At lunchtime the loud, cavernous cafeteria at Framingham High School fills with students talking and laughing with one another. They eat tortillas, rice noodles, and chapatis. They speak more than fifteen languages. Banners with flags from more than twenty-seven countries represented by the student body swing from one corner of the ceiling to the other.

Located twelve miles outside of Boston, Framingham is a microcosm of the United States. Once a predominantly white, working-class community, it is now home to numerous new immigrant communities. Many of the students at the high school are either immigrants themselves or members of the second generation: they were born to immigrant parents in the United States, or they came to this country when they were still very young. These trends mirror developments in the United States as a whole. In 2000 an estimated 27.5 million residents, or 10 percent of the nation’s population, were children of immigrants, born primarily to the Latin American and Asian migrants who began arriving in the 1960s (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001). In 2000 approximately 56 million residents, or 20.5 percent of the population, were foreign stock (first- and second-generation individuals combined). In that same year immigrant children and the U.S.-born children of immigrants accounted for one out of every five children in the United States. They were the fastest-growing segment of the population under eighteen years of age.
There is much debate among researchers and policymakers about how the “new” second generation will fare. Will they follow the paths of the Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants who arrived in the early 1900s and gradually ascended the socioeconomic ladder? Or are there significant differences characterizing the contemporary migration experience that will shape mobility trajectories in fundamentally different ways?

Two partial answers to these questions come from different subfields of migration scholarship, although the researchers conducting this work have not always seen themselves as taking part in the same conversation. One body of scholarship focuses on the process of immigrant incorporation. Two broad views of assimilation characterize these debates. The theory of segmented assimilation proposes three patterns of adaptation for contemporary migrants and their children. One path involves increasing acculturation and subsequent integration into the white middle class. A second path predicts downward mobility and incorporation into the underclass. And a third pattern involves rapid economic advancement through the preservation of unique ethnic traits (Zhou 1999). An alternative view of the assimilation process revisits earlier ideas about straight-line assimilation, which viewed integration as linear, generationally driven, and a necessary prerequisite for successful incorporation into the United States. It emphasizes the agency of social actors in negotiating the incorporation process and stresses the influence of contextual factors. From this perspective, assimilation is an interactive, bumpy journey along multiple nonlinear pathways (Morawska 2002; Rumbaut 1997; Alba and Nee 1999; Gans 1992).

The second body of scholarship focuses on the kinds of attachments that contemporary migrants maintain to their homelands. Rather than severing their ties to their countries of origin and trading one membership for another, increasing numbers of migrants sustain economic, political, and religious ties to their homelands even as they work, vote, and pray in the countries that have received them. And although it is unlikely that the children of immigrants will be involved in their ancestral homes with the same frequency and intensity as their parents, the extent to which they will engage in transnational practices is still an open question.

This volume tries to wed these conversations. It grows out of a conference we organized at Harvard University in the spring of
1998 in which we brought together scholars of transnational migration and researchers working on the second generation. At this event we took stock of what we knew about how transnational the children of immigrants actually are and the kinds of activities they engage in. Given that more and more migrants participate in transnational activities, how widespread will these kinds of activities be among the second generation, and with what consequences? In many ways our efforts were premature. Most members of the second generation are still too young to know what kind of relationship they will have with their ancestral homelands. They may express strong attachments and formulate plans to act on them in the future, but it is impossible to predict what they will actually do. In addition, in many immigrant communities the size of the second generation is still quite small. Finally, survey data with which to assess these questions are only now becoming available.

Yet we still felt it imperative that migration scholars begin to lay the groundwork toward a better understanding of the transnational practices of the children of immigrants, for both intellectual and practical reasons. The concept of transnational migration, and its theoretical development, must grapple with the question of whether it extends beyond the immigrant generation. Researchers need to understand the relationship between transnational practices and assimilation among the first generation and examine how the character, intensity, and frequency of these activities might change among their children. The second generation is also expanding and maturing. Its members will play an increasingly important role in the economic and political life of this country and, perhaps, the countries from which their families came. The more information we have about the objective and subjective ties that the children of immigrants have to their ancestral homes, the better we will understand their experiences in this country and in their sending communities.

Thus, rather than propose definitive answers, this book presents the results of a first round of research on the transnational practices of the second generation. The chapters are organized into three parts. In part I, the authors address the content, meaning, and consequences of transnational practices among the second generation. They present findings from their own research on second-generation transnational engagements, descriptions of how these vary across groups and time periods, and some possible explanations for these
variations. Although each of these contributors finds some evidence that the children of immigrants are transnational actors, they disagree over whether “the glass is half empty or half full,” and over whether these activities will have any long-term, widespread impact. One perspective sees transnational activism among the second generation as confined primarily to certain groups of individuals who are, by and large, physically and emotionally rooted in the United States and lacking in the language and cultural skills or desire to live in their ancestral homes. Since these individuals are only occasionally transnational activists and their activities are confined to very specific arenas of social life, those activities are likely to have minimal long-term consequences. An alternative view sees the first view as overemphasizing the importance of physical movement and giving short shrift to the strong influences of the transnational social fields in which the second generation is embedded. This view stresses the importance of the sending-country individuals, resources, and ideas that are a constant presence in the lives of the second generation and holds that even selective, periodic transnational practices can add up.

The authors in part II comment on these analyses. They offer suggestions about how to bridge this analytical divide, introduce conceptual tools, and suggest directions for future research.

The chapters in part III are not, by and large, about actual transnational behaviors but instead use a transnational lens to analyze the second-generation experience. They examine the impact of home and host-country value systems on how the children of immigrants construct who they are, decide where to work, and choose civic and political communities. While the authors in part I actually conducted fieldwork in two settings or asked their respondents directly about their transnational affinities and behaviors, the authors in part III approach issues of transnational attachments more indirectly. While studying aspects of the lives of the second generation, many have come to realize that their respondents’ lives cannot be adequately understood without reference to their ancestral homes.

We want to be clear from the outset, then, about what this book can and cannot do. It contributes to ongoing debates about transnational migration by expanding the range of groups previously covered. It includes Vietnamese, Filipino, and Chinese migrants in addition to those from Latin America and the Caribbean, who have been the focus of much of the prior research. It sheds light on the
experiences of both upwardly mobile, middle-class migrants and their working-class counterparts. It includes work on groups with a high propensity toward transnational involvements, such as Dominicans, Mexicans, and Haitians, and on those whose networks and connections to their sending communities are not as well established, such as Koreans and Chinese. It advances a theoretical perspective stressing the synergy, rather than the antagonism, between assimilation and transnational practices. This volume cannot resolve questions, however, about how widespread or long-lasting transnational practices among the second generation are likely to be. Despite these limitations, we are confident that our contributors speak to concerns that are critical to ongoing immigration debates and are likely to become even more central in the future.

WHAT IS TRANSNATIONALISM?

Much early migration research predicted that migrants would sever their homeland attachments as they became integrated into the countries that received them. In the last decade, however, many scholars have come to acknowledge that international migration can no longer be seen as a one-way process. Events, communities, and lives, most observers now recognize, are increasingly linked across borders. The frequent and widespread movement back and forth between communities of origin and destination, and the resulting economic and cultural transformations, have prompted some researchers to speak of a set of activities grouped loosely together under the rubric of “transnationalism.” Though the field is still in its infancy, those sympathetic to this perspective seek to recast our understanding of migration through their studies of the multilevel social, economic, and religious ties and practices that link migrants and nonmigrants to one another across borders.

Yet transnationalism remains a controversial topic. Some critics claim that transnationalism has become a catchall category that is used to describe everything under the sun. Others argue that transnational migration has a long history and that earlier waves of migrants also displayed strong connections to their homelands. Finally, while some scholars acknowledge the importance of transnational
ties among the first generation, they predict that they will quickly weaken among their children.

Some of the confusion around these questions arises from the fact that those who ask them come from a variety of disciplines. Anthropologists, political scientists, cultural studies scholars, and sociologists have all thrown their hats into the ring. At present, vocabularies of “diaspora” and “transnationalism” are both used to describe the ways in which globalization challenges social organization and identity construction. Scholars using these terms are interested in how heightened social, economic, and political interconnectedness across national borders and cultures enables individuals to sustain multiple identities and loyalties, create new cultural products using elements from a variety of settings, and exercise multiple political and civic memberships. The different ways in which these terms are deployed stem more from their intellectual roots than from differences in their substantive concerns, and as the following discussion illustrates, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between them.

The term “diaspora” is used in three principal ways in the literature (Vertovec 1997). First, there are those who use “diaspora” to describe a social form involving individuals living throughout the world but identifying collectively with one another, their host societies, and the lands from which they and their ancestors have come (Safran 1991). In addition to studies of classical diasporic groups, such as Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, these researchers now study voluntary and involuntary migrants from a variety of homelands, as well as their widespread connections to one another. Second, there are those who use “diaspora” to describe a type of social consciousness that locates individuals in multiple cultural and social spaces (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Gilroy (1993) and Hall (1991), for example, reconceptualized the mid-Atlantic as a zone of movement, connections, and structures of domination and power that produce multiple black diasporic cultures. Nonini and Ong (1997) examined the multi-sited, multi-layered geography formed by networks of family ties, kinship, sentiments, and commerce that evolved from connections formed by earlier Chinese diasporas. Finally, there are those who use “diaspora” to describe a mode of cultural production involving the production and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomenon through creolization and hybridization (Hannerz 1992). Clifford (1988), for
example, describes the formation of cultural subjectivities through the actual or imagined travel of intellectuals, business elites, or slum dwellers.

Many of these same social relations are of interest to those employing a transnational vocabulary. International relations scholars introduced the term “transnationalism” in the early 1970s to describe the proliferation of nonstate institutions and governance regimes acting across boundaries. They called these processes “transnational” rather than “international” to differentiate between activities that transcend national borders and relations between corporate actors whose boundaries are maintained (Keohane and Nye 1971). Several years later anthropologists used “transnationalism” to describe the “process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic, and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders” (Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc 1994, 6). These scholars explored the ways in which connections to collectivities constituted across space seem to override identities grounded in fixed, bounded locations (Hannerz 1992). They were also interested in the ways in which newly emerging transnational public spheres replace strictly bounded, geographically confined communities as sites where political claims are made (Gupta and Ferguson 1997).

Some scholars of transnationalism focus on the reorganization of the relationship between the global and the local through the logic of late capitalism, including the redistribution of corporate activities across the globe, the relocation of industrial production to global peripheries, and the reorganization of banking and investment relations. Instead of conceptualizing the global as macrolevel political and economic forces that stand in opposition to local cultural production, they explore where and how the global and the local meet and the ways in which relations of domination, as well as relations of reciprocity and solidarity, shape these encounters. Appadurai’s (1996) work focuses on how media and travel influence identity, locality, and community creation. His notions of “ethnoscapes, ideoscapes, and mediascapes” bring to light how social actors use resources and construct identities that transcend traditional political and social boundaries. Ong (1999, 4) uses “transnationality” to
describe the condition of “cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space.” By doing so, she wants to call attention to the horizontal and vertical economic, social, and cultural practices that span space, the power hierarchies and citizenship regimes in which they are embedded, and the ways in which these practices are enabled and regulated by the changing relationship between states and capitalism. Kearney (1995, 548) also uses “transnationalism” to “call attention to the cultural and political projects of nation-states as they vie for hegemony in relations with other nation-states, with their citizens and aliens.”

Another approach to transnationalism focuses on postnational politics. These scholars argue that national boundaries are no longer the principal axis around which social life is organized because the nation-state system is weakening, international governance bodies are proliferating, and global rights regimes protect individuals regardless of their national citizenship (Soysal 1994; Baubock 1994). Beck (2000) claims that the new dialectic emerging between the global and the local requires a transnational response because national political institutions can no longer resolve the kinds of challenges posed by globalism. An increasingly large body of work focuses on the international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) that are changing the nature of politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rivera-Salgado 1999; Brysk 2000).

This book focuses on one subset of activities included under the broad rubric of transnationalism—transnational migration, or how ordinary individuals live their everyday lives across borders and the consequences of their activities for sending- and receiving-country life. Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999) define transnational practices as the economic, political, and sociocultural occupations and activities that require regular long-term contacts across borders for their success. Clearly, not all migrants are engaged in transnational practices. Recent surveys find, however, that a small but significant group of migrants exhibits a distinct mode of transnational incorporation. Portes and his colleagues (2002) report that slightly more than 5 percent of the Salvadoran, Dominican, and Colombian migrants they studied were engaged in what they call “transnational entrepreneurship.” The success of these business owners, who were more likely than their non-entrepreneurial counterparts to be male, to have
higher incomes, and to be citizens, depended on frequent travel and constant contact with other countries. Guarnizo (2002) also has found that nearly 10 percent of the Colombians, Dominicans, and Salvadorans he surveyed were involved in some form of regular transnational political engagement. Their activities included membership in a home-country political party (9.9 percent), membership in a civic hometown association (13.7 percent), and participation in home-country electoral campaigns and rallies (7.7 percent). Nearly 20 percent reported occasional participation in these kinds of informal political activities.

We want to propose a somewhat more expansive view of the field. We are also interested in the connections that migrants sustain to their sending communities, the various kinds of social networks and social groups that result, and the ways in which these ties influence migrants’ positions in their home and host countries. We also want to explore how these dynamics vary by race, class, and gender. But we are just as interested in the impact of transnational migration on those who stay behind as on those who move. We take cognitive and imagined elements of transnational livelihoods seriously. That is, our contributors are not only interested in migrants’ actual behaviors and practices. They are also concerned about how social actors construct their identities and imagine themselves and the social groups they belong to when they live within transnational social fields and when they can use resources and discursive elements from multiple settings. Moreover, we analyze the ways in which non-economic transnational institutions create and are created by transnational migration. We explore religious, civic, and political institutions as sites of transnational belonging and how organizations respond to ensure that these loyalties endure (Levitt 2001a).

The size and impact of population movements increase through social networks. Sometimes these networks ultimately unravel as migrants are incorporated into host-country life. In other networks the effect of migration is so strong and widespread that a transnational social field or public sphere emerges between the sending and receiving countries. These social spaces extend beyond the networks of social relations and kin that actually connect each person located within them (Glick-Schiller 2000). Those who live within transnational social fields are exposed to a set of social expectations, cultural values, and patterns of human interaction that are shaped by
more than one social, economic, and political system. Because their activities are influenced powerfully by the social fields in which they are carried out, the lives of individual actors cannot be viewed in isolation from the transnational social fields that they inhabit.

The transnational social fields that migration engenders encompass all aspects of social life. Though they may result at first from economic ties between migrants and nonmigrants, religious, political, and social connections soon emerge that also constitute and are constituted by these arenas. The thicker and more diverse a transnational social field is, the greater the number of ways it offers migrants to remain active in their homelands. The more institutionalized these relationships become, the more likely it is that transnational membership will persist.

Some researchers describe transnational social fields that encompass all migrants from a particular sending country residing in a key site of reception (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, this volume; Guarnizo 1998). These fields, however, often arise out of connections between multiple localities. Although there may be large overarching fields between the United States and Mexico, the Dominican Republic, or El Salvador, for example, the building blocks of these are the many smaller, bounded fields between particular sending villages and cities and specific urban or rural receiving points. Brazilian migration to the United States has created transnational social fields between residents of the city of Governador Valadares and migrants in New York City; Pompano Beach, Florida; Danbury, Connecticut; and the greater Boston metropolitan area (Margolis 1994). Transnational social fields also unite Dominicans in Venezuela and Spain to those who have stayed behind (Nyberg Sorensen 2000).

These arenas operate at multiple levels. Relations between local-level migrant and nonmigrant actors often produce ties between community-based sending- and receiving-country political party chapters. But these local, personalized ties also often form part of coordinated efforts between the party’s national-level sending- and receiving-country operations. Similarly, relations between local parishes extend and deepen existing ties between national and regional sending- and receiving-country churches (Levitt 2001a).

The thick and expansive set of social relations that migration produces diminishes the importance of movement as a requirement for engaging in transnational practices. Those who travel regularly
to carry out their routine affairs have been called “transmigrants” by some researchers (England 1999; Glick-Schiller 1995; Guarnizo 1997). Some individuals move infrequently and are rooted primarily in a single sending- or receiving-country setting, but their lives are integrally involved with resources, contacts, and people from far away. Finally, there are those who never move but who live their lives within a context that has become transnationalized because it is permeated by social remittances and cultural elements that migrants introduce.

Frequent travelers, periodic movers, and those who stay in one place engage in a wide variety of transnational practices. Guarnizo (2000) defines “core transnationalism” as those activities that form an integral part of an individual’s habitual life, are undertaken on a regular basis, and are patterned and therefore somewhat predictable. “Expanded transnationalism,” in contrast, includes migrants who occasionally engage in transnational activities, such as responses to political crises or natural disasters. Itzigsohn and his colleagues (1999) characterize “broad transnational practices” as those that are not well institutionalized, involve only occasional participation, and require only sporadic movement. These researchers contrast these practices with “narrow transnational practices,” which are highly institutionalized and constant and involve regular travel.

These terms help to operationalize variations in the intensity and frequency of transnational practices, but cross-border engagements also vary by scope. Even those engaged in core transnational practices may confine their activities to one arena of social action. Or an individual may engage in core transnational activities with respect to one sphere of social activity and only expanded transnational activities with respect to another. There are those, for example, whose livelihoods depend on the frequent, patterned harnessing of resources across borders while their political and religious lives focus on host-country concerns. In contrast, there are those who engage in regular religious and political transnational practices but only occasionally send money back to family members or invest in homeland projects. Those individuals whose transnational practices involve many arenas of social life engage in “comprehensive transnational practices,” while those involved in activities with a more limited purview engage in “selective transnational practices” (Levitt 2001b).
Highlighting variations in scope, intensity, and goals brings to light the multiple ways in which migrants and their children can combine transnational and assimilative strategies and the diverse outcomes these produce with respect to home- and host-country mobility. Doing so also reveals that transnational practices and assimilation are not diametrically opposed to one another (Levitt 2001a). Depending on their socioeconomic characteristics, immigrants and their children combine incorporation and transnational strategies in different ways at different stages of their lives. They use these to construct their identities, pursue economic mobility, and make political claims in their home or host country or in both. The resulting configurations produce different mixes of upward and downward mobility with respect to both contexts, depending on the kinds of activities in which migrants participate, the institutional arenas where these activities take place, and the class and life-cycle stage of individual migrants. Some migrants continue to play an active role in the economic, political, and religious lives of their homelands and achieve mobility in both home- and host-country contexts. Others engage in transnational practices but advance only in one setting. Still others engage in transnational practices that impede their mobility in both contexts (Levitt 2002; Morawska 2002).

A growing body of work uses a transnational lens to explore the experiences of the immigrant generation. But even those who now acknowledge that we must study migrants’ and nonmigrants’ experiences in their home and host communities to understand contemporary migration rightfully ask whether transnational practices will persist among the second generation. These questions are just beginning to attract serious attention from those who study these issues.

THE SECOND GENERATION

Studies of the second generation generally focus on the children of immigrants who were born in the United States (the classic second generation) and people who came to the United States as children, usually accompanied by their parents, but who grew up and attended school in this country (the “1.5 generation”). Almost
11 million are U.S.-born second-generation youth and 2.9 million are foreign-born. In 2000, 27.5 million U.S. residents, or 10 percent of the population, had one or two immigrant parents. Among these, over half are the new second generation—children of immigrants who have come to the United States since the 1960s. The remainder tend to be older individuals whose parents came to this country during the last great wave of immigration (1880–1920).

These two waves of immigration differ in terms of their racial origins. While the vast majority of immigrants who came between 1880 and 1920 were from Europe, 88 percent of immigrants who have entered the United States since the 1980s come from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data, Zhou (2001) calculates that 35 percent of the second generation are Latin American in origin and 7 percent are Asian. Most important for our purposes, these are precisely the regions whose migrants, researchers have found, engage in higher levels of transnational activism.

Members of the second generation, like their immigrant parents, are concentrated in gateway cities, especially Los Angeles, New York, Miami, and San Francisco. Immigrants and their children are a diverse lot. They are especially heterogeneous with respect to socioeconomic characteristics. Bipolar immigrant streams have brought large numbers of skilled professionals and entrepreneurs along with uneducated and unskilled laborers. Thus, immigrants are among the most educated and least educated Americans. Smith and Edmonston (1997) have found that overall about the same percentage of foreign-born and native-born are college graduates (20 percent), but that immigrants are overrepresented at the lowest educational levels: only 14.4 percent of native-born men had less than a high school diploma, but 37.1 percent of immigrant men had less than a high school diploma. Immigrant educational attainment also varies a great deal by national origin. Zhou (2001) reports that while 60 percent of foreign-born Indians report having a college degree, fewer than 5 percent of immigrants from El Salvador or Mexico have one. In gateway cities immigrant children have a particularly strong impact on the local school systems where they live because more than one-third of them speak a language other than English at home (Zhou 2001).

The difficulties of studying the second generation at the national level are well known (Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001;
The quantitative and qualitative work that has been done on this population to date generally compares the experiences of new immigrants and native minorities, analyzes their labor market status, examines patterns of naturalization and citizenship, measures language loss and retention, and examines strategies for economic mobility, including entrepreneurship and employment in ethnic enclaves. Immigration scholars have generally stressed the great variation in the social origins of the immigrants, who include highly educated professionals as well as unskilled laborers. They have also underscored the importance of legal conditions upon arrival, comparing legal immigrants, undocumented immigrants, and refugees. Attention has also been given to the regional distribution of the immigrants and their interaction with local labor markets and the geographic mobility patterns among the native-born. Finally, given the long history of castelike exclusion of America’s nonwhite minorities, scholars have addressed the central question of how non-European immigrants are doing relative to native minority groups, not only to examine potential displacement effects but also to understand the long-run prospects for nonwhite immigrants.

The new scholarship on the second generation also stresses the changes in the American economy and the ways in which those changes shape the options available to the children of immigrants today. The decline in manufacturing and the growth of the service economy have combined with the impact of the civil rights movement and subsequent legal measures to open universities and the economy to all groups to make enormous opportunities available to well-educated immigrants and their children. Because of the growth of racial and ethnic tolerance and the acceptance of multiculturalism, this socioeconomic success does not come at the cost of cultural assimilation. At the same time the lack of well-paid jobs for those with less than a college education and the growth of low-level service jobs have combined to limit the opportunities and outlooks for those who did not do well in school.

This burgeoning literature has produced many intriguing findings and some speculation about the experiences of the new second generation. Taken as a whole, it suggests that the experience of twenty-first-century immigrant children will be quite different from that of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century European immigrants and their children and grandchildren.
The “straight-line” model of assimilation was developed to explain the experiences of white ethnic groups of European origin. This model suggests that the second generation learns an immigrant culture at home but encounters the more highly valued American native culture in school, among their peer groups, and from the mass media. They internalize American culture and identity and reject their parents’ culture and identity as foreign. These competing allegiances work themselves out through rebellion and profane behavior, total rejection of the immigrant culture, and ultimately the forging of an ethnic culture that combines the American and immigrant social systems. Whatever the psychic toll of this shedding of cultural identity for the immigrant’s third- and fourth-generation descendants, assimilation was rewarded with substantial upward mobility. Generation has thus been a key term in assessing the assimilation of different ethnic groups in the United States (Gordon 1964; Lieberson 1980; Perlmann 1988; Hirschman 1983; Waters 1990; Lieberson and Waters 1988).

This description proved generally accurate for immigrant groups of European origin. Even as they have noted differences in the pace of change across ethnic groups, researchers have determined that the progress of once-stigmatized groups like the Greeks, Slavs, Irish, and Italians merits Greeley’s (1976) description as an “ethnic miracle.” They have found that time spent in the United States explains success because immigrants acquire the language skills, educational credentials, and general cultural knowledge needed to compete with native white Americans. Second-generation ethnic Americans may even surpass native Americans because of the selectivity of the immigrant generation and the drive and achievement orientation they instill in their children.

The new second generation, however, has elicited some disturbing hypotheses in recent years from thoughtful observers. Gans (1992) outlined several scenarios in which the children of the new immigrants could do worse than their parents or society as a whole. Gans speculated that second-generation immigrants who are restricted to poor inner-city schools, bad jobs, and shrinking economic niches will experience downward mobility. Using ethnographic case studies and a survey of second-generation schoolchildren in Miami and San Diego, Portes and Zhou (1993) have made a similar argument. The mode of incorporation of the first generation endows the
second generation with differing amounts of cultural and social capital in the form of jobs, networks, and values and exposes them to differing opportunities, thus exerting differential pulls on their allegiances. Those who face discrimination and are close to American minorities adopt a “reactive ethnicity.” Groups that arrive with strong ethnic networks, access to capital, and fewer ties to U.S. minorities, on the other hand, often develop a “linear ethnicity” by assimilating into existing ethnic communities. Still others practice a “segmented assimilation” in which they hold on to an immigrant identity to avoid being classified with American blacks or Puerto Ricans. Like Gans, they conclude that members of the second generation who cast their lot with America’s minority groups, whose peer culture takes an adversarial view of upward mobility and school success, are likely to experience downward social mobility.

Recently some have criticized this “second-generation decline” hypothesis for concluding prematurely that today’s second generation will not follow a pattern similar to that of earlier immigrants. Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) point out that earlier immigrants did not experience the effortless rise we sometimes attribute to them and that the heterogeneous nature of the second generation might just as well lead analysts to an optimistic assumption about their future prospects. They note that earlier waves of the European second generation also exhibited opposition toward school achievement, yet this attitude did not prevent them from doing well in the labor market.

Ethnographic studies support the notion that the children of voluntary migrants can resist mainstream American culture while not embracing an oppositional minority culture. Suárez-Orozco’s (1987) study found that Central American immigrant schoolchildren contrasted their U.S. experiences with their experiences at home and developed an “immigrant attitude towards school that helped them to do well.” Gibson’s (1989) study of second-generation Punjabi Sikhs in California developed the concept of “accommodation without assimilation.” The Sikh children, like the Central American children, saw success in school not as an avenue for individual mobility but rather as a way to bring honor and success to their families. Zhou and Bankston (1998) found that the social capital of a Vietnamese community protected its children against lowered educational performance in inner-city schools.
In the most comprehensive study of second-generation youth published to date, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) show very divergent paths for second-generation youth from different national origins and class backgrounds. They find three different trajectories of incorporation among the youth they studied in San Diego and Miami—dissonant, consonant, and selective acculturation. Dissonant acculturation occurs when young people quickly adopt American ways and the English language and their parents do not move as quickly. This is the trajectory that leads to role reversal: children must translate for their parents, and they become more worldly and sophisticated about American ways, leaving their immigrant parents relatively powerless and often dependent on them. Consonant acculturation occurs when parents and children learn the new culture and abandon the old one at the same pace. This occurs most commonly among middle-class immigrants and their children. Finally, with selective acculturation the second generation is embedded in a co-ethnic community that supports their parents, slows the loss of the parents’ home language and norms, and cushions the move of both generations into American ways. This is characterized by a lack of intergenerational conflict, the presence of co-ethnics as friends, and full bilingualism in the second generation. Portes and Rumbaut conclude by extolling the benefits of selective acculturation and call for policy initiatives to promote it.

What might such policy initiatives mean for the second generation? Concepts such as second-generation decline, segmented assimilation, and selective acculturation all stress that, for the second generation, becoming American could lead to downward mobility and maintaining ties to their parents’ culture and homeland could facilitate upward mobility. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) also show that first-generation immigrants with high levels of education and income are better able to provide a grounding in their own culture and language for their children. This has intriguing implications for the study of second-generation and transnational migration. Does the level of transnational involvement of the parental generation lead to more selective acculturation among the second generation? Does this hold even when we control for class background, or is all of the effect of transnational ties merely due to the fact that middle-class people are more likely to maintain transnational ties in the second generation? Or is the effect of transnational ties among the
first generation not in the transmission of transnational ties or behaviors to the second generation, but rather in the beneficial effect of transnational ties among the first generation on the identities developed among the second generation? If indeed immigrants with higher levels of income and education are more likely to maintain transnational ties than immigrants from more modest class backgrounds, we might then expect to see more participation of the second generation in transnational practices now than in earlier periods, when fewer middle-class immigrants came to the United States (Foner 2000).

Race is the other crucial variable that at least in the theoretical literature plays an important part in both second-generation outcomes and in the maintenance of transnational ties. Many scholars have argued that contemporary immigrants may be more likely to maintain active involvement in their sending societies because of the racial discrimination they face in the United States (Foner 2000; Waters 1999; Kasinitz 1992). Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001) suggest that the negative reception of people of color gives them more motivation to stay involved in a sending society in which they are members of the majority or in which their class status negates their racial status. This is another area ripe for empirical investigation in the second generation and for creative cross-fertilization between those who study transnational ties and those who study second-generation identity. What role does racial discrimination play in the second generation’s maintenance of ties to their parents’ sending countries? And what role does transnationalism play in how the second generation develops racial and ethnic identities and copes with racial discrimination when it does occur? Does multiculturalism in the United States create conditions that sustain transnational ties over generations? Does access to a global diasporic consciousness create opportunities for young people to acculturate selectively (to use Portes and Rumbaut’s terms)? Or does the maintenance of ties to the parents’ sending country cause second-generation young people to disengage from American society and become politically or socially isolated?

Again, we cannot resolve these questions in this volume. Instead, our aim is to present a range of initial responses to these questions and to pave the way for future research. The first part of this volume offers some initial insights into the kinds of trans-
national practices the second generation is engaged in and their variations across groups. The authors in this section agree that fairly small numbers of the second generation are actually engaged in transnational practices, but they disagree on the long-term impact of these engagements.

Part I opens with a chapter by Reed Ueda, who uses the case of Japanese American Nisei in Hawaii to place the contemporary second-generation experience in historical context. He argues that the second-generation consciousness that emerged in the 1920s functioned quite differently from the transnational identities expressed by the second generation today. It makes a difference, he concludes, that these identities were constructed within a cultural and policy context that favored the American national melting pot rather than the “globalizing multicultural mosaic” that currently prevails. Homeland connections during this earlier era were valued for their contribution to an emerging democratic, cosmopolitan amalgam and to the spirit of internationalism that also occupied center stage.

Rubén Rumbaut’s chapter presents evidence from a decade-long longitudinal study highlighting the subjective and objective transnational attachments of a diverse sample of 1.5- and second-generation young adults from Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, China, and several other Latin and Asian countries. His findings reveal low levels of transnational activism (less than 10 percent) among his survey respondents, with significant differences between national-origin groups. Young people from Spanish-speaking countries in the Americas, and especially Mexicans, are much more likely to be fluently bilingual into adulthood than the rest of the sample, and language plays a critical role in the maintenance of transnational ties. Religious involvement, legal and financial wherewithal, and, in the case of remittances, specific transformative events (such as natural disasters) also explain variations in transnational attachments.

In chapter 3, Philip Kasinitz, Mary Waters, John Mollenkopf, and Merih Anil present findings from the Second Generation in Metropolitan New York Study, which examines indicators of second-generation transnational activism, such as remittances by the second generation, remittances by their parents, interest in and involvement in home-country politics, use of home-country media, and visits to the home country. They found that the Dominicans in their sample displayed the highest levels of transnational activities, followed by
the Colombians, Ecuadorans, and Peruvians (CEPs) and the West Indian samples. A significant minority (“but a minority nonetheless”) seem highly embedded in transnational social structures and engage in frequent, comprehensive transnational practices. The majority, however, display much more selective, periodic transnational engagements and are therefore, according to these authors, clearly “here to stay.”

These authors conclude that the scope and durability of transnational practices among the children of immigrants are confined to a small minority and are likely to become even less significant over time. In contrast, Peggy Levitt, Robert C. Smith, and Georges Fouron and Nina Glick-Schiller take issue with the time frame and social field implicit in these analyses. Although they too acknowledge that transnational activities are not central to the lives of most of the second generation, they say that to understand the impact of these behaviors we must look at the sending and receiving countries, and over time. From their perspective, the fact that most children do not want to return to live in their ancestral homes, are not completely fluent in their parents’ ancestral tongue, or identify for the most part as New Yorkers on a survey questionnaire does not justify dismissing second-generation transnational practices out of hand. Such a gold standard overlooks the effect of the many periodic, selective transnational activities that some individuals engage in at different stages of their lives. It also underestimates the powerful influence of the transnational social fields in which these individuals are embedded. Such a perspective also privileges actual movement and mistakenly overlooks the resources, discourses, and social contacts in the homeland that strongly shape the lives of the children of immigrants. Over time, and taken together, these influences can have a cumulative effect, particularly at the local level.

Peggy Levitt describes three different types of transnational participatory patterns among the second-generation Irish, Dominicans, and Indians she studied and highlights several factors that explain variations in the emergence of these patterns among these groups. The first factor is the high level of institutional completeness and the persistence of strong, multigenerational social networks that afford migrants multiple arenas within which to participate and many choices about when and how to do so. The second factor is life-course effects. Levitt finds that her respondents displayed three in-
tendencies of transnational involvement across the life cycle: constant and frequent transnational practices; periodic but sustained transnational practices that have a cumulative effect over time; and intensive transnational activism at a particular life-cycle stage. The class and racial characteristics of immigrant groups constitute the final factor explaining the emergence of transnational practices.

Robert C. Smith’s work on the children of Mexican immigrants also highlights the importance of life-course effects and the strong influence of the transnational social field occupied by the second generation. He argues that transnational activities among the second generation are a response to the racial, gender, and class hierarchies they experience in the United States. He highlights the ways in which transnational activities change as the children of immigrants move from adolescence to young adulthood and as they attempt to fulfill what Marcelo and Carola Suárez-Orozco (2001) call the immigrant bargain. Smith’s work also stresses the importance of the dynamic interaction between the social worlds these individuals inhabit in the United States and in their parents’ hometowns. The young adults he studied use transnational sites and practices to redefine second-generation social locations and the meaning of Mexican-ness in New York.

Georges Fouron and Nina Glick-Schiller also make a strong argument for the need to look at transnational practices to understand identity formation among the children of immigrants in the United States. They call for a redefinition of the term “second generation” to include the entire generation in both the homeland and the new land who grow up in transnational social fields. They claim that these individuals develop a sense of self that is indelibly shaped by personal, family, and organizational connections back home. At the same time identity formation is also the product of racial, ethnic, and national categories that are themselves produced transnationally.

The chapters in part II comment on the chapters in part I. In chapter 7, Susan Eckstein challenges the notion of generation as biologically based and urges us to reconceptualize generations as those who share a historically contextualized experience. Joel Perlmann also calls for greater conceptual and historical specificity. In chapter 8, he asks analysts to make a distinction between cultural and economic transnational practices; argues that discussions about events in the home country contribute little to our understanding of “what
if anything is special about the experiences of immigrants and ethnics in the United States today”; and differentiates between various types of possible receptions in the host country. Although Michael Jones-Correa concurs that we might be tempted to attribute little significance to the transnational practices of the second generation given that the relative numbers engaged in these practices are so small, “there are good reasons to reflect before passing judgment.” Though these actors constitute only a small minority, their actual numbers may be quite large. They will have a differential impact depending on the region of the United States they live in, their own wealth and influence, and the particular crises to which they may be responding. Finally, Nancy Foner draws on her comparative study of the two great waves of immigration to New York. She finds that among the first wave, daily involvement in and connections to sending-country community life declined sharply after the first generation. For their contemporary counterparts, however, “it seems clear that connections to their parents’ homelands will be more important, though those for whom this is central to their lives are likely to be a minority.”

In part III, contributors use a transnational perspective to make sense of the second-generation experience. Several authors explore the impact of parental transnational attachments and the transnational social spaces they engender on second-generation lives. Although the majority of these youngsters do not actively engage in transnational practices, their parents’ involvements and the fact that they are growing up in a context infused with homeland values and behaviors strongly affect their life trajectories. Other contributors emphasize that members of the second generation, in the process of learning more about their family histories and ancestral homes, incorporate elements of these narratives and experiences into their own self-concepts. They may become more transnationally active as a result, or they may come to new ways of thinking about their place in the United States.

Diane Wolf claims in chapter 11 that the second-generation Filipino youth she studied experience emotional transnationalism. These individuals are situated between a variety of different, often competing generational and locational points of reference, including those of their parents and their grandparents as well as their own, both real and imagined perspectives. As a result, ethnic iden-
Identity formation does not occur in one place. Instead, Filipino children are exposed to a range of “Home and home” discourses and cultural elements from which they construct their identities and life plans in ways that, Wolf claims, contradict conventional understandings of assimilation.

The second-generation Chinese and Korean American college students whom Nazli Kibria studied also reported that transnational practices did not play a major role in their everyday lives. However, their trips to the homeland affirmed the value and appeal of such engagements, the circumstances under which they developed, and the difficulties posed by creating them. They came to understand that Chinese and Korean membership could be strategically valuable, provide a means to take advantage of the rewards of a globalizing economy, and help them overcome the racial barriers to mobility that they may experience in their future professional lives. At the same time these homeland visits highlighted the barriers to their full acceptance in Chinese and Korean society.

Andrea Louie has also studied the genealogical projects and homeland trips of second-generation Chinese Americans. Her respondents used these experiences to locate themselves within the broader context of the Chinese–Asian American experience. But in contrast to Kibria’s respondents, who courted transnational attachments in response to the social and occupational barriers they experienced in the United States, the Chinese Americans Louie studied were using such attachments to build strong ties to and achieve greater legitimacy within U.S. society. By piecing together their own account of Chinese culture, they bridged the divide between “China” and “Chinese American” that is central to U.S. multicultural politics.

Milton Vickerman discovered an interesting paradox from his research on second generation West Indians in New York City. These young people clearly live in a transnational social space that is increasingly vibrant. But, he predicts, the existence of such a space may diminish the incentive for the second generation to engage in actual transnational practices. Because the West Indian community in New York has recreated its culture so effectively and completely, the second generation can access their homeland without ever having to go home. West Indian ethnic enclaves represent reservoirs of West Indian culture that, to some extent, can substitute for actual contact with the West Indies.
Finally, Yen Le Espiritu and Thom Tran urge us to think about transnationalism not solely as actual transnational practices but as imagined returns to the homeland through memory, cultural rediscovery, and longing. For these authors, transnationalism is enacted both literally and symbolically. The homeland is thus not merely an actual physical place but also a place of desire that one returns to in one’s imagination. Most of the second-generation Vietnamese these authors studied developed strong symbolic attachments to their ancestral home, although their factual knowledge about Vietnam was quite limited. Like the youth whom Diane Wolf and Nazli Kibria describe, these young people are caught between their inability to achieve full assimilation into the United States and their inability to achieve full membership in Vietnam, underscoring once again that identities are constituted from multiple places and from multiple components.

As Georges Fouron and Nina Glick-Schiller conclude in their chapter, our analyses of transnational migration and of the transnational practices of the second generation are not intended to celebrate unconditionally or lament these new forms of belonging across borders. Instead, our aim is to begin a conversation and to inspire a body of future research that will further advance our understanding of these relationships.

NOTES

1. In a recent article, Portes (2001) further delineates these arenas of social life. He defines “international” as those activities carried out by states and other nationally based institutions in other countries that take place across borders in pursuit of the goals of large organizations that possess clear national affiliations. “Multinational” refers to those institutions whose purpose and interests transcend the borders of the nation-state. He reserves “transnational” to describe those activities begun and sustained across national borders, many of which are informal and take place outside the boundaries of state regulation and control. These are goal-oriented initiatives that require coordination across borders by members of civil society.

2. Since 1980, when the U.S. Census Bureau replaced a question on parental birthplace with one on parental ancestry, adult children of immigrants who no longer live with their immigrant parents cannot be identified using census data. However, a growing body of research
tries to extrapolate future adult patterns of incorporation from the experiences of second-generation children and teenagers (Gibson 1989; Portes and Zhou 1993; Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 1996; Portes and Schauffler 1996; Zhou and Bankston 1998; Rumbaut 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Qualitative and ethnographic studies of second-generation young adults highlight generational transitions within immigrant communities (Waters 1996a, 1996b, 1999; Bacon 1994, 1996; Suárez-Orozco 1995; Smith 1994; Grasmuck and Pessar 1993). Quantitative analyses have also been carried out using 1990 census data (Hirschman 1996; Jensen and Chitose 1994; Landale and Oropesa 1995), and Kao and Tienda (1995) studied immigrant youth and the second generation using the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) longitudinal data set. (For an overview of these studies, see also Zhou 1997.) In addition, analyses from the Current Population Survey, which added a question on parental birthplace in 1994, have also begun to shed light on these issues, although, with the exception of Mexicans, the number of second-generation individuals in the sample is still very small (Zhou 2001).

REFERENCES


Introduction


