

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Repairing the Hole in the Heart of the City

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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, dawned as one of the most beautiful days of the year in New York City. The air was crystal clear, the early sun was bright, and the temperature was warming up to a perfect level. It was an exciting day for those interested in city politics because the people going to polls that had opened at 6:00 A.M. for the Democratic and Republican primary elections would determine the choices for the next mayor of New York City and begin to define the post-Giuliani era in New York City politics. In the Democratic primary, Bronx borough president Fernando Ferrer was the first Latino candidate with a real shot at the mayoralty since Herman Badillo's narrow losses in the 1969 and 1973 primaries, while public advocate Mark Green, a white progressive consumer advocate, also enjoyed wide support. (Two other prominent Democrats, city council speaker Peter Vallone and comptroller Alan Hevesi, had failed to gain traction in the public opinion polls.) The Republican side featured two former Democrats. Michael Bloomberg, a political neophyte who had built an extremely successful financial information and news business, was favored over Herman Badillo, who had gravitated to a Republican view on many issues. A distinguished former borough president and member of the U.S. Congress, Badillo had been the first Puerto Rican elected to either position.

No matter who won, the received wisdom went, the primary election would begin to end the polarizing period of Republican Rudolph W. Giuliani's ad-

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ministration. Many observers thought that the Democratic nominee would become mayor, since the Republicans were unlikely to support Badillo and Bloomberg was judged to be still on the first, steep part of his political learning curve. Attention therefore focused on the battle between Green, the early front-runner who had historically drawn strong electoral support from blacks as well as white liberals, and Ferrer, whose support from the Rev. Al Sharpton and Harlem's Congressman Charles Rangel had enabled him to fuse a Latino-black coalition and gain ground on Green. The contest was keen and the outcome closely watched and eagerly awaited. Those insiders sufficiently in the know learned that the first early morning wave of the exit poll reported that Green had received 31.5 percent, Ferrer 27 percent, and the others lesser amounts.

As everyone now knows, September 11 did indeed change the political dynamics of the city and the rest of the world, but in completely different ways than anticipated. Sitting at my breakfast table that morning, drinking coffee and reading the *New York Times*, the first report that a plane had hit the World Trade Center came across the radio shortly after 8:45 A.M. A few minutes later it became clear that the culprit was no wandering Cessna. The television revealed voluminous smoke rising from the North Tower and provided a real-time view of the second plane smashing into the South Tower at 9:03 A.M. My home in Park Slope, Brooklyn, was soon enveloped by the vortex of smoke cascading from both towers and blowing downwind directly toward us. The televised view showed the buildings shedding debris, ephemera, and, horribly, human beings. This was most palpably not going to be a normal day, nor were any of the following ones. The South Tower collapsed at 10:05 A.M., the North Tower at 10:28 A.M. Soon the subways were shut down, then all air traffic was grounded in the United States, and word came that a plane had hit the Pentagon too, while another had gone down in Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, bits and pieces of singed paper began to fall like a light winter snow on our yard.

With swelling tears, I tried to absorb the fact that 10,000 people might have just perished before my eyes. It took time to learn that the number was, blessedly, much lower: 2,749 in and around the World Trade Center, with 189 more at the Pentagon and 44 in the Pennsylvania field, not counting the 19 hijackers who sent themselves to death. It took some time to learn that this total included 13 members of our local firehouse in Park Slope (343 firemen lost their lives in all), the father of a family living around the corner, and the son of the woman who owned a favorite clothing store down the block. It was a real relief to learn that this total did not include a neighbor who worked for the Port Authority on the 67th floor of the North Tower, though that friend was traumatized by the loss of so many colleagues.

After calling my daughter at college to let her know that her parents were safe, the site of the catastrophe beckoned me closer. For hours after the col-

lapse, soot-drenched office workers, shocked and often crying, streamed past me on foot over the Manhattan and Brooklyn Bridges. (For days and months, acrid smoke continued to hang over lower Manhattan, drifting slowly over Brooklyn or up the island, depending on the prevailing wind.) Neighborhood parents searched frantically for their children who were students at Stuyvesant High School, located virtually across the street from the WTC—they had been sent fleeing northward into the streets after watching bodies fall, and then buildings. In succeeding days an intrepid observer could approach the site on foot to see the mangled and smoking wreckage and the stark, burned skeletal remains of the U.S. Customs House, 6 World Trade Center.

These experiences remind us that, no matter how detached we must become to analyze the political implications of 9/11 for the residents of New York City, we must first acknowledge all those who perished, the deep loss to their families, friends, and neighbors, and the gash inflicted by the attack on the social fabric of greater New York. It sent many New Yorkers, especially those whose lives were connected to lower Manhattan, into a collective depression that took a year or more to dissipate. But it also elicited a magnificent response from New Yorkers. The firefighters and police officers who gave their lives seeking to save others showed surpassing heroism, while those who worked feverishly from September to May to clear the site displayed stoic determination. New Yorkers from many other walks of life sought to contribute their particular talents to rebuilding the city and restoring its vitality, optimism, and ability to realize its best hopes and values.

UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF 9/11

This book is one small part of that effort. The authors assembled here have sought to apply their scholarly skills and insights to clarifying the choices that government made about how to rebuild the city and respond to the attack, explaining how and why these choices were made, and considering the larger political consequences of the attack. All of the contributors to this volume are people who live in, work in, or study the city, who have been closely involved in its affairs, and who were deeply affected by the attack. We gratefully accepted the invitation of the Russell Sage Foundation to participate in this study as our small contribution to the city's recovery process. Along with two companion volumes, *Wounded City: The Social Impact of 9/11* (Foner 2005) and *Resilient City: The Economic Impact of 9/11* (Chernick 2005), this volume seeks to go behind the popular accounts of the rebuilding process, which tend to focus on the many intense and colorful personalities involved rather than the logic that guides their actions, and to go wider than those accounts and consider the larger and longer implications.

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The political consequences of the attack were immediate, enormous, and grave. Locally, the mayoral primary election was postponed; nationally, the country went into a political shock from which it has not yet recovered. When the delayed primaries and then the final mayoral general election were held in the months after the attack, they yielded a result quite different from what many had anticipated. Far from ending Mayor Giuliani's career on a down and rather sour note, September 11 made him a national hero and led to discussion about whether his term should have an emergency extension. In the 2002 Democratic gubernatorial primary campaign, Andrew Cuomo suffered a political meltdown after he belittled Governor George E. Pataki's role in responding to the attack, which in fact helped Pataki triumph in the November 2002 general election. The terrorist attack also gave purpose to the presidency of George W. Bush, culminating in his reelection in November 2004, which conferred on him a political legitimacy that the 2000 election had not. More broadly, the attack and its aftermath shifted public opinion and electoral choices—not only in New York City but across the nation—away from jobs and the economy, which might have been expected to be priorities during a recession, toward a concern for physical security, national security, and patriotism in the face of foreign enemies. If we do not yet know if September 11 has changed the course of American history forever, we certainly do know that it had an enormous short-run impact.

In this volume, we consider the local dimensions of this political impact. In the wake of the destruction of the twin towers, the citizens and elected officials of New York City faced many fundamental questions about the future of the city. As the companion volume edited by Howard Chernick (2005) shows, New York City demonstrated great resilience in achieving a fairly full economic recovery four years after the attack, but the attack sharply worsened local economic and fiscal conditions in 2001 and 2002. It destroyed or severely damaged tens of millions of square feet of prime office space, ended or displaced hundreds of thousands of jobs, and cost billions of dollars in economic activity in the historic heart of the city. These impacts posed many questions: How would local officials mobilize to clean up the site? How would the city balance its budget in the face of falling revenues and rising security costs? What help would the federal government provide to the recovery effort? How would government plan for rebuilding the site and creating a suitable memorial? And more broadly, what could be done to maintain lower Manhattan as the nation's third-largest office district—and indeed, Manhattan's role as the engine of the regional economy?

The companion volume edited by Nancy Foner (2005) details the sharp and disproportionately negative impact of the attacks and the attendant economic trends on nearby communities such as Battery Park City, Tribeca, and Jersey City, as well as more distant communities that were home to workers in the

most severely affected industries, such as the airlines, hotels, restaurants, and retail. The attacks mobilized these and other constituencies, most notably the families of the victims, who became a powerful voice advocating, among other things, that nothing be built on the footprints of the former twin towers. No politician wanted to be seen as disrespectful of their wishes, and some, like former mayor Giuliani, became powerful advocates for their views. Beyond the specific steps to be taken to help the city recover, the response to 9/11 evoked a complex swirl of advocacy groups. A central question arose: How could the city's political leaders navigate these groups to achieve a modicum of public satisfaction with what they decided to do?

The attack and its economic aftermath led intelligent observers to question whether New York City had a viable future, just as others had done during New York's fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s. A few even proclaimed the end of the tall office building. Particularly in doubt was the role of lower Manhattan in the larger economic geography of the city. The city's historic point of origin in the seventeenth century, this area housed its first business and governmental institutions, its port and shipping and processing activities, as well as places of residence and recreation. It was home to the New York Stock Exchange, founded in 1827, as well as the city's growing complex of commercial and investment banks, insurance companies, and law firms. When the "greater city" was formed by combining Manhattan with Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island in 1898, its corporate, commercial, and industrial activities were still largely to be found below Houston Street.

These activities began to gravitate uptown, however, as the highly congested terrain of lower Manhattan was built out and Pennsylvania Station and Grand Central Terminal were opened in 1910 and 1913 (Lockwood 1976). With the construction of the initial buildings of Rockefeller Center in 1939 and continuing with the construction of Lever House as the first glass-walled skyscraper on Park Avenue in 1952, the city's banking, investment banking, corporate headquarters, and corporate service activities were reconcentrated in midtown, and "Wall Street" became a metaphor more than a place, although the stock exchanges, the Federal Reserve Bank, and important banks and law firms remained downtown, as did the city's government office complex. Despite initiatives to reinforce the lower Manhattan office economy, including the construction of the World Trade Center and the adjacent World Financial Center, midtown nevertheless grew more rapidly from the 1950s onward. Indeed, lower Manhattan's legacy of pre-World War II office buildings, which were difficult, if not impossible, to transform into the large, open floors demanded by modern corporate uses, constituted a drag on the lower Manhattan office market, and they became candidates for residential conversion.

The 9/11 attack had potentially devastating consequences for lower Manhattan's office economy. In addition to destroying the sixteen-acre, ten-million-

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square-foot World Trade Center complex, the attack severely damaged an adjacent skyscraper, the Deutsche Bank headquarters, and temporarily impaired many others, including the World Financial Center in Battery Park City. Much of lower Manhattan, including the southern portion of Chinatown, was closed to nonresident traffic, and mass transit service from New Jersey to downtown Manhattan was suspended. Elected officials and business leaders had good reason to fear that these constraints, along with added costs for security and insurance, might be the straws that broke the back of lower Manhattan, or even Manhattan as a whole. In the face of such doubts, decisionmakers felt a huge imperative to restore confidence in the city and rekindle its economic growth.

The local, state, and federal governments, joined by philanthropies, insurance firms, the private sector, civic organizations, and concerned citizens, responded with an unprecedented flow of funds and professional talent to help lower Manhattan and the rest of the city cope and, ultimately, rebound. The federal government promised some \$21.5 billion to clean up the site, repair the infrastructure, provide incentives for businesses and residents to stay in Manhattan, and rebuild the site. The state government deployed the power of eminent domain, its exemption from local regulation, and the borrowing power enjoyed by its Empire State Development Corporation to create a subsidiary, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), to work with the bistate Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ, or PA), which also was not subject to local regulation. The City of New York's Department of Design and Construction oversaw the initial cleanup and repaired the streets around the site, while the Police Department provided heightened security.

Taken together, the financial scale of the response has been impressive. A recent RAND study estimated that compensation to the victims of the attack (including residents and businesses in lower Manhattan as well as the victims and their families) would amount to \$38 billion, including \$2.7 billion donated to charities and almost \$20 billion in insurance proceeds (Dixon and Stern 2004, 132). Many billions more will clearly be invested in redeveloping the site and other parts of lower Manhattan. The cost of building the proposed structures and supporting transportation improvements (not counting a proposed new direct transit link with Kennedy Airport) is estimated to be around \$12 billion.

Rebuilding Ground Zero and the surrounding area may well be the largest, biggest-budget, and highest-visibility urban renewal program ever launched in New York City. (Past projects on a similar scale include the \$110 million Lincoln Center urban renewal project built on fourteen acres between 1956 and 1969; the eleven-acre Rockefeller Center office complex built between the late 1930s and the 1960s in midtown Manhattan; and the fifteen-story apartment buildings of Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village built by the Metropoli-

tan Life Insurance Company on eighty acres between Fourteenth and Twenty-third Streets on the East River in the late 1940s.)

Rebuilding this area of lower Manhattan poses the same questions raised during many previous conflicts over urban renewal: Who will benefit, and who will bear the burdens? What urban functions will it promote, and what will it destroy or displace? The rebuilding process also poses a larger set of questions: What kind of city will New Yorkers use the resources to seek to build? What values will their choices reflect? How well or poorly will the city's leaders do in engaging the complicated array of interests activated by the 9/11 attack—as well as the citizenry at large—in the dialogue over how to rebuild? What problems or conflicts will this dialogue reveal, and how will the city's leaders overcome them? In the final analysis, what will their actions (or inactions), as opposed to their rhetoric, reveal about the kind of city they really hope New York will become?

Lynne Sagalyn and Susan Fainstein address the most immediate question in their analyses of the planning for rebuilding Ground Zero and the neighboring parts of lower Manhattan. Sagalyn opens the volume with a detailed and incisive analysis of the “inner politics” of the rebuilding process. She describes the struggle of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, established to manage the planning process for the site and oversee efforts for the surrounding area, to achieve influence in an environment constrained by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's ownership of the site and its lease with Silverstein Properties, whose insurance proceeds would provide much of the funding for the redevelopment. Sagalyn provides a detailed master narrative of how these key players interacted with each other and a host of interests with ringside seats, including the city of New York, downtown property owners and business interests, nearby residents, the families of the victims, and a variety of architects and planners. Susan Fainstein inspects the same story from the point of view of the Port Authority. This agency was struggling to survive a near-mortal blow and to reassert itself as the historic engine of the region's transportation system in a political environment where the two governors to whom it reports had tended to treat it like a piggy bank. Moreover, as Fainstein details, the Port Authority was locked in an intimate financial and political relationship with Silverstein Properties and sharply constrained in what it could or would envision for the site.

A key aspect of this process was deciding what trajectory lower Manhattan's development should take. Sagalyn and Fainstein explain why the LMDC and the Port Authority were closely focused on restoring the office and retail space that had been destroyed, whether or not larger perspectives on lower Manhattan recommended such restoration. Mitchell Moss addresses this question from the point of view of city government. In a variety of ways, city policy had sought to diversify both the types of economic activities located down-

town and the types of land uses characteristics of the area. It had encouraged owners of older, outmoded class B office space to convert it to residential use and made efforts to attract nonprofit organizations into spaces formerly used by Wall Street or insurance firms. Battery Park City, immediately to the west of Ground Zero and noted for the World Financial Center, was also hailed as a superbly designed setting for upper-middle-income professionals, with some of the most compelling new waterside public spaces in the city. Tribeca, just to the north, had become a trendy area of loft living, fine restaurants, and refined retail opportunities. Further north, SoHo had evolved from a district of declining garment industry activity into a zone of art galleries and loft living and ultimately into an expensive home furnishings and design center. Chinatown, a few blocks east of Ground Zero, was similarly evolving from a center of garment production and crowded housing for recent immigrants into a more regional center of services and entertainment for a more broadly distributed Chinese community (for discussions of these communities, see Kasinitz, Smith-simon, and Pok 2005). In the city's view, the activities in these neighborhoods were the prime ingredients for transforming lower Manhattan from a 9-to-5 business district that closed with the markets into a 24/7 environment mixing living, playing, and working. In Moss's account, the city expressed its view that lower Manhattan should evolve toward a mixed-use community, but key decisionmakers did not adopt this perspective.

The rebuilding of the World Trade Center site has been an exercise in articulating public values within a deeply traumatized civic realm and drawing diverse constituencies into a meaningful debate about the city's future. In addition to the immediate interests activated by the rebuilding process, described by Sagalyn, Fainstein, and Moss, the challenge of rebuilding the site evoked a huge outpouring of public interest and a broad public desire for involvement in the decisionmaking process. Arielle Goldberg explores the fascinating interplay between the five major civic organizations that evolved to address the rebuilding issue and the key decisionmakers, as well as how LMDC in particular used these decisionmakers to strengthen its own position. She shows how these players articulated their positions, how they sought to have influence, and what they ultimately accomplished. Although they did not alter the decisions made by LMDC and the Port Authority in any fundamental way, they did put before the public basic questions about the values that the decisionmaking process should advance.

James Young focuses on a particularly intense value question: what kind of memorial should be placed at the site? This seemingly simple question has many complicated ramifications. On the one hand, those who lost loved ones on September 11 are a symbolically potent constituency—or rather constituencies, since they are internally differentiated about whom they want to remember and how. On the other hand, the decisionmaking institutions and impor-

tant stakeholders like downtown business interests and residents of Battery Park City have not wanted the memorial to compromise the commercial success of the redevelopment project or “turn the area into a cemetery.” Moreover, as Young shows, the memorial selection process also became a vehicle through which the LMDC could reshape parts of the site design. His is a fascinating case study of how highly accomplished members of the jury sought to resolve such difficulties as: How should these individual constituencies be recognized? Which broad categories of people should the memorial serve, and in what ways? What values should it embody? And how should the imperative to remember those who suffered losses be weighed against the imperative to restore the commercial functions of the site?

The articulation of values and the political consequences of the attack, of course, flow far beyond the site itself, and beyond lower Manhattan. What were the larger political consequences of the attack? How were they felt by New Yorkers, and what political responses did they make? Lorraine Minnite explores a critical dimension of these questions by examining the adverse impact of the Patriot Act and other domestic security measures on the Muslim immigrant communities in New York City, their responses and those of their advocates, and what this interaction says about an important trend in New York City politics. Her chapter shows how the anti-immigrant trend in national politics diverges from the basically pro-immigrant orientation in local politics. Even Mayor Giuliani, often criticized as being insensitive to minority New Yorkers, consistently took a pro-immigrant position. Despite the significant personal trauma suffered by the mayor on September 11, he asked all New Yorkers to show fairness and compassion to Muslim residents of the city and not to take out their anger and bitterness in any misdirected acts against them. As Minnite shows, the same cannot be said about the ways in which the federal security and immigration agencies treated South Asian residents in places like Coney Island Avenue in Brooklyn.

The volume concludes with my own discussion of how the attack created disequilibria in city, state, and national politics, driving them all in new directions. The attack played a central role in electing Michael Bloomberg mayor of New York, altered the issues dominating city, state, and national politics, and shifted voters' priorities in the 2001, 2002, and 2004 elections. Before 9/11, the New York City mayoral election had been dominated by debates among the Democrats about how to temper the racial polarization that had marked the Giuliani and Dinkins administrations and how to address the Giuliani administration's unfinished business. Afterwards, reestablishing security, coping with the immediate physical and economic consequences of the attack, and rebuilding the city's economic confidence came to the fore. This chapter details the restoration of Mayor Giuliani's reputation and the political glow acquired through close association with 9/11 by Governor Pataki, whose second term

had evolved in a lackluster direction. The governor's leadership in that period and his embrace of the rebuilding process served him well politically in 2002. Finally, the September 11 attacks enabled George W. Bush to assert the strongest and most unhindered power of the presidency—namely, being commander in chief—to establish a legitimacy for his office that he was not able to achieve in the election of November 2000.

ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES

How do we evaluate what our decisionmakers have done? What do their decisions and actions tell us about what they want the city to be or become? The scholars contributing to this volume show that participants in the process have put forward three broad alternatives. Lynne Sagalyn and Susan Fainstein detail the first approach, which is to make whole the economic value of Ground Zero. Owing to the Port Authority's charter restriction against building residential housing, the terms of its lease with Silverstein Properties, its dependence on the revenue from that lease, and its reliance on Silverstein's insurance settlement to finance the construction, the Port Authority was committed to ensuring that Silverstein Properties could build 10 million square feet of office space and 450,000 square feet or more of retail space on or near the site, along with restoring PATH service to it. This primary objective, which was embraced by the LMDC and other actors in the inner circle, such as Governor Pataki, would also provide economic and political benefits to Brookfield Properties (owner of the World Financial Center) and the residents of Battery Park City, the tax collectors of New York City and State, and elected officials, who could reap electoral support and campaign contributions from its success. If the matter were left up to the most interested parties, this would be the approach taken, albeit dressed up with a memorial and cultural facilities.

The second broad course of action would be to use the rebuilding of the WTC site and the area around it to change the economic and social relationships of lower Manhattan to the rest of the city and region. As Mitchell Moss points out, the city has made a good case that lower Manhattan would make a greater addition to the overall economic vitality of the city if it were to place greater emphasis on residential housing (especially housing for corporate service professionals), attract economic activities that are being priced out of midtown Manhattan office space, and generate new kinds of cultural and recreational activities. (Governmental activities will continue to be vital to lower Manhattan's economy.) In this view, lower Manhattan should continue to house major financial service activities, like the stock exchanges and Goldman Sachs, and government should encourage these activities, but the area should diversify.

The Bloomberg administration and the civic organizations described by Ar-

ielle Goldberg, particularly the Civic Alliance, have both argued against replacing what previously stood on Ground Zero and in favor of taking new directions in lower Manhattan. Moving in these directions would require much more attention to building housing and creating new amenities in lower Manhattan, as the mayor's plan for lower Manhattan urges. It might call for long-sought transportation improvements that have no direct bearing on the WTC site, such as building the Second Avenue subway. Mayor Bloomberg made his policy clear by refusing to provide public subsidies for constructing a new facility for the New York Stock Exchange, pushing for construction of new class A office space in far west midtown, and advocating construction of housing for all income ranges, including for the middle-class professionals who would work downtown or in midtown Manhattan. In the long term, the real estate and job markets in New York may judge this second alternative to be a more rational course than the first.

A third course of action would be even more radical. As Goldberg has shown, the Labor Community Advocacy Network (LCAN) and the Civic Alliance have called for shifting the focus of public development away from promoting office construction in Manhattan's business districts toward other parts of the city. This perspective, advanced by mayoral candidate Fernando Ferrer during the runoff campaign in September 2001, and again in the 2005 mayoral race, rests on the idea that the attack was against the whole city, not just downtown property owners, and that the resulting suffering was experienced by janitors, restaurant workers, firefighters, and secretaries, who live all across New York, not just by high-income financial services professionals. From this point of view, the resources made available for rebuilding should be used to help people living outside lower Manhattan to find better jobs, live in more affordable housing, and enjoy better public amenities, not just to promote new office buildings in existing business districts. The fate of Chinatown exemplifies what those who hold this view would see as the misallocation of resources in the first and even the second courses of action. Because much of Chinatown was in the "frozen zone" established after September 11, trucks were unable to reach garment firms or supply neighborhood restaurants. Employment and foot traffic fell sharply as a result, yet the rebuilding authorities paid little attention to the difficulties being experienced by Chinatown's residents and firms (Asian American Federation of New York 2002a, 2002b; Chin 2005). Although this course of action received support from many quarters, the key decisionmakers gave it lip service at best.

A fourth alternative might have been inaction. As Sagalyn notes, this danger always faces ambitious development schemes in New York City. For example, the Forty-second Street Development Project, which began to be discussed in the Lindsay administration in 1969, was not realized until a third of a century later (Sagalyn 2001). In a political environment as complex as New York City, almost any proposal will be subject to a Newton's Third Law of Political Dy-

namics: any action produces an equal and opposite reaction. The emotional force of 9/11 and the large scale of the resources made available for the response might have made it difficult for political actors to act in a concerted manner in such an environment. As one commentator told us, “For many groups, September 11 represented the opportunity to strike out the first line of their pet proposals and insert ‘in light of September 11’ to pursue their long-standing agendas.” Political actors seeking to please everyone in the face of such conflicting interests might have taken the rebuilding process as an opportunity to delay or temporize. The announcement in May 2005 that the Freedom Tower would have to be redesigned owing to security concerns reflects these cross-cutting currents.

In the final analysis, it seems that they did not. Although it may be too soon to say definitively what will happen in and around Ground Zero, the initial outlines of this critical period in the city’s history have become clear. This volume suggests that the legal structure of the site’s ownership by the Port Authority, its lease to a private developer, and the reliance on state development unencumbered by accountability to the people or government of New York City have strongly shaped the outcome to date to favor the first course of action over the two other alternatives.

This has not been a particularly democratic process. Although Sagalyn and Goldberg describe how the “Listening to the City” event brought 4,500 concerned citizens together to evaluate the first set of plans issued by the PA and the LMDC, they also suggest that this and other public forums had only marginal impacts on the final outcome. This happened because all the key agencies concerned with the rebuilding process report to the governor, not the mayor. Governor Pataki, not Mayor Bloomberg, has made, and will continue to make, the critical decisions. Indeed, the procedures for rebuilding were apparently designed that way to ensure that a potential Democratic victor in the 2001 mayoral election would not be able to influence the outcome. As a result, the city of New York and its citizens have had little influence over the response to its most traumatic experience in decades, if not a century.

The September 11 attack created openings for all sorts of people to do all sorts of things. It certainly provided many people with an opportunity to display heroism and generosity. As Goldberg shows, the attack generated a strong if perhaps transitory sense of community among New Yorkers, prompting many to offer their help in rebuilding the city. The attack also provided many opportunities for self-interested behavior. A former pornographer used silver stored in the Bank of Nova Scotia’s vault in the basement of the WTC to put a thin plating on base metal coins commemorating the event, which he sold for \$19.95 apiece until New York State attorney general Eliot Spitzer put a stop to the sales (Barry 2004). The FBI agent in charge of screening WTC debris permitted thirteen other agents to take mementos, including a Tiffany

globe, for their own use (Fried 2004). New York City police chief Bernard Kerik used an apartment donated as a resting place for workers cleaning Ground Zero as a place to conduct affairs with both a Corrections Department officer and his publisher (Seelye 2004). A police official commandeered vehicles removed from the site for his own use, while several people falsely asserted that they had lost family members in order to receive compensation. Some people took advantage of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) cleanup program to get free air conditioners even when their old ones were not contaminated. Some of the businesses that have benefited from state aid have also been large contributors to the governor's campaigns (Saltonstall 2004). Such is human nature.

How do we evaluate the choices that have resulted from taking the first course of action? According to the RAND Corporation study, \$10.6 billion of the total \$38 billion in compensation, mostly from the federal Victims Compensation Fund, will flow to the families of those killed or severely harmed by the attacks, especially the first responders (Dixon and Stern 2004, 25–27). The other two-thirds of this money, including most of the \$21 billion in federal funds, will flow to cleaning up the site, making emergency repairs, providing business incentives, building new infrastructure, and erecting new structures on Ground Zero (Hecker 2003, 9–13).

As Sagalyn reports, Larry Silverstein of Silverstein Properties plans to use his insurance proceeds, which may be as much as \$4.5 billion, to build the Freedom Tower and four other office buildings on the project site. He has already nearly completed a fifty-two-story, \$700 million building just to the north of the WTC where the former 7 World Trade Center was located. To facilitate that plan, the LMDC will tear down the former Deutsche Bank building south of Ground Zero and plans to create the memorial, a museum, cultural facilities, and two transit centers, a new PATH station for the PA and the Fulton Street Transit Center for the subway system. (It is not clear whether the \$6 billion or more needed to build a proposed new direct transit link with JFK Airport will be found.)

What are we to make of this emerging new complex? From a design and planning point of view, many would agree that the new site plan will accomplish some important goals, such as restoring part of the city's street grid, thus integrating the site into the surrounding urban fabric. The plan also calls for providing a better link with Battery Park City. The area will enjoy much better links with the PATH train and the subway lines, and its public spaces will certainly be far more attractive and draw far more users than the windswept plaza between the twin towers.

Despite squabbling between the site planner, Daniel Libeskind, and the architect retained by Silverstein Properties, David Childs, which resulted in a hybrid and perhaps questionable design for the Freedom Tower, many leading

architects have been engaged to design buildings in the complex, including Frank Gehry for the performing arts center and Santiago Calatrava for the PATH station. The resulting buildings are likely to be far bolder and more interesting than the modernist facades of the twin towers. Even if economic uncertainties prevent the realization of all aspects of the plan, it seems likely that New York will have an attractive and compelling replacement for the twin towers. Moreover, by New York standards, it may be built with far less community opposition than has sometimes been the case.

Although the site plan may represent a significant accomplishment in its own terms, we nevertheless have every right to expect, and should have gotten far more, in the response of our elected officials to such a grave crisis. By allowing the Port Authority's institutional needs and the lease privatizing the twin towers to define the core nature of the problem as a matter of commercial real estate development, public officials—in particular Governor George Pataki—greatly narrowed the scope of the issue. As a result, consideration of important, arguably superior courses of action was precluded.

Even considered within its own narrow boundaries, however, the plan for Ground Zero faces a number of persistent concerns. First, it is far from clear whether the first buildings to be erected, 7 World Trade Center and the Freedom Tower, will find tenants and become economically viable. Neither is being built on the basis of loans from a financial institution backed by leases signed with prospective tenants. Indeed, no major tenant has been identified for either building. (Governor Pataki has made a possibly empty promise to move his New York office into the Freedom Tower, assuming that he will still be in office when the building is ready; the Port Authority, at his urging, has also signed up for some of the space.) Whether Silverstein can find a market for these buildings and go on to construct and market the others has been the subject of considerable debate (Frangos 2004). The obvious unstated problem is that few commercial tenants would want to move into a building that takes over from the twin towers as “the world's tallest target.” In May 2005, concerns expressed by the police department forced a reconsideration of the building's design. Similar concerns caused Goldman Sachs to put on hold its plan to construct a new headquarters across the street from Ground Zero. It is also possible that 7 World Trade Center and the Freedom Tower—containing about as much space as one former twin tower—will constitute a drag on the office market in lower Manhattan, where vacancies have already been at a historic peak.

A second concern involves opportunity costs. New York City has never before seen, and will never again see, \$21 billion in federal aid over a few short years. To the extent that government can most effectively hone the city's competitive advantage by enhancing underlying factors of productivity, such as increasing skill levels, lowering general costs of doing business, or improving

physical and electronic access, the plans adopted for Ground Zero may not be a logical course of action. It might well have been far wiser to invest the federal aid in the region's many unfunded transportation infrastructure needs, in the integration of the existing transit system, in lower Manhattan's shift toward housing and entertainment, or even in the city's research universities.

Despite considerable agitation from civic organizations and the New York City government, Governor Pataki and the agencies he commands did not choose to alter the constraints facing the agencies responsible for making decisions about how to respond to 9/11. The governor designed the LMDC so as to deny influence to the state legislature and the incoming mayor. He named many close associates to manage it for him. At points of conflict, he stepped in to make key decisions. Clearly, he made rebuilding the World Trade Center his principal legacy and main purpose as governor. This decision served him well in his 2002 reelection campaign, just as holding the Republican National Convention in New York City on the eve of the third anniversary of the attack helped to underscore President Bush's role in responding to terrorism and bolstered his reelection chances.

As a direct consequence, the people of New York City and their mayor have had little impact on the decisionmaking process, though they cleaned up the site, cared for those who were harmed, and administered various sources of assistance. Perhaps making a virtue of necessity, the mayor apparently struck a deal for a political division of labor in which he ceded rebuilding lower Manhattan to the governor but received the governor's support for his plans for the far West Side, including \$300 million in state capital funds to build a \$1.2 billion facility to provide a new stadium for the New York Jets and expansion space for the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center. In the process, each official has quieted his staff's concerns about aspects of the other's pet project (Steinhauer 2004).

It is worth noting that New York City residents have taken a different attitude toward the war on terror than the country at large. Mayor Giuliani, Governor Pataki, and President Bush wrapped themselves in the political symbolism of Ground Zero to build support for a forward-leaning policy of armed intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Lorraine Minnite points out, the federal government defined members of Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian communities as potential threats and deported a great many improperly documented but otherwise law-abiding immigrants. In New York City, by contrast, even Mayor Giuliani, the local politician most strongly identified with the heroism of the first responders to 9/11, urged New Yorkers "not to engage in any form of group blame or group hatred" (Giuliani 2001).

New Yorkers responded to the attack with grief more than with anger. City residents continue to worry deeply that they may bear the brunt of another terrorist attack, and they are much less likely than other Americans to support

the war in Iraq. The depths of these feelings were evident in the differences between a *New York Times* poll of city residents undertaken on the eve of the Republican National Convention and a national poll taken just after the November election (*New York Times* 2004a, 2004b). City residents gave George Bush a 24-to-71 approval-disapproval rating, compared to the 51–44 rating nationally. Most (48 percent) felt that life in New York City had gotten worse over the preceding two years (16 percent felt that it had gotten better, while 34 percent said things were the same). Although national sentiment had turned against the war in Iraq by November 2004 (46 percent saying it was the right thing to do, 48 percent saying we should have stayed out, and 5 percent being uncertain), New Yorkers predominantly opposed it (25 percent saying it was the right thing to do, 65 percent saying we should have stayed out, and 11 percent being uncertain). Two-thirds of New Yorkers worried that terrorists would attack the city again, and half thought such an attack might well happen during the convention. More than three-quarters of all New Yorkers thought that the war in Iraq was not worth the cost in American lives, 60 percent thought that Washington was not doing enough to help New York recover, and 47 percent felt Washington was not doing enough to protect the city from another attack. More than one-quarter felt that they were still dealing with the fallout of the 9/11 attack and that their lives had not returned to normal (*New York Times* 2004a).

Hidden behind the overwhelming “blueness” of New York City, President Bush increased his share of the vote from 18 to 24 percent between 2000 and 2004. His share of the vote in 2004 ran well ahead of the Republican share of the voter registration in the ultra-orthodox Jewish neighborhoods of Williamsburg, Crown Heights, and Borough Park, Brooklyn, and the Italian American neighborhoods of Dyker Heights and Bensonhurst. Such neighborhoods have been the traditional bedrock of the vote for candidates like Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg. John Kerry also ran ahead of Democratic registration in neighborhoods with many well-educated professionals, which provided critical swing votes in recent mayoral elections, for example, helping Michael Bloomberg win office in November 2001. Opinion polls from the end of 2004 suggest that Mayor Bloomberg paid a price for being associated with the president, the war, and the perceived inadequate federal response to the risks facing the city (*New York Times* 2004a).

What, then, can we conclude about the political implications of 9/11 for New York City? The chapters in this volume offer evidence that the economic, political, and legal imperatives surrounding the site pushed the officials charged with responding to the attack to focus on real estate development and transportation infrastructure at the site to the exclusion of other ways of understanding and responding to the crisis caused by the attack. They did not ignore other interested parties, whether the families of the victims, neighbors

living in Battery Park City or Chinatown, or even the mayor of New York, but they paid attention to them mainly only to the extent necessary to achieve their primary objectives. The governor, the authorities under his control, and the leaseholder, Silverstein Properties, succeeded in defining the process their way.

On the positive side, residents of the city did not react to its Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian immigrant communities in the angry, punitive manner that might have been expected. Despite the federal registration program and the incarceration and even deportation of many men of these communities, most New Yorkers expressed no ill will toward them. Given the family experiences of some New Yorkers with the Holocaust, their historically strong support for civil liberties, and the negative example of the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, many city residents instead showed concern for these vulnerable immigrants.

Of the rebuilding process the Regional Plan Association (2004, 5–6) observed that its aspirations for civic engagement “have yet to be realized,” that the authorities had “neglected many . . . recommended strategies,” and that their receptiveness to public input was “uneven over time and across subject areas.” Most pointedly, it stated that the plans “have not supported the diversification of Lower Manhattan’s economy nor do they promote a range of housing options that would encourage a socially, economically, and racially diverse residential community.”

The vigor of the civic coalitions, the evident concern for immigrant rights, the unease with the war on terror, and the lack of support for President Bush in the 2004 election suggest that New York does not lack critics of the response to September 11. With the economic uncertainty about whether it is possible to realize the plans for the site and the looming 2005 mayoral election and 2006 gubernatorial election, it may still be possible for these critics to push public policy toward measures that would better integrate Ground Zero into a more diverse lower Manhattan economy. If so, the city would achieve something closer to the best aspirations of its citizens.

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