Women, Politics, and Change

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In discussing the rights of women, we are to consider, first, what belongs to her as an individual, in a world of her own, the arbiter of her own destiny, . . . Secondly, if we consider her as a citizen, as a member of a great nation, she must have the same rights as all other members, according to the fundamental principles of our Government. . . . Thirdly, viewed as a woman, an equal factor in civilization, her rights and duties are still the same—individual happiness and development. Fourthly, it is only the incidental relations of life, such as mother, wife, sister, daughter, which may involve some special duties and training. The isolation of every human should and the necessity of self-dependence must give each individual the right to choose his own surroundings. The strongest reason for giving woman all the opportunities for higher education, for the full development of her faculties, her forces of mind and body; for giving her the most enlarged freedom of thought and action; a complete emancipation from all forms of bondage, of custom, dependence, superstition; from all the crippling influences of fear—is the solitude and personal responsibility of her own individual life.1

So spoke Elizabeth Cady Stanton, feminist and suffragist, in her statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, February 20, 1892. Her words are striking in their contemporary tone, in their inclusion of familial as well as formal political and civic equality. At the same time they echo eighteenth century Enlightenment ideas about individual rights and responsibilities, a long-lasting political model in the United States. Our view of women's politics includes more than feminist poli-

tics, and we are more interested in collective action than in individual action: We begin here, however, because this quotation raises an important contextual theme of this book, that of historical continuity and change. Other major themes are the meaning of politics and the place of women's politics in the context of large-scale structural change.

Three intellectual opportunities shape this project. The first is theoretical: the opportunity to apply the suggestion of feminist scholars that to understand women and politics we must broaden and expand our definition of politics—past and present.² The second is sociological: the opportunity to bring a structural perspective to the problem of women's politics. The third is historical: the opportunity to look in detail at the "long" twentieth century, starting in the 1880s and coming up to the present, to compare not only the first and second great waves of women's feminist activism—two periods of women challenging the state and other institutions—but also the context and content of more routine politics in other periods.

What Is Politics?

In the late nineteenth century, middle-class American women wrote tracts, marched, petitioned, and demonstrated to support temperance, demanding government intervention to prohibit the sale of liquor; in 1901 Cuban and Italian immigrant women in Tampa, Florida—some workers themselves and others simply Latin community members joined male workers in a hard-fought strike of cigar makers for improved working conditions and the right to organize (Lebsock and Hewitt, this volume). In the late twentieth century, women, young and old, but primarily middle class, marched, lobbied, and campaigned for the Equal Rights Amendment; women hospital workers—many of them black and Hispanic—led their union in struggles for recognition, better wages, and improved working conditions (Mansbridge and Milkman, this volume). Through these actions, women were collectively and individually attempting to affect the distribution of power and/or resources in a state or community. In short, they were engaged in politics.

Any study of politics must define its terrain: What is politics? One answer is the "authoritative allocation of values for a society"; the mellifluous phrase is David Easton's. Easton rejects definitions that simply concern relations between citizens and their government within states as too narrow and rejects as well definitions that are so broad that they encompass the power component in personal relations. For us, the problem with his definition (although he would disagree) is that it seems

both to require that all actors be members of the polity and to suggest too consensual a process.

Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie define political participation in a way "narrower [than some] in that [they] consider as acts of participation only those activities aimed at influencing the government in some way . . . they have a broad view of the ways one can influence the government—both inside and outside the electoral sphere." Yet Verba and Nie's classification of the political acts that interest them—voting, campaigning, initiating contact with officials, and group or organizational activities—has an important limitation for our purposes: their "concern is with activities 'within the system'—ways of influencing politics that are generally recognized as legal and legitimate." This highly contemporary definition is inappropriate for historical

investigation, for it assumes both a particular type of state and political system and a broadly inclusive polity. These conditions did not obtain in the past. Women were not members of the polity when they had no right to vote, hold office, or sit on juries; even after they received the vote through the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, their rights as citizens were not clear (Andersen, this volume). Susan B. Anthony had pointed out the implications of this anomaly much earlier, when she argued her case at her 1873 trial for voting:

Your denial of my citizen's right to vote is the denial of my right to consent as one of the governed, the denial of my right of representation as one of the taxed, the denial to a trial by a jury of my peers as an offender against law. . . . All of my prosecutors, from the eighth ward corner grocery politician, who entered the complaint, to the United States Marshal, Commissioner, District Attorney, District Judge, your honor on the bench, not one is my peer. . . . 6

Women received suffrage in all states only in 1920. (A similar argument could be made by southern blacks, progressively disfranchised in the period starting in 1877, but accelerating in the 1890s.) In order to give women's politics a single definition before and after suffrage we need a broader definition.

Resource Mobilization

Recent theories of political mobilization that emphasize the role of organizational resources in fostering all types of collective action provide the needed breadth. Critical of the crowd metaphor and of social breakdown and individual frustration as sources of collective movements, the

resource mobilization theorists stress the importance of previously existing organizations and resources. Organized collectivities are able to marshal participants for specific events and activities, recruit new members, formulate strategies, garner support from potential allies, and sustain action even in the face of failure. Resource mobilization theories treat both orderly and disorderly collective action as politics, and as instrumental and rational modes of pursuing group ends. They use the term "collective action" for coordinated action on behalf of shared interests or for action in which sets of people commit pooled resources, including their own efforts, to common ends. 8 For William Gamson, the basic unit of analysis is the challenging group, whose members are "seeking the mobilization of an unmobilized constituency and [whose] antagonist or target influence lies outside of this constituency." In his view, mobilizations to defeat or elect a candidate, or to advance a social policy outside party politics, are simply different forms of political behavior: "In the place of the old duality of extremist politics and pluralistic politics, there is simply politics. The American Medical Association and Students for a Democratic Society are not different species but members of the same species faced with different political environments."10

We take account of collective action in addition to conventional definitions of politics. When we define politics (as efforts to affect the distribution of power and resources in a state community) in this way, we can bring in the entire spectrum of women's politics, that of both disfranchised and franchised women, and we can compare periods before and after females had the vote. In terms of our definition, very little collective action is not also politics. One example that might qualify as nonpolitical is a large gathering of collective cultural expression, like a rock festival, say, Woodstock. Such events, although collective, are not directed toward power or redistributive issues, hence are excluded from our definition of politics. (It should be noted, however, that in practice it is state or community official responses that label collective acts political or not, independently of the participants' intentions, and it is difficult to imagine large collective acts that do not take on some political coloration, as indeed Woodstock did in 1969.) For the purposes of this volume, power struggles in the family are also excluded from our definition of politics, which is limited to the arena of the state or collective units within it. Outside collective action are political acts that are individual, like voting (although when it is deliberate bloc voting, voting is collective action), or individual refusals by southern blacks to perform certain types of work that had political import in the Reconstruction South and the succeeding period with its Iim Crow laws (Jones, this volume). Both of these types of acts fall under our rubric of politics even if they are not collective because they are motivated by political purposes or had political consequences. Our broad definition of politics thus includes claims not only by those "outside the system," but also by citizens whose ability to influence the system through voting and other types of participation is limited, either structurally or because of historical patterns of discrimination.

Dimensions of Women's Politics

Within the bounds of our definition of politics, there are three major dimensions along which women's politics can be situated: forms, bases, and issues. Women's participation takes two forms: (1) "politics" in the conventional sense, which includes social movements or other types of "claiming" politics; 11 pressure group politics, electoral politics, and leader-initiated (both legislative and executive leaders are included here) action for change in the distribution of power and resources; (2) "protopolitical" activities, which include direct collective appeals to authorities (unmediated by organization), often in defense of customary rights or statuses, and membership and action in organizations that work outside the formal political arena. Through such activities women may acquire organizational skills or networks of relationships, accumulate resources, and define their interests and/or acquire consciousness of their collective situation.

The two major forms of political activity have different *bases*. Protopolitics, even when organizations mediate the relationship, is based on solidarities formed in everyday life (those of family, community, and collective experience). Conventionally defined political activities, social movements, and other forms of claiming politics are normally based on voluntary organizations formed explicitly for political purposes. With the targets of politics becoming increasingly national at the end of the nineteenth century, and with the granting of suffrage, women's activity in electoral and pressure group politics based on organizations with explicit political goals gradually increased. Nevertheless, neither protopolitics nor social movements in which women were central actors disappeared.

The *issues* of women's politics run along a continuum ranging from those in which being female is irrelevant (and communal, familial, racial, class, or national issues dominate) and those in which women's interests *as women* (either the interests of all women or those of particular subsets) are foremost.

A Historical Overview of Women's Politics

Let us look at greater length at the three dimensions of women's politics chronologically in the United States.

There are two types of protopolitical activities. The first is direct appeals to authorities via protest or symbolic, ritualized demands, unmediated by organization. Jacqueline Jones (this volume) offers an example in the acts of resistance in which southern free black women refused to work in the fields for planters or worked only slowly and erratically for white women in their homes. Another example is the setting of food prices in the era of the American Revolution by women who insisted that merchants sell commodities at a "fair price" determined by their customers. 12 In its pure form, such price setting occurred primarily before our period. However, boycotts against certain "overpriced" products by Jewish women on the lower east side of New York between 1902 and 1917 share, in their early phases at least, the community base and lack of organization that characterized earlier price setting. 13 The southern black women resisted what they saw as unjust demands on them; the women who took part in price setting or boycotts resisted by their action food prices they perceived as iniquitous. These acts tended to be reactive rather than proactive, defending a vision of a just society that had, or should have, existed.

This type of protopolitics is generally associated with specific bases for action. In decentralized nineteenth century America, women, like men, acted politically and collectively within groups in which bonds grew out of common everyday experience. Solidarities of household or community, for example, were based on shared status, shared rights or privileges, shared oppression, or more banal daily factors like the household division of labor. These were the solidarities of everyday life. Women going about their tasks could easily join food protests and other popular politics—collective action that grew out of the quotidian.

Women also acquired skills and resources in a second type of protopolitical activity—participation in voluntary organizations with no explicit political goals. In these organizations they could develop as well a consciousness of their interests essential for any future political mobilization. Resources and skills garnered in nonpolitical organizations are often transferred from one organization to another, and by this means provide a route to formal political activity.

Alexis de Tocqueville laid Americans' propensity to voluntary associ-

ation to their early experience with political organizations. He wrote:

There is only one country on the face of the earth where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of association for political purposes. This same country is the only one in the world where the continued exercise of the right of association has been introduced into civil life, and where all the advantages that civilization can confer are procured by means of it. . . . In their political associations, the Americans of all conditions, minds, and ages daily acquire a general taste for association, and grow accustomed to the use of it. There they meet together in large numbers, they converse, they listen to each other, and they are mutually stimulated to all sorts of undertakings. They afterward transfer to civil life the notions they have thus acquired, and make them subservient to a thousand purposes. Thus it is by the enjoyment of a dangerous freedom that the Americans learn the art of rendering the dangers of freedom less formidable. ¹⁴

The American Revolution, a period of intense political contention and challenge, had indeed witnessed an upsurge of revolutionary committees or clubs, examples of political organizations. However, Tocqueville's model, in which political organization served as a prototype for other associations, considered only men; most women experienced voluntary association first in organizations not explicitly directed to politics. Mary Ryan's study of Oneida County, New York, in the antebellum period reveals a "remarkable variety and vivacity of voluntary associations." Moreover, one third of the twenty-six religious and charitable associations listed in the 1832 Utica City Directory were exclusively female. 15

By no means, however, were all antebellum women's organizations nonpolitical. Nancy Hewitt's study of Quaker women's politics in Rochester, New York, demonstrates that these women mounted radical challenges to the distribution of power and resources in both their community and the nation around the issues of the abolition of slavery, temperance, and women's rights. Elizabeth Cady Stanton developed a radical critique of marriage which she later had to temper when she sought supporters for her and Anthony's position calling for universal (rather than simply black male) suffrage in 1869.¹⁶

Later in the nineteenth century, women's associational propensity continued, but the scope of their associations broadened. Many organized women were concerned with the distribution of resources in their communities, but did not struggle for power in a broader sense. "After 1870 clubs of all kinds proliferated . . . ," write Anne Firor Scott and Andrew Scott. "Their purposes were various: literary studies, community action, civic reform; but whatever the purpose they represented also an effort at self-improvement and self-education." 17

Another type of associational activity was the systematic examination or thoughtful reflection on problems in a study club or prayer group, a long-held American tradition. This kind of activity could awaken

women to matters that demanded solutions and sometimes could lead to action. Consciousness-raising groups, in this perspective, may be understood as a latter-day iteration of a cluster of longstanding women's activities through which collective definitions develop.

In both the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, women gained organizational experience most often in voluntary associations, often religious or philanthropic in purpose, which provided services for the community or specific groups within it. Without the vote, women could not translate the politics of associational activism and the resources gained thereby into electoral politics. This does not mean, however, that reform-minded women did not also act collectively to sway politically powerful men.

Both philanthropic organizational and civic reform activities remained characteristic of American women even after they gained the suffrage, at least partly *because* of their experience when their direct entry into electoral politics was blocked and partly because the local community arena continued to be the arena of so many of their socially constructed self-defined interests.

In the 1880s and 1890s the rich and dense network of women's associations concerned with nonelectoral ends was joined by suffrage organizations and others, such as temperance groups, with local and national political goals (Lebsock, this volume). This change signaled renewed movement from a politics concerned with the distribution of social resources to one concerned with the redistribution of power. (The antebellum women's coalition for abolition, temperance, and women's rights had earlier worked for a radical redistribution of power.) A high point of women's social movement activity ensued, continuing until national suffrage was gained in 1920 and the Prohibition Amendment passed. These social movement organizations adopted the forms of electoral politics—meetings, demonstrations, petitions—even before women gained the vote. With the contemporaneous growth of an industrial capitalist economy and a vigorous labor movement, unions came to serve a function similar to that of civic or national associations. They represented workers' interests, and, to a degree that varied systematically in different types of unions (Milkman, this volume), sometimes acted explicitly on behalf of women workers. Early unions shared the social movement form with reform organizations and developed the strike as their typical form of protest. Unions, and the temperance and suffrage associations that acted on behalf of unrepresented constituencies, often displayed a more confrontational style than mainstream political organizations (including women's civic reform organizations), but they shared much of the latter's repertoire of collective action. 18

Only after 1920 was women's politics able to expand to include electoral efforts to shape government policies. Nevertheless, as Nancy Cott shows in this volume, women continued to favor organizations other than political parties through the decade of the 1920s. No "women's bloc" emerged despite a high level of participation in organizations. The twenties also saw a slow expansion of women voting (Andersen, this volume) and new party activism by black women (Higginbotham, this volume). In the thirties, there came greater participation in parties and unions (Faue and Milkman, this volume) as family and domestic matters such as jobs and mortgages became political issues in the Depression. The fifties saw women still pursuing politics in nonpartisan pressure groups such as the League of Women Voters (Ware, this volume).

According to Jo Freeman, the contemporary women's movement in its early years took two distinct forms, neither of them electoral. The bases, Freeman continues, were two different cohorts of women. The first was the women connected to the national and state commissions on the status of women (originally appointed in 1961 by President Kennedy) who formed the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966. The second was a loose coalition of small groups of younger women, many of whom had been involved in the civil rights or anti-Vietnam War movements. "The two branches . . . are structured in distinctly different ways," Freeman writes:

The "older branch" possesses several prominent and numerous minor core organizations. The structure of such groups as NOW, the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), Federally Employed Women (FEW), and some fifty different organizations and caucuses of professional women has tended to be traditionally formal, usually containing local chapters and national governing bodies. . . . All started as top-down national organizations lacking a mass base. . . .

The structure of the "younger branch," on the other hand, can best be thought of as a decentralized, segmented network of autonomous groups. Its basic unit is the small group of from five to thirty women held together by an often tenuous network of personal contacts and feminist publications. . . . With time and growth, the informal communications networks have partially stratified along functional lines, so that, within a single city, participants in, say, a feminist health clinic will know less of different groups in their own area than of other health clinics in different cities. . . .

[Their] conscious lack of hierarchy means that the groups share a common culture but are politically autonomous. . . . 19

In some respects, the contemporary "younger branch" harked back to the antebellum movement with its lack of formal organizations for

women's rights and its dependence on informal networks ready to make radical demands.

The two cohorts were women in different contexts. The context of the "older branch" of the 1960s was the federal government-sponsored commission on women and its state offshoots. The context of the "younger branch" was the civil rights and student movements, both committed to nonhierarchical process and direct, unmediated forms of politics concerned with social and cultural issues as well as with more narrowly political issues. The formula of the "younger branch" had more in common with a protopolitics, consciously chosen, than with the organizational forms that had predominated at the turn of the century.

In the 1980s feminist politics again became characterized by formal organizations—primarily pressure groups. Many New Right groups, pursuing antifeminist goals—in which women played an important role as members—organized in pressure groups that paralleled those of their

rivals (Klatch, this volume).

The Context of Large-Scale Structural Change

Two large-scale processes of structural change shaped the protopolitics and politics described here. First was the growth of a relatively centralized, strong state apparatus. Second was the growth of a capitalist in-

dustrial economy.

The beginning of the twentieth century saw a transition, according to Stephen Skowronek, from the nineteenth century state of courts and parties to a more bureaucratic, administrative state. According to Skowronek's analysis, the American Revolution rejected "the organizational qualities of the state . . . evolving in Europe over the eighteenth century." The authors of the Constitution concentrated authority in the central government, but left most political institutions to the control of the states. The result was a state of parties (locally based organizations that distributed patronage) and courts (which defined the rights and duties of the various political actors).

The combined effects of industrialization, with the great growth in scale of the economy and the rise of a labor movement, and urbanization, with both rural-to-urban migration and the settlement of overseas immigrants in cities, undermined this nineteenth century state; in the early years of the twentieth century, a new administrative state was born. In it the President and agents of the administrative apparatus gained enormous responsibilities. This state took on new functions, including some regulation of the economy—for example, antitrust

policies in response to abuses accompanying the unbridled economic competition at the end of the nineteenth century. Intervention did not include general regulation of working conditions, however. The Supreme Court viewed such efforts as violations of the right to free contract. Reformers turned instead to legislation that would protect women only, on the grounds of their physical weakness and maternal responsibilities, creating a legal and political precedent that would affect women's politics throughout the twentieth century (Freeman, this volume).

"Progressive" reforms proliferated at the turn of the century and up to World War I. These included, in the matter of elections, innovations that brought officials closer to voters: direct election of senators, direct primaries, and the initiative, referendum, and recall. At the same time, however, blacks and poor whites were being disfranchised in the South through poll taxes and literacy tests, while voting requirements that similarly disfranchised immigrants in northern cities were introduced. The Progressive credo emphasized the value of expert civil servants in the place of potentially corrupt members of patron-client networks. Women Progressives focused especially on the hardships of women and children in urban life and in the workplace. They were advocates for these powerless groups with urban and national politicians, and served them in settlement houses and other social agencies.

Growth of the government bureaucracy at national, state, and local levels, and its increasing specialization, was paralleled by the growth of the service and clerical sectors of the economy. Employment in these sectors expanded, and with it a new area for women's employment. Only in the 1910 population census, however, did a clerical occupation ("stenographers and typists") make the list (it was number eight) of the ten leading occupations for women. Servant was the leading female occupation through 1940, with agricultural laborer second through 1910 (the latter occupation dropped to tenth in 1920 and disappeared only in 1940). Clerical occupations came to dominate women's employment in the 1950 census. There were women's professions, such as teaching, nursing, and social work, that also expanded in the period, but the women employed in them were far less numerous than those in clerical occupations. Overall, there was a slow increase in women's labor force participation, but it continued to be concentrated in a few occupations, mostly in the service sector.

World War I, like the Civil War in an earlier period, saw further expansion of government functions, including a military draft, greater direct taxing power, aid to agriculture, and new social programs (for families of soldiers, for example). Although the war induced an economic boom, solutions to the longer-range problems of poverty, immi-

gration, the national economy, and labor relations were not advanced. At the end of the war, national woman's suffrage was achieved through the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. Suffrage movement organizations were dismantled and women demobilized from their effective mass political movement, its ends realized. Yet women received the vote in a period in which parties were becoming less important as distributors of patronage, as a consequence of progressive good government reform and increasing delegation of government to experts. Elections were becoming less central to American politics. As the trend of voter turnout moved downward between 1896 and the 1920s, pressure group politics became increasingly important. (Lebsock, this volume, suggests that women, with their rich organizational history, made an important contribution to this shift.) Suzanne La Follette, feminist and pacifist, declared in 1926, "It is a misfortune for the woman's movement that it has succeeded in securing political rights for women at the very period when political rights are worth less than they have been at any time since the eighteenth century."22

New women voters also confronted a rising conservatism, as three Republican presidents, from 1920 to 1932, supported business/government corporatism and rejected federal government responsibility for poverty or labor relations. Even these conservative administrations, however, did not undo the reforms of the Progressive period. Indeed, some additional Progressive programs were adopted in these years, although usually in somewhat attenuated form. Among these were two acts which directly affected women: the Sheppard-Towner Act (1921) and the Cable Act (1922). Sheppard-Towner, pushed by the Women's Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC, an umbrella pressure group for women's organizations), passed the Congress with huge majorities. It provided funds for locally administered maternal and infant care, conferences on childcare, and public education on these problems. The WJCC also actively supported passage of the Cable Act, which gave American women married to foreigners (except for Chinese who were themselves ineligible for citizenship by naturalization) the rights of naturalized citizens. Earlier laws had linked a married woman's citizenship automatically to that of her husband. (The act was amended only in 1930-1931, to make wives' citizenship fully independent of their husbands' status.) As Nancy Cott writes, these two acts "neatly illustrate the dual legacy of the suffrage campaign, for as profoundly as Sheppard-Towner declared that women, as mothers, differed from men in their relation to the state, the Cable Act declared that women as people required the same relation to the state as men—or almost."23

By 1930 three fourths of the states had passed laws which provided

for mothers' pensions; nine had passed general old age pension laws. The provisions of the state mothers' pension and workmen's compensation laws passed in the 1920s and 1930s reflected their supporters' gender assumptions (Nelson, this volume): Women could claim state aid as mothers if they lost their husbands' support through death or disability. Men's entitlement to state aid went via their economic role as workers. Congress did not renew the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1929, when its original authorization expired. Although Harding declared economic "normalcy," and overall there was economic growth, the international picture was not so bright. Trade protectionism and agricultural distress picture was not so bright. Trade protectionism and agricultural distress increased across the globe. The twenties were a period of great rural to urban migration, of both blacks and whites, as crisis spread in the agricultural economy.

The crash of 1929 occurred in an economy whose financial sector was overexpanded speculatively, whose agricultural sector was in a deep depression, and whose income was distributed in a polarized and inequitable manner. Banks and businesses failed, and unemployment rose rapidly. The Republican administration of Herbert Hoover regularly announced, against strong evidence to the contrary, that things were getting better.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's election in 1932 changed matters. Although the Democrats had customarily opposed government intervention, and indeed had offered no systematic programs in the electoral campaign, Roosevelt hastened to sponsor a large array of legislation designed to reassure Americans, to attack the most urgent problems, and to lay the basis for longer-term solutions. Unemployment was addressed by federal relief and several types of work assistance. A National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) prohibited most child labor, as well as interference with labor organizing. When the Supreme Court found the NIRA unconstitutional, Congress reenacted several of its functions; most important here was the Wagner Act, which guaranteed found the NIRA unconstitutional, Congress reenacted several of its functions; most important here was the Wagner Act, which guaranteed unions the right to organize and bargain collectively. Even in the fervor of reform and expansion of the economic role of government one matter was left unchanged: Protective legislation continued to be gender specific (Faue, this volume). It operated as a legal constraint on women's labor force participation. In 1935 Congress approved the Social Security Act, the most far-reaching program passed by the New Deal. The act established a national system of old age pensions, paid for by a payroll tax. It also included provisions for an unemployment compensation system and joint federal-state assistance to the elderly, the handicapped, and dependent mothers and children living in poverty.

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returned to and surpassed 1929 levels. Real GNP per capita in 1971 was roughly double that of 1929. The distribution of income among households also was leveled to some degree, with a substantial reduction in the share going to the top 5 percent of wealthiest families. Population grew much more rapidly in the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s than it had in the 1930s. Government intervention in the economy increased in the Kennedy and Johnson years, as the American version of the welfare state was constructed. Minimum wages were increased, and social security was first extended and then indexed to the cost of living. The first budget which increased spending without raising taxes was the Kennedy budget of 1963, proposed in a period of threatened recession. Lyndon Johnson's progressive Great Society policy included direct federal aid to schools and Medicare for the elderly who were eligible for social security (that is, those who had earned entitlement through wage work in covered industry or through marriage to such an individual).

The 1960s and 1970s were also a period of social movements. The background of the civil rights movement lies in changes in the political economy of the South, in particular the end of the cotton-based economy and the accompanying phenomenon of black migration to the cities of the South and the North. Blacks' battles for restoration of their civil rights began in the South but eventually swept the North. They were soon followed by the student and anti–Vietnam War movements. A feminist movement gathered momentum in the late 1960s, organized in the two branches described by Freeman and discussed below.

Women's labor force participation increased steadily in the postwar period, despite the baby boom, to reach a level of 51.4 percent in 1981 compared with 31.8 percent in 1947. In the 1970s and 1980s fertility plummeted, and age at first marriage and divorce rates increased rapidly. The new higher rates of female labor force participation included for the first time many married women, even those with children under age 6. A concomitant of the new labor force and divorce patterns was an increase of female-headed households and of women as the chief wageearner in households. Recently, the proportion of women has increased greatly in professions such as medicine, the law, and accounting, and in upper management positions in business. Although labor force participation patterns have changed, and some occupations have become more female, sex segregation in occupations continues; the index of segregation by sex among white workers fell from 46 in 1940 to 41 in 1981, a modest decline concentrated mostly in the decade of the 1970s. The decline was arguably due to civil rights legislation (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) forbidding discrimination in hiring and the affirmative action programs which were mandated in the enforcement process. Persistent wage inequality between the sexes continues to accompany occupational segregation.

Progressive legislation, increasing government participation in the economy, the growth of bureaucracy and services in government and in the private sector, and persistent inflation slowed dramatically with the recession of 1979–1982 and the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Social programs were cut and a generally conservative outlook on the economy and society prevailed.

How did these large-scale political and economic changes affect the forms, bases, and issues of women's politics?

Large-scale political change—the expansion of government functions accompanying the development of the welfare state—and similar expansion on the state and local level (where education was especially important) opened up new employment for women in government. Women's employment in this area has served as a bridge to and base for interest group and party political participation. Women in teaching and women in clerical and management positions in government, as members of either unions or pressure group organizations, are especially visible (Knoke, Schlozman, and Jennings, this volume). Increased women's labor force participation in the private service sector, especially in those industries that are at least partially unionized—here hospitals and social work are important—has also led women to pressure group and party politics. These are new bases for women's politics, although the voluntary association (including unions) continues to serve as a central institution for women's activism. Over the twentieth century, then, but especially after 1960, the political party became a new form of women's politics.

Urbanization—with its concentration of population and its economic and social problems—has been accompanied by greater integration of women and men in local reform and social movement politics. (There was an early example of this type of integration in the antebellum period, when women and men worked together in abolitionist, temperance, pacifist, and women's rights organizations.) In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, women and men worked together on issues of child welfare, educational reform, and housing. They promoted protective legislation for women and children and laws that curbed homework and child labor. Women were commonly more active on these issues than they were on reforms to encourage good government or improvement of urban services—getting rid of political machines and corruption, improving urban transportation and sanitation, and so on. They brought expertise gained in women-only voluntary associations to the issues of health, education, and welfare, refor-

mulated as government responsibilities. Women and men also worked together in national social movements such as black rights, socialism, and labor, where issues of race and class dominated. Turn-of-the-century and Progressive-era politics saw thus both an increase in gender-integrated reform politics and the continued importance of women-only organizations such as women's clubs, settlement houses, and the National American Woman Suffrage Association. Later twentieth century social movements such as civil and welfare rights and women's liberation furthered the integration of women into party politics as voters and candidates. Historically, women-only organizations seem to have opened new paths for women's politics; as they achieved their goals, or at least some of them, they were supplemented but not supplanted by organizations in which women and men worked together.

To sum up, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen great growth in the domain of women's politics, along with growth in the domain of government. New bases for women's politics have emerged with changing employment patterns. Women have continued to work politically in voluntary associations and at the local level; but through their labor market involvement as workers providing state services and as union members, they have moved into the national political arena in both party and pressure group politics. Correspondingly, the bases and forms of women in politics have become more similar to those of men. New issues—for example, maternity leave and daycare—have emerged as women's relationship to the family and workplace has changed.

The contemporary women's movement has gone beyond workrelated issues, moreover, and has brought issues of sexuality and private life (such as abortion, homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights, wife abuse and other forms of family violence, displaced homemakers and the poverty of female-headed households) into the legislative arena. Are these new issues related to the patterns of structural change reviewed above? To the extent that women's increased labor force participation both increased their potential autonomy and increased pressures on married couples, yes. Also, the greater integration of men and women in political and economic institutions has to some extent delegated these issues (except gay rights) to women-only or primarily female organizations—to which, of course, many women who are also members of gender-integrated institutions belong. Why did these issues become so important in the contemporary women's movement compared with that of the earlier twentieth century? The woman suffrage movement's avoidance of these issues, or similar ones, was a deliberate strategy. Most of its leaders felt that it was vital to avoid the divisiveness of such issues as divorce and "free love" in order to focus on suffrage first and foremost. (As Ellen DuBois points out, Elizabeth Cady Stanton's radical position on marriage and divorce in the late 1860s was played down by her colleagues.)²⁴ The social movement climate of the second half of the twentieth century, which the later women's movement shared, made cultural and personal issues political. As structural change both increased women's labor force participation and increased the fragility of married life, the contemporary women's movement embraced rather than avoided cultural and sexuality issues. (Here, however, the avoidance of discussion of lesbianism by the older branch of the movement should be noted. Also, as Jacob, this volume, shows, divorce reform was an issue not greatly influenced by feminist organizations in the 1960s and 1970s.)

Continuity and Change

Many aspects of political life have changed for women since 1890, yet many continue in much the same form. The historical themes of continuity and change run throughout the chapters assembled here. Overall, disparate goals and cleavages in ideology, class, and ethnic/racial background have prevented women from acting as a single interest group. This very divisiveness, moreover, is a form of continuity. Two conflicting ideologies in particular have divided women politically across time. (We simplify here; there was ideological overlap in some groups' or individuals' positions, and many variants within each ideology.) One ideology emphasizes equal rights and the similarities between men and women; the other emphasizes gender differences and the belief that women have a special capacity for humanizing the public world. Both ideologies have been present across the long sweep of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; indeed, individuals and organizations sometimes drew on both in their attitudes and tactics. And sometimes one ideology has been dominant, depending on the state of the economy and the political system at the time.

Ideological and Structural Cleavages

In order to trace these ideological changes and divisions, we must begin with the broad equal-rights movement in the mid nineteenth century—an earlier starting point than that taken by our authors. A *humanist* or *egalitarian* ideology, which grew out of the antislavery crusade in the 1830s and 1840s, dominated the first woman's rights movement. Alice

Kessler-Harris describes its central belief: "Women, by virtue of their common humanity with men, are entitled to all the same rights and privileges. They share with men... a set of human rights that transcend biological/gender differences."²⁵ The organizers of the first woman's rights convention held in 1848 in Seneca Falls, New York, emphasized common humanity and the same rights for men and women. Quaker women, in particular, worked together with men to analyze critically the condition of women and men and contributed to the progressive abolitionist, pacifist, and temperance movements in which they participated.²⁶ The language of these movements encouraged these radical egalitarians in this direction, and their experience as abolitionists taught them that men and women were more alike than different. This belief was reinforced by men's and women's joint membership and participation in many antislavery societies. Breaking the taboo against women speaking in public, the great antislavery female orators-Angelina Grimke, Sojourner Truth, Lucretia Mott, Abby Kelley Foster, Maria W. Stewart, and later Susan B. Anthony—demonstrated, for example, that rhetorical skill was as natural for women as for men. Aware of the many restrictions on women's participation in public institutions, these women activists argued for social and cultural changes to lift these restrictions as well as for strictly legal and political rights.

Following the Civil War and the bitter break between feminist advocates of universal suffrage, in particular Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, and former abolitionists who put black suffrage before that of women, women's politics increasingly reflected a second ideology. Variously termed domestic or woman-centered, this view accepted and extended the prevailing ideology of separate spheres for men and women to provide a rationale for women to bring their domestic roles into public activities. Women who subscribed to this ideology were less militant about rights for women than about their roles as wives and mothers with a special obligation to family and community. Stressing biological differences between men and women, these women emphasized the compassionate and moral nature of women and their duty to curb the natural aggressiveness and competitiveness of men. They believed that a place for women in the public sphere was warranted by

their unique obligation rather than by equality itself.

In the 1890s and early 1900s the woman-centered ideology was upheld also by service and reform activists who championed legislation and social programs to protect and help women and children. By that time some advocates of woman suffrage had also accepted aspects of the woman-centered ideology. To appeal to a wide range of suffrage supporters, Susan B. Anthony had de-emphasized her earlier goals of trans-

forming society to achieve equal rights and stressed the single goal of winning equal *political* rights. The vision of social and cultural changes that would be required to achieve equality in other areas did not disappear, however. Some female reformers—especially the settlement house workers and the activists in the Women's Trade Union League—and some suffrage activists maintained commitment to a broader definition of equality. Nancy Cott describes the spectrum of ideology in the woman's movement at the close of the century as having a seesaw quality:

. . . at one end, the intention to eliminate sex-specific limitations; at the other, the desire to recognize rather than quash the qualities and habits called female, to protect the interests women had already defined as theirs and give those much greater public scope. A tension stretched between emphasis on the rights that women (like men) deserved and emphasis on the particular duties or services that women (unlike men) could offer society. No collective resolution of these tensions occurred and seldom even did individuals permanently resolve them in their own minds.²⁷

Ideological tension persisted in the final drive for woman suffrage in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Carrie Chapman Catt put together a broad coalition of women, some of whom argued for suffrage based on a belief that the electoral system would benefit from women's special nature; others on a belief that political equality was required to achieve general equality. The coalition proved unstable, however. In 1913 Alice Paul and others formed the Congressional Union (CU), a separate organization to fight for suffrage and for a broad program demanding equal rights and equal treatment. After suffrage was won, the CU became the National Woman's Party, sponsor of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) that was introduced into Congress for the first time in 1923.

This ideological dualism continued to influence women's politics in the decades between 1920 and the emergence of the modern women's movement in the late 1960s. It affected the stance that women took in partisan politics (Andersen and Cott, this volume), fueled political disagreement about the ERA and protective legislation in the 1920s and 1930s (Freeman, this volume), ²⁸ and was the basis of cleavage between older and younger women in the Farmer-Labor party in the 1930s (Faue, this volume). For the most part, however, an ideology emphasizing women's vulnerability in the labor market and in the marriage bargain was dominant in women's politics and their treatment by the law until the late 1960s (Freeman).

The balance shifted in the 1960s and 1970s, producing a revolution in women's legal status. Freeman describes these developments. Congress led the way by passing the 1963 Equal Pay Law, which committed the federal government to improving women's economic position, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited sex discrimination in employment, and in the 1970s by sending the ERA to the states and passing laws that encouraged equal opportunity for women. The Supreme Court fundamentally altered its interpretation of women's position. Until 1971 "virtually all laws that classified by sex were constitutional; their purpose was to protect a dependent group. Today most such laws have been found unconstitutional."²⁹ Equality and women's rights became increasingly important political issues within the parties (see Jennings, this volume) and legislative bodies.³⁰ The older branch of the contemporary women's movement primarily sought equal rights. The rights agenda was most prominent in the drive to get the ERA ratified by the state legislatures. Indeed, ideological division about gender difference and similarity was an important basis of the bitter fight between women who supported the ERA and those who opposed it. Even among supporters, however, some women continued to question the extent to which women and men differ, and whether womanliness and motherhood can form a basis of feminism.

Contemporary exponents of the woman-centered ideology, now called maternal feminists and represented best by Jean Bethke Elshtain,31 do not subscribe to biological differences between men and women. In the view of some, ³² they are less moralistic than were earlier activists who stressed women's differences from men. According to maternal feminists, differences in the early socialization of boys and girls and women's adult experiences as mothers are significant in forming women's identities and values. Boys are pushed to separate from their mothers at an early age, they argue, and hence develop an ethic of iustice revolving around individual rights and universal standards of morality. Girls, held by their mothers in a closer bond, are believed to develop an ethic of care revolving more around relationships than rights; females furthermore come to value particularities in determining moral behavior. 33 Motherhood is thought to strengthen the ethic of care. Carol Dietz points out that the maternal feminists politicize these social psychological differences and describes the maternal feminists' conception of a woman citizen as a loving being devoted to the protection of vulnerable human life and to making the virtues of mothering the template for a new, more humane public world.34

If this ideological cleavage were restricted to today's feminists, it would hardly bear mention. But our authors show that disagreement

about the nature of male and female produces strange political coalitions among contemporary women. In debates about pornography, maternity leave, and custody of children, feminists who emphasize gender differences and social conservatives of the New Right take similar positions, although they disagree on the appropriate sphere for women's activities. Egalitarian feminists and New Right economic conservatives are aligned on equal rights and personal choice, even though they disagree about the appropriate role for government (Klatch, this volume).

Not surprisingly, given these ideological disagreements as well as important differences in class, region, and ethnicity, women have rarely voted as a bloc, supported female candidates in proportions greater than men, or pushed a consensual women's agenda (Cott and Sears and Huddy, this volume). *Particular* groupings of women have acted collectively to advance goals they have defined as their interests as women. The woman suffrage movement is the most spectacular example (but even it included large organizations—the NAWSA and the CU—which disagreed deeply about method and distrusted and sometimes dismissed each other's actions). Others include the Women's Joint Congressional Committee's support for the Sheppard-Towner and Cable Acts, the broad coalition supporting ratification of the ERA in the 1970s and 1980s, and the coalition of feminists and antifeminist social conservatives in Women Against Pornography. But overall, women have never been a single interest group.

At first glance, alternation appears to characterize the relationship between the ideologies emphasizing gender differences and similarities. However, history does not repeat itself in a simple fashion. The dominance of one ideology over the other has changed with demographic,

economic, and political transformations.

The nineteenth century consolidation of industrial capitalism and greater separation of home and of work fostered a domestic culture for middle-class women. Less advantaged women worked outside the home, but their jobs were generally segregated from those of men. The rising influence of political parties between 1840 and the end of the century furthered separation between men and women (Lebsock, this volume). Increasingly, powerful parties became the political channel for white men. Disfranchised women generally invested their energies in a range of voluntary activities. Middle-class women, in particular, found an outlet for their newly acquired advanced education and greater leisure in voluntarism. (Black men's hard-won enfranchisement was essentially destroyed by laws passed in southern legislatures in the 1880s and 1890s. From that period into the twentieth century, black men and women formed independent political organizations, protested against

lynching, and worked for political rights.) At the end of the nineteenth century, an ideology emphasizing biological differences fit the nation's overall political conservatism. For some of its supporters, this ideology reflected and justified the structural separation of men and women, of blacks and whites, and of immigrants and native-born persons in the late nineteenth century economy and political system. Some adherents of a woman-centered ideology were not simply conservative, however. Progressive social reformers also stressed gender differences and advocated protective legislation for women and children because they believed that these groups in particular were vulnerable victims of capitalism.

The balance shifted after the middle of the twentieth century as a consequence of demographic, political, and economic changes: lowered fertility rates; increased employment of women; growth in number of households, especially those headed by women; and increased integration of women and men in political institutions. The political and social unrest associated with the civil rights, antiwar, and women's movements in the 1960s and 1970s led many Americans to question the justice of social constraints on individuals, including rigid gender roles and presumed differences between men and women. Separate spheres for men and women had been characteristic of the nineteenth century social structure and integrated spheres more characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century social structure.³⁵ The reemergence of womancentered feminist theories and reassertion of customary gender roles and family values among social conservatives in the 1980s, however, demonstrate a continuing vacillation between the ideologies that divide women politically. Nonetheless, equality of rights is now broadly institutionalized and buttressed by law. It is unlikely that the ideology of difference will again dominate women's politics in the form that it did at the turn of the century because men and women are now much more integrated in the economy and in political institutions.

Other ideological disagreements also separate women. Some are loyal Republicans; others are loyal Democrats or Independents. Some define themselves as conservatives and subscribe to an individualistic, antigovernment ideology; others call themselves liberals and favor redistributive policies and a strong national government. Our authors who analyze *contemporary* party and electoral politics find that (1) the distribution of liberal and conservative beliefs among women is nearly identical to the distribution among men; (2) partisanship and liberal-conservative identification are the best predictors of the policy positions preferred by both men and women; (3) male and female delegates to each party's

presidential nominating conventions have more in common politically than do female Republican and Democratic delegates (Jennings, this volume); and (4) men and women hold remarkably similar attitudes about gender roles (Sears and Huddy, this volume). There have been deep-seated historical attitudinal changes, but men and women have changed together. ³⁶ With the exception of attitudes toward war and violence, they have held similar political attitudes ever since the polls began monitoring public attitudes in the 1930s, and on most issues they agree now even more than they did earlier.³⁷ Historical and structural factors undergird the ideological similarities between men and women. Men and women have become more integrated into political and economic life. Both groups are also more educated now than they were earlier. Women have achieved virtual equality with men in access to education, and this has been accompanied by a shared shift in attitudes. With similar attitudes and similar relationships to the economy and polity, it is no wonder that men in the public at large support women's issues in proportions not dissimilar to women. Women predominate, however, among the activists for gender equality. Finally, ideological similarity between men and women has been preserved because the structure of gender relations has changed little. The interdependence of married men and women and parents and children of both sexes within the family has remained strong even as divorce has increased. Men and women have reacted similarly to the economic, political, and cultural changes in the twentieth century because they are still so closely connected and in many ways share similar structural situations.

Three factors then have created and maintained divisions among women: (1) increasing structural integration of men and women; (2) continuing embeddedness of families within ethnic groups, social classes, and religious communities; and (3) the physical segregation of blacks and whites, different ethnic groups, and social classes. Husbands and wives and parents and children share gains and losses as members of racial, ethnic, and regional groups and social classes. Because women rarely interact as equals with women of different social groups, they have difficulty making their gender and common experiences as wives, mothers, and daughters a basis for political solidarity. (Nor do men often interact as equals across class lines.) Not surprisingly, our authors and other historians have documented class, ethnic, and racial divisions in many different forms of women's politics: the woman suffrage movement and the club movement (Lebsock, Cott, and Higginbotham, this volume); the Socialist movement, in which immigrant women accepted women's customary family roles and native-born women pressed Social-

ist organizations to work for gender equality;³⁸ political parties in which black women encountered racism from white women and white men (Higginbotham, this volume); nonpartisan political organizations (Ware, this volume); and labor organizations (Lebsock, Hewitt, Jones, and Milkman, this volume). The National Women's Trade Union League, active at the turn of the century, was eventually weakened by class and ethnic disagreements, and racism broke the fleeting class solidarity of women in the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union in the 1930s. However, our authors also highlight moments of interracial, cross-class, and interethnic cooperation. Particular chapters of the NAWSA purposely designed different instrumental appeals to black and white women and other distinct groups of women. The Commission on Interracial Cooperation and the YWCA attained sporadic cooperation across racial lines (Cott and Lebsock, this volume). These historical examples demonstrate that women can achieve political solidarity when their organizations and leaders deliberately pursue strategies to reach women in different social circumstances.

The structural integration of men and women is thus a potential political liability for gender-solidarity-based politics. Women have been less able than blacks and some ethnic groups to mobilize group bonds in social movements and in collective action within electoral and party politics. Nevertheless, gender integration can be a political asset for women in forging alliances and exacting support from powerful men in government and in the private sector. Thus, while the structure of gender relations may inhibit the development of female solidarity, at the same time it provides a political mechanism (less available to blacks and most ethnic minorities) that capitalizes on coalitions and consensus between the sexes.

Forms of Women's Politics

Another apparent continuity in women's politics is the importance of voluntary group involvement outside parties. From the early nineteenth century to the present, women have joined and worked for change through voluntary associations, most often without explicitly partisan goals. In this activity, they pioneered the typically twentieth century political strategy of interest group politics (Lebsock and Cott, this volume). A less salutary continuity that accompanies this type of associationism is the pattern of lesser resources in women's organizations. Cott concludes that in the 1920s men's lobbying organizations had economic clout that women's organizations lacked; Schlozman shows that women's pressure groups still have fewer economic resources than others;

and Jennings demonstrates that even among party elites, a gender disparity in access to political resources continues.

Nonpartisan organizations have continued to be a vehicle for women's politics, but the degree of organization, links with other groups, and cooperation have increased (Cott, Ware, and Schlozman, this volume). The Women's Joint Congressional Committee was promptly established as a Capitol Hill clearinghouse and lobby once women gained the suffrage (Cott, this volume). Women are now part of the professional lobbying community (Schlozman, this volume). They are sufficiently integrated in party structures that they can press women's issues in that context (Jennings and Mansbridge, this volume). Further, Jennings shows that women convention delegates, although still more likely to be in women's organizations (especially school and teacher-related ones), are increasingly affiliated with gender-integrated labor organizations, service clubs, and professional groups.

Other changes in the forms of women's politics are also noted by our authors. The distinctiveness of women's politics has waned with their integration in political and economic life, although Knoke (this volume) finds that contemporary women's pressure groups are much more democratic and their members more active than are other groups lobbying in Washington. Although women continue to be active in nonpartisan organizations, these organizations are themselves transformed. They now move in the channels of conventional politics, at least that part of it represented by interest groups. Subsets of women still pursue their perceived interests, but their method is now subsumed in that of others. Some of the new forms of political action have been built on more complex networks and coalitions (Hewitt, this volume); others have involved new types of organizations and militance as workers (Milkman, this volume). In the 1970s and 1980s women's access to political power increased. Relations between feminist organizations and congressional staffs have moved closer, and women lawyers have developed the skills to advocate feminist issues in the legal system (Schlozman and Freeman, this volume). Schlozman also demonstrates that the women's voluntary organizations of the 1980s are more likely to work through a professionally staffed pressure group organization than by mass mobilization of their members.

Women's participation in electoral politics has increased dramatically. The increase has come in voting and officeholding (Andersen and Ware, this volume) and within political parties (Jennings, this volume). Although Higginbotham (this volume) examines black women's politics primarily in the 1920s, she looks also to the great change in party allegiance in the 1930s which brought black women into a much more

active position in political movements seeking the economic and social improvement of blacks. Jones (this volume) discerns many precedents for black women's resistance to southern white supremacy in earlier activism; hence she interprets their militancy in civil rights as a change in degree, not in kind.

Women's organizations have become part of the Washington pressure group community. Although the ratification of the ERA failed, women were an effective political force on this issue in a large majority of the states. Although separate women's institutions had a major effect in nineteenth century women's politics on issues like temperance and suffrage, integrated organizations have become more common in the twentieth century (Lebsock, Andersen, and Faue, this volume). The proportions of women who participate in politics through gender-integrated institutions have grown enormously. Further, women's authority and power in integrated institutions (the cases discussed in this volume are unions and political parties) have increased (Milkman and Jennings, this volume).

In brief, in the areas of ideology, interests, and organizations a combination of continuity and change best describes the course of women's

politics in the twentieth century.

Women's Politics in the United States, 1890-1980

The chapters in this volume cover a wide range of topics and a long arc of time. Part II illustrates the fluid boundaries between protopolitics and politics, as well as the continuing pattern of voluntarism in women's politics. Electoral politics, broadly conceived, is the topic of Part III. Part IV examines continuities and discontinuities in women's voluntarism, and Part V examines the politicization of gender. Part VI constitutes an

epilogue to the volume.

These chapters emerged from three workshops that provided social historians, political scientists, sociologists, and a psychologist and anthropologist or two with a cross-disciplinary opportunity to consider problems and issues in women's relationship to politics. Despite lively interchange and commitment to the value of integrating perspectives found in the different social sciences, with few exceptions the participants produced chapters that follow the methodologies and assumptions of their own disciplines. Particular chapters in the collection will, therefore, appeal more to one audience than another. The case studies will be more attractive to social historians and anthropologists and the quantitative and survey studies to political scientists and other social

scientists. We hope that the presence of widely ranging approaches and topics within a single volume, however, will entice some readers to cross boundaries and sample the unfamiliar.

This book should be viewed as a set of case examples of how twentieth century American women have participated in politics. These cases are not organized by periods, however, because continuities and changes do not fit into distinct periods. Nor is there one chapter that delineates the many ideological controversies within contemporary feminism or one that focuses exclusively on the modern women's movement. Instead, these topics are covered by several of our authors as they focus on voluntarism, electoral politics, or the politicization of gender. Readers will find that our authors are not of one mind about the meaning of feminism or the significance of the women's movement, and especially about the broad definition of politics that we, the editors, have taken. And one or two authors stretch the definition further than we do. This is a book that permits, indeed sets out to include, many points of view. The selection of the workshop participants, of course, shaped the content of the book and resulted in omissions that in hindsight we regret. In particular, no chapter examines women in the national government bureaucracy that grew substantially over the twentieth century, and there is only limited coverage of women in political movements on the left. The book's emphasis on the increasing integration of men and women in political institutions may also partially reflect the authors who were selected for this project. Some scholars would stress more than our authors the importance of separate institutions, although separate women's organizations are fewer in number and appeal to proportionately fewer women than was true at the turn of the century. As with any set of case examples, these chapters do not exhaust either the topics or theoretical approaches that could be incorporated in a study of women, politics, and change. We believe, however, that their emphasis upon structural and historical factors and their attention to the construction of gender are unique in the growing literature on women and politics.

Collectively these chapters demonstrate that women's political history is not an evolutionary phenomenon in which one model supplants another in stages. Our authors do not argue that older forms of women's politics were supplanted by newer or more modern forms after woman suffrage was won. Instead, protopolitical forms persisted as the range of political acts widened and became increasingly formalized in organizations after suffrage opened party and electoral politics to women. Similarity to turn-of-the-century bases and forms is apparent, for example, in the nonhierarchical, democratic structure and consciousness-raising

techniques of one branch of the contemporary women's movement. To this day, women's lobbying organizations are less hierarchical in structure and offer a broader range of incentives than do other pressure groups (Knoke, this volume).

Similar patterns observed in women's political history are not evidence that history repeats itself. Even when circumstances in a general way are similar, as in the case of the nineteenth century (1840s–1860s), the early twentieth century (1890s–1920s), and the contemporary women's movements—all three cases came in a period in which there were other movements and groups challenging and making claims on the state and other institutions—the relationship of past and present is complex. Each historical moment is unique, but it is also the product of short- and longer-term processes of change. The past shapes and limits the present; it also structures the circumstances that offer possibilities to historical actors at any moment. To protopolitical forms have been added more institutionalized forms, as parts of an expanded repertoire of activities and of national and local organizations.

Change, then, also characterizes the "long" twentieth century examined by our authors. Three broad changes are demonstrated in the chapters in this book: (1) economic opportunities for women have increased greatly; (2) equality in men's and women's legal status is greater now than ever before; and (3) women and men are now more fully, though not completely, integrated in politics and the economy. There has been a distinctive women's politics, as women have fought for political incorporation over the twentieth century. Nevertheless, women's politics is now less different from men's politics than it was at the turn of the century. Women's politics is now characterized by *general* patterns of citizenship and participation.

Notes

- 1. Quoted in Buhle and Buhle (1978), pp. 325-326.
- 2. For contemporary critiques, see Bourque and Grossholtz (1974); Goot and Reid (1975); Keohane (1981); Sapiro (1979). For a historical critique, see Baker (1984).
- 3. Easton (1971), p. 129.
- 4. Verba and Nie (1972), p. 29.
- 5. Verba and Nie (1972), p. 3.
- 6. Quoted in Peattie and Rein (1983), p. 80.
- 7. Gamson (1975), p. 19.

- 8. Tilly (1981), p. 17.
- 9. Gamson (1975), p. 19.
- 10. Gamson (1975), p. 19.
- 11. See Peattie and Rein (1983). Charles Tilly (1986) defines a social movement as a "sustained challenge on behalf of an unrepresented constituency" (p. 174).
- 12. Countryman (1981), pp. 182-183.
- 13. Frank (1985).
- 14. Tocqueville (1947), pt. 2, p. 331.
- 15. Ryan (1981), pp. 106, 105-144.
- 16. Hewlett (1986); DuBois (1978), p. 184.
- 17. Scott and Scott (1982), pp. 20-21.
- 18. On repertoires, see C. Tilly (1986).
- 19. Freeman (1979), pp. 168-179.
- 20. Skowronek (1982), p. 27.
- 21. Cott (1987), pp. 101-102.
- 22. Quoted in Cott (1987), p. 102.
- 23. Cott (1987), p. 98.
- 24. DuBois (1978), pp. 184-185.
- 25. Kessler-Harris (1985a), p. 145.
- 26. Hewitt (1986).
- 27. Cott (1987), pp. 19-20.
- 28. Also see Kessler-Harris (1985b).
- 29. Also see Mansbridge (1986).
- 30. Gertzog (1984).
- 31. Elshtain (1982). For another maternalist view, see Ruddick (1980).
- 32. Kessler-Harris (1985a), p. 157.
- 33. The maternal feminists draw heavily upon the psychoanalytic object-relations theory of Chodorow (1978) and the moral development theory of Gilligan (1982). The contemporary expression of the other side of the controversy draws from sociological theory and from a different school of psychoanalysis associated with the French theorist Jacques Lacan. In this view, gender identity is continually redefined and socially constructed in different contexts. See Conway, Bourque, and Scott (1987), p. xxiv; Epstein (1988).
- 34. Dietz (1987), p. 11. For an earlier statement of the maternal view, see Charlotte Perkins Gilman Stetson (1979).
- 35. See Freedman (1979) for a historical analysis of separatism in women's politics. She credits the strength of separate female institutions with political gains won up to suffrage and the subsequent decline of feminism to integration (p. 254).

- 36. These structural changes that produced the shift in role attitudes were not distributed evenly across all Americans. Their impact was felt less by members of conservative than of liberal organizations and less by older than younger people, but this was true among both men and women. See Wuthnow, this volume; Thornton and Freedman (1979); Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn (1983).
- 37. Sears and Huddy (this volume); Shapiro and Mahajan (1986); Gurin (1985); Thornton and Freedman (1979); Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn (1983).
- 38. Buhle (1981).