calculations.

[a] Regression with robust standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent variable is the percentage of the vote.

FIGURE 10.1 MENTIONS OF PUNCH-CARD AND TOUCH-SCREEN VOTING IN *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, 2000 TO 2006



Source: Authors' coding of articles from a Lexis-Nexis search.

FIGURE 10.2 RESIDUAL VOTE RATES BY PRECINCT IN 2004 PRESIDENTIAL RACE FOR LOS ANGELES AND SAN BERNARDINO COUNTIES[a]



Source: Authors' research.
[a] Darker colors indicate higher residual vote rates.

FIGURE 10.3 THE VOTER'S FAULT



Source: Re-quest.net, used with permission.

FIGURE 10.4 FRESNO COUNTY RESIDUAL VOTE RATES IN CENSUS TRACTS BY PERCENTAGE MINORITY IN 1996 (TOP) AND 2000 (BOTTOM)





Source: Authors' calculations.

FIGURE 10.5 MENTIONS OF TOUCH-SCREEN VOTING AND SELECTED CRITICS OF DRE VOTING IN *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, 2000 TO 2006



Source: Authors' coding from a Lexis-Nexis search.

FIGURE 10.6 PRESIDENTIAL RESIDUAL RATE BY PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION FOR CITIES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY IN 2004



Source: Authors' calculations.

FIGURE 10.7 HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION LEVELS (TOP) COMPARED WITH RESIDUAL VOTE RATES (BOTTOM)



Percentage of People with Less than High School Degree

0 to 9.8 percent	19.7 to 31.4 percent	45.3 to 60.6 percent
9.9 to 19.6 percent	31.5 to 45.2 percent	60.7 to 100 percent



Residual Vote Rates

0 to 0.6 percent	1.6 to 2.2 percent	3.3 to 5.2 percent
0.7 to 1.5 percent	2.3 to 3.2 percent	5.3 to 10.8 percent

Source: Authors' compiliation.

FIGURE 10.8 RESIDUAL VOTE RATES IN LOS ANGELES AND ORANGE COUNTIES



Source: Authors' compilation.

TABLE 10.1 SUBJECTS OF ARTICLES IN *THE NEW YORK TIMES* ON VOTING MACHINES (PERCENTAGE)

Subject	2001	2004
Accuracy and fairness	35%	10%
Security and trustworthiness	5	50
Both	7	9
Neither	53	31
Total number of articles	77	147

Source: Authors' coding of articles from a Lexis-Nexis search.

TABLE 10.2 RISKS, THREATS, AND VULNERABILITIES

Type of Risk	Threats (Experts on Threats)	Vulnerabilities (Experts on Vulnerabilities)	Who Is Affected?
Accuracy risks (can mean *inaccurate* system)	Systems that don't record votes properly (*Human factors, experts, engineers, and psychologists*)	People who have trouble with machines (*Social scientists who study vulnerable populations*)	The disabled, elderly, and those with less education
Security risks (can mean *untrustworthy* system)	People who rig elections (*Social scientists and risk analysts who study corruption*)	Corruptible voting systems (*Computer scientists and management experts*)	Partisans of either party

Source: Authors' compilation.

TABLE II.I LINKS IN THE ELECTION PROCESS CHAIN

Procedure	How Affected by HAVA	Current and Potential Methods of Assessing
Establishing the voting rolls (registration)	• Mandated integrated statewide registration databases	• Focused audits of "paper trail" • Tally of provisional ballots issued • Reports of registration problems at the polls • Exit polls
Checking in voters at polling place	• Mandated "provisional ballots" to resolve Election Day disputes over registration	• Observer audits of polling places • Number of provisional ballots issued • Reports of registration problems at the polls • Exit polls
Use of voting equipment by voter	• Mandated handicapped accessibility • Outlawed punch-card and mechanical-lever machines • Paid for most equipment upgrades (with local matches) • Provided role for EAC and NIST in assessing machines	• Residual vote rates • Observer audits of polling places • "Ease of use" surveys of voters
Counting ballots	• Mandated statewide criteria for counting ambiguous ballots	• Random-sample auditing • Study of recounts • Exit polls

Source: Author's compilation.