

Working Paper

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Working Hours and Inequality, 1968-2001: A Family Perspective on Recent Controversies

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ABSTRACT

Debates about working hours elide the number of hours the average person spends on the job with the number of hours the average *employed* person spends on the job. Among married couples, the workweek of the average person increased by 8 hours while the workweek of the employed person increased by 2.5 hours between 1975 and 2001. Rising employment among married women produced the difference. We document workweek trends of all married persons and employed married persons and show how they affected (a) total family work hours, (b) family income inequality, and (c) Americans' attitudes toward work. We also compare married couples with other household types and find that age and education have replaced gender and marital status as the main influences on paid work time.

OVERVIEW

Scholars and journalists have debated – for over a decade now – the extent to which work commitments are squeezing American families. In *The Overworked American* (1991), Juliet Schor claimed that Americans were spending more time at paid work in the late 1980s than they had been in the late 1960s. Using government statistics she estimated that total annual work time grew by 163 hours per year between 1969 and 1987. Both women and men worked longer hours, but women worked 300 hours more in 1987 than in 1969 while men worked almost 100 hours more. Schor's calculations proved to be controversial. No piece of her argument is unchallenged today. Critics question the main conclusion; many claim that working hours are actually decreasing. Some who think that Americans are working less have questioned the veracity of workers' reports of their hours; others have noted the trend is a complicated combination of changing hours at work per week and weeks at work per year. Finally both sides of the argument have shown that people in different family types and at different stages of the life cycle work more or fewer hours as befits their circumstances, raising the prospect that work could be increasing for some kinds of people but decreasing for people in other circumstances.

For all the controversy, neither side has worked through the implications of rising women's labor force participation for the debates. As far as we can tell, all of the scholars who have participated in these debates are fully aware of women's employment trends, but nobody has figured out how to incorporate it in their analysis. The standard practice is to address working hours by calculating the hours that employees spend at paid work (some researchers include the self-employed and some exclude farmers and agricultural workers). That standard practice is correct as far as it goes, but it is less than ideal for the present purpose because it misses the hours new entrants add to the labor force. A specific example reveals its shortcomings. Think of a married-couple family made up of a stay-at-home mother, a breadwinner father, and their children. Suppose now that the mother decides to look for a job, finds one, and

starts to work at it. For the sake of argument, let us say that the number of hours she works at her new job precisely equals the national average for women her age. From the family's point of view, life has changed. They now have two working adults with all that entails in the way of coordination, childcare issues, and the like. Yet as the newly minted working mother puts in an average number of hours, her experience of dramatic change will not show up in the statistics as Schor and her critics figure them. In taking her new job, the mother in question added an average amount to the sum of hours worked by everybody in the country. As she would also be tallied in the number of workers, the average itself would stay exactly what it was before she took the job. Had she taken a part-time job, she could have actually lowered the average as calculated by standard methods by adding less than the average to the numerator but a whole case to the denominator.

If instead of excluding her until she took a job, the researcher tallied the stay-at-home mother as "working" zero hours in the paid workforce, her absence from the labor force would register and hold down the average. Then when she moved into the paid labor force, her presence would be noted as an increase in the total number of hours mothers were spending at paid work, and the national average would go up. Likewise should the breadwinner father retire (or leave the labor force for any reason), our method would register his change of status as a drop from positive hours to none – a drop that would show up as a small decline in the national average. Standard practice would remove him from the calculation.

Our small accounting shift dramatically alters the statistics of working families and the terms of the working hours debate.¹ The terms of debate get even clearer if we

¹ We are not the first researchers to note the increase in women's labor force participation, of course. It is a commonplace observation regarding how American gender roles have shifted over the 20th century. At the time we began this work, though, nobody else had picked up on the connection to the overworked American debates. Schor herself makes some reference to more working wives (and she is right to note that mothers and other wives both increased their participation in the labor force), but she mentions it to give weight to her universal calculations not to frame her case. And she does not integrate labor force trends in her calculations in the way we do. Rones, Ilg, and Gardner (1997) and Cohen and Bianchi (1999) include women out of the labor force in some of their calculations, but they do not link their

shift focus away from the labor supply of individuals in the labor force and put it on the labor supply of families. As we shall show here, the family data show a clear upward trend in paid work time for married-couple families in which the adults were between 25 and 54 years old; our focus is on them. Younger adults (18 to 24 year-olds) worked less in recent years than young adults did in the 1960s – they are staying in school longer – and older adults, especially the 55-64 year-old men, are working less than men their age used to – they are retiring at younger ages. We will revisit these age groups at the end of our analysis.

A family focus clarifies the ways in which the various trends come together to put some families in a time bind while freeing others. Husbands and wives do not choose their work schedules in a vacuum. They consult one another, work around one another, and use work to redress the grievances they have with one another (Hochschild 1997). If that is the way the world is, then research that ignores the ties between husbands and wives is misleading. Our family focus lets us factor together growing wives' labor force participation and (modestly) growing working hours of workers. It also gives us a perspective on the correlation between husbands' and wives' hours. Many couples retire at about the same time (which is usually a younger age for the wife than for the husband). That results in some families working far less than they used to. The simple math of modest growth in working hours in the presence of radically reduced hours for some families implies an offsetting increase for other families. This element of the current situation is hidden from the researchers who focus exclusively on people who are currently employed and look at men and women as unconnected individuals. We are not the first researchers to notice that we learn more from studying people by looking at the people they are linked to, of course, but the evidence we present here is new.

results to the overwork debates. Jacobs and Gerson (2001) share our perspective, but they treat the data in the standard way. Mishel et al. (2001) present family hours calculations that appear to involve the equivalent of giving people who are out of the labor force zeros, but we cannot be sure of their procedures as they do not give the details.

For most of this article, we limit our attention to two types of families: married-couple families with and without children present. Married-couple families are our primary interest because they are the ones in which individuals are most clearly linked to one another and because much of the overwork controversy addresses them explicitly. After our full analysis of married-couple families, we turn to the working hours of adults in other types of families.

To this point we have addressed previous research and our own in broad generalities. In the next section we discuss previous research in some detail. Then we present our original results for married couple families and discuss how the trends we identify contribute to the growing inequality of family income. Then, more briefly, present work trends of adults in other types of families. In the last empirical section we use subjective data to interrogate the link between hours at work and the interpretation of it as “overwork.”

THE OVERWORK CONTROVERSY

Schor (1991) touched off a controversy when she presented evidence that Americans were working more hours and interpreted it as symptomatic of “overwork.” Schor calculated the number of hours worked in a year by multiplying reports of the number of hours worked last week by the number of weeks worked last year. The first term – hours last week – shows little or no change between 1969 and 1987. The action is in the other term: working Americans, especially working women, were on-the-job more weeks per year in the late 1980s than they had been 18 years earlier. Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmidt (2001) used data from the 1990s to calculate the annual work hours of people 25-54 years old and found even more substantial increases in annual hours worked. They also found that women increased their hours more than men did. Their net estimate was that mothers’ and fathers’ combined hours increased 350 hours between 1979 and 1999 (twice Schor’s estimate of 163 for all workers from 1969 to 1987).

Critics fault one or both of the measures that Schor and Mishel et al. combined to estimate annual hours worked. (1) The question about the number of weeks worked –

the one at root of the trend – is not matched to the one about hours worked; one refers to last week and the other to last year (Jacobs and Gerson 2001). (2) Men who had positive hours in the week before the interview and positive earnings in the year before the interview actually worked slightly fewer hours in 1987 than in 1969 (Coleman and Pencavel 1993). Schor adjusted her data “for unemployment and underemployment” (p. xxx); Coleman and Pencavel speculate that her unspecified adjustments turned apparent decline into reported increase.² (3) Time diaries show much less work time on the sampled day (Robinson and Godbey 1997), and the gap between the CPS question and the hours logged in time diaries was bigger in 1985 than twenty years earlier – suggesting that some and maybe all of the trend should be attributed to peoples’ growing tendency to exaggerate how much they worked, not to increases in actual work. The comparison between recollections about last week and time diaries would be a knock-out punch for Schor’s thesis – and all analyses based on CPS data – if the diary data stand up to scrutiny. We do not think that they do. The 1985 sample contains a higher fraction of respondents over 60 years old than the 1965 sample did (even after restricting attention to 18-64 year olds the data contain a higher fraction “retired” than the March 1985 CPS does). The 1985 data includes summer (vacation) months while the 1965 sample was restricted to the autumn of that year. Either or both of these factors could contribute to the way discrepancies between work hours tabulated by diaries and the CPS question widened between 1965 and 1985.

Robinson and Godbey’s most compelling critique, though, has nothing to do with change over time. It is their comparison of their respondents’ answers to the standard question about how many hours were worked last week with the work hours logged in the time diaries. They found that, on average, people recall working more hours last week than they record in their time diaries. Robinson and Godbey called the difference between the two estimates of working hours “the gap.” They emphasized how the gap

² Male unemployment was 5.2 percent in 1987 compared with 3.1 percent in 1969, so if her adjustments took the form of statistically replacing weeks lost to unemployment, they presumably boosted hours more in the later than in the early year. We are not saying that we have uncovered Schor’s adjustment, just suggesting how a reasonable correction might be behind her number.

rises with hours recalled, i.e., it is greatest for people who recalled working more than 42 hours in the week before the interview, and referred to the gap as “exaggeration” in their summary.

Our reanalysis of their data, however, indicates that the exaggeration originates with Robinson and Godbey, not in their data (see Appendix A). The gap emerges on the weekend. People who said that they worked 35 to 49 hours the week before they filled in the diary recorded 6 or more hours in their time diary if they kept a diary on a weekday; they recorded a couple of hours at most if they kept a diary on a weekend day. This is hardly surprising. It is certainly not a reason to discard the CPS question about hours last week and go to the far more expensive time diary approach.

The overworked American thesis has critics who use the standard approach, too. McGrattan and Rogerson (1998) drew on census and CPS data from 1950 to 1990 and estimate that the average employee’s workweek declined from 41 hours in 1950 to 37 in 1990 while employment increased from 52 percent in 1950 to 61 percent in 1990. The real story, they argue, was a shift during this period in the allocation of work hours from men to women, from older to younger workers, and from single to married workers. They analyzed average weekly hours worked per person by gender, marital status, and age. They also presented the results of a cohort/life cycle analysis which showed that, on average, later cohorts were working significantly fewer hours per week once they had reached the age of 65 years, and moderately fewer hours at younger ages. For the employed male population, there has been a significant drop from early to later cohorts in labor force participation after age 55, a mild decrease for middle-aged workers, and an increase for young workers (15-24 years old). They note the sharp increase in paid employment for women at all ages except the very oldest (over 75 years of age). The upshot is less differentiation in work by gender and marital status and more by age. This is a crucial point that we will return to in our own analysis.

DATA

Most of our original analyses use the Current Population Survey, a nationally representative sample of households interviewed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to estimate the unemployment rate each month. We use the annual demographic supplement data collected each March because it offers the longest times series: 1968 through 2001. The base sample includes between 40,000 and 60,000 households. We restrict attention to married couple households in which both the husband and wife are at least 25 years old but less than 55 years old. Even with this restriction these are extremely large samples – over 29,000 observations in most calculations. Thus the margin of error in estimating labor force participation is less than plus or minus 0.3 percentage points and the margin of error in estimating the mean number of hours worked is less than plus or minus 1 hour per week.³

We analyze the answers to two questions about the husband's and wife's activities last week: (1) whether the principal activity was working, looking for work, going to school, keeping house, retirement, or other activities, and (2) for those who were working, hours at paid work last week.⁴ The second question is the same one that Robinson and Godbey (1997) criticized as over-estimating peoples' work effort. We think that our reanalysis of their data (see the appendix) makes clear that the answers to these questions are reliable enough to give us an accurate account of Americans' changing working hours.

After documenting trends in employment and hours at paid work, we examine data from the General Social Survey (GSS) on Americans' attitudes toward work. The GSS is a nationally representative sample of English-speaking adults living in households. It has been on-going as an annual or biennial survey since 1972. Like the CPS, the GSS samples households. But the GSS then randomly selects one of the

³ The figures refer to sampling errors; other errors cannot be quantified with the data available.

⁴ The CPS interviews one person from the household who reports on all workers in the household. Thus some of our data is from the worker in question; other data is from another adult in his or her household. We cannot restrict attention to respondents because the CPS does not draw them randomly from within the sampled household.

adults in the sampled household to be the respondent. Details are on the GSS website (www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss), but a key fact to bear in mind is the high response rate – 77 percent throughout the period from 1973 to 2000.⁵

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

Wives' labor force participation has increased dramatically since 1968; Figure 1 shows precisely how much so for wives who had children present in their household (●), other married women (o), husbands with children (+), and other married men (x).⁶ In 1968 55 percent of 25-54 year-old married women with no children living at home were in the labor force (i.e., either working for pay or looking for paid work); by 1993, 79 percent were – a 24 percentage-point increase in labor force participation. The 1990s saw no further increases among the women without children. Married mothers nearly doubled their attachment to the labor market from 38 percent to 69 percent between the late 1960s and the early 1990s; a few more moved into paid work (or the search for it) in the 1990s, topping out (for now) at 72 percent in 2000 and 2001. The gap between married mothers and other married women shrunk from 17 to 7 percentage points. Married mothers of pre-school-age children entered the labor force even faster – climbing from 22 percent in 1968 to 63 percent in 2001 (data not shown). By the late 1990s recent mothers were more likely to be employed or looking for work than were students or seniors.

Figure 1 about here

These well-known trends have important implications for the debates about working hours. Working wives and mothers were exceptional a generation ago but common by 1990. In the early 1970s any trend in the working hours of married women in the paid labor force would have touched less than half of all families and just about half of the married-couple families in which the wife was 25-54 years old. By the late

⁵ The 1972 GSS used quota sampling methods; a response rate cannot be calculated for a quota sample.

⁶ Husbands and wives are coded as having children present if there is at least one person under 18 years old in the household who is recorded as a child or stepchild of the householder.

1990s, trends in the length of the workweek would touch three-fourths of married couple families. In fact, with this huge increase in wives' labor force participation, the sum of husbands' and wives' working hours could grow substantially even if the workweek of the average working wife decreased. If working hours for working wives were increasing at all during this time, that trend would have been compounded because it was applying to an ever-wider spectrum of families (Jacobs and Gerson 2001).

Some researchers have noted a decrease in husbands' participation in the work force. If it is limited to husbands over 55 years old, then it is beyond our view. But if husbands 25-54 years old have been withdrawing from the labor force, their lower participation could, if it were large enough, offset the growth of their wives' participation. Figure 1 shows that the married men of interest here decreased their labor force participation between the end of the 1960s and 2001 – but just barely. Over 98 percent of married men with children at home were in the labor force in the late 1960s and 96 percent of them were active in 2001; 96 percent of other married men were in the labor force in 1968 and that dropped just 4 points to 92 percent by 2001. Older and younger men were responsible for the by-now widely known decrease in men's labor force participation. Labor force participation for men less than 25 years old, 55 years old and older, and unmarried men all decreased by more than 8 percentage points between the late 1960s and the late 1990s. Some studies that have failed to differentiate among men of different ages have missed this development. But most researchers have remarked on it and incorporated age restrictions in their calculations in some way or another (e.g., Coleman and Pimentel 1996; Robinson and Godbey 1997; Casper and Bianchi 2001; Jacobs and Gerson 2001; Mishel et al. 2001).

WORKING HOURS: TWO VIEWS

We present two views of working hours in Figure 2. The conventional view calculates the hours worked by people who have jobs; our alternative view includes all persons whether or not they are working, scoring those who do not have jobs as working zero hours. The conventional view – labeled “with jobs” – is in panel A; our alternative view –

labeled “all” – is in panel B. Each panel displays four time series: husbands with children (+), other married men (x), wives with children (●), and other married women (o). We have added gray vertical stripes to the charts to show recession years. We expect working hours of all married persons (panel B) to drop during recessions as layoffs reduce the average.⁷

Figure 2 about here

The conventional view reproduces the conventional (puzzling) findings. Men worked the same number of hours – 45 – throughout the 33 year span, whether they had children or not. Working women increased their workweek by a very modest 2 hours a week, closing the gender gap just a little. Mothers and wives with no children at home each increased their work by that amount; mothers from 32 to 34 hours per week, other wives from 37 to 39 hours per week. From this chart it is easy to see how Schor’s critics have made their case. Indeed, even Schor’s data show the same anemic trend in weekly hours; recall that her case rests on more weeks per year for married women.

Panel B makes our case that the conventional view misses the action. By bringing the labor force participation trends into the calculation, we see why so many women think that they are spending more time on paid work than they used to – and more than their mothers did at a comparable age. They are.

The paid work time of the average married mother doubled from 12 to 24 hours per week; time on the job for other wives increased almost as much – from 19 to 29 hours per week. Husbands’ hours reflect the ebb and flow of the business cycle over the past 33 years. Husbands worked fewer hours through the stagflation years of the late 1970s and early 1980s when recessions coupled with inflation to weaken the American economy and reduced demand for men’s labor. They built up their hours through the recovery years of 1980s, but fell back again as a new recession struck them in 1990. Husbands’ hours rose again through the Clinton years, only to drop by an hour per

⁷ The conventional approach excludes the unemployed so hours worked in recessions tend to be equal (and occasionally greater than) hours worked in periods of economic growth. Our approach includes the zero hours worked by the unemployed and records the associated dips in hours worked.

week when the economy lapsed into recession in March 2001. Of course, recessions would be fairer if every man shared the recession experience and lost an average number of hours per week. But in the real world that one-hour drop typical of the 1990-91 and 2001-02 recessions comes less often from the elimination of overtime and other cutbacks in hours and more often from layoffs that reduce some men's hours to zero while leaving other men's untouched. The evidence that layoffs predominate is the difference between panels A and B. The conventional view (panel A) misses the business-cycle fluctuations; our view registers their missed hours by scoring unemployed persons as working zero hours.

So the first payoff to how we approach working hours – including all potential workers in the calculations whether they currently have a job or not – is realized here when we can see the impact of both increased wives' labor force participation on their paid working hours and economic recessions on husbands' hours. We do not register any impact of recessions on wives' hours for two reasons; women's unemployment rate is typically less than men's and the reduced hours some women experience in recession is offset by the entry of laid-off men's wives into the labor market.

FAMILY HOURS

“Overwork” and “time bind” are family experiences built out of the working hours of family members. So the combined hours worked by husbands and wives are more relevant to the controversies than individual hours are. Did families average more hours on the job in the 1990s than in the late 1960s? They did (see Figure 3). In families without children, husbands and wives combined to put in a 58-hour workweek in 1968 and a 68-hour workweek in 2000 (before losing half an hour as the 2001-02 recession set in); in families with children the parents combined for a 53-hour workweek in 1968 and a 64-hour workweek in 2000 (they, too, lost half an hour in the current recession). The low-point for combined hours was the trough of the 1973-75 recession when combined hours sagged to 56 hours for families without children and 51 hours for families with children. Thus the trough-to-peak comparison pegs the increase in working

hours at between 12 and 13 hours per married-couple family: parents spent an additional 13 hours at work in 2000 than their counterparts from 1975 had, and adults in other kinds of married-couple families worked an additional 12 hours.

Figure 3 about here

This view should resolve the controversy over why family workers feel a time bind but objective statistics cannot find it. Most previous calculations have looked at the working hours of workers.⁸ Parsing a complex question into simpler subparts is essential in a causal analysis, but the workweek controversy does not turn on the causes of individual behavior but on the complex patterns as families experience them. As such, descriptive statistics that reveal those patterns are the appropriate ones. In particular, we get the true read on work as families experienced it in the last third of the 20th century by looking at the data that combines the full working experience in a single time series that melds the labor force participation and work hours of workers – as in Figure 3.

HOURS AND INEQUALITY

The incentives and opportunities that opened up the labor force for women over the last quarter of the 20th century were not equally available to all American women. Education played an important role. In the first half of the twentieth century, women who were married to highly educated men had less incentive to join the paid workforce than other women did. Beginning in the 1950s, though, their husbands' educations became less of a factor in their working patterns (Waite 1976). Whether that was because husbands' incomes became less reliable as divorce rose or some other change in women's orientations is not clear. But the trend has continued – as we will show. Meanwhile, wives' own educations remained an important incentive to work (Coleman and Pencavel 1993b). The trends were accelerated by employers' preferences for college-educated workers. By the late 1990s the gap between the working hours of college graduates and

⁸ Rones, Ilg, and Gardner (1997) compare workers' hours with "population based" working hours. Mishel et al. (2001) report family hours.

high school dropouts was wider than ever. This divergence of the working hours available to highly educated and less educated women combined with growing wage differences that also favored the college graduates to boost the inequality of family incomes. We break this chain of trends into three parts: trends in wives hours at work, trends in families total work hours, and trends in family incomes.

In the previous section we showed how the trends in families' work hours are driven by trends in wives' hours at paid work. While many factors influence which women seek paid employment and how much time employed women spend working, few are as pervasive or potentially important as her education. From the earliest studies of women's labor force participation (e.g., Cain 1966; Bowen and Finegan 1969; Sweet 1972; Waite 1976), researchers have emphasized the way mates' educations can substitute for one another as people make decisions about their joint work effort. Highly educated women have better labor market prospects and an incentive to try to reap the rewards of their investment in education. Women with highly educated husbands have less need to work – as long as their man has an income commensurate with his education. As the gender gap in pay has shrunk and marriage has become less certain, the effect of her husband's education on the wife's labor force commitment has shrunk (Cohen and Bianchi 1999; McCall 2000).

The husband's and the wife's education cannot be studied in isolation because we expect bigger effects of wife's education among the wives of college graduates and because the correlation between spouses' educations has increased. From the 1940s to the 1990s, men who had not completed high school became increasingly likely to marry women with low education; women who have college degrees grew increasingly likely to marry men with high education (Mare 1991). As a consequence, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the wives with college degrees have husbands with higher earnings than did college-educated wives in the past.

Figure 4 shows how spouses' educations combine to influence trends in working hours. The generalization that wives' work commitments rise with their own education

and fall as their husbands' educations rise is borne out. But it presents a rather incomplete summary of the real changes in women's working hours. Wives' own educations have become more important for their working hours and their spouses' educations have become less important – continuing the trend first identified by Waite (1976). In every year the few college-educated women who were married to men with incomplete high school educations worked the most hours. Since the recession of the early 1980s ended, the least-educated women who were also married to least-educated men worked least. Thus, their own educations matter most to the wives of men with no diploma. The labor market hours of high-school-educated women have grown faster than those of less- or more-educated women. Finally, in 1968, the work hours of college-educated wives fell by 5 hours as their husband's educations rose from no diploma to high school diploma and a further 9 hours as it rose to college degree (a full range of 14 hours). After 1992 the range was just 5 hours.

Figure 4 about here

We turn now to family hours, i.e., the husband's and the wife's hours combined (see Figure 5). The wife's education leveled differences among working families in the late 1960s; it now amplifies them. The difference between the extremes – between families in which both husband and wife dropped out of high school or both graduated from college – was just 7 hours in 1968; it grew to 25 hours by 1995 before the recent recovery of working hours among the least educated families reduced the gap somewhat to 20 hours in 2001 (still 2.9 times greater than the gap in the late 1960s). The families in which either one spouse or both left high school without a diploma worked fewer hours in 1980 (and afterwards) than they had in 1970. The decline was sharpest and lasted longest for the least educated families – the ones in which neither spouse had a diploma. Their combined hours fell steadily for 20 years – from 1968 to 1988 – and dipped most during the 1981-82 recession and again during the 1990-91 recession. Only couples in which the husband was a college graduate and the wife had

a high school diploma or college degree saw their hours climb uninterrupted from 1968 to 1998; they worked slightly less in the last three years of the series than in 1998.

Figure 5 about here

These wider differences in hours worked had huge implications for economic inequality as the gap between the hourly wages of college educated workers and high school dropouts grew from 1975 to 1995 (e.g., Card and DiNardo 2001). As Costa (2000) notes, it is no longer possible to study inequality without also accounting for the way working hours contributed to those the growth in inequality. Mishel et al. (2001) infer that the average family's income would have fallen in the 1990s had its members not worked more hours than their counterparts did in the 1980s.⁹ Labor market earnings are the main source of income for nearly all of the 25-54 year-old married couples we focus on here. Thus hours at paid work are important for both the level of family income – on average – and for inequality. Growing inequality in hours combined with growing inequality in pay per hour resulted in growing inequality in pay per week. And unless there was offsetting inequality in weeks worked per year – favoring the less educated – we can expect these inequalities to have combined to increase educational differences in annual family income. That is exactly what we see in Figure 6.¹⁰

Figure 6 about here

The least educated couples saw their families' incomes fall from \$33,000 in the mid 1970s to \$23,000 in the mid 1990s.¹¹ That would be a 30 percent decline in

⁹ This conclusion depends on the inflation adjustment they made. They used the official inflation rate – CPI-U – instead of the research series.

¹⁰ The family income question on the annual demographic supplement asks about pre-tax income last year from a number of specific sources. We have converted the answers to 2000 dollars by applying the consumer price index for urban residents research series (CPI-URS). Note that the income refers to the year before the interview, so the data cover the years from 1967 to 2000, not 1968-2001. Finally, we took the natural logarithm of the adjusted incomes, calculated the mean of logged incomes for each combination of year and education, and then converted the results back to dollars by taking the antilog of the mean of logs.

¹¹ The controversy regarding whose incomes really fell over this period has drawn attention to the index used to adjust incomes for inflation (see Elwood 2000, pp. 5-8). Had we used the official inflation adjustment used in Bureau of Labor Statistics publications, the CPI-U, instead of the CPI-URS, Figure 6

standard of living if the value of public goods and services remained constant over the period. It is hard to quantify the relative contributions of improved food supply and cleaner air that improved the standard of living for people of all income categories and deteriorating public services and public safety, on the other hand, that diminished the standard of living, especially of people that rely on public services and live in high-crime neighborhoods. The family incomes of the least educated are not perfectly in-synch with the trend in their working hours. Incomes stayed steady or rose a bit through the 1970s despite falling working hours. But the downturn, once in progress, continued downward even after hours began to pick up in the late 1980s. The family incomes of the least educated did not start upward until after 1996.¹² By 2000, however, the incomes of these families had regained all that had been lost over 20 years, matching the average of non-recession years in the 1970s.

The incomes of married-couple families in which just one of the spouses had no diploma cycled downward, then upward, just as the least educated families did, but the amplitude of the cycle was lessened by the educational advantage of one of the spouses. The data reveal a symmetry that is somewhat surprising. The incomes of families in which the wife had a diploma but the husband did not were the same as the incomes of families in which the husband had a diploma but the wife did not.¹³

Families with two high school graduates increased their incomes in the late 1960s, neither lost nor gained much in the 1970s, lost some during the 1981-82 recession, gained almost \$10,000 in the mid 1980s, reached a plateau of \$50,000 per

would show a steeper decline for this group and others that lost income or barely maintained their incomes but less increase for the groups that increased their incomes.

¹² These are before-tax incomes so gains from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) – probably greatest for this educational group – do not register in these trends. The EITC was instituted in 1989 and dramatically expanded in 1993. So the pre-tax trend misses, at most 3 years of improvement. EITC provides a much bigger benefit to families with children than to families of adults, so not all families were affected equally by its expansion. Of course other tax changes, beginning in 1982, benefited the top earners, so on the whole our data on trends in pre-tax incomes understate the growing inequality between 1982 and 1995.

¹³ The rarity of the college-graduate-with-high-school-dropout combinations makes our estimates of their families' incomes imprecise, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that their incomes were also the same.

year where they stayed from 1988 through 1995, and closed out the century with a modest gain up to \$55,000. Families with one high school graduate and one college graduate followed the same time line but at income levels that were 25-to-50 percent higher. The advantage of being married to a college graduate grew over time.¹⁴

The wage advantage of college graduates combined with the burgeoning work commitment of dual-college-graduate families to increase the incomes of families in which both husband and wife graduated from college by about 65 percent.¹⁵ The increases came in two growth periods – 1980-to-1987 and 1992-to-2000. This is the only group that increased its income during the 1981-82 recession. In 2000 the incomes of dual-college-graduate families topped \$100,000.

The consequences of these trends was to double in the ratio of the incomes of the most educated families to the least educated ones from \$1.97 in 1974 to \$3.97 in 1994. After 1994 the least educated actually increased their incomes more (proportionally) than the best educated did, so the ratio fell back to \$3.54. The dollar gap continued to widen though, from \$67,000 to \$73,000.

The income trends in Figure 6 all refer to married-couple families. In general, married-couple families were well-off compared to other kinds of families. Income of individuals, single parents, and extended families all lag behind that of married-couple families (Casper and Bianchi 2000 summarize the extensive literature).

WORKING HOURS IN OTHER TYPES OF FAMILIES

We cannot undertake a thorough-going analysis of the working hours of persons in families other than married-couple households we have considered up to this point. But we can, for comparison, show married peoples' hours in next to the hours worked by people in other types of households. We distinguish three other types: primary

¹⁴ The ratio of the average income of families with a college-graduate husband and high-school graduate wife to the average income of families with two high-school graduates rose from \$1.29 to \$1.51. The ratio of incomes for families with college-graduate wives and high-school graduate husbands to those of families with two high-school graduates rose from \$1.24 to \$1.36.

¹⁵ The ratio of the average income of families with two college graduates in 2000 to the average for those families throughout the period from 1970 to 1982 is \$1.64.

individuals, single-parent households, and extended households. Primary individuals are persons living alone or in households with adults who are not their relatives.¹⁶ Single-parent households are families composed of one adult and her or his own children (and possibly other children).¹⁷ Extended households contain related adults from two or more generations and include more than just parent-child relationships. We compare the trends for men and women living in these kinds of households with those living in married-couple households with and without children in Figure 7.

Figure 7 about here

American men and women living in all types of households were working more similar hours by the end of the 1990s than they had been in the late 1960s. Early in the period, living arrangements greatly affected women's work hours. Women living as primary individuals worked far more than other women – 10 hours more than single parents, 12 hours more than wives with no children at home or women in extended families, and 18 hours more than mothers in married-couple households. Through the 1970s and 1980s, women in all these types of living arrangements dramatically increased their working hours while the hours of primary individuals increased by just one hour. The result was much less variation by family type. The rank ordering was little different. Although childless wives raced ahead of single mothers in the mid 1980s, the single mothers themselves dramatically increased their work times after 1994. Meanwhile men in each kind of family were shaving from 3 to 7 hours off their work schedules.

The upshot of these changes is that, by 2001, the variation in working hours by family type and gender was substantially less than it had been in the late 1960s. A simple model of working hours as a function of gender, household type, and interaction terms for the gender differences in working hours by household type explained almost one-third of the variance in working hours of people 25-54 years old in the earliest five-year period for which we have data – 1968-1972 (precisely, the R-squared from the

¹⁶ Some of these are couples living together (e.g., Casper and Cohen 2000).

¹⁷ Unrelated adults may be present, and some of these may also be unmarried partners. However, no relatives are allowed in this category.

regression was .314). The differences between men and women in different types of households fell steadily for 20 years so that the same model accounted for just one-ninth of the variance in the fifth five-year period – 1988-1992 (precisely, the R-squared was .109). In the most recent period – 1998-2001 – the simple model was slightly less powerful, accounting for just one-eleventh of the variance (the R-squared was .091). The diminished ability of gender and household type to account for variance in working hours is statistical confirmation of the impression from Figure 7 that working hours are converging for men and women and among household types.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the increased concentration of work into the age range we have focused on – the ages from 25 to 54 years – means that age, or more decidedly phase-of-the-lifecycle, is the new powerful determinant of working hours.

DO MORE HOURS IMPLY OVERWORK?

Our new approach to calculating hours has answered the question “Are family members working more hours than they did in the 1960s?” mainly in the affirmative. Deciding if the hours we have tallied add up to “overwork” is more subjective. Sociologists, economists, and the public have yet to reach a consensus definition of overwork. Hochschild’s (1997) subjects were time bound, which may be a form of overwork. But the time bind has aspects of choice that suggest that it is distinct from overwork. Amerco invited Hochschild to study their plant because they could not figure out on their own why so few workers used the company’s family leave options. She found plenty of Amerco employees who were eager for more work hours even when they lacked pressing financial needs. For example, Deb Escala used overtime at the factory to get her husband Mario to do what she saw as his share of the family work. Mario, for his part, told Hochschild, “We could live on one salary. In fact, I’ve asked Deb to quit. I work 50 percent for need, 25 percent for greed, ..., and 25 percent is getting away from the

¹⁸ Presenting the details of this analysis would take up a lot space so propose to that the details not be included in the article if it is accepted for publication. However, to aid in the review process we append all seven regressions in Table X.

house” (Hochschild 1997, p. 179). To the Escalas and many at Amerco, overtime is more about control (of finances and family relations) than overwork.

Fligstein and Sharone (2002) found that the Amerco pattern is a general one. Three-fourths of California workers in 2001 worked at least some overtime; 43 percent “usually” did.¹⁹ Overtime was skewed toward workers in skilled, highly paid occupations: 80 percent of managers said they usually work overtime and 53 of professionals did.²⁰ Blue-collar workers who put in overtime did so because they needed the money or because they enjoyed the work or their co-workers, but the managers and professionals reported that they did not have enough time to get all their work done unless they worked overtime. Taken together these patterns suggest that overwork may be a side-effect of otherwise desirable jobs. One other observation by Fligstein and Sharone reinforces that interpretation: managers and professionals liked their jobs more than blue-collar workers did.

Overwork may seem like a simple and straightforward judgment, but our attempts to work with it reveal it to be a surprisingly vague concept.

Calculations based on objective conditions like working hours cannot resolve the interpretative issues. Some of the families that are contributing the most hours to the labor force must surely be overworked, but we cannot identify them with the CPS data. And for every one of them, there are untold others that wish they had the lifeline of overtime or a second job to help make ends meet. That was a key part of Schor’s argument, of course; it just got less attention than her title got. Emphasis matters. Schor emphasized the burden of spending many hours on the job. It was her view that American workers sought out more and more working time so they could consume more (viz., her companion book *The Overspent American*).

¹⁹ The response categories were “usually,” “sometimes,” and “never.”

²⁰ Figures 4 and 5 above showed that college-educated men and women work more hours than high school dropouts do, and that the gap is widening, suggesting that the gap in overtime may be a relatively new phenomenon.

To get additional insight, we turn to some subjective data. In 1998 the General Social Survey (GSS) included a 60-question supplement that helps us focus on what overwork might mean to people. The supplement began with a question about peoples' time preferences. "Which of the things on the following list would you like to spend more time on?" The list was "a paid job," "doing household work," "with family," "with friends," and "doing leisure activities." As we see in Table 1, few 25-54 year-old married people were looking to spend more time at a paid job (8 percent "much more time" and 14 percent "a bit more time") while 41 percent would prefer less working time (15 percent "much less"). Family, friends, and leisure would, by this calculus, get more time if people were somehow freer to choose. These percentages cannot distinguish "overwork" from the right amount, but Americans in 1998 were clearly not desperately seeking more employment.

Table 1 about here

Turning to the way physical demands may be linked to overwork, the survey inquired about how often workers came home "exhausted," did "hard, physical work," and faced "dangerous working conditions." Two-fifths of the married 25-to-54-year-olds were "often" or "always" exhausted. And working more hours significantly increased the chances of being exhausted.²¹ That's a tally for overwork. Men did physical and dangerous work more often than women did. They might get a third mark in their overwork column.

Other evidence in the 1998 GSS supports the interpretation of time at work as "overwork," but it does so less directly. A majority disagreed with both of the following (mildly contradictory) statements: "work is a person's most important activity" and "a job is a means of earning money – no more." If they disagree that work is most important but still put in long hours and come home exhausted, then they may be overworked. But they also disagree that work is merely a means of making money. There is, by

²¹ The logistic regression coefficient for the logarithm of hours worked was .66 (standard error = .31; $p < .05$).

implication, more to it. Also cautioning against a facile labeling are the answers in Table 2. When asked which they would prefer – longer hours for more pay, the same hours for the same pay, or fewer hours for less pay – a majority of our sample of married people chose the status quo. And one-third of husbands opted for more hours and more pay, while women preferred less work time when they did not opt for keeping their current work arrangement.

Table 2 about here

Ultimately we want to know if working more hours makes people unhappy. In the 1970s and 1980s, longer hours actually led to more job satisfaction. By the mid 1980s that started to wane and by the late 1990s there was no relationship between the number of hours in paid work and job satisfaction. We also obtained these results from GSS data. Every GSS has included the question, “On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do – would you say you are very satisfied, moderately satisfied, a little dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?” We scored these responses 1.5, .5, -.5, and -1.5. We converted the hours into categories (1-15, 16-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-54, and 55+) and grouped the years into six time periods (1972-1975, 1976-1980, 1982-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1994, and 1996-2000). We graph the expected means observed for married 25-54 year-olds by hours, period, and gender in Figure 8. The first observation of note is that all of the scores are positive. Workers like their jobs, “on the whole.” Satisfaction increased with time on the job in the first three periods, but not in the last two (the fourth is intermediate). In the 1970s, women were more satisfied with their work than men were, but that difference disappeared over time, too.²²

Figure 8 about here

²² Increases in other factors that influence job satisfaction have offset the declines in the impact of hours and gender. In particular, the gap between the highest and lowest paid workers has become substantially larger (Fligstein 2002).

This review of the subjective data alongside the data we have on working hours does not resolve the overwork controversy. But it does lend more credence to Schor's conclusions than most other scholars have given them.²³

CONCLUSION

The well-known increase in married women's labor force participation has boosted the number of hours the average wife spent in paid work in the last 35 years even though the workweek of employed women did not increase much. Husbands' and wives' combined work hours grew by 12 or 13 hours per week since 1968. Juliet Schor's by-now famous discussion of "overworked" Americans was based on more modest calculations. Her numbers, based on trends in the product hours per week and weeks per year among women and men who had jobs, may not have supported her sweeping conclusions. But our numbers show that there was some basis in experience for thinking that Americans were working more. While some kinds of working Americans have been putting in more hours, the big change is that more middle-aged, married women are working for pay.

Middle-aged, married people have higher incomes, on average, than younger, older, or unmarried people do. And so the greater involvement of these relatively privileged Americans in work-for-pay has contributed to the growing inequalities in family incomes since the mid 1970s. Higher pay per hour and more paid hours for husbands and wives who have college degrees combined to raise the family incomes of two-degree families significantly faster than the incomes of less educated families. In the early 1970s, two-degree families had twice the income of the least-educated couples and their families; two-degree families now have four times as much income as the least educated ones.

The rhetoric of "overwork" can be rather unscientific; we have tried to discipline the discussion with some data on how people feel about work. When asked to think

²³ The 2002 GSS includes a battery of questions developed to tap into issues raised by *The Time Bind*. The data will become available in December 2002 or January 2003.

about how they might otherwise spend their time, most married 25-54 year-olds would opt for less work in order to spend more time with family and friends. But few would opt for less work if it meant less pay (more women than men would choose free time over money). The subjective data accords well with many of Schor's more nuanced points.

Gender and family type differences in labor force participation were important components of American society 30 years ago. They all but disappeared for people of prime working ages – roughly from 25-to-54 years old. In combination with research of others who have documented how the youngest adults and seniors were working less in the 1990s than in the 1960s, our results suggest that “work” is becoming something of a universal life cycle phase, an activity pursued by nearly all Americans between 25 and 54 years old and for far fewer younger or older Americans. Specialization of the old type – men and never-married women working outside the home for pay while married women worked inside the home for no pay – is rare and getting rarer. Education and age now explain more variation in working hours than gender and family type do.

APPENDIX

The time diary method asks people to log a full day's activities for a randomly selected day. Robinson and Godbey compare each respondent's responses to the BLS's standard question about hours worked last week with the working hours she or he recorded in a time diary. They interpret discrepancies as "exaggeration" in the self-report. Not every discrepancy is an exaggeration, though, because the two data types actually refer to different weeks. If a woman worked, say, 60 hours the week before she was interviewed, but then she worked her regular schedule of, say, 7 hours the day she kept her diary, she would show up in the data as discrepant²⁴ even though both accounts were truthful. Now, chance selection should make it just as likely that we would have a complementary case in which the "normal" week occurs the week before the interview and the heavy workload comes up in the week the other respondent keeps her diary. Lucks-of-the-draw like these two examples should cancel out in a study with several thousand respondents. The chart that Robinson and Godbey (1997, Fig. 7) presented invites us to think that the errors did not cancel. They plot the average gap for intervals of hours reported in the question about last week. The average gap rises sharply for men and women. While this pattern is consistent with the inference that people who report working more than 75 hours are exaggerating, it is not definitive because of the difference between compiling a diary on a working day and a day-off.

Even the busiest workers put in most of their working hours Monday through Friday. If a worker with a busier-than-average schedule was selected for a weekday diary, then his or her gap was, in all likelihood, slight.²⁵ If that worker got picked to fill in the diary on the weekend, however, the gap probably turned out quite large. Think

²⁴ Robinson and Godbey convert a day's hours into a week's equivalent by multiplying the day's total by 7.

²⁵ The gap could even be negative if the worker in question concentrated all his or her work into a Monday-Friday schedule. Suppose a man works 50 hours a week, 10 hours a day, Monday through Friday. If he fills out a weekday diary he will log 10 hours at work. Robinson and Godbey would then multiply that by 7 and guess that he worked 70 hours a week – generating a negative gap of 20 hours.

about a man who worked 50 hours per week – but never on weekends. Suppose that he is a perfectly honest respondent and that his randomly selected diary day was a Sunday. In answering the “last week” question he would have reported (accurately) his 50 hours, but logged virtually no work activities in his time diary for the selected Sunday. The gap by Robinson and Godbey’s calculation would have been 50 even though he was perfectly honest in answering the last week question and keeping his diary. The gap is built into the procedure and has nothing to do with the honesty or dishonesty of the respondents.

The foregoing case is not imaginary. In our own analysis of the 1985 time use study, we found almost 200 cases that conformed to the profile of a person who reports more than 35 hours “last week” but less than an hour in a diary recorded on a Saturday or Sunday. We found far fewer cases of this type in diaries filled out on the weekdays. Table A shows how important it is to pay attention to the day of the interview. We follow Robinson and Godbey’s practice and classify peoples’ answers to the “last week” question into the 12 categories they used and restrict attention to employed persons 18-64 years old.²⁶ The first data column shows the average number of hours spent doing the person’s main job recorded in diaries kept on weekdays. The vast majority of 18-64 year olds who said that they did not work last week also recorded no time working on the sampled day.²⁷ Part-time workers – those who worked less than 35 hours last week – logged an average of 4.2 hours. Most full-time workers (68 percent) logged 7 or more hours at their main job; however, 28 percent of these “full-time” workers logged less than an hour doing their main job, suggesting that they had the sampled day off (even though it was a weekday). The diaries kept on weekend days fall into a very different pattern. People recorded only 2.2 hours of work in their diaries, on average, if they were logging a Saturday or Sunday; 65 percent of the full-time workers who kept

²⁶ The data file we obtained from UC DATA did not contain an employment status variable, per se, but there are four questions that identified persons who were unemployed, retired, a student, or a housewife. We restrict our attention to persons who were none of these things. We used the overall weight variable. We got virtually identical results using unweighted data.

²⁷ A few recorded between 15 minutes and three hours but the average for these 773 people was less than five minutes which rounds off to 0.0 hours

weekend diaries recorded less than an hour of work. This is the major source of Robinson and Godbey's gap.

Table A about here

Days off – not exaggeration – yield the different answers for the time diaries and last week question, is how we read the evidence. A detail in the pattern of weekday-weekend differences in the first two data columns of Table A support our inference. So, too, does the very different pattern of diary hours we get when we restrict our attention to workers who recorded an hour or more doing their main job (see the third and fourth data columns in Table A). First, focusing on the first two data columns, note that biggest differences between workdays and weekends are for the people who worked typical full-time schedules – 35 to 50 hours last week. They logged 6 or 7 hours (over 8 if their commute and eating time were counted) on weekdays but only 2 hours on weekends. The 24/7 workers who claimed to have worked 60 or more hours last week logged 7 or 8 hours on weekdays and 4-7 hours on weekend days. Indeed if we calculate the “weekly average” for each last-week category as 5 times that category’s average for weekdays and 2 times its average for weekend days, the gap goes away – in the aggregate.²⁸

The gap also goes away if we exclude people who kept their diary on a day off, whether it falls on a weekday or the weekend. The numbers in the third and fourth data columns show that part-time workers put in about 6 hours on days when they work as much as an hour (5 is more common on weekends); full-time workers put in 7 or 8 hours (6 on weekends); and those who work 60 hours or more put in 9 or 10 hours during the week and 6 to 8 hours on a weekend. If we were to multiply these numbers by 7, as Robinson and Godbey do to obtain their workweek-equivalents, we might think people were more overworked than Schor does. But that is not appropriate, and it is not our point. The appropriate reading of these results is that people work pretty full schedules on the days they work. The difference between the majority of part-time and full-time

²⁸ It will not go away at the individual level because the full-time weekday worker who fills in his diary on the weekend will still have a large discrepancy between his last week and diary hours.

workers is the combination of an hour or two per shift and – much more importantly – the number of days worked per week. There is a minority of workers who put in very heavy schedules of 60 or more hours per week. Even they have days off. And some of them – we cannot say how many given the data at hand – may have cut back in the diary week to compensate for all the hours they worked in the previous week. Some may be exaggerating in answering the last week question, but their diaries indicate pretty clearly that they are working more than other people, especially on weekends.

Robinson and Godbey suggest that part of the gap might be due to a tendency to count work-related activities as “work” when answering the last week question. Full-time workers logged over an hour, on average, of commuting, eating at work, arriving early or leaving late (compare the second and fourth columns of Table A) if they kept a time diary on a workday. On the weekends, much less work-related activity was recorded (compare the third and fifth columns of Table A). Only among the busiest workers – those who worked 55 or more hours last week – did work-related time average over an hour on the weekend.

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


Figure 1
 Labor force participation by parenthood status, gender, and year: Married persons 25-54 years old
 Source: Current Population Surveys (March).
 Note: We have no data for 1972 and 1994.




Figure 2
 Hours at Paid Work by Gender, Year, and Presence or Absence of Children in the Household: (A) Employed Married Persons 25-54 Years Old and (B) All Married Persons 25-54 Years Old
 Note: Gray stripes indicate recessions.




Figure 3
Hours at Paid Work (Husband and Wife Combined) by Year and Presence or Absence of Children in the Household: Married Persons 25-54 Years Old, Living in a Married-Couple Household
Note: Gray stripes indicate recessions.




Figure 4

Wife's Hours at Paid Work by Year, Wife's Education, and Husband's Education: Married Women 25-54 Years Old, Living in Married-Couple Household

Notes: Gray stripes indicate recessions. Data smoothed by polynomial regression (year, year-squared, and year-cubed).




Figure 5
Hours at Paid Work (Husband and Wife Combined) by Year, Wife's Education, and Husband's Education: Married Persons 25-54 Years Old, Living in Married-Couple Household
Notes: Gray stripes indicate recessions. Data smoothed using third-order polynomial regression.




Figure 6
 Family Income (Husband and Wife Combined) from All Sources by Year, Wife's Education, and Husband's Education: Married Persons 25-54 Years Old, Living in Married-Couple Household

Notes: Gray stripes indicate recessions. Incomes adjusted to 2000 dollars using the CPI-URS. Data for small groups smoothed using third-order polynomial regression.




Figure 7
Hours at Work by Year, Gender, and Family Type: Persons 25-54 Years Old




Figure 8
 Job Satisfaction by Hours Worked, Gender, and Year: Persons 25-54 Years Old Who Worked at Least One Hour Last Week

Table 2

Time-Money Trade-off by Gender: Married Persons, 25-54 Years Old, 1997

Partner	Which of the following choices would you prefer?				Total
	Work longer hours & earn more money	Work the same hours & earn the same money	Work fewer hours & earn less money	Can't choose	
Wife	13	58	18	11	100
Husband	31	53	8	8	100

Note: Gender difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table A

Working Hours as Recorded in Time Diary by Answer to "Last Week" Question, Definition of "Work" and Day of the Interview: Persons 18-64 Years Old, 1985

How many hours did you spend working last week?	Definition of "Work"					
	<i>Doing Main Job</i>		<i>Worked at Least One Hour at Main Job</i>		<i>Main Job plus Commuting, Eating at Work, Showed-up Early, etc.</i>	
	Monday- Friday	Saturday- Sunday	Monday- Friday	Saturday- Sunday	Monday- Friday	Saturday- Sunday
0	0.1	0.2	--	--	0.2	0.2
1-19	4.9	2.3	6.1	5.6	5.6	2.6
20-29	3.8	1.5	5.8	5.1	4.5	2.1
30-34	4.4	2.7	6.2	6.2	5.2	3.4
35-39	5.5	1.5	6.8	5.7	6.5	1.8
40-44	6.3	1.7	7.5	5.8	7.6	2.1
45-49	7.2	2.4	8.2	6.3	8.5	2.7
50-54	7.3	2.2	8.1	5.7	8.6	2.6
55-59	7.6	2.9	8.7	6.2	8.8	3.4
60-64	7.1	3.8	9.1	5.9	8.3	5.0
65-74	8.5	5.4	9.9	7.9	9.8	6.4
75+	6.6	7.2	9.2	8.4	7.4	8.6
Total Observations	5.9 (1,932)	2.2 (726)	7.6 (1,500)	6.0 (257)	7.0 (1,932)	2.6 (726)

Source: 1985 Time Use Study (see Robinson and Godby 1997)




Figure n/u

Weekly wages by pay class, gender, and year: Persons 25-54 years old

NOTE: Wages adjusted to 2000 spending power by the CPI-U_RS; wages for salaried employees adjusted to hourly figure by dividing weekly pay by 40.

log: :XFolders :Stata:dumr .log
 log type: text
 opened on: 14-Mar-20 02, 23:11:49

. tab Famhr Period if lfpsamp==1

Sum of
 Husband's
 and Wife's
 Hours

Worked Last Week	1972-1975	1976-1980	1982-1985	1986-1990	1991-1994	1996-2000
	199.5	239.7	223.9	260.7	221.3	275.6
0	157	155	144	139	117	103
2	0	0	0	0	1	0
4	0	0	2	1	0	1
5	0	1	1	1	1	2
6	0	1	1	0	1	2
7	0	2	0	2	0	0
8	1	4	5	4	2	1
9	0	1	0	0	0	0
10	3	5	5	3	2	6
11	0	0	0	1	0	0
12	4	2	6	3	4	0
13	1	0	3	0	0	0
14	0	1	0	1	1	0
15	5	4	3	3	1	5
16	3	5	6	6	4	1
17	0	0	0	1	0	0
18	1	0	3	0	0	1
19	0	0	0	0	1	1
20	7	19	10	13	12	11
21	2	2	0	1	1	0
22	0	0	1	2	1	0
23	0	0	1	2	1	1
24	9	9	9	9	10	8
25	4	10	7	12	6	7
26	1	0	2	2	0	0
27	3	3	1	3	1	4
28	3	3	5	5	2	1
29	1	1	1	0	1	0
30	18	25	20	23	15	10
31	1	3	2	0	0	2
32	15	17	14	11	10	9

33	1	2	0	3	1	0
34	3	2	0	4	3	0
35	28	21	13	11	8	11
36	4	7	13	4	8	7
37	10	15	7	6	4	4
38	7	8	12	10	12	9
39	3	3	3	4	1	1
40	488	525	401	358	249	325
41	1	2	6	4	0	4
42	13	17	14	14	6	19
43	7	11	3	15	5	8
44	25	20	16	15	14	13
45	63	56	31	47	38	57
46	12	10	18	17	9	8
47	5	6	4	6	5	6
48	47	73	51	41	32	36
49	3	6	8	6	6	5
50	113	114	111	89	103	120
51	4	6	3	2	6	6
52	10	11	14	21	19	16
53	8	8	1	5	6	7
54	9	10	7	9	4	5
55	35	58	43	50	36	36
56	28	36	22	26	18	16
57	7	4	10	6	9	3
58	14	13	10	5	12	18
59	3	6	4	4	5	4
60	95	106	111	115	114	140
61	5	2	6	7	9	8
62	6	15	10	9	5	12
63	7	8	4	11	6	12
64	17	20	14	23	23	17
65	34	37	29	39	38	49
66	8	8	10	12	11	15
67	0	6	3	8	6	8
68	3	14	8	17	12	16
69	7	5	5	6	4	7
70	50	61	65	81	51	85
71	3	4	6	6	3	5
72	34	38	27	35	32	42
73	8	6	10	7	11	6
74	10	12	10	10	11	12
75	39	47	42	61	28	49

76	9	23	16	16	25	23
77	15	17	16	20	16	12
78	17	18	28	29	24	22
79	4	8	8	9	5	8
80	181	224	282	332	281	387
81	5	10	8	4	7	9
82	8	13	16	22	22	29
83	10	9	7	13	11	12
84	18	24	12	21	24	25
85	27	41	55	70	45	71
86	5	9	14	20	12	24
87	8	9	8	15	5	12
88	18	31	24	36	39	45
89	10	21	12	16	16	15
90	33	54	61	102	103	134
91	3	4	2	3	7	6
92	9	5	13	17	16	27
93	2	6	6	10	10	14
94	3	4	5	8	5	11
95	14	16	19	48	41	58
96	12	9	11	12	7	16
97	4	3	4	9	8	10
98	2	2	9	13	14	7
99	3	3	4	7	2	6
100	12	34	43	86	89	118
101	2	2	2	5	7	5
102	2	1	3	12	11	10
103	0	2	1	3	4	9
104	4	4	7	9	2	3
105	1	8	14	23	29	32
106	3	4	0	4	4	7
107	0	2	4	3	3	3
108	3	3	4	8	3	19
109	2	0	0	2	1	2
110	6	18	13	33	34	33
111	0	1	1	1	1	3
112	4	6	6	2	5	9
113	1	2	3	1	2	2
114	0	1	1	3	3	2
115	2	4	12	6	11	13
116	0	0	1	0	2	1
117	0	1	3	0	1	2
118	3	0	0	3	2	1

119	0	1	1	1	0	2
120	8	6	9	28	34	23
121	0	0	0	1	2	1
122	0	0	2	1	0	1
123	0	0	1	1	0	0
124	0	1	4	2	1	1
125	0	2	3	3	3	11
126	2	1	2	1	1	0
127	0	0	0	0	1	2
128	0	1	1	0	1	1
129	2	3	6	8	5	12
130	0	3	3	7	10	11
131	0	0	0	1	0	0
132	0	1	1	2	0	1
134	0	0	0	1	1	1
135	0	1	0	3	1	2
136	0	1	0	0	0	0
137	0	0	0	0	0	3
138	0	0	1	1	1	1
139	0	0	0	1	2	2
140	0	2	3	2	4	9
141	0	0	0	2	0	0
143	0	0	0	0	0	1
144	0	0	0	1	1	1
145	0	0	0	1	0	2
146	0	0	0	1	0	0
147	0	0	0	0	0	1
149	0	0	1	0	0	0
150	0	0	1	0	0	2
154	0	0	0	1	1	1
155	0	0	0	0	1	0
159	0	0	2	0	0	0
160	0	1	1	1	3	2
162	0	0	0	1	0	0
164	1	1	0	0	0	0
165	0	1	0	0	0	1
169	0	0	0	0	1	0
173	0	0	0	1	0	0
178	1	3	2	1	2	1
Total	1995	2397	2239	2607	2213	2756

	1972-1975	1976-1980	1982-1985	1986-1990	1991-1994
1420.7					
Total					
815	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0
72	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0
54	0	0	0	0	0
46	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0
15	40.5	0	0	0	0
19	84	0	0	0	0
4	29	0	0	0	0
111	540	375	240	0	0
8	31	93	62	0	0
76	480	544	448	0	0

7	33	66	0	0	0
12	102	68	0	0	0
92	980	735	455	210	0
43	144	252	468	144	0
46	370	555	259	222	0
58	266	304	456	380	380
15	117	117	117	156	39
2346	19520	21000	16040	14320	9960
17	41	82	246	164	0
83	546	714	588	588	252
49	301	473	129	645	215
103	1100	880	704	660	616
292	2835	2520	1395	2115	1710
74	552	460	828	782	414
32	235	282	188	282	235
280	2256	3504	2448	1968	1536
34	147	294	392	294	294
650	5650	5700	5550	4450	5150
27	204	306	153	102	306
91	520	572	728	1092	988
35	424	424	53	265	318
44	486	540	378	486	216
258	1925	3190	2365	2750	1980
146	1568	2016	1232	1456	1008
39	399	228	570	342	513
72	812	754	580	290	696
26	177	354	236	236	295
681	5700	6360	6660	6900	6840
37	305	122	366	427	549
57	372	930	620	558	310
48	441	504	252	693	378
114	1088	1280	896	1472	1472
226	2210	2405	1885	2535	2470
64	528	528	660	792	726
31	0	402	201	536	402
70	204	952	544	1156	816
34	483	345	345	414	276
393	3500	4270	4550	5670	3570
27	213	284	426	426	213
208	2448	2736	1944	2520	2304
48	584	438	730	511	803
65	740	888	740	740	814
266	2925	3525	3150	4575	2100

112	684	1748	1216	1216	1900
96	1155	1309	1232	1540	1232
138	1326	1404	2184	2262	1872
42	316	632	632	711	395
1687	14480	17920	22560	26560	22480
43	405	810	648	324	567
110	656	1066	1312	1804	1804
62	830	747	581	1079	913
124	1512	2016	1008	1764	2016
309	2295	3485	4675	5950	3825
84		774	1204	1720	1032
57		783	696	1305	435
193		2728	2112	3168	3432
90		801	1068	1424	1424
487			5490	9180	9270
25			182	273	637
87			368	1564	1472
48				930	930
36				752	470
196				4560	3895
67				1152	672
38				873	776
47				1274	1372
25				693	198
382				6900	2000
23					
39					
19					
29					
107					
22					
15					
40					
7					
137					
7					
32					
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108					
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8					
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1					
1					
10					
14207	55.3349	57.15165	60.54321	68.7102	65.62528

0	0
0	0
0	665
0	1548
0	1702
0	2204
0	585
2704	93840
164	697
798	3486
344	2107
572	4532
2565	13140
368	3404
282	1504
1728	13440
245	1666
6000	32500
306	1377
832	4732
371	1855
270	2376
1980	14190
896	8176
171	2223
1044	4176
236	1534
8400	40860
488	2257
744	3534
756	3024
1088	7296
3185	14690
990	4224
536	2077
1088	4760
483	2346
5950	27510
355	1917
3024	14976
438	3504
888	4810
3675	19950

1748	8512
924	7392
1716	10764
632	3318
30960	134960
729	3483
2378	9020
996	5146
2100	10416
6035	26265
2064	7224
1044	4959
3960	16984
1335	8010
12060	43830
546	2275
2484	8004
1302	4464
1034	3384
5510	18620
1536	2851.2
970	
686	
594	
2360	

63.34679 62.93334

Table X

Regression of Hours Worked at Paid Job on Gender, Household Type, and the Interaction of the Two, by Period

Independent variable	Period						
	1968-1972	1973-1977	1978-1982	1983-1987	1988-1992	1993-1997	1998-2001
<u>OLS estimates</u>							
Gender (male =1)	4.982	2.934	3.055	2.389	2.526	2.613	3.331
Household type							
Primary individual	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -
Single parent	-9.439	-9.430	-8.168	-8.486	-8.421	-7.393	-4.938
Couple, no children	-11.717	-9.630	-7.950	-6.705	-5.359	-3.830	-3.480
Couple, w/ children	-18.631	-16.564	-14.657	-13.116	-11.194	-9.323	-8.742
Extended	-12.160	-11.770	-11.230	-10.813	-9.931	-9.226	-7.493
Interaction with gender							
Primary individual	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -	- 0 -
Single parent	5.496	5.349	2.026	1.523	2.078	1.634	0.445
Couple, no children	14.147	13.083	10.390	9.082	7.743	6.847	6.081
Couple, w/ children	23.700	22.220	18.672	16.052	14.075	13.180	12.472
Extended	13.090	12.027	9.423	7.599	6.284	5.696	4.887
Constant	31.323	30.803	31.806	32.642	33.503	32.609	32.856
R-square	.314	.241	.181	.132	.109	.095	.091
<u>Number of cases</u>	208,240	249,732	313,790	319,136	325,054	307,519	227,858
<u>Standard errors</u>							
Gender (male =1)	0.353	0.281	0.214	0.198	0.185	0.186	0.204
Household type							
Primary individual							
Single parent	0.324	0.271	0.216	0.203	0.192	0.194	0.217
Couple, no children	0.299	0.255	0.209	0.199	0.187	0.190	0.210
Couple, w/ children	0.267	0.223	0.177	0.165	0.156	0.158	0.176
Extended	0.307	0.272	0.227	0.216	0.206	0.205	0.225

Interaction with gender

Primary individual							
Single parent	0.550	0.465	0.366	0.336	0.310	0.307	0.337
Couple, no children	0.418	0.346	0.283	0.272	0.259	0.264	0.293
Couple, w/ children	0.368	0.297	0.233	0.220	0.209	0.213	0.237
Extended	0.434	0.381	0.318	0.305	0.290	0.289	0.315
Constant	0.257	0.212	0.165	0.151	0.140	0.141	0.154
